The Scottish Foreign Policy Context:
Investigating the Possibility of Divergent Scottish Preferences
Brandon Valeriano & Anthony Craig
University of Glasgow
24th June 2014
-------------------
Scottish Global Forum
www.scottishglobalforum.net
Foreign Policy Views and Independence
The vote for Scottish independence is coming. Some premise their intended ‘Yes’ vote
on the belief that Scotland needs to go its own way because Scottish views are distinctive
on some of the big policy issues. Foreign policy is one such issue. This is a particularly
thorny matter because of the constant engagement in combat that the UK government
seems to participate in, a commitment which might be seen to diverge from the wishes
of the Scottish public. Should London direct the foreign policy choices of Scotland if
there is shown to be a wide divergence between the Scottish and the wider UK view in
this area?
This is an open empirical question. No one has really investigated Scottish foreign
policy views and compared these views to those of the wider UK public. Doing so would
represent an important step towards understanding the motivations and preferences of
a potential Scottish foreign policy mind-set. Most analysis treats UK preferences as a
monolithic single unit but to truly understand the Scottish mind-set in relation to the
UK mind-set more broadly, and the potential convergences or divergences in foreign
policy views, we must examine the data that might indicate patterns and trends.
Unfortunately, most national polls fail to indicate Scottish opinion in order to facilitate
the analysis of this question. What is worse, without thinking about the importance of
such questions, most polls do not even identify a general direction of foreign policy
views by regional location, let alone have a statistically valid sample of Scottish views.
To move forward with our question, we have to analyse data on Scottish preferences
and compare them to non-Scottish UK views as a whole. In this report we start that
process by investigating the Scottish context with the few polls we could find that
allowed us to single out Scottish preferences. First we review the Scottish foreign policy
context in general.
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The Scottish Context
A vote for independence would probably result in a significantly different foreign policy
for Scotland. By leaving the UK, Scotland would no longer be part of a state with
permanent membership of the UN Security Council which gives members greater
influence over issues of global security. NATO membership is an open question; many
seem to assume that Scotland would join up with NATO but it is unclear how the
process would work, whether NATO would allow expansion given potential problems
with expansion in post-Soviet areas, or even if Scotland would ultimately want to join.
Military capabilities and power projection would also be greatly diminished. In 2013 the
UK’s military spending was about £37 billioni, one of the largest in the world whereas,
according to the Scottish Government’s White Paper, the “budget for defence and
security” in an independent Scotland would be £2.5 billion.ii And if the Scottish National
Party sticks to its commitment to remove Trident nuclear missiles from the Clyde,
Scotland would no longer be a member of the select ‘nuclear club’.
Scottish independence would also have important tactical military consequences;
Scotland’s long history of being the spear-point of British military power would end
abruptly.
Independence has importance consequences for the future of the UK,
Scotland, and international institutions in general. To understand possible future
directions which might arise from a ‘Yes’ vote, we must try to understand Scottish
foreign policy preferences.
Scottish versus UK Foreign Policy Views
An important question to answer is therefore the extent to which Scottish public
opinion is aligned with wider UK views. Evidence from opinion polls can show whether,
within the UK, Scots have different preferences than non-Scots when it comes to some
key foreign policy issues.
The evidence presented here comes from three different public opinion surveys, chosen
because they contained polls on relevant UK foreign policy issues, and made regional
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distinction possible (a rare condition). The first survey, used for Figure 1, was a 2010
internet panel survey by the British Election Study, conducted by the University of
Essex.iii The raw data contained a variable on the responses to a question regarding
Trident nuclear weapons. This variable was cross-tabulated with a geographical region
variable. Since this variable originally divided the UK into eleven regions, it was
simplified into Scotland and England/Wales. The sample size was 16,816 of which 1,609
were Scottish. Missing data from the Trident poll meant the actual number of data
analysed was 13,356, of which 1,240 were Scottish. The responses to the question, as
percentages and distinguished by region, are illustrated in Figure 1. A chi-square test
was also run to determine whether the difference between regions was statistically
significant. These results are supplemented by the recent British and Scottish Social
Attitudes Survey, used for Figure 2, 3, and 4.iv
The third survey, used for Figure 5, 6, and 7 was a 2012 YouGov.com online survey
conducted on behalf of Chatham House.v The raw data was not available but the results
from the survey distinguished respondents regionally into Scotland, north of England,
Midlands and Wales, rest of the south, and London. The responses to three individual
polls are again presented in graphs here in the form of percentages. The questions were
on the UK’s “Great Power” status, the foreign aid budget, and membership of the
European Union. The weighted sample size of this survey was 2,079, 181 of which were
from Scotland.
