1
EGOBUEZE ANTHONY
PG/Ph.D/05/40129
THE ROLE OF THE RIVERS STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY IN CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT,
1999-2011
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Chukwuma Ugwuoke
Digitally Signed by: Content manager‘s Name
DN : CN = Webmaster‘s name
O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka
OU = Innovation Centre
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THE ROLE OF THE RIVERS STATE HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT,
1999-2011
BY
EGOBUEZE ANTHONY
PG/Ph.D/05/40129
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE AWARD OF THE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN GOVERNMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
SUPERVISOR:
PROFESSOR OKECHUKWU IBEANU
JUNE, 2013
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1.
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Sections 4(1) and 4(7) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provide
for the law-making function of the legislature at both the Federal and State levels.
Consequently, there is a bi-cameral National Assembly made up of the Senate and House of
Representatives at the Federal level, and the 36 unicameral State Houses of Assembly, all
legislating for peace, order and good governance of the Federation and States respectively
(Egobueze, 2010:4). Since the return to democracy in Nigeria in 1999, four Legislative
Assemblies have been elected at both the Federal and State levels. These are 1999-2003,
2003-2007, 2007-2011 and 2011-2015. In each of these elections, thirty two legislators were
elected to the Rivers State House of Assembly. This is in conformity with Section 91 of the
1999 Constitution of Nigeria which states, inter alia:
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of Assembly
of a State shall consist of three or four times the number of seats
which that State has in the House of Representatives divided in a
way to reflect, as far as possible nearly equal population: Provided
that a House of Assembly of a State shall consist of not less than
twenty-four and not more than forty members (FGN, 1999).
The Rivers State House of Assembly is a unicameral legislature with thirty – two Members.
The 1999-2003 Assembly was composed of three political parties viz; the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP), later All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP)
and Alliance Democracy (AD), while all the others have had only members of the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP) without an opposition party member in the House. The House
currently has the following Officers: the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, House Leader, Deputy
House Leader, House Whip and Deputy House Whip. Worthy to note is that all other
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Members of the House are Chairmen of Committees and each of them is a member of not less
than four Committees.
The legislature is the yardstick for measuring the views of the people in a democracy.
It is also the watch dog of public funds in that it not only appropriates for the State but
scrutinizes how the funds so appropriated are spent. Finally, the legislature is constitutionally
mandated to direct investigations into the conduct of the affairs of State, institutions,
organizations and individuals within the State. In other words, the legislature has the right to
summon any public or private organization or individual to appear before it to answer
questions based on petitions received and or motions made. The Rivers State House of
Assembly as a legislative body upholds these mandates. The tripartite functions of the
legislature namely, Representation, Legislation and Oversight are central to this research
because they manifest in the intervention of the legislature in conflict management.
It is important to note that the political landscape of Nigeria particularly in the Niger
Delta has been characterized by one conflict or the other. Most of these conflicts have either
been for economic, political, religious and or other social reasons. Executive, Legislative and
Judicial means have been adopted in the resolution of these conflicts. From 1966 when Isaac
Adaka Boro formed the Delta Volunteer Force (DVF) to confront the Nigerian State against
perceived oppression and marginalization till date, the oil rich Rivers State has witnessed
several conflict situations that have to do with oil, economic wealth, politics and the
misapplication of the huge resources that come with them. Some of these conflicts were the
Ogoni crises which resulted to the death of prominent Ogoni leaders including the
environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa in the 1995, the Umuechem crisis; and the Ogbakiri crises.
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the State has witnessed not less than forty five
conflicts that culminated in the loss of many lives and properties. Prominent among these are
Emuoha Civil Disturbances 1999, 2001, 2002, 2010; Ogbakiri communal crisis 1999, 2011;
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Choba-Wilbros crisis 1999; Okrika crisis 2002-2003, 2007; Tombia crisis 2002-2003;
Omuma crisis 2003, 2007-2011 among others. The above conflicts in the oil rich State have
majorly been between the government forces and some militant elements on one hand and
inter or intra communal on the other hand. The conflicts have been mainly attributed to
economic and political factors, that is, quest for economic wealth as well as political power.
Conflict is not only a threat to human rights, but also a barrier to development. Violent
conflicts can reverse decades of development gains. The costs of preventing conflicts are far
lower than the costs associated with recovery. Effective and responsive programming in the
field of democratic governance can be a major component of work to prevent violent conflict
and support post-conflict peace building. Through their everyday work of representing
constituents, law-making, oversight of government activities, and the process of political
contests, Legislative Houses have a critical role to play in conflict prevention and resolution.
Legitimately, elected Houses provide a forum for the concerns of diverse societal groups to
be aired and incorporated into processes of dialogue, reconstruction and conflict resolution.
The legislature is a natural place for mediation, where competing points of view can be
represented. By providing a forum to debate contentious issues peacefully, the House helps
prevent violent political conflicts. Such dialogue can help to prevent conflicts by generating
an understanding of the challenges facing society, and a consensus on how to address them.
In this way, the legislature can mitigate the divisions caused by conflicts by developing an
inclusive vision for society, based on commonly held values and goals.
For democratic governance to peacefully manage conflicts, Executive bodies must
function efficiently and effectively. This requires ‗Legislative oversight of the Executive‘, a
core Legislative function. The Legislature connects citizens with the State and holds
governments to account for their actions or inactions on critical issues that have bearing on
conflicts. For instance, the Legislature can ensure that government works to resolve a conflict
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between the University Unions and the Executive by providing in the Appropriation Law,
good remuneration for the University workers. Also, in order to check restiveness of youths,
it could eradicate the seeds of conflicts by advocating for pro-poor policies, monitoring the
implementation of poverty reduction strategies, and by ensuring that the appropriation — and
its implementation — respond to popular needs and expectations. The Legislature also
promotes dialogue on budgetary issues and communicates the reasons behind the allocation
of resources, to ‗manage‘ constituents‘ expectations and minimize conflicts that result from
competition for scarce resources.
Legislative oversight of the security sector is a crucial element of the balance of
power within a democracy. Legislators have a critical role to play in monitoring the use of the
State budget for security sector expenses and in reviewing draft laws on security issues. As
citizens‘ representatives, they could relay citizen‘s concerns and priorities to be incorporated
into security laws and policies.
It is essential to state that the Executive has always been a dominant player in conflict
resolution and creating political stability. However, the role of the Legislature has most often
been considered tangential. More studies have been done on the Executive in general and the
Legislature at the Federal level than the State, but none of these studies featured the role of
the Legislature in conflict management. Okoosi-Simbine (2007:9) avers that a logical study
of the Legislature in contemporary Nigeria is the National Assembly, where empirical
indications of a malfunctioning Legislature are regularly featured in Nigerian dailies. Some
major studies on the Legislature in Nigeria and germane to our research are (Alabi and
Egbowole, 2010; Olusanya & Akindele, 1986; Ayodele, 2002:12-24; Ayua, Guobadia and
Adekunle, 2000; Bello Imam, 2004:406-426; Dunmoye, Njoku and Aluba, 2007; Egobueze,
2010; Egwu, 2005; Guobadia and Azinge, 2007; Ogwu and Alli, 2007; Mbah, 2007;
Nwabueze 2007; Nzeribe, 2004).
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It is therefore important to the discipline of political science that more empirical
research be produced on the contributions of the Legislature to conflict management and
political stability generally. Mishler and Hildreth (1984:26-27) are correct about studies of
the Legislature when they note that:
…the available research tends to be impressionistic and based on
case studies of one or at most a small group of nations having
typically similar legislative systems, political cultures, regime
types, and levels of economic and political development. Even
then, the conclusions are inconsistent and contradictory.
Consequently, we still may not understand whether, to what extent, and under what
conditions legislatures contribute to political stability or its breakdown. The question still is,
as Wahlke (1971:165) posed it, "how do representative bodies contribute to the generation
and maintenance of support? In what respects and for what particular aspects of the task are
they superior to non-representative institutions?"
This work attempts to redress this neglect by examining the critical role that the
Legislature plays in conflict management focusing on the Rivers State House of Assembly
between 1999 and 2011. This covers the period between the reintroduction of democratic rule
on 29th May, 1999 to 29th May, 2011 when the 6th Assembly came into being. That is, it
covers the 4th, 5th and 6th Assemblies. The period is associated with years of uninterrupted
civil rule, based on the presidential system at all tiers of government in Nigeria. In a nutshell,
this is a study of the role of the legislature in creating political stability through its role in
conflict management in Rivers State.
1.2.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is generally assumed by both political scientists and policy makers that conflict
management is principally the role of the Executive and Judicial arms of government. The
role of the Legislature in conflict management is assumed to be incidental, often limited to
enactment of legislations to give effect to negotiated agreements or curb the proliferation of
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conflicts. This is assumed to be the case for both international and domestic conflicts. In
international conflicts, the executive arm of government takes the lead in foreign policy,
especially in treaty making and implementation. Although in some jurisdictions like Nigeria,
the Legislature is required to domesticate international treaties before they come into effect,
in reality, once treaties have been entered into, their domestication becomes almost a routine
exercise. On the other hand, in domestic conflicts, it is assumed that the Executive and
Judiciary take the lead. This is so for a number of reasons; first, it is principally in the process
of implementing government policies that most domestic conflicts arise and the Executive
arm, as the policy implementation arm of government, is at the fore of managing these
conflicts. Secondly, as the arm of government which principally incarnates the capacity and
authority of the state, the Executive arm has responsibility to manage conflicts and create
political order and stability. Thirdly, the Judiciary is central to conflict management because
of its role as the interpreter of policies and legislation. Finally, the role of the Legislative arm
in conflict resolution is subdued because as a body, it incarnates the diversities of society and
it is precisely such diversities that create the fault lines of conflicts in the first place. Some
scholars however argue that:
Recognizing the minimal role played by most legislatures in the
lawmaking and policy processes, scholars increasingly have
attempted to account for the prevalence, persistence, and apparent
regenerative capacity of legislative institutions in terms of their
putative contributions to political stability. The argument usually
advanced is that by providing an institutional forum for the
representation of societal diversity and the expression of dissent,
legislatures contribute to the integration of society and the
legitimation of both government and regime. In so doing,
legislatures are credited with reducing levels of political conflict,
rendering conflict more manageable, and mitigating the effects of
conflict on government and regime (Mishler and Hildreth,
1984:25-26).
In support of the above school of thought, Loewenberg and Patterson (1979, 65-67) are
careful to point out that:
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Legislatures are not the only or even the most important
institutions that perform these functions. They also note that some
legislatures perform these functions better than others and that in
some circumstances legislatures may even exacerbate political
conflict and undermine stability. Nevertheless, they conclude that
when political leaders collectively deliberate on political issues in
public, that they do so, how they do so, and to what effect they do
so have profound consequences for the survival of political system.
In countries divided by conflicts, and where the management of conflicts by the
executive and judicial branches of government have been ineffective, there is an urgent need
for reconciliation to enable all communities to work together towards a common vision of a
peaceful future. The Legislature can exercise a leadership role in a broad reconciliation
process by building relationships across party lines and by bringing to bear its oversight
functions. Also, they can use their legislative role to promote reconciliation, for example by
drafting laws that address grievances in representation (e.g. electoral or constitutional
reforms), human rights legislation or minority rights legislation that lessens animosities
between communities. By participating in the legislative process in a spirit of co-operation to
produce such laws – and by strengthening judicial independence to support their
implementation – parliaments can play a key role in supporting conflict prevention. In all, the
role of the legislature in conflict management could be linked to the concept of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR).
This research examines the role of the Legislature in conflict management in a
conflict prone emerging democracy like Nigeria. It seeks to explain the rising role of the
legislature in conflict management in Nigeria. Dominant paradigms frozen in the assumption
that the Legislature only makes laws completely ignore the dynamic and changing role of that
organ of government, particularly in situations where traditional institutions of conflict
management are either underdeveloped or ineffective. The legislature as the creator of
institutional rules and the collective democratic will of the people increasingly plays a role in
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conflict management in such contexts. In fact as Meny (1993:186) suggests, the role or state
of the legislature is a crucial indicator of the state of health of democratic government.
The nature and dynamics of conflict and the processes of conflict management differ
from one institution to the other and from sector to sector in a society. However, the driving
forces for conflictual relationships remain largely the same. Nieuwmeijer and Cloete (2001:4)
opine that:
The driving forces for conflictual relationship consist of the
perceptions by one or more individuals or groups of conflicting or
diverging values, aspirations, needs or interests in society, that
hamper the full realisation or fulfilment of one‘s own values,
aspirations, needs or interests. If these perceptions are intense
enough, they are transformed into actions to redress the perceived
problem by mobilising resources to promote one‘s own interests at
the cost of others, resulting in an escalation of tension among the
parties concerned.
The specific issues around which conflict revolves, the manifestations of the conflict and the
conflict management strategies and processes, however, are different in the social, cultural,
organizational, economic, technological and political sectors of society. It is instructive to
state that the management of conflicts falls basically with the responsibilities traditional to
the executive and the judiciary. However, it is sad to note that these institutions have not been
able to adequately stem conflicts. Instead, conflicts have deepened in Nigeria and indeed
Rivers State. As a result of this perceived inefficiency, Legislative bodies as the broadest
representatives of the people have been inundated with petitions from the public about
conflicts. The implication of this is that there is the growing trust and confidence by the
people in the ability of the Legislature to resolve conflicts. Therefore, the relevant question is
not whether Legislatures contribute to political stability or change: some undoubtedly
facilitate stability; others promote change; still others have little effect on either; and all are
susceptible to reciprocal influences from their environments, that is, the political system.
Nonetheless, the important question, rather, is under what conditions are Legislatures likely
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to contribute to stability as measured by conflict management and to what extent is this
feasible? What combination of legislative structures and procedures is most conducive to
political stability, under what circumstances, in what social, economic, and political settings
are citizens more likely to trust the Legislature with conflict management than they would
with the Executive and the Judiciary? To this end therefore, this research seeks to answer the
following questions:
1. Does the direct interest of members of the Legislature in conflicts lead to increased
involvement of the Legislature in conflict management?
2. Does the failure of the Executive and Judiciary to reduce conflicts increase the
involvement of the legislature in conflict management?
3. Does the involvement of the Legislature in conflict management enhance political
stability?
1.3.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The general objective of this study is to explain the rising role of the Legislature in conflict
management and, therefore, in creating political stability in emerging democracies like
Nigeria. More specifically, this study seeks to:
1.
Investigate whether the direct interest of the members of the Legislature in a
conflict would lead to the increased involvement of the Legislature in conflict
management.
2.
Ascertain whether the failure of the Executive and Judiciary to reduce conflicts
would increase the involvement of the legislature in conflict management.
3.
Determine whether the successful management of conflict by the Legislature
would enhance political stability in Rivers State
4.
Make recommendations that would engender peace and stability capable of
stemming conflicts and promoting good governance in the State.
1.4.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
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The empirical significance of this study is that it treats a current and socially relevant subject.
It is important to state that the Legislature not only represents the masses, but also enacts
laws and conducts oversight especially on the Executive branch of government, which
implements the laws made. Through its power of the purse, motions/resolutions as well as
bills, the legislature could stem the tide of bad governance and redirect the focus of
government to be transparent and very accountable to the people, this the World Bank argues,
is relevant in modern democracy.
There is dearth of empirical theoretical knowledge on the Legislature in Nigeria‘s
politics, because of the long period of military rule, which invariably was characterized by
the sack of the Legislature and its replacement with military (decrees) making structures with
different nomenclatures at different times in our political history. These antidemocratic forces
were features of governance in Nigeria till the rebirth of democracy in May, 29, 1999, when
all democratic institutions were restored with Chief Obasanjo as the President and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Most literature
dwelled essentially on the Executive which had fully evolved ignoring the position of the
Legislature, study on the Legislature is currently agitating the mind of scholars and provoking
discourse in social science. Furthermore, the major theoretical significance of the studies lie
essentially in filling a major theoretical gap on the rising role of the Legislature in conflict
management.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study critically looks at the legislature and conflict management in Rivers State. In order
to establish our work within the context of others related to this study, we would critically
examine the contributions of some scholars on conflict, political stability and the legislature.
Therefore, this research seeks to review the legislature and conflict management, and
legislative/executive relations, conflict management and political stability.
Political Stability
The concept of political stability is nebulous. It can refer among many other things to the
level of domestic political order or violence, the continuity of the government in power, the
persistence of the basic constitutional framework, or the public's feelings of support,
opposition, or apathy toward their country, its institutions, or political leaders (Mishler and
Hildreth, 1984:33). Political stability is the level of domestic political order or violence, the
continuity of the government in power, the persistence of the basic constitutional framework,
or the public's feelings of support, opposition, or apathy toward their country, its institutions,
or political leaders. Sharma, (1989) sees stability as synonymous with endurance equilibrium,
viability and durability. That is, political stability to him refers to endurance of political
system. The equilibrium is a resultant condition of the political system in the wake of socioeconomic cultural changes to maintain viability of the regime and durability of the
government or administration. Moreover, Loewenberg and Patterson (1979:299) as cited in
Mishler and Hildreth remind us, ―stability in some of these respects can be accompanied by
instability in others. Urban guerrillas may create violence in the midst of stable institutions;
the nation may continue to exist although the central institutions of government change, some
members of the public may defy government decisions without fomenting violence.‖ At a
minimum, following Easton's (1965:177, 194, 213) cited in Mishler and Hildreth that
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distinction of the community, government authorities, and the regime as separate objects of
political support, it is important to distinguish three general types of stability: mass stability
or the absence of political violence and disorder; regime stability or the continuity of basic
political institutions; and government stability or the continuity of government leaders,
political parties, and public policies.
Many reasons have been adduced in the literature as causes of instability in Nigeria
and indeed the Third World, the most outstanding is the absence of good governance,
interpreted variously as lack of competitive democratic practice, accountability and absence
of rule of law. These hydra headed factors mentioned above, lead to crack of the political
system and crystalline to political instability. Ojo (2006:1) holds that:
Those who studied new democracies such as ours tell us that many
of them do face threats of illegal or pseudo-democratic overthrow
by anti-democratic force. Many faces more faceless spectacular
changes but contend with the more insidious dangers of decay,
more incremental and less transparent forms of regression that
usually lead to a fuzzy semi-democracy, a hybrid regime
somewhere between liberal democracy and dictatorship.
