international journal for the study of skepticism
5 (2015) 145-167
brill.com/skep
Realism and Anti-Realism about Science
A Pyrrhonian Stance
Otávio Bueno
University of Miami
[email protected]
Abstract
Pyrrhonists provide a way of investigating the world in which conflicting views about
a given topic are critically compared, assessed, and juxtaposed. Since Pyrrhonists are
ultimately unable to decide between these views, they end up suspending judgment
about the issues under examination. In this paper, I consider the question of whether
Pyrrhonists can be realists or anti-realists about science, focusing, in particular, on
contemporary philosophical discussions about it. Although prima facie the answer
seems to be negative, I argue that if realism and anti-realism are understood as
philosophical stances rather than particular doctrines—that is, if they are conceptualized in terms of a mode of engagement, a style of reasoning, and some propositional
attitudes—the apparent tension between Pyrrhonism, realism, and anti-realism
vanishes. The result is a first step in the direction of bringing Pyrrhonism to bear on
contemporary debates in the philosophy of science.
Keywords
realism – anti-realism – Pyrrhonism – stance – voluntarism
1
Introduction: Pyrrhonism and Pyrrhonists
It is well known that Pyrrhonism is not a philosophical doctrine, and the
Pyrrhonist is not someone who defends philosophical views. Rather, Pyr­
rhonism is a particular strategy of investigation. It can be thought of as an ability to manage opinion and information. In his description of this philosophy in
the influential Outlines of Pyrrhonism (ph), Sextus Empiricus (2000) notes:
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Skepticism [that is, Pyrrhonism] is an ability to set out oppositions among
things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by
which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts,
we come first to suspension of judgment and afterwards to tranquility.
ph I 8; italics added
Sextus here makes it clear that Pyrrhonism is an ability of investigation, and
the exercise of that ability is a way of implementing inquiry. The Pyrrhonists’
strategy of investigation consists primarily in the examination of arguments
for and against a certain conclusion. Since for them these arguments seem to
be equally persuasive, Pyrrhonists are unable to decide between the considerations provided, and as a result suspension of judgment emerges.
It is also well known that Pyrrhonism does not involve beliefs; at least beliefs
about the ultimate nature of things. On some interpretations, Pyrrhonism
allows for beliefs about the appearances, as long as these beliefs are not thought
of as involving dogmatic claims about what is really going on.1 Pyrrhonists tell
us that they are not committed to establish the way things are (they are not
dogmatists). They also tell us that they have no commitment to establish the
way things are not (they are not negative dogmatists). Rather, they continue
the investigation and, being genuinely unable to decide the issues under consideration, end up suspending judgment.
Sextus himself highlights this point. Discussing the different kinds of philosophy, he notes:
[I]n the case of philosophical investigations … some have said that they
have discovered the truth, some have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still investigating. Those who are called Dogmatists
in the proper sense of the word think that they have discovered the
truth—for example, the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics,
and some others. The schools of … Academics have asserted that things
cannot be apprehended. And the Skeptics are still investigating. Hence
the most fundamental kinds of philosophy are reasonably thought to be
three: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptical.
ph I 2–4
A distinctive trait of Pyrrhonism is the fact that it involves continuing
the investigation rather than claiming that the truth has been established
1 For different interpretations of this issue within ancient Pyrrhonism, see the papers collected
in Burnyeat and Frede (1997).
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(as dogmatic philosophers do) or asserting that the truth cannot be settled
(as academic philosophers insist on). Pyrrhonists do not stop their inquiry for
to do so would amount to either a form of dogmatism or simply giving up on
investigating. After all, if Pyrrhonists stopped because they have found the
truth, they would become dogmatists; if they stopped because they concluded
that the truth couldn’t be found, they would become negative dogmatists
(which is what Academic philosophers amount to in Sextus’ classification of
philosophical investigations above). What if they stopped because they got
tired, sick or decided to do something else with their lives? In this case, the
Pyrrhonist would simply abandon investigating—and would also abandon
being a Pyrrhonist. Even a temporary commitment to claiming that things are
really a certain way (or that one cannot ever decide how they are) would take
Pyrrhonists beyond Pyrrhonism. Suspension of judgment is, thus, an integral
part of the Pyrrhonian investigation.
But can the Pyrrhonist simply voluntarily decide to suspend judgment? Can
one voluntarily decide to withhold belief? To the extent that deciding to
believe in something is a puzzling phenomenon, the same seems to go for
deciding not to believe and for deciding neither to believe in something nor
to believe in its negation—hence to suspend belief on the topic under
consideration.
This raises the issue of the connection between voluntarism and Pyrrhonism.
Which degree (if any) of voluntary control over one’s beliefs and opinions is
possible, including the management of opinion involved in suspending judgment? And once voluntarism is on the table, how far does it extend? Does the
Pyrrhonist suspend judgment about everything, or is such suspension somehow restricted? As is well known, Pyrrhonists follow the appearances, and the
issue regarding the suspension of judgment about them doesn’t emerge, since
appearances are not claims about the way things are. Considerations as to
whether to suspend one’s judgment or not arise only once particular claims are
made. These claims may be about a range of issues, including ordinary situations, scientific matters, or philosophical doctrines (among other possibilities). Whenever a claim is made (particularly about the nature of things),
Pyrrhonian investigation strategies apply.
To make the discussion concrete, in this paper I will examine claims
involved in making sense of science, focusing on realist and on anti-realist
views about it. In particular, is there a form of realism underlying Pyrrhonism?
That is, do Pyrrhonists assume that scientific theories properly describe the
world? Or, alternatively, does Pyrrhonism presuppose some form of antirealism? That is, do Pyrrhonists assume that scientific theories need not (or
cannot) be true?