In order to test for statistical significance, the percentages were
translated into raw numbers and a chi-square test was then run. Probability values of
<0.05 are considered statistically significant.
Both surveys are limited in value. Neither of these surveys polled a sample from
Northern Ireland. They both also rely on newer internet-based sampling techniques,
not exactly established in the literature as statistically representative but growing in use
and clearly viable given the problems of traditional landline polls. The YouGov.com
sample of 181 Scottish residents is too limited to infer much direct direction given the
small amount of data.
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Nonetheless, these polls are the only evidence we have on the potential directions of
Scottish views in relation to rest of the UK and thus will form the foundation for our
preliminary investigation and review of the current landscape.
The UK as a nuclear power
The first question we examine regards the UK nuclear force which is based in its entirety
on Scotland’s Clyde coast. The SNP continues to insist that a vote for independence
would see Trident nuclear weapons removed from Scottish territory.
The UK
government is understandably unenthusiastic about this prospect and maintains that it
does not have a plan to remove and relocate the weapons. Respondents in the poll were
asked to what extent they agree or disagree on the proposition of scrapping the Trident
nuclear weapons.
Figure 1: Should the Trident nuclear weapons be scrapped? (2010)
35
% RESPONDENTS
30
25
20
15
Scotland
10
England and Wales
5
0
Strongly
Agree
Agree
Neither Disagree
Agree nor
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Don't
Know
RESPONSE
Figure 1 shows that a majority of Scottish respondents favour being rid of Trident.
Combined we find that 53% of Scots polled either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that the
programme should be scrapped. Yet, only 35% of English and Welsh respondents ‘agree’
or ‘strongly agree’ with scrapping Trident. 37% of the English and Welsh sample either
‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ with the same proposition, whereas this figure fell to 27%
among Scottish respondents.
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These results were also found to be statistically significant. The chi-square test returned
a p-value of .000 meaning that the regional differences discovered here are highly
unlikely to have occurred by pure chance.
These results are perhaps unsurprising.
Since the nuclear weapons are based in
Scotland, it is a greater issue in Scottish politics and the Scottish public are more
exposed to the strong anti-nuclear arguments made by Scottish politicians and
campaigners. This dynamic is also understandable when one considers the possibility
of a nuclear accident or the targeting of these weapons as a first strike in the event of
nuclear war.
Complicating matters – and receiving much media attention – is the recent British
Social Attitudesvi, and the separate Scottish Social Attitudesvii surveys, carried out in
2013 and released in June of 2014. These large polls provide for a complex – but also
conditional – engagement with the Trident question given that the surveys asked a
different question of Scottish residents (1,497 polled) and the rest of the UK (987 polled).
Respondents were asked if they are “in favour or against Britain having its own nuclear
weapons?” The results can be seen in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Britain having its own nuclear weapons? (2013)
50
45
% RESPONDENTS
40
35
30
25
20
Scotland
15
England and Wales
10
5
0
In favour
Neither in favour nor
against
Against
RESPONSE
Scottish Social Attitudes (2013), British Social Attitudes (2013)
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When asked if Britain should continue to have nuclear weapons, 43% of those in
England and Wales agree while 37% of those in Scotland agree. Differences are a bit
more in evidence in the negative responses: 36% of the England and Wales sample is
against the UK having a nuclear capability nuclear while 46% of Scots hold this view.
The divergence here is smaller, however, than in Figure 1 which asked whether Trident
should be “scrapped”.
Perhaps this more negatively-phrased question – which
specifically mentions the controversial Trident program – creates a stronger antinuclear weapons response. Nevertheless, both polls are consistent in showing a notable
regional divergence in opinion, with Scots notably more likely to hold anti-nuclear
preferences.