Zachariah (1997) views this scenario as ―a permanent agile illiberal democracy‖. Thus, there
is democratic erosion at all levels of Nigeria‘s political life. The basic principles of popular
sovereignty, participation and accountability which entail selecting government and making
them accountable to the citizens which Mayo (1960) asserts:
Popular control of policy makers, political equality of all adult
citizens, effectiveness of popular control and building majority
decision if and when the representatives are divided on an issue are
invisible in our democratic process.
There is also the subversion of the Rule of Law, which simply means limitation of the
powers of the rulers. For Ojo (2006:2) election and accountability to the electorate are
defining characters of democracy. Indeed, the dilemma of democracy is that free and fair
elections may produce racists, fascists, ethnic jingoists, separatists and religious bigots. Or
government produced by free and fair elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted,
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irresponsible, dominated by special interest, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by
the public good (Agbakoba, 1999). To prevent tyranny, liberal constitutionalism emphasizes
separation of powers, checks and balances in the power of each branch of government,
equality under the law and impartial courts/tribunals. The challenge to good governance
which enhances political order is associated with the dominance of the executive over the
other branches of government, most importantly the legislature. The Executive arm of
government has been a constant factor as the prime mechanism for governing Nigeria
(Robert, 2002) and (Benjamin, 1999). It has remained a dominant ‗power house‘ of
government operations and has orchestrated corruption and incapacity to manage effectively
the polity. The inefficiency of the Executive arm of government to effectively manage the
polity has incarnated crisis which has led to economic, social and political instability. From
the President through the thirty-six State Governors to the Seven Hundred and Seventy-Four
Local Government Chairmen, the executive has arrogated to itself absolute and enormous
powers inconsistent with modern Constitutions (Egobueze, 2009:3). They see themselves as
infallible and men and women of absolute wisdom, thus, continuing with the centralization
of authority of the military era, despite widespread cry for reversal. Just like the President
and the State Governors, the Local Government Chairmen have continued to usurp the
powers and rights of other branches of government, most importantly, the Legislature. The
Legislature which is empowered to check and control Executive excesses, has failed to do so
either because of fear of retaining their tickets (getting re-elected) or desire for personal
aggrandizements. Instead of guarding against the Legislature‘s powers vis-à-vis the
executive, legislators have extensively fallen prey to the ageless tradition of divide and rule
introduced by our colonial masters and entrenched by successive regimes in Nigeria
(Egobueze, 2009:6). The horizontal executive encroachment on other branches of
government, visibly the Legislature, has devastating effects on our democracy. It not only
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defeats the spirit and letter of the principle of Separation of Powers, but it undermines the
philosophy of good governance. The absence of good governance leads to disaffection
among various groups in the polity. The effects of this therefore, are acrimonious
contestation and political upheaval that have defined our political life.
Omololu (2007:32) asserts that one of the major factors responsible for political
instability is the failure of the political class to sufficiently adhere to the basic tenets of
democracy and constitutionalism. As Harriman (2006:2) has rightly noted, this situation ―has
given rise to abuse of power, brazen corruption, disregard for due process and the rule of law,
intolerance of political opposition, abuse of the electoral process and the weakening of
institutions.‖ This contradicts the tenet of governance, which presupposes ―the process of
social engagement between the rulers and the ruled in a political community‖ (Adejumobi,
2004).
Political stability and or instability has occupied a central stage in social science
research. Prominent contributions are those of Studies in political development in ‗new
states‘ by Huntington (1965), Ake (1975), Nnoli, Shill (1966), Almond et al (1960), Lars
Rudebeck et al (1998), O‘Daniel and
Schimitter (1986), Folola and Ihonvbere (1985),
Callage (1984), Clapham (1985) among others were conducted from different theoretical
perspectives. These studies were of modernization, to the strains of liberal, neo-liberal and
radical perspectives.
Studies predicated on modernization perspective locate socio-economic factors ‗and
the rise of strong middle class‘ to explain political in (stability) and democratic evolution in
new states. In his contribution, Fukuyama, while in a foreword to Samuel Philip Huntington‘s
book as cited in Huntington (2006: xii) observes that modernization theorists placed a strong
normative value on being modern, and in their view, the good things of modernity tended to
go together. Economic development, changing social relationships like urbanization and the
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breakdown of primary kinship groups, higher and more inclusive levels of education,
normative shift towards values like‘ achievement‘ and rationality, secularization, and the
development of democratic political institutions were all seen as interdependent whole.
Economic development would fuel better education, which would lead to value change,
which would promote modern politics, and so on in a virtuous circle. Leading this school of
thought is Huntington. Huntington (1968:32) describes modernization as a multifaceted
process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity. He stresses the
importance of modern political institutional structures as guarantors of political stability in
society. He argues that ‗political decay‘ entails instability in the society, that is, political
order depends to a large extent on the relationship between the development of political
institutions and the modernization of new social forces into politics (Huntington, 1968:vii).
Huntington believes that the prevalence of political instability in ‗developing societies‘ stem
largely from rapid social change and rapid modernization of new groups into politics, coupled
with slow development of political institutions (Huntington, 1968:4). He sees the absence of
broad participation of the citizens in politics as a source of instability. For Huntington,
political instability was rife in twentieth-century Asia, Africa, and Latin America in large part
because the rate of modernization was so much faster than it had in the earlier modernizing
countries.
Mishler and Hildreth (1985) hold the view that Modernization theory assumed that
conflicts in developing societies were borne out of the fact that the peoples who constituted
these societies originated from varied cultures that engaged themselves in bloody duels
before the advent of the ‗civilisers‘. Modernization theory was based on the premise of
existentialism, the theorist advanced charismatic national leadership, national parties, national
youth movements, national political institutions, western education, advances in
communication and transportation, and urbanization – indeed modernization – as catalysts for
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integration. However, in a major critique of modernization theory, Melson and Wolpe
(1971:3) asserted that, ―inter-group conflict is seldom a product of simple cultural diversity
and, in the Nigerian case there is little that is ‗traditional‘ about the contemporary pattern of
political divisions. On the contrary, Nigeria‘s political crisis is traceable directly to the
widening of social horizons and to the process of modernization at work within the national
boundaries‖.
On the other hand, radical scholars like Ake, Nnoli, David and Schimitter, Folola and
Ihonvbere among others locate the role of classes, the dynamics of their incessant struggle,
and centre periphery issues and political instability in excolonies as the causes of instability
in new states. Ake (1975:273) argues that, the regularity of the flow of political exchanges;
the more regular the flow of political exchanges, the more stability. Although, we may state
that there is political stability to the extent that members of the society restrict themselves to
the behavioral patterns that fall within their political expectations. Any act that deviates from
these limits is an instance of political instability. Ake therefore visualizes political stability as
an absence of structural change, or conversely, or presence of continuity and patterns.
According to Ake as cited in (Shama, 1989) a political system is stable when the inputs and
output between its component unit… and between it… and its environment are regular
enough to make possible the persistence of the main structural patterns of the system. He
continues, we may say the political system is stable when the impact on the system of the
dysfunctional processes generated by the system and environment are neutralized to the
extent of keeping them from altering the structure of the political system. To Ake, the system
that is capable of neutralizing the dysfunctional process are authoritarian, paternal, identific
and consensual. If any of these attributes is missing, then, the system will tend to be instable.
Political instability in one form or the other has been a recurring phenomenon in the
history of mankind. Its occurrence has often coincided with the rise and fall of political
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system/regimes. Political science has consistently puzzled itself with the problem of political
instability, its causes, characteristics, consequence and cures. Changing notions about the
State, new formed governments, the relationship between the state and the individuals,
economic rights, individual right and liberty, rising expectations for freedom and society are
all indices for the search for a durable form of government. As this idea for a perfect form of
government has not yet been found, no government can be totally immune from instability
(Sharma, 1989).
The nature and patterns of political instability have changed considerably due to
historical acceleration process of modernization, development in technology and
communication in the last century (Sharma, 1989). Both old and new states have experienced
massive disorder, violent change and sometimes even total breakdown of their political
system. Since after the Second World War, many nations have witnessed upheavals; the most
current being the wind of change in the Arab world popularly known as ‗Arab Spring‘, the
London civil disturbances, the Oslo carnage, the Niger Delta upheaval, the Buko Haram
phenomenon in several parts of Nigeria to mention but a few.
Studies show that substantive efforts have been made to ascertain some fundamentals
requisite of political stability. Some of these are: distribution of wealth, geographical
location, attitude towards the state, experience with revolution, class structure, appropriate
political institutions, presence of independent political groups, role of elites and racial
capacity. In his contribution, Hurwitz (1973:450) itemized the following as approaches to
political stability: the absence of violence; governmental longevity; the existence of a
legitimate constitutional regime; the absence of structural change and a multifaceted social
attribute.
Usman (2000) opines that the political stability of any form of government has to
involve the stable realisation of the political essence of that form of government. The political
21
stability of a communal gerontocracy in villages and small towns headed by elders under an
age grade system means the continuation of the exercise of power by those who have reached
the appropriate age at various levels of the system. The political stability of a feudal
monarchy means the continuation of the exercise of power by the heirs of the dynasty or
dynasties who produce the monarch. The political stability of the type of democracy provided
for in our constitution means the continuation of the exercise of power by those freely elected
by the people of this country for specific periods with definite mandates which conform to
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy clearly defined in
chapter II of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended.
While explaining political stability, it is difficult to avoid normative conditions; it is
the extent of effectiveness in the maintenance of political order in a society. This implies
stability of the political system, viability of political regime and durability of government.
That is, the components of political stability are society, regime and government. The extent
of stability depends on them. The first property, which is the society, implies that demands in
the society are processed in an orderly and peaceful manner. The use of violence to further
political ends is not justified against norms associated with domestic polity. However, mild
violence may be adopted sometimes but this depends on the political culture of the state.
Political regime or government and its personnel are good measure of political stability.
Longevity of certain government breaches stability. The revolution in the Arab world which
claimed dozens of lives is an indicator of this.
Moreover, as Loewenberg and Patterson (1979: 299) remind us, "stability in some of
this respect can be accompanied by instability in others. Urban guerrillas may create violence
in the midst of stable institutions; the nation may continue to exist although the central
institutions of government change, some members of the public may defy government
decisions without fomenting violence. It is important to distinguish three general types of
22
stability: mass stability or the absence of political violence and disorder; regime stability or
the continuity of basic political institutions; and government stability or the continuity of
government leaders, political parties, and public policies. In all, to determine the extent of
political stability of a polity, we must be able to systematically identify both regularities and
irregularities in the flow of political exchanges. Political behavior or act of exchange is
regular if it does not violate the system or pattern of political exchange; it is irregular if it
violates that pattern.
Political instability in Nigeria stems from the inability of its ‗bourgeoisie‘ to take
control over other classes in the struggle ‗to create a viable hegemony in the social formation
(Folola and Ihonvbere, 1985: 234). A close examination of political instability in Rivers State
indicates that both the modernization and the radical scholars have been unable to provide
solutions to the persistent conflicts in the state in particular and Nigeria at large. They are yet
to address the roots of the problem. Questions about why, how and when the instability
evolves are yet to be addressed.
Conflict and Conflict Management
It is a well known fact that neighbours are our biggest assets as they most often stand by us
whenever we need them. Let us take the example of Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers states in
Nigeria or at international level, India and Pakistan. The duo are twin sisters as there is hardly
any difference in the culture, religion, climatic conditions, eating habits of the people staying
in both states and the countries, but, the two states and countries are always at loggerheads.
Small issues between the two sister states and countries have triggered a conflict between
them which has now become a major concern for both the states and countries.
Conflict is inherent in all societies and arises when two or more groups believe their
interests are incompatible. ‗Conflict‘ is not, however, interchangeable with ‗violence‘. Nonviolent resolution is possible when individuals and groups have trust in their governing
23
structures, society and institutions to manage incompatible interests. Conflict becomes a
problem when this trust and respective conflict management capacities are absent and
conflicting parties choose instead to resort to the use of force to secure their goals. While no
single definition of conflict exists, most definitions confluence around two broad views: that
there are at least two independent groups, the groups perceive some incompatibility between
themselves, and the groups interact with each other in some way. Two example definitions
are, ―process in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively
affected by another party" (Wall & Callister, 1995:517), and ―the interactive process
manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance within or between social entities‖
(Rahim, 1992:16). Conflict occurs with two or more people who, despite their first attempts
at agreement, do not yet have agreement on a course of action, usually because their values,
perspectives and opinions are contradictory in nature.
Thus, conflict is the ―process in which one party perceives that its interests are being
opposed or negatively affected by another party" that is, it is ―the interactive process
manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance within or between social entities‖.
Conflict is a clash between individuals arising out of a difference in thought process,
attitudes, understanding, interests, requirements and even sometimes perceptions. Conflict
results in heated arguments, physical abuses and definitely loss of peace and harmony. A
conflict can actually change relationships; persons, communities, states and countries that
were hitherto friends may become foes as a result of conflict. A small conflict not controlled
at the correct time may lead to a large war and rifts among countries leading to major unrest
and disharmony. Conflicts can be of many types like verbal conflict, religious conflict,
emotional conflict, social conflict, personal conflict, organizational conflict, community
conflict and so on.
24
Conflict management is the implementation of strategies to limit the negative aspects
of conflict and to increase the positive aspects of conflict at a level equal to or higher than
where the conflict is taking place. That is, conflict management aims at the enhancement of
learning and group outcomes and effectiveness in organizational setting. It is not concerned
with eliminating all conflict or avoiding conflict, but limiting conflicts. Conflict management
normally aims at the settlement or regulation of disputes (peaceful or violent) about
conflicting relevant values, interests or preferences; and about the general access to resources
at governmental level in society. Poor conflict management remains a major source of
political instability in countries the problem of good governance like Nigeria.
The Legislature and Conflict Management
The legislators, not only have the capacity to represent their people, but also legislate for
peace and good governance of the State. This involves in the main, having a say in translating
preferences into policy through the enactment of high impact laws that would engender peace
and security of the lives and properties of the citizens. Good legislations check conflicts and
this is very essential in every stable democracy. This, Johnson and Nakamara (1999) say
requires reconciling differences once articulated, as well as pressing the legislature‘s claim to
power against the executive and other power holders such as political parties. Thus, law making is important to the Legislature, just as policy implementation is to the Executive, and
interpretation of laws, to the Judiciary. The three arms of government must work in coordinate relationship in order to maintain peace and security and provide the dividends of
democracy to the people. Conflict has remained a dominant feature of modern democracies
because of lack of service delivery by the State to the citizens, and unhealthy rivalry of the
ruling elites for access to political and economic power and wide spread corruption. Nations
are almost sliding to self destruction as a result of conflicts; USAID (2004:1) argues that:
25
‗Civil‘ conflict has become the dominant mode of violence in the
post-Cold War era. In 2001, all but one of the world‘s wars was
internal, and widespread, deadly violence now affects nearly 60
percent of the countries of the world. While conflict can be an
inherent and legitimate part of social and political life, in many
places the costs and consequences of conflict, crisis, and instability
have become unacceptably high. Internal conflict causes
tremendous human suffering with a disproportionate share of the
costs falling on civilian victims. In today‘s wars, civilians are nine
times more likely to be killed than combatants. By the year 2000,
internal conflict and repression had generated 14.5 million asylum
seekers worldwide and nearly 25 million persons were displaced
within their own countries. Child soldiers, gender-specific
atrocities, and the targeting of aid workers are all part of ―new
war‖ scenarios.
The word ‗conflict‘ (Latin, conflictus) means ‗fighting or a struggle for mastery‘; ‗a quarrel‘.
It means therefore a combat; a striving to oppose or overcome active opposition. Many
scholars have defined the word in different ways, but for the purpose of this study, we would
look at the usefulness of some of these definitions to our study. Conflict arises as a result of
frustration of important life goals or profound disruption of life cycles and methods of coping
with life stressors. Huggett (1999) in Uchendu (2007: 10) see ‗conflict as a struggle, a strong
disagreement, a clash between contradictory wishes, to be incompatible, to oppose‘. That is,
it is opposing interest that occurs in relationship. Thomas (1992: 891) visualizes conflict as
'the process which begins when one party perceives that another has frustrated, or is about to
frustrate, some concern of his'. Conflict is an expressed struggle between at least two inter
dependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce rewards and interferences from
the other part in achieving their goals. Finally, it is a situation in which people, group or
countries are involved in a serious disagreement or argument; this could be a violent or
fighting, or a situation where there are opposing ideas, opinions, feelings or wishes, a
situation where it is difficult to choose.
Conflict management normally is the settlement or regulation of disputes (peaceful or
violent) about conflicting relevant values, interests or preferences; and about the general
26
access to resources at governmental level in society (Burgess & Burgess 1997:77 and Miall,
Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:21). According to Ifesinachi in Ikejiani-Clark (2009:104)
conflict management is the operationalization and responses to the enforcement of the
strategic provisions, goals and ideals of conflict resolution agenda. Conflict Management is
the complementary role of process and structural interventions, and some diagnostic
questions to help practitioners identify key intervention targets.
Once conflict has broken out, prevention is obviously not an option any more, and the
next best strategy is the need to resolve it. Acceptance and regulation only becomes an option
once resolution is also not possible. As stated above, resolution implies a primary focus on
the deep-seated roots of the problem, as well as the creation of conditions within which such
attempts at resolution can be implemented and pursued relatively effectively (Burgess &
Burgess 1997:76). It therefore means both a short term focus on a de-escalation of the
conflict into more peaceful and rational and less violent and emotional interaction among the
conflicting parties, and a longer term focus on the elimination of those trigger factors that led
to the eruption of the conflict, i.e. to bring about structural changes that will eliminate the
conflict. Conflict resolution is a complex, multidimensional process that can be costly and
time-consuming, but if it succeeds in transforming destructive energies in society into
constructive energies, it can bring about sustainable peace. External interventions are in some
situations necessary in order to achieve these outcomes.
