ARISTOTLE ON FREEDOM IN THE PO L IT IC S
Daniel H. Frank
‘Freedom ’ is a slippery term and a tricky notion. It has both positive and
negative connotations. Freedom is opposed to slavery, but it is also opposed
to any constraint whatever. I believe that Aristotle was well aware of this,
and in this essay I should like to discuss A ristotle’s multi-faceted use of the
word ‘ελευθερία’ (and its cognates) in the Politics. In so doing I shall, of
course, not be merely presenting a lexical study, for behind the word stand
the phenomena upon which it rests. And it is these phenomena, the way
people use the word as well as the situations and events which account for
the linguistic practice, which Aristotle is at pains to point out.
Finally, a note of caution. There is no a priori reason why we should
expect Aristotle to use the word (and understand the notion of) ‘ελευθερία’
exactly as we do. Indeed, as we shall see, there is overlap, yet if Aristotle
will seem to us to be describing something foreign to our (normal) concep­
tion or notion o f what the word connotes, let us be prepared to free our­
selves of our conception o f the word and try to understand his.
I. FREEDOM vs. SLAVERY
The first kind o f freedom which I would like to demarcate is quite general
in scope, applicable in fact to any o f the good constitutions (monarchy,
aristocracy, polity) which Aristotle describes. This conception o f freedom is
not found exclusively in democratic contexts. Furtherm ore, this ‘transconstitutional’ freedom is the only one which Aristotle does not describe
pejoratively. These last two points are connected as we shall see. The
pejorative content which Aristotle attaches to freedom in the context of
democracy is intimately connected with his antipathy toward democracy,
the democratic man, and the democratic mode of life. Aristotle was no
more enamoured o f democracy than was P la to .1 But more of this later.
Now let us turn to what might be called the political notion o f ελευθερία.
For Aristotle there are many kinds o f rule (αρχή). One is the rule which a
master has over his slave. Another is what he calls political rule (αρχή
πολιτική). It is this latter kind o f rule which will concern us now, for,
according to Aristotle, political rule is ‘rule . . . over free m en.’2 At once
the distinction between free and slave is manifest. A slave is incapable of
1.
C f. Republic 557 b-558 c. A ristotle’s ‘dem ocratic’ conception o f freedom (discussed in
Part II o f this paper) is heavily indebted to this Platonic passage.
2.
Politics 1255 b20, 1277 b7-8. A ll translations are my own and depend upon the Oxford
Classical Text o f A ristotle’s Politics, edited by W . D. Ross (O xford, 1957).
110
D A NIEL H . FRANK
being ruled politically, for to be ruled politically entails a subject who can
learn3 from this subjection and can later apply the acquired knowledge (of
ruling). This a slave cannot do, for he cannot reason.4 Contrarily, free men
can, and thus political rule is applicable to them. The free m an (= ό
πολίτης) is the one who has the capacity to participate in the political life,
now and in the future. He is the man who knows how to obey and how to
rule.5 For our purposes, then, this distinction between slave and free is vital.
In this regard we can understand A ristotle’s rem ark that ή πόλις κοινωνία
των ελεύθερων έστίν.6 As man is by nature a π ολιτικόν ζωον7, a creature
born and bred for life in the πόλις, he will live up to his nature if, and only
if, he lives in a society which guarantees his political and constitutional
rights. Again, a constitution which looks to the well-being o f all its
members is one which is consonant with a society of free men—men who,
unlike slaves, can partake of the life o f the city/constitution.
Entirely opposite to the correct sorts of constitution are those which, like
masterships (δεσποτείαι), are concerned with the ruler(s) alone. These con­
stitutions and types o f rule are degenerations (παρεκβάσεις) of the correct
forms, for they are a sort o f rule befitting a slave, not a free man. Slaves,
who by their very nature cannot partake of society and government, are fit
to be ruled; unlike free men who must at first and then in turn be ruled, the
rule o f a master over a slave is not at all to the latter’s advantage8; such a
type o f rule is by no means a pedagogical device for future reference. Here
again the Aristotelian notion o f freedom or free men is to be understood in
contraposition to that o f slavery or the slave.
This, then, is the political usage of έλευθερία. In a word, ελευθερία
means ‘political capability,’ which, in turn, implies human rationality. And
this a (natural) slave does not possess. Finally, let us note that έλευθερία in
such contexts is used trans-constitutionally; it does not refer to the citizens
o f any particular constitution or perversion thereof.
II. THE DEM OCRA TIC CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM
а. Free-Born vs. Well-Born
For the remainder o f this paper I shall discuss έλευθερία as it is found in
the context o f democracy, a particular form o f constitution. This immed­
iately distinguishes this type o f freedom from the trans-constitutional type
of freedom just discussed. As we shall see, in the context of democracy
3.
4.
5.
б.
7.
8.
N . B. μ α θεΐν at Politics 1277 blO.
1254 b l6 -2 3 , 1280 a32-34.
1277 b l3 -1 6 .
1279 a21.
1253 a3, 7-8.
1278 b32-37 esp. 34-36.
Politics
Politics
Politics
Politics
Politics
ARISTO TLE ON FREEDOM IN T H E POLITICS
111
A ristotle’s discussion o f ελευθερία is less dominated by constitutional rights
and politics narrowly conceived than it is by sociological considerations.
His discussion o f freedom in the context o f democracy is inextricably bound
up with his appraisal o f the specific type of individual who constitutes a
democracy, viz. the democratic man. A ristotle’s discussion o f democratic
freedom and the democratic m an is not flattering; moreover, it is full of
interesting prejudices. Let us now turn to A ristotle’s democratic conception
of ελευθερία.
Democracy, for Aristotle, is a perversion of πολιτεία in its specific, not
generic, form .9 As all the παρεκβά σεις for Aristotle aim at the advantage
o f the group in power, so too does democracy. It aims at the advantage o f oi
άποροι, the poor. In response to the query that democracy is in fact not rule
of oi άποροι but rather rule of τό πλήθος or οί πολλοί, Aristotle asserts
that rule of τό πλήθος is not o f the essence o f democracy; rather it is an
accident or concomitant o f it, albeit a universal one. The essence or defini­
tion o f democracy is rule of the poor. In so defining democracy, Aristotle
takes a view o f it rather different from our own. We tend to think of
democracy as a system o f government or type o f constitution wherein all
citizens have equal rights, legal and political, and the m ajority rules. Now
indeed for Aristotle το πλήθος or oi πολλοί is sovereign, yet this is not the
essential aspect o f democracy. For him democracy is not best understood as
the rule by the m ajority so much as the rule by a specific, albeit large, class,
viz. oi άποροι.
To the extent that democracy is viewed as the rule by a depressed
economic and, as we shall see, social class, I do not think that it is far from
the truth to equate A ristotle’s democracy with a ‘dictatorship o f the pro­
letariat.’ This is Richard R obinson’s view, and I think that much can be said
for it.12 ‘P ro letariat,’ if understood in a certain way, captures much o f the
flavour of οί άποροι. In saying this I am thinking not of Engels’ 1888
definition o f the proletariat as ‘the class o f wage labourers who, having no
means o f production o f their own, are reduced to selling their labour power
in order to live’; rather I am thinking in terms of W ebster’s Dictionary
definition of proletariat as ‘the lowest social or economic class o f a
com m unity.’
Again, let us not think that for Aristotle ‘the poor’ describes merely an
economic class; it has a richer connotation than that. N or let us equate the
poor with the working class, unless we think of the working class not only as
Politics 1279 b8-9.
Politics 1279 b9-10.
Politics 1280 a2-3.
12. A risto tle’s Politics, Books III and IV, translated with introduction and com m ents by
9.
10.
11.
Richard R obinson, O xford, 1962, p p .24-25, 82.
112
DANIEL H. FRANK
those who must work for a living, but also as those who have ‘working
class,’ i.e. blue collar, values. We say e.g. ‘he is working class’ and we mean
more than that he goes to work in the morning; after all, so do doctors and
lawyers and they are not ‘working class’! It is not so much the occupations
o f oi άποροι13 or even their lack o f wealth that Aristotle has in mind as
much as the social class to which they belong, or, alternatively, the type of
person which they are. Let us, then, keep before us these (so far unsubstan­
tiated) remarks about the group which is sovereign in a democracy, for
A ristotle’s ‘dem ocratic’ notion o f freedom, the ultim ate explanandum, is
inextricably bound up with his appraisal of a certain type of person and the
members of a certain social class.
We must now substantiate our claims regarding the class structure
inherent in A ristotle’s thought. It is in this context that the democratic no­
tion o f ελευθερία appears. The usage I have in mind occurs in contexts
where ‘freedom ’ (and its cognates) is offered as a defining characteristic of
οι άποροι or το πλήθος or oi πολλοί, the sovereign group in a democracy.