The Scottish Social Attitudes surveys also polled the public on their preferred location
for UK nuclear weapons after a vote for Scottish independence. When asked if UK
nuclear-weapon-carrying submarines should continue to be based in an independent
Scotland, 41% of the sample replied in the affirmative while 37% are in the negative
(Curtice 2014, Scotland, page 8).
Importantly, this question asked if UK nuclear
submarines should be housed in Scotland and we should question whether the framing
of the question affected the outcome given that questions on this topic invariably do so
through mention of the “Trident” program. Figure 3 below shows the results for this
question which have been widely reported in the media recently, this attention due to
the novelty of a poll which seems to show support for the Trident system remaining in
Scotland.
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Figure 3: Scottish views on nuclear weapons remaining in Scotland postindependence (2013)
30
25
% RESPONDENTS
20
15
10
Scotland
5
0
Strongly
agree
Agree
Neither
agree nor
disagree
Disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don't Know
RESPONSE
Scottish Social Attitudes (2013)
The British Social Attitudes survey also put this question to the residents of England
and Wales, albeit with a different phrasing. It asked:
“At the moment, Britain’s nuclear weapon submarines are based in Scotland. Regardless
of whether you support or oppose Britain having nuclear weapons, if Scotland became an
independent country, separate from the rest of the UK, should Britain’s nuclear weapons
remain in Scotland or should they be moved to somewhere else in Britain?”
The results are displayed in Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4: English and Welsh views on nuclear weapons remaining in Scotland
post-independence (2013)
35
% RESPONDENTS
30
25
20
15
10
England and Wales
5
0
Definitely
should
remain in
Scotland
Probably
should
remain in
Scotland
Probably
Definitely
Don't know
should be
should be
moved
moved
somewhere somewhere
else in Britain else in Britain
RESPONSE
British Social Attitudes (2013)
Only 26% think the weapons should remain in Scotland while 63% want them moved.
This division in responses between Scotland and the rest of the UK is odd. Given that
the question was phrased differently for each region, it is unclear if there is an evident
political will being expressed by either side. One conclusion which might be drawn is
that Scots are more likely to want to continue having their nuclear umbrella provided
by the Trident system. However, without explicitly naming the program and its trigger
frame – ‘Trident’ – we have no idea just how clear the answer is at this point. It would
have been beneficial if the Scottish Social Values survey specifically asked about the
Trident program, otherwise, we have no clear position being expressed. Polls that
mention ‘Trident’ consistently show the Scots do not want the program in the country,
while polls which make reference only to British nuclear weapons, show some evidence
that Scots actually want the programs to remain (41-37 percent).
The Social Attitudes surveys are an impressive sample and look at British views, but
since there are no other foreign policy questions asked, we do not know just what
differences there are between those who live in England and Wales, and those who live
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in Scotland. Asking a different question of the Scottish and England/Wales sample
complicates the issue more.
Assuming the Scottish government would stick to its commitment to removing Trident
in the aftermath of a ‘Yes’ vote, we might paradoxically assert that Scottish
independence would actually see the will of the remaining British nations being met –
at least on the issue of removing nuclear weapon submarines from Scotland. Clearly
more work needs to be done on this question since there is no clear sentiment
expressed.
The UK as a ‘Great Power’
The next poll we examine (Figure 5, below) asks whether the UK should seek to retain
its major power status “with substantial armed forces and its own seat at the United
Nations Security Council as one of the ‘big five’”, or else give up on that aim and “cut its
defence budget further, in due course give up its seat on the UN Security Council, and
reduce its contribution to maintaining international security”.
This is an important consideration because it suggests a direction for the foreign policy
of the combined UK countries. Divergence here would suggest a general problem with
the UK’s ‘foreign policy unity’. The data is charted on the next page.
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Figure 5: Britain’s “Great Power” Status (2012)
70
% RESPONDENTS
60
50
40
Scotland
North
30
Midlands and Wales
20
Rest of South
10
London
0
UK should remain a
great power
UK should accept it is
no longer a great
power
Don't know
RESPONSE
When the data is analysed, there is in fact a clear difference between the views of
Scottish respondents and those in England and Wales. Compared to other regions, a
substantially smaller proportion of Scots want the UK to hold on to its major power
status, whereas a substantially higher proportion would prefer the UK to play a less
prominent role in international politics. Here we see that 36% of Scots prefer that the
UK abandons its aspirations to be a ‘great power’, as compared with only 24% of people
out-with Scotland. Although 42% of Scots think the UK should seek to remain a great
power, this is much lower than the 57% of the non-Scottish respondents who agreed.