Violent conflict dramatically disrupts traditional development. It discourages
investment, erodes and weakens the institutions needed for political and economic reform,
redirects resources to non-productive uses, and causes a dramatic deterioration in the quality
of life. In the past fifty years as a nation, Nigeria has spent billions of Naira on development
programmes. Prominent among these are the unending Ajaokuta Steel Company, the EastWest road truncated by the Niger Delta upsurge and other roads across the nation. Many of
27
these projects may never come to fruition due to conflicts. The consequences of conflicts are
not limited to the country where they are prevalent; they also have sub-regional and
transnational implications. It also has a damaging effect on global stability. Transnational
criminal organizations and terrorist cells have found refuge and profit in fragile states and
have used war torn societies, such as Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, and on a
lighter note Nigeria as
bases from which to target the interests and citizens of other
countries. The botched terrorist attack on the United States Delta Airline by the young
Nigerian Mutallab is a case in point. A peaceful and stable world order is a key foreign policy
priority for many nations of the world, and foreign assistance has a critical role to play in
achieving this goal. Many of the most important causes of violence such as a stagnant or
deteriorating economy, weak or illegitimate political institutions, or competition over natural
resources already lie squarely at the heart of traditional assistance. Although development
and humanitarian assistance programmes are increasingly implemented in situations of open
or latent violence, most still do not explicitly incorporate a sensitivity to conflict in their
design or execution. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were designed over ten
years ago to check basic issues that may lead to conflict. With less than five years away to the
expiration of the targeted period of the visions of the founding fathers of these goals, how
ready is Africa and indeed Nigeria for the realization of these goals? USAID (2004:3)
observes that there are different causes of conflict; thus, there is an emerging consensus that
certain broad clusters or categories of causes need to be in place for conflict to emerge. These
are:
1) incentives or motives for participation in violence;
2) causes that facilitate the mobilization and expansion of violence;
3) institutional capacity to manage and respond to violence; and
4) regional or international causes.
28
The first category looks at motives or incentives for participating in violence. Ethnic
or religious tensions, political exclusion and repression, population pressures, poverty, and
competition over access to valuable natural resources all fit into this category. Many of these
factors feed into a strong sense of grievance, and without a widespread sense of anger it will
be difficult to move large numbers of people to fight. However, greed and selfishness are
major reasons for turning to violence. Some groups and individuals, loosely termed ‗conflict
entrepreneurs‘, stand to gain a great deal of power and wealth from instability and conflicts.
These are a particularly pernicious and difficult set of incentives to address, and they require
a very different set of solutions than those that have traditionally focused on redressing
grievance.
The second category looks at whether individuals or groups with an incentive for
violence have the means at their disposal to organize and execute conflict on a wide scale. Do
they have the organizational capacity necessary to sustain violence? Do they have access to
money and weapons and on what scale? Are there pools of recruits they can draw from?
Without these resources, no matter how deeply felt a grievance or overwhelming the desire
for economic or political gain, widespread violence cannot be sustained. Causes in this
category are critical for determining whether violence will remain at a relatively low,
sporadic level or whether violence will scale-up to more dangerous levels that can lead to the
widespread loss of life and property and ultimately trigger state failure.
The third category looks at whether the opportunity exists for conflict to emerge.
Essentially, state institutions are the filter through which all other causes of violence must
pass. Institutions can either work to address grievances and be responsive to the needs of their
citizens, or they can fuel discontent through repression, poor governance, corruption, and
inefficiency. They can block access to conflict resources by crafting policies that limit the
flow of arms or find economic alternatives for potential recruits, they can fail to do so, or
29
they can actively contribute to conflict by providing these resources to different factions.
Perhaps most important, institutions can either constrain the behavior of opportunistic elites
who see violence as an effective strategy for gaining power and wealth, or they can create the
conditions that foster their emergence, appeal and room for maneuver.
While these three categories are at the heart of internal conflicts, forces at the regional
and international level have become increasingly important. National borders in most parts of
the world are extremely porous and many of the networks that sustain conflicts are
transnational in scope. The boko haram case in Northern Nigeria in the early part of 2010, the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and all other militant Groups in
the Niger Delta before the Amnesty Programme are worthy of note. The ease with which
rebel movements sell oil, diamonds and gold on global markets; arms flows, refugee flows,
and trans - boundary extremist groups have all had a significant impact on violence occurring
within a country and indeed Nigeria. If all of these causes are in place, there will be certain
events, such as elections or natural disasters, economic shocks, religious extremism or riots to
trigger the outbreak of full-scale violence.
The legislature, as the representative body of government, has the potential to be an
extremely effective institution for conflict management. Legislatures are the guarantors of
pluralism and can play a significant role to ensure the proper workings of government while
protecting the interests of minorities (Taylor, 2005: 105) or disenfranchised groups.
Stakeholders can transfer their grievances from the battlefield to the political sphere, and
power-sharing mechanisms can be adopted to bring all segments of society into the political
framework (Sisk, 2001:789). In addition, stakeholders can pursue compromises and
participate in making difficult decisions on contentious issues of national policy through the
legislative and committee processes in the legislature. An effective legislature can exercise
30
oversight over the executive, acting as a check on an authority, which if unfettered, could
ignore or abuse minority interests.
Managing conflict between competing groups is an essential function of legislatures
in all democracies (IPU, 2006:1). The very process of democratization hinges on the
development of ‗tolerance, bargaining, and compromise among rival political groups‘
(Barkan, 1995:3). This function is especially critical in post-conflict and fragile states. In
these contexts, where there is recent precedent for the use of violence to settle disputes and
grievances, government institutions must reconcile divergent interests and build effective
compromises. The importance of compromise creation in conflict management is
tremendous. In its absence, the legislature could become an ineffective institution where
legislative activity is paralyzed; alternatively, it could produce decisions that are unacceptable
to a wide array of social groups or individuals. Either outcome can lead to the breakdown of
legislative legitimacy, as governmental inefficacy or systematic exclusion from decisionmaking processes lead important groups to lose faith in democratic governance structures.
Democratic consolidation becomes impossible under such circumstances, for democratization
is complete only when key societal stakeholders view the democratic process as the only
legitimate way to pursue group interests.
Legislatures can function either in a ‗transformative‘ manner or act simply as
‗arenas‘. Transformative legislatures possess the independent capacity to mold and transform
proposals from whatever source into laws. Arenas, in contrast, serve as formalized settings
for the interplay of significant political forces in the life of a political system (Polsby,
1975:277). A metamorphosis from ‗arena‘ to ‗transformative legislature‘ needs to occur to
equip legislatures in conflictual states with the capacity to manage conflicts and build
compromises. Legislatures need to serve not merely as forums for the airing of
disagreements, but as creative bodies capable of producing policy solutions that a broad
31
variety of societal actors can support. Such an outcome requires the establishment of suitably
designed institutional sub-structures and regulations (Polsby, 1975:291), with the goal of
reducing the likelihood that policy creation will become deadlocked or that key groups will
be excluded from the policy creation process.
Legislatures that are organized to conduct investigations, negotiation and compromise
processes in small groups like committees tend to manage conflicts more successfully. The
committee system appears to be the most useful instrument by the legislature in conflict
management. When self-governance mechanisms exist to ensure that these sub-structures are
allowed to fulfill their designated roles and that regulations protecting opposition party
participation are respected, the effectiveness of these sub-structures and regulations can be
significantly enhanced. Moreover, using super-majoritarian or consensual modes of decisionmaking to settle particularly critical questions can create incentives for majority parties to
engage and negotiate with minority parties to achieve super-majoritarian support. Legislative
restructuring alone cannot accomplish the conversion of legislatures from arenas to
transformative bodies, however. Executives must be prevented from interfering in legislative
compromise-building efforts. Strong parties can help ensure that legislators have the
legitimacy, resources and information needed to negotiate credibly with each other, but
strong parties can also weaken legislative conflict-management mechanisms if undemocratic
party governance and rigidly hierarchical methods of organization prevent legislators from
negotiating freely.
Most legislatures in recent times play significant roles in the lawmaking, policy
formulation, or resource allocation processes, their durability and resilience as institutions are
widely assumed to be consequences of the contributions they make to the maintenance of
political order and stability. Some legislatures are credited with promoting stability by
providing forums for symbolic representation. This is achieved through its role in
32
representativeness and effectiveness in policymaking and resource allocation and oversight
function. There is no gain saying the obvious that genuinely, effective and responsive
legislatures enhance the stability of democratic regimes but legislatures in authoritarian
regimes have little impact on stability and may even exacerbate political disorder and
violence. Mishler, (1984:26) argues:
That by providing an institutional forum for the representation of
societal diversity and the expression of dissent, legislatures
contribute to the integration of society and the legitimation of both
government and regime. In so doing, legislatures are credited with
reducing levels of political conflict, rendering conflict more
manageable, and mitigating the effects of conflict on government
and regime.
The legislature promotes integration, mobilizes support for the government and its
policies, and legitimizes regimes. In several countries confronted by serious political,
economic, ethnic, religious, class, or other social cleavages, the legislature provides a forum
where representatives of politically salient subcultures can interact and compromise group
differences (Crow, 1973; Hoskin, 1975; Musolf and Springer, 1979). In several other
countries, individual legislators are credited with building support for the government and its
policies through constituency outreach and by serving as linkages between center and
periphery, articulating constituent concerns to government, and explaining government
policies to constituents. Even where social cleavages defy compromise and where individual
legislators play minimal roles in resource allocation or linkage, the inclusion in the legislature
of representatives from diverse subcultures can be of symbolic value, if only by promoting
the appearance of representation (Packenham, 1979; Stauffer, 1979; Mezey, 1972; Sisson and
Shrader,1977).
Conflicts are persistent in Rivers State in particular and the Niger Delta at large.
Ibeanu (2006:1) argues that there persists today a myth of a Hobbesian Niger Delta. Gang
wars, cult killings, kidnapping of oil workers, hijacking of oil tankers, violent occupation of
33
oil installations, armed robbery, election violence and communal conflicts are the raw
materials for this mythology of the Niger Delta. This myth, in turn, feeds into stereotypes of a
Niger Delta that is peopled by groups that are prone to conflicts, criminality and violence.
The sources of conflicts in Rivers State and other Niger Delta States are control over
the oil wealth, quest for political power, chieftaincy crises amongst others. The effects of
these on the citizens and communities whom the resources are located in their land are
multifarious. Ekpebu (2008: 7-8) summarized the causes of conflict and factors that sustain
and inflame conflict in the Delta to include:
a) Lack of development due mainly to the long period of neglect of the Region by
successive supervisory Governments, both Regional and Federal.
b) Unemployment, particularly of the youths.
c) Near absence of empowerment of the elders resulting in their inability to meet the
most basic needs which the youths ordinarily expect of their elders, leading to
general youth disrespect for their elders. This scenario explains the general
ineffectiveness of elders in their efforts to contribute meaningfully to the solutions
to the problems in the Niger Delta.
d) Resource diversion both real and perceived from the sub-region to other parts of
the country, resulting in the lopsided development between the Niger Delta and
other parts of the country.
e) Lack, particularly of sound and adequate educational facilities for generally
highly intelligent youth.
f) Low funding for Federal Government‘s development initiatives like the NDDB,
OMPADEC, and NDDC.
The Niger Delta contains most of Nigeria‘s hydrocarbon deposits. By implication, the Delta
holds the bulk of the economic resources that sustains the public treasury in Nigeria. Yet,
34
years of neglect and ecological devastation have left much of the Niger Delta despoiled and
impoverished. This contradiction of riches is a constant refrain in most conflicts in the Delta.
A myriad of specific factors is often adduced for the protracted conflicts in the Niger Delta.
Among them are neglect by government and oil companies, unemployment, military rule, the
minority question, and a badly structured Nigerian federalism, especially as it concerns
finances (Ibeanu, 2010). While these factors singly or jointly bear on the conflict dynamic in
the region, what has been lacking is their integration into an explanatory system to enable us
to make sense of empirical data and support effective policy intervention. Thus, it is not often
clear if all the factors are causal or only mediatory. If they are all causal factors, are they
principal, secondary, or tertiary? It is also not clear if the factors are trigger, pivotal,
mobilizing, or aggravating. Perhaps, the most commonly cited reason for conflicts in the
Niger Delta is the dissatisfaction of oil-bearing communities with monetary compensation
paid by oil companies and government for exploitation rights and ecological damage with
minimal or no development. The oil-bearing communities are then portrayed as greedy and
unpatriotic. This explanation is popular in government and petrobusiness circles (Ibeanu,
2000). Surely, this explanation is simplistic and reductionist for it explains everything in
terms of money. Without doubt, compensation is important in understanding what is
happening in Nigeria‘s oil belt, but it conceals more than it reveals.
The root of conflict in the Niger Delta rests in the different
meanings of security. On the one hand, local communities see the
current pattern of petroleum exploitation, which devastates the
environment, as a threat to security of livelihoods. State officials
and petrobusiness, on the other hand, see security in terms of
uninterrupted production of petroleum irrespective of
environmental and social impacts. The long rule of the military
failed to forge the consensus necessary for a peaceful management
of this conflict of securities. Instead, the military ought through
state violence to impose the interests of petrobusiness. This
practice made the Niger Delta ungovernable. A spiral of violence
enveloped the area in the last ten years as local populations
mobilized to confront state violence. Repression failed. It failed
precisely because it excluded the people (Ibeanu, 2000).
35
There is a huge amount of money being directed by the Nigerian Federal Government to the
Niger Delta Region and the oil companies are desperately paying protection money. Within
the Region, local politicians are fighting it out for the control of this money and violence
protest has become an orchestrated part of political rent seeking, grievance has evolved over
the curse of a decade into greed (Watt 2007:637-8).
So far, eleven years of civilian rule have shown that the rhetoric of rights, whether as
resource control or as resource management, is conducive to conflicts. While it has failed to
resolve pre-1999 conflicts by substituting resource control for human rights, communal
livelihoods and environmental protection, it has created new interwoven trajectories of
conflict (Ibeanu, 2006:11). ‗Resource‘ from a Niger Delta perspective means primarily the
land, waters, forests, and all other resources within /around them, whether physical or
spiritual. A ‗control‘ of these is one of the struggles that most nations have been involved at
one point or the other. Thus, resource control is now a term used to describe the desire and
determination of the communities and people whose resource and or source of survival have
been taken away undemocratically and possibly, violently and therefore unjustly (Okonta,
and Douglas, 2001:17). Ibeanu (2008:104) submits that a remarkable feature of
environmental injustice in the Niger Delta is that renewable resources like land, forests and
underground aquifers are destroyed in the process of extracting non-renewable resources like
crude oil and gas. Worse still is the fact that little of the wealth generated from this process
gets back to local communities Consequently, there is the persisting conflict between local
communities and security, counterinsurgency and surveillance forces, which has led to many
deaths, as in the widely publicized Mobile Police invasion of Umuechem in 1990 which
Ibeanu (2010:7) argues led to the indiscriminate razing down of the community, killing over
80 inhabitants, including the traditional ruler of the town, and destroying more than 400
houses. Odi in Bayelsa State was razed down by the Nigerian army, acting on the orders of
36
President Obasanjo. Indeed, many communities in the Niger Delta still live under heavy
military surveillance operating under different nomenclatures such as Swift Operation Squad,
Joint Military Task Force (JTF) and so on. Military patrols have summarily killed hundreds
of people, ostensibly in trying to dislodge armed gangs that steal crude oil and abduct oil
workers. More recently, the emergence of the many militia groups like Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), acclaimed by many government officials as an
underground group specializing in the abduction of oil workers for ransom, has raised the
tempo of secret military operations in which many local people are tortured and summarily
executed in remote creeks and mangrove. It is important to note that development associated
with petroleum extraction and revenue distribution therein are the primary source of conflicts
in Rivers State in particular and the Niger Delta at large. Ibeanu (2010:10-14) opines that
petroleum, particularly the distribution of revenue accruing from it, is therefore not just a
trigger factor in Niger Delta conflicts (in that it sets them off), but a pivotal factor (in that it is
always present in them). He further itemizes six paradoxical reasons for conflicts in the area
as a result of oil-led development; these are:
 Those who have it don‘t use it and those who use it don‘t have it;
 Those who have it can‘t extract it and those who can extract it don‘t have it;
 It protects the livelihoods of those who don‘t have it and destroy the
livelihoods of those who have it;
 It makes the labour of those who have it irrelevant and makes the labour of
those who don‘t have it relevant;
 those who control it don‘t work and those who work don‘t control it; and
 money for nothing and nothing for money.
The above scenario therefore led to militancy, militarization and destruction of oil formations
in Rivers State and indeed the Niger Delta especially, between 2007 and 2009; this action
37
practically retarded oil extraction activities and drastically reduced Nigeria‘s foreign
exchange earnings and her OPEC quota. It also led to increase in world demand for crude oil
as Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of the ‗black gold‘ in the world.
There are also conflicts associated with politics; especially conflicts linked to party
politics. Contest for political power, which is expected to be free, fair and open in a
democracy, has become a major source of violent conflicts in the Rivers State in particular
and Nigeria at large. A good illustration is the spate of violent conflicts that engulfed the
State in particular and the Niger Delta at large following the 2003 and 2007 elections, which
are believed to be linked to young gangs recruited and armed by politicians to fight their
perceived political opponents during the elections.
The conflict in Rivers State has been exacerbated by emerging issues of gross
distortion of Nigerian federalism in respect to resource control; citizenship rights and
environmental degradation and access to political power. Unfortunately, the external
manifestation has been mainly that of violent agitations and criminal activities by some
elements taking advantage of the bad situation. In fact, the former Managing Director of Shell
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in Nigeria, Mr. Basil Omiyi, tried to summarize
the crisis in the state by identifying three factors; these are:
1) Inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic rivalries;
2) Perceived neglect by government over the years; and
3) Economic depression laced with lack of empowerment of the people.
His analyses are impeccable as the combinations of these factors are directly responsible for
the mayhem in Port Harcourt particularly, and some parts of the Niger Delta, in general (See
The Guardian, January 7, 2008).
The seriousness of the Rivers State‘s debacle made Soyinka, (2007) to state that: "I
consider that Nigeria is on the verge, on the brink of a massive implosion that will make
what's happening in the Sudan child's play...‖. The analysis above and the crisis in the state,
38
brought about by disagreement over the use of oil seems to confirm the research conducted
by the World Bank on the economics of civil war, crime, and violence in oil producing
countries that:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(iii)
―the key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development
such that many
of the world‘s poorest countries are locked in a tragic vicious circle
where poverty causes conflict and conflict causes poverty‖;
―countries that have low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita
incomes, and
that have remained dependent on primary commodities for their
exports, face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflicts‖; and
―once a country has had conflict, it is in far greater danger of further
conflict. Commonly the chief legacy of a civil war is another civil war‖
(Shakleman, 2006:11).
