Dr. Alexander G. Savelyev
ARMS CONTROL DECISIONMAKING IN THE SOVIET
UNION
Alexander G. Savelyev, Nikolay N. Detinov. Arms Control
Decision-Making in the Soviet Union. Praeger, 1995
Nuclear Arms Race
Cuban Missile Crisis
1962
John F. KENNEDY
Nikita S. KHRUSHCHEV
Leonid I. BREZHNEV
Richard M. NIXON
SALT-1 Negotiations 1969-1972
Moscow, May 26, 1972
The Big Five Members
Ustinov
Smirnov
Gromyko
Grechko
Andropov
MISSILE SCANDAL (mid.-1960s)
Keldysh
Yangel
(SS-17)
Chelomey
(SS-19)
Marshal Nikolay V. OGARKOV
Chief of the General Staff
Admiral Sergey G. GORSHKOV
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy
US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES PRACTICALLY
ALLOWED UNDER SALT-1 AGREEMENT
UNITED STATS
SOVIET UNION
ICBMs
1054
1398
SLBMs
710
950
44
62
Modern SSBNs
Grigori V. Kisunko
THE FIVE
Detinov
Osadchiyev
Central Committee of the
Communist Party
Kozlov
Korniyenko
Military-Industrial Committee
(VPK)
Mityayev
(Ivanov)
Ministry of Defense
KGB
Foreign Ministry
SALT-2 MAIN PROBLEMS
1. Accounting rules for MIRVed and single-warhead ICBMs of the same type
2. Nuclear long-range air-launched cruise missiles
3. Tu-22M Backfire bomber
BREZHNEV
SOVIET DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM IN EARLY-1980s
THE BIG FIVE
DoD
VPK
KGB
Central Committee of the SPSU - OUT
FM
Mikhail S. GORBACHEV
The BIG FIVE under GORBACHEV
Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Foreign Ministry
Viktor M. Chebrikov
KGB
Lev N. Zaykov
Communist Party
Sergey L. Sokolov
Ministry of Defense
Yuri D. Maslyukov
VPK
KEY PLAYERS
Sergey F. Akhromeev
Chief of the General Staff
Georgiy M. Korniyenko
First Deputy of the Foreign Minister
MAIN FEATURES OF THE DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM
UNDER GORBACHEV
1. The mechanism became more complicated.
Alongside with the Big and Small Fives a number of interagency groups were organized.
3. Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry established special Departments
dealing with arms control.
2. The role of the Academy of Sciences increased.
A number of its representatives was included into Soviet delegations.
3. More experts took part at different levels of decision-making.
4. Information on nuclear weapons, doctrines and strategy became more available and open.
As the result the influence of independent (or semi-independent) think-tanks on decisionmaking process also increased.
5. Confrontation at upper echelons of power increased.
A number of attempts to by-pass the existing decision-making mechanism took place.
6. Dissatisfaction on the results of arms control increased, in particular, on the INF Treaty.
GORBACHEV PLAN
Complete Nuclear Disarmament by the year 2000
(main provisions)
Overall period of elimination of all nuclear weapons – 15 years (1986-2000)
First stage (1986-1990). Within 5-8 years the US and the USSR reduce their nuclear weapons
capable to reach each other territory to the level of 6000 warheads.
Medium-range systems to be eliminated in European zone.
Britain and France undertake obligations not to increase their nuclear arsenals.
Second stage (1990-1995). United States and the Soviet Union continues reductions,
including the complete elimination of medium-range systems.
After 50% reductions of the US and Soviet nuclear forces all the nuclear states eliminate
tactical nuclear weapons.
Third stage (1995-2000). All the states eliminate the rest of their nuclear weapons.
Main condition for implementation of the Program: The United States and the Soviet Union
agree not to develop, not to test and not to deploy space-strike weapons.
GORBACHEV PLAN
Complete Nuclear Disarmament by the year 2000
The Authors
Sergey F. Akhromeev
Chief of the General Staff
Nikolay F. Chervov
Chief of the Department of Negotiations
and Law, General Staff
FINAL COMPOSITION OF THE BIG FIVE (1990-1991)
Alexander A. Bessmertnykh
Lev N. Zaykov
Vladimir A. Kryutchkov
Dmitri T. Yazov
Oleg D. Baklanov