BjörnLEMKE / Jana OSTERKAMP /SevanPEARSON
“The Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908 as a watershed”
The Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908 has been a watershed for the history of the Habsburg
Empire. The constitutional, political, social, national and economic integration after the
annexation has unfolded many of the problems of the Habsburg Empire not only with regard to
that region, but for Austria-Hungary as a whole.
We will stress these conflicts within Austria-Hungary and take a closer look on attempts for
trialism on three levels: first, a Viennese perspective, second, local media, and third, the Austrian
part of the so called Delegations.
Our story begins with Joseph Maria Baernreither, a well informedViennese politician. The
newspaper „SarajevoerTagblatt“ 1,introduced him in 1909 as the „famous Austrian statesmen,
who had almost become Minister for Bosnia in 1908“; another newspaper named him the „semiofficial Vienna“.In fact, his life is paradigmatic for an imperial biography. He had been member of
the Herrenhaus, the upper house of the Austrian parliament, member of the Austrian delegation,
Minister of Commerce, furthermore, he often counts as one of the counsellors of Franz
Ferdinand.
“Vienna”, a semi-official perspective
Baernreither was indeed a kind of “semi-official” Vienna. He shared important ideas of the
political Viennese mainstream, above all the euphoria after annexing Bosnia. In his diary he
wrote in autumn 1908 “finally there was a sign that the monarchy was vital; the necessity of the
annexation was evident, and [in the Delegations] we all were put into good mood.” 2 Baernreither
did not stand alone with his feeling, that the annexation meant the resurrection of the monarchy
as a great-power. After 1897 the monarchy had been confronted with severe domestic crises.
This had lead, in the eyes of many observers, toa loss of influencecaused by its own internal
frictions. So, annexing the occupied countries seemed to prove the vitality of the monarchy and
to refute thoserumours on its last twitches. One could, again, walk with your head held high.
Besides, there was practically little difference to the relation between centre and periphery
before and after the annexation . 3 Already in the years after occupation, Bosnia and Herzegovina
were administered by the Common Ministry of Finance. It was a consequence of the dualistic
structure of the Monarchy and its political dogma, that Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be
funded with extra money neither from Austria nor from Hungary. Furthermore, Bosnia and
Herzegovina were not represented in the Parliaments.
These were the crucial points, where Baernreither, although in favour of the annexation, was
opposing the policy of the Empire in the Balkans. In his speech at the Austrian delegation in
autumn 1909 he claimed that the monarchy was morally obliged to overcome the economic and
Carl Bethke: staatlich gesponsort, mit Nähe zu Kroaten und zu den österreichischen Christsozialen.
Fragmente eines politischen Tagebuchs, 86, siehe auch S. 90.
3 Regi erungsquellen: HHStA, Vorträge an den Kaiser, etc.
1
2
social backwardness in the region. 4 Most famously, in order to uphold peace and to build up
economic welfare in the region he sought to compromise with the Serbs. Being in contact with
politicians and scientists in Serbia, he vehemently criticised the anti-Serbian movement,
omnipresent in Vienna at that time. Moreover, he asked for great efforts to build up new
railways for economic growth, a question that targeted at the heart of the dualistic structure.
The railways question made the “dualistic” struggling for influence quite visible: Should the rails
be connected first to Hungary or to Austria?
With his speech, Baernreither gained support of many Southern Slavs. I quote a letter by
VratislavJagic, the groundbreakingSlavist:
“I believe that your accurate depiction of current affairs […] gains you broad agreement within
the public opinion of the Southern Slavs. In further respect one might even think of trialism, […].
Today, however, this question isn’t ripe for decision at all.” 5
Baernreither agreed on this point. In 1910, in a memoire for Franz Ferdinand, Baernreither
summarised his regard:
“Trialism is not ripe yet; however, the administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina has to develop
conditions and to evoke dispositions that will serve as a strong fundament for the idea of the
Monarchy as a whole.”6
For Baernreither and Jagic, reform within Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to its social,
economic, agrarian and educational backwardness was coming first. With claiming trialism as a
utopia, they stood aloof from their contemporaries in the Balkans who believed in the possibility
of trialism as a near future.
Press in Bosnia and Herzegovina on trialism
Trialistic options were an important part of the “great expectations” before and after the
annexation in the region. We want to show with an analysis of local newspapers,
thattrialismnevertheless remained vague and was complemented by important alternatives.
Addressing the question of trialism we have to take into account the ethno-religious, social and
political cleavages in the region.
. According to the census of 1910
-
32% of the population 7 were Bosnian Muslims,
43% of the population were Orthodox Serbs,
and23% of the populationwere Catholic Croats.
These ethno-religious dividing lines were reinforced on social grounds: most landowners were
Muslims, whereas most kmets (serves) were Serbs 8.
Ebenda, S. 89.
Baernrei ther, Brief vom 29.6.1909, K. 42, fol. 3.
6 Baernreither, Fragmente eines politischen Tagebuchs, S. 116.
7Statistisches Departement der Landes regierung für Bosnien und die Hercegovina (1912): Die Ergebnisse
der Volkszählung in Bosnien und der Hercegovina vom 10. Oktober 1910. In: Sarajevo, p. XXXIX.
4
5HHStANl.
A third cleavage went along with expectancies of loyalty. From a Viennese perspective, most
Croats were regarded as loyal to Austria-Hungary, whereas the majority of Serbs and Muslims
demanding autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Ottoman Empire remained
somewhat suspicious.
So: Which were actually the local debates in the press regarding the future status of Bosnia and
Herzegovina before and after the annexation? There were four main options: first, up-holding
the status-quo; second, “autonomy”, that is self-administration in the occupied lands, not cutting
the bonds with the Ottoman Empire; third, “autonomy” as self-administration after annexation
to Austria-Hungary, and fourth, trialism. The preferences of the single groups were clearly set.
Before annexation, Serbian newspapers 9likeSrpskariječ, advocated autonomy for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, based on the argument of the right to self-determination 10. They asked for a
constitution, arguing that Bosnia and Herzegovina was after the Young Turkish revolution the
only country in Europe without one11. These newspapers claimed that Serbs – Orthodox and
Muslims–formed the majority of the country and had to decide about its future 12. 13.
Bosnian Muslimson the other handdefended the status quo within the Ottoman Empire.
Newspapers like Bošnjak,Muslimanskasvijest and Musavatopposed the annexation strongly 14.
Whereas the Musavatwas asking for constitutionalism 15, the Muslimanskasvijest argued even
against autonomy, referring to the Berlin Treaty. After the annexation, however, these
newspapers welcomed the new status of their country16. They expected that the political-legal
status of Bosnia and Herzegovina had now been solved and they hopedfor better protection of
Muslims by the Emperor 17. In that context, the newspaper Bošnjak demanded religious and
educative autonomy18.
Mainly Bosnian Croats welcomed the possibility of an annexation as a chance for change and
popularized trialism. 19 Newspapers like HrvatskiDnevnik and OsvitregardedBosnia and
Herzegovina as historically being Croatian and asked for a reunification with the motherland in
Hungary, Croatia, 20 due to national, but also economic reasons 21. Establishing a new Southern
Babuna, Ay din (1996): Die national e Entwicklung der bosnischen Muslime. Mit besonderer
Berücksichtigung der österreichisch-ungarischen Periode. Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, pp. 73 and 78.
9Imamović, Mustafa (2001): Histori jadržaveipravaBosneiHercegovine. Sarajevo: Magistrat, p. 249.
10SrpskaRiječ (1908): Nes hvatanjeprilika. In: SrpskaRiječ IV, 03.01.1908 (2), p. 1.
11SrpskaRiječ (1908): Memorandum. In: SrpskaRiječIV, 28.08. 1908 (188), p. 1 and SrpskaRi ječ (1908):
Zapisci. In: SrpskaRiječIV, 05. 09.1908 (196), p. 1.
12SrpskaRiječ (1908): Bosanskauprava. In: SrpskaRiječIV, 28.01.1908 (21), p. 1.
13Imamović, Mustafa (2001): Histori jadržaveipravaBosneiHercegovine. Sarajev o: Magistrat, p. 250.
14Bošnjak (1908): Ne propustimopriliku! In: BošnjakXVIII, 21.05.1908 (20), p. 1 and MuslimanskaSvijest
(1908): Našimčitaocima. In: MuslimanskaSvijestI, 02.09.1908 (1), p. 1. - Musavat (1908): S kimćemo? In:
MusavatIII, 29.05. 1908 (23), p. 1.
15Musavat (1908): O aneksijiBos neiHercegovine. In: MusavatIII, 04.09.1908 (39), p. 1.
16Bošnjak (1908): Muslimanskinarode! In: BošnjakXVIII, 09. 10.1908 (40), p. 1, MuslimanskaSvijest (1908):
Muslimani! In: Musli manskaSvijestI, 14.10.1908 (7), p. 1 and M uslimanskaSvijest (1908):
Živionašpremilostivi car ikraljFranjo Josip I. In: MuslimanskaSvijestI, 02.12.1908 (14), p. 1.
17Bošnjak (1908): Muslimanskinarode! In: BošnjakXVIII, 09.10.1908 (40), p. 1 and MuslimanskaSvijest
(1908): Muslimani! In: MuslimanskaSvijestI, 14.10.1908 (7), p. 1.
18Bošnjak (1908): Sloga! In: BošnjakXVIII, 16.10.1908 (41), p. 1.
19Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): BosanskiHrvati - Izdajicehrvatstva II. In: Hrvatskidnevni kIII, 27.08.1908 (193),
p. 1.
20Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): Nar. zast. dr. Ivo Elegović o srbijanskojpropagandi. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII,
28.04.1908 (97), p. 1, Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): ZadatakHrvatskeNad. Zajednice. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII,
8
Slavic state comprising Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia and Dalmatia was directed both against
Serbian claims for a Greater Serbia 22and Hungarian expansion plan towards the Balkans 23.
Before annexation, this new Southern Slavic state was designed in the press as an autonomous
kingdom linked to the Monarchy 24,25,26. Later on, the annexation was considered as a first step
leading towards atrialistic state corps27. The HNZ argued:
“Našetežnjeinašizahtjeviostajui u budućeisti, kaoštosubili do danas: da se Bosnai Hercegovina
priključeHrvatskojiDalmaciji, te da postanuovezemljetrećedržavnotijelo u okvirumonarhije”28.
[Our aspirations and our demands will stay the same in the future, as they have been until today:
that Bosnia and Herzegovina be incorporated within Croatia and Dalmatia, and that these lands
become a third state corps within the Monarchy].
However, Hrvatskidnevnikmade other voices heard as well.Nikola Mandić, vice-mayor of
Sarajevo, opposedtrialism and was prioritising the establishment of an assembly for Bosnia and
Herzegovina instead 29.
As the press analysis shows, Bosnian Croats expected the Emperor, who was seen as an
“Austrian”, to accept their demands and to outbalance Hungarians’ interests . Furthermore, they
counted on the Slavs of the Empire to support their position 30.
The Austrian Delegation
In the mirror of the Austrian Delegation, an institution to negotiate common Austrian and
Hungarian topics,however, these trialistic thoughts for Bosnia are reflected as rather naïve ideas.
First, from a more general perspective of dualism, the impression of the emperor being
“Austrian” was misleading, not taking into account the composite structure of Austria-
20.05.1908 (115), p. 1, Osvit (1908): "Osvit" premahrvatskojpolitici. In: OsvitXXV, 09.01.1908 (2), p. 1
andOkružniodbordolnja Tuzla "HrvatskeNarodneZajednice" zaBos nu i Hercegovinu (17.01.1909):
[Letter], ABH NKHZ k.5 V -3/20.
21Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): Velikosrpskapropagandapredaus trijskimdelegacijama. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII,
29.02.1908 (50), p. 1.
22Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): BosanskiHrvati - Izdajicehrv atstv a. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII, 26.08.1908 (192), p.
1 andHrv atskidnevnik (1908): Program i taktika. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII, 13.09.1908 (207), p. 1.
23Osvit (1908): Bosanskopitanje. In: Osvi tXXV, 22.02.1908 (21), p. 2.
24Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): Velikosrpskapropagandapredaus trijskimdelegacijama. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII,
29.02.1908 (50), p. 1.
25
Hrvatskidnevnik
(1908):
KomunikésrednišnjegodboraHrvatskeNarodneZajednice.
In:
HrvatskidnevnikIII, 01.03.1908 (51), p. 1.
26Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): Nar. zast. dr. Ivo Elegović o srbijanskojpropagandi. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII,
28.04.1908 (97), p. 2.
27Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): BosanskiHrvati - Izdajicehrvatstva II. In: Hrvatskidnevni kIII, 27.08.1908 (193),
p. 1.
28Hrvatskidnevnik (1908): Novo doba - novepotrebe. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII, 10.10.1908 (232), p. 1.
29Hrvatskidnevnik
30Hrvatskidnevnik
(1908): "Bosanskirazgovori". In: HrvatskidnevnikIII, 11.09.1908 (205), p. 1.
(1908): Poslijeaneksije. In: HrvatskidnevnikIII, 18. 10.1908 (238), p. 1–2.
Hungary.Also, expecting Hungary to give up voluntarily parts of its country like Croatia was a
way too optimistic.
Second, the debates in the Delegation show that a tri-partition of the Habsburg Monarchy into an
Austrian, a Hungarian and a Southern Slavic part did not gain full support of other Slavic
peoples. Even if KarelKramar, political leader of the Young Czechs, claimed in 1908, that “150
million Slavs have a common feeling and thinking”; 31 his counterpart, the Czech national socialist
Vaclav Klofac put it more frankly, saying:
“If the South will be federalised, our North has to be federalised as well. If the possibility of an
independent state is recognised for the South […] then it is impossible to deny our right.” 32
The rising demands for further federalisation, decentralisation, or autonomy, points towards the
central problem of trialism or any other reform debate that could be raised within the context of
the annexation.
Astrialism was leading to further demands for creating even smaller political entities, it becamea
threat for the monarchy as a whole. Not only the political balance of power would have been at
risk, but also the economic integrated common market of the monarchy would have been
altered. Two states with full internal responsibility for their own economic framework and a
system of foreign economic relations based upon unanimity became more and more
dysfunctional. Finding a compromise with an additional third partner seemed quite unrealistic –
or, as Baernreither and Jagic had put it, a utopia.
Conclusion:
The problem of integrating Bosnia and Herzegovina legally, politically, economically and socially
into the monarchy, be with a trialist option or without, brought the main problems of the
Habsburg Empire back onto the table as problems of the entire Empire, not only with regard to
the one or other region
-
-
first, the dysfunctional parts of Austrian-Hungarian dualism, that was combining a
confederacy on the state level of Austria and Hungary with some degree of
decentralisation in the Austrian crownlands and a rather centralistic system within
Hungary;
second, the unfulfilled expectancies of Slavic nationalities like Czechs, Croats, Ruthenians
and other with regard to national equality;
third, the important question of economic integration.
After all, the Bosnian case reveals the struggle between an imperial political thinking that still
relied on expansive policies and distributions of privileges, and modern categories of
constitutionalisation assuming all individuals, all national and religious groups, all crown lands
should as be treated as equals. Trialistic attempts took a position in between: Even if their
argued with the universal right to self-determination, the result of their attempt, a tri-parted
monarchy would have awarded only three states with the right for autonomous self-rule.
31
32
Protokoll der D elegation vom 28.10.1908, S. 139.
Protokoll der D elegation vom 27.10.1908, S. 31.
Thus, the annexation crisis sharpened and accelerated the nationality question, without solving
it. As KarelKramar put it:
“Austria must have the courage to admit without reserve that the annexation has made things
becoming seriously.” 33
Once more, the Monarchy stood at the watershed, confronted with the alternatives reform vs.
dualism; once more it had chosen the option for continuity and dualism. For the sakeof imperial
integration, that was not enough anymore.
33
Protokoll der D elegation vom 28.10.1908, S. 141.