Legislative-Executive Relations, Conflict Management and Political Stability
The relations between a country‘s governing institutions differ depending on whether a
country has a presidential, parliamentary or hybrid political system. Although each country
has its own variance on these political typologies, some conclusions have been drawn about
the characteristics of each of these systems and their relationship with conflicts. Nigeria runs
a presidential system which, in structure and theory of operations, is almost identical to that
of the United States (Aminu, 2006). While the Constitution provides for equality between the
three branches of government, viz; the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, the
president as head of the executive actually enjoys first-among-unequals status.
In the presidential system, policy-making is characterized as a product of Separation
of Powers and often times, by a separation of purpose – different parts of the government are
motivated to seek different goals but with common unity of purpose. This separation of
purpose arises when separate elections result in different partisan groups controlling the two
(executive-legislative) branches produce ―divided government‖. Difference of purpose may
also exist because presidents are elected by a national constituency, whereas parliaments and
39
legislators usually stem from a smaller ballot (Shugart/Haggard in Haggard/McCubbins,
2001).
The direct consequence of this separation of purpose is a conflict that may place the
whole of the legislative powers on one side, and those of the executive on the other, the latter
aiming to get its initiatives through a series of parliamentary reactive tools. From the
presidential side the main variety of proactive/reactive powers include decree, veto, late
release of funds, implementation of legislations and agenda setting powers. Presidentiallegislative powers are particularly significant in crucial instances when residential and
legislative interests diverge openly and sometimes when legal speed is required. However it
is not a sine qua non clause that a divided government forcefully has to lead to gridlock,
indecisiveness or slow motion in policy approval. Magar (1999:19) argues that Separation of
executive and legislative powers gives each branch of government a veto of some sort over
the actions of the other: change in policy requires simultaneous acceptance by both branches.
The increased risk of executive‐legislative conflict has been presented as one of the
disadvantages of presidentialism. According to Lijphart (1984:15) the problem of executive legislative conflict ―is the inevitable result of the co‐existence of the two independent organs
that presidential government creates and that may be in disagreement‖. In fact, unlike the
mechanism of legislative no‐confidence in parliamentary systems, there is no institutional
means of resolving a confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches of
government, which may lead to deadlock and paralysis. In some cases, the president may
resort to formal or informal powers to overcome the institutional paralysis. Laski (1940)
contends that presidential systems alternate between normal situations of deadlock and crisis
situations marked by presidential activism. However, the use of these presidential powers and
prerogatives may increase, rather than defuse, the level of confrontation between the
President and the Congress or National Assembly. The problem of executive‐legislative
40
conflict is aggravated by the temporal rigidity of presidential systems. The fixed term in
office of the president and the fixed duration of the legislative period do not leave room for
the readjustments that political events may require (Linz, 1990:51).
Mainwaring (1990:157) argues that presidential systems and multipartism are
―difficult combination‖ which is inimical to stable democratic governance for three main
reasons. First, the risk of executive‐legislative deadlock is more acute because the president is
likely to lack stable support in the legislature in a fragmented system with many relevant
parties. Second, in multiparty system, competition tends to be centrifugal, which makes
compromise and cooperation between the different parties (and between the different
branches of government) more difficult to achieve. Finally, the formation of interparty
coalitions to deal with these problems is difficult in presidential systems. On the one hand,
the commitment of individual legislators to support an agreement negotiated by the party
leadership is not assured. While on the other, in multiparty presidential systems party leaders
have incentives to distance themselves from the president in office when elections approach,
which increases the likelihood of executive‐legislative deadlock.
Another institutional factor that may have an impact on executive‐legislative conflict
is the electoral cycle. Several studies show that the share of seats obtained by the president‘s
party tends to decline when elections are held later in a President‘s term (Carey and Shugart
1995; Shugart and Carey 1992). The victory of the Republicans over the Democrats in the
mid-term election in the United States of America is a point of reference. Hence, when
presidential and legislative elections are not concurrent, the likelihood of an opposition
majority in Congress significantly increases. On the one hand, when elections are concurrent,
legislators from the winning presidential candidate tend to benefit from coattail effects
(Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983:407). This helps the party of the president to gain more seats in
Congress. On the other hand, when elections are held later in the president‘s term, many
41
disillusioned voters defect to the opposition to show their dissatisfaction with the incumbent
administration. This is the well-known ―midterm decline‖ phenomenon in the United States
(Kernell, 1977:44; Tufte, 1975:812). In sum, the support for the party of the president in the
Congress tends to be lower when elections are non‐concurrent. As mentioned above, when
the President is supported by a minority in the legislature the likelihood of
executive‐legislative conflict increases. In Nigeria, midterm elections do not hold, and the
President‘s party – the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has continued to maintain majority at
the National and State level.
The electoral system may affect the level of confrontation between the two branches
of government. In a highly representative system, a relatively high number of parties obtain
seats in the legislature. In such a system therefore, the president is less likely to garner
majority support in the legislature, which may increase the risk of executive‐legislative
conflict (Payne, Zovatto and Díaz 2007). However, the disproportionality of the electoral
system is often linked to a low district magnitude (Lijphart 1992). Carey and Shugart
(1995:327) argue that when the district magnitude is low legislators have incentives to
cultivate a personal vote. Thus in such systems the cooperation between the executive and the
legislative branch may become more difficult because political parties in Congress lack the
ability to impose discipline to their own legislators.
A split in the president‘s party can also increase the level of confrontation between the
executive and the legislative branches of government. When the presidential party is divided,
the different factions have conflicting incentives. While they may want to cooperate on
certain issues, they also have incentives to attack the other factions in order to attract voters
to their own faction (Katz, 1986:85; Morgenstern, 2001:235). This is especially true when
elections approach if the electoral system allows or encourages different factions to
participate in the race as happened in Uruguay or Colombia until recent electoral reforms.
42
Moreover, intraparty rivalries often result from ideological differences. According to
Morgenstern (2001:243) ―the factions are ideologically disposed to competition‖. Hence,
when the president‘s party is divided into factions, the administration is less likely to obtain
support from its own party for key bills, increasing the likelihood of institutional deadlock.
The popularity of the president is another factor that can have an impact on the
likelihood of executive‐legislative confrontation. Scholars of American politics have shown
that declines in the level of presidential approval may create hurdles in executive‐legislative
relations. This is the scenario in the majority of Sates in Nigeria. Presidential popularity
influences the success of presidential policy initiatives (Rivers and Rose, 1985:183). In fact,
Congress tends to be more reluctant to support bills proposed by an unpopular president
(Neustadt 1964). Presidential approval also affects the response of the legislature to
presidential vetoes. There are two possible explanations for this impact of presidential
approval on Congressmen‘s behaviour. On one hand, legislators may see themselves as
representatives of a popular mandate, hence, some Congressmen see reflecting public opinion
as part of their role. On the other hand, legislators may be concerned about re-election and
decide whether they support the president based on the latter‘s approval ratings (Edwards
1976).
Since the return to democracy in May 29, 1999 in Nigeria, the country has witnessed
conflicts between the legislature and the executive on a number of issues. Oyewo (2007:2)
argues that the operation of the Constitution was characterized by conflicts, confrontations,
feuds and deadlocks between the executive and legislative arms of government especially at
the federal level, that usually centered on the question of the existence, scope, and efficacy of
the legislature‘s independence and oversight function in the constitutional scheme. He further
contends that:
The connection between the independence and performance of
oversight functions of the legislature (as an essential legislative
43
role in the practice of separation of powers) and constitutionalism
(as requiring that government be conducted through
constitutionally established institutions
and impersonal
bureaucratic procedures and processes) is evidently understandable
against the background of the absence of effective institutional
checks and limitations on the exercise of executive powers under
the preceding military administration and the ―carry-over‖ of
―military personnel‖ into the executive (especially, the Executive
President, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd)) and the frequent resort to
certain undemocratic practices‖ in the operation of the 1999
Constitution (Oyewo, 2007:2).
Budgetary processes at all levels of government cause a serious conflict between
governmental institutions. Obasanjo (2000) argues: ‗it was perhaps expected that at the
beginning of our search for the meaning and the form of a true republican democracy,
mistakes would be made, and extreme positions will be taken by those involved in the
search‘. At the centre of this conflict is the timing of budget presentation and its eventual
passage as well as assent and implementation.
It is worthy to note that public sector budgetary process is divided into four phases,
namely; budget drafting, legislating, implementation and auditing. Typically, the role of the
legislature and executive is clearly spelt out in each phase (Izedonimi, 1997).
Most constitutions empower the President or cabinet to prepare a draft of the budget.
Section 81 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 requires the President
to lay before each Chambers of the National Assembly at any time in each fiscal year
estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the Federation for the next fiscal year. In
Britain, the tradition of requesting for a budget draft from the cabinet was codified in the
1713 standing order, today known as No. 48 standing order of the House of Commons
(Joachim, 2001: 58). A review of some African constitutions indicates that most of the
constitutions assign the budget drafting function to the executive arm of the government.
Perhaps, this derives from the technical and the time consuming nature of drafting a modern
budget. Some constitutions assign the function to the President, while others to the Cabinet.
44
The examples of constitutions that assign the function to the President are Kenya, Ghana,
Zambia and Nigeria; those that assign it to the cabinet are Malawi and Namibia etc. A survey
of some European constitutions also reveals that in Germany and France the budget drafting
functions are assigned to the executive. However, there are some exceptions to this rule. The
most interesting example is the US 1787 Constitution, which assigned the budget drafting
function to the Congress. This system truly represents the wishes of the people as each
representative will have to consult its constituency in determining preferences. Thus, the
national budget can truly represent a consolidation of the decisions of the people. In addition,
the system enhances the popular participation required under culture governance. However,
since 1921, this power has been ceded to the President. This was as a result of the increasing
technical nature of modern budgeting. Nevertheless, the draft budget of the President remains
an advisory draft, implying that the Congress has an ultimate power to alter the budget
(Bowles, 1998: 46).
The major issue arising from the drafting of the budget by the executive is the timing
of the presentation of the draft estimates to the parliament and the period within which
legislative action ends. A survey of several constitutions identified two traditions. First, is a
tradition in which the budget is presented to the parliament before the commencement of the
fiscal year. For instance, in Germany, the budget is presented to the parliament four months
before the commencement of a new financial year (Heller, 1997:486). Other examples
include the Republic of Congo, whereby the budget is tabled before the parliament seventyfive days before the commencement of a new financial year. In Madagascar, the constitution
provides for sixty days before the commencement of a financial year for the President to
present the draft budget. This tradition gives enough time for the parliament to consider and
debate on the budget. In Nigeria, the President is granted the latitude to present the budget at
45
any time. This causes delay in its passage by the National Assembly leading to a lot of
institutional conflicts.
On the other hand, the second tradition requires the budget to be submitted after the
commencement of the financial year. This tradition is practiced by some countries with
parliamentary system of government; examples are India, South Africa, and Zambia. The
main reason behind this practice is the belief that economic conditions are not static. Thus,
budget approvals before the new financial year are usually based on those previous economic
conditions which are likely to change in the New Year.
Another issue of conflict between governmental institutions is presentation of
supplementary estimates by the executive in most financial year. In most systems,
supplementary estimates require the approval of the parliament as in Nigeria, Egypt, Malawi,
Uganda, and India. With respect to timing and approval of the estimates, three practices were
identified. First, some constitutions require that the supplementary estimates must be
approved before spending, e. g. Nigeria and the USA. Second, some constitutions provide for
retrospective approval of the supplementary estimates as in Zambia. Third, some
constitutions grant power to the Finance Department to approve such requests but subject to
an upper limit provided by the parliament during the main budget approval, as in Germany.
The source of disagreement in Nigeria is usually, the money for the proposed estimate may
have been spent before supplementary is presented by the executive. This practice is not in
tandem with constitutional provisions and causes frictions by the institutions of government.
Virement has also been identified as a source of conflict between the Executive and
the Legislature. In the cause of performing oversight functions by the Legislature and during
budgetary legislations at all levels of government in Nigeria, empirical evidence suggests that
most projects executed are not appropriated for. However, they are executed by Executive
46
fiat. This is unacceptable and causes unhealthy rivalries between the Executive and the
Legislature.
Although the legislature is not involved in the implementation of the budget,
nevertheless, many constitutions provide for its supervision over budget implementation. This
is to ensure accountability, transparency and orderly implementation of the approved budgets.
However, the degree of parliamentary oversight function differs widely among different
systems. In some cases, its oversight function is weak while in others it is strong. For
instance, US Congress exercises a strong oversight function over budget implementation and
more stringent over defense appropriations. The constitution provides that no defense
commitment will be entered into by the President without the approval of the Congress (USA
Constitution, 1778). In addition, to ensure transparency, the constitution clearly makes it
necessary for the Executive to publish at regular intervals, the statement of income and
expenditure. But in Nigeria, oversight function is perceived either as a witch hunt exercise or
an avenue for the Legislators at all levels to enrich themselves.
Beside the budgetary process, some other feud that arise in Executive-Legislative
relations are in the appointment/ratification of Ministers, Ambassadors, High Commissioners
and Commission Chairmen /Members, ratification of treaties, election of Principal Officers of
the legislature, impeachment, recall amongst others.
Between 1999 and 2007, there was an overwhelming dictatorship of the Executive
in the democratic process. Just as the President held sway in the Executive, he most often
interfered and did not allow the Legislature to commence legislative action before taking full
implementation. Similarly, at the State and Local Government levels, the situation is not
different, (Fawole, 2000:28) has this to say:
In the realm of foreign policy, though the Constitution grants the
President wide latitude within which to act, his policies and actions
are subject to the dictates of the laws made by the National
Assembly. The National Assembly technically controls the
47
President in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy in the
sense that it controls the national purse, ratifies the appointment of
ministers, ambassadors and other diplomatic agents. It also ratifies
treaties and agreements before they can become an integral part of
the laws of the land, approves/disapproves deployment of the
armed forces of the nation for combat duties outside the country,
approve/disapproves a declaration of war by the president, and
exercise oversight functions. A President can be impeached and
removed from office if he grossly violates the constitution. The
implication, judging by the constitution, is that Obasanjo does not
enjoy the latitude to do things as he pleases.
The President sometimes undermined the prescription of Baron de Montesquieu, to the risk of
abuse of powers and arbitrariness. The doctrine of Separation of Powers posits that the
guarantee against abuse lies in established mutual checks among the legislature, executive
and judicial arms of government. Such checks become more meaningful where these
functions are performed by distinct people or organs. The union of power is a recipe for
arbitrariness and abuse; this has been poignantly demonstrated by the dictatorship of the
military in the political affairs of Nigeria. The negation of the doctrine of Separation of
Power as enshrined in the 1979 and preceding constitutions are well known. Obviously, the
doctrine of Separation of Powers is a cardinal feature of the 1999 constitution, which like the
repealed 1979 constitution, prescribes a bicameral Legislature at the centre, with
unilateralism at the sub-natural level, with the President vested with the Executive powers
and the Chief Judge of the Federation vested with Judicial powers. The framers of the
constitutional were careful to provide linkages in the distribution of power. Thus, section 4 of
the 1999 constitution recognizes and vests law making functions with the National Assembly;
while Section 5 gives the president the leverage for the execution of the laws made, and
interpretations are vested in courts as provided for in section 6. Section 47 of the 1999
constitution establishes the National Assembly which shall consist of the Senate and House
of Representatives (FGN; 1999; Sec.4). Section 62 guarantees the establishment of
committees of the National Assembly. The Senate or the House of Representative may
48
appoint a committee of its members for such special or general purpose as in its opinion
would be better regulated and managed by means of such a committee, and may by
resolution, regulation or otherwise, as it thinks fit, delegate any of its functions exercisable by
it to any such committee.
Consequent upon the above, Order 98 of the Standing Rules of the Senate 2003 and
Order XIV of the Rules of the House of Representatives 2003 establish committees to
manage the affairs of the National Assembly. While the Senate had about 34 Standing
Committees (Standing Rule of the Senate, 2003), the House of Representatives had 46
Standing Committees (Rules of the House of Representatives, 2003). These Committees
assist in strengthening the third major function of the parliament – oversight. Oversight
function has been misconstrued by many people; it is seen by some as a legislative instrument
for witch hunt; but others view it as major tool for checking Executive inadequacies.
(Egobueze, 2008:1) defines committee as a part of the larger group appointed to perform a
specialized service at one time or on a continuous basis. Committees are subdivisions of the
legislature that prepare legislation for action by the respective Houses or that makes
investigations as directed by the respective Chambers. Legislative committees are saddled
with studying policies and programmes and reporting its findings and appropriate
recommendation to the general House for deliberation. Committees no doubt are the back
bone and indeed heart beat of the legislature. No wonder Shannon (1995) describes
committees thus:
Around the world, there is a trend to move towards more reliance
on committees to conduct work of parliament and the greater
reason for this trend is a concern for efficiency. The demands on
modern parliament are numerous and it is not possible for the
whole House to consider all the details necessary for performing
the proper functions of a legislature.
Oversight functions of the legislature are most often achieved through the use of committees.
The term ‗oversight functions‘ is not expressly employed in our constitutional lexicon,
49
neither is it defined or described by the 1999 Constitution. However, it is a concept or
principle that is conventionally adapted as a check on executive excesses. ‗Oversight‘,
according to Egobueze (2011:11), is ‗the exercise of constitutional powers by the legislature
to check, control, or subject the exercise of the constitutional powers of the other arms of
government to scrutiny‘. More specifically, it is the ability of the Legislature to check or
control the exercise of executive powers or to make the executive accountable and be
responsible to the electorates. It involves monitoring the activities of the executive to ensure
that they are carried out legally, efficiently and according to legislative intents. It is not
surprising that executives at all levels of governance in Nigeria are not ready and willing to
partner with the legislature in this regard. It is an instrument of ensuring accountability and
transparency in government. Sections 88 and 89 of the Constitution of Nigeria guarantee the
National Assembly the power to conduct investigations as well as to obtain evidence.
Through these sections, the Senate or House of Representatives could summon anybody to
appear before it or its committee(s) to make representations on issues they are investigating.
Similarly, section 67(2) of the constitution states:
A minister of the Government of the Federation shall attend either
House of the National Assembly if invited to explain to the House
the conduct of his Ministry, and in particular when the affairs of
the Ministry are under discussion (FGN 1999:5).
As part of its oversight function, Oyewo (2007:14) argues that:
The Senate Committee on Public Accounts in 2001 investigated
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and National Electric Power Authority
(NEPA) the most alarming finding was the controversy
surrounding the N2.3 billion NEPA Fund that could not be
properly accounted for by NEPA Officials.
