SWP Research Paper
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
German Institute for International
and Security Affairs
Nadine Godehardt
No End of History
A Chinese Alternative Concept of
International Order?
RP 2
January 2016
Berlin
All rights reserved.
© Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, 2016
SWP Research Papers are
peer reviewed by senior
researchers and the executive board of the Institute.
They reflect the views of
the author(s).
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik
German Institute
for International
and Security Affairs
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4
10719 Berlin
Germany
Phone +49 30 880 07-0
Fax +49 30 880 07-100
www.swp-berlin.org
[email protected]
ISSN 1863-1053
Table of Contents
5
Problems and Recommendations
7
7
8
Three Challenges to International Order
The Weakness of Democracy
Competition of Ideologies:
Horizontal Complexity of the World
Everyday Practices in International Politics:
Vertical Complexity of the World
9
11
12
14
China, the Menace! China, the Alternative?
Traditional Chinese Understanding of “Order”:
Tianxia and Chaogong Tixi
Revival of Tianxia:
Zhao Tingyang’s Political Philosophy
19
21
The Chinese OBOR Initiative:
An Alternative Concept of International Order?
Key Features of China’s OBOR Initiative
What Is All the Fuss About?
23
Conclusions
24
Abbreviations
18
Dr. Nadine Godehardt is Deputy Head of SWP’s Asia Division
Problems and Recommendations
No End of History
A Chinese Alternative Concept of
International Order?
In the last three years, President Xi Jinping has used
nearly every opportunity to announce new foreign
policy initiatives. Most importantly, he emphasized
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (“China
dream”) as the central goal of his political agenda. In
addition, Xi described relations with the United States
and Russia as a “new type of major power relationship” that should be mainly built on mutual respect
and recognition of national interests. He further reemphasized the significance of China’s neighboring
countries, proclaimed the need for a “New Asian security concept,” and kicked off the “One Belt, One Road”
initiative. Among all these different announcements,
OBOR clearly stands out. It is by far the most comprehensive and visible Chinese initiative of the last three
years. OBOR not only replaces the concept of “harmonious society/world” but also represents Xi’s central instrument to actually realize the “China dream”
and turn China into a great power again. OBOR has
thus the potential to grow into an alternative idea
showing how the common space of international
politics could be organized in the future. Consequently,
OBOR challenges the still dominating Western vision
of the international system and could effectively transform the existing structure of the current international
order.
For this reason, it is crucial to conceptualize China’s OBOR initiative in a broader context. Instead of
only focusing on specific mechanisms linked to OBOR,
such as, for example, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), it is necessary to develop a comprehensive analytical approach to OBOR. Before doing so,
it makes sense to briefly discuss three major challenges to the existing international order (the weakness
of democracy, the competition of ideologies, and the
increasing relevance of everyday practices in international politics) that increase the leverage for China
(and other actors) to push forward alternative ideas
of international order.
In a nutshell, China’s OBOR initiative is regarded
as a vision for building up a comprehensive cultural, economic, and political network that promotes connectivity
and cooperation between countries, regions, and cities
along the Silk Road. Furthermore, the OBOR initiative
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
5
Problems and Recommendations
is flexible, inclusive, and open. The geographic scope of
the initiative has still not been determined, and the
Chinese leadership has not yet published an official
OBOR map. Thus, everyone who has an interest in the
initiative – or in one of the institutions summarized
under the OBOR initiative – can become part of it.
OBOR itself is not an institution/organization, but as a
network OBOR comprises many different institutions
and mechanisms; even China’s bilateral relations
are increasingly linked to the OBOR initiative. Consequently, the newly established financial mechanisms such as the AIIB or the Silk Road Fund as well
as already existing multilateral mechanisms (BRICS or
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) are now seen
as part of OBOR. In the OBOR network, cooperation is
thus possible between all kinds of actors and in many
different contexts.
The main risk for European countries and the EU
consists of the concentration in particular mechanisms or even projects in the realm of OBOR. This
could strengthen Chinese actors in playing, for instance, individual European countries off against the
European Union (EU), or the EU off against mechanisms such as the Central and Eastern European
forum with China (“16+1”). A focus on only specific
elements of OBOR further conceals that most of these
projects, mechanisms, and funds are part of a comprehensive network vision with a potential global
outreach.
Hence, European countries – particularly European
foreign ministries – firstly, need to start collecting
and distributing information about all Chinese OBOR
activities in their countries. This would make it much
easier for these countries to actively define in what
areas they want – or do not want – to cooperate. Secondly, the newly established EU connectivity platform
should not only serve as a platform for identifying
joint infrastructure projects; it also needs to develop
into the main center for coordinating all OBOR activities of Chinese actors in the EU.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
6
Three Challenges to International Order
In times of crises, experts and policymakers are faced
with continuously new political events, an incredible
amount of “facts” about these incidents happening all
over the world, and an enormous as well as uncontrollable speed of information. Moments of crisis are events
that require actors to immediately articulate their
interpretations and preferred choice of action. Crises
are thus moments of dislocation and decisions, in
which the political principles, values, and understandings of actors are challenged and, at the same time,
are in great need of being created again. 1
The many different international, regional, and
local crises of the last years have revealed weak points
of the existing international order, for instance regarding the governance capability of global institutions,
the difficulty of leading powers to translate their power
into outcomes, or the growing struggle to maintain
national coherence. Furthermore, the focus of European governments on the management of acute crises
has often prevented discussions about a more fundamental challenge, that is, the development of alternative ideas of international order by other (non-Western, non-state, etc.) actors. It is thus necessary that
questions such as “What is international order?” are
again discussed more comprehensively. After all, there
exist many different understandings about how the
space of international politics could be organized.
Hence, it is crucial to seriously reflect on the question
of what alternative concepts of order exist and how
these concepts may challenge the existing order, its
values, and its rules.
Before I show how the OBOR initiative could be
regarded as an alternative Chinese concept of international order, I firstly stress three key challenges to
the existing structure of the international order: the
weakness of democracy, the competition of ideologies,
and the growing relevance of everyday practices in
international politics. These challenges increase the
leverage for actors such as China to promote their
own understandings of international order.
1 See Hillis Miller, “‘Taking Up a Task’: Moments of Decision
in Ernesto Laclau’s Thought”, in Laclau: A Critical Reader, ed.
Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart (London and New York:
Routledge, 2004), 217–26.
The Weakness of Democracy
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the enthusiasm about “the triumph of the West” peaked in
Francis Fukuyama’s famous claim that “What we may
be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or
the passing of a particular period of post-war history,
but the end of history as such; that is, the end point of
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of
human government.” 2 Almost three decades later, this
nearly exuberant self-confidence of the West has turned
into quite the opposite. The end of history, and in
particular the end of conflicting ideologies, was not
achieved. 3 Today, it is very obvious that democracies
represent only one way to organize human coexistence; besides, they are constantly being challenged by
external crises as much as being tested by threats from
the inside. In this regard, the many different crises of
the last years (Greece, Russia/Ukraine, the refugee crisis,
the challenge of ISIS, Occupy movements, etc.) underscore the vulnerability of our democracies.
This immanent weakness of democracy was also
the topic of Giovanna Borradori’s interview with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida shortly after the
September 11 attacks of 2001. 4 In their discussion
about the impact of these terrorist attacks on our
lives, politics, and societies, Derrida emphasized the
phenomenon of “democratic autoimmunity,” which
describes a specific weakness of liberal democracy.
The concept of autoimmunity derives from medical
science. It describes the malfunction of the immune
system. Normally, the immune system of a healthy
human body responds to foreign materials but does
not attack the body itself. When the immune system
attacks the body (cells and tissues), we are speaking
2 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History”, The National Interest
(1989): 1.
3 See Oliver Lembcke, “Kein Ende in Sicht. Zur Rolle der Ideologie in der Politik – aus Sicht der Politischen Theorie”, Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 24, no. 1–2 (2014): 149–61.
4 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Philosophy in a Time
of Terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermann and Jacques Derrida, ed.
by Giovanna Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2003).
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
7
Three Challenges to International Order
of an autoimmune disease. 5 In the political context,
Derrida uses this notion to highlight that democratic
systems already incorporate the possibility of destruction and failure within its structure. Following this
autoimmune logic, democratic governments are prone
to “produce, invent, and feed the very monstrosity
they claim to overcome.” 6
This leads to two very particular weaknesses of
liberal democracy: firstly, the necessary openness
of democracy always puts it at risk 7; secondly, in
response to internal or external crises, democratically
legitimated governments might come to political
decisions that stand in contrast to fundamental democratic principles and values. In other words, to protect
democracy against its enemies, democracies sometimes refer to methods that are not democratic. Giorgio Agamben emphasizes this specific aspect in his
discussion about the “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand). 8 Agamben relies on Carl Schmitt’s famous
definition of sovereignty, which comprises the power
to decide about the state of exception. Thus, in cases
of exception (or emergency), the state is authorized to
suspend the law due to its right to self-preservation. 9
Agamben understands the state of exception as “the
original structure in which law encompasses living
beings by means of its own suspension.” 10 Derrida’s
democratic autoimmunity and Agamben’s thinking
5 See “Autoimmunity”, Nature Insight 435, no. 7042 (2005),
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v435/n7042/pdf/
435583a.pdf (accessed 31 August 2015).
6 Derrida, at this juncture, mainly focusses on US policy
before and after 9/11. Habermas and Derrida, Philosophy in
a Time of Terror (see note 4), 99.
7 Mouffe highlights: “On the one side, we have the liberal
tradition constituted by the rule of law, the defence of human
rights and the respect of individual liberty; on the other the
democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality,
identity between governing and governed and popular sovereignty.” Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London:
Verso, 2005), 2–3. Taking a very simplified perspective, this
means, for example, when democratic cities such as London,
Paris, or Brussels turn into places of training for terrorists,
or when young men and women who grew up in largely nonMuslim democracies suddenly decide to support ISIS. Besides,
it is also possible that “the apparently suicidal political openness allows that a party hostile to democracy might be legitimately elected”. Habermas and Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of
Terror (see note 4), 101.
8 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 2005).
9 Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der
Souveränität [1922], 8. ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004),
18–19.
10 Agamben, State of Exception (see note 8), 3.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
8
about the state of exception represent structural elements of democracy. In times of crises, these elements
could, however, turn into weak spots of democracy,
which then also become visible to outsiders, for instance to China.
Competition of Ideologies:
Horizontal Complexity of the World
The Eurocentric concept of international order has
determined the understanding of international
politics for nearly 200 years. In the atmosphere of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European
thinkers generated a European identity “against the
rest.” The idea of European superiority and the praxis
of expansion grew together and created what John
M. Hobson called “an imaginary line of civilisational
apartheid that fundamentally separated or split East
from West.” 11 However, the invention of a Eurocentric
worldview alone is not quite special (every great empire tends to create a dominant and specific worldview centered on itself). But what inevitably distinguishes Eurocentrism from other “isms” is that its
ideas reached out to dominate every (academic, political, territorial, etc.) realm, starting in (at least) the
nineteenth century. Consequently, although many
countries developed images, maps, or concepts of the
world – and for a long time these different perspectives co-existed or influenced each other – it is still, as
Wigen and Lewis underscored: “With the triumph of
European imperialism […] the contemporary European
view of the divisions of the world came to enjoy nearuniversal acceptance.” 12
In the last two decades, the Eurocentric concept
of international order has clearly been challenged by
a new variety of actors that are increasingly forcing
traditional powers to seriously consider what they
“want.” These are, for instance, states such as Brazil,
India, China, and Turkey, which alone or together
11 See John M. Hobson, “Is Critical Theory Always for the
White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalia
towards a Post-Racist Critical IR”, Review of International Studies
33, no. S1 (2007): 94.
12 See Martin W. Lewis and Kären, The Myth of Continents. A
Critique of Metageography (Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1997), 33. This is not only regarding the regional
divisions of the world but is also the case for the emergence
of international/regional institutions as well as the success of
the Westphalian nation-state as the most important container
of politics.
Everyday Practices in International Politics: Vertical Complexity of the World
(for instance in the framework of BRICS) raise their
voices and develop their own ideas about the future
structure of the international order (or parts of this
structure). Thus, they are no longer mere objects but
(again) become subjects of international politics. 13
In addition, the rising number of powerful non-state
actors, transnational groups, and global players further challenges the principles, norms, and values of
the existing international order. 14
Thus, the world is not simply becoming multipolar
in the sense that a fixed amount of power resources/
capabilities is distributed between more than two
nation-states and, following this neorealist logic, only
more countries compete for the leading role in international order. In fact, the horizontal complexity of
the world firstly refers to a new diversity of actors
that try to dominate the political discourse from very
different angles (not only at the state level). Secondly,
this new complexity is further expressed in a competition of ideas/ideologies about international order
and a multifaceted understanding of power. As Mouffe
rightly emphasizes, “we should acknowledge that the
world is a pluri-verse and realise that to accept a diversity of political forms of organization will be more
conducive to peace and stability than the enforcement
of a universal model.” 15 In this pluriverse competition,
the notion of power is no longer understood as a mere
distribution of capacities; the question “What is
power?” is not as important as the question “What
can power do?” 16
13 Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible
Shift of Global Power to The East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).
14 Such as the unpredictable power of companies such as
Google that, among others, has an interest in building cities
in developing countries. See Mark Lutter, “Google’s Utopia:
The Tech Giant Plans to Build Cities, Experiment with Social
Rules”, Financial Review, 24 April 2015, http://www.afr.com/
technology/googles-utopia-the-tech-giant-plans-to-build-citiesexperiment-with-social-rules-20150421-1mpmlu (accessed
31 August 2015).
15 Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy in a Multipolar World”,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37, no. 3 (2009): 554.
16 Although “power identifies a capacity”, “power is a
potentiality, not an actuality – indeed a potentiality that may
never be actualized”; thus “having the means of power is not
the same as being powerful”. Steven Lukes, “Power and the
Battle of Hearts and Minds”, Millennium: Journal of International
Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 478.
Everyday Practices in International Politics:
Vertical Complexity of the World
In addition to the horizontal complexity of the world
– that is, the new range of actors and the new power
dynamics that highlight a competition of ideas/ideologies about the future constitution of the international
order – phenomena such as protest movements, transnational migration, jihadism (returnees), the flow of
refugees, and the digitalization of society underscore
the growing vertical challenges to the international
order. These phenomena show that international politics is no longer limited to traditional inter-state relations in which the crucial container of “where politics
take place” is still the Westphalian nation-state. Moreover, they jeopardize the boundaries between political
levels (national, regional, and global) as well as the
clear-cut distinction between domestic and foreign
policy practices. Hence, these phenomena lay open
alternative spaces and ways of political articulation
that cut across the traditional layers of international
politics. For instance, phenomena such as the various
protest movements of the last years might have had
an impact on the domestic policy of a third country or
different movements might even have influenced each
other. For a long time, international politics has been
mainly about “the realm of exceptional events conducted by states and statesmen, or their proxies.” 17
Today, international politics is increasingly driven by
the concern of “the everyday,” in other words, events
or phenomena that take place in the everyday environment of people.
Consequently, we need to look beyond the wellestablished but somewhat limited understanding of
international politics to foster our “ability to conceptualize how the ‘international’ is constituted by and
constituted of a myriad of phenomena.” 18 This includes the viewpoint of the “international” as “everyday practice” taking place in “everyday spaces.” Against
this backdrop, it is necessary to understand how everyday practices and spaces uncover the linkages between
international politics and our everyday lives. 19
17 Xavier Guillaume, “The International As an Everyday Practice”, International Political Sociology 5, no. 4 (2011): 459.
18 Xavier Guillaume, “Unveiling the ‘International’: Process,
Identity and Alterity”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies
35, no. 3 (2007): 742.
19 See Matt Davies and Michael Niemann, “The Everyday
Spaces of Global Politics: Work, Leisure, Family”, New Political
Science 24, no. 4 (2002): 557–77.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
9
Three Challenges to International Order
This development is further increased by the digitalization of society. When something happens in the
world, we (academics, policymakers, and public) rely
on visual representations to believe it. 20 Visuals are
still “one of the principle ways in which news from
distant places is brought home.” 21 Images, photographs, and video clips further represent articulations
of how people approach and engage with the world.
Visual images, thus, are a means of mapping, watching,
ordering, and representing the world. 22 This, however,
was also the case in the pre-digital world. The peculiarity in our digitalized world today is that visuals are
usually available in an instant, since everyone with a
smartphone can share them through services such
as Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr, Twitter, YouTube,
or WeChat. The fast pace of communication clearly
diminishes the response time of policymakers. Thus,
there is no time to wait when images – and along with
them (often random) first statements, evaluations, or
opinions – already surround you. It is something we
learn from a friend of Mark Zuckerberg in the film
“The Social Network”: The internet is not written in
pencil but in ink. Consequently, it seems to be of utmost importance to be one of the first responders to
influence a particular political debate, but at the same
time, everything that is once said on the internet cannot be taken back, or even deleted. 23 Hence, the digitalization of society also questions the relationship
between facts and truth, because when digitalized facts
are being constantly updated, they lose their durability, which once was the major characteristic of their
truth. 24 Furthermore, people all over the world are
directly connected through social media. Together,
they constitute a digital space of political communication that is detached from the traditional geographic
20 After all, seeing is believing. See David Shim, Visual Politics
and North Korea. Seeing is Believing (London: Routledge, 2014).
21 David Campbell, “Poststructuralism”, in International Relations Theory. Discipline and Diversity, ed. by Tim Dunne, Milja
Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press,
2007), 220.
22 See David Shim and Dirk Nabers, “Imaging North Korea:
Exploring Its Visual Representations in International Politics”, International Studies Perspectives 14, no. 3 (2013): 289–306.
23 Which is very similar to what Dave Eggers emphasises in
his novel “The Circle”, in which one of the pivotal principles
of the company “the circle” is that “we don’t delete”.
24 Mercedes Bunz, Die stille Revolution (Berlin: Suhrkamp,
2012), 61.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
10
units of the world. 25 Hence, this space again highlights the deterritorialization of politics (see horizontal complexity of the world).
For example, recent protests have been quickly
visualized through photographs, video clips, and art
work that were usually made by demonstrators themselves. Protest movements thus still rely on a geographic
space or location, but protesters further create a virtual space that detaches itself from territorial boundaries (into rather new digital boundaries). Their images
and videos create the paradox of being inside (that is,
being part of the movement on the streets) as well as
outside of the movement (since they also produce the
“data of the movement”). This situation permeates the
traditional categories of world politics. Consequently,
protests in Egypt, Turkey, or Hong Kong are not only
visible but also accessible for everyone in the world
creating growing “imagined data communities.” 26
In other words, we have protest communities on the
ground and growing data communities that facilitate
the immediate production and transportation of news
(in the form of visual imagery and others) from distant
places to our home as well as to our national governments and policymakers.
25 Still, the internet relies on physical and technical requirements. See Nicole Starosielski, The Undersea Network (Durham
and London: Duke University Press, 2015).
26 Nadav Hochmann, “The Social Media Image”, Big Data &
Society (2014), 6.
China, the Menace! China, the Alternative?
In Western academia and politics, it is particularly the
narrative of China’s rise that questions the hegemony
of Western powers (mainly the United States) in the
international system. In the discipline of International
Relations, this challenge is often described with the
power transition theory. Power transition theory
mainly deals with the (recurring) emergence of global
power transformations and their effects on the structure of the international system. In this regard, power
transition theory argues that the rise of China (and to
a much lesser extent other non-Western powers) could
lead to greater tension – even potential conflict – with
the United States or the West in general. With regard
to the future of US-China relations, John Ikenberry
emphasizes, “the drama of China’s rise will feature an
increasingly powerful China and a declining United
States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system.” 27 China, it seems, is
the pivotal menace of the existing international order.
Why is this narrative still a rather dominant one? Surprisingly, this is not only the case because of China’s
(still) increasing power capabilities but rather because
China is, in many ways, the “absolute other” to our
understanding of international order.
Firstly, China is a non-democracy, more precisely
a “capitalist non-democracy” and, in this regard, the
country is a denial of the liberal narrative that economic development is necessarily followed by political
democratization (in a Western sense). Secondly, China
is one of the emerging actors forcing traditional powers
(and institutions) to seriously consider what the country wants. Thirdly, China also has to deal with new
phenomena that challenge the national coherence
and stability of the country and does this on its own
terms. Hence, President Xi Jinping has explicitly increased the control and surveillance system within
China, particularly in questions regarding the digitalization of society. 28
27 John G. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of
the West. Can the Liberal System Survive?”, Foreign Affairs
(2008), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/
rise-china-and-future-west (accessed 31 August 2008).
28 The Chinese leadership plans a comprehensive package
of security-related laws. In July 2015, a new National Security
Law was already adopted by the National People’s Congress
What in recent years has mainly happened in our
dealings with China is that we have created a political
narrative of “us” on this side and “them” on the other
side. In other words, we tend to clearly differentiate
“us” – our political system, political practices, thinking, and values – from “them.” Consequently, our
academic and political debates about the likelihood of
China rising peacefully, the country’s potential threat
to the international order, or the new assertiveness
in its foreign policy practices somehow constitute the
image of “a” China that acts outside of what we – in
the West – regard as the righteous way of politics in the
first place. This is not unusual, since every political
and collective identity is based on the process of differentiation between an “us” and a “them.” The distinction of who belongs to us and who does not is, thus,
not accidental – it is a precondition of community. 29
However, as Mouffe rightly claims, “it means that
there is always the possibility of this relation us/them
becoming one of friend/enemy.” 30 If we mark China as
the menace, and even harsher as the enemy, it always
includes the “real possibility of physical killing.” 31
Nevertheless, it is not an imperative that the differentiation of “us” and “them” has to turn out this way.
The task is to think of others not as enemies but adversaries, which, for Mouffe, are “friendly enemies, that
is, persons who are friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies because they
want to organize this common symbolic space in a
different way.” 32 Hence, the crucial questions are how
China wants to organize the common space of international politics and whether the Chinese leadership
uses the growing leverage to push forward an alternative Chinese understanding of (international) order.
and at the end of December 2015 an anti-terrorism law
passed. However, a cyber-security law and an NGO-law are
also currently being drafted and debated.
29 Following Carl Schmitt’s classic Concept of the Political,
the identification of a necessary outsider constitutes political groups and also helps to differentiate among them.
30 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (see note 7), 550.
31 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 33.
32 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (see note 7), 13.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
11
China, the Menace! China, the Alternative?
In approaching these issues, it is crucial to understand that the notion of international order is not
much discussed in China’s departments of International Relations. Rather, the meaning of political
order is dealt with in other disciplinary contexts such
as Linguistics, History, Philosophy, and Sociology. Chinese International Relations departments are mostly
constituted by people who studied – and sometimes
even translated – the most important Western International Relations texts into Chinese. 33 In addition,
their scholarly points of departure – and this is particularly the case for most Chinese International Relations experts – are still the “very ideas that are the
root of the modern Western worldview.” 34 I focus instead on brief illustrations of China’s traditional understanding of order, the idea of Chinese networks, and
Zhao Tingyang’s political philosophy 35 because all
33 What you can find in these departments are scholars who
try to bridge local traditions and perspectives with key Interational Relations concepts and categories. For example, the
work of Qin Yaqing, who points us to the importance of background knowledge (culture, experience, habits, histories, etc.)
in the respective communities. Qin particularly introduces a
constructivist perspective that builds on the idea of relationalism, which represents a central aspect in traditional Chinese thinking. See Qin Yaqing, “International Society As a
Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise”,
The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 129–53. Thus,
he promotes a specific Chinese perspective on constructivism
without “advocating a Chinese school per se”. Arlene B. Tickner
and David L. Blaney, Claiming the International (London and
New York: Routledge, 2013), 19. Qin and others have written
extensively on this. See Song Xinning, “Building International
Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics”, Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 61–74, and Zhongguo guojiguanxi yanjiu (1995–2005) [Chinese IR Scholarship, 1995–2005],
ed. Jisi Wang et al. (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2006).
34 Tickner and Blaney, Claiming the International (see note 33),
3. They cannot think out of the box because they are educated
in the box.
35 Zhao Tingyang has been increasingly noticed in the West,
especially since he has also published in English. During a
research trip from August to December 2010 in Beijing, I met
with Professor Zhao personally and at different conferences
in Beijing and Xiamen. In the Beijing academic circle, particularly within Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),
Zhao is very well-known and respected, although his conception of tianxia has also created a broad debate among Chinese
academics, especially historians and philosophers. Regarding
the issue of tianxia (all under heaven), Zhao has published two
books, many Chinese articles, and two English articles. See
Zhao Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept
‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia)”, Social Identities 12, no. 1 (2006):
29–41; Zhao Tingyang, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms
of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)”, Diogenes 56, no. 5 (2009): 5–18.
In the chapter on Zhao Tingyang’s philosophy, I mainly refer
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
12
highlight elements of Chinese political practice that
might also be helpful to understand the main characteristics of Xi Jinping’s OBOR initiative.
Traditional Chinese Understanding of
“Order”: Tianxia and Chaogong Tixi 36
The ideas of tianxia (all under heaven) and chaogong tixi
(tributary system) derive from the early Zhou Dynasty
(ca. 1100–256 B.C.) and have accompanied Chinese
politicians, philosophers, and thinkers ever since. Consequently, there does not exist one definition of tianxia
or chaogong tixi but many interpretations. Following
John J. Fairbank’s famous attempt to identify the
essence of the Chinese World Order, I only highlight
key characteristics of both concepts.
The notion of tianxia constitutes the core of the Chinese traditional concept of political order. As Edward
Wang points out, “Zhongguo [the Middle Kingdom,
China, N. G.] indicated the center of the world, hence
the ‘central state’ or ‘middle kingdom’, while Tianxia
referred to the extended Chinese world, despite its
ecumenical claim.” 37 From a Chinese perspective,
tianxia comprises the whole known geographic space.
Furthermore, “the Confucian conception of tianxia
refers to an ideal moral and political order admitting
of no territorial boundary – the whole world to be
governed by a sage according to principles of rites (li)
and virtues (de).” 38 This sage stands for the Chinese
Emperor, who is appointed by heaven (tian). He holds
the Mandate of Heaven (tianming), which legitimizes
his authority. Thus, the Emperor is the Son of Heaven
(tianzi) and he likewise represents the highest level
of morality. His authority essentially depends on this
virtue and his ability to act in the terms of the Mandate of Heaven. Ideally, the Emperor rules and attracts
to Zhao Tingyang, Politics of Everybody [Mei ge ren de Zhengzhi]
(Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2010), and chapter 4 of Zhao Tingyang, Investigations of the Bad World: Political
Philosophy as First Philosophy [Huai Shijie Yanjiu: Zuowei diyi zhexue
de zhengzhi zhexue] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmindaxue Chubanshe, 2009).
36 These paragraphs are partly taken from Nadine Godehardt, “China and the Definition of the Asian Region”, in
Regional Powers and Regional Order, ed. by Nadine Godehardt
and Dirk Nabers (New York: Routledge, 2011), 119–21.
37 Edward Wang, “History, Space, and Ethnicity: The Chinese
Worldview”, Journal of World History 10, no 2. (1999): 287.
38 Joseph Chan, “Territorial Boundaries and Confucianism”,
in Confucian-Political Ethics, ed. Daniel A. Bell (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008), 69.
Traditional Chinese Understanding of “Order”: Tianxia and Chaogong Tixi35F
all under heaven (tianxia), because “if people under
your reign are happy, people will be attracted to come
from afar.” 39 In this sense, his authority surpasses territorial boundaries and his moral superiority is simultaneously a prerequisite for his selection, the grounding of his authority, and also serves as the leading
principle for his actions. Put differently, the Emperor’s
morality (personality) cannot be distinguished from
his authority (office). Herrlee G. Creel explicitly emphasizes the centrality of tianxia for traditional China:
“The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven became the
cornerstone of the Chinese empire. Henceforward
China was a state – and, since it ideally embraced ‘all
under heaven’, the only state – created by, and maintained under the direct supervision of, the highest
deity, Heaven. Its ruler was the Son of Heaven. His office
bestowed the highest lorry [sic!] possible to man.” 40
The Emperor exemplifies the core of the Chinese
empire. His authority is not constrained by territorial
boundaries. Consequently, foreign relations in the
tianxia are rather a reflection of internal relations. As
Fairbank underscores, the “Chinese tended to think of
their foreign relations as giving expression externally
to the same principle of social and political order that
were manifested internally within the Chinese state
and society.” 41 Instead of territorial boundaries, relations between different entities are better expressed by
a hierarchical relationship between the center (Emperor) and the periphery (tributary states). In this regard,
Edward Wang rightly argues that “in the Chinese perception of the world, there was always a center-periphery consideration that helped situate the zhongguo in
the known world, the Tianxia.” 42 The Chinese understanding of hierarchy, therefore, stands for a specific
distribution of power, that is, the acceptance of the
largest power by independent sovereign states (or
kingdoms) that remain fully functional on their own
terms. 43
The tributary system (chaogong tixi), therefore, organized and structured the co-existence between the different entities in the Chinese tianxia system. However,
the tribute system was not only one-sided; it was based
on a mutual exchange of payments that – especially
in periods of weakness – were more expensive for the
Chinese Emperor than the tributaries. 44
It is further interesting that foreign kingdoms
could only establish contact with the Chinese empire
by following the rules of the tributary system. After
all, the Chinese empire was the only accepted political
order. In fact, the existence of other political orders
would have been contrary to the very idea of the tianxia
system – at least following Chinese logic. Peripheral
countries were perceived rather as being either vassal
states or barbarians that lacked the cultural prerequisites to establish an independent and sovereign political order. Nevertheless, each of these units still kept a
certain amount of self-determination and autonomy.
But the implementation of sovereign policies would
have been equated with an internal rebellion against
the authority of the Chinese Emperor that could justify a punitive expedition. As Zhao emphasizes: “The
hegemonic nature of Chinese culture in the region
gave rise to a false security among the Chinese emperors that world hierarchy was universal. There were
no other hierarchies and no other sources of power
on the international scene. […] In modern parlance,
one might say that all states were ‘satellites’ of China.
Within the satellites, a great deal of ‘self-determination’ existed, but opposition to China was considered
rebellion against the established order and the traditional values, and should be dealt with accordingly.” 45
39 Confucius, Analects of Confucius (Beijing: Beijing Foreign
Languages Printing House, 1994), 13, 16.
40 Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, vol. 1:
The Western Chou Empire (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1970), 93.
41 John K. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s
Foreign Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1968), 3.
42 Wang, “History, Space, and Ethnicity: The Chinese Worldview” (see note 37), 290.
43 David Kang, “The Theoretical Roots of Hierarchy in International Relations”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 58
(2004): 348. Kang further describes this as a feature of Asian
international relations. He emphasises that, in contrast to the
European tradition, which was dominated by formal equality
and informal hierarchy, the Asian (particularly Chinese) traditions highlights formal hierarchy and informal equality
(Kang 2006, 339–40).
44 See Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast
Asia: A Background Essay”, in The Chinese World Order: Traditional
China’s Foreign Relations, ed. by John K. Fairbank (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). With regards to the long
history of Chinese dynasties, the margin between claim and
actuality concerning the idea of superiority were often enough
impossible to bridge.
45 Zhao Suisheng, Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old
Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 19.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
13
China, the Menace! China, the Alternative?
Chinese Networks or the Differential Mode of Association
(Chaxu Geju)
Fei Xiaotong introduces the concept of chaxu geju,
which he regards as central to understand China’s
traditional social order.a This concept is characterized by a pattern of circles surrounding a core.b
Fei compares this pattern with “the circles that appear on the surface of a lake when a rock is thrown
into it.”c Although each person is at the center of
his/her own network (egocentrism), all networks
are interrelated. In contrast to the Western mode
of association, which, following Fei, presumes
the autonomy of individuals and consists of clear
boundaries between self and others (inside/outside, subject/object, public/private, etc.), the Chinese mode of association builds on “overlapping
networks of people linked together through differentially categorized social relationships.”d
This again underscores that there are no clear-cut
boundaries between different networks. A person
is part of strong as well as weak relationships,
with very different demands and duties in each
a See Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil. The Foundations of Chinese
Society (Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1992).
Fei Xiaotong was the first social scientist that introduced
“features of the Chinese social network with the concept of
differential order, as illustrates by the concentric circles”.
Hwang Kawang-Kuo, “Chinese Relationalism: Theoretical
Construction and Methodological Considerations”, Journal
of the Theory of Social Behaviour 30, no. 2 (2000): 136.
b Fei, From the Soil, ibid., 60–71.
c Ibid., 62.
d Hamilton and Zheng, “Introduction”, in ibid., 20.
Revival of Tianxia:
Zhao Tingyang’s Political Philosophy
In his work on rethinking tianxia, Zhao Tingyang
develops the traditional Chinese idea of tianxia into a
contemporary political theory – a theory of “worldness.” 46 Zhao introduces his own tianxia ideal-type of
the world. He is not so much interested in the philosophical debates about the evolution of tianxia in
46 See Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun
[The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World
Institution] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005); Zhao,
Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35); Zhang Feng, “The
Tianxia System: World Order in a Chinese Utopia”, Global Asia.
A Journal of the East Asia Foundation 4, no. 4 (2009): 108–12.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
14
specific context. The relevance of other people
depends on their position within the concentric
circles of one’s own network. People do not need to
decide between networks, for instance because of
differing interests. Networks can exist in parallel.
Hence, the traditional Chinese social order is based
on flexible networks without clear boundaries.
“This is a society in which considerations of order,
not laws, predominate; and in this context, order
means […] that each person must uphold the moral
obligations of his or her network ties. Otherwise,
the entire social system collapses.”e
Fei’s differential mode of association (chaxu geju)
is an important point of reference for the following
discussion. Although it should only be applied carefully to modern Chinese society and politics, it, however, highlights that the Chinese concept of network might help us to understand the main features
of the new OBOR initiative.f
e Ibid., 24.
f Furthermore, it again becomes apparent that most of the
important Western political concepts such as community,
legitimacy, sovereignty, or even the idea of the Westphalian
nation-state, which we also use in our analyses about Modern
China, have no roots in Chinese culture and traditional
thinking after all.
Chinese thinking. Zhao rather extracts and perspectivizes. As Callahan rightly points out, he aims to
“‘transcend the historical limits’ of Chinese tradition.” 47 With reference to one of the most ancient
notions of Chinese philosophy, Zhao constitutes a
Chinese picture, theory, and view of the world. 48
In Politics of Everybody, Zhao unfolds his ontological
assumptions, which are essential to his work on
47 William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order:
Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?”, International Studies
Review 10 (2008): 753.
48 I focus particularly on Zhao’s argumentation, without
all his many (often too narrowly considered) comparisons to
“Western approaches”, since I rather aim to highlight the
particular strengths of his approach.
Revival of Tianxia: Zhao Tingyang’s Political Philosophy
rethinking tianxia. 49 He argues that humans do not
exist independently from each other. They are always
placed in the world and, thus, are always acting in
relation to others, which is why the world is not simply
a “world of things,” that is, a world of autonomous
objects. 50 According to Zhao, people cannot live in
isolation because from the moment they exist they
act, and when they act they always do so in relation
to others. 51 Consequently, Zhao strongly underlines
an “ontology of coexistence” (gongzai zunzailun) instead
of an ontology of things (or an ontology of existence).
Hence, there is nothing outside of coexistence, which
emphasizes the point that coexistence comes even
before existence. 52 In Western thinking, Zhao’s idea
could be best described in the words of the French
philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. 53 In his essay “Being Singular Plural,” he emphasizes that there is no existence
without coexistence, since I always relate myself to
others and others are only in relation to me. 54 “That
which exists, whatever this might be, coexists because
it exists. […] the world is the coexistence that put these
existences together.” 55 Thus, “I” cannot come before,
and, furthermore, cannot be independent of “we.”
As Nancy points out, “From the very beginning, then,
‘we’ are with one another, not as points gathered together, or as a togetherness that is divided up, but as
a being-with-one-another.” 56 In a similar way, Zhao
emphasizes that people are embedded in the world
and that they always exist in relation to others. They
live in plurality, together with each other, and only
because they do, it gives meaning to their existence. 57
Zhao’s understanding of world thus refers to a world
of coexistence and relationality. 58
Following Zhao, the key to understanding the political problems of our world lies in seeing the world
as a “failed world.” 59 He understands the contempo-
49 Zhao, Politics of Everybody (see note 35).
50 Ibid., 163.
51 Ibid., 167.
52 Ibid., 172.
53 See Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2000).
54 Thus, “Being is singularly plural and plurally singular”,
Nancy, Being Singular Plural (see note 53), 28.
55 Ibid., 29.
56 Ibid., 96.
57 For instance through the type and contexts of their relationship.
58 His focus is primarily on the relations between A and B.
59 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-underheaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 6.
rary world as a “non-world,” 60 since we have not yet
developed a political worldview that has constituted
an effective political world order, world institution,
or simply a world entity. He states that “the failure to
create a world entity is basically due to political ignorance of the idea of mundus qua mundus, a lack of political philosophy from the viewpoint of the world as a
whole, as opposed to that of nation-states.” 61 In his
view, Western approaches “lack a vision of world-ness,”
whereas Chinese theory understands the “world from
its world-ness.” 62 This is not to be mistaken as a plea
for a “holistic approach”; Zhao rather points us to an
alternative starting point of thinking. Here, the world
is comprised of interrelated and co-existing entities.
The understanding of the “world from its world-ness,”
thus, refers to a perspective that always looks at the
whole picture and not only parts of it (for example,
individual entities such as nation-states).
In his discussion about the notion of tianxia, he
stresses three components. 63 First, tianxia refers to
the topographical expanse, everything under the sky,
or simply the geographical world. Therefore, the first
meaning gives reference to the geography of the world.
Second, the social understanding of tianxia refers to
the necessary support of the “hearts of all people”
(minxin). Minxin secures the political legitimacy of the
tianxia and mostly depends on virtuous governance.
Therefore, the relationship between the common
agreement of the people (minxin) and the rule of virtue
(dezhi) is co-constitutive. 64 Third, the most important
meaning of tianxia is the establishment of a world institution (shijie zhixu 65), and only with the creation of
such a world institution will the tianxia system be fully
accomplished. Consequently, Zhao’s conception of
tianxia represents an understanding of the world as
a material geographic entity, a social collective supported by all people, and a world order. Zhao particularly emphasizes that the world is not simply an autonomous object; rather, the world only becomes our world
when we – all people in coexistence – build a world institution. 66
60 Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35).
61 Ibid., 6.
62 Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘Allunder-heaven’ (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 31.
63 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-underheaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 9–10.
64 Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 98.
65 The Chinese word zhixu can also be translated as “order”
66 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-underheaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 9.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
15
China, the Menace! China, the Alternative?
Alongside these three relatively broad meanings,
Zhao mentions a set of important principles that
further explain the features of the tianxia system.
The first is the principle of “all-inclusiveness” (wuwai),
which states that every person, family, or state is part
of tianxia. Nothing is considered to be outside, since
we are all embedded in the world anyway. Nobody is
excluded. Tianxia becomes the common interest of
every person; this interest is in line with the many
existing personal interests because of the underlying
conformity of both. 67 Thus, the “inclusion of all” describes the world as a family of – and a home to – all
people. As Zhao emphasizes, “‘all-under-heaven’ is
meant to be of all and for all, and never of and for
anybody in particular.” 68 The condition of wuwai also
secures peace and prosperity among the countries
in the tianxia; it refers to the transformation of many
states into one world entity by attraction rather than
coercion. 69 World Order prevents conflict and chaos
and “should be as extensive as possible, thereby contributing to a worldwide political system in which all
are included and protected, and in which nobody is
treated as an outsider.” 70
In a tianxia system, in which every place is internal,
Zhao characterizes relations between different entities
as relations between the close and the distant (yuanjin
qinshu guanxi). Zhao refers to what is generally described
with the image of core-periphery relations that originally indicated the difference between the core and
the periphery in cultural and geographic terms. Later,
this image often changed into an idea of discrimination of the core toward the periphery, or simply a presupposed supremacy of the core toward the periphery. 71 However, it is crucial that the relation between
the close and the distant is not understood in a purely
geographic sense. Closeness and distance can also be
perceived in cultural terms; thus, the “core” could also
be identified as a mutual understanding of certain
values or ideas independent from the geographic location. The development of these relationships is a process of constant change and transformation. Consequently, “all-inclusiveness” does not simply stand for
enforced conformity.
67 Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 90.
68 Ibid., 11.
69 William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order”
(see note 47), 752.
70 Ibid., 752.
71 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-underheaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 92.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
16
The second principle deals with the institutional
character of the tianxia, specifically the issues of order
(zhi) and disorder (luan). Zhi represents the Chinese
quest to establish a good social order that is accepted
by the people; on the other hand, luan stands for the
absence of any social order. 72 A successfully constituted zhi comprises institutions that are credible and,
thus, foster social trust. In addition, the institutions
should facilitate cooperation and keep the possibility
of conflict low. Zhao further argues that “maximizing
cooperation is even more important than minimizing
conflict, since the former contains the latter, but the
latter does not contain the former.” 73 In addition,
cooperation in the tianxia is based on two political
strategies. First, the strategy of virtue (de celüe), which,
from a long-term perspective, seems to be more effective than the use of force, since it builds mainly on the
common agreement of all people (minxin). This strategy
essentially refers to the differentiation between the
people, who get more benefits, and the sovereign, who
then obtains the power to rule. 74 Second, Zhao introduces the strategy of harmony (he celüe), which focuses
on the question of how to build cooperation out of differing interests. Cooperation is here inevitably linked
to harmony. Harmony (he) is seen as the most essential
principle in Chinese thinking: “the necessary ontological condition for different things to exist and
develop.” 75 In contrast to the idea of sameness (tong),
harmony refers to the diversity of things that make
cooperation possible. It follows that harmony grows
out of the improvement and transformation of differences, whereas “sameness reduce[s] possibilities to
only one thing.” 76 Hence, harmony (he) represents an
ontological principle, whereas sameness (tong) stands
for a psychological effect (in other words, all simply
merge into one). The two should not be confused. 77
This distinction is crucial because harmony is contrary
to sameness, in that it does not refer to an enforced
conformity that would destroy the substance of culture in the first place. Culture develops – and is shaped
72 Ibid.
73 Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 106
(transl. N. G.).
74 Ibid., 114.
75 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-underheaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 14; Zhao, Investigations of the
Bad World (see note 35), 117.
76 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-underheaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 14.
77 Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 118.
Revival of Tianxia: Zhao Tingyang’s Political Philosophy
by – relations within the tianxia. 78 The concept of
harmony again reveals the underlying ontology of
Zhao’s theory. In this regard, Zhao points out three
criteria. First, “relations determine things.” 79
Therefore, defining a thing as such cannot determine
its ontological condition or its very existence. A thing
can only be defined in relation to other things. 80
Second, the harmonious relationship between things
is the necessary condition for the survival of things.
“Coexistence is, therefore, the precondition for
existence.” 81 Third, the mutual relationship between
people also facilitates conditions whereby everybody
benefits from these relations. According to Zhao, this
principle highlights the differences between harmony
and cooperation, since “the principle of cooperation
could be seen as being ‘live-and-let-live,’ whereas
harmony is a stronger principle meaning live-if-let-live
and improve-if-let-improve.” 82 Ideally, harmony thus
creates a game where common success is inevitably
linked to the reciprocal relationship between actors.
A can only gain benefits if B also benefits, and vice
versa. 83 Harmony is in fact the premise on which a
successful world institution should be established. In
summary, Zhao develops a specific perspective of the
world by highlighting the ontology of coexistence, the
need for cooperation and harmony, and the embeddedness and relationality of all actors. In this sense,
he reframes the notion of tianxia as a way to highlight
a Chinese philosophical concept of political (and international) order.
78 It also refers to Qin Yaqing’s understanding of Chinese
dialectics, where A and non-A, in the process of exchange
between A and non-A, are constantly redefining their identities. See Qin Yaqing, “International Society As a Process:
Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise”, The Chinese
Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 129–153; Qin Yaqing,
“Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and
China’s International Stategy”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no 3. (2014): 285–314.
79 Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 118
(tranls. N. G.).
80 Ibid.; Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of
All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 15.
81 Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 118
(transl N.G).
82 The idea of live-and-let-live refers to a rather pure “existence”, in other words “I live and let you live”. Harmony, however, puts everyone in a conditional relationship to each other
or “coexistence”, that is “I live if I let you live, and I improve
if I let you improve”. Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in
Terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)” (see note 35), 15.
83 Zhao also calls his harmonious strategy “Confucian improvement” (kongzi gaijin).
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
17
The Chinese OBOR Initiative:
An Alternative Concept of International Order?
In early September 2013 President Xi Jinping first
announced the “Silk Road Economic Belt” as an economic initiative to deepen cooperation and expand
development in the Eurasian region. 84 A month later,
Xi visited Indonesia and prominently introduced the
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” which complements the Silk Road Economic Belt and is supposed
to link China across the Indian Ocean and Africa to
Europe. Although the Chinese Silk Road initiatives,
now officially the “One Belt, One Road” initiative,
were, particularly at the beginning, very vague in content, they are not simply just a hasty manifestation
of another Silk Road image. 85 In fact, since Xi’s speech
in Kazakhstan, the “One Belt, One Road” phrase has
quickly penetrated the Chinese academic, political,
and public discourse. It is, thus, repeatedly mentioned
in all possible contexts. In a very short time, the Silk
Road initiatives grew into a dominant representation
for China’s foreign policy practices, regional neighborhood relations, as well as some domestic issues,
especially regarding China’s economic development.
Interestingly, it has never been defined officially what
the OBOR initiative geographically actually comprises.
All maps that have been published either by Chinese
or other sources only present interpretations of official statements or documents. Most maps do not even
show national borders, but rather various corridors,
regions, and cities. 86
84 For more information about the initial Chinese discourse
about the Silk Road initiatives, see Nadine Godehardt, Chinas
“neue” Seidenstraßeninitiative. Regionale Nachbarschaft als Kern der
chinesischen Außenpolitik unter Xi Jinping, SWP-Studie 9/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2014).
85 The image of the Silk Road has been used quite extensively in international politics, not only with regard to foreign
policies of many different nation-states (examples, Central
Asian states, Turkey, etc.), the US-led New Silk Road strategy
concerning the future of Afghanistan, and several Eurasian
land-bridge projects (transport projects). It has also been used
in China’s past, in particular to describe China’s infrastructure policy towards the Western regions. Thus, even in the
Chinese political discourse, the idea of the Silk Road is not
completely new; however, it was never successfully implemented as a comprehensive policy tying China’s foreign
(neighboring) and domestic policy closer together.
86 I am thankful to Maximilian Mayer for highlighting this
aspect to me.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
18
This repetition of an (at first) “empty political
phrase” is, however, in many ways characteristic of
the introduction of new Chinese (domestic or foreign)
policies. Other examples are, for instance, concepts
such as “harmonious society/world” and “peaceful
development.” In this context, the reference to the
ancient trade route of the Silk Road is similarly difficult to classify. The Chinese leadership usually intends
to provide as little concrete information as possible
about what these political labels actually mean when
they are firstly announced. 87 This vagueness, however,
often creates space for vivid debates in academia,
the media, or, generally, in the public. Most concepts
initially only offer starting points for discussion; they
are not yet comprehensive and well-thought-through
political programs. In fact, these concepts depend on
the work of scholars, experts, or policymakers who
develop concrete ideas of implementation and try to
further flesh out the contents of these political labels.
Consequently, the Chinese leadership has encouraged think tanks, research institutes, and different
governmental branches 88 as well as provincial governments to host international workshops and conferences to stimulate the debate. In the case of the OBOR
initiative, there has been a tremendous demand for
discussion. Since Xi’s speech in Kazakhstan in September 2013, already dozens of Silk Road events have been
organized all over China, several specific OBOR research
institutes were founded, and in late March 2015, the
government even set up a “special leading group” that
oversees the coordination and implementation of different projects under the framework of the OBOR initiative. 89
87 As William Callahan has also prominently shown in
his analysis about Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. William A.
Callahan, China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013).
88 Most likely, all branches under the management of the
State Council, and regarding the OBOR, also the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in particular.
89 For example: China’s OBOR Strategic Research Institute
at the Beijing International Studies University, http://obor.
bisu.edu.cn/, or the OBOR Research Institute at the China
Institute of International Studies at Beijing, http://www.ciis.
org.cn/chinese/node_544601.htm. See also, “China Sets Up
Leading Team on Belt and Road Initiative”, Xinhuanet Online,
Key Features of China’s OBOR Initiative
After the announcement of the new Silk Road initiatives, the reactions of Chinese experts were initially
rather cautious and general. They either emphasized
the geopolitical (in contrast to US efforts) or transregional significance of the OBOR initiative. This emphasis has changed slightly since mid 2014. The many
Silk Road forums as well as the number of newly setup
research projects show two further developments.
Firstly, most forums were organized in different Chinese provinces, thus many local cadre also participated. Their involvement clearly added a stronger
domestic and socio-economic dimension to the Silk
Road initiatives. Secondly, the often very diverse composition of participants also led to vastly differing
ideas of potential areas of cooperation for the countries along the Silk Road. However, it became clear
that the OBOR is not only about traditional infrastructure programs (although this is still a major aspect),
but should also, for instance, include environmental
issues, questions of urbanization, and the build-up of
partnerships between key cities along the Silk Road.
The recently published official report Vision and
Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road absorbed many of these ideas
that have been discussed between scholars, experts,
local cadres, journalists, and entrepreneurs. 90 However, the authors of the report also seem to have included every suggestion that was mentioned between
September 2013 and March 2015. After a careful look
at the report, it seems the vagueness of Xi’s speech was
replaced with a listing of “everything” that was mentioned at different occasions, turning OBOR into one
of the most ambitious political visions of the last years.
Striking are three aspects of the report. Firstly, the
authors quite prominently emphasize the inclusiveness of the initiative and the chance to create win-win
cooperation that is beneficial to all participating
countries along the Silk Road. 91 The major goal is to
strengthen connectivity (hulian hutong) by building up
traditional infrastructure and establishing a network
29 March 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201503/29/c_134107435.htm (accessed 1 September 2015).
90 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt
and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, issued by the NDRC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the
People’s Republic of China with State Council authorization
(March 2015), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/
t20150330_669367.html (accessed 1 September 2015).
91 “Inclusiveness” (Baorongxing) is repeatedly used by Xi
Jinping. On every official occasion, he refers to the inclusiveness of China’s new initiatives – not only referring to the Silk
Roads but also BRICS development bank and AIIB.
of key cities. These parts often read like a revival of
China’s Great Western Development Strategy, only
that this time the focus is on the development of
regions outside of China. 92
Secondly, the authors emphasize the close relation
between the OBOR and different economic corridors
such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
Furthermore, they refer to many recently announced
financial institutions, such as the AIIB, the New Development Bank (formerly known as BRICS Development
Bank), and the Silk Road Fund as parts of the OBOR
initiative. In this regard, they also mention the Chinese intention to follow up on negotiations about an
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development
Bank. This, moreover, underscores the Chinese willingness to build up a strong financial backing for OBOR
mainly through multilateral investment banks or
funds, but also through the support of domestic financial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank or the
China Development Bank. 93 Thirdly, OBOR also has a
domestic and socio-economic dimension, in particular
regarding the increasing focus on China’s borderland
regions. In other words, the report identifies key provinces, such as Xinjiang, Fujian, Guangxi, and Yunnan,
that should strengthen cooperation with their neighboring countries. This is not a new element of Chinese
politics, but it is clearly new that all these different
areas of Chinese politics (domestic, foreign, regional,
etc.) are now set under the framework of the OBOR
initiative.
Key Features of China’s OBOR Initiative
The OBOR initiative is not (yet) a “grand strategy”
that presents itself as a counter-model to all established mechanisms, rules, and values characterizing
the existing international order. Thinking in an
either/or manner is not very helpful at this juncture,
since it conceals that the constitution of a counternarrative is nothing that the Chinese can simply pull
out of the hat. Besides, China also is part of the existing international system, incorporated in global net92 Great Western Development Strategy is a plan of the Chinese leadership to develop the Western part of China, particularly through building up infrastructure. It started in the
year 2000.
93 The fact that the report was also published by the NDRC
shows that the OBOR has a clear internal dimension, particularly regarding China’s borderland provinces.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
19
The Chinese OBOR Initiative: An Alternative Concept of International Order?
works, and – regarding building up the OBOR – also
dependent on a stable international order. Nevertheless, OBOR can be regarded as a proactive Chinese
response to the growing complexity in the world that
definitely has the potential to turn into an alternative
concept of how international politics could be organized in the future. It represents a loose political concept in which new mechanisms of cooperation are
created, or already existing institutions and ongoing
projects are integrated. 94 In this regard, OBOR is in
fact very different from our rule-based Eurocentric
model of international order.
Firstly, the OBOR initiative is mainly about building
up and strengthening cooperation among the countries
along the Silk Road. The goal is to create networks of
cooperation in many areas and on many different political levels. The guiding principle echoes Zhao Tingyang’s abovementioned description of a successful
order in which “maximizing cooperation is even more
important than minimizing conflict, since the former
contains the latter, but the latter does not contain the
former.” 95 This also reflects the Chinese debate about
OBOR, which focuses mainly on common benefits and
economic opportunities, but less on security threats
and difficulties. 96 It also points us again to the rather
simple Chinese understanding of stability, which
refers to the absence of chaos.
Secondly, the OBOR initiative is flexible, inclusive, and
open. The geographic scope of the initiative is, thus,
not determined and remains vague. As highlighted in
the official report of March 2015, OBOR is increasingly
perceived as being beneficial for people and countries
around the world. 97 The aspect that the Chinese leadership still has not published an official OBOR map fur94 At the simultaneous Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and BRICS summits in July 2015, even the Russian initiative
of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was linked to – and
actually even integrated in – the OBOR initiative. From the
Chinese perspective, this is not a contradiction, it rather represents the very idea of inclusiveness that marks the Chinese
initiative.
95 Zhao, Investigations of the Bad World (see note 35), 106.
96 This does not mean that Chinese experts and policymakers
are not aware of the security issues, but it is not the main narrative regarding the OBOR initiative.
97 As General Qiao Lang emphasised in a speech at the University of Defense: “As a rising great power, ‘one belt, one
road’ is the initial stage of China globalization. As a big country, the process of rising must be about the plan for advancing
globalization.” Qiao Liang, “One Belt, One Road”, Eurasian
Review of Geopolitics, 17 July 2015, http://temi.repubblica.it/
limes-heartland/one-belt-one-road/2070 (accessed 1 September
2015).
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
20
ther underscores its “global” openness and inclusiveness. Every country that has an interest in the Silk
Road or in one of the institutions related to the OBOR
initiative can become part of it. 98 Despite this
inclusive orientation, the success of the OBOR and its
related institutions also relies on the diversity of the
countries along the Silk Road. Following Zhao
Tingyang’s argumentation, inclusiveness does not
simply stand for enforced conformity. In this sense,
successful cooperation also builds on diverse interests
and capacities. It is crucial, however, that the Chinese
emphasis on win-win cooperation does not underlie
the condition of parity. A win-win situation can also
emerge when, economically, shares are unequally
distributed. 99
Thirdly, the main task is to build up a comprehensive
economic and political network that promotes the connectivity between countries along the Silk Road. In this
regard, the OBOR initiative, on the one hand, comprises
all kinds of actors within China, including provincial
and city governments, banks, Confucius institutes, as
well as national universities. Most external activities
of these actors are now summarized as part of OBOR. 100
On the other hand, cooperation also takes place in
very different arrangements, such as multilateral
mechanisms initiated by China, 101 other multilateral
institutions, 102 and bilateral relations. Thus, China
clearly represents the core of OBOR. Due to the growing network of cooperation, countries are increasingly
bound to China, and the significance of each actor is
defined by its specific position within the Chinese
OBOR network.
98 In this context, Chinese experts and officials usually point
to the increasing interest of other countries in participating
in the OBOR initiative since it was announced. Several meetings of the author with Chinese experts and officials in 2015.
99 For some countries a disadvantaged relationship with
China might still be of interest because usually China’s economic relations are not tied to any political claims.
100 This is even the case for the cultural exchange along the
Silk Road which is a crucial part of the initiative. The main
goal is to increase the awareness of Chinese culture and language in the countries along the Silk Road, as a representative of the Foreign Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference highlighted to the author.
101 These are for instance the AIIB, the 16+1 mechanism,
which is the meeting between China and 16 Central and
Eastern European countries, and several trilateral meetings,
such as the recent one between Russia, China, and Mongolia.
102 For example BRICS, the EEU, and the EU.
What Is All the Fuss About?
What Is All the Fuss About?
Over the years, many countries have created a dense
network of cooperation with China. For example,
Germany and China alone make use of more than 60
cooperation mechanisms that foster the relationship
between governments, political parties, parliaments,
academia, and think tanks. After all, China is the
biggest trading country in the world. The interest
of other countries in building up economic relations
with China has never waned, despite all the hesitations about China’s real intentions or new assertiveness in its foreign policy. This justifies the slightly
cynical question of what all the fuss concerning the
Silk Road and OBOR is actually about.
The polite response to this is as follows: It indeed
makes a difference that China’s relations with other
countries are increasingly connected to the OBOR
initiative. After all, most newly established or already
existing multilateral cooperation and financial mechanisms – as well as many bilateral relations – are now
seen as part of OBOR. 103
For instance, Xi Jinping’s visit to the port of Duisburg in March 2014 also underscored how the Chinese
side had already linked his visit of the completion
of Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe International Railway 104
to the vision of building up a Silk Road between
Europe, particularly Germany, and China. 105 Right
103 The only exception is China’s relationship to the United
States, which traditionally possesses a special status within
China’s foreign relations. With reference to OBOR, Chinese
experts like to highlight that OBOR is also open to the United
States (at some point) and, further, that it should not simply
be regarded as a Chinese strategic response to the US rebalancing to Asia, particularly to the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, of which China is not yet a member.
This is partly true and partly false. Thus, OBOR is clearly not
only a response to US activities in Asia – that would be a very
simplified perspective of the OBOR initiative – but it is still
also a response to the TPP trade agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the proposed free
trade agreement between the EU and the United States,
which both (until now) exclude China.
104 It is part of a wide net of transport routes for moving
goods and people from Asia to Europe. The railway could
have been made operable already in 2011.
105 See the headlines of the following news articles and
statements on governmental websites: “President Xi Calls
on China, Germany to Build Silk Road Economic Belt”, CCTV,
30 March 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/03/30/ARTI13961
37868612808.shtml (accessed 1 September 2015); “President
Xi Jinping Visits the Port of Duisburg, Germany”, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 30 March
2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/
from the beginning, the Chinese leadership used the
Silk Road initiatives (and later OBOR) to successfully
reframe its relations with many states and institutions
– or even long-standing infrastructure projects – as
now being a crucial part of establishing OBOR as a
global network of cooperation and connectivity. 106
This is also the case in China’s relation toward
Europe. Although there are already many established
dialogue formats between China and the EU, the former Chinese leadership decided to announce a new
dialogue mechanism between China and 16 Central
and Eastern European countries 107 in April 2012
(“16+1”). 108 Today, 16+1 is seen as a crucial element
of OBOR; this was also evident at the latest meeting in
Suzhou, the first one in China. 109 In addition, China
also maintains very good bilateral relations with the
Central and Eastern European countries. In June 2015,
Hungary was the first EU member state that signed a
memorandum of understanding promoting China’s
OBOR initiative. Shortly thereafter, China and Poland
decided to sign a cooperation agreement linked to the
OBOR. The agreement promotes stronger bilateral ties
between the two countries and mainly focuses on the
development of joint railway projects. 110 At first sight,
xjpzxcxdsjhaqhfbfwhlfgdgblshlhgjkezzzbomzb_666590/
t1164914.shtml (accessed 1 September 2015).
106 The BRICS forum is another example. This forum was
once established as an organisation that could challenge the
existing global financial structure, and it is most likely still
perceived as such by most members, but certainly not by
China. From a Chinese perspective – and this is made very
clear in the official report on China’s OBOR vision – BRICS,
and particularly the New Development Bank, are now summarised under the OBOR initiative. This was also discussed at
the international conference “BRICS: Political Ambitions and
Opportunities” in Moscow, organised by the Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung Moscow and Deutsch-Russische Auslandshandelskammer (30 November – 1 December 2015).
107 Of the 16 members are 11 EU members. The 16 countries
are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slowenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania.
108 Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, “China’s Charm Offensive in
Central and Eastern Europe: The Implementation of Its ‘12
Measures’ Strategy”, PISM Bulletin 106, 4 October 2013, https://
www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=14927 (accessed 1 September 2015).
109 See “For China, Central and Eastern Europe, Is 16+1 Really
Greater than 17?”, Global Times, 13 December 2015, http://www.
globaltimes.cn/content/958133.shtml (accessed 15 December
2015).
110 Conversation between the author and representative of
the Polish Embassy in Germany. See also “China and Poland
to Sign ‘One Belt, One Road’ Cooperation Agreement”, Global
Times, 17 June 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/
927483.shtml (accessed 1 September 2015).
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
21
The Chinese OBOR Initiative: An Alternative Concept of International Order?
these documents might only look like another bilateral
agreement between an individual European country
and China, but in China these activities are perceived
as another successful step for building up China’s
OBOR network of cooperation.
Hence, European governments (and others) need
to be aware that OBOR has an impact on their current
and future relations with China. Most European countries are already considered as being part of the OBOR
initiative, either through bilateral agreements or their
membership in one of the existing formats (16+1, the
AIIB, the EU, etc.). It seems that many European governments have already (albeit implicitly) acknowledged
China’s new vision, without realizing that OBOR could
indeed have the potential to effectively transform the
structure of the existing international order.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
22
Conclusions
OBOR is China’s most ambitious and visible foreign
policy initiative of the last three years. Still, OBOR is
difficult to describe. Explanations often remain diffuse
and vague. The biggest challenge is to use a language –
or more precisely an interpretation – that works in
Chinese as well as in Western languages. This is exactly
why the imagery of OBOR as an inclusive, open, and
global network of cooperation has been introduced
here. Firstly, this idea very much stems from Chinese
traditional thinking about the organization of society
and political order. Secondly, the imagery helps us to
understand the different layers of OBOR, which consists of (at least) three dimensions. First, OBOR is not
an organization with defined rules but a political vision
that is flexible, inclusive, and open. OBOR represents a
loose framework that still can be modified by its participants.
Second, the main goal is to strengthen cooperation
and connectivity between China and OBOR members.
In this regard, already existing cooperation formats –
both bilateral and multilateral – have been increasingly linked to OBOR. Other financial mechanisms, such
as the AIIB or the Silk Road Fund, were newly established to help finance OBOR. Furthermore, from a Chinese perspective, it is not a problem when affiliations
of certain actors overlap, such as, for instance, in the
case of Poland, which is a member of the EU, 16+1,
and the AIIB, and has growing bilateral ties with China
(all of these affiliations are now summarized under
the OBOR initiative). Ideally, actors do not need to
decide between different mechanisms, not even when
these mechanisms are based on very different rules or
interests. Third, OBOR is about concrete infrastructure
projects (communication, energy resources/power
grid, and transport) that also involve various Chinese
actors (state-owned enterprises, banks, provincial governments, etc.). Consequently, every railway project –
no matter if it was already initiated long before OBOR
– investments in seaports, for example in Gwadar and
Piraeus, or China’s move to set up Special Economic
Zones in Africa can now easily be linked to OBOR.
Following this interpretation, the main risk for European countries and the EU in their relations toward
China is the concentration on individual infrastructure projects, specific financial mechanisms such as
the AIIB, and bilateral negotiations without realizing
that – from the Chinese side – these are all linked to
OBOR. Thus, a focus on only specific elements of OBOR
conceals that most of these projects, mechanisms, and
relations are part of a comprehensive Chinese network
vision with a potential global reach. In addition, the
existing ignorance of the broader context of OBOR
could strengthen Chinese actors in playing individual
European countries off against the EU, or the EU off
against mechanisms such as the “16+1” forum.
In response to OBOR, European countries – in particular European foreign ministries – firstly need to
start collecting and distributing information about all
Chinese OBOR activities in their countries, and maybe
even in all of Europe. This would make it much easier
for these countries to actively define in what areas they
want – or do not want – to cooperate and how they
could actually benefit from OBOR. It could also minimize the puzzled reactions of European countries and
the EU, such as, for instance, when Chinese representatives proposed the idea of a digital Silk Road for Eurasia at the last EU-China summit in June 2015. Secondly, the focus of the newly established EU connectivity
platform, which defines a first European response to
OBOR, is mainly on the identification of joint infrastructure projects. However, it is important that this
platform develops into the dominant coordination
center for all OBOR activities of Chinese actors in the
EU, particularly since China will also continue to conduct bilateral (infrastructure) projects with individual
European countries. In short, the EU connectivity platform can only be of real value to EU members when it
turns into the leading EU hub for coordinating OBOR
activities between Chinese and European actors.
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
23
Abbreviations
Abbreviations
AIIB
BRICS
EEU
EU
NDRC
OBOR
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
(association of five major economies)
Eurasian Economic Union
European Union
National Development and Reform Commission
One Belt, One Road
SWP Berlin
A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order?
January 2016
24