Aristotle says: εύποροΰσι μέν γάρ ολίγοι, τή ς δέ έλευθερίας μετεχουσι
πάντες. δί ά ς αιτίας άμφισβητοΰσιν άμφότεροι τής πολιτείας (tr. ‘the few
are well off, but all partake o f freedom; and for these reasons both sides
[viz. oligarchs and democrats] make their [respective] claim for rule’) .14
Both sides in the struggle for power, oligarchs and democrats, make a claim
for sovereignty, but their claims are radically different. The oligarchs, ‘the
few,’ assert that because they are wealthy (εύποροΰσι) this inequality gives
them the right to rule. On the other hand, the democrats, ‘the m any,’ assert
that because (as they put it) ‘all partake o f freedom ’ they have as good a
right to rule as do oi ολίγοι.15 Indeed ‘freedom ’ is the watchword o f the
democrats. It is equality in this regard which gives them their claim to take
part in the constitution.
But what sort o f ‘freedom ’ is upon their lips? It cannot be the ‘political’
freedom which we earlier discussed, because participation in the constitu­
tion is what they are claiming they deserve (i.e. do not already possess) as a
result of the ‘freedom ’ which they already possess. W hat then is the
freedom upon which the democrats base their claim for political participa­
tion and sovereignty? I do not think we are yet in a position to answer this
question; in fact we will not be able to answer it until we have asked and
answered a few others.
13. Politics 1289 b32-33, 1291 b l8 ff.
14. Politics 1280 a4-6.
15. The phrase τής έλευθερίας μ ετεχου σι π ά ντ ες, ‘all partake o f freed om ,’ is clearly a
slogan shouted by the dem ocrats, viz. ‘the m any’ assert ‘all partake o f freedom .’ Our job
ultimately will be to understand this phrase, that is, the freedom which is upon the dem ocrats’
ARISTO TLE ON FREEDOM IN TH E POLITICS
113
W ho are the democrats? They have been specified as οί άποροι and to
πλήθος. This characterization is, at first glance, essentially an economic
one, but it becomes much more than that when Aristotle equates τό πλήθος
and οί άποροι with ελεύθεροι.16 ‘The m ultitude’ and ‘the p o o r,’ thus, are
also specifiable as ‘the free.’ And these, in turn, are όσοι μήτε αξίωμα
έχουσιν αρετής . . . (tr. ‘all who are not wealthy and have no claim to vir­
tue’) .17 What is interesting here is the description, or equation, of οί
ελεύθεροι with those ‘who have no claim to virtue.’ A ristotle’s prejudice is
laid bare. Virtue (άρετή) is not, and cannot be, a possession o f the
democrat; in fact it is one o f the defining characteristics of the oligarch."
The point now being urged is that democracy, originally characterized in
(apparently) economic terms as rule o f the poor, is further describable in
non-economic term s.19 Not only is the dem ocrat poor, but he is also lacking
in virtue.
Let us not lose sight o f our goal. We are intent on explicating the notion
of freedom in the democratic slogan τή ς έλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες (‘all
partake o f freedom ’), for it is on the basis of this freedom that the
democrats make their claim for participation in the constitution. We have
gone some distance in resolving our worry by beginning to understand the
type of person who shouts the words. The democratic man is poor and,
moreover, bereft of virtue.
And we can say still more. In Book IV chapter 3 another specification of
the democrat is forthcoming. He is in this passage delineated by various
jobs or occupations which he may hold, viz. agricultural, mercantile, and
menial.20 Straight away the dem ocrat is contrasted with οί γνώριμοι, the
nobles (= the oligarchs); not, as we might expect, in terms of occupation,
but in terms o f what we might broadly call social standing, viz. wealth,
birth, and virtue.21 This contrast between, say, being a day-labourer and
being virtuous, between being a salesman and being of high birth may seem
a bit bizarre to the modern reader, but once we are alive to the constant
interplay between economic and social categories in A ristotle’s political
thought it may begin to appear less puzzling. The democrat must work for
his living, and, for Aristotle, this toil means that he is poor, of low birth,
and boorish.22
16. Politics 1281 b23, 1290 b l8 , 1294 al6-17.
17. Politics 1281 b24-25.
18. See esp. Politics 1291 b29.
19. In this light a close look at Politics 1291 b28-29 reveals that οί γνώ ριμοι, the nobles, are
delineated by the follow ing properties: π λ ο ύ τ ο ς (rich), ευγένεια (well-born), άρετή (virtue),
παιδεία (education)— a matrix o f econom ic and socio-cultural properties.
20. Politics 1289 b32-33.
21. Politics 1289 b40-1290 a l.
22. C f. The Politics o f Aristotle, edited and translated by Ernest Barker, O xford, 1962,
p .301 note 4; Μ. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy, Berkeley and Los A ngeles, 1973, p p .35-61.
114
D A NIEL H . FRANK
But in what sense is he ‘free’? In what sense is the democratic man, a man
poor, common, and brutish, free in a way in which the oligarchic man, a
m an wealthy, exclusive, and proper, is not? A part from slaves, aren’t all
people free? To finally answer the question let us turn to Book IV chapter 4.
In this chapter we start o ff with the usual dichotomy: we have democracy
when oi έλεύθεροι κύριοι ώσιν, ολιγαρχία . . . οΐ πλούσιοι (tr. ‘[we have
democracy when] the free are sovereign, oligarchy [when] the wealthy [sc.
are sovereign]’).23 Furtherm ore, Aristotle goes on to make his (by now
redundant) observation that the number o f people who share power in a
democracy (oi πολλοί) and the number who share power in an oligarchy (oi
ολίγοι) are accidental. In this passage, as in others we have seen, the free are
opposed not to the enslaved, but rather to the rich. Thus, it is tempting to
construe the free as the poor, something which we have seen Aristotle do.
But this does not help us at all with the question as to why Aristotle uses this
word, ‘free,’ to describe the poor.
We have, however, a strong hint further in the chapter. At 1290 b l7 ff.
Aristotle says: ‘There is a democracy whenever the free and poor, being in a
m ajority, are in command of the government; and [there is] an oligarchy
whenever the wealthy and well-born, being few, [sc. are in com m and].’ The
usual remarks?—not quite. In this case note that the pairings are ά πορ οι/
πλούσιοι, πλείους/όλίγοι, and έλεύθεροι/εύγενέστεροι. It is this last
which is of interest for our purposes now. The contrast free/well born
makes it plain that we are to think of οι ελεύθεροι as base-born (opp. well­
born) or, more charitably, as free-born, i.e. born free but with no pedigree
whatsoever. The free have their birthright, their ‘free’ birth, and nothing
else. Freedom is here to be thought of as opposed, on the one hand, to
slavery, a condition where no birthright exists whatsoever; but it is also
opposed to pedigree. In this latter context we must understand the demo­
cratic m an, the sort of man who is prom inent in a democracy, as doomed
from, and indeed because of, his birth. He was, alas, not well-born. He
shares a free birth with the nobles, but that is all. Where we may wish to say
that if οί άποροι become wealthy, then they enter the class of oi πλούσιοι,
Aristotle precludes this social mobility by his severely class-conscious
remarks related to birth. No m atter how much money one may accrue one
cannot, according to Aristotle, become a member of the monied-class, and
so forth.
We are now in a position to answer the question we previously raised:
what is the ‘freedom ’ which is upon the lips o f the democratic man in his
slogan ‘all partake o f freedom ’? Again, what is the meaning o f the
predicate ‘free’ when applied to those people who are also described as oi
άποροι, oi πολλοί, and τό πλήθος? I would suggest that freedom in these
23.
Politics 1290 b l-2 .
ARISTO TLE ON FREEDOM IN TH E POLITICS
115
contexts refers to freedom of birth24; but to maintain the pejorative flavour
which Aristotle attaches to it we must fill out the sense to something like
‘freedom o f birth and that is all' or ‘menial, boorish, impoverished, yet free
in birth.’
We can now readily understand the slogan of the democrats, ‘all partake
of freedom .’ As the oppressed and disenfranchised storm the Bastille they
will shout ‘man is born free, yet he is everywhere in chains.’ Indeed the
watchword o f democracy is ‘freedom .’ Free birth is the one thing that
democrats, oligarchs, aristocrats, etc. share. No doubt the disenfranchised
will fasten on this equality to make their case for enfranchisement, and,
given their numerical m ajority, for ultimate sovereignty. Aristotle makes
the point explicitly at 1280 a22-25: oi μέν γάρ αν κατά τι άνισοι ώσιν, οϊον
χρήμασιν, δλω ς οϊονται άνισοι είναι, οί δ ’ άν κατά τι ϊσοι, οΓον
ελευθερία, δλω ς ϊσοι (tr. ‘the [oligarchs] believe in complete inequality
because of a certain inequality, namely money; but the [democrats], on the
other hand, believe in complete equality because of a certain equality,
namely freedom ’). The dem ocrats’ claim is based upon the only equality
which they share with οί πλούσιοι, namely the right to take part in political
life, a right which befits all free (born) men. Com mon humanity enjoins
common rights.
b. Free Life Style vs. Aristocratic Life
Let me finally demarcate a second Aristotelian conception of freedom as
found in the context of democracy. This notion o f freedom is closely linked
with our notion of license or anarchy.25 In no other discussion, I think, is
Aristotle’s negative appraisal o f democracy and the democratic man so
manifest as in his remarks o f the life-style, the modus vivendi, o f the demo­
cratic man.
As the sovereign (κύριον) will o f the m ultitude is capricious26, so this
‘free’ and unfettered attitude is paralleled by the life of the ‘dem ocratic’
man. For the democratic man, as for the sovereign assembly, ελεύθερον δέ
τό δ τι άν βούληταί τις ποιεΐν. ώ στε ζη έν τα ΐς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις
έκασ τος ώ ς βούλεται . . . (tr. ‘to be free is to do whatever one wishes, the
result of which is that in such democracies each man lives as he wishes’).27
The democratic m an’s life is free and unrestrained. And Aristotle comes
down very hard on this notion· o f freedom and this way o f life. It is
φαύλου.28
24. C f. R. G. M ulgan, Aristotle’s Political Theory, O xford, 1978, p p .63, 73.
25. C f. R. G. M ulgan, ‘Aristotle and the Dem ocratic C onception o f F reedom ,’ in B. F.
Harris (ed.), Auckland Classical Essays, Auckland and O xford, 1970, p .104; Barker (ed.), op.
cit., p .257.
26.
27.
δ τι α ν δόξη at Politics 1310 a30-31, 1317 b5-6.
Politics 1310 a 3 1-33.
116
DA NIEL H. FRANK
Now undoubtedly Aristotle was a man o f moderate sensibility, yet I think
we would be wrong to assume that he condemned ‘free-living’ solely
because it differed from his own predilection. I cannot help but think that
Aristotle also condemned this ‘free’ life-style because it was the life-style of
the democratic m an. Let me clarify my point here. In the immediately
preceding section o f this paper I attem pted to lay out A ristotle’s description
o f the democratic man. We saw this specimen of hum anity to be poor, of
low birth, and lacking in virtue. Such was his character, and Aristotle loath­
ed it. Thus, we may well believe that the mode o f life which this ‘character’
led would be equally loathsome. For Aristotle, being vulgar and being of
low birth entailed that you acted in a vulgar and unrestrained manner.
Action turns out to be a function o f the social class to which the individual
belongs. A certain person will act in a certain way because o f the type of
person he is, because of the class to which he belongs. Stereotypes come to
mind: are not Orientals sly, Jews niggardly, and Blacks shiftless? For
Aristotle ήδιον τοίς πολλοΐς τό ζην ά τά κ τω ς ή τό σωφρόνως (tr. ‘for the
masses to live without discipline is more pleasant than to live
m oderately’).29
A ristotle’s point should not be missed. The point is not that John or Peter
lives the life o f a libertine, but that a whole class (οί πολλοί), the class
sovereign in a democracy, is assumed to do so. Now surely Aristotle did not
conduct a check o f all democrats and then draw the (let us suppose) induct­
ively valid conclusion that for them ‘to live without discipline is more plea­
sant than to live m oderately.’ Rather, I would suggest that Aristotle had a
prior conception o f οί πολλοί, a view which I have tried to explicate in sec­
tion Ha, and was led by that conception to the outright condemnation of
their life style. And this is nothing more, and nothing less, than
prejudice.30·31
28. Politics 1310 a34; the word is as bad as it sounds.
29. Politics 1319 b 3 1-32.
30. O ne final point: it may be urged (and was by my colleague T. M . Olshewsky) that if, as I
suggest, A ristotle views the m any as base and consequently dem ocracy as an inferior form o f
governm ent, then how can he praise as one o f the good form s o f constitution, polity, defined
in III.7 as the rule o f ‘the m any’ for the com m on good (1279 a37-39)? A gain, if ‘the m any’ are
base by nature, then how can any constitution in which they rule be good?
M y answer is that when A ristotle gets to work in IV .8 on describing the actual polities
nothing more is said about rule by the m any or for the com m on good . A s Mulgan (Aristotle's
Political Theory, p .77) points out in regard to the polity as described in III.7 as the rule o f ‘the
m any’ for the com m on good: ‘it is a constitution which has rarely if ever existed in its true
form and is an abstract ideal which serves as a standard for the deviant form s o f oligarchy and
dem ocracy.’ Actual polities (as described in IV .8) are som e sort o f mixture o f oligarchy and
dem ocracy, rich and poor, well-born and base-born (1293 b33 ff.). There is in fact no society
or constitution in which ‘the m any’ rule for the com m on good . Because o f what Aristotle
believed about ‘the m any’ his ‘good dem ocracy,’ the polity, was a contradiction in terms.
31. This paper has profited from discussion by audiences at the universities o f Pittsburgh,
D ayton, ancj. Kentucky.