The resultant threats of impeachment of President Obasanjo by the National Assembly, led
then by Senator Anyim Pius Anyim and Rt. Hon Ghali Umar Na‘Abba respectively as
President and Speaker of the Senate and House of Representatives for constitutional
violations and ―unconstitutional actions‖ can be seen as desperate responses by the legislature
50
to assert its independence and oversight the executive. The Presidency made concerted efforts
to remove these presiding officers of the National Assembly but to no avail. Also, the Senate
conducted investigations into the Presidency‘s handling of the Petroleum Trust Development
(see Daily Trust, March 30, 2007 and Vanguard, March 26 2007). The findings of the
Committee were revealing as both the President and the Vice President were indicted in one
form or the other. The saga threw the whole nation into turmoil.
The situation at the State level was not different. Governors were indiscriminately
removed from office. Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State, Ladoja of Oyo State, Dariye of
Plateau State, and Fayose of Ekiti were impeached by the respective State Houses of
Assembly where they governed. However, the Supreme Court invalidated these impeachment
processes based on non compliance with constitutional provisions on the removal of
Governors. Thus, in these conflicts, the role of the Judiciary in conflict management was
brought to the fore.
A decade of experience on intergovernmental relations between the executive and the
legislature at the state level has been varied by various factors including the dominance of the
same political party in the legislature and the executive of the state, external influence,
leadership tussle, intra governmental conflicts, among other factors. The extreme example of
such conflict leading to a divided and failed government is Oyo and Plateau States, where the
legislatures were factionalized, the Governors were impeached by a faction of the legislature,
and even when the impeachment of the Governors were invalidated by the Supreme Court,
the legislature never functioned as an arm of government. Similarly, the Ogun State
experience, within the same geo-political zone of the south west with Oyo State was not
different. First under Governor Segun Osoba‘s Alliance for Democracy (AD) Party led
government (1999-2003) and most recently under Governor Gbenga Daniel‘s PDP led
government (2003-2007) the intergovernmental relations between the executive and
51
legislature revealed cooperative approach dictated by the predominance of one party in the
executive and legislature and the effectiveness of the State majority party in conflict
resolution between the two arms of government. However, the tendency towards consensus
building approach to the discharge of legislative powers may be read as the supremacy of the
executive over the legislature, and the weakness of the legislature in asserting its
independence and oversight over the executive in Ogun State. This factor continued to
permeate the State till 2011. Other States that had serious rift; this includes Anambra and
Abia.
Treaty making is another source of conflict between the executive and the legislature,
Treaty refers to a consensual engagement which subjects of international law have
undertaken towards one another, with the intent to create legal obligations under international
law. That is, it is a written agreement between two or more states or sovereigns. Such
agreement could be related to trade, peace, ceding of territory, tax or some others. Treaties
are the main source of international law and whenever there is a dispute between actors, the
international court or tribunal looks into any existing treaty between the two disputing states
for the determination of the case. In Nigeria, the Executive initiates treaty-making, thus
accounting to a large extent for the many treaties that have been entered into, but with no
legislative backing.
Treaty ratification is the main political mechanism through which States get their
consent to create new rules of international law (Struett, 2009:1). It is the primary mechanism
for creating institutions of global governance such as the United Nations, the World Trade
Organization, and International Criminal Court, among others. Treaty ratification process
varies from State to State. For any treaty to have full legal backing in Nigeria, it must be
enacted into law by the National Assembly; thus Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution states
inter alia:
52
No treaty between the Federal government and any other country
shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any of
such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.
This is one area where the National Assembly participates in the pursuit of Foreign Policy
objectives of the Nigerian State. The implication of the above therefore is that treaties entered
into by the Executive and other countries remains a nullity to the extent to which it has been
ratified by the National Assembly. The Green Tree Agreement between Nigeria and
Cameroon caused a serious conflict between the National Assembly and the Presidency.
While the Presidency said it was not a treaty, the National Assembly insisted it must therefore
be ratified by the legislature.
GAPS IN THE LITERATURE
Part of what emerged from existing review is that the existing knowledge and
previous works relating to our study have provided an analysis of conflict and conflict
management as well as inter institutional conflicts that exist between the arms of government,
namely, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. However, the studies have tended to
neglect the rising role of the Legislature in conflict management. In other words, what
emerged from the review is that, there appears to be a dearth of knowledge on the relevance
of the legislature in conflict management which has implications for political stability in
contemporary time. As indicated earlier, the objective of this study is to fill this gap.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
What we seek to explain is the rising involvement of the Legislature in conflict
management in Rivers State, a function hitherto seen as belonging to the Executive and the
Judiciary by the discipline of political science. We theorize the role of the legislature in
conflict management in the context of the contemporary capitalist state and the
interpenetration of governmental rather separation of powers. To begin with, we locate our
explanation in the doctrine of separation of powers. In his famous work, ‘Second Treatises of
53
Government’ the English philosopher John Locke examined governance in England and
stated that the legislative and executive powers should not reside in the same person or
governmental body, otherwise corruption and tyranny would result. Power, according to him,
should be divided between the king and the parliament in England of his days. Half a century
later in 1748, Montesquieu published the Spirit of the Laws (Esprit de Lois) in which he
reformulated this ancient idea in political theory that has become a touchstone in modern
liberal constitutionalism namely, the idea of separation of powers and the cognate principle of
checks and balances. In Book XI of Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu ascribed liberty in
England to the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, and to the balancing
of these powers against each other. However, long before Montesquieu, the idea of a mixed
state had also appeared in Plato‘s Laws. It was later used by Polybius to explain the stability
of Roman government. In Medieval Europe also, the idea of division of powers came to be a
principle in constitution-making as a counter to the divine sovereign powers claimed by
monarchs. And in England, the long struggle between the Crown, parliament and courts of
common law, which climaxed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, underscored the
importance of separation of powers and checks and balances. The genius of Montesquieu lay
in reformulating an idea connoting a political balancing of economic and social interests or
sharing of powers by corporations, communes and municipalities, into a system of legal
checks and balances between parts of a constitution. Montesquieu proposed that all political
functions are necessarily classifiable into legislative, executive or judicial. To safeguard
liberty, each of these sets of functions must be separate and act as checks and balances on one
another. American Federalists later adopted the propositions of Montesquieu, especially
Madison, as the organizing framework of the American Constitution.
Although the idea of separate and co-ordinate powers of the three arms of government
has been a major principle of liberal democratic constitution making for over three centuries,
54
political scientists often overlook what has become its organic connection to competitive
capitalism. Many political scientists have noted the progressive changes in the original
formulation of the idea of separation of powers, particularly the increasing fusion of functions
among the three arms of government. Today, there is delegated legislation (a law making
function) as well as power to grant prerogative of mercy (Judicial function), conferred to the
Executive arm of government, and through oversight functions too, the legislature is
increasingly involved in executive function, finally judicial review places the Judiciary in
fore with law making and executive functions. This therefore leads to interpenetration of
governmental power rather than separation of power as previously conversed by theorist like
Locke, Montesquieu and other notable scholars in political science. Yet, they have
superficially attributed these changes to specific historical experiences of countries.
Consequently, there is no attempt to theorize a general and fundamental basis for these
changes, particularly the relations between executive power and the legislature. Such an
understanding has to be sought in historic changes in capitalist production and the capitalist
state. Being a market-oriented, commodity-driven system, the capitalist society invariably
evolves an executive force seemingly standing above society and appearing as the guarantor
of the collective interests of the people-nation. The principles of separation of powers, checks
and balances, and rule of law are the political equivalents of the market ethics of division of
labour and collective subordination of commodity bearers to the impartial forces of demand
and supply.
In the West, separation of powers was particularly important during the phase of
competitive capitalism for it served to balance the competing interests of fractions of capital,
for these interests were usually inscribed in the arms of government. At the same time, by
concurrently limiting and balancing the arms of government, the liberal state, which
corresponds to competitive capitalism, appears as non-arbitrary, impartial and therefore
55
capable of guaranteeing both the interests of the dominant and dominated classes. As a result
of this position of the liberal state, which corresponds to the competitive stage of capitalism,
its
political
function,
consisting
of
exercise
of
legitimate
violence
and
the
reproduction/inculcation of the dominant ideology, becomes accented and takes precedence
over its economic functions. In turn, the Legislature, as the symbol of universal Reason,
popular representation and popular power, tends to be dominant over the Executive and
administration. This dominance arose because parliament as the law-making organ incarnated
general norms whose universal and formal character constituted the essential feature of
modern law. By extension of this fact, parliament expressed public opinion, protection of the
people-nation from executive arbitrariness (as represented by the monarchy in Europe of the
Middle Ages), supremacy of law and the reign of universal reason (Poulantzas, 1980).
At the stage of monopoly capitalism, the liberal State is superseded by a monopoly
capitalist State, a process marked by a progressive movement away from separation of
powers of the arms of government to an interpenetration of powers of the arms of
government. This condition is explained by an unprecedented rise in the direct involvement
of the capitalist state in the economy and the extraordinary expansion in the state‘s economic
apparatuses. Consequently, rather than the role of maintaining and reproducing the ‗external
conditions‘ of production, this state is at the very heart of directing the economy. In the
process, the political function of the state recedes progressively in favour of its economic
functions. The Executive and administration expand to meet the demands of the economic
functions of the state. By implication, increasingly the executive arm becomes directly
involved in social conflicts (state violence/aggression). Concomitantly, there is a fundamental
shift in the basis of the state‘s legitimacy. In place of the legitimacy based on universal
rationality, general norms represented by the legislature, what emerges is a new legitimacy
based on instrumental rationality expressed as efficiency and authority.
56
Increasingly therefore, the Executive becomes less democratic and more repressive of
underprivileged groups. Consequently, it is increasingly less able to manage conflicts and, in
the words of Engels, keep them within the bounds of order. Still, the collective role of
government in capitalist states is to maintain the long-term domination of the ruling classes.
Thus, the legislature increasingly steps in as a moderating force in conflicts.
We can then make the following conceptual propositions regarding the rising role of
the legislature in conflict management:
1. The principal role of the present-day state, particularly its governmental apparatuses,
is to establish and maintain the general long-term interests of the dominant classes.
2. The long-term interest of the dominant classes is principally expressed in political
stability, that is to say, maintenance of economic, political and ideological dominance
of these classes.
3. In contemporary times, this role is marked by both harmony and contradictions in the
interest of the dominant classes which the state apparatuses and branches try to
balance.
4. This balancing act is underlined by the interpenetration rather than separation of
powers among the three arms of government.
5. Following Poulantzas (1980,134), we theorize that the overall role of maintaining the
long-term interests of the dominant classes and its necessary expression in the
distribution and balancing of functions among the branches of government and state
apparatuses produce the following hallmarks of the contemporary capitalist state:
a) A structural mechanism whereby an apparatus filters the information given,
and the measures taken, by other apparatuses. The process of selection is
implied by the particular materiality and history of each apparatus (army,
school system, judiciary, and so on), by its specific internal representation of
57
given interest, and, more generally, by its position in the configuration of the
relationship of forces.
b) A contradictory movement of the decisions, and ‗non-decisions‘ – that is, a
certain systematic lack of state action – are not a conjunctural phenomenon,
but are inscribed in the contradictory structure of the state and are one result
of the contradictions discussed above. They are just as essential to the unityorganization of the power bloc as the positive measures that it undertakes.
c) The
determination
of
priorities,
and
counter-priorities,
within
the
organizational structure of a given state apparatus or branch, according to its
specific materiality and the specific interest it represents. The order is
different for each apparatus and branch, and each network or level thereof,
according to its place in the configuration of the relationship of forces: there is
thus, a series of mutually contradictory priorities and counter-priorities.
d) A system graded by branch and apparatus, and located within the decision
making process, whereby measures proposed by other branches and
apparatuses are filtered and the measures which they have already adopted are
selected for various modes of practical execution.
e) A set of conjunctural, conflictual and compensatory measures responding to
the problems of the hour. The policy of the State is thus established through a
real process of intra-state contradictions and harmony within the arms of
government.
The following three explanatory statements are derivable from our conceptual propositions:
(i)
As a result of increasing interpenetration rather than separation of powers of
government, the failure of the executive and judicial arms of government in managing
conflict generates increased involvement of the legislature in conflict management.
58
(ii)
This involvement is shaped by the specific interests of the legislature and legislators.
(iii) Successful involvement of the legislature in conflict management correlates positively
with political stability.
Fig. 2.1: Explanatory Framework
Source: government publications, text books and internet materials
As indicated in figure 2.1 above, the role of the state in capitalist society is to defend the
interests of the class that owns the means of production by suppressing any threat to its
59
domination and by ideologically integrating the exploited classes. The capitalist state differs,
however, from all previous forms of class rule due to the unique character of capitalist
relations of production. As a result of the social conditions and the competition generated by
generalized commodity production on the basis of private property, the interests of the
capitalist class as a whole cannot be represented by individual capitalists, even the richest.
The capitalist state therefore requires certain autonomy in order to represent the collective
interests of the capitalist class. A system in which the vast majority of people have no control
over the most important decisions and actions of the government, the economy, their material
well-being, or the course of their lives, cannot be considered genuinely democratic. In reality,
it is a dictatorship of the capitalists disguised by democratic forms. This leads to unhealthy
rivalries which culminate to political instability and indeed conflicts between classes and
institutions in the state. However, these dislocations are expressed in the State apparatuses
with the arms of government struggling to maintain stability in the polity. To achieve balance
in the system, the specific role played by each arm is as outlined in item 4 of the fore going
figure. Thus, the failure of both the Executive and the Judiciary in conflict management leads
to the rising role of the Legislature in conflict management.
60
Fig. 2.2: Schema of conceptual propositions
CONFLICT
CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT
If high interest of
Legislators:
Principal
responsibility
of:
LEGISLATURE
If
unsuccessful:
THE EXECUTIVE
AND
THE JUDICIARY
If unsuccessful:
If successful:
If successful:
POLITICAL
STABILITY
Source: government publications, text books and internet materials
In figure 2.2 above, the diagram illustrates conflict management matrix. It highlights that
conflict management basically is the role of the Executive and the Judiciary. It shows that if
these organs are successful in conflict management, there would be political stability, but the
failure of these two organs to successfully manage conflicts would lead to political instability
and conflict. However, the role of the Legislature is basically to make law, represent the
constituents and oversight the other arms of government especially the Executive. It therefore
acts as a watch dog over the other organs. The failure of these organs to curb conflicts leads
to the increasing role of the Legislature in conflict management.
61
HYPOTHESES
Based on the foregoing conceptual scheme, we can hypothesize as follows:
1. If the interest of legislators in a conflict is high then the legislature is more likely to
intervene in its management.
2. If the Executive and Judiciary fail to manage conflicts effectively, then the
involvement of the legislature in conflict management is likely to increase.
3. If the involvement of the Legislature in conflict management is successful, then
political stability is likely to increase
62
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
3.1.
METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION
This research utilized both primary and secondary data. Primary data are data observed or
collected from first hand source by the researcher. That is, it is information about the results
of an experiment or observation. It could be likened to an eyewitness testimony at a trial
which no one has tarnished or spun the information by adding their independent opinions or
biases; therefore, it can form the basis of objective conclusion. Kelly (2005) describes it as
data that you collect yourself using such methods as direct observation, surveys, interviews
and logs. White (1989:176) notes that for many political issues, the most obvious way to test
hypotheses is simply to ask people questions or observe what is happening and what people
are doing. Questionnaire and observation give researchers more control over the data they are
collecting.
Secondary data on the other hand are data collected from external sources such as
research articles, journals, text books, verbatim reports, magazines, newspapers, internet
publications, television, radio, stories told by people, etcetera. Data here could be assumed as
pre- processed information, and originality may have been lost and may not be totally
verified in its initial content. White (1989:233) refers to secondary data as ‗data that has
already been collected‘. Thus, we made extensive use of both primary and secondary data;
that is direct and indirect gathering methods.
For the purpose of this research, we used three major conflicts and some others
relevant to our study. These conflicts were mitigated upon by the Rivers State House of
Assembly and they are germane in proving our hypotheses.
63
Primary Data
We adopted two primary sources of data collection; these are interviews and questionnaires.
Interview
We interviewed seventy persons; these were mostly past and present Chairmen and members
of the Rivers State House of Assembly Committees on Public complaint & Petition,
Education, Energy & Natural Resources, Environment, Youth & Employment Generation,
Finance, other Members of the House and some Legislative Staff of House involved in the
above mentioned Committees; the Commissioners of Youth Affairs & Employment
Generation, Environment, Energy & Natural Resources and Education. In addition, the
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, the Special Adviser to the Governor of
Rivers State on Conflict Management, fifty petitioners and members of Public knowledgeable
in these conflicts, Civil Society Organizations especially involved in conflict related activities
were interviewed. We achieved these using tape recorders.
We adopted structured and unstructured interview methods. The former assisted us to
maintain uniformity and sequence of questions during interview sessions, while the latter
enabled us to ask the interviewees questions which do not restrict their answers, such that
they are encouraged to express their views freely and elaborately.
One essential element of all interviews is the verbal interaction between the
interviewer(s) and the interviewee(s). Hitchcock and Hughes (1989:79) stress that ‗central to
the interview is the issue of asking questions and this is often achieved in qualitative research
through conversational encounters.‘ Consequently, it is important for the researchers to
familiarize themselves with questioning techniques before conducting interviews.
Questionnaire
This is another primary source of data collection adopted for this study. Two hundred and
fifty (250) copies of a questionnaire were distributed to fifty former and current members of
the Rivers State House of Assembly, twenty Legislative Staff of Rivers State House of
64
Assembly, twenty Members of the State Executive Council, Executive institutions involved
in conflict management like the Special Adviser to the Governor of Rivers State on conflict
management, twenty judicial officers especially Magistrates, Judges and Registrars, eighty
petitioners, and thirty Civil Society Organizations involved in conflict related activities,
lawyers, opinion leaders and social commentators.
Sample of Respondents
We adopted a purposeful sample of two hundred and fifty persons (250) respondents. The
essence of this was to ensure that all critical groups related to the conflicts were covered.
Purposefully, we allocated numbers of respondents to the groups based on our perception on
how knowledgeable they are to the conflicts. A detail of the breakdown is as presented
below:
I.
