Globalization
and
Emerging
Technologies:
The
Example
of
Nanotechnology
Ishwar
K.
Puri*
Department
of
Engineering
Science
and
Mechanics,
Virginia
Polytechnic
Institute
and
State
University,
Blacksburg,
VA
24060,
USA
Abstract:
Despite
uncertainties
in
predicting
their
economic
and
societal
impact,
due
to
their
market
potential,
emerging
technologies
offer
emerging
economies
with
the
promise
of
leapfrog
platforms
for
new
industries
and
possibilities
for
more
established
economies
to
maintain
their
global
competitiveness.
For
instance,
nanotechnology
is
viewed
as
an
enabling
and
potentially
disruptive
technology
that
is
both
pan‐industrial
and
convergent,
and
as
one
that
could
provide
major
improvements
such
as
inexpensive
sustainable
energy,
environmental
remediation,
radical
advances
in
medical
diagnosis
and
treatment,
and
more
powerful
IT
capabilities.
Access
to
emerging
technologies
in
the
global
society
depends
upon
the
invested
resources,
the
local
level
of
education
and
workforce
training,
and
the
prevalent
knowledge
infrastructure.
Due
to
political
factors,
the
local
development
of
these
technologies
necessitates
both
nation‐specific,
and
regional
and
global
strategies.
Prediction,
uncertainty
and
potential
Predictions
of
the
impact
of
emerging
technologies,
other
than
for
near
market
applications,
involve
many
uncertainties
(Anton,
Silberglitt
et
al.
2001).
Current
evaluations
of
the
impacts
of
nanotechnology
are
located
on
a
continuum
extending
from
incremental
progress
to
a
radical
disjunction
from
current
science
and
technology.
Some
currently
envisioned
applications
of
nanotechnology
which
are
seen
as
technically
feasible
may
never
be
realized,
while
unanticipated
future
breakthroughs
may
lead
to
the
rapid
development
of
applications
that
are
currently
unforeseen.
In
the
case
of
textiles
it
is
argued
that
major
breakthroughs
will
come
only
in
the
long
run,
beyond
2015‐2020
(Kaounides,
Yu
et
al.
2007).
The
oft‐quoted
figure
of
a
nanotechnology
market
worth
$1
trillion
obscures
discussions
on
the
high
financial
risks
that
investors
face
when
investing
in
an
emerging
technology.
This
distortion
is
rarely
acknowledged
and
the
figure
is
continuously
used
to
justify
and
rationalize
the
financial
potentials
of
nanotechnology
(Ebeling
2008).
So,
why
play
in
such
an
environment?
Government
policies
for
nanotechnology
more
often
resemble
an
embrace
of
imagination
rather
than
systematic
strategic
decision‐making
based
on
the
value
of
their
own
effort,
competitors’
efforts,
and
the
environment
in
which
these
occur.
The
reason
for
such
exuberance
is
simple.
Nanotechnology
is
an
enabling
and
potentially
disruptive
technology
that
is
both
pan‐industrial
and
convergent.
For
instance,
although
the
realization
of
the
full
potential
of
nanomedicine
may
be
years
or
decades
away,
recent
advances
in
nanotechnology‐related
drug
delivery,
diagnosis,
and
drug
*
Address
correspondence
to
[email protected].
I.
K.
Puri:
Globalization
and
Emerging
Technologies
development
are
beginning
to
change
the
landscape
of
medicine,
e.g.,
through
site‐
specific
targeted
drug
delivery
and
personalized
medicine
(Morrow
Jr,
Bawa
et
al.
2007).
Thus,
nanotechnology
is
viewed
as
having
the
potential
to
provide
emerging
economies
with
leapfrog
technology
platforms
through
the
formation
of
new
industries.
Established
economies
likewise
see
nanotechnology
as
an
emerging
economic
wave
that
will
help
retain
their
competitive
advantage
(Romig
Jr,
Baker
et
al.
2007).
Indeed,
the
dynamic
is
such
that
if,
in
2006
the
US
had
suddenly
closed
all
its
university
centers
and
simultaneously
Japan
all
its
governmental
research
institutes
in
nanotechnology,
those
actions
would
altogether
have
affected
only
11%
of
institutions
worldwide.
The
global
nanotechnology‐related
institutional
growth
is
so
strong
that
such
a
closure
would
have
been
compensated
for
by
growth
through
new
nanotechnology
institutions
in
less
than
three
months
(Schummer
2007).
Past
and
present
discussions
of
nuclear
energy,
agricultural
biotechnology
and
embryonic
stem
cells
illustrate
that
nanotechnology
might
raise
societal
concerns
that
arise
not
because
of
the
underlying
science
or
engineering
but
due
to
the
specific
applications
involved
(Mosterín
2002;
Dowling
2004).
For
instance,
while
the
scientific
basis
could
be
similar,
the
medical
uses
of
biotechnology
generally
raise
different
concerns
from
those
that
arise
from
agricultural
applications
(Gaskell
and
Bauer
2001).
Since
the
term
“nanotechnology”
encompasses
a
wider
range
of
basic
science,
methods
and
engineering
approaches
than
does
biotechnology,
it
is
likely
therefore
to
lead
to
a
much
larger
set
of
potential
applications.
Fortunately,
most
issues
arising
from
their
use
and
applications
will
most
likely
not
be
new
or
unique
to
nanotechnologies
(Wood,
Jones
et
al.
2003).
An
example
of
improvements
through
nanotechnology
is
the
promise
of
smaller,
cheaper,
and
more
ubiquitous
sensing
devices
(Roco
and
Bainbridge
2003).
These
devices
could
be
linked
over
networks
to
provide
greater
safety,
security,
and
better
healthcare.
However,
these
could
also
be
used
to
limit
individual
or
group
privacy
through
covert
surveillance,
for
collecting
and
distributing
personal
information
without
consent,
and
for
concentrating
access
to
this
information
to
enable
policing,
profiling,
and
social
sorting
(Bainbridge
2003).
Here,
it
is
important
to
note
that
the
newness
of
a
technology
does
not
itself
offer
evidence
against
its
potential
uses
(Dowling
2004).
In
many
cases,
the
underlying
legal
and
ethical
issues
raised
by
such
developments
are
similar
to
those
our
society
has
already
faced.
For
instance,
a
discussion
of
privacy
issues
involving
nanosensors
is
similar
to
one
about
the
use
of
radio
frequency
identification
(RFID)
technology
to
replace
bar
codes.
Access
and
collaboration:
Who
will
benefit
and
who
might
lose
out
It
has
been
predicted
that
nanotechnology
will
provide
major
improvements,
such
as
inexpensive
sustainable
energy,
environmental
remediation,
radical
advances
in
medical
diagnosis
and
treatment,
and
more
powerful
IT
capabilities
(Roco
and
Bainbridge
2001;
Roco
and
Bainbridge
2003).
Since
these
possibilities
2
I.
K.
Puri:
Globalization
and
Emerging
Technologies
have
profound
implications
for
the
global
society
and
international
economy,
the
important
question
to
ask
is
who
will
benefit
and,
more
crucially,
who
might
lose
out
(Dowling
2004)?
For
instance,
the
appropriate
ownership
of
intellectual
property
is
advantageous
(Thursby
and
Thursby
2003),
but
experience
in
genetics
shows
that
patents
that
are
too
broad
or
do
not
strictly
meet
the
criteria
of
novelty
can
work
against
the
public
good
(Dowling
2004).
One
concern
is
that
broad
patents
could
be
granted
for
emerging
technologies
that
could
stifle
broad
global
innovation
by
hindering
access
to
basic
information.
Global
competition
for
emerging
technologies,
such
as
thorough
stem
cell,
proteomic,
and
nanotechnology
research,
arises
from
the
desire
to
reap
advantages
from
a
science
that
promises
much
in
comparison
to
the
little
it
has
already
delivered.
However,
globalization
and
the
international
movement
of
the
capital,
labor
and
materials
necessary
for
successful
innovation
in
these
fields
makes
this
global
competition
a
complex
political
task
(Salter
2008).
It
is
not
universally
easy
to
pursue
research
and
development
(R&D)
in
emerging
technologies
though
global
collaborations.
While
knowledge
and
products
do
not
know
borders,
the
policies
and
regulatory
frameworks
of
various
countries
related
to
R&D
are
still
fragmented
(Roco
2008).
Moreover,
embargos
and
government
policies
can
hinder
technical
cooperation.
It
has
become
more
difficult
in
the
post
9/11
world,
to
exchange
R&D
work
for
many
emerging
technologies
across
international
boundaries.
Material
transfer
across
international
borders
requires
extensive
and
sometimes
cumbersome
protocols
(Banerjee
2007).
This,
along
with
other
political
factors,
necessitates
both
nation‐specific,
and
regional
and
global
cooperation
strategies
to
invest
and
develop
in
emerging
technologies.
Investment
Nations
that
enjoy
long‐term
economic
competitiveness
have
typically
higher
levels
of
investment
R&D.
They
are
able
to
support
research
institutions
that
produce
world‐class
talent
and
an
industrial
sector
that
maximizes
the
potential
of
these
individuals
to
produce
world‐class
products
and
services
(Nature
Review
Microbiology
Editorial
2008).
Developed
nations
typically
have
the
necessary
infrastructure
for
scientific
innovation
already
in
place
so
that
the
role
of
the
state
is
simply
to
find
methods
to
support
it.
In
contrast,
for
many
developing
nations
the
difference
between
the
ambition
to
become
a
global
player
and
its
realization
is
considerable.
Emerging
economies
are
also
much
less
advantageously
placed
in
their
access
to
the
global
financial
markets
to
enable
early
stage
development
of
nascent
technologies
(Salter
2008).
Large
R&D
budgets
help
but
offer
no
foolproof
guarantee
for
breakthrough
innovation.
For
instance,
Lucent
and
Motorola
did
not
foresee
and
react
effectively
to
a
rival
competitor
Nokia
(Boutellier,
Gassmann
et
al.
2000;
Fallah
and
Lechler
2008).
Nonetheless,
at
a
national
level,
R&D
investment
is
key
for
a
nation’s
effective
global
competitiveness
in
emerging
technologies,
since
immediate
access
to
basic
scientific
advances
also
provides
an
initial
market
advantage.
The
emerging
economies
recognize
this.
In
China,
R&D
spending
rose
to
over
$87
billion
in
2007,
third
worldwide
behind
Japan
($139
billion)
and
the
United
States
($344
billion)
3
I.
K.
Puri:
Globalization
and
Emerging
Technologies
(Organisation
for
Economic
Cooperation
and
Development
2007).
Thus,
some
Asian
nations
have
rapidly
advanced
their
nanotechnology
research
in
recent
years
(Kostoff,
Koytcheff
et
al.
2007).
For
companies,
emerging
technologies
form
the
basis
for
strategic
experiments
that
require
development
of
new
knowledge
and
capabilities
and
respond
to
nonlinear
shifts
in
the
industry
environment
(Katila
2002;
Katila
and
Ahuja
2002;
Govindarajan
and
Trimble
2005).
In
1970
complex
technologies,
such
as
for
aerospace
and
telecommunications
applications,
comprised
43%
of
the
30
most
valuable
world
goods
exports,
but
by
1996
they
represented
84%
of
those
goods
(United
Nations
1975,
1996;
Kash
and
Rycroft
2002).
Innovation
networks
involving
alliances
and
agreements
deal
with
uncertainty,
e.g.,
the
difficulty
of
predicting
exactly
which
combinations
of
knowledge,
skills
and
know‐how
will
be
needed,
faster
and
with
more
flexibility
(Rycroft
and
Kash
2004).
Nonetheless,
while
globalization
is
on
the
rise,
the
national
component
of
the
organization
and
work
of
scientific
teaching
and
research
in
most
cases
remains
relatively
insular
(Shinn
2002).
We
thus
note
the
potential
for
international
innovation
partnerships
to
overcome
various
pitfalls,
e.g.,
delayed
participation,
sticking
with
the
familiar,
reluctance
to
fully
commit,
and
lack
of
persistence
(Day
and
Schoemaker
2000),
if
these
barriers
are
overcome.
Education
and
workforce
training
Qualified
workers
are
required
to
develop
and
handle
new
knowledge,
to
integrate
it,
and
to
promote
innovation.
Creating
a
pipeline
for
such
workers
through
an
education
infrastructure
that
is
also
informed
about
the
synergy
between
the
knowledge
society
(intellectual
drive),
the
industrial
society
(to
assist
productive
means),
and
the
civil
society
(civic
and
personal
well
being)
is
essential.
The
stakeholders
involved
in
the
education
infrastructure
must
have
a
visionary
function,
since
they
are
responsible
for
detecting
early
signs
of
change,
developing
scenarios,
real‐time
technology
assessments,
and
must
be
committed
to
long‐term
planning
keeping
human
development
in
perspective
(Roco
2008).
They
must
be
able
to
facilitate
technological
innovation
and
accommodate
the
trend
toward
greater
complexity.
Indeed,
income
inequality
between
individuals
and
nations
is
attributed
to
the
result
of
differences
in
knowledge
and
skills,
since
increasingly
knowledge
rather
than
ownership
of
capital
generates
new
wealth
(Reich
1991;
Drucker
1993;
Spring
2008).
Thus
students
must
be
educated
with
skills
for
the
global
workplace
so
that
they
can
continually
adapt
frequent
technological
innovations
(World
Bank
2003;
Monahan
2005;
Spring
2008).
A
national
commitment
for
developing
a
knowledge‐based
economy
is
more
easily
maintained
during
a
period
of
economic
growth.
When
economies
enter
a
period
of
reduced
growth,
the
more
difficult
circumstances
invariably
force
governments
to
reassess
their
investments
in
education
and
research,
and
hence
there
is
always
the
risk
that
committed
funds
could
be
diverted
to
other
sectors.
There
is
also
the
potential
for
a
shift
in
funding
policy
to
provide
more
support
to
education
and
research
that
has
an
obvious
economic
impact
at
the
expense
of
fundamental
education
and
curiosity‐driven,
basic
research,
which
is
the
basis
of
emerging
technologies
(Nature
Review
Microbiology
Editorial
2008).
An
informed
4
I.
K.
Puri:
Globalization
and
Emerging
Technologies
and
engaged
stakeholder
constituency
can
be
energized
to
prevent
major
downsides,
since
specialized
knowledge
can
become
a
very
short‐term
resource.
Learning
resources
through
the
education
infrastructure
on
the
other
hand
are
key
to
innovation.
Such
workers
provide
the
economy
with
an
ability
to
adapt
to
changing
economic
and
technological
conditions
and
reinforce
competitive
advantages
(Rycroft
and
Kash
2004).
From
1990
to
2002
the
patents
granted
to
all
U.S.
overseas
subsidiaries
in
Europe
fell
from
about
70%
to
65%,
while
in
China
and
India
this
proportion
grew
from
0.1%
to
2.3%,
reflecting
both
market
interest
and
improvements
in
the
science
and
engineering
(S&E)
infrastructure
in
these
nations
(Hicks
2004).
Thus,
emerging
economies
that
seek
to
foster
innovation
are
better
served
by
investing
in
their
public
S&E
institutions
rather
than
enhancing
foreign
manufacturing
activity
(Hegde
and
Hicks
2008).
There
is
some
evidence
of
the
nascent
formalization
of
globalized
R&D
partnerships
involving
S&E
institutions
and
industry
(Cleave
2008).
Knowledge
infrastructure
Universities
are
critical
sites
for
the
initial
development
of
emerging
technologies
due
to
their
strengths
in
conducting
basic
research.
Worldwide,
universities
accounted
for
70.5%
of
nanotechnology
research
articles
from
1990‐
2004
with
a
corresponding
22.2%
share
for
public
research
institutes.
The
initial
role
of
the
private
sector
was
more
limited.
It
was
the
source
of
7.3%
of
such
articles,
although
its
contribution
was
more
prominent
in
the
United
States
(12.4%)
and
Japan
(12.3%),
indicating
industry
leadership
in
the
area
from
both
nations
(Miyazaki
and
Islam
2007).
Unlike
university
budgets
or
numbers
of
graduates,
the
number
of
articles
produced
by
an
economy
is
a
partial
measure
that
does
not
inflate
the
efforts
of
unproductive
people
and
resources.
Thus,
it
reflects
the
research
base
of
a
national
system
of
innovation
based
on
its
knowledge
infrastructure
(Hegde
and
Hicks
2008).
Technological
innovation
arises
due
to
the
interactions
and
feedback
between
university
researchers,
industrial
product
developers,
intermediary
organizations,
and
end‐users
(Hessels
and
van
Lente
2008).
Increasingly,
innovation
in
our
knowledge‐based
societies
occurs
through
reflexive
communications
between
universities,
industries,
and
governmental
agencies
that
form
a
triple
helix,
and
the
hybrid
organizations
that
emerge
at
their
interfaces.
Although,
like
business,
scientific
specialties
also
operate
differently
in
different
national
institutions,
these
new
mechanisms
integrate
market
pull
and
technology
push.
Regardless
of
national
differences,
basic
research
is
being
increasingly
linked
to
useful
applications
through
a
series
of
intermediate
processes
such
as
government‐initiated
programs
that
facilitate
university–industry
interactions
in
the
triple
helix.
The
configuration
provides
synergistic
puzzles
that
participants,
analysts,
and
policymakers
who
participate
in
the
helix
must
solve
(Etzkowitz
and
Leydesdorff
2000).
Thus,
an
“endless
frontier”
of
basic
research,
one
that
has
only
long‐term
practical
results
expected
from
it,
is
no
longer
funded
as
an
end
in
itself,
5
I.
K.
Puri:
Globalization
and
Emerging
Technologies
but
is
instead
replaced
by
an
“endless
transition”
model
in
which
basic
research
is
linked
to
utilization
through
a
series
of
intermediate
processes
that
are
typically
stimulated
by
the
government
(Callon
1998).
This
confluence
arises
from
the
third
mission
of
universities:
in
addition
to
their
traditional
roles
in
teaching
and
research
they
must
also
make
contributions
to
economic
growth.
The
lack
of
synergy
between
universities,
industry
and
business
is
a
serious
detriment
for
the
development
of
scientific
and
technical
collaborations,
and
thus
innovation
(Archibugi
and
Iammarino
1999).
Such
a
synergy
leads
to
the
formation
of
an
innovating
region
in
which
in
which
firm‐formation
is
tied
to
a
research
base.
In
the
US,
following
early
bets
on
the
futures
of
the
electronics
and
computer
industries,
Stanford
and
MIT
made
similar
investments
in
molecular
biology,
thereby
becoming
loci
for
the
biotechnology
industry
just
a
few
decades
later
(Etzkowitz
and
Klofsten
2005).
Thus,
successful
triple
helix
examples
that
have
been
critical
for
the
market
development
of
emerging
technologies
in
the
United
States
include
Silicon
Valley
in
California
and
the
Boston
Corridor
that
are
adjacent
to
these
universities.
Summary
Despite
uncertainties,
investments
in
emerging
technologies
are
attractive
for
both
developed
and
emerging
economies.
These
technologies
offer
emerging
economies
with
a
promise
of
leapfrog
industries
while
more
established
economies
see
the
potential
to
retain
their
competitive
advantage.
Global
competition
for
emerging
technologies
leads
to
the
question
of
access,
i.e.,
who
benefits
and
who
loses
out?
We
use
examples
related
to
nanotechnology
and
discuss
three
critical
issues
that
are
crucial
for
the
rapid
development
of
emerging
technologies,
i.e.,
R&D
investments,
education
and
workforce
training,
and
the
knowledge
infrastructure.
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