Book Title: Democracy Promotion and Civil Society in Post-Socialist Europe
Chapter I.1
Introduction: External Democracy Promotion and Domestic Civil Society – the Missing Link
Irene Hahn-Fuhr* & Susann Worschech**
–
Work in progress. Please do not cite without permission –
Abstract
This text is an introductory chapter of a volume on external democratization and civil society in Post-Socialist Europe.
The volume focuses on the development of civil society in the context of transition and the impact of external democracy
promotion via civil society on sustained democratic development. Contributions to the volume tackle those issues by
explicating theoretical concepts of civil society in democratization and external democracy promotion on the one hand,
and examining the empirical state of civil societies in post-socialist Europe on the other.
While the volume focuses the development and role of civic actors in society against the background of external
democracy promotion, this introductory chapter aims at opening the black box of democracy promotion through
disentangling the process and the related theoretic concepts of civil society and democratization. In order to develop a
compelling systematization, we propose a model for analysis of democracy promotion via civil society. We argue that
external financial aid produces a division between externally funded and non-funded civic actors, and that this division
and the stagnating democratization process are interdependent.
Outline
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................................................2
Logics of External Civil Society Support.............................................................................................................................5
A.
Civic Actors in Society: Underlying Assumptions .............................................................................................5
B.
Civic Actors and External Donors: Interaction Processes ................................................................................12
C.
Civic Actors in Democratization: Relations to the Target Group .....................................................................14
Democracy Promotion via Civil Society: A Research Model............................................................................................17
The Divided Civil Society ..................................................................................................................................................19
References ..........................................................................................................................................................................25
*Irene Hahn-Fuhr was trained as a political scientist at the Freie Universität Berlin. In her dissertation at the European University
Viadrina titled “Democratizing Power Europe? Modes of EU Democracy Promotion in Post-Socialist Europe”, she analyzes the
decisiveness of macro-institutional and strategic arrangements of the EU’s foreign policy – integration, stabilization, association,
and partnership – for its respective democracy promotion agendas. ([email protected]) **Susann Worschech graduated in Social Sciences from the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. With her current dissertation research
at the European University Viadrina titled “The Making of Civil Society: Network Structures and Interaction Patterns of External
Democracy Promotion in Ukraine”, she analyzes in which way donors support civic actors and thus influence the characteristics
of civil society. ([email protected])
Introduction When the bulldozers and tractors were heading to the Serbian capital in October 2000, bringing
upset farmers and citizens from Serbian provinces to Belgrade in order to “bring down a dictator”1,
one could get an idea of what political power of civil society could look like. And the same image
has been repeated several times since these days, from the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the
tent camps at Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev/Ukraine in November 2004,
the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon in 2005 to the
2011 “Arabellions”: large protest campaigns, organized by civil society activists and supported by
international actors, challenging autocratic power. Well-elaborated strategies to bring the people to
the streets and to convince them to struggle for democracy have become a serious threat for
authoritarian regimes world-wide. Furthermore, many successful civil society organizations and
democracy movement activists had previously been supported by external actors.
However, while a strong and vibrant civil society fostered by international support seemed to grow
in those countries, democracy has stagnated or even declined in most of them. This puzzle is our
starting point: After all, is civil society able to contribute substantially to democratization of postsocialist authoritarian systems? Can external democracy promotion focusing at civil society support
contribute substantially to democratization in target countries? Scholars as well as practitioners
define and perceive democracy promotion and civil society in different concepts, and the very
process of democracy promotion remains to appear as a black box. We will open this black box and
provide tools for answering the questions by disentangling democracy promotion through
discussing concepts, assumptions and interactions on which democracy promotion is based.
Following the political and economic transition after 1989/91 in Central and Eastern Europe, civil
society has become the focus of active political promotion of democracy by the international
community. As a consequence, civil society in these states saw dramatic and fast developments in
the last two decades. Civil society is presumed to be a general factor that facilitates democratic
transitions in two ways and in two different phases: either "by helping to generate a transition from
authoritarian rule to (at least) electoral democracy” or “by deepening and consolidating democracy
once it is established" (Diamond 1999: 233). Thus, it is a common assumption that stable and
1 “Bringing Down a Dictator” is a documentary by Steve York and Miriam Zimmerman. It portrays the
spectacular defeat of Slobodan Milosevic by nonviolent protest strategies and massive civil disobedience in
October 2000. The film and more information are available at http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/.
2 functioning democracies depend to a large extent on vibrant civil societies. However, that vision is
challenged by many post-socialist transitions which display a broad variety of transition paths. They
prove that democratization should not be understood teleologically: Today, while some of the
former socialist societies have become consolidated democracies and EU members, many postSoviet countries may be characterized as hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002). After first steps toward
democracy, their political direction now alternates between democratization and re-autocratization.
At the same time, variation in the effect of external political assistance is obvious. Whereas EU
enlargement has turned to be a powerful and successful democratization tool of EU foreign policy
in the (potential) candidate countries for EU membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005;
Vachudova 2005), EU democracy promotion has proved much less successful in the rest of the EU
neighborhood (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008)2. The most important mechanism has proven to
be conditionality, whereas institutional learning, socialization, and international norm adaption play
a less crucial role.
In contrast, the role civil society might have played within these different contexts of democracy
promotion in Central and Eastern Europe is not consistent (Kutter and Trappmann 2010). Research
on civil society and democratization has been linked to different groups of cases. The first phase of
research was linked to transition countries in general - Huntington referred to them as the Third
Wave of Democratization (Huntington 1993) – and marked by conceptual transfer. The
democratizing functions of civil society were primarily developed and discussed with reference to
existing democracies. When strong civic associations and movements such as the Polish
Solidarność and other opposition groups drove the socialist systems in Central Europe to their
knees, it seemed obvious to apply the knowledge about established democracies to processes of
regime change. Consequently, democracy promotion programs of the first phase were designed with
regard to this knowledge and aimed at the support of civil society groups that would aggregate
citizens’ interests, advocate them against the state, provide broader access to political decisionmaking, and establish a democratic culture (Carothers 1999a, 1999b).
The empirical results of this first phase in Central and Eastern Europe fed into theoretical
expectations that were not met in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Consequently, a second
research phase started in which scholars explored less successful and difficult cases. This phase was
2 We define “EU Neighborhood” here according to the EU's definition of the European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP) as a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country of the ENP. The ENP framework includes
16 of EU's closest neighbors – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine; see also
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm.
3 marked by empirical perspectives which gave cause for a more pessimistic view. After the first
decade of democracy promotion efforts in Central and Eastern Europe had passed, practitioners and
scholars stated that – despite undeniable efforts – very little civil society existed. Even where it did,
it was described as weak (Howard 2002). Many civil society organizations had been built from
scratch by Western aid agencies and transnational NGOs and were characterized as artificial
(Mandel 2002). Case studies showed that externally supported civil society did not perform the
expected functions, be it because of a lacking constituency or a negligible to nonexistent influence
on elites and decision-makers (Mendelson and Glenn 2002). Henderson argued that Western
support to NGOs in post-socialist countries had created a distinct civic elite, which lacked
horizontal ties to other groups and society, and that assistance programs led to “the business of aid”
(Henderson 2002). Thus, after a decade of experience of intensive democracy assistance, civil
society was rather seen as “engineered” (Ishkanian 2007) and unlikely to perform the ascribed
functions.
Hence, democracy promotion via civil society displays an ambivalent picture: Although most
theories suggest that civil society is a necessary feature of vibrant democracies, civil society support
does not necessarily lead to democratization. Today, in post-socialist Europe, there are huge
numbers of civic organizations working on democracy issues and campaigns3. However, while
external civil society promotion as a purpose in itself appears to be successful in quantitative terms,
it does not seem to translate into effective democracy promotion.
In this introductory chapter, we will explore theoretical links between theories on civil society and
democracy promotion and outline a theoretical approach to the study of civil society as a target of
democracy promotion in post-socialist states. To this end, we deconstruct the process of civil
society support and democracy promotion according to the relevant actor groups - external donors,
civil society and the targeted democratizing society – and their interrelation. Accordingly, we
distinguish three analytical steps:
The first step refers to the role civic actors are supposed to play in society and, in particular, in
democratization. It sheds light on the underlying assumptions guiding a certain donor, thus, on the
input dimension of external civil society support. The second step focuses on interaction processes
between donors and civil society and in-between civil society. It asks for the mechanisms of
external democracy promotion that shape the structure and development of civil society. The third
3 In Ukraine, for example, there are more than 7.000 active NGOs (Palyvoda and Golota 2010).
4 step points at the output dimension of external civil society support and asks for the way externally
promoted civic actors establish ties to their target group.
We link these three analytical steps to three theoretical strands that explain different aspects of a
complex process: First, we disentangle given concepts of civil society, second, we refer to modes of
interaction processes within external democracy promotion, and third, we explore possible impacts
of civic actors on democratization. Thus, this deconstruction of this process displays democracy
promotion through civil society as a combination of different logics.
Logics of External Civil Society Support A. Civic Actors in Society: Underlying Assumptions Strategies of external democracy promotion are based on donor ideas about what civil society is and
how it may contribute to democratization. The definition of civil society in the context of a certain
support program seems to be one important independent variable, if not even a basis for democracy
promotion. However, theories of civil society present a broad variety of definitions. In this section,
we systematize relevant approaches in order to clarify the analytical role of civil society in
democratization.
The concept of civil society has its roots in multiple theoretical and empirical contexts and is seen,
by some authors, as an “umbrella concept” (Salmenniemi 2008) characterized by “acute definitional
fuzziness” (Edwards and Foley 1996: 3). Until today, there is no single theory of civil society, but
competing approaches to describe civil society from different perspectives. While the term itself
goes back to antique philosophical discussions on the constitution of state and polity4, a more
precise evolution of the concept in relation to other aspects of politics and society became
contoured only during the period of Enlightenment. Within the polity architecture proposed in the
17th century by Thomas Hobbes, civil society was understood as a sphere outside the state and thus
as one of the (non-political) parts of society (Adloff 2005: 21). Enlightenment philosophers rejected
the absolutist view of a sovereign decoupled from the societas civilis and re-integrated civil society
into political processes. Hegel located civil society within a public sphere that is distinct from the
state, and therefore within the realm of public politics (Powell 2010: 354). Hence, civil society
4 In his seminal Politeia, Aristotle described the societas civilis (greek: Politike koinonia) as the association of
free citizens, engaging in self-governing their community. Although conditions and meanings of citizenship
and hence, of civil society have obviously changed since, the basic idea of voluntary engagement in selfgovernment is inherent in all modern definitions of and discourses on civil society. See also Adloff (2005:
17f.).
5 became linked to evolving parliamentarism and increasing political participation of the bourgeois
class. 18th century philosopher Tom Paine, who contributed essentially to the progress of the debate,
introduced civil society as a “natural and potentially self-regulating form of association,
counterpoised to ‘government’” and acknowledged it “as the basis for the realization of equal rights
for all citizens” (Powell 2010: 355). Here, we find a basic distinction of all modern concepts of
(politically relevant) civil society: On the one hand, civil society is seen as an intermediate sphere.