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In this paper, I will address these topics by examining three issues within
Pyrrhonism:
(a) Are Pyrrhonists voluntarists?
(b) Are Pyrrhonists realists (in particular, about science)?
(c) Are Pyrrhonists anti-realists (in particular, about science)?
The question (a), about voluntarism within Pyrrhonism, can be raised, of
course, quite independently of questions (b) and (c), about the Pyrrhonian
attitude toward realism and anti-realism. But I address the voluntarism issue
in the context of the realism debate since this issue will pave the way to the
discussion, central to my argument, of philosophical stances (van Fraassen
2002). As I use this concept, a stance is a practice of investigation composed of
a mode of engagement, a style of reasoning, and some propositional attitudes
(see Rowbottom and Bueno 2011). (I’ll discuss each of these components in
detail below.) And by understanding realism and anti-realism as philosophical
stances, I will argue that there is no incompatibility between Pyrrhonism, realism and anti-realism. Thus, in the end, my answers to the three questions
above are the same: no and yes (as long as we properly understand what is
being asked). But there is no inconsistency in the Pyrrhonian attitude, since
these answers, as so much else within Pyrrhonism, are not committing, given a
proper use of stances.
Before proceeding: a word of warning. In the discussion of Pyrrhonism,
I will sometimes raise issues that ancient Pyrrhonists, such as Sextus, have not
explicitly discussed. For instance, our contemporary conceptions and theories
in science are significantly different from those found in Ancient Greece,
although there are important similarities between them. But the hope is that
what I have to say about Pyrrhonism captures, or at least is compatible with,
the central features of the Pyrrhonian attitude. If not, consider the attitude
I discuss as a form of neo-Pyrrhonism.2
2 The term ‘neo-Pyrrhonism’ has been used, in different ways, by Robert Fogelin (1994) and
Oswaldo Porchat Pereira (2007). Fogelin explores the implications of Pyrrhonism to contemporary debates in epistemology (particularly in accounts of knowledge and justification).
Porchat tries to identify, more broadly, positive contributions of Pyrrhonism beyond the
usual strategies of suspension of judgment. I am examining here the implications of
Pyrrhonism to the framing of the realism/anti-realism debate in general philosophy of science, within broadly Porchatian lines. (I owe to Porchat much of my understanding of
ancient Pyrrhonism.)
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Pyrrhonism and Voluntarism
Voluntarism is the view according to which one can have some level of
voluntary control over one’s beliefs. It is common to distinguish the scope
of voluntarism relative to the kinds of beliefs that are involved.
(i) Basic perceptual beliefs are typically not included in the scope of
voluntarism. We cannot simply decide to believe, given a table and our normal
perceptual modalities, that there is no such table in front of us. We would normally need to have some defeaters in order to rule out the belief that the table
is there (such as that we are hallucinating it). And even then, typically, the
table will still seem to be in front of us if we have the corresponding visual
experience.
(ii) Inferred, theoretical beliefs are the usual candidates for beliefs under
voluntary control. Suppose someone asks you: “How many empty sets exist?”
Perhaps someone (say, a nominalist) answers: sets don’t exist; therefore, there
are no empty sets. But someone else (say, a platonist) may think that the proper
answer may require stronger ontological commitments (which, it is thought,
the question presupposes). A different answer is then provided: sets do exist,
and there is only one empty set (the one referred to in the correct set theory).
Alternatively, someone else (say, a more thoroughgoing platonist) may give yet
another answer: sets exist, and there are several, in fact, infinitely many, empty
sets (one for each rank in type theory; one for each possible set theory etc.).
Which of these answers should you give? After examining the available arguments, it’s by no means obvious that any one of them is ultimately telling—
none of them forces you to believe in a particular answer. It is not as though a
single answer is the only viable alternative and needs to be adopted. As a result,
you may then decide to believe one way or the other.3
Thus, there is an important difference between perceptual and theoretical
beliefs. The former seem involuntary given your visual experiences whereas
the latter seem to be within the scope of our voluntary control. I can’t avoid
forming the belief that I’m typing on a laptop computer at this moment, just as
presumably you can’t avoid forming the belief that you are reading these words.
In contrast, theoretical beliefs provide significantly more room for adjustment
and control.
3 This seems to be a typical situation in philosophical debates. Usually there are several arguments in support of a certain philosophical view, and several arguments against it. But nothing forces one to believe that particular position. As a consequence, one can decide to believe
one way or the other. Needless to say, this is precisely the kind of scenario explored by the
Pyrrhonist.
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There are those who deny that this is the case. Some theoretical beliefs force
themselves upon us just as perceptual beliefs do. When Kurt Gödel writes that
we have “something like a perception of the objects of set theory” (1964: 485),
he is ultimately noting that, on his view, we are able to “perceive” these objects
as having certain properties and lacking others, just as we perceive physical
objects in our environment: this process also involves recognizing the objects
in question as having or lacking certain properties. Gödel emphasizes that the
perception of set-theoretic objects can be “seen from the fact that the axioms
[of set theory] force themselves upon us as being true” (1964: 485). On his view,
we have direct intuition of the truth of basic mathematical axioms, including
those axioms of set theory (and arithmetic). As a result, if the relevant axioms
“force themselves upon us as being true”, it seems that the resulting theoretical
beliefs are not open to our voluntary control, just as perceptual beliefs are not.
Since Gödel’s account highlights a putative similarity between mathematical
intuition and perception, it putatively supports an important analogy between
perceptual and (at least some) theoretical beliefs. One could then use such a
Gödelian account to resist voluntarism about some theoretical beliefs.4
How about Pyrrhonists, do they adopt voluntarism? There is one sense in
which the answer is clearly ‘No’. Suppose that voluntarism is thought of as a
particular philosophical view about the nature of belief formation. The view
insists that, at least for a range of theoretical, inferred beliefs, it is under our
voluntary control whether we are going to form or not a particular belief of this
kind. Understood in this way, this is precisely the sort of view about which
Pyrrhonists suspend judgment. They will point out that there is disagreement
about the truth of voluntarism: some defend it; others reject it. On the one
hand, a voluntarist epistemology is an important feature of Bas van Fraassen’s
empiricist account of science, including, in particular, theoretical beliefs (van
Fraassen 1989; 2002). On the other hand, we saw that even regarding theoretical beliefs a Gödelian view could be invoked to resist voluntarism about them.
Pyrrhonists, however, are unable to decide the issue. There are good arguments
to resist voluntarism about theoretical beliefs, given the similarities between
intuition and perception, but there are also good arguments to adopt voluntarism about such beliefs, given that they generally allow for adjustments
under our control. It is genuinely unclear for Pyrrhonists how to decide
4 For further discussion of Gödel’s view on this issue, see Maddy (1990) and Parsons (2008). Eli
Chudnoff (2013) develops a fascinating account of intuition according to which, similarly to
perceptions, intuitions have presentational phenomenology. On his account, just as in
Gödel’s, it is less clear whether there is room for voluntarism about at least some theoretical
beliefs.
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between the two opposing views. This leads them to suspend judgment about
the issue, and as a result, it cannot be said that they embrace voluntarism.
There is, however, a sense in which a Pyrrhonist seem to be a voluntarist.
Perhaps the best way to understand the Pyrrhonian attitude regarding voluntarism is to consider it as a form of voluntary agnosticism: voluntarism regarding suspension of judgment. It is under one’s voluntary control whether one
suspends judgment or not about a given issue. But this point needs to be
understood carefully. The Pyrrhonist is genuinely unable to decide between
rival accounts of a given issue. In this respect, suspension of judgment simply
emerges from the inability to decide, and is not a voluntary action. However,
Pyrrhonists can voluntarily produce the conditions under which they will
be led to such suspension. In this way, they systematically explore a form of
voluntarism as part of their investigation: they actively look for counterarguments to balance the weight of evidence offered by the particular view under
examination. The active process of search for counterarguments creates a
situation in which Pyrrhonists end up being struck by the equal force of arguments, pro and con, regarding the issue at hand—the opposing evidence that
is generated from this search. The result is then suspension of judgment.5
But it is important to note that voluntary agnosticism is not a philosophical
view. Pyrrhonists would suspend judgment about any such proposal. Rather,
the idea is simply that Pyrrhonists seem to exhibit some voluntary control over
their suspension of judgment. To insist on this point: Pyrrhonists voluntarily
engage with the process of continually examining the evidence for and against
a certain claim until their ability to suspend judgment is manifest—being
unable to decide the issue (given the evidence), they suspend judgment—and
then recurrently repeat this process, again and again. This suspension of judgment may be thought of as a form of voluntarism; it does not lead to the commitment to a particular belief, but rather to the lack of commitment, since no
belief is acquired. What we have here is the suspension of judgment typical
of the agnostic who holds no view about the nature of the matter under
consideration.
However, there may be a problem for Pyrrhonism if it is conceptualized in
terms of voluntary agnosticism. It may be objected that, if voluntary agnosticism is invoked, one does not obtain a serious form of skepticism (Lammenranta
2008: 15). In order to obtain suspension of judgment, Pyrrhonists may need to
choose the evidence selectively. After all, it is only on extremely rare occasions
that the evidence will point equally strongly in opposite directions. If the
5 See Alston (1988) for an examination of different kinds of control of belief (and other propositional attitudes).
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evidence is collected responsibly, and if it is taken properly into account, the
argument goes, suspension of judgment will rarely emerge. As a result,
Pyrrhonists do not seem to be serious inquirers interested in the truth, and
the corresponding form of skepticism, if it involves choosing selectively the
evidence, is not very serious either. As Lammenranta notes:
If the skeptic really finds such equally convincing oppositions everywhere, this requires that she attend only to arguments that are equally
strong on both sides of the issue, and manage to forget arguments that do
not balance in this way. But why should anybody try to do this? If we aim
at truth, we should rather take all arguments on both sides of the issue
into account, and these arguments typically do not balance.
2008: 15
In response, three points should be made. (a) Pyrrhonists do not require
that the evidence point equally strongly in opposite directions. As Lammenranta
presumably agrees, no one should require that either. If the total evidence
available supported P and if it also supported not-P (thus supporting P and not-P),
it would be seriously misleading as evidence. The total evidence is not required
to support, equally well, contradictory (or even contrary) claims. Rather, the
evidence is such that one is unable to decide whether P or not-P is the case.
There may be evidence for P and some other evidence for not-P (not for both!),
and it may be unclear how to rule out the evidence in each case.
It may be argued that if a part of the evidence supports P and some other
part supports not-P, then the evidence as a whole supports P and not-P equally
strongly, since it would give both, say, a probability around 0.5. But in this case
it seems that one would not be in a position of favoring P over not-P (or vice
versa), which is precisely the situation the Pyrrhonian skeptic is in.
Of course, Lammenranta is not suggesting that the evidence is contradictory, but that skeptics selectively choose the evidence, and somehow “manage
to forget arguments that do not balance in this way”. But is this really the case?
(b) I don’t think Pyrrhonists selectively choose the evidence. If they did that,
it would be perfectly appropriate to ignore them. But the situation is very different. Suppose that the available evidence supports one party to a dispute. In
response, Pyrrhonists will question to what extent the evidence in fact provides
the relevant support. However, this is done dialectically. For example, Pyrrhonists
may indicate considerations that seem to question, if not completely undermine,
the alleged evidence. Or they may suggest considerations that seem to favor the
negation of the conclusion supported so far. As a result, they will note, one cannot conclude just yet that the evidence favors one party to the debate.
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But are there always undermining considerations that favor the negation of
the conclusion at issue? Lammenranta’s point is that often there are not.
Pyrrhonists disagree. In fact, their practice of investigation consists in keep
searching for such undermining considerations to counterbalance the dogmatists’ claims. And by uncovering counterarguments, Pyrrhonists can resist the
excesses of those who claim to have found the true nature of things. However,
what would happen if the undermining considerations couldn’t be found, and
Pyrrhonists were unable to provide suitable counterarguments to a given
claim? If after searching further with no success (perhaps the person who
could provide the counterargument hasn’t been born yet?), Pyrrhonists might
eventually convince themselves that there were no such counterarguments. In
that case, they would no longer be Pyrrhonists, and would become dogmatic
philosophers. That’s a possibility that Pyrrhonists don’t rule out, and this fact
underscores the seriousness of the Pyrrhonian investigation.
(c) In light of these considerations, we can see why Pyrrhonism does not
produce an irresponsible form of inquiry. On the contrary, Pyrrhonists are
exceedingly careful and systematic in their adjudication of disputes, and
refrain from making judgments in the absence of suitable evidence. If, in the
end, it turns out that the evidence does not clearly favor either side of the issue
under consideration—the arguments Pyrrhonists consider seem to be equally
persuasive to them—suspension of judgment results.
3
Pyrrhonism and Realism
In the contemporary literature, there are many forms of realism about science.
I will mention three prominent ones:
(i) Standard scientific realism (Putnam 1979; Boyd 1990; Psillos 1999):
According to the scientific realist, scientific theories are true (or approximately
true), and the terms of these theories refer (to relevant objects in the world).
Moreover, scientific theories are empirically successful because they provide
true (or approximately true) accounts of the objects that compose the world.
However, concerns about how to accommodate reference in the context of
scientific change have motivated an alternative realist view that does not rely
on such reference. On this view, rather than securing reference to particular
entities, the realist should be realist about the relevant structures (characterized, in particular, by suitable properties and relations). The resulting view is a
structural form of realism.
(ii) Structural realism (Worrall 1989, Ladyman 1998; French and Ladyman
2003a, 2003b; French 2006): For the structural realist, scientific theories are
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true (or approximately true); however, the truth of these theories does not
depend on the referential success of their terms, but on their ability to capture
the relevant structure of the world. Scientific theories are empirically successful because they provide true (or approximately true) accounts of such
structure.
But how should we make sense of what a structure is if it is not characterized (or constituted) by underlying objects? Is it intelligible for relations to be
primary than objects? Concerns of this kind have motivated an alternative
realist view that incorporates both structural and object-oriented features. The
resulting view is semirealism.
(iii) Semirealism (Chakravartty 2007): According to the semirealist, scientific theories are true (or approximately true), but the terms of these theories
refer to both objects (that is, relevant entities in the world) and properties (in
particular, properties that can be detected). The cluster of these properties and
the particular relations that hold among the objects under consideration yield
the relevant structures. Scientific theories are empirically successful because
they provide true (or approximately true) accounts of the detection properties
in the world, and thus they provide proper accounts of the relevant objects and
the appropriate structures in which they feature.
In a certain respect, semirealism inhabits a common ground between an
entity-based scientific realism and structural realism. On the one hand, the
role of objects in scientific success is emphasized, given that objects need to be
properly identified; on the other hand, the role of structural considerations is
also stressed by noting the importance of detection properties and the relations among the objects in question.
Are Pyrrhonists realists? There is one sense in which the answer is ‘No’.
Scientific realism, structural realism and semirealism are all philosophical
views about the nature of science. They are precisely the sorts of thing about
which Pyrrhonists suspend judgment. There is, of course, disagreement about
which of these views is correct. Structural realists argue that scientific realism
is inadequate given its commitment to the metaphysics of objects. Scientific
realists complain about the intelligibility of the structural realist conception of
a structure without any objects. Semirealists point out the shortcomings in
both views, finding a common ground that acknowledges some role for objects
and structures (determined, in part, as noted, by detection properties).
In turn, scientific realists will complain that the semirealist picture
concedes too much to the structural realist by acknowledging the role of
structures. And structural realists will complain that the semirealist picture
concedes too much to the scientific realist by acknowledging the role
of objects. Pyrrhonists, being unable to decide these issues without begging
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the question against some of these views, suspend judgment. In this sense,
Pyrrhonists are not realists, and they could not be, given the dogmatic characterization of science these views provide (in the sense that they advance
defenses of what scientific knowledge ultimately is).
There is, however, a sense in which Pyrrhonists can be thought of as being
realists. They are, after all, searching for the truth, which is, as should be clear
by now, the central feature shared by all realist accounts of science. In fact,
searching for the truth is perhaps the only feature among realist views about
which there is some agreement.
But in what sense are realists searching for the truth? There are at least two
ways of answering this question.6 One is to understand it as a question about
the proper interpretation of science (the question is, thus, raised at the metalevel): Scientific realists are trying to articulate the correct interpretation of
scientific theories; they are seeking the truth about which epistemology of science is right. In this sense of truth seeking, there seems to be no difference
with antirealism. But there is another way of understanding the question—as
addressing something about the world (the question is, thus, raised at the firstorder level): Realists are searching for truths about how the world is beyond
the appearances, by interpreting scientific theories as they do. In this way
of understanding the question, realism and anti-realism are significantly
different.
One could imagine Pyrrhonists seeking both sorts of truth. They could be
trying to determine what is the proper interpretation of scientific theories, but
they could just as well be searching for truths about the world that go beyond
the appearances. It just happens that Pyrrhonists haven’t found these truths
yet. But that doesn’t prevent them from persisting in trying to find them, and
thus continuing the search. As Sextus tells us:
Men of talent, troubled by the anomaly of things and puzzled as to which
of them they should rather assent to, came to investigate what in things
is true and what false, thinking that by deciding these issues they would
become tranquil.
ph I 12
Here we have a description of the way in which a person of talent eventually
became a Pyrrhonist: it was by searching for such truths, and by systematically
failing to be able to decide them, that this person eventually noted the rashness of deciding the issues under consideration. The difficulty to make a
6 Thanks, here, to Anjan Chakravartty.
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decision emerged from the fact that “to every account an equal account” could
be opposed (ph i 12), and Pyrrhonists were unable to decide between the
conflicting accounts. In fact, it’s precisely the ability to make such oppositions
that Pyrrhonists explore in their inquiry, and the oppositions include, I suggest, different interpretations of scientific theories and conflicting claims
about the way the world is beyond the appearances. In fact, it is this “ability to
set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way
at all” (ph i 8; italics added) that Pyrrhonists explore. Among those items that
are “thought” and opposed “in any way at all”, I suggest, we have the two different ways of interpreting the realist’s search for truth. As a result of their investigation, however, being unable to decide between opposed and equally
persuasive accounts, Pyrrhonists eventually come “to hold no beliefs” (ph i 12).
Hence, since they are still searching for the truth—in either of the two senses
just identified—they can be thought to be realists, without, however, being
committed to realism as a philosophical doctrine.
But how exactly should realism be understood in this case? Clearly, for
Pyrrhonists to be realists, realism cannot be conceived of as a particular doctrine to be believed (as noted, Pyrrhonists will just suspend judgment about
such a view). But realism can be thought of in a different way: it can be conceived of as a practice of investigation (with associated goals, norms, methods,
and techniques); in other words, it can be conceived of in terms of what I will
refer to as a ‘stance’.
In the contemporary philosophical literature about science, Bas van Fraas­
sen has been responsible, perhaps more than anyone else, for rehabilitating
the concept of stance. On his view:
A philosophical position can consist in something other than a belief in
what the world is like. We can, for instance, take the empiricist’s attitude
toward science rather than his or her beliefs about it as the more crucial
characteristic. … A philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, approach, a cluster of such—possibly including
some propositional attitudes such as beliefs as well). Such a stance can of
course be expressed, and may involve or presuppose some beliefs as well,
but cannot be simply equated with having beliefs or making assertions
about what there is.
van Fraassen 2002: 47–48
The central feature of a stance is the attitude one has toward a domain of inquiry
(say, a certain portion of the world) rather than the particular beliefs one may
have about it. To talk about a stance is to emphasize the relevant attitude.
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But this doesn’t yet answer the question of what a stance is. In particular,
what is involved in having a certain attitude toward a given domain? Although
van Fraassen does not elaborate on this point, a number of authors have considered this very issue. In particular, a stance can be thought of as having three
components (see Rowbottom and Bueno 2011):
(a) A stance has a mode of engagement, that is, it involves a particular way of
approaching the world. For example, in considering a certain situation, someone can be more or less active, more or less contemplative; the person can also
be more investigative or more dogmatic in examining the domain.
(b) A stance also has a style of reasoning, that is, it involves certain patterns
of inference that are used to obtain the relevant results. Different patterns of
inference employ different inferential devices: some are logical (different logical principles are at stake, depending on the particular logic that is used); other
devices are of a non-logical sort (for instance, diagrams, templates, models,
simulations; each can be used as inferential devices).
Finally, (c) a stance involves certain propositional attitudes, such as beliefs,
desires, or hopes as well as commitment, detachment, pursuit, or suspension.
These attitudes, however, typically are not identified with a stance, in the sense
that normally they are not invoked to individuate it.
As an illustration, the following example of a stance may be helpful.
Consider constructivism in mathematics. Conceptualized as a stance, constructivism involves the three components just discussed: (a) The mode of
engagement is the critical attitude toward the introduction of mathematical
objects without a corresponding method of construction. The constructivist
insists that, in the absence of a proper method, no such introduction is acceptable. (b) The style of reasoning involves arguing that proofs by reductio ad
absurdum are not legitimate devices for positing mathematical objects. More
generally, non-constructive methods of inference are systematically questioned (for example, cases in which the axiom of choice is used to establish the
existence of certain mathematical objects are typically contested). Only constructive inferences are accepted. Finally, (c) among the propositional attitudes,
due to the mode of engagement and the style of reasoning that are adopted,
the disbelief in certain results from classical mathematics emerges.
In just the same way, it is possible to consider realism about science also as
a particular stance. The three relevant components are satisfied: (a) The mode
of engagement, not surprisingly, is the search for true (or approximately true)
scientific theories. This is a realist mode of approaching the investigation of
the world. (b) The style of reasoning involves accepting inference to the best
explanation as an inferential device within science. Although strictly speaking
not necessary for realism in science, such inference is fairly common among
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realists. Finally, (c) among the propositional attitudes we find, for instance, the
belief in the existence of unobservable features of the world, which is another
common trait among realists. However, as noted, such a belief need not be
used to individuate a stance.
In examining contemporary science, Pyrrhonists could be realists in the
sense of invoking a realist stance. The mode of engagement they invoke is one
in which the search for truth is crucial (in either of the two senses discussed
above). It’s just that, as noted, Pyrrhonists haven’t found it yet. In good
Pyrrhonian style, they keep searching. So this key aspect of realism is really not
in conflict with Pyrrhonism.
Moreover, their style of reasoning may involve the adoption of inference to
the best explanation as a device of hypotheses generation. Once a hypothesis
is identified as the best explanation of a certain phenomenon (given the available alternatives), it is considered as a candidate for the truth. Pyrrhonists will
then critically examine, as good realists do, how strong is the evidence in support of that hypothesis, and whether some alternative hypotheses that haven’t
been considered yet could be better supported. What this means, however, is
that the investigation will then continue, by uncovering alternative possibilities and assessing them. The commitment to establish the truth is not a requirement for a realist view. This would be an unreasonably high demand for a
philosophical proposal at any rate. The central component is the systematic
search for it—and that’s precisely what Pyrrhonists do.
As part of this process of investigation, Pyrrhonists will entertain, as realists
do, a number of propositional attitudes; in particular, the belief that there are
unobservable features of the world. They can do that, and have done so, dialectically. They will consider these unobservable features and contrast rival
accounts of them together with proposals that emphasize entirely different
unobservable traits—not to mention conceptions that deny the existence of
these features altogether. Pyrrhonists will examine critically, as realists do, the
weaknesses and strengths of the various possibilities, and they can do that
non-dogmatically, that is without having to be committed to any particular
proposal. In this way, even this component of realism—the belief in the existence of an unobservable reality beyond the appearances—is something available to Pyrrhonists, as long as it is understood as something they explore
dialectically, as part of their investigation.
The result is a non-dogmatic form of realism, in which at issue is the search
for the truth, rather than its establishment; the search for hypotheses that
better explain the phenomena, rather than the commitment to one unique
explanation; and the search for unobservable traits of the world, rather than
the advocacy of a single one proposal among many possibilities. In this way,
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understood as a stance, realism becomes a form of investigation rather than
a particular philosophical doctrine. It is a kind of investigation in which
the emphasis lies on the search for the goal rather than on its guaranteed
establishment.
As is well known, Pyrrhonists are those who keep searching. And as long as
the mode of engagement involves a critical attitude and a lack of commitment,
they can adopt a realist stance. Understood in this way, realism provides a form
of investigation that is not in conflict with Pyrrhonism.
To sum up: it seems that Pyrrhonists can be realists in the sense that they
explore a mode of engagement and a style of reasoning that are crucial to a
realist stance, precisely because this excludes the sorts of commitments that
one may fear enter into the propositional attitudes that are part of realism and
which would seem on their face to conflict with Pyrrhonism. However, once
one sees how these propositional attitudes function in their dialectical process, even the Pyrrhonist can non-dogmatically embrace them.
Typically most realists adopt the sorts of beliefs referred to in the third
component of a realist stance. In fact, one might think that this is constitutive
of realism. The suggestion here is that, on the stance conception, such commitments need not be constitutive of realism. One can envision other attitudes
towards such propositions being compatible with realism, including the
dialectical attitude characteristic of the Pyrrhonist. The result is that, as long
as realism is conceived of as a stance, there need not be any conflict with
Pyrrhonism.
4
Pyrrhonism and Anti-Realism
As in the case of realism, there are many anti-realist views about science. I will
consider two:
(i) Instrumentalism (Nagel 1950): According to the instrumentalist, scientific
theories are not truth-apt; they are simply tools of inference that are used to
derive predictions about the observable world and, in this way, are helpful to
organize experience. These theories can also be employed to connect empirical laws and observations. As a result, they help to establish the relevance that
some such observations have to one another, while also guiding empirical
research. For the instrumentalist, theories are unable to represent anything
beyond experience.7
7 For a helpful survey of different kinds of instrumentalism, see Psillos (1999: 15–37).
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Concerns have been raised regarding the viability of taking scientific theories in such instrumentalist terms. A significant form of revisionism regarding
scientific practice is required to get such a view off the ground, since it demands
that scientific theories not be taken literally. But there are anti-realist alternatives that manage to take scientific theories literally, such as the following one.
(ii) Constructive empiricism (van Fraassen 1980, 1989, 1991, 2008): For constructive empiricists, scientific theories need not be true to be good, as long as
they are empirically adequate (and informative); that is, roughly, as long as
what they say about the observable world is correct. However, constructive
empiricists recommend agnosticism regarding the unobservable, since according to them it is unclear how one can establish what is really going on beyond
the observable level, given particular instances of underdetermination—the
same phenomena are compatible with conflicting unobservable descriptions.
Consider, for instance, different interpretations of non-relativist quantum
mechanics, such as the Copenhagen interpretation and the many-worlds view:
although they agree with the empirical predictions generated by the theory,
what each of them has to say about the unobservable world is significantly different. In the end, it is unclear how we can be in a position to know what is
really going on beyond the appearances. Moreover, the constructive empiricist
insists, it is possible to make sense of significant features of scientific practice
without the commitment to the existence of unobservable entities, their properties, and relations.
Are Pyrrhonists anti-realists? In one respect, clearly they are not. Anti-realist
views about science are dogmatic proposals about the nature of the scientific
enterprise. Despite the different commitments they recommend vis-à-vis their
realist alternatives, they still advance definite views about the issues under
consideration. Instrumentalism is committed to a particular conception of the
nature of scientific activity, highlighting the central role that predictions play
in this enterprise, and they deny that truth is the proper criterion for evaluation of a scientific theory. Constructive empiricists defend particular claims
about the aim of science (the search for empirically adequate theories), the
nature of the observable (which is restricted only to what can be seen with
the naked eye), and the limitations of our epistemic access to unobservable
features of the world (given particular underdetermination arguments).
Pyrrhonists, not surprisingly, will suspend judgment about all of these claims,
invoking if needed realist arguments to counterbalance the considerations
provided by anti-realists.
In another respect, however, Pyrrhonists can be thought of as being antirealists. Consider anti-realism as a philosophical stance. (a) As its mode of
engagement, we have a critical attitude toward the idea that scientific theories
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need to be true to be good. Pyrrhonists will challenge, along instrumentalist or
constructive empiricist lines, the adequacy of truth as a proper aim for science.
They will note the difficulty of adopting, as an aim for science, something that
one cannot know that has been reached—even if it has indeed been reached
(Laudan 1984). They will raise objections to the introduction of a concept
(of truth) that, when taken as an aim of science and applied to scientific
theories, commits one to all kinds of objects that are invoked in such theories:
from whatever mathematical objects that are referred to, to all sorts of unobservable entities, processes and structures that may be in the world. In order to
prevent such consequences, one needs to develop some nominalization strategy for mathematics (for a critical survey, see Bueno 2013) or some way of
restricting the scope of the truth predicate when applied to scientific theories
(for a defense, see Psillos 1999).
A critical mode of engagement, which is common to a number of antirealist views, is central to anti-realism since this stance is typically adopted as
a reaction to what is perceived as the excesses of realist alternatives. For the
anti-realist, the various commitments that are embraced in realism are often
questionable. (Realist conceptions can, of course, also adopt this critical mode
of engagement, but it is not typical of what makes them realist.) Precisely this
sort of critical engagement is similarly crucial to Pyrrhonism, which also
emerges in response to the excesses of dogmatic philosophies in their attempt
at establishing the truth (or approximate truth) about the relevant domains.
From the perspective of a stance, anti-realism and Pyrrhonism share the same
mode of engagement.
Some anti-realist views, however, go beyond the critical mode of engagement, and attempt to establish the negative claim that nothing in a given
domain (e.g., about unobservable objects) can be known. But to establish a
claim of this sort can be just as difficult as to establish the corresponding positive claim (namely, to the effect that knowledge of unobservable objects is possible). Given the stance understanding of anti-realism, the critical mode of
engagement will keep the anti-realist searching for whether it is indeed impossible to establish the relevant knowledge claim. By being critical about what it
takes to establish such a negative claim, the anti-realist will pursue alternative
arguments and will keep searching for better ways of trying to settle the matter.
The critical mode of engagement is, thus, crucial to the process of making
it clear that more is required to establish claims of this negative sort.8 Not
8 Perhaps Pyrrho himself was a metaphysical anti-realist, according to whom we must suspend
judgment because no beliefs are true or false (for a thorough discussion of Pyrrho, see
Bett 2000).
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surprisingly, the compatibility of anti-realism and Pyrrhonism with regard to
the mode of engagement emerges once again.
(b) As its style of reasoning we have the questioning of inference to the best
explanation as an acceptable inferential device within science or with which
to interpret scientific activity (or both). Anti-realists will question the reliability of using this inferential mechanism given its inability to guarantee the truth
of the relevant conclusion even if one starts from true premises. Moreover, one
could be dealing with a “bad lot” of potential explanations, and thus one would
infer the best explanation from the lot as the true one, despite the fact that the
true explanation is not there (van Fraassen 1989).
Once again, the critical considerations that are raised against inference to
the best explanation should not be understood as conclusively deciding the
issue. Additional arguments in support of the rival perspective can always be
advanced, and the anti-realist will keep investigating the matter.
Finally, (c) among its propositional attitudes we find agnosticism about the
existence of unobservable entities. Given the critical mode of engagement and
the difficulties that were raised to inference to the best explanation, it is
expected that, as part of an anti-realist stance, a non-committal attitude be in
place. But why should agnosticism be embraced rather than the (admittedly
stronger) denial of the existence of unobservable entities? An anti-realist
need not be committed to rejecting the unobservable. After all, to establish its
nonexistence is just as difficult as to establish the opposite. For all we know,
perhaps unobservable entities do exist. But, the anti-realist will argue, nothing
requires such commitment one way or the other. An agnostic attitude then
emerges.
For dialectical purposes, however, when mounting a critique of standard
commitments found in realism, the anti-realist can, and often does, engage
with negative claims to the effect that unobservable entities do not exist. But
this does not amount to any kind of commitment on their part, provided that
the points are only made dialectically.
In this way, understood as a stance, anti-realism becomes a form of investigation rather than a particular philosophical doctrine. As long as the mode of
engagement involves a critical attitude and a lack of commitment, Pyrrhonists
can adopt an anti-realist stance. Moreover, while engaging with anti-realist
issues, Pyrrhonism would explore them dialectically, contrasting them, as
needed, with realist views.
To conclude: it seems that Pyrrhonists can be anti-realists in the sense that
they explore a mode of engagement and a style of reasoning that are crucial to
an anti-realist stance, precisely because this excludes the sorts of commitments that one may fear enter into the propositional attitudes that are part of
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anti-realism (such as the belief that unobservable entities don’t exist) and
which would seem on their face to conflict with Pyrrhonism. However, once
one sees how these propositional attitudes function in their dialectical process, even the Pyrrhonist can non-dogmatically embrace them.
Certain anti-realist beliefs (e.g., about the nonexistence of unobservable
entities) may be thought of as constitutive of anti-realism. The suggestion here
is that, on the stance conception, such beliefs need not be understood in these
terms. One can envision other attitudes towards the relevant propositions
being compatible with anti-realism, including the dialectical attitude and the
agnostic way characteristic of the Pyrrhonist. The result is that, as long as
anti-realism is conceived of as a stance, there need not be any conflict with
Pyrrhonism.
5
Pyrrhonism, Scientific Practice, and the Realism/Anti-Realism
Debate
By conceptualizing realism and anti-realism as stances to be taken rather than
doctrines to be believed, the Pyrrhonist is able to avoid taking a stand on the
debate between realists and anti-realists about science. Conceptualized in
these terms, no dogmatic commitment to particular beliefs is involved (such as
those concerning the existence of unobservable entities): just different attitudes toward scientific research are at issue. As we saw, realists typically take
the scientific enterprise to involve the search for underlying features of the
phenomena, whereas anti-realists tend to question whether the search for any
such traits is in fact required, noting that if the phenomena are saved, in informative ways, this is enough to make sense of scientific research.
These are, of course, different ways of implementing an investigation of the
world. But to make them metaphysically substantive, additional commitments
are needed, e.g., regarding the existence of unobservable objects, the search for
true (or approximately true) scientific theories, the assignment of a central
role to inference to the best explanation as a guide to truth (or approximate
truth) of the relevant theories—or, alternatively, the denial of each of these
proposals. Commitments of this kind are typically invoked in order to argue
that the underlying traits of the phenomena have been identified and possess
the properties that have thereby been uncovered (following a version of realism), or that no such traits can ever be detected or that it’s impossible for one
to be in a position to settle such issues (following some forms of anti-realism).
But these features involve particular interpretations of scientific activity and
its achievements, and thus go beyond the simple specification of the relevant
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domains of inquiry. Scientific practice as such, similarly to mathematical practice, is typically neutral about such metaphysical commitments. To describe
these practices in ways that involve commitments of this sort is to add a particular philosophical gloss to such practices, a gloss that is neither presupposed
nor entailed by them.9
Underlying these considerations is the emphasis on scientific practice,
rather than on decontextualized and abstractly formulated theories and their
justification, as the significant source of understanding of science. Some readings of Thomas Kuhn’s contribution to the philosophical understanding of science emphasize the important shift Kuhn brought about by conceptualizing
scientific research as a particular practice—an activity—rather than the
endorsement of some particular content—the products of that activity (see, in
particular, Kuhn 1970).10 The emphasis on the practice dissolves certain issues
that would otherwise emerge regarding the justification of scientific knowledge as a whole. As Joseph Rouse notes:
Kuhn did not even ask … questions about the wholesale justification of
scientific knowledge, let alone answer them. We can now see better why
these questions did not arise for him. Such questions presuppose a retrospective, epistemological orientation, which stands back from scientific
work to ask whether its achievements really are genuine. Kuhn adopted
the implicit standpoint of scientific practitioners rather than that of philosophical spectators. Their questions concern which projects to pursue and
what concepts, theories, and instruments to use, and these questions can
be formulated only against the background of an extensive practical
understanding of what one is dealing with, how it might function or break
down, and what is at stake in its success or failure. To have doubts about
the whole of one’s grasp of the field is to doubt not just one’s answer, but
one’s ability to ask intelligible questions or try to answer them.
2003: 117
Here the contrast between an epistemologically oriented view of science and a
practice-based conception is highlighted. The advantage of the latter over the
former consists precisely in the ease with which it accommodates scientific
practice. It is a conceptualization that allows one to study the sciences without
9
10
As these considerations should make clear, Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude—as
long as it is understood non-dogmatically—has much in common with a Pyrrhonian
account of the scientific enterprise (see Fine 1984).
This reading is explicitly advanced by Rouse (2003).
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endowing them with a particular epistemological agenda, without adding to
their understanding a layer of theoretical commitments that may be foreign to
them. These are considerations that Pyrrhonists would be sensitive to, given
their systematic distrust in theories and given their emphasis on practices and
abilities.
I am not suggesting, however, that Kuhn was a Pyrrhonist. Clearly, he wasn’t.
He defended definite views about scientific revolutions, their nature, structure, and the role they play in understanding the scientific enterprise. My point
is that considerations emphasizing scientific practice are quite congenial to
the practice-oriented attitude embodied in Pyrrhonism. As noted above,
Pyrrhonism is not a doctrine to be believed, but a practice of investigation to
be implemented, a practice that, ultimately, is not guided by theories. Similarly,
on this reading of Kuhn, the emphasis is on understanding scientific practice
rather than on its wholesale justification. In both cases, the focus is on practice—scientific, philosophical, or ordinary—and how to understand it, rather
than on formulating theories about, and justifications of, these practices and
their conceptualization. This provides an additional connection between
stances, themselves understood as a practice of investigation (in terms of
modes of engagement, styles of reasoning, and propositional attitudes), and a
Pyrrhonian understanding of the sciences.
6Conclusion
If Pyrrhonists can adopt both a realist stance and an anti-realist stance, are
they ultimately incoherent, given the incompatibility between such stances?
This would be the case if stances were thought of as propositional entities that,
in this case, are inconsistent with one another. But stances are not propositions. As we saw, they are certain modes of engagement with the world, which
provide different ways of framing, asking and trying to answer questions
about it. Pyrrhonists can adopt a realist stance—non-dogmatically—to
explore its limits and boundaries, and to criticize anti-realist commitments.
Pyrrhonists can similarly adopt—non-dogmatically—an anti-realist stance to
similar effect.
In the end, realism and anti-realism, understood as stances, provide different ways of understanding scientific activity. They each illuminate certain
features of that activity, and can be used to explore the complexities of scientific practice. Ultimately, what Pyrrhonists gain with their investigation is
understanding. One need not be committed to particular philosophical doctrines (or to the truth) to appreciate how the world could be if the relevant
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doctrines under investigation were true. In exploring realist and anti-realist
stances regarding science, this is the sort of understanding that Pyrrhonists
may acquire. And perhaps even non-Pyrrhonists should join them in searching
for it.11
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11
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop “Ancient Skepticism,
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