US Foreign Policy Options to Tackle Migration in the Mediterranean Sea
An Options Memo submitted by
The Center for International Human Rights (CIHR), John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY and
The Center for Security Studies (KEMEA), Greek Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection
July 2015
George Andreopoulos, Mihalis Tsinisizelis, Daniel Golebiewski, Adriana Michilli and Fotini Mine
1
Introduction.
Migration in the Mediterranean Sea is a complex issue that raises security and humanitarian concerns.
Addressing the challenges posed by this complex issue is primarily the task of the frontline/destination
states in the three main routes: Spain in the Western Mediterranean route, Italy and Malta in the
Central Mediterranean route, and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean route. These efforts involve a
variety of national, regional, and international actors, including other European states, the countries of
origin and transit in North Africa and the Middle East, United Nations agencies (primarily the UNHCR),
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and a plethora of non-governmental organizations
dealing with migrant and refugee issues.
This memo is divided into the following sections: section 1 addresses the extent of irregular/illegal
migration in the Mediterranean.1 It also provides data on asylum trends from the top five third-country
nationalities (countries of origin) in the three routes; section two examines bilateral agreements
between countries of origin and frontline/destination involved in these routes; section 3 examines key
regional and national border control initiatives, like Operations Poseidon, RABIT, and Indalo by
FRONTEX, and Operation Mare Nostrum by the Italian authorities; section 4 examines recommended
policy options for the US aimed towards the management of migratory flows; finally, section 5 offers
some concluding observations on the need to ensure that humanitarian response and control policies
remain anchored on the applicable international rules and standards.
Migration in the Mediterranean Sea: routes and numbers.
As mentioned above, there are three migratory routes in the Mediterranean Sea.
In the Western Mediterranean route, the frontline state is Spain. During the period 2009-third quarter
of 2014, the total number of detected irregular migrant sea border crossings between Morocco and the
southern Spanish Coast came to around 23,000 (Table 1). Within each year, there have been wide
fluctuations with peaks occurring during the third quarter of each year (July to September); around
1,500 crossings in 2009, a bit over 1,500 in 2010, 2,200 in 2011, 1,200 in 2012, 1,000 in 2013, and a bit
over 2,500 in 2014 (Table 1). During the period 2011- second quarter of 2014, Spain received a total of
6,467 asylum applications from the top five countries of origin; 13 countries were represented at various
times among the top five: Cote d’ Ivoire, Cuba Nigeria, Guinea, Palestine, Syria, Algeria, Cameroon, Mali,
Somalia, Ukraine, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (Table 2).
In the Central Mediterranean route, the frontline states are Italy (primarily) and Malta. During the
period 2011-third quarter of 2014, the total number of detected irregular migrant sea border crossings
on that route came close to 250,000. This route has likewise witnessed wide fluctuations with a peak of
75,267 in the third quarter of 2014 (Table 3). The majority of the migrants came from West and North
African countries followed by migrants from South Asia and the Middle East. During the period 2011second quarter of 2014, Italy received a total of 57,288 asylum applications from the top five countries
of origin; 10 countries were represented at various times among the top five: Nigeria, Tunisia, Ghana,
Mali, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Senegal, Somalia, Eritrea, and Gambia (Table 2). During the same period,
Malta received a total of 5,555 asylum applications from the top five countries of origin (less than one
1
There has been an extensive debate among scholars and policymakers on the proper designation of migrants. In the United
States, the preferred designation is illegal; in Europe, the relevant 2008 European Union directive on common standards and
procedures that sought to address the return of third-country nationals did not use the term “illegal migrant” in its title. The
United Nations Global Commission on International Migration designated them as “migrants with irregular status”; for more on
this, see Christal Morehouse and Michael Blomfield, Irregular Migration in Europe, Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute,
December 2011, pp. 4-6. Consistent with UN terminology, the term irregular will be used in our memo.
2
tenth of the applications submitted to Italy); 8 countries were represented at various times among the
top five: Somalia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Syria, Ethiopia, Libya, Gambia, and Iran.
In the Eastern Mediterranean route, the frontline state is Greece. During the period 2011-2014, the
total number of detected irregular migrant sea border crossings came to around 155,082.2 The majority
of the migrants came from Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, followed by Sub-Saharan
countries. During the period 2011-second quarter of 2014, Greece received a total of 17,381 asylum
applications from the top five countries of origin; 7 countries were represented at various times among
the top five: Pakistan, Georgia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Albania, and Syria (Table 2). Although
not included among the top five during the period under consideration, Somalis and Eritreans have
topped the list of migrants from Sub-Saharan countries.
Bilateral agreements.
Several bilateral agreements between countries of origin/transit and countries of destination in the
Mediterranean have been concluded in order to address irregular migration. These include agreements
between Spain and Algeria, Spain and Senegal and Mauritania; Italy and Libya, Italy and Tunisia, and Italy
and Egypt; and Greece and Turkey (Table 4). Many of these agreements focus on the provision, by
countries of destination, of operational resources as well as training to strengthen police
administrations in the countries of origin, in order to be able to efficiently and successfully detect
migration flows. Other agreements call for exchanging information on such flows and engaging in
mutual assistance including repatriation and readmission of irregular migrants.
Although the record of bilateral agreements is mixed, these agreements can constitute an important
tool in the efforts to manage migration flows. For example, on December 1, 2013, Greece and Turkey
signed a bilateral agreement on the return of up to 1000 irregular migrants per year in a three-year pilot
scheme. This came on the heels of efforts to implement the earlier Readmission Protocol (see Table 4),
the implementation of which was only agreed in 2010.3 After Greece increased surveillance and
patrolling activities in 2012, FRONTEX reported that, compared to 2000 migrants crossing the GreekTurkish land border per week, their numbers dropped to 200 per week.4 Similarly, when civil unrest in
Tunisia sparked a massive spike in the number of migrants (about 64,000 arrivals) in 2009, Italy and
Tunisia signed an accelerated repatriation agreement which reduced the numbers by 75%.5
National and Regional Border Control Initiatives.
There have been a number of customs and border patrol operations pursued by Member States of
the European Union in an effort to manage migratory flows originating from the Middle East and Africa.
Oftentimes governments do not possess adequate resources to cope with the influx of persons and tend
to request assistance from international security agencies such as FRONTEX. This practice often involves
the externalization of border control rather than the implementation of migration prevention measures.
2
This is based on data provided by the Center for Security Studies (KEMEA), Hellenic Ministry of Public Order and Citizen
Protection.
3
Michael Tsinisizelis, “Managing migratory movements in a time of crisis,” Unpublished position paper, KEMEA, January 2015.
4
Frontex, “Situational Update: Migratory Situation at the Greek-Turkish Border,” October 3, 2012,
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/situational-update-migratory-situation-at-the-greek-turkish-border-bvud4C (accessed March
10, 2015).
5
Frontex, “Central Mediterranean Route,” http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route (accessed
March 10, 2015).
3
A common criticism of most of these operations is their emphasis on frontier security rather than
respect for human rights.
Greece
Operation RABIT
The idea of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) was first introduced in 2006 by the then newly
created FRONTEX. It was first enacted upon a request in 2010 by Greece in an attempt to manage the
high volume of migrants along the Greek-Turkish border. The Operation lasted from November 2010 to
March 2011 and was directed in the Evros region. The RABIT team deployed consisted of 175 trained
guest officers from 26 member states in order to effectuate enhanced border control by screening,
apprehending, and finally transferring migrants to detention facilities. The program received donations
that included buses, vans, and helicopters from several countries (Austria, Hungary, Germany, and
Denmark, among others). RABIT did not follow a proactive or preventive migratory flow agenda; rather
its mission was largely reactive in nature.
Although RABIT is credited with the decline of migration along the Greek-Turkish border (figures
produced by the Greek Government indicate that it resulted in a reduction of 76% in the daily average
number of irregular migrants during this period with 13,736 migrants detained),6 its ability to effectively
prevent migrants from reaching the Greek shores was severely criticized. Many law enforcement
activities centered on the interdiction of boats and sea vessels before entering Greek territory, thus
denying migrants their right to request asylum and protection.
RABIT was also criticized for human rights abuses that occurred at detention facilities in the highly
trafficked Evros region. Human Rights Watch investigations concluded that, although RABIT officers
were cognizant of violations and unsanitary conditions in the Fylakio, Tychero, Feres, and Soufli
detention facilities, they continued to transfer migrants there.7 In the rare case that FRONTEX notified
Greek immigration officials of ongoing violations, there was no substantive follow-up investigation.
Operation POSEIDON
Operation POSEIDON was initially planned as a temporary two to four-week program functioning
under the direction of FRONTEX’s Operational Office in Piraeus, Greece. The Joint Operation, in which 26
EU member states participated, involved surveillance and migration control in the Greek-Turkish,
Bulgarian-Turkish, and Greek-Albanian borders. The Operation lasted from March 2011 to January 2012
for the land borders, and from April 2011 to December 2011 for the sea borders. Its major objectives
were to streamline early detection from departure points and prevent secondary westward migration
flows towards Italy. Upon renewal of Joint Operation Poseidon Land and Sea, combined with the
launching of two national operations, Operation Aspida and Operation Xenios Zeus, and the
construction of the wall at the Greek-Turkish Land border, arrivals in the Evros land region fell drastically
from 2,000 per week in the first week of August 2012 to 10 per week in October 2012.8
Due to heightened emphasis on operational activities in the Evros land region, migrants naturally
shifted towards the Aegean islands, where operations focused on interception in the high seas. Such
actions raised criticisms similar to the ones levelled against Operation RABIT concerning their adherence
to international and regional (Council of Europe and EU) rules and standards.
6
Figure drawn from Table 5.
Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands. Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece, September
21, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2011/09/21/eu-s-dirty-hands (accessed June 1, 2015).
8
FIDH - Migreurop – EMHRN, Frontex Between Greece and Turkey: At the Border of Denial, May 2014,
http://www.frontexit.org/en/docs/49-frontexbetween-greece-and-turkey-the-border-of-denial/file (accessed June 10, 2015).
7
4
Italy
Operation Mare Nostrum
The Italian government’s Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN) was created on October 18, 2013 as a
response to the tragedy at Lampedusa, where an estimated 300 persons died trying to reach this port of
entry. The monthly cost of OMN for the country came to approximately 9 million euros. OMN was hailed
by many international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, as a step in the right
direction. One of its major benefits was that it patrolled a vastly expansive Search and Rescue zone,
allowing Italian navy and coast guard personnel to voyage into the territorial waters of sovereign states
in order to better conduct salvage operations. The project provided surveillance and reconnaissance,
although its major focal point was the rescue of persons; in this endeavor, it collaborated with other
organizations, including the Italian Red Cross and UNHCR. In this context, the humanitarian agenda
clearly took precedence over migratory control. During its existence, it is credited with having rescued
more than 100,000 migrants.9 Despite OMN’s potential as an alternative approach to dealing with
migratory flows, financial reasons led to its closing in October 2014.10
Triton
FRONTEX’s Operation Triton (OT) was established as a replacement to OMN. OT aims to relieve Italy
of its human resources and fiscal burdens by calling upon other EU member states for aid and
assistance. In the implementation of OT, FRONTEX operates under the command and control of the
Italian authorities and will be working in close coordination with Guardia di Finanza, the Coast Guard,
and the Navy. It will also be supporting the Italian authorities in collecting intelligence on peoplesmuggling networks located in Libya and other countries as it deploys five debriefing teams to Italy.
FRONTEX has no naval or airborne assets; it has a budget of 2 million Euros per month and its logistical
and intelligence assets are, when compared to OMN, significantly smaller in size and scope. While
several member states have indicated their willingness to donate wing aircrafts, helicopters, and open
shore vessels, many of these commitments remain unfulfilled. From the limited number of operations
undertaken under OT, it is clear that the focus has shifted from OMN’s emphasis on rescue to border
surveillance and control.
Spain
Operation Indalo
Established in November 2007, Operation Indalo (OI) is a maritime operation targeting irregular
migration from the North African coast through the Western Mediterranean to Southern Spain.11 This
FRONTEX joint operation provides assistance to Spanish authorities in border control activities in the
Western Mediterranean.12 Despite the fact that border control is the primary aim of this operation, it
also contributes to EU maritime security by sharing operational information on drug boat detection.13
One of the major challenges facing Spanish authorities is drug trafficking. Drug traffickers attempt to
9
Estimates of those rescued vary between 100,000 and 150,000. Official figures released by the Italian Ministry of Defense
bring the total of rescued migrants to 150, 810; Ministero della Difesa (Italian Ministry of Defense), “Mare Nostrum Operation,”
http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx (accessed June 10, 2015).
10
Interview with representatives of the Mission of Italy to the United Nations, January 16, 2015.
11
Frontex, “Frontex Deployed Assets Involved in the Interception of a Drug Boat in the Alboran Sea,” September 30, 2013,
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-deployed-assets-involved-in-the-interception-of-a-drug-boat-in-the-alboran-sea1ax4We (accessed June 25, 2015).
12
ibid.
13
ibid.
5
smuggle large quantities of hashish from Morocco on fast boats.14 Hence, in September 2014, Operation
Indalo helped intercept a drug trafficking boat carrying 13 tons of hashish at an estimated value of 20
million euros.15 This interception occurred when the Italian Guardia di Finanza plane, conducting
surveillance in the Alboran Sea, alerted Madrid authorities to the presence of the boat; this information
led to the deployment of French navy and Spanish Guardia Civil patrol boats.16 In another case, OI
provided evidence indicating that Morocco is both a destination and a transit country in the sexual
exploitation of women and children.17
Policy Options for the US Government.
The recent migrant crisis in the Mediterranean18 has rekindled the debate about the need for a
comprehensive European Union policy on this issue. While this is an issue that does not, at this juncture,
directly affect the US, it is an issue that the US will have to address in its humanitarian, as well as in its
security dimensions. While humanitarian and security issues tend to move on separate tracks,
humanitarian issues will, if left unaddressed, become security issues. This is particularly the case with
the migrant crisis where the near exclusive emphasis on border control has clearly not solved the
problem; on the contrary, it has contributed to the growth of organized criminal networks that are fed
on the widespread desperation of people fleeing war, poverty, and persecution. Migrant smuggling
networks are also engaged in other illegal activities (drug trafficking) thus rendering the multiplier effect
quite substantial. The US cannot afford to remain disengaged.
Here are some options that the US government should consider:
 The US government should use its good offices to encourage its European Union allies to
adopt a comprehensive policy on migration that would involve the fair distribution of asylum
seekers among EU member states. In response to the recent wave of migrants, the EU
Migration, Home Affairs, and Citizenship Commissioner proposed the relocation of 40,000
asylum seekers arriving in Greece and Italy to other EU states on the basis of a formula that
would factor in population, GDP, unemployment rate, and number of asylum applications
received. While this was in many ways a problematic proposal (among other things, it would
be temporary and would only apply to Syrians and Eritreans), it was rejected by member
states. The agreement reached, at the most recent EU summit, on the resettlement of
60,000 asylum seekers over two years was another example of the ad hoc and fractious
mood that currently prevails in the European Union.19 This is a temporary measure of a
voluntary nature which affects only a small percentage of migrants and allows for
exemptions and opt outs (Bulgaria, Hungary, Denmark, Ireland, and UK).
 The US government should provide equipment and logistical support for national and EU
agencies and operations. Last year, EU governments agreed that FRONTEX could acquire its
14
Frontex, “Western Mediterranean Route,” http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-mediterranean-route
(accessed June 25, 2015).
15
ibid.
16
ibid.
17
Frontex, “Indalo Detects New MO,” October 5, 2011, http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/indalo-detects-new-moXCqWm5 (accessed June 25, 2015).
18
According to UNHCR, so far this year migrant and refugee arrivals to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea have moved above
100,000; as of June 8, 2015, it is estimated that a total of 103,000 refugees and migrants had arrived in the southern frontline
states: 54,000 in Italy, 48,000 in Greece, 920 in Spain, and 91 in Malta; http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=557703c06&query=Mediterranean crossings 2015 (accessed June 26, 2015).
19
The current plan would affect 40,000 Eritreans and Syrians who are already in the EU, as well as 20,000 who are
outside its borders.
6



20
own naval and air assets. The US can contribute to this endeavor. Such an initiative should
be accompanied by a requirement that some of these assets be used for rescue operations,
thus redressing the imbalance between rescue and interdiction that resulted from the
termination of OMN.
Following on the previous point: the US government should provide assistance to the
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). EUROSUR was created “in order to
strengthen the exchange of information and the operational cooperation between national
authorities of Member States as well as with the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European
Union.”20 EUROSUR is expected to contribute to the comprehensive surveillance of the
maritime domain of the European Union through information exchange among the relevant
public authorities of member states. The US could provide relevant intelligence through its
naval and air assets at the US Naval Air Station Sigonella, in eastern Sicily.
The US government should explore ways of improving the effectiveness of existing bilateral
agreements. This support can come in the form of training and information sharing. For
instance, in their project titled “Forced Return Monitoring” (FReM), the International Center
for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) aims to train a European pool of return monitors
to countries in need of implementing a forced return monitoring system and, at the same
time, ensure that the return system meets human rights standards and regulations.21
Moreover, FRONTEX has signed working agreements with many countries22 that call for the
parties to establish contact points to develop communication and information sharing in
border management.23 Last, but not least, the US can provide logistical support through its
use of air and naval equipment for better surveillance/monitoring of migratory routes.
The US government should assist the EU in combatting the networks of migrant smugglers
and traffickers in the countries of origin and/or transit. This can be done on two fronts: first,
by providing support for public education campaigns conducted by civil society organizations
in the countries of origin/transit; and, second, by providing diplomatic support for the
posting by FRONTEX of its own Schengen Liaison Officers to the delegations of EU countries
in North and Sub-Saharan Africa.24 These officers could contribute to the training of local
Official Journal of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur),”
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Legal_basis/Eurosur_Regulation_2013.pdf (accessed June 25, 2015).
21
International Centre for Migration Policy Development, “Ongoing Projects,” http://www.icmpd.org/OngoingProjects.1570.0.html#c6989 (accessed March 15, 2015).
22
Frontex has been successful in establishing working arrangements with authorities of 17 countries: Russia (2006), Ukraine
(2007), Moldova (2008), Georgia (2008), Macedonia (2009), Serbia (2009), Albania (2009), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), the
United States (2009), Montenegro (2009), Belarus (2009), Canada (2010), Cape Verde (2011), Nigeria (2012), Armenia (2012),
Turkey (2012), and Azerbaijan (2013). However, it is at various stages in negotiations with seven other countries of origin: Libya,
Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Egypt, Brazil, and Tunisia; http://frontex.europa.eu/partners/third-countries (accessed March
15, 2015).
23
Frontex, “Working Arrangement establishing operational cooperation between the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) and the Nigerian
Immigration Service,” January 19, 2012, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Third_countries/WA_with_Nigeria.pdf
(accessed March 15, 2015); Frontex, “Memorandum of Understanding on establishing cooperation between the European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
And the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,” May 28, 2012,
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Third_countries/WA_with_Turkey.pdf (accessed March 15, 2015).
24
For a similar proposal, see Hugo Brady, “Schengen’s maritime border: Another annus horribilis in the Med?,” European Union
Institute for Security Studies, June 2014, p. 2.
7

officers and, through ongoing cooperation and information sharing, enable the formation of
transnational law enforcement networks focused on the prevention of migrant smuggling.
Finally, the US government should make use of its state-building assistance experience as a
preventive tool in migration management. Many migrants are fleeing their countries due to
conflicts and poverty in search of greater security and a better future. As a NATO
Parliamentary Assembly Report noted, “NATO has developed considerable experience
through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and its peacebuilding
efforts in the Balkans that could be applied to other regions that are sources of
migrants.”25 NATO’s experience could contribute towards greater stability in countries of
origin.
Concluding remarks.
The recent surge in migration across the Mediterranean has demonstrated, once again, the need for
a more holistic approach to this continuing challenge. The umbrella concept of ‘migration management’
masks an overwhelming emphasis on control; while control is indeed important, there is a humanitarian
response dimension that needs to be addressed both in the countries of origin (development as
prevention), as well as in the countries of destination (rescue/protection and inclusion). Even a cursory
review of past and current operations indicates that prevention measures, which aim at reducing the
flow of migrants stemming from the country of origin, are rarely given the attention that they deserve.
Reactive policies, such as interdiction, arrest, and detention, while necessary, easily lend themselves to
abusive practices (violation of non-refoulement, forced repatriation, torture, and inhuman treatment)
and, by raising the level of risks involved, incentivize organized criminal networks.
Failure to develop a more effective policy would have an impact well beyond the Mediterranean and
EU regions. While there is no magic bullet here, the US cannot afford to remain disengaged; it can and
should provide valuable assistance on both the humanitarian response and control fronts. Such
assistance must be guided by adherence to internationally recognized human rights law and refugee law
norms and standards (including right to security, non-discrimination, prohibition of torture and inhuman
treatment, and non-refoulement). Last, but not least, to ensure sustainability, a more holistic approach
must be accompanied by a commitment to burden-sharing; this is an issue area in which US diplomacy
can play an important role in the years ahead.
25
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group, Migration in the Mediterranean Region:
Causes, Consequences, and Challenges, December 2009, http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1858 (accessed June
25, 2015).
8
Appendix
Table 126
26
Table taken from Frontex’s “Fran Quarterly. Quarter 3: July-September 2014” (Figure 11 from p. 24).
9
Table 227
Greece
Italy
Malta
Spain
27
Asylum Applications - Top Five Third-Country Nationalities (2011-Quarter 2 of 2014)
2011
2012
2013
Q1 2014
Q2 2014
PakistanPakistan –
PakistanAfghanistanAfghanistan2,310
2,340
1,360
421
431
GeorgiaBangladesh AfghanistanPakistanPakistan1,120
1,005
1,225
399
404
AfghanistanGeorgiaBangladeshAlbaniaAlbania635
895
730
246
185
BangladeshAfghanistan AlbaniaSyriaBangladesh615
585
580
161
140
ChinaAlbania –
GeorgiaGeorgiaSyria405
385
535
130
139
Nigeria7,030
Tunisia4,805
Ghana3,402
Mali2,607
Pakistan2,444
Somalia455
Eritrea315
Nigeria250
Syria125
Ethiopia115
Pakistan –
2,601
Nigeria –
1,613
Afghanistan 1,495
Senegal939
Tunisia893
Somalia –
1,250
Eritrea435
Syria150
Nigeria70
Libya60
Nigeria3,519
Pakistan3,232
Somalia2,774
Eritrea2,109
Afghanistan2,056
Somalia1,015
Eritrea475
Syria250
Libya110
Nigeria95
Cote d’Ivoire550
Cuba445
Nigeria260
Guinea150
Palestine135
Syria255
Nigeria205
Algeria200
Cameroon120
Cote d’Ivoire105
Mali1,470
Syria725
Algeria350
Nigeria180
Somalia130
Mali1,486
Gambia1,477
Pakistan1,425
Nigeria1,100
Afghanistan820
Syria63
Nigeria11
Iran11
*Iraq,
Pakistan,
Somali,
Mali,
Dem. Rep. of
the Congo
(denotes value
between 1 to 4)
Syria230
Mali159
Pakistan37
Afghanistan32
Nigeria32
Mali3,169
Nigeria2,274
Gambia1,848
Pakistan1,521
Afghanistan649
Somalia84
Libya74
Syria70
Gambia40
Nigeria32
Syria279
Mali184
Ukraine111
Algeria43
Palestine40
Nigeria40
Total
17,381
57,288
5,555
6,467
Total: 86,691
Data taken from European Migration Network’s “Country Factsheet 2013” and UNHCR’s “Asylum Trends, First Half 2014”
(Figure 10 from pp. 26-27 and Figure 12 from pp. 30-31).
10
Table 328
28
Data taken from Frontex’s “Fran Quarterly. Quarter 3: July-September 2014” (Figure 5 from p. 14).
11
Table 4
Bilateral Agreements Between African and Middle-Eastern Countries of Origin and Mediterranean Countries of Destination
Western Mediterranean
Central Mediterranean
Eastern Mediterranean
Spain and Senegal and Mauritania
Italy and Libya
Greece and Turkey
In 2006, Senegal and Mauritania agreed that
Spain would help carry out surveillance
operations along the West-African coast,
including checkpoints on the Mali and
Senegal borders.29 According to Senegalese
Interior Minister Ousmane Ngom, patrols
identified a total of 901 boats from the coast
of Senegal with 35, 490 irregular migrants in
2006; in 2010, the figures decreased to 101
canoes with 450 people aboard.30 In 2013,
Spain signed two Memoranda of
Understanding in which the parties involved
must cooperate to manage irregular
migration into Europe, with Spain providing
training operations.31
Spain and Algeria
Italy and Libya signed several agreements:
cooperation against irregular migration in
2000; a readmission agreement in 2003; and
an agreement to conduct joint patrolling of
sea borders in 2007.32 During the conflict in
Libya, both countries signed a bilateral
agreement in 2009 which almost completely
stopped the traffic of about 40,000 Libyan
civil war migrants attempting to enter Italy;
both also signed a Memorandum of
Understanding in 2011, which called for
exchanging information on migration flows
and engaging in mutual assistance to combat
irregular migration, including repatriation of
irregular migrants.33
Italy and Tunisia
Spain agreed to help Algeria strengthen its
police and judicial administration.36 Both
signed a protocol on the movement of
persons in 2004.37
Spain and Countries of Origin
During civil unrest in Tunisia, which sparked a
massive spike of about 64,000 arrivals during
2011, both signed an accelerated repatriation
agreement which reduced the numbers by
75%.38
Italy and Egypt
In collaboration with the EU on the Atlantic
seaboard and Mediterranean coast of Africa,
Spain agreed to provide operational
resources to detect boats and migrants
Both signed a readmission agreement of
Egyptian nationals in 2007.43 Both signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on
migration and employment in 2011, which
29
Turkey agreed to effectively implement the
provisions of the bilateral Readmission
Protocol (Council of Ministers Degree
2002/3914 of 2002) including article 12,
which states that Turkey shall implement a
port in Izmir and use it as a border patrol
station and as a place to readmit irregular
migrants.34 Instead of 2000 migrants crossing
the Greek-Turkish land border per week, as
was the case in 2012, the numbers dropped
to 200 per week, after Greece’s increased
surveillance and patrolling activities.35
Afrique-Europe-Interact, “EU Migration Politics in West Africa,” http://www.afrique-europeinteract.net/index.php?article_id=177&clang=1 (accessed March 10, 2015).
30
Niels Frenzen, “Spain and Senegal Renew Agreement Permitting Frontex to Operate From Dakar,” Migrants at Sea, May 24,
2010, http://migrantsatsea.org/2010/05/24/spain-and-senegal-renew-agreement-permitting-frontex-to-operate-from-dakar/
(accessed March 10, 2015).
31
ibid.
32
Migration Policy Centre, “Libya’s Migration Profile,” June 2013,
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Libya.pdf (accessed March 10, 2015).
33
Il Governo Italiano (The Italian Government) and Il Consiglio Nazionale Transitorio Libico (The National Transitional Council of
Libya), “Memoradum D’Intesa (Memorandum of Understanding),” 17 Giugno 2011 (June 17, 2011),
http://download.repubblica.it/pdf/2011/migrazione.pdf (accessed March 10, 2015).
34
Hellenic Republic’s Ministry of Citizen Protection, “Important Steps Taken Towards Furthering Greek-Turkish Cooperation on
Illegal Immigration,” May 14, 2010,
http://www.minocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=EN&perform=view&id=3211&Itemid=440 (accessed March
10, 2015).
35
Frontex, “Situational Update: Migratory Situation at the Greek-Turkish Border,” October 3, 2012,
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/situational-update-migratory-situation-at-the-greek-turkish-border-bvud4C (accessed March
10, 2015).
36
Migration Policy Centre, “Migration Facts-Algeria,” April 2013,
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/fact_sheets/Factsheet%20Algeria.pdf (accessed March 10, 2015).
37
ibid.
38
Frontex, “Central Mediterranean Route,” http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route
(accessed March 10, 2015).
12
attempting to enter its territory through
Ceuta and Melilla.39 These resources included
training, creating Police Cooperation Centres
(PCC), and signing memoranda of police
cooperation.40 The countries to which Spain
provides such resources include Algeria,
Gambia, Morocco, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania,
and Niger.41 In 2013, Spain signed a
Memorandum of Collaboration to allow its
Civil Guard to work with Moroccan security
forces in preventing irregular migration
through Ceuta and Melilla.42
Algeria
was intended to help support activities in
vocational training.44
Signed readmission agreements with Italy
(2000), Switzerland (2006), and UK (2006).45
Switzerland and Nigeria
The 2011 migration partnership between the
two covers capacity building, return
assistance, border control, and readmission
and reintegration.46 Nigeria has agreed to
take back its nationals who have entered
Switzerland illegally; Switzerland has agreed
to provide aid and vocational training
programs in order to persuade Nigerian
migrants to remain in their country.47
43
Migration Policy Centre, “Egypt’s Migration Profile,” June 2013,
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Egypt.pdf (accessed March 10, 2015).
39
European Migration Network, “Country Factsheet: Spain 2012,”
http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/redeuropeamigracion/Informe_Anual_Politicas_Inmigracion_Asilo/country_factsheet_spa
in_2012_en_400004.pdf, p. 3 (accessed March 10, 2015).
40
ibid.
41
ibid.
42
European Migration Network, “Country Factsheet: Spain 2013,” http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/country-factsheets/26.spain_emn_country_factsheet_2013.pdf, p. 3
(accessed March 10, 2015).
44
Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Egypt: Frattini, Supporting the Democratic Process,” May
17, 2011, http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/05/20110517_fratdem.html/
(accessed March 10, 2015).
45
Migration Policy Centre, “Migration Facts-Algeria,” April 2013,
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/fact_sheets/Factsheet%20Algeria.pdf (accessed March 10, 2015).
46
Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), “Bilateral Relations Switzerland-Nigeria,” November 7, 2014,
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/representations-and-travel-advice/nigeria/switzerland-nigeria.html (accessed March
10, 2015).
47
ibid.
13
Table 548
48
Center for Security Studies (KEMEA), Greek Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection.