Grant Reynolds
The Near Success of the White Movement in the Russian Civil War
Historians cannot afford to look at the world in terms of black and white. It robs the past of the detail
needed for proper understanding. In that regard, success and failure cannot be drawn so harshly in the sand as
to prevent us from seeing pyrrhic victories or fruitful defeats. In the long, human history of failed revolutions
and counterrevolutions, the story of the White Movement in Russia’s Civil War is often told as a meritless,
hopeless uprising that was no serious threat to the unstoppable rise of Bolshevism.
After the 1917 October overthrow of Russia’s Provisional Government by the Bolsheviks, party policies
and socialism quickly became the law of the land. While many welcomed the Revolution, some stood up to fight
back. In general, the success of a revolution, or in this case a counterrevolution, is usually a factor of how much
support one call rally and how much damage one can inflict on your foe. While most uprisings fall short in one
or both of these regards, the White Movement showed a good measure of success in both. Around the borders of
the Old Russian Empire, independent armies, peoples, and governments grew in strength and authority,
eventually uniting under the causes of the White Movement. Despite many histories that paint the
counterrevolution as a little more than a directionless revolt, the White Movement was an organized, state-like,
professional, effort with unsung success that nearly ended Bolshevism in its cradle.
The Siberian Army
In the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks climbed to the top of the pack by stepping up on the back of the
Provisional Government, specifically the Social Revolutionaries (SR). Almost overnight the SRs were marginalized
in key cities like Petrograd and Moscow, but in more obscure Eastern Russia, SRs didn’t fade away so easily. In the
eastern city of Tomsk, Social Revolutionary Committees denounced the Bolshevik coup and rejected their new
Red government. Instead of conforming to the Bolshevik’s leadership, they created an all socialist Siberian
Regional Duma, and eventually, a Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia. 1 The Social Revolutionaries
had no intention of bending to a new Red master, especially in a region where they had popular support.
As is often the case in history, it is one thing to gain power and another to keep it. The Social
Revolutionaries knew their actions would mean war and they quickly prepared themselves for it. The SR officer
Arkady Krakovetsky was placed over the military and tasked with raising an army. Recruitment was slow at first,
1
Norman Pereira, White Siberia: The Politics of Civil War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996) 50.
mostly men from other various anti-Bolshevik groups, but once recruitment changed from a volunteer to a
conscription-based system, the ranks swelled to around 184,000 by October 1918. 2 This substantial fighting
force was simply named the Siberian Army to reflect the land its people came from.
The Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia and the Siberian Army underwent a great deal of
structural change in November of 1918 when unity with the Komuch created the Provisional All-Russian
Government and placed the Siberian Army under the control of the Czech Legion. In general though, it is worth
pointing out the White Movement started out as a civilian, not a military affair. Where most uprisings around the
world begin and end with total control of warlords and generals, White forces in Serbia actually started around
somewhat egalitarian lines of bureaucracy and governance.
The Komuch
Komuch is short for the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly. The members of the
Constituent Assembly were a body in Russia that had known a brief moment of political acceptance under the
Provisional Government, but were then soon dispelled by the Bolsheviks. Their democratic ideas had no place
within the new socialist, party state. Like the Social Revolutionaries in Tomsk, SRs and Constitute Assembly
members in eastern cities had enough local support to declare their independence. In June of 1918 after the
Czech Legion drove off the local Red forces in the city of Samara, the Komuch was formed. 3
The Komuch declared its authority to be the highest of any White Movement in Russia. It was a rather
bold claim that wasn’t taken very seriously since nearly all other White groups had much larger military forces.
However, the Komuch acted as if it had the authority it purported. The Assembly issued proclamations, reinstated
freedoms, reestablished free enterprise and private ownership, and stripped away Bolshevik laws in the
territories surrounding Samara. 4 Some of these changes however were met with resistance. Much of the
peasantry who had thrown out the land owners and the wealthy kulaks were aghast to see the Komuch returning
land to these aristocrats.
To keep order and prevent any sort of Green movement, the Komuch formed the People’s Army in the
summer of 1918. Under the commissioned monarchist Kappel, the People’s Army never grew to much more than
2
Pereira, White Siberia, 54.
Ibid 99.
4
Edward Action, ed., Vladimir Cherniaev, ed., and William Rosenberg, ed., Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 191421 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997) 65.
3
3,000 troops and although the Army captures a number of Bolshevik cities, it plays more of a defensive role in
the war. 5 This defensive role should not be underestimated however, for by keeping the region open, the People’s
Army would allow the Eastern Front of the White Armies to push towards Moscow.
With the creation of the Provisional All-Russian Government in November 1918 the Komuch was
absorbed into the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia, as was its People’s Army into the Serbian
Army. 6 The Komuch is noteworthy for helping launch the counterrevolution, but also because it shows the ability
of the White Movement to govern. The Komuch controlled nearly all the Volga Region and the millions of people
that inhabited the critical region. And while there were numerous problems with production and military
recruitment, the Komuch kept society functioning, proving the Whites could run a state. That is a lot more that
can be said for the average warlord whose rebellion takes over a city.
The Czech Legion
The White army with the most military success by far, was not even ethnically Russian, but rather
Czechoslovakian. Russia had been home to populations of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks for centuries, and at the
start of WWI, many of them were all too eager to defend their Serbian brethren from Austria-Hungary. The
Czech Legion was formed in 1914 and quickly became battle hardened on the Eastern Front. 7
After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks were desperate to make peace with Germany. The Czech
Legion was being redeployed by ship to France to fight on the Western Front, but per Germany’s orders, the
Legion’s trains were detoured through Siberia to Vladivostok. The Bolsheviks then capitulated even further to
Germany and ordered the 60,000 man Legion disarmed and interned. 8 In May 1918, after a train of Czech
soldiers crossed paths with recently released Austro-Hungarian Soldiers, a riot broke out resulting in the capture
of the city of Chelyabinsk and the expulsion of all Red forces there in. 9
Word spread through the Legion and with rapid military efficiently the cities up and down the TransSiberian Railway were captured. Once the immediate areas around the railways were secured, the Czech legion
quickly expanded into the Siberian countryside, linking up with other White forces, such as the Komuch and the
5
Action, Russian Revolution 1914-21, 65.
Ibid 96.
7
Ibid 712.
8
Russian
9
Pereira, White Siberia, 60.
6
Siberian Army. 10 They captured Red armories, artillery, and armored trains, and no Bolshevik force in Siberia
was prepared to stop them. By the summer of 1918 the Czech Legion was to be thanked for the total White
dominance of Siberia and the Eastern Front. 11
The Eastern Front of the White Movement would suffer a number of blows, but one of the biggest came
in 1919. By that time WWI had officially come to a close, and the Central Powers had clearly been defeated.
With no war to get back and fight for, the Czech Legion no longer had much of a stake in the Red-White
struggle. What’s more, on October 28, 1918 Czechoslovakia was made its own state out of Austria-Hungarian
territory. 12 With a new homeland and new purpose, the men of the Legion no longer saw the point of fighting in
Russia’s war.
The Czech Legion pulled back to their fortified Trans-Siberian Railways and opened communications
with the Bolsheviks. In order to leave Russia in peace they agreed to hand over a large amount of stolen gold and
to betray the White Movement. 13 The Legion did this in two ways: They tried to start a rebellion in numerous
White cities, but more drastically, the Legion captured the supreme White Movement Commander, Aleksandr
Kolchak, and delivered him to the Bolsheviks. Kolchak was promptly killed and the White Movement suffered
another deadly blow. In the end, the Czech Legion evacuated the last of its troops through Vladivostok by 1920,
eventually making their way to Czechoslovakia. 14
While the fatal flaw of the Czech Legion proved to be their lack of vision or commitment to the White
cause, that doesn’t mean we should discount them as a non-serious threat to the rise of Bolshevism. This was a
fighting force that not only had years of combat experience, but experience working together under the same
command and with the same companions. They were able to work effectively with Russians for a shared goal and
conquer half of Russia. It’s fair to say that had the Czech Legion been more committed to working with the other
White Armies and to overthrowing Bolshevism, there may have never been a USSR.
Northwestern White Army
While some White armies didn’t prove to be as professional as others, some could still come as close to
success as any other. For many, the October Revolution was the final signal to leave Russia entirely, or to at least
lower one’s public status. This was exactly Tsarist General Nikolai Yudenich’s goal as he went into hiding in
10
Ibid.
Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987) 47.
12
Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 67.
13
Ibid 94.
14
Action, Russian Revolution 1914-21, 550.
11
Estonia and Finland in 1917. Yudenich, however, chose to be more proactive while he was away, and by June
1919 he made contact with the All-Russian Government in Omsk. 15 He was promptly given permission to raise a
Northern Army and, more importantly, was given the funds to do so. Traveling around Latvia, Estonia, and
Finland, Yudenich recruited nationalists, freed Russian prisoners, Mensheviks, German supporters, and any other
anti-Bolsheviks he could find. Yudenich’s Army even received foreign support as the British offered money, guns,
and six tanks. 16
In October 1919 the Northwest White Army, as it was named, marched on Petrograd with almost 20,000
men. It was a smaller force, but Yudenich hoped to make up for their size with a rapid, surprise attack. His army
did manage to fight its way to Petrograd rather quickly and promptly besiege it, but the Whites forces failed to
capture a critical railway that served as a lifeline between Moscow and Petrograd. 17 The siege continued for a
number of weeks while the city’s forces remained under-manned, but Trotsky refusing to surrender. To rally the
citizens of Petrograd in taking up arms, Trostky stated, “If the White Guards break through into this enormous
city they will be plunged into a labyrinth of buildings, where every house will face them with an enigma or
deadly danger...” 18 However, such measure were unnecessary since Yudenich’s supplies quickly decreased and
Petrograd’s actually increased via rail.
When Yudenich decided to break the siege, his army is promptly chased out of Russia by the Red Guard.
However, as the Army returned to Estonia in late October 1919, a problem arose. While, the White Movement
didn’t have an official dogma or constitution, many of its followers tend to be Tsarists of the Imperial Empire.
This meant that many of the Whites hope to one day restore the original empire of Russia and end the recent
independence movement of nations like Estonia. It was for this very reason that Finland had given Yudenich no
support during his recruitment efforts. Having grown wary of the White Army’s intentions, once Yudenich’s
troops crossed back into Estonia, the Estonian military disarmed and arrested the entire army. The White soldiers
were eventually forced into exile. 19
The Bolsheviks had moved the capital at the start of the war from Petrograd to Moscow, for a more
central location, but Petrograd was still the heart of Russia. It is quite incredible to think that a nearly undetected
force was able to sneak across the border, into this most emotionally significant area, and almost pull the rug out
15
Pereira, White Siberia, 302.
Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 116.
17
Ibid 196.
18
Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987) 164.
19
Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 200.
16
from under the Bolsheviks. It is hard to say what would have happened, but perhaps capturing Petrograd, or
simply securing the railway, could have won the war for the Whites. The morale of your troops and the
demoralization of your enemy has won and lost countless conflicts throughout history.
The Volunteer Army
After the failed coup and imprisonment of Kornilov, a fellow general of the Imperial Army, Mikhail
Alekseyev, took the few remaining troops of Kornilov’s and retreated south to the Cossack region of Don in
November 1917. Alekseyev was unable to rally immediate support however, since the near independent Cossack
regions weren’t terribly concerned with the Revolution. 20 It became necessary for Alekseyev to form an allvolunteer force to battle the Reds. Slowly a small force of 4,000 men developed, mostly of cadet and tsarist
military personal. But small as it was, it was enough to take the fight back to the Bolsheviks.
It has often been argued that the greatest failing of the White Movement was the lack of a unified voice
or cause for the people to rally behind, leading to lackluster support. However General Anton Denikin of the
Volunteer Army would argue differently. “Officially the aims pursued by the army were published in a
proclamation by the General Staff. These were: to struggle, to fight against anarchy and the Germano-Bolshevist
invasion, and to steer the country to the Constituent Assembly, the army pledging itself implicitly to submit to the
Government legally elected by the former.” 21 This was not a tsarist or Marxist pledge, but a pledge for
democracy and the voice of the Russian people. Not for power or control but, stated clearly, for the people.
History seems to support idea that revolutions based on ideology tend to be more successful.
On November 19, 1917, Kornilov and a number of his followers actually managed to escape their
imprisonment and met the Whites in Don. Kornilov assumed command and had to face the challenge of holding
off repeated Bolshevik advances into Don Territory with a static supply of White troops. 22 With the Don Cossacks
proving unwilling to fight, Kornilov turned his attention to the neighboring Eastern Kuban Cossacks. The entirety
of the White force was told to retreat, abandoning the Don to the Bolsheviks. After a long frozen trek (known as
the Ice March), the Army reached the Kuban region and proceeded to attack the Bolshevik occupiers. 23 Driving
all the way to the capital city of Ekaterinodar, the Whites began to encounter heavy Red resistance, with only
20
Anton Denikin, trans Catherine Zvegintozv, The White Army (United States: Academic International Press, 1973, reprint of
1930 edition) 27.
21
Denikin, The White Army, 34-35.
22
Ibid 40.
23
Ibid 45.
3,000 Kuban Cossack volunteers came to the White’s aid. On April 10, 1918, Kornilov himself was killed by
artillery fire, leaving General Denikin to command the Volunteer Army. 24
Denikin, unable to fend off the Bolsheviks or secure the volunteers he needed pulled the Army north, out
of Kuban Territory. At this point, after the failed rallying of the Kuban and Don Cossacks, one could cynically
think that the White cause was impractical, unwanted, or that of a fringe minority. However this was not the
case. News arrived from the Don Territory of a dramatic change of spirit that had Denikin marching his army
straight back home again.
After the Volunteer Army pulled out of Don, the Bolsheviks flooded into the region and started a regional
“Red Terror”. Firstly, the Red Guard plundered, destroyed, and executed. Then any semblance of Cossack
independence was stripped away as party leadership was established, lands were divided and collectivized,
private property was seized, conspirators were arrested, etc. 25 Shocked by the suicide of Don’s Military
Commander, Alexi Kaledin, and outraged at the Bolshevik rule, the Don Cossacks rebelled in massive numbers in
April 1918. 26
The entire experience converted the Don Cossacks to the White Movement. They shared the same cause
as stated by General Denikin above, “to fight against anarchy and the Germano-Bolshevist invasion”. While it
took living under the effects of Bolshevism to come to that decision, both groups were eventually united by
ideology. To unite culturally/ethnically different groups under a common banner is a strong indication of
successful leadership. And the Don supported the White ideology with a new Cossack Army 52,000 strong and
thousands of recruits for the Volunteer Army. 27
The summer of 1918 was the Volunteer Army’s most successful, transforming them into a force capable
of destroying Bolshevism. With fresh troops and supplies the Army set out on the Second Kuban Campaign.
Much more successful this time (in large thanks to Don Cossack recruits) the Army completely liberated the
territory from Red control. 28 White control of Kuban offered even more recruits and resources, but more
importantly, it offered access to the Black Sea, making it possible to receive greater aid from foreign supporters.
24
Ibid 95.
Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 86.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid 88.
28
Denikin, The White Army, 162.
25
Foreign aid played a critical role throughout the White counterrevolution, just as it is usually required in any
successful rebellion.
Denikin made a very wise move at this point. Although his army was then stronger than ever, instead of
turning it north towards Moscow, he turned it south towards the Caucuses. Unable to be easily reinforced, the
Reds in the Caucuses quickly fell to the Volunteer Army. By dividing his forces, and using a healthy dose of
propaganda, Denikin’s forces neutralized 100,000 Red soldiers, liberated the Northern Caucuses, and swelled the
Army with some 35,000 men. 29
In 1919, from Don, Denikin assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South
Russia. In all, he commanded around 73,000 troops and a small naval force on the Black Sea. 30 However
Denikin’s new title was now under the self-proclaimed Supreme White Military Commander Admiral Alexander
Kolchak. Kolchak’s November 1918 “coup” over the White government in Siberia had given him supreme
authority over all groups that identified with the White Movement. Kolchak would keep Denikin in the South
and would ultimately use the very organized and formidable Volunteer Army in the final move on Moscow.
The amazing turnaround of the Southern White forces is astounding. From 4,000 men in one city, to
73,000 men and all of Southern Russia in only fourteen months is incredible. Denikin’s forces were now a broad
spectrum of soldiers, from Caucasians to cadets, and had to be managed carefully. In a personal letter Denikin
reflected, “If I raise the republican flag, I lose half my volunteers, and if I raise the monarchist flag, I lose the
other half. But we have to save Russia.” 31 Great commanders can find common cause when little exists and by
turning his men into the saviors of Russia, Denikin created a united and committed military.
Supreme Commander Kolchak
One of the greatest defining factors in a revolution’s legitimacy is its leaders. Unwise, unprofessional, and
uncommitted leaders have turned uprisings into riots and militaries into militias. Sadly, for the White movement,
the November 1918 creation of the Provisional All-Russian Government quickly brought political dissidence.
Social Revolutionaries and Constituent Assembly members failed to compromise on most issues. This stalled
political track began to seriously affect the peoples and the war effort of the Eastern Front.
29
Denikin, The White Army, 204-212.
Ibid 214.
31
Action, Russian Revolution 1914-21, 209.
30
In order to end the political stalemate, the SR White leadership in Omsk was arrested by a troop of
British-sponsored, White Cossacks. The remaining government leaders looked to a single strong leader to grant
emergency powers to, and the unanimous decision was Alexander Kolchak. 32 Admiral Kolchak had only arrived
in Russia a few months prior, and arrived in Omsk a few days before the arrests, but his reputation as an
intelligent, strong, Imperial Officer preceded him. Whether begrudgingly or premeditatedly, Kolchak accepted
the nomination to be the Supreme Commander of the Provisional All-Russian Government, in what some would
call an un-planned coup.
In many respects Kolchak’s effective and professional leadership defines the legitimacy of the White
Movement as a whole. In a general proclamation inside White territory Kolchak states, “My chief aims are the
organization of a fighting force, the overthrow of Bolshevism, and the establishment of law and order, so that the
Russian people may be able to choose a form of government in accordance with its desire and to realize the high
ideas of liberty and freedom.” Again, instead of the tsarist/imperialist/monarchical ambitions often associated
with the Whites, we see more general ideals of choice for the Russian people. This was mostly likely said in the
hopes of uniting a diverse population behind the cause of Russian freedom from Bolshevism.
However, in creating a military state prepared enough to face the Reds, Kolchak used the stick just as
much as the carrot. All communists were expelled from White territory or executed. Most, if not all trade unions
were disbanded. Farmland was taken back from the peasantry and returned to the landowners who had lost it
during the Revolution. This often led to deadly confrontations between White troops and farmers. 33 More than a
few civilians met their end under Kolchak’s reign.
By December 1918, Kolchak was secure enough in his position to press his forces forwards again. The
combined force of 110,000 White soldiers directly under Kolchak’s command quickly pressed back the inferior
Red Army. Cities fell rapidly as his Eastern Front pressed all the way to the Volga River by March 1919. 34 At
Samara, the Whites were only a little more than a week’s travel from Moscow. Finally connecting the two fronts,
the Eastern and Southern, was becoming a real possibility. Had this happened, needed troops, supplies, and
information could have easily been exchanged between the White Armies, greatly increasing their odds of
victory.
32
Pereira, White Siberia, 100.
Pereira, White Siberia, 116.
34
Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 135.
33
As would be the case however, Bolshevik commanders refocused their tactics, making Kolchak’s Eastern
Front their number one priority. With a fresh supply of new troops, the Red Army smashed into the White line at
Ufa in 1919, only to see the line crack like an egg shell. 35 While Kolchak had expertly and professionally
organized and deployed his forces, he had simply been too successful too fast. His forces were completely over
extended trying to maintain the vast territory they had recently conquered from the Reds. The front line was
often cut off from supply lines, leaving the men without food, clothing, medicine, and ammunition. Most
devastating was the extremely poor recruitment rate the Whites were having in these new regions, especially
compared to the fresh recruits the Bolsheviks were fielding. 36 Trotsky himself later said, “We owe these victories,
first and foremost, to the soviets of Petrograd and Moscow, in the shape of the proletarians they hurled into battle
on the Eastern Front.” 37
Most inferior rebel armies quickly turn an initial retreat into a total route after the first few defeats, but
the White Army of the Eastern front put up some of its toughest fighting as it the Bolsheviks advanced. The Red
push was halted at the Tobol and the Ishim rivers until October, but without fresh recruits and the abandonment
of the Czech Legion, the Whites simply couldn’t hold out. 38
Kolchak’s reign and the reality of an Eastern White Russia came to a close on November 14, 1919, when
the Red Army captured the White capital of Omsk and some 50,000 White soldiers. 39 Having lost the confidence
of the reaming White Movement, Kolchak resigned his office to General Denikin on the Southern Front and
transferred control of his remaining forces to the Cossack Commander Semyonov. 40 As mentioned above,
Kolchak was eventually betrayed by the Czech Legion. Without central leadership the Eastern Front fell apart,
and while some pockets of resistance in Serbia continued on for nearly a decade, the Red Army reestablished near
total control by 1921.
Southern Front Marches on Moscow
In the beginning of May of 1919, when Kolchak’s Eastern Front had made its greatest gains, Denikin
began his march north to take advantage of the opportunity. With his substantial forces, he was able to split off
Cossack, Caucasian, and Volunteer units in a sweeping line of advance to capture cities and push back Red forces
35
Ibid 137.
Ibid.
37
Leon Trotsky, How the Revolution was Armed: Volume 1
38
Ibid 139.
39
Ibid 149.
40
Ibid.
36
as they marched. Denikin’s forces captured cities all the way up to Saratov on the Volga River, and were even
supported by a flotilla from the Black Sea. 41
While, the Southern Front had advanced even closer to the Moscow than the Eastern Front, here also they
ran into similar problems. While the White Army was gaining plenty of recruits, they were over extended and
couldn’t supply them themselves nearly as well as the Reds could supply their new recruits. The lack of
industrialization and weapon production in the countryside had always been an advantage for the Bolsheviks. 42
Most rebel armies flee completely at a counterattack; good armies at least put up a fight, like Kolchak’s,
professional armies counter counterattacks. This is exactly what Denikin’s forces are able to do. After three weeks
of heavy fighting, the Reds pushed Denikin’s line back some eighty kilometers, but with great officers and Kuban
Calvary, the Bolsheviks were driven out and the line was restored. Later on, the Volunteer Army was able to repel
a massive surprise rear-attack from a Red unit, saving the entire line. Critical supplies on the way to Moscow
were also captured by Don Cossack Calvary, saving many White soldiers, and demoralizing many Red. 43
By mid-October 1919, the three month battle seemed to turn against the Bolsheviks. The Whites had
actually managed to expand their line, capturing more cities, and start to encircle the region around Moscow. 44
Leaders and citizens in Moscow grew worried as talk of evacuation became serious conversation. The critical
mistake Denikin makes in this process however was capturing Kiev and Ukrainian territory as he expands his
battle space. Ukraine, while it was no friend of the Bolsheviks, had its own independence movement with the
February Revolution and many there didn’t wish to see any kind of Russian influence return.
The Ukrainian anarchist Nestor Makhno led his Black Army of tens of thousands of guerilla fighters
against Denikin’s forces. This first attack on September 25, 1919 led to the total route of a White Army
regiment. 45 After a few direct confrontations, the Black Army settled into constant raids of White Army supply
lines. Denikin had to divert thousands of his best troops from the front to fight of the Ukrainian Nationalists.
Thus, with the Whites deprived of needed supplies and troops, the Bolsheviks began to make ground. 46
41
270 white armies
Ibid 272-275
43
Ibid 274-276
44
Ibid 282.
45
Ibid 324.
46
Ibid 328.
42
Over the coming months the Southern Front was pushed back steadily and split in half. Denikin retreated
through Don, but he and 40,000 remaining troops were forced to evacuate to the Crimea. In Crimea, Denikin
gave command up to another officer and the White Army regrouped until 1920. 47 In mid-1920 the last of the
White Forces did make one last attempt to break north out of Crimea, but there efforts were futile. The end of the
White Movement in Russia came in November 14, 1920 as the last White resistance to Bolshevism sailed from
Crimea to Constantinople. 48
Conclusion
Fighting for what one believes in has been, and will always be, a noble cause, but the success of
revolutions can still be measured to some extent. For example, the Republic of West Florida in 1820 lasted for a
total of 90 days. The Anglo-Zanzibar Rebellion of 1896 only lasted 45 minutes. History seems quick to forget the
failed revolutions of Hungary, Tibet, and Czechoslovakia in the mid-20th Century. So too do many histories
downplay the significances of the White Movement, calling it failed and therefore un-noteworthy.
By looking at the history of the various White Armies in the Russian Civil War we can see that the White
Movement was the greatest threat Bolshevism ever faced, second only to Hitler perhaps. Unlike the disorganized,
militia-based, leaderless, mobs that have made up so many uprisings around the world, the White Movement was
led by professional officers and statesmen who could organize government, pass laws, build armies, coordinate,
and lead with vision. The White Movement had numerous flaws that led to their eventual downfall, but they did
not fail until they made the extermination of Red Russia a real possibility. Trotskey was besieged for three weeks
in Petrograd, Kolchak was days from Moscow, Denikin mere miles outside of Moscow for months, total control of
Siberia and Southern Russia was in White hands. These were accomplishments of a worthy opponent to the Red
Army. Despite their shortcomings, the White Armies of the Russian Civil War should be remembered for their
near success in a failed counterrevolution and how close they came to drastically altering world history as we
know it.
47
48
Ibid 345.
Ibid 366.
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