This perspective follows the question where civil society is located within society. On the other
hand, civil society is recognized as an actor on its own, following the question what civil society is
supposed to do in society. Figure 1 illustrates this analytical distinction as a basis for different
approaches to conceptualize civil society:
Figure 1: Classification of Civil Society Theories
Following this analytical distinction, civil society can be conceptualized and further defined within
two ideal-typical forms. The first group of civil society theories defines “(…) civil society as a
sphere that is analytically independent of – and, to varying degrees, empirically differentiated from
– not only the state and the market but other social spheres as well” (Alexander 1998: 6). Civil
society is seen as an “arena in society, distinct from the state, market, and usually the family, where
collective action in associations and through other forms of engagement takes place” (Heinrich
2005: 213). Within this logic of spheres, Heinrich stresses empirical-analytical approaches (in
contrast to normative-theoretical approaches as an umbrella category for all non-empirical
concepts) which conceptualize civil society as a sector composed of voluntary non-profit
organizations. Empirical-analytical approaches of civil society have become exceedingly influential
in the second phase of empirical civil society studies. They have been deployed in seminal studies
that focused organizational aspects of civil society such as amount, size and density in comparative
perspectives (e.g. Heinrich and Fioramonti 2008 on the CIVICUS project). Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and grassroots initiatives are referred to as the main agents and
6 manifestations of democratization although their ‘actorness’ is not considered relevant in that
respect. These studies are mainly based on the idea that quantitative aspects of civil society
organizations reflect the status of democratization in a given entity.5 Within the perception of these
studies, the emerging chain ‘NGOs = civil society = democracy’ was called the “civil society
orthodoxy” (Salmenniemi 2008: 5). However, as illustrated before, the assumed causality between
quantitative aspects of civil society organizations and a qualitative development of democratization
proved to be too simplistic. Empirical-analytical approaches fail to explain civil society’s
contribution to democratization, as they do not provide the possibility of a systematic verification or
falsification of the ‘civil society orthodoxy’ theorem.
Moreover, systemic approaches offer ideas from a macro-perspective on the ‘location’ of civil
society in a political or social system. In a systems-theoretical perspective, civil society is still seen
as a sphere or part of a (sub-)system, but it is also attributed certain functions within the system:
Civil society is a part of the community component of the social system and fosters integration in
modern societies. 6 Mutual agreements, communication, and solidarity are supposed to form
dominant interaction logics of civil society. Following the systemic approach, Gosewinkel and
Rucht (2003) define civil society as its own subsystem of societal integration. Assumed that civil
society is based on resources like values and norms, abstract appreciation and solidarity constitute
the central media of interaction. With this own systematic interaction logic, civil society becomes a
fourth subsystem besides community, state and economy (Rucht 2005). Moreover, this logic of
interaction links the macroscopic frame of systemic approaches on civil society to rather
microscopic functions of civil society in democratization, though without spelling them out in more
detail.
The second group of theories exposes civil society’s actorness and concentrates on its political and
social functions. These functionalist approaches seek to examine the potential contributions of civil
society to specific political settings, which mainly means democracy or democratization as a
5 For example, data on the density of organizations in a given entity (a state, a city, etc.) is used to analyze e.g.
Social Capital (see Franzen and Freitag 2007). In this context, the concept of Social Capital forms the
theoretical approach to a study, the conceptualizations of civil society remain solely operational.
6 Within Parson's structural functionalist approach, civil society can be located within the social subsystem.
Each system and subsystem runs four central functions: (A) Adaptation to changing environmental conditions;
(G) Goal attainment – that is, the ability of a system to define and pursue certain goals; (I) Integration as the
ability of a system to provide cohesion and inclusion of the system itself; and (L) Latent pattern maintenance,
which means the sustainment of basic structures and norms. The social system can be subdivided again into
basic functional components which are related to these four functional aspects. These components are the
economy (A), the political system (G), the community (I), and the cultural system (L). Since the community
component contributes integration to the overall social subsystem, civil society has to be located here. See also
Parsons (1965).
7 process. At the end of the 20th century, democracy “has come to mean a special type of political
system and way of life in which civil society and government tend to function as two necessary
moments, separate but contiguous, distinct but interdependent” and is seen as a system in which
“the exercise of power (…) is subject to public monitoring, compromise, and agreement” (Keane
2010: 461). The functionalist approach conceptualizes civil society either as an integrative power
which serves a democratic system by enhancing democratic skills and norms, or as a counterpart to
state and government, defending democratic rights and values against political power.
The first view refers to republican concepts of civil society as complementary to the state and to the
political system, providing basic socialization functions. This concept goes back to Tocqueville’s
idea of associations as ‘schools for democracy’ and was further developed Robert Putnam in his
theory on social capital (de Tocqueville 1956; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993; Putnam 1995;
Lin 2001: 19f.). Civil society is based on “private and public associations and organizations, all
forms of cooperative social relationships that created bonds of trust, public opinion, legal rights and
institutions, and political parties” (Alexander 1998: 3). The second view of civil society as a ‘state
counterpart’ takes up liberal arguments. Here, civil society acts as a bulwark against state power
and defends the free civic sphere. This perspective is mainly rooted in John Locke’s juxtaposition of
state control and civic rights and freedoms that have to be defended against the state. The liberal
view became specifically prominent at the end of the 20th century, when opposition groups and
dissidents fought for civil rights in socialist dictatorships and thus brought the authoritarian political
systems in Eastern Europe to their knees.
Based on this differentiation, we can distinguish the functions of civil society in democratization
and categorize them firstly by their relation to the state and secondly by their temporal scope and
leverage.7 The following table outlines this categorization by presenting the republican and liberal
perspective on the horizontal dimension and the scope from short-term and direct to long-term and
indirect leverage on the vertical dimension:
7 This classification is based on a detailed listing of civil society's functions mainly proposed by Diamond
(1999).
8 Table 1: Functions of Civil Society in Actor Oriented Theories
Table 1 clusters the different functions of civil society in democratization and allocates them to four
groups of aggregated functions. Three of the four groups follow the republican logic of a
complementary to the state, while the fourth group of functions corresponds to the liberal logic of
controlling state power. Each will be discussed in turn:
Civil society as a complement to a (democratic) state (table 1, groups of functions ‘School of
Democracy’, ‘Social Capital’ and ‘Modernization’) follows the idea that democracy is not an elitist
or institution-based concept, but needs active citizens who have internalized democratic values and
habits. Thus, these concepts focus on democratic socialization, participation, and social capital to
establish a democratic culture in which institutional arrangements are rooted.
Functions of group 1 refer to the ‘School of Democracy’. This probably most prominent grouping
of functions can be subsumed as ‘learning democracy through civil society’. The single functions of
this group all refer to Tocqueville's observation that associations as parts of civil society work as
‘large free schools of democracy’, in which citizens learn democratic negotiation, mutual trust, and
thus internalize democratic norms and values. Among the functions of this group, we can
distinguish broad education and specific training in the short range. First, civil society may
9 contribute to democracy or democratization through supplementing the role of political parties in
stimulating political participation, increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens,
and promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as rights of democratic citizenship (left
column). A second short-term function is recruitment and training of new political leaders (right
column). Through trainings and co-operations with political parties, youth organizations etc., civil
society organizations may directly teach potential future leaders in technical and social aspects of
democratic governance. One caveat especially of the short-term recruitment function can be that
democratic habits of young leaders may be corrupted when they enter institutions which are not yet
overwhelmingly democratic. The absorption of democratic leaders by an autocratic political system
can undermine people's respect towards democracy and politics and render new political figures
untrustworthy. More medium-term oriented and general is the function ‘education for democracy’.
Civil society may elaborate and provide techniques, strategies, and curricula for democratic civic
education and thus teach in particular young people democratic habits and values as well as
stimulate their active participation in community affairs (left column). Civil society may also
contribute more indirectly and medium-term oriented to the recruitment of potential political
candidates when civil society activists start to engage and build cross-ties to political parties and
institutions (right column). In the long run, this democratic socialization function is said to establish
large cultural changes towards a more critical, democratic society. Furthermore, one long-term
effect of civil society's democratizing power can be the improvement of the state's ability to govern:
Since democracy education through civil society increases citizens’ respect for the state and
enhances their positive engagement, it is argued that also the state's accountability, responsiveness,
effectiveness, and thus the legitimacy of the whole political system might grow.
Functions of group 2 comprise ‘Social Capital’ and the building of trust networks and draw on
inspiring confidence on all levels of society. This civilizing aspect of civil society has been noticed
and described extensively in Robert Putnam's work on social capital and its implications for
democracy in the USA and in Italy (Putnam 1995; Putnam et al. 1993). Theories and assumptions
about how civil society generates social capital focus abstract as well as concrete mechanisms.
Short-term civilizing functions of civil society include direct conflict mediation between different
interest groups in society and/or politics. Civil society provides multiple channels for the
representation of interests beyond classical political party structures. In doing so, civil society offers
a platform for the transformation of bonding social capital to bridging social capital: Interest groups
are given possibilities to negotiate their diverging interests, build coalitions, and seek for influence
via different channels and media. On the other hand, political parties may build their specific
10 networks upon these interest groups, and thus include ideas and preferences (from outside) in the
political process. In the medium-term perspective, bridging social capital and the provision of
multiple networks minimize the dependency from monopolistic networks or clientelism and foster
citizenship. In enhancing the building of social capital in particular within community development
in the long-term, civil society furthers the development of a pluralistic society that includes liberal
citizenship and cooperation through horizontal ties.
Function 3 on ‘Modernization’ stems from the socio-economic perspective in transformation
studies. A consensus is that measures of macro-economic stabilization should be implemented
immediately by the executive (as in Poland 1990/1991). However, more structural economic
reforms, as for instance liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, are still highly controversial
(Pickel and Wiesenthal 1997), hence, require acceptance of a larger part of society. Civil society
can contribute to creating a minimal consensus and enhance democratic legitimization of reforms
that mostly imply short- to middle-term costs for certain parts of society. Therefore this function is
also short- to medium-term oriented.
The liberal view of civil society (table 1, group of functions 4: ‘Watchdog’) emphasizes civil
society's ability to control state institutions and thus forms a ‘counterpart’ to the state
administration. In the short term, it checks and limits state power by raising public criticism on
decisions that ignore democratic standards and the rule of law. In order to execute this function,
civil society needs at least the possibility of initiating a public debate, so there must be a responsive
audience in- or outside the state which is sensitive to civil society actors’ signals and reports. Also
in the short term, civil society ‘against’ the state seeks to defend citizens' rights by providing legal
assistance, rising public awareness or publishing abuses of power. A function that spans from shortto medium-term is election monitoring and campaigning against election fraud. A long-term
oriented function of group 4 is the wide dissemination of information which “empowers citizens in
the collective pursuit and defense of their interests and values” (Diamond 1999: 247). This function
provides citizens with alternative information on government activities that often contradicts the
official version of a story. Based on investigation, civil society organizations, together with
independent media, provide the public with information and alternative perspectives, which may
form the basis for citizens' activities in contesting government policies and defending their own
interests. These activities are also referred to in the literature on social movements, where it is noted
that not only the distribution of information, but also the provision of alternative frames of
interpretation is a central accomplishment of social movements (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000; Della
Porta and Tarrow 2004). In a process of framing and counter-framing, several alternative
11 interpretations and perspectives on political issues are offered, which minimizes the danger of an
information monopoly in favor of the government, and which gives citizens the possibility to react
on power abuses.
In the light of this categorization of the roles civic actors can play, it becomes obvious that civil
society support in democracy promotion rests on a functionalist approach. It is not an aim per se but
implies an assumption of the donor about the way a civic organization should contribute to
democratization. In supporting civil society in a certain manner, donors support particular functions
of civil society. We assume that functions are related to organizational aspects of civil society in the
way that the implementation of a function requires certain organizational preconditions. If donors
foster democratization via civil society support, they imply some ideas about the relation of civil
society to the state, and they will have to decide whether to promote short-term effects or long-term
changes. Consequently, donor strategies differ and lead to interrelations and path dependencies in
the support of functions and organizational issues. Thus, the input process of democracy promotion
can be characterized as a set of different strategies of enabling civil society to fulfill certain
functions.
B. Civic Actors and External Donors: Interaction Processes Donor strategies can be conceptualized in terms of political aims, technical and financial aspects,
and project cycles, inter alia. In supporting certain functions, donors deploy an idea about their
implementation, which leads to organizational aspects of civic actors. Thus, ideas on functions and
organizational settings of civil society actors seem to be linked.
In democracy promotion theories, distinguished instruments of donors to impact on their immediate
target groups, civic actors respectively, generally follow the paradigm of encouraging and
demanding. Mechanisms of interaction processes range between socialization and conditionality8
(Kelley 2004). A transmission of organizational ideas is expectable, based on the inherent hierarchy
between donor and beneficiary within both mechanisms. Organization theory provides for
assumptions concerning the emergence of different organizational structures and influences.
Theories on world society or world polity underline that there is a rapid global diffusion of culture
and norms which lead to a world-wide adoption of institutional models of organization (Meyer et al.
8 Further concepts that distinguish between “political
incentives and capacity building” (Börzel, Pamuk and
conditionality” (Youngs 2001) or further differentiate
(Schimmelfennig 2008; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz
2012: 287ff.).
conditionality”, “political dialogue” and “financial
Stahn 2009) or “democracy assistance” and “political
between “externalization”, “imitation” and “learning”
2010) could be assigned to this classification (Hahn
12 1997; Meyer 2010). Rationalization and professionalization have been emphasized as central
processes that influence the character of nonprofit organizations both on the national and on the
international level (Hwang and Powell 2009; Boli and Thomas 1997). Therefore, external
democracy promotion can be seen as a process of homogenization via institutionalization of certain
organizational models and practices, based on norms and cultures of the donor community.
Institutional isomorphism is one of the most prominent perspectives and describes three different
modes of organizational alignment: coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes, and normative
pressure (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 67ff.). All three modes may occur in democracy promotion
interaction between donors and beneficiaries, as well as within the group of the latter.
Coercive isomorphism indicates an alignment strategy of civil society actors to meet the formal
requirements for support, such as bureaucratic aspects, reference lists etc. The criteria set by a donor
reflect the donor's functional script and thus imply the donor's ideas, values, and norms. To receive
a grant, a civic organization has to comply with ideas and standards set by the donor. Thus,
financial support is a medium for the transfer of ideas. That means, elaborated criteria for
cooperation correspond to the promotion of a certain ‘Western’ role model of civil society. This
mechanism implies a hierarchy or a bias in power and is characteristic for the donor-beneficiary
relation. The beneficiaries have to model their organizations corresponding to these ‘Western’
models, regardless of the specific context they are working in. One example of this logic is the
democracy promotion strategy of the European Union: The EU (for example, via programs of
EIDHR9) launches calls for applications in certain fields of activities, and civic organizations who
apply for these grants have to prove their compliance to sophisticated standards, professional
characteristics, and good references. The application process is perceived as extremely bureaucratic
and difficult by most civic organizations, so that there are even civil society organizations providing
consultancy services for other NGOs on how to get an EU grant10. However, receiving a grant
requires designing the organization according to the EU's professional standards for democracy
promotion.
As a second process of organizational alignment, mimetic processes occur without direct pressure
and often via diffusion. Organizations try to ‘copy’ others who appear to be more successful,
legitimate etc. Role models may thus be other grantees or beneficiaries of foreign aid, but also
independent actors. Other beneficiaries' positive role models (possibly following certain donor
9 EIDHR stands for “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights”. 10 This information is based on yet unpublished own empirical data on Ukraine.
13 strategies) encourage actors to change their organizational characteristics, strategies, and action
repertoires. As a ‘peer alignment’, mimetic processes may lead to an equalization of specific aspects
of civil society and thus to the clustering around certain subtypes.
Normative pressure is the mechanism that comes into play with increasing professionalization.
Organizations change their structure either because of higher education levels that are required in
the field or because of the growth and elaboration of professional networks across which new
models diffuse rapidly (DiMaggio et al. 1991: 71). With regard to democracy promotion, this
mechanism occurs when civil society actors enter into a ‘competition’ of being more professional.
Typically, professionalized civil society actors are engaged in delivering policy services rather than
in working on the grassroots level. In that way, we assume normative pressure to contribute to the
establishment and stabilization of distinctive subtypes of supported civil society.
We expect the first process (coercive isomorphism) to come into play between the donor and the
beneficiary; thus, this interaction process describes the input dimension. But the second and third
processes mostly occur between the different beneficiaries of democracy promotion. We assume
that differentiation of the field of civil society is enhanced by the influences of civil society actors
on their peers. In particular, imitation and professionalization are regarded as important mechanisms
in that area. While donor strategies based on functional logics are one independent variable,
isomorphic processes can be seen as the second independent variable fostering the formation of
civic actors' organizational profiles and, consequently, the establishment of different types of civil
society.
C. Civic Actors in Democratization: Relations to the Target Group Since in democracy promotion civil society is conceptualized as a representative of certain societal
groups and interests, it seems necessary to analyze in which name civil society acts and which other
actors are addressed. Hence, regarding the output dimension of democracy promotion via civil
society, the question is in which way externally promoted civic actors establish ties to their targeted
addressee(s). We assume that depending on the democratizing function supported by external
donors, different civic actors also address different target groups in different ways. Consequently,
we explore ‘where’ civil society's functions may be located in the democratization process, and in
which way this output logic corresponds to the target groups of externally supported civil society.
Democratization is described and defined in a plurality of theories. In the aftermath of revolutions
and democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe, a group of scholars around
Laurence Whitehead and Guillermo O'Donnell developed a seminal series of analysis and transition
14 theories (O’Donnell, Whitehead and Schmitter 1986). After the ‘Third Wave of Democratization’,
their actor and phase oriented approach was further developed. Displaying a focus on elite
constellations, civil society was seen here as a factor for the regime breakdown and the
consolidation of democracy, but not as a necessary condition for democratization. Thus, the
contribution of citizens’ activities to obtaining and sustaining democracy is better reflected in
processual concepts.
In his influential theory on democratic rule, Robert Dahl described democracy – which he calls
“polyarchy” – more in terms of certain rights citizens are given in a polyarchic system (Dahl 1972,
1997): Essential criteria for a democratic system are effective participation and inclusion, equal
rights of voting, free formation of opinion, freedom of expression, and the final control of all
eligible voters over the political agenda and the political process. All these criteria focus on the
relationship between citizens and state. But although Dahl stresses process-oriented criteria for
democracy, the bottom-up approach of civil society's contribution to democratization is not
reflected. As Charles Tilly wrote, „Dahl's criteria for polyarchial democracy describe a working
process, a series of regularized interactions among citizens and officials“, and claims to „improve
Dahl's criteria while remaining faithful to their process-oriented spirit“ (Tilly 2007: 10).
Starting from Dahl's polyarchy, Tilly develops a procedural and relational theory of
democratization. Since in Tilly's concept “Democratization means movement toward broader, more
equal, more protected, and more binding consultation” (ibid.: 13f.), interactions between citizens
and institutions are central processes. Democratization can be conceptualized as the occurrence of
changes in three central areas (ibid.: 51ff.): First, networks of trust have to integrate in regimes,
“and thus motivate their members to engage in mutually binding consultation – the contingent
consent of citizens to programs proposed or enacted by the state” (ibid.: 74). Second, Tilly
emphasizes inequalities in society which could hinder democracy if they translate into categorical
differences in political rights and obligations. Thus, the insulation of public politics from
categorical inequalities is central to democratization. Third, continued existence of autonomous
power centers which remain detached from public politics can inhibit democracy. With this
processual as well as relational view on democratization, Tilly proposes an integrative model of
democratization as increasing ties and relations of different qualities and functions.
The relational concept of democratization outlined above leads to some hypotheses of how an
externally supported civil society may contribute to democratization. If functional expectations
form the basis of a donor's strategy, we may assume that this functional expectation towards a
supported civil society group also includes an idea of who should be the target group of civic action.
15 The logic of the ‘pro-state’ path consists mainly of fostering ‘Schools of Democracy’, ‘Social
Capital’ and ‘Modernization’ (see table 1). Therefore, the citizens themselves are the target group in
focus. Democratic changes are expected to occur on the individual level. Institutions such as
administrative bodies, parties, or media enter the picture only as indirect target groups since it is the
individual citizen who builds them up. Related to Tilly's concept of democratization, the task of the
‘pro-state’ civil society is to establish networks of trust and integrate them into the regime. For
example, a donor who supports the function “conflict mediation and civilization” will support an
organization that works as a mediator. The target group of this civic actor might be young people
from post-conflict regions in order to participate in exchange programs or Bosnian and Serbian war
veteran groups. Within the logic of the ‘contra-state’ path, civic actions by ‘Watchdogs’ (table 1)
target the state regime and its institutions. Democratic changes are expected to occur on an
aggregated systematic level. In Tilly's concept of democratization, we find this functional logic
embedded in the areas of decreasing categorical inequality and autonomous power centers. For
example, a donor who supports the function “election monitoring” will cooperate with a civil
society group that works as a watchdog. The target group of this group's civic action (training of
election observers, observing directly in the polling station) will be administrative bodies.
The relations between civil society and its respective target group demand preconditions within the
functional logic with regard to democratization. Civic action within the ‘pro-state’ logic requires a
certain level of interconnectedness between civil society actors who promote democratic values,
and citizens. Since cultural changes are often based on role models and a certain level of persuasion,
social embeddedness and prestige of democratic trendsetters are important aspects. Hence, trust
would be the precondition for, and not the effect of cooperation. In that respect, the logic of
Putnam's statement on the origin of social capital as a community effect – “People who join are
people who trust” (Putnam 1995: 666) – might be turned around into “People who trust are people
who join” (Kern 2004: 125; also Newton 2001). If basic trust and linkage are lacking, it is in
question whether horizontal ties spanning different groups and parts of society can be established
through civil society. Civic action within the ‘contra-state’ logic needs at least a responsive
audience, be it a domestic one or the international community. As Levitsky and Way (2005) point
out, the quality and degree of international linkage is a key factor to the success of democratic
pressure. The audience shall respond through different levels of linkage (economic, political, and
societal cooperation) and may exert a certain degree of leverage in cases of power abuse. If neither
the political system itself nor the domestic audience are responsive, and if international linkage and
leverage capacities are low, the watchdogs and advocates remain solitary and ineffective actors.
16 Apparently, a supported civil society group addresses its specific action to specific target groups
according to its respective function. Returning to the external democracy promotion agenda, the
question remains whether the promotion of democratizing functions reaches the respective target
groups. In other words: Are the input and the output dimensions of democracy promotion via civil
society congruent?
Democracy Promotion via Civil Society: A Research Model As stated in the beginning, the aim of this introductory chapter is to define hitherto missing
theoretical links between theories on civil society and democracy promotion. The question on input
and output dimensions of democracy promotion underlines our argument that results of this
complex process cannot be analyzed substantially if democracy promotion is tackled as a black box.
Therefore, we asked for components of the democracy promotion process and the guiding principles
within possible sub-processes. We deconstructed 'democracy promotion' into the relevant actor
groups – external donors, civil society and the targeted democratizing society – and their
interrelations. On this basis, we distinguished three analytical steps: The first step refers to the role
civic actors are supposed to play in society and, in particular, in democratization. It sheds light on
the underlying assumptions guiding a certain donor, thus, on the input dimension of external civil
society support. The second step focuses on interaction processes between donors and civil society
and between civil society actors. It asks for the mechanisms of external democracy promotion
determining the structure and development of civil society. The third step points at the output
dimension of external civil society support and asks how externally promoted civic actors establish
ties to their target group.
In sum, we propose to conceive democracy promotion through civil society as a combination of
different logics that are described within different strands of theory: We argue that democracy
promotion processes are based on and thus can be analyzed along the following three aspects: first,
underlying assumptions of democracy promotion via civil society; second, interactive formation of
civil society; and third, relations of civil society to the respective target groups. In linking the single
parts of the process to theories on civil society, interaction processes, and democratization, we aim
at systematizing the missing links and open questions of external democratization at different levels.
Upon this systematization, we put the outlined segments in an analytical framework and introduce
the following model of external democracy promotion via civil society:
17 Figure 2: Democracy Promotion via Civil Society
Analytical step A concerns the donors' underlying concepts of civil society's contribution to
democratization. The main question of this part of the process is which democratizing function a
donor promotes, and, in combination with organizational requirements of this function, to which
type of civil society the logic of support leads. Step B touches the aspect of interaction processes
and organizational alignment. We hypothesize that the relation between donors and civil society is
mainly characterized by coercive mechanisms of standard setting. Furthermore, it seems likely that
different groups of civil society influence each other through normative pressure and mimetic
processes. Step C refers to the relation of civil society to target groups of democratization. Civil
society actors are connected to specific target groups according to the functional logic of civic
action and aim at inducing changes in specific areas of society. Thus, external democracy
promotion via civil society follows a path dependency that links different actors, functions,
mechanisms, and areas of democratization.
18 The Divided Civil Society The starting point of our book is a major puzzle of democracy promotion in post-Socialist countries:
whereas a strong and vibrant civil society fostered by international support seems to have
developed, democracy has stagnated or even declined. Thus, empirical research has put core
theoretical assumptions on the role of civil society in and for democratization in question.
Following our analytical model to disaggregate the process of external promotion, we proceed on
the assumption that external financial aid yields a division of domestic civil society into externally
funded and non-funded civic actors. We argue that this division and the stagnating democratization
process correlate.
Obviously, domestic civil society is as heterogeneous, pluralistic, and complex as the respective
society itself. Within the framework of democratization, civil society usually deploys a ‘division of
responsibilities’ related to political or social functions. However, external funding seems not only to
comply with that given internal functional differentiation of civil society. Moreover, in the context
of external funding, a certain division between voluntary and professional groups of civil society
has emerged. The phenomenon of a Divided Civil Society appears in most post-socialist countries
alike. This is puzzling, considering that paths of economic, cultural, social, religious, and political
development differ significantly between those countries. That means, there is a high variance in
terms of local conditions, contrasted by a strikingly low variance in the characteristics of the
respective domestic civil societies.
With regard to the differentiation into social and political functions in democratization processes on
the one hand, and to the divide between voluntary and professional characteristics on the other
hand, we may distinguish four subtypes of civil society. The following chart outlines the resulting
typology:
Characteristics
Direct
(Political)
Function in
Democratiz
ation
Indirect
(Social-, WelfareOriented)
Voluntary
Professional
(1)
Opposition
(e.g. Dissidents, Small Initiatives)
(3)
Consistently Funded Organizations:
„Political Service Providers“
(2)
Social Initiatives
(4)
Externally Promoted:
„Social Service Providers“ or
„State Substitutes“
Table 2: The Divided Civil Society
19 Section (1) of the typology in table 2 outlines voluntary initiatives and groups that are part of a
wider societal opposition. They consist of – inter alia – former political dissidents, once agents of
the democratic change who had attained influential positions during the transformation process.
Those groups and activists operate rather spontaneously and are little formalized. Anecdotal rather
than empirical observations suggest that a certain part of this group remains stuck in the mode of
‘societal opposition’ without gaining back political relevance. Staying critical and weary of
democratic backlashes constantly, those former dissidents seem to become marginalized. This
group also includes political grassroots initiatives and small movements – hence, in a way, the
‘ideal type’ of a political civil.
The second section (2) illustrates voluntary initiatives operating within the social sector, often run
by those who are themselves directly affected. These initiatives include for example war veteran
organizations caring for welfare provisions and pensions as well as child care and education
networks. Although there may be an overlap with political work, the groups' focus is on welfare.
On the other side of the table, section (3) outlines highly professionalized political organizations.
Those professionalized structures are often shaped by young and well educated (full-time)
employees from the academic sector. These organizations seem to operate as agencies, thus
representing a part of an (externally fostered) modern employment sector which was hitherto
underdeveloped or non-existing in many post-socialist countries. Organizations of this section
appear compliant to the aims and principles of external democracy promotion. They perform as
implementation organizations and thus as ‘political service providers’ for external donors. At the
same time, there is a high deficit of voluntary activists or financially contributing members.
Section (4) illustrates highly professionalized civil society actors working within the social sector.
They often operate within the context of weak statehood and take on public tasks or social services,
such as the organization of health clinics. The discharge of state actors from their responsibilities
within the education, health, and welfare sectors11 has already been recognized (and discredited)
within the field of traditional development aid. External democracy promotion considers those
actors also as cooperation partners; however, their role within democratization remains
questionable.
11 It is often criticized that if social matters are concerned, many civil society organizations take over the
implementation of tasks that in Western democracies are considered responsibilities of the state administration. This
only corresponds to some of the different models of welfare systems Western states represent and deploy, so that the
‘problem’ of the state's discharge of responsibility may be interpreted differently.
20 The professionalized social and political organizations (3 & 4) seem to be the key partners of
foreign assistance. We hypothesize that the emergence of these professionalized groups is one
specific result of external funding: Foreign assistance creates its own type of cooperation partners
and thus contributes to the divide of domestic civil society induced by material support. This
corresponds to the findings on the “engineered civil society” (Ishkanian 2007). Among these two
subtypes, we find professionalized ‘political service providers’ (3) – analog to the traditional social
service providers (4) – as a new phenomenon. We assume that the emergence of the ‘political
service providers’ as a distinctive subtype marks the divide of civil society. In the view of many
donors, actors of group (3) are described as successful civic organizations, while the consequences
of ‘providing political services’ appear to be under-explored: Democracy promotion via civil
society seems to consist of intended actions which evoke unintended results. This points to an
inherent problem of democracy promotion: Whether the promotion of civil society is a means to an
end (democratization) or an end to itself remain undecided. However, this differentiation of the
complex ‘civil society’ provides an improvement of our research model:
21 Figure 3: Democracy Promotion and the Divided Civil Society
Since donors usually frame their work as democracy promotion via civil society, the support of
‘political service providers’ becomes conflictual. With the help of our model, we propose three
hypotheses on unintended effects of democracy promotion via civil society:
1. Hypothesis: Criss-Cross Support - External Democracy Promotion Leads to the Generation of
Political Service Providers
The first hypothesis concerns a problem that emerges within part A of the model (figure 1) and is
based on the underlying assumptions of donor strategies. We argue that the promotion of functions
related to the ‘watchdog’ (table 1, group 4) produces ‘political service providers’. The analysis of
donors’ aims shows that democracy promotion orients its targets, contents, and ideas towards the
voluntary-political subtype of civil society which we called ‘opposition’ (section 1 in table 2).
Groups and movements like the Solidarność are still seen to have embodied the role model of civil
22 society democratizing authoritarian systems. However, the way external actors try to advance civil
society in this direction generates effects on the organizational side that pushes civil society more
and more towards the subtype of the ‘political service providers’. We call this phenomenon the
‘criss-cross support’ of functional and organizational logics. It seems to lead to professional actors
who implement democratizing functions as agencies. Simultaneously, the genuine but less
standardized subtype of civil society remains disconnected from support because of organizational
shortcomings. The problematic aspect of this phenomenon is that external assistance to ‘political
service providers’ fosters material dependencies: Following tenders released by the donors, civic
groups have to act according to economic rationales. In professionalizing by regularly filing in
applications and employing professional staff, civic groups become agencies, and political civic
action becomes a profession. The resulting business structure of ‘civic action’ does obviously not
comply with a common ideal of a voluntary-political civil society. Instead, external democracy
promotion via civil society has created a new business sector, and so could be considered an
‘external labor market policy’.
2. Hypothesis: External Democracy Promotion Might Counteract Social Capital
The second hypothesis touches upon the interaction processes between the different subtypes of
civil society (part B in the model): We argue that the divide implies a conflicting situation within
civil society. Through its contribution to the division into professionalized and voluntary civil
society actors, external assistance generates processes of disintegration: In strengthening only actors
working according to certain democracy promotion criteria, external democracy promotion
intervenes in and may even distort the political competition of groups, interests, and methods.
Hence, externally supported civil society actors are often seen as ‘agents’ of Western states. The
promotion of functions related to ‘social capital’ (table 1, group 2) as a central means to
democratization is thereby counteracted. Instead, external democracy promotion causes distrust
within the ‘Divided Civil Society’.
3. Hypothesis: External Democracy Promotion May Alienate Civic Groups from its Constituencies
Third, the relation of democracy promotion to its constituency (part C) is ambiguous. If civil society
is seen by donors as a means to target society, respective interconnections ought to be defined.
Obviously, the subtypes of civil society point to different target groups and aim at different levels of
society. It remains uncertain whether and how external support can strengthen these ties and
provide opportunity structures to unfold civil society's democratizing potential. Particularly the
relations of the ‘political service provides’ with the state and its institutions are questionable. We
assume that, since ‘social service providers’ run social institutions, ‘political service providers’
23 might ‘run’ alternative state institutions – for example, they could design shadow reforms, establish
shadow cabinets, and the like. From a democratic perspective, the respective legitimacy is highly
controversial. The role of ‘political service providers’ is ambivalent with respect to participative
opinion making, political parties and to state institutions who are often themselves partners of
external democracy promotion actors. The more civic actors have to comply with externally set
economic rationales and agendas, the more they get alienated from concerns within their domestic
society. If linkage between civil society and the domestic audience as well as the political system is
low, civic actors seem to act within a vacuum. Thus, we expect that the inherent logic of external
democracy promotion renders it difficult for supported civil society actors to implement
democratizing functions.
Summarizing, we can state that the given internal functional differentiation of civil society is not
only a structure on which external assistance operates. Moreover, external democracy promotion
also produces an additional divide. This divide implies unintended effects, provoking not only
normative but also practical criticism. The typology of civil society reveals certain analytical gaps
in the research on democracy promotion and civil society. We state that the different subtypes –
social and political actors, volunteer and professionalized organizations – are handled differently by
external donors of money, knowledge, and ideas. Thus, different forms and strategies of external aid
yield different forms and roles of civil society with respect to its democratizing potential. The
analytical model combines the insights of different theories on civil society, organizational
development, and democratization. It proposes a system of hypotheses and research questions that
is compatible with distinctive and interdisciplinary research strands. In bringing these together, we
propose an integrative approach to the dispersed attempts of theorizing and systematizing external
democracy promotion and civil society in post-socialist countries. Rather than stating that civil
society is simply ‘weak’, or that donors are not aware of what they are doing, and that democracy
promotion does not cause democratization, we should ask for the specific aims of support, for the
constraints and potentials of the supported subtype of civil society, and for the coherence of input
and output dimension of democracy promotion. The model might encourage scholars to integrate
theoretic approaches into their research on civil society that have been more popular in other
contexts to date.
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