Despite a relatively small sample size, the chi square p-value was .006 which indicates
that these differences are statistically significant.
It is interesting to note that within the English and Welsh regions, the response on this
issue is very uniform, despite varying political allegiances. For instance the north of
England, like Scotland, has much more Labour party support compared to the south of
England which is often Conservative dominated. Yet the north of England, at 23%, was
the region least in favour of the UK giving up on its major global role. The public’s views
on this issue may be determined more by nationhood than political allegiance; the
cynicism towards the UK’s attempts at maintaining its global influence seems to be a
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characteristic more unique to Scotland than elsewhere in the UK. This is perhaps linked
to support for Scottish independence since independence would be expected to bring
about radical changes to the manner of Scotland’s global engagement, change which
would be welcomed by advocates of Scottish independence.
Foreign Aid Spending
The UK also maintains a very large overseas aid and development budget and according
to the OECD, in 2012 this was the second highest in the world in absolute terms, at
$13.66 billion.viii One of the polls in the survey asked what the priority for this overseas
aid spending should be. Figure 6 (below) shows the regional responses.
Figure 6: Foreign Aid Spending (2012)
70
% RESPONDENTS
60
50
40
Scotland
North
30
Midlands and Wales
20
Rest of South
10
London
0
Reduce poverty and
help people in the
developing world
Promote British
interests abroad
Don't know
RESPONSE
Diverging preferences between Scotland and the rest of the UK are again evident. The
average proportion of respondents in England and Wales who want overseas aid to
promote specifically British interests is 36.5% whereas only 19% of Scottish respondents
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hold this view. Scottish respondents therefore seem more likely to oppose the UK
seeking to further its national interest via its foreign aid spending. Instead, 62% of Scots
want the foreign aid money to be spent on the more altruistic aim of reducing world
poverty, an aspiration which is almost 10% higher than the average response from the
other UK regions. The p-value from the chi square test was .000 showing that the
regional divergence suggested by the graph would be very unlikely to have arisen by
chance alone, and can therefore be considered statistically significant.
In another poll in the same survey, respondents were asked how much the UK
government should spend on overseas aid and Scottish respondents were found to be
in favour of greater spending than in other regions. Very few people from any UK region
supported “a great deal” of money being spent, yet 41% of Scots wanted a “fair amount”
to be spent which contrasts with the 33% of the English and Welsh regional respondents
who expressed this view. 43% of non-Scottish respondents preferred “not very much”
to be spent whereas only 35% of Scots took this view. The UK’s foreign aid spending in
2012 was 0.53% of its Gross National Incomeix, yet according to the Scottish
Government’s White Paper, an independent Scotland would meet the UN target and
spend 0.7% of its GNI on international development.x So, depending on whether this
money is spent altruistically or in the national interest, we might speculate that the
Scottish preferences regarding foreign aid would be better realised under independence.
Relations with the European Union
A divisive issue in contemporary UK politics today is the UK’s relationship with the
European Union (EU). With the rise in popularity of UKIP in England and the promise
of an ‘in-or-out’ referendum by the Conservative Party if they win the next UK General
Election, it is conceivable that the UK may leave the EU in the near future. In Scotland
however, support for UKIP is weak and this may in itself be evidence of a different civic
attitude towards Europe and the issues – such as immigration – associated with it. The
opinion polls can show what Scottish preferences are, compared to elsewhere in the UK.
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Figure 7: Britain’s EU Membership (2012)
60
% RESPONDENTS
50
40
Scotland
North
30
Midlands and Wales
20
Rest of South
London
10
0
Stay in EU
Leave EU
Wouldn't vote
Don't know
RESPONSE
In the question shown above, respondents were asked how they would vote if there was
a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU. Although a very slightly higher
proportion of the Scottish public apparently prefer to exit the EU rather than stay in,
there is a notably difference between Scottish and English/Welsh responses as Figure 4
demonstrates. 40% of Scots want to remain in the EU while on average 30% of the rest
of Britain want to remain. We can thus say that Scots are less Euro-sceptic than the
other UK regions. In some of these regions, over 50% of the respondents prefer to leave
the EU, while the Scottish public are least in favour of leaving, at a rate of 41%. The chi
square p-value of .002 confirms that we are observing statistically significant results.
It appears that leaving the EU is not in the will of the majority of Scots as it is in other
areas of the UK. Although many questions have been raised about an independent
Scotland’s relationship with the EU, the UK’s membership may in fact be under threat
considering the high levels of Euro-scepticism south of the border and the prospect of
an ‘in-or-out’ referendum on the issue.
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What We Have Learned and Future Directions
The polls show that Scotland has clearly different attitudes towards foreign policy than
the rest of the UK. To summarise, Scots are more Europhilic, and they favour a greater
and more altruistic foreign aid budget. Regarding the global status of the UK, the
Scottish public are less interested in the UK maintaining its influence in the world, its
military spending projects, and its nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the changes to
foreign policy that might be expected if Scotland gains independence seem to be aligned
with the wishes of much of the Scottish public, as shown in these polls (the Trident issue
is unclear at this point). It is evident that the Scottish people have their own sense of
identity when it comes to foreign policy priorities, but these views are an expression of
the question asked, when it was asked, and how.
Much more work must be done, however, in order to fully understand the potential
alignments or divergences between Scottish and wider UK views. At this point, it is
unclear if these views are stable through time or whether they would the same under a
more traditional sample method of telephone surveys. Also, the divergence might be a
result of the small sample size of those polled, rather than real differences of opinions,
and so much larger sample sizes would help to ensure the reliability of these results.
We also need more work on critical aspects of combat and foreign policy direction. How
does Scotland feel about humanitarian missions, missions to return stability to former
British colonies, or in defending the territorial integrity of British possessions? How
have these views changed through time? Has the independence debate alone impacted
the views of the Scottish public? In short, rather than reflecting Scottish views, has the
campaign itself changed Scottish views?
Our point here is only to show that there is clearly a divergence between Scottish views
and non-Scottish UK views. In order to accurately make a case as to the necessity of
Scottish autonomy in foreign policy, we need evidence to back these claims up. Such
evidence is not yet forthcoming but it has certainly been hinted at here.
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This issue is important regardless of whether Scotland votes ‘Yes’ this September. After
a ‘No’ vote, further devolution is being promised but how far should empowerment to
Edinburgh extend if it is proven that Scotland’s foreign policy views are very different
to the rest of the UK, especially on issues such as Trident and the EU? We hope to have
highlighted the importance of this issue here. We hope also to return to this question
in the future as more data becomes available.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Dr Brandon Valeriano is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and Global Security at the University of
Glasgow. He is a Fellow of the Scottish Global Forum
www.brandonvaleriano.com
Mr Anthony Craig has recently completed an M.A Honours degree in History and Politics at
the University of Glasgow. He is preparing to take a Masters’ degree in International Relations.
Sources
i
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditures Database. Available
at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.
ii
The Scottish Government, (November 2013), Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent
Scotland, Available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00439021.pdf, p. 237.
iii
The British Election Study at the University of Essex, (2010), Internet Panel Study – All
Waves and Constituency Level Political Variables. Dataset available at: http://bes200910.org/bes-data.php.
iv
British Social Attitudes Survey (2013). Data available at: http://www.britsocat.com/. Scottish
Social Attitudes Survey (2013). Results available at: http://whatscotlandthinks.org/
v
Chatham House-YouGov, (June 2012), The Chatham House-YouGov Survey: British Attitudes
Towards the UK’s International Priorities. Survey results available at:
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_sur
vey_0.pdf.
vi
British Social Attitudes Survey (2013). Data available at: http://www.britsocat.com/
vii
Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2013). Results available at: http://whatscotlandthinks.org/
viii
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Cooperation Directorate, Donor Profile: United Kingdom. Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/unitedkingdom.htm
ix
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Co-operation
Directorate, Donor Profile: United Kingdom. Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/unitedkingdom.htm
x
The Scottish Government, (November 2013), Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent
Scotland. Available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00439021.pdf, p. 230.
END/
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