50 elected former and present Members of Rivers State House of Assembly
Committees on Public Petition, Education, Energy & Natural Resources/Environment
and Employment;
II.
20 Committee Staff of Rivers State House of Assembly;
III.
20 Members of the Executive;
IV.
20 Judicial Officers;
V.
VI.
VII.
30 Academic/None Academic Union Members
80 Petitioners/ Members of Communities with consistent conflicts ;
30 members of Civil Society Organizations.
The Validity and Reliability of Measuring Instruments
Validity is central to effective research. If a piece of research is invalid, then it is not reliable.
Validity is thus a requirement for both quantitative and qualitative research. A valid measure
provides useful information about the concept in question. Reliability, on the other hand,
means the measures rather than the concept. A reliable concept gives the same result no
matter who does the measurement or what the circumstances are (White, 1999:148).
Consequently, the issue of data utilized for this analysis bothers on validity and reliability.
65
For this purpose therefore, we consulted with experts and practitioners to evaluate the validity
of the interview schedule. For the reliability of the schedule, about 250 potential respondents
were interviewed. For the questionnaire, we appreciate the importance of validity and
checking the reliability in a multi-facet process, therefore, we were interested in the internal
consistency of the instrument. In furtherance of this, we included questions to check the
consistency of the respondents. Additionally, combining the interview schedule,
questionnaire and personal observation offer us suitable means of validating our data. Ibeanu
in Mbah (2007:64) states that for secondary data, reliability can only be established by
vigorous logic of content analysis. For expressive documents for example, the following
checks could be employed to test their dependability:
1. If the truth of the statement is a matter of indifference then the author's account is
likely to be unbiased. But it must be noted that his indifference or disinterestedness
may have affected the reliability of his observation when it was made.
2. If the statement is prejudicial to the information or his interest, it is likely to be
truthful. But we must guard against exaggerations and self immolations, which may
occur.
3. If the statement is common knowledge, then the author is not likely to lie.
4. If part of the statement is of tangential interest to the informant, the statement is
probably true.
5. A statement is likely to be true when it is contrary to what is widely expected from the
information.
It is significant to note that the dependability of some secondary data may be difficult
to establish. However, a rigorous use of the technique of content analysis helped us select
what is dependable from what is not. Mbah (2007:62) notes that there are other types of
documents such as well researched texts, instruments, official statistics, and verbatim reports
66
among others, which tend to be more credible. We tried as much as possible to concentrate on
these materials for this research.
3.2.
METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS
Data analysis according to Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2009:183-184) involves
organizing, accounting for, and explaining the data. In short, it entails making sense of data in
terms of participants‘ definitions of the situation, noting patterns, themes, categories and
regularities. We adopted multiple data analysis strategies in order to fully deal with the
complex nature of the research problems. Thus, we relied on descriptive statistical techniques
like frequency tables, charts, percentages, and diagrams to analyze our primary data. Our
choice of such tool is to categorize and order some of the data in both our questionnaire and
interview schedules. For our secondary data, we used research articles, journals, text books,
Legislative documents like verbatim reports, votes and proceedings, order paper. Others are,
government publications, magazines, newspapers, internet publications, television and radio
stories, etcetera to clarify our analysis.
To deal with some of the hypotheses which entail nominal data and which have
expressed association/relationships, we relied on the chi-square test. Chi-square as statistics
summarizes the extent of the difference between observed (real) and expected (chance) data.
It is a measure of ‗goodness of fit‘ between an expected and an actual result or sets of results
(see Cohen, et‘al, 2006) .This strategy was used to see if there is any relationship between the
proposed independent variables and the role of Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict
management in Rivers State.
The formula for Chi – square is thus:
∑ (O –E² )
X ² = _________
E
Where O
=
E
=
observed frequency
expected frequency
67
∑
=
sum of or summation
Hence, if the calculated Chi – square value is large compared with what might be expected
under the null hypothesis, it will be held to be significant.
For a concise summary of the work, refer to the logical data framework is presented in the
appendix.
68
CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CONFLICTS IN RIVERS STATE
This chapter seeks to give a background of conflicts in Rivers State with a synopsis of
conflicts in Nigeria as a precursor to Rivers State. Furthermore, explanation would be made
on three major conflicts mitigated upon by the Legislature in Rivers State which form part of
our case study. In an attempt to situate the role played by the legislature in conflict
management, it is imperative we give a theoretical background of Rivers State, its people,
culture and economy. This would provide a background to the persistent conflicts in the state.
Background of Conflicts in Nigeria
Nigeria like many other African states has a chequered history of conflicts. Smyth and
Robinson as cited in Osaghae and Suberu, (2005) opine that ‘Nigeria is usually characterized
as a deeply divided state in which major political issues are vigorously – some would say
violently – contested along the lines of the complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions
in the country‘. The issues that generate the fiercest contestation include those that are
considered fundamental to the existence and legitimacy of the state, over which competing
groups tend to adopt exclusionary, winner-take-all strategies.
The cause of these conflicts could be traced to primordial factors associated with
ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry, structural imbalance of its federalism and bad
governance. These factors are played out in quest for the control of state power, resource
allocation, and citizenship. As a consequence, deeply divided states tend to be fragile and
unstable because almost by definition, there are fewer points of convergence and consensus
among the constituent groups than are required to effectively mitigate or contain the
centrifugal forces that tear the society apart (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Thus,
disintegration, secession, civil strife, civil war, minority agitation, and violent conflicts, all of
which would normally be considered aberrant to ‗normal‘ state formation, are quite common
69
threats or actual occurrences in divided states. It is not surprising therefore that divided states
have devised some of the most innovative and delicate systems of government. Most states
practice some variant of the federal solution, with the emphasis on political accommodation
and inter-segmental balance. This emphasis has made it necessary and expedient to adopt
instrumentalities that mitigate the effects of majoritarianism, as well as promote inclusion,
equity, and distributive justice between the different salient groups (Osaghae and Suberu,
2005). Yet, despite the precautions taken, divided states remain perennially unstable and
many survive on the brink of collapse and disintegration (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972).
By virtue of its complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and
seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, Nigeria can be rightly described as one of the
most deeply divided states in Africa. From its inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has faced
a perennial crisis of territorial or state legitimacy, which has often challenged its efforts at
national cohesion, democratization, stability and economic transformation (Dudley 1973;
Herbst 1996; Kirk-Greene 1971; Maier 2000; Melson and Wolpe 1970; Post and Vickers
1973; Soyinka 1997). The high point of the crisis seems to have been the civil war in the late
1960s, which ensued shortly after independence in 1960. However, rather than abate,
conflicts have become more or less pervasive and intense in the post-civil war period, and
disintegration continues to be contemplated by aggrieved segments of society as one of the
possible ways of resolving the ‘National Question‘. This means that the consequences of
Nigeria‘s diversity in an unstable political context remain as dire as ever (Osaghae and
Suberu, 2005).
Kesselman et al (1996) in their survey, blamed this on three principal factors- scarce
resources, weak legitimacy and patron-client or what is commonly known in Nigeria as
―godfather‖ politics, thus they assert that:
Scarce resources engender poverty, inequality and a weak position
in the international economic system‘. State control of the limited
70
resources provide the leeway for officers, political and
bureaucratic, to manipulate government spending to advance their
personal fortunes. This led to weak legitimacy, as the citizens lack
faith in their political leaders, and, by extension, the political
system. Participation in government is low because the citizens
perceive it as irrelevant to their lives. In the absence of the support
of the civil society, the effective power of government is eroded.
Patron-client relationships take the primacy over the formal aspects
of politics such as the rule of law, well-functioning political
parties, and a credible electoral system.
Consequently, Ake (1995) describes the gloomy nature of African States argues thus:
‗decades of efforts have yielded largely stagnation, regression or worse. The tragic
consequences of this are increasingly clear: a rising tide of poverty, decaying public utilities
and infrastructures, social tensions and political turmoil, and now, premonition of inevitable
drive into conflict and violence‘. These problems could be located in the inclement political
and social conditions in the developing countries. This manifests in poor planning and
implementation, lack of entrepreneurial abilities, the stifling of market forces, falling
commodity prices and unfavourable terms of trade, poverty of ideas, the dependency
syndrome, corruption and indiscipline.
Nigeria, like many other countries in Africa and the third world, confronts a number
of internal conflicts. It is a country characterized by intense ethnic polarization and conflict.
Mustapha (2004) argues that: ‗Since independence in 1960 it has survived a civil war,
countless religious conflicts and series of inter- tribal wars. It has also survived a series of
military regimes that have exacerbated many conflicts rather than resolving them‘. The
upshot of the policy of suppression became clear when Nigeria returned again to civilian rule.
Conflicts that had festered under the preceding military regimes, becoming more venomous
and difficult to process with the passage of time, burst into the open shortly after the
emergence of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to the Nigerian presidency on May 29, 1999.
Ojukwu (2012:121) opines that:
71
Problems of communal violence had confronted the Obasanjo
government since its inception. Since May 29, 1999 when Nigeria
began her current experiment on democracy (after many years of
military rule), the nation has been bedeviled by a series of social
crises.
The array of conflicts that greeted his arrival is bewildering and the intensity of the violence
often stunning. Since the return to civil rule, armed confrontations have erupted throughout
the country over such issues as: religion; economic power and opportunities; political power
and offices; division of wealth known colloquially as ―the federal cake‖ derived from
subsurface nonrenewable resources – principally petroleum in the Niger Delta and
neighboring areas – and controlled by the federal government; land; renewable natural
resources, including livestock forage, food stocks, and fisheries; environmental damage;
labor–management relations; urban ―turf‖ disputes among youth gangs; disputes among
youth of rural communities; and Police-related violence. Some of these conflicts occur along
ethnic lines and therefore have a potential to spread to other areas, whereas other sorts of
conflicts are more localized and less threatening to the broader Nigerian political system.
Thousands of people have died in violent interactions tied to incompatible visions of religion
within the context of a state whose constitution is ambiguous as to whether the state is to be
secular, and in battles between ethnic groups over control of markets and other incomegenerating enterprises such as slaughterhouses.
Ethnicity is generally regarded as the most basic and politically salient identity in
Nigeria. This claim is supported by the fact that both in competitive and non-competitive
settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than
any other identity. Indeed, according to the authoritative 2000 survey on ―Attitudes to
Democracy and Markets in Nigeria‖, ethnicity ―is demonstrably the most conspicuous group
identity in Nigeria‖ (Lewis and Bratton 2000:27). In other words, ―Nigerians tend to cluster
more readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of the
72
workplace‖ (Lewis and Bratton 2000:25). What is more, ―religious and ethnic identities are
more fully formed, more holistic and more strongly felt than class identities‖ as evidenced in
the fact that ―whereas those who identify with religious and ethnic communities are almost
universally proud of their group identities…those who see themselves as members of a social
class are somewhat more equivocal about their pride‖ (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 26). Yet, in
spite of the salience of ethnicity, and the large number of studies that have been devoted to
the subject, the exact number of ethnic groups in the country is not known. Different
estimations have been given, notably, including: 248 (Coleman, 1958), 394 (Hoffman, 1974),
62 (Murdock, 1975), 161 (Gandonu, 1978), 143 (Odetola, 1978), 619 (Wente-Lukas, 1985),
and 374 (Otite, 1990). A recent ethnic mapping project puts the number at over 500 (PEFS
2001). The wide variation is largely explained by the different criteria used by the authors.
Matters are not helped by the fact that ethnic identities and differentiations are intricately
linked with other identities like religion, and furthermore they do not exist in pure forms.
With over four hundred (400) ethnic groups, belonging to several religious sects,
Nigeria since independence has remained a multi-ethnic nation state, which has been
grappling and trying to cope with the problem of ethnicity/religion on the one hand, and
governance on the other. Nnoli (1980) produced empirical examples linking socio-economic
factors to ethnic conflict in Nigeria. According to J.S. Furnival, cited in Nnoli (1980:72-3),
"the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing
interests." This is because over the years the phenomena of ethnicity and religious intolerance
have led to incessant recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts, which have given birth to many
ethnic militias like the O'dua People Congress (OPC); the Bakassi Boys; the Egbesu Boys;
the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC); and the Igbo People Congress (IPC). Others include the
Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State
of Biafra (MASSOB); and the Ohanaeze N'digbo (Daily Trust; 20/8/2002:16). With the
73
emergence of these ethnic militias and the deep divides between the various ethnic groups,
religious intolerance has become more violent and bloody with more devastating results using
the ethnic militias as the executors of ethno-religious agenda; further to this is governance
challenge bridled with corruption.
While it is true that it is not possible to know the exact number of ethno-religious
conflicts that has erupted since independence due to lack of adequate statistical data on this
issue, it is interesting to note that about forty percent (40%) of ethno-religion based conflicts
are credited to the fourth Republic of Nigeria; the period covered by this study.
Also, because of the violent nature of ethno-religious conflicts, which often take the
form of riots, sabotage, assassination, armed struggles, guerilla warfare and secession in
Nigeria, they no doubt have implications for the political and economic development of the
country and thus making it an important issue for discussion.
A major cause of what we now see as conflict in Nigeria has to do with the
accusations and counter accusations of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation,
victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry. In every nation (Nigeria
inclusive), there is no complete agreement on how wealth, power and status are to be shared
among individuals and groups. There is also no agreement on how to effect necessary
changes and reforms. This is because, different groups and individuals have diverse interests
in which case, some groups will have their aims met, while others will not. What this means
is that conflicts usually occur when deprived groups and individuals attempt to increase their
share of power and wealth or to modify the dominant values, norms, beliefs or ideology.
Thus, in Nigeria, and going by the various conflicts that have occurred, there seems to be a
divisive interplay of politics, economic wealth, ethnicism and religions, which has
consequently led to the rising nationalism and militancy of various ethnic and religious
movements. It is interesting to note that the overall consequence of this is the escalation of
74
various conflicts that are witnessed all over the country today which are meant to correct any
perceived form of marginalization, oppression or domination.
It is important to note here too that the failure of the Nigerian leaders to establish
good governments forge national integration and promote what can be called real economic
progress, through deliberate and articulated policies, has led to mass poverty and
unemployment. This has resulted into communal, ethnic, religious and class conflicts that
have now characterized the Nigerian nation. Poverty and unemployment have therefore
served as nursery bed for many conflicts in Nigeria because the country now has a reservoir
of poor people who are determined to make money through illegal sources; thus they try to
achieve this through serving as mercenary fighters, bunkerers and kidnappers. What this
means theoretically is that poverty and unemployment increase the number of people who are
prepared to kill or be killed for a given course at token benefit. This explains why all crises
that ever occurred in Nigeria have a large turnout of people (including the under-aged) as
fighters.
A very important cause of conflicts in Nigeria is the breakdown of such vehicles of
social control that characterized the traditional African societies such as the family;
education, law, religion and political system that cared for the well-being of all citizens.
Indeed, the malfunctioning of all these important institutions has actually increased conflicts
in Nigeria. For instance, the inability of many homes to make the ends meet with the family
income tends to increase immorality, broken fatherless/motherless homes, divorces and
drunkenness, leading again to a large army of youths who could be employed for execution
warfare. It is also important to note that the school system in Nigeria today is in shambles and
may not impart even sound knowledge, let alone instill discipline and desired type of
morality. Not less than one hundred and eight cult groups exist in our universities, these cult
groups have permeated secondary and primary schools as well as communities. Some
75
members of these groups are hired by politicians to launch attacks on perceived opponents in
order to acquire political powers. So our universities and other institutions, instead of
retaining their status as ivory towers and centres of excellence have degenerated into training
grounds for militia forces. The religious institutions are not left out; they have departed from
effectively imparting morals; while the law enforcement agents indulge in crimes, demand
bribes and collect illegal levies from motorists openly and, shamelessly. The Judiciary is part
of the corruption spoil; jurists collude with politicians to obtain judgments in their favour.
The legislature, on the other hand, is not left out. Instead of oversighting other institutions of
government to unearth corruption, the legislators greedily are involved in the celebration of
brazen corruption. They squander state resources through over bloated allowances and
constituency projects, receive financial rewards from corporate bodies and highly placed
individuals. The electricity power probe led by Hon. Ndudi Elumeu, the Capital Market by
Hon. Herman Hembe and lastly, the Petroleum Downstream Subsidy by Hon. Farouk Lawan
are key examples. The spate of corruption in Nigeria is well known globally. The scenario
above presents a wrong signal to the social development of the state and encourages social
vices in the society thereby laying the foundation for conflicts in general. Furthermore, the
uncontrolled arms supply has quickened the outbreak of conflicts, and encouraged fighting
rather than peaceful settlement to disputes.
Finally, conflicts in Nigeria have some historical antecedents; many governmental
actions during the colonial rule and after independence encouraged, to a large extent, the
sowing of the seeds of conflicts that are found to be rampant in the Nigerian nation today. As
noticed by Ikejiani-Clark cited in Olu-Adeyemi (2006) that over the years, many events in
Nigeria have led to the politicization of mistrust, intolerance, violence and acrimonious
relations between the mainly Moslem north and the Christian south of Nigeria. To this extent,
Ikejiani-Clark contended that there has been an unfortunate insertion of ethno-religious
76
discrimination and incompatibility in the structures of the Nigerian State since the colonial
period. In 1931 for instance, the colonial administration under the leadership of Governor
Donald Cameroun did not encourage intermingling of religions. Advice given by the
governor is indicative of this. The Governor advised the Christian missions to thread softly in
Moslem areas so as to maintain the stability of indirect rule. The political events of the
January 15, 1966 coup and the July 1966 counter-coup further entrenched ethno-religious
configuration in Nigeria. This is because the killings and counter-killing that follow the coups
which took ethnic and religious colorations as the Muslim dominated tribes in the north were
set against the Christian dominated tribes of the southern region. These events later led to the
bloody civil war. The insurgencies in the nation today especially the Boko Haram
phenomenon leave social science scholars with no option but to suggest that the nation is sick
and requires a good surgeon to diagnose the ailment.
Rivers State and Conflicts
Rivers State was created by Degree No. 19 of 1967 under the military administration of
General Yakubu Gowon (RSG). This State, created alongside eleven others, had a total land
area of about 7,008 square miles. Rivers State was divided into five political divisions,
namely; Port Harcourt Division, Ahoada Division, Brass Division, Ogoni Division and
Degema Division PABOD (Nemieboka, 2005:37). In October 1996, Bayelsa State was
created out of the present Rivers State (Nyewusira, 2010:57). The State currently has twenty
three (23) Local Government Areas and according to the 2006 population census, it is
inhabited by about five million (5,000,000) people.
77
Fig. 4.1: A map of Rivers State
Source: Rivers State website
78
LGA Name
Area (sq.km)
Port Harcourt
109
Obio-Akpor
260
Okrika
222
Ogu/Bolo
89
Eleme
138
Tai
159
Gokana
126
Khana
560
Oyigbo
248
Opobo/Nkoro
130
Andoni
233
Bonny
642
Degema
1,011
Asari-Toru
113
Akuku-Toru
1,443
Abua/Odual
704
Ahoada West
403
Ahoada East
341
Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni 969
Emohua
831
Ikwerre
655
Etche
805
Omuma
170
Census 2006
population
541,115
464,789
222,026
74,683
190,884
117,797
228,828
294,217
122,687
151,511
211,009
215,358
249,773
220,100
156,006
282,988
249,425
166,747
284,010
201,901
189,726
249,454
100,366
Administrative capital
Port Harcourt
Rumudumanya
Okrika
Ogu
Eleme
Sakpenwa
Kpor
Bori
Afam
Opobo Town
Ngo
Bonny
Degema
Buguma
Abonnema
Abua
Akinima
Ahoada
Omuku
Emohua
Isiokpo
Okehi
Eberi
Postal
Code
500
500
500
500
501
501
501
502
502
503
503
503
504
504
504
510
510
510
510
511
511
512
512
Source: Rivers State web site
Rivers State is located in the south-south part of Nigeria and bounded in the North by
Imo, Anambra and Abia States, the East by Akwa Ibom State, the West by Bayelsa and Delta
States and on the South by the Atlantic Ocean. Like the other Niger Delta States, Rivers State
has topography of relatively flat plain netted in a web of rivers, creeks and tributaries;
creating what Okonny (2002:18) refers as ‗a water environment‘. The inland part of Rivers
state consists of tropical rainforest; towards the coast of the typical Niger Delta environment
features many mangrove swamps.
79
Rivers State is multi ethnic and is composed of various ethnic groups such as Abua,
Andoni, Ekpeya, Engenni, Etche, Ikwerre, Ibani, Kalabari, Ndoni, Ogba, Ogoni, Okrika and
etcetera. These ethnic groups have been existing centuries before the creation of the State in
1967 (Rivers State Government Bulletin, 2003). It is worthy of note that each of these ethnic
group represents a language or dialect group. Presently, the State has about twenty four
recognized languages.
Rivers State is the Oil capital of Nigeria (Obianime, 2010:1), a nerve centre of oil and
gas activities in the federation (Amachree, 2010:10), a center stage of oil and gas in Nigeria
(Bipi, 2012). The State is famous and indeed leading in the production of oil and gas in
Nigeria. With enormous reserves of crude oil and natural gas, Rivers State accounts for about
40% of Nigeria crude oil production (Obiechine, 2010:43). Apart from this, there are many
petrochemical related industries in the state. The State is blessed with a plethora of industrial
activities; thus, it harbours two petroleum refineries in Nigeria, Nigeria's gigantic Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) project; located in Bonny Island of the state, a number of multinational
Exploration and Producing (E & P) Companies namely Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC), Nigeria Agip Oil Company Ltd (NAOC), Total E & P Ltd,
Chevron Nigeria Ltd, Mobil Unlimited amongst others. Besides these multinational
companies involved in (E&P) activities, other indigenous companies participate actively in
exploration, drilling and or production activities. Some of these are Monopulo Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd, Petrolog Group, Lonester Drilling Ltd, Drillog
Petrodynamics Ltd, Siscon Services Ltd, Weltec Ltd among others
It is important to state that the economy of the State is shaped predominantly by
hydrocarbon industrial activities. This strongly accounts for the persistent conflicts in the
State because studies indicate that ‗States blessed with enormous natural deposits are most
often theatres of conflict‘ because of the quest for survival on who gets what, when and how.
80
Globally, several States are engulfed in one conflict or the other as a result of their natural
endowment in oil, gas, gold, diamond, precious stones among others.
Besides the oil economy, the State prides itself in agriculture; fishing and farming are
the main occupation of the local people. The State is also becoming a tourism destination in
Nigeria, the annual cultural carnival – CARNIRIV is a new word in tourism lexicon in
Nigeria. This carnival has greatly enhanced the growth of the hospitality industry in the State
and further stimulated commerce and industrial activities in a state that was once becoming
pariah as a result of the out - loose of criminality typified in wanton kidnap of prominent
business moguls, family members, or cronies, foreign and local oil company staff and
politicians of all sorts. This act of criminality is becoming a trade because in exchange for the
release of the kidnapped, the kidnappers ask for fabulous ransoms which are paid in millions
of Naira. The passage of anti kidnap Law by the state legislature in 2010 stemmed the tide of
kidnap of all forms. At the core of the conflicts are primordial factors – namely unhealthy
competition for the control of resources of our land characterized by inter and intra class
competition between the haves and the have-nots or the bourgeoisie and the proletariats.
The foregoing review reverberates the issue why the peripheral capitalist state could
be regarded as a site of intra-class conflict over accumulation. To be sure, the capitalist state
has historically been a site of intra-class conflicts among fractions of capital (Poulatzas,
1980). It is this fact that lies at the heart of one of the most central principles of political
science - separation of powers. Central to the emergence of the capitalist state in the West
was the separation of the producer from the means of production and consequently the
separation of the state from the economy (accumulation). The economy becomes the site for
class struggles over accumulation, while the state incarnates these struggles as the site for
setting the grand rules for economic management and balancing the interests of fractions of
capital. In the West, separation of powers was very central to competitive capitalism and the
81
liberal state because it served to balance the competing interests of fractions of capital, since
these interests were usually strongly expressed in the various arms of government. At the
same time, by concurrently limiting and balancing the arms of government, the liberal state
appears as non-arbitrary, impartial and therefore capable of guaranteeing the interests of all
fractions of capital (i.e. fractions of the bourgeoisie). As a result of this, the political
functions of the liberal state, which consist of setting and enforcing the ground rules of
accumulation, both through force and through inculcation of the dominant ideology, become
preeminent over its direct intervention in accumulation. Although this position is slightly
modified under monopoly capitalism, with increased role of the state in the economy, the
liberal state generally remains a force standing over the process of accumulation and deftly
balancing the interests of the various fractions of capital and not a direct intervener in
accumulation (see Ibeanu, 2007: 299-300).
The peripheral capitalist state presents a different logic. Unlike the liberal state of the
Centre (―developed capitalist state‖), this state is a very important site for intra-ruling class
struggles over accumulation in a very direct way. As a result of the enormous wealth and
resources that are directly controlled by this state, and because autonomous accumulation
outside the state is either weak or non-existent, control of this state is the basis of wealth for
fractions of the ruling class. This has led to the description of this state variously as ―a means
of production‖ (Ekekwe, 1986), ―patrimonial‖ (Menard, 1982), built on ―primitive
accumulation‖ (Iyayi, 1986), ―parcelled out‖ to class fractions (Ibeanu, 1999) and generating
―prebendal politics‖ (Joseph, 1987). Consequently, rather than a state that reconciles the
contradictory interests of fractions of the ruling class, its structures, institutions and
processes, including those of policy making and implementation,
are objects of bitter
struggles by these class fractions. As such, relations in the State do not consist of
82
―reconciling‖ the interests of fractions of the ruling class, which is the major ember that fans
conflicts but a struggle for spoils among them.
From 1999 - 2007, Rivers State witnessed no fewer than sixty major conflicts which
claimed many lives. See in the appendix, a table that contains some of these conflicts.
The table
justifies the response generated from the sixth
question on the
questionnaire which sought to know if the community in which the respondents live have
been or is currently in crisis; the response were as follows: 180 (82%) was in affirmative, 30
(13%) said ‗no‘, while 10 (5%) had no answer to the question. From the response therefore,
we could see that over 80% of the communities have experienced one form of conflict or the
other. The causes of the conflicts were basically quest for economic and political wealth as
well as chieftaincy, land, youth restiveness/cultism and communal matters. This is as
generated in a bar chart below:
Fig 4.2: Bar chart showing causes of conflict in Rivers State
Source: Data from framework
83
Most of the conflicts were as a result of oil led development and most of which are currently
on-going till date and many new ones have erupted. This is better represented on the diagram
below.
Fig 4.3: Shows the causes of conflict in Rivers State
Source: Data from framework
Ibeanu, (2010) itemizes six paradoxical reasons for conflict in the area as a result of oil-led
development; these are:
-
Those who have it don‘t use it and those who use it don‘t have it;
-
Those who have it can‘t extract it and those who can extract it don‘t have it;
-
It protects the livelihoods of those who don‘t have it and destroy the livelihood
84
of those who have it;
-
It makes the labour of those who have it irrelevant and makes the labour of
those who don‘t have it relevant;
-
those who control it don‘t work and those who work don‘t control it; and
-
money for nothing and nothing for money.
The above scenario therefore led to militancy and destruction of oil formations in Rivers
State and indeed the Niger Delta, especially between 2007 and 2009. This action practically
retarded oil extraction activities and drastically reduced Nigeria‘s foreign earning and her
OPEC quota. It also led to increase in world demand for crude oil as Nigeria is the sixth
largest producer of the ‗black gold‘ in the world. Commenting on the state of conflict and
wanton kidnaps of persons, a youth from Ishukwa-Ndoni community said ‗in many cases,
state officials and oil companies either generate or fuel these conflicts in their antics of divide
and rule. It is a known fact that some oil companies have local chiefs and notables on their
payrolls in return for cultivating favourable public opinion on behalf of oil companies.
However, the oil companies increasingly divulge their names to restive youths, thus fueling
anger that stimulates inter and intra communal conflict (Ada, 2011).
In his contribution, Engr. Akpan, the Managing Director Green Ocean Petroleum indigenous oil, gas and Power Company in Port Harcourt observes:
Almost all the Local Governments in Rivers State and indeed the
Niger Delta have experienced one form of conflict or the other.
The conflict basically could be attributed to the oil-led
development. Communities experience Chieftaincy as well as
communal problems because of oil royalties and contracts;
politician struggle to win election because of interest in the oil
companies for contracts and employment of their people; oil
companies employ divide and rule to cause confusion in
communities so they would not be united to make legitimate
demands; the end result of all is the application of divide and rule
principle as adopted during the colonial era. That was the reason
why the Niger Delta boiled especially between 2007 and 2009 and
pockets of the conflicts still persists till date.
85
Also, there are conflicts associated with politics; especially conflicts linked to party politics.
Contest for political power, which is expected to be free, fair and open in a democracy, has
become a major source of violent conflicts in the Rivers State. A good illustration is the spate
of violent conflicts that engulfed the State in particular and the Niger Delta at large following
the 2003, 2007 and 2011 general elections, which are believed to be linked to young gangs
recruited and armed by politicians to fight their political opponents during the poll. Some of
the criminal cult groups recruited were ‗the Bush Boys‘, ‗Dey Gbam‘, ‗Dey Well‘,
‗Icelander‘, ‗Elegemface‘, ‗KGB‘, White ‗Bishop‘, ‗Dolphine‘, to name but a few. These cult
groups were used to perpetrate harm, maim, and even assassinate perceived opponents.
Within the period under review in Rivers State, Marshal Harry was the first victim consumed
and he was brutally murdered on 23rd March, 2003; he was followed by A. K. Dikibo on 5th
February 2004. Both were former Deputy National Chairmen of Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP) South – South. Others that fell to the weapons of the assassins and hired killers were
Dr. Nzeoma Nwachukwu, a brilliant medical doctor and a perceived Chairmanship aspirant in
Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Government election 2006; Mr. Obenade Joseph Ihenacho, father
of a Chairmanship aspirant in Tai Local Government Council in 2007; Hon. Charles Nsiegbe
– a former Member of Rivers State House of Assembly and a perceived aspirant for Nigeria‘s
House of Representatives on 23rd November, 2009; Chief Ignatius Ajuru – former
Ambassador, Chairman and Pro-Chancellor University of Jos and a perceived aspirant for
Senate on 23rd December, 2009; Chief A.E Egobueze; the father of the researcher, the
Chairman Rivers State Civil Service Commission till his brutal assassination on 11th June,
2010; two men were shot dead in Assemblies of God Church on 13th June, 2010 in their
attempt to protect the kidnapping of Eze Sunday Njoku, Ochimba 1 of Umuebulu. After
them, three other killings suspected to be politically motivated were recorded in the state; the
victims were Soboma George; a king militant of MEND extraction on 25th August, 2010; Mr.
86
Paago, a perceived aspirant from Gokana Local Government Area Chairmanship election;
Mrs. Lucy Ukabunwa Wokocha, mother of Hon. Augustine Wokocha, Commissioner of
Power, Rivers State joined her ancestors 29th October, 2010 through the bullet of assassins. It
is worthy to note that the killers and the accessories to these crimes are yet to be ascertained
by the Law Enforcement Agencies, especially the Nigeria Police. Most of these killings were
perpetrated either in election years or close to an election year. Beside these perceived
political assassinations; there were some extra judicial killings.
During the period under review, especially between 2006/2008, the spate of conflict
and violence in the state got to a crescendo; militants fought with government forces,
sabotaged oil installations, kidnapped foreign and local oil workers and took them hostage for
different kinds of ransom. They also embarked on car bombings and wanton destruction of
properties. They almost overran Government House, Port Harcourt. There was a state of
anarchy; the military completely took over Port Harcourt and its environs. Mrs. Cecilia
Omehia, mother of the erstwhile Governor of Rivers State, Sir Celestine Omehia; the Vice
Chancellor of Rivers State University of Science and Technology, Professor B.B. Fakae; A
Catholic Priest, Monsignor Dr. Pius Kii; Agip Oil Company Ltd Divisional Manager Public
Affairs, Naaman Feyi Deinyi; the wife of High Chief O.G Lulu Briggs the oil magnate Seinyi; the wife of Chief Humphrey Idisi CEO, Lone Star Drilling - Margaret and not less
than three hundred other foreign and local residents were at one time or the other kidnapped.
In 2007, about eight foreigners were killed and 172 taken hostage (The Telegraph, 19th April,
2008). Lately, a militant king – Osisikankwu and his gang from Abia State held Omuma
Local Government Area of Rivers State on captive. Innocent and unsuspecting travelers
going and returning from Aba, along the Port Harcourt-Aba Express way and villagers in the
Local Government were kidnapped and some killed. As noted above, at the root of the
problem is a crisis of poverty, political power, oil and gas activities, neglect and
87
underdevelopment. Beside the frequent spates of kidnapping, demand for ransom and show
of power by militants in the region, the state has lately witnessed war-like confrontations
between the militants and the Joint Task Force (JTF) on one hand and the Police on the other.
The Police has in fact seemingly become the whipping boy of the militants, who raid police
stations at will and kill policemen randomly. See appendix three, a table that illustrates the
issues raised above.
Given the above, the State increasingly became conflict-ridden, this, in turn,
heightened competition over control of resources through the acquisition of political power,
oil bunkering and wanton kidnap of innocent citizens for ransom which are seen as a means
to the wealth. At the institutional/organizational level, there were incessant strike action
embarked upon by the educational Institution‗s Unions. Also, as a result of the struggles and
conflict relations in the State, the various arms of government have constituted themselves as
arbiters for the resolution of conflicts. This has occasioned conflictual relations between
them, and has increasingly weakened the process of attaining peace in Rivers State in
particular and Nigeria at large.
A synopsis of three conflicts in Rivers State
Ogu Crisis
Ogu is the head quarter of Ogu/Bolo Local Government Council of Rivers State. The Local
Government shares boundary with Okrika, Elema and Gokana Local Government Areas of
Rivers State and it has a population of about 74, 683 persons, (2006 Census). Like other
Local Government Areas in the State, Ogu people are predominantly fisher men and some of
them are engaged in the public and private services in the State.
Ogu was a peaceful community before the return of Nigeria to Civil rule in 1999. As
the bell for political activities rang in 1999, the struggle for the control of the Local
Government politics was between Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and All Peoples Party
88
(APP). Ogu/Bolo Local Government Area eventually fell under the control of then All
Peoples Party (APP), later All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) with Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP) in control of Rivers State.
The conflict in Ogu was political. It was as a result of control of the political
machinery in the Local Government Area between the APP (ANPP) controlled Council and
the PDP led government at the State. The principal parties were Mina Tende (then Chairman
of Ogu/Bolo Local Government Council) and George Thompson Sekibo (then Special
Adviser to the Governor, Rivers State on Special Projects, presently and a Senator of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria). The PDP led by George Thompson Sekibo wanted to unseat the
APP led government of Mina Tende. Tende resisted and conflicts ensued. Each of the
warring factions gathered boys loyal to them, armed them with powerful guns and weapons
and started to unleash mayhem on the other. The effects were therefore, the burning of houses
and destruction of properties by both parties. People were forced to flee their homes to nearby
communities and towns.
The House was quickly informed of the scenario by Hon. Adokie Oruwari (APP)
representing Ogu Constituency through a motion. The House passed a Resolution
condemning the act, suspended the two principal actors and setting up an Ad – hoc
Committee to look into the matter. The Committee was charged to look at the remote and
immediate cause(s) of the matter, conduct public hearing, reconcile the warring parties and
report back to the House. Accordingly, the Committee acted as directed by the House and
resolved the matter.
Aggah Egbema Crisis
Aggah is the most populous Egbema village in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Government Area
of Rivers State. The Community is oil rich and its people are predominantly farmers. The
Community had no previous history of major conflict till 2003 when one of its prominent
89
sons Chief Joseph Omuegbe elicited the support of some chief and he was made Ochioha of
Aggah, whereas the official paramount ruler Eze-ali existed. The installation of Omuegbe as
Ochioha led to division in Aggah and unhealthy rivalries. Besides being a Chief, Omuegbu
was also a Pastor and founder of Koinanion Ministries with head quarter in Aggah. In 2003,
with his assumed position as Ochioha, he acquired land which belonged to Community Girls
Secondary School Aggah to build the head quarter of his church. The acquisition of the land
sparked-up conflict in the community as boys loyal to the Eze-ali resisted the building of the
church. The both camps were armed with modern guns and ammunitions and engaged each
other. The crisis left many houses burnt and no fewer than ten persons dead.
The Member Representing Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Government Constituency II
raised the issue as a matter of urgent public importance and it was referred to the House
Committee on Public Complaints and Petitions. The Committee after an investigation turned
in its report with far reaching recommendations. Finally, the House resolved that Koinonian
Ministries do vacate the premises of the School and any other illegal occupant should vacate
the school premises.
Trade Unions in Tertiary Institutions Crisis
The Rivers State Government is the proprietor of seven tertiary Institutions namely:
The Rivers State University of Science and Technology,
Ignatius Ajuru University of Education,
The Rivers State Polytechnic,
The Rivers State College of Arts and Science,
The Rivers State School of Nursing,
The Rivers State College of Health Technology.
These Institutions have academic and non academic Unions, and almost all of them had
conflicts with their management and indeed the State Government. Some of the crises were
as a result of none implementation of agreement reached with the Tertiary Institution‘s
Unions with the Federal Government, especially, increase in salary or arrears to such
90
increase. There were also some industrial unrest as a result of perceived over bearing attitude
of management on critical issues. Some of these were on officer‘s promotion, inducement
allowances, attendance to conferences, welfare, amongst others. Critically, the Rivers State
University of Science and Technology and Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, had
running battles with their Vice Chancellors and Governing Councils over the above
mentioned issues. The University Unions declared industrial actions over nonimplementation and payment of the arrears or increase in their salaries and allowances in
2010. They petitioned the Speaker, Rivers State House of Assembly on the matter. The
intervention of the House Committee on Education made the House Leadership to meet with
the Executive arm of government, and a supplementary Appropriation was made for that year
which addressed part of their demands. Beside, series of meetings were held between the
Governing Council, the Vice-Chancellor and the University Unions especially ASUU of
Rivers State House of Assembly. These meetings were midwife by the House Committee on
Education, Rivers State House of Assembly.
91
CHAPTER FIVE
INTEREST OF LEGISLATORS AND THE ROLE OF THE RIVERS STATE HOUSE
OF ASSEMBLY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
In this chapter, we seek to test the hypothesis that the legislature is likely to intervene
in a conflict if the interests of its members are affected. One salient question that needs to be
asked is ‗why does the legislature intervene in a particular conflict when other conflicts
exist?‘ The answer to this question would be unravelled in this chapter.
Democracy is based on the notion that a people should be self-governing and that the
representatives of the people should be held accountable for their actions by the people. The
legislature unquestionably occupies the most important place as it formulates and expresses
the will of the state. The legislature, which represents the people and acts as their agent, is
therefore at the core of the Western democratic tradition. Although the legislature is known
primarily as a lawmaking body, it is important to recognize that this institution has many
other important responsibilities. The foremost function of the legislature is law making,
which is achieved through representation. Mill (1862) states that ‗in a representative
democracy, the legislature acts as the eyes, ears, and voice of the people‘. Representation
provides the basis for legislative behaviour. In the capacity of representatives, legislators
participate in law-making and other legislative business and the represented generally accept
legislative decisions as authoritative. As the elected representatives of the people, legislators
provide legitimacy to the government. In the many decades of military rule in Nigeria, the
Legislature was completely sacked, while the Executive and Judicial institutions were still
functional, this accounts for while the legislature is regarded as the symbol of democracy.
Certain Legislative actions are determined by the specific interest of the Legislators.
Interest is defined as a feeling that makes you to pay attention to something or to find
out more about it (Della, 2003:742). It is a state of curiosity or ‗curiosity about, or intellectual
or emotional involvement in something‘. It is a feeling of having one's attention, concern, or
92
curiosity particularly engaged by something; that connotes the engagement of attention to
excite emotion or passion in, on behalf of a person or thing. Interests of legislators therefore
are very paramount in legislative actions and decisions; such interest most often affects the
voting pattern of the House and the final House Resolution on specific matters. The following
are some of the reasons why the Legislature intervenes in conflicts:
Conflicts that directly affect Member’s constituents or cut across many constituencies
Unlike other branches of government, constituents have greater access to the legislators; they
are often more likely to feel that they have a claim on a representative than on other
government officials. Legislative proceedings are often organized to maximize public
attention to particular controversies and to offer participation opportunities ranging from
contacting individual representatives to organized hearings to getting information at the
constituency office of the Members of the Legislature amongst others. Commenting on
constituents‘ access to the legislature, Sir Ogele Emmanuel, Clerk, Rivers State House of
Assembly states:
Relations between constituents and their representatives differ
from other citizen-government relationships. Compared to the
executive, the legislative branch is usually more equal in its
membership, diverse in composition, and expected to be more
accessible to all citizens. In addition, the Legislature is far more
likely than the executive to do at least part of its business in public,
making it easier for constituents to learn what their representatives
are doing, and why? This accounts for why most often, legislative
bodies be it at the Federal, State and Local Government Level are
involved in conflict management. More so, the Legislators
realizing that they are nearest to their constituents would seek for
re-election or contest other elections, therefore, they are more
likely directly to intervene in conflicts that affect these
constituents.
Representation requires that representatives express the interests of their constituents, or take
positions on issues that they think are best for their constituents or the larger public interest.
Activities associated with representation include introducing legislation on behalf of
constituents, proposing motions on issues bothering on their constituent, presenting petitions
93
on matters of utmost importance to their constituents, voicing constituents' views and
interests through speeches and other public statements, and meeting with constituents and
interest groups to hear their concerns. Thus, legislators can represent their constituents in
many was without actually passing new legislations. In this vein therefore, constituents‘
interest is most often propagated by the legislator because his views are likened to the views
of his constituent. Contributing to the fore-–going, the Member representing Ogu/Bolo
Constituency in Rivers State House of Assembly, Hon. Bipi Evans asserts:
An effective legislator represents constituents, influences law and
policymaking, and acts as a constraint on executive power by
exercising a degree of oversight. Member-constituent relations can
affect each of these functions by shaping member motivations and
incentives, by providing local content and human context to
decisions, and by providing a way for constituents to measure
performance of legislators and to assess government actions. The
Member representing Ogu/Bolo in that Assembly seeing the
carnage and arson and spate of hostility in the crisis that rocked the
peaceful community – Ogu, had no choice but to raise the issue as
a matter of urgent public importance; the 4th Assembly then did not
waste time but, intervene in the crisis. The intervention of the
House to me led to the timely resolution of the crisis, so if you say
that the interest of a Member on a particular matter may lead to the
timely intervention of the House in that conflict, you may not be
wrong.
As indicated in annexure 1, the motion on Ogu crisis was proposed by Hon. Adokye Oruwari,
member representing Ogu/Bolo constituency in the House on 9th May, 2001. In an interview
with Hon. Oruwari, he states as follows:
Who sent the motion on Ogu crisis to the House? I represented that
constituency, but am from Bolo Community, it is the interest of the
constituents that motivated my personal interest and my colleagues
saw nothing sectional on the matter. Not only did the House set up
a committee to investigate, but she went further to suspend the two
primary parties to the conflict. You remember, I represented All
Peoples‘ Party APP later All Nigerian Peoples‘ Party ANPP and
the Peoples‘ Democratic Party PDP was the dominant party in the
House‘. My basic interest in the matter was because most of my
constituent lost their houses, means of livelihood, and many others
were displaced as a result of the conflict.
Based on the motion, the House resolved as follow:
94
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
That a Committee of the House be appointed to investigate the
crisis in Ogu, in Ogu/Bolo Local Government Area.
That, the Chairman of Ogu/Bolo Local Government Council, Hon.
Clever Mina Tende, pursuant to Section 64 of the Rivers State
Local Government Law, 1999, stands suspended from office, until
the resolution of the crisis in Ogu.
That the Vice Chairman, Ogu/Bolo Local Government Council,
Hon. Anidikima Alabo, do act as the Chairman of Council during
the period of suspension of the Chairman.
That His Excellency, the Executive Governor of Rivers State, be
requested to direct Mr. George Sekibo, Special Adviser on
Projects, to step aside, until the Committee of the House concludes
its assignment.
That all vigilante groups in Ogu be ban forthwith
That the Commissioner of Police do beef up security in Ogu town
(See annexure 1).
Party Interest and Party Politics
Another critical reason that stimulates the Legislature‘s intervention in conflict is party
interest or political consideration. A member of the seven- man Ad-hoc Committee set up to
investigate the Ogu conflict Hon. (Prince) Oforji, Precious (Oyigbo Constituency) in an
interview states:
If you look at the conflict in Ogu, you would realize that it was a
war over the control of the political future of that Local
Government. You will recall that at the advent of the new
democracy in 1999, APP later ANPP won Okrika and Ogu/Bolo
Councils respectively, the victory of the party could be linked to
Chief Rufus Ada George, a former Governor who hails from there
and a chieftain of the opposition party ANPP. As PDP fully got
entrenched at the Federal and State levels, there was a strategic
plan to take over the control of States and Local Governments lost
in 1999 to opposition parties, AD in the West and the ANPP in
most parts of the North and the South. When you critically look at
the two principal parties in the conflict – Mina Tende ANPP and
George Thompson Sekibo PDP, you would understand what I just
said that the conflict at Ogu was a build up to 2003 elections. This
underpins the party interest and politics associated with the
conflict.
Commenting on the House Resolution, another member of the seven-man Ad-hoc Committee
on Ogu conflict, Hon. Prince Azubuike Odum (Emohua Constituency) states:
In every profession, there is comradeship; the forces say espirit de
corp, we in the legislature are not different. We look at issues and
consider them in their merits; just like the Rotary Club will ask few
95
questions in their creed; ‗is it the truth? Is it fair to all concerned?
Will it build good will and better friendship? and will it be
beneficial to all concerned?‘. Therefore, as peoples‘
representatives, our responsibility first is to the people; we
consider first the interest of our people. In the case of the Ogu
crisis, our colleague convinced the House then with facts;
especially the outcry from his people, the House therefore took
decisions based on its findings. I was particularly interested in the
matter because I was the minority Leader and the sponsor of the
motion who was from my party APP, and the Chairman of Council
then Mina Tende my party man too. You can see beyond other
factors why I was interested.
The contributions above from Hon. Odum indicate that two principal reasons activated his
interest on the matter; the first and most significant was party interest and secondly,
comradeship. He was the Minority Leader of the ANPP and the sponsor of the motion and
the Chairman of Council were members of ANPP, consequently, he saw the conflict as a war
between the ANPP controlled Council and the PDP controlled State with the PDP struggling
to capture the Local Government in the next election. This is in alignment with the
contributions of Hon. (Prince) Precious Oforji
Table 5.1: Opinion of Respondents ‘why the legislature intervenes in conflict?’
S/N RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
NO. OF RESPONSE
1.
When the interest of its Member is
150
affected
2.
Because it is its constitutional
51
responsibility
3.
Because of its zealousness as a law
9
making House
4.
No response
10
TOTAL
220
Source: Data from framework
%
68
23
4
5
100
Respondents‘ response to question 24 as presented in Table is instructive, 150 (65%) hold the
view that the legislature intervenes very fast in conflict when the interest of their members
are affected. Contributing to the above subject, Dr. Ken Nweke, a lecturer at Ignatius Ajuru
University of Education and public affairs commentator asserts:
96
The intervention of Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict
management is sectional; the House most often intervenes in
conflicts when the interest of their Member is affected. From 1999
till date, Rivers State has been engulfed in so many conflicts; how
many of them did the House intervene? If you look critically to
those ones they intervened in, either that they were directly
involved or their relation or crony was involved. So many other
conflicts that did not have any body linked to the House, citizen
had to look up to the executive that was ambivalent to consider
these issues. This actually is the state of affair. We look forward to
a House that without prejudice and without any personal interest
will go into the conflict and tirelessly resolve it because the House
is a peoples‘ Assembly paid from the tax payers money and other
appropriation from the Federation and other accounts. We must
move away from sentimentalism and be broad in our thinking and
action, the House must legislate for peace and good governance as
set out in section 4 (7) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria as amended.
Implicit in the above interview is that the Legislature intervenes greatly in conflicts that affect
their Members. One other person interviewed, who wished to remain anonymous, cited the
case of the Aggah-Egbema conflict. The House in its Resolution at the 133 Legislative Sitting
held on 17th January, 2001 on Aggah-Egbema conflict resolved as follows:
(1) That Rev. Joseph Omuegbu and the Koninonia International
Ministries should, forthwith, stop encroaching into the land
belonging to Community Girls Secondary School, Aggah,
ONELGA;
(2) That government do survey and fence up the land occupied by
Community Girls Secondary School Aggah, ONELGA;
(3) That Aggah Community including other Communities in the
State, be held responsible for any harm or threat to life
sustained against government officials posted to serve there
(RVHA, 2001:1). See annexure 2 for details.
However, some other arguments in support of the House not being sectional in conflict
management were put forward by Hon. Nelson Singer, a member representing Onelga
Constituency II (2003-2007) he states inter alia:
The House may be accused of being sectional, but in reality, it is
not. That is the sentiment of people that do not understand the
workings of the legislature. In Aggah-Egbema crisis, my
predecessor Hon. Elemchukwu Ogbowu raised the matter on the
floor of the House, he is not from Aggah, but he represented them;
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he had to raise the matter for the immediate attention of the House
because the lives and properties of our constituents were involved.
You must always have the good, the bad and the ugly in every
constituency, should the good not enjoy the benefits and fruits of
their labour?‘
Asked if they thought that the interest of a member influenced the State Assembly to make
timely interventions in conflicts, 82% of our respondents strongly agreed, while only 5%
strongly disagreed.
Fig 5.1: A pie chart showing respondents view on a question ‘Interest of Legislators lead
to timely intervention in conflict’?
Source: Data from framework
A review of the submission as presented in the pie chart shows that an overwhelming
majority strongly agreed and agreed to the assertion that the legislature would be timely in
the conflict management when the interest of their Member is involved; while only about 7%
strongly disagreed and disagreed to the assertion and 2% had no comment. A look at Tables 5
and 6 above on motions and bills proposed and passed on the floor of the House shows that,
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in Ogu crisis, as explained earlier, the Member representing the community from All
Peoples‘ Party (APP) Hon. Oruwari presented the motion to the House, the House suspended
the two principal parties to the conflict Mina Tende and George Sekibo and swiftly set up an
Ad-hoc Committee to investigate the matter. The House was careful in the selection of
Members of the Committee, the Committee had four Members including the Chairman from
the PDP and three from the opposition parties- the ANPP and the AD. The Committee
organized public hearing and made a fact finding visit to the affected Community. Finally,
the Committee made far reaching recommendations that resolved the matter and restored
peace in the Community.
Fig 5.2: Bar Chart showing respondents’ response to a question ‘do you see conflict
management as one of the responsibilities of the Legislature?’
Data from framework
Finally, the bar chart above shows response to question 23 of the questionnaire, it
indicates that 180 representing 82% of the respondents answered ‗yes‘, that conflict
99
management is part of the responsibilities of the Legislature, 9% answered ‗no‘ while 9%
others did not provide any response to the question. Commenting on the foregoing, Ojirika
Callistus, a former Clerk to the House Committee on Public Complaints & Petitions states:
In a democracy, there is inter dependence in the functions of all the
organs of government. A concept known as ‗inter penetration of
power‘ has evolved. Conflict management is a responsibility of all
the organs of government in a State. But, it falls principally within
the ambit of the Executive and the Legislature. The inefficiency of
those two organs to resolve the conflicts leads to the increasing
role of the Legislature in conflict management. As a former Clerk
to the House Committee on Public Complaints & Petitions, we
were inundated with series of petition; the people believed so
much in our ability to solve their problems instead of the courts
and Public Complaints Bureau and other Executive Departments, I
am glad we did our best and we delivered on our set goals.
Table 5.2: Chi – Square Tests
Chi-Square Tests
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by -Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
Value
295.963a
348.675
238.614
4
4
Asy mp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.000
.000
1
.000
df
440
a. 0 cells (.0%) hav e expect ed count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 6.50.
From the Chi-square distribution table, we find that at d.f. = 4 and at α = 0.05 level of
significance, then X2.05 = 9.4877
Since the Test statistics, X2 ( = 295.9637), is GREATER than X2.05 (= 9.4877); also since p
(= 0.000) < α (=0.05), we reject the null hypothesis (H0) and conclude that:
H1:
There is a significant association between interest of the Legislature and its
intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State.
Strength of Relationship: The high value of 0.634 for the test statistics, contingency
coefficient, indicates that there is a strong relationship between the two variables.
In conclusion, it is important to note that the three conflicts identified as our case
studies have great implications for our research and the government of the day, led by the
100
Peoples‘ Democratic Party (PDP). In Ogu conflict for instance, it was principally a war over
the political control of Ogu/Bolo by the PDP from the ANPP, The Aggah-Egbema conflict
showed the inaptitude and lackadaisical attitude of the Executive and the Judiciary towards
conflict management in the state, while the Labour Union of Tertiary Institutions in the
State‘s conflict reveals the insensitivity of the Executive to honour agreements and the
Judiciary‘s inaptitude. Other critical factors worthy of note as indicators for the timely
intervention of the Legislature in conflicts are: where the conflicts have direct implications
for the Legislature, Executive biases or particular conflicts and delay in justice delivery by
the Judiciary on some conflicting matters in the State among others.
The failure of the Executive and the Judiciary in conflict management led to the
increasing role of the Legislature in conflict management. Legislative interventions are seen
through increased involvement of Members in the sponsorship of conflict management
related Bills and motions, invitation of persons connected with the conflicts to brief the
House or a Committee of the House, timely attendance of Members to Sitting and Committee
meetings to contribute to debates on the conflicts, timely dispensation of debate on conflict
related Motions or Bills, regular presentation of petitions on conflicting matters to the House
in plenary and Committees of the House by members of the Legislature, conduct of public
hearing on the conflicts, example the Ogu conflict, regular Press briefing by the Legislature
especially on the conflicts it is or has mitigated upon, constituency outreach programmes and
town hall meetings to educate the people on Legislative actions and intervention on the
conflicts and other related matters.
The result from our chi square test indicates that there is a strong relationship between
the two variables. The results from our primary and secondary data indicate that the
legislature often times intervenes in conflicts when the interests of its members are affected.
This is as indicated mostly in the Ogu, the Egbema and the Labour Unions in Tertiary
101
Institutions conflicts which constitute our case study. Interest in this circumstance does not
connote parochial interest, but the public interest of the State, when the constituency where
the legislator represents is in turmoil or at the verge of being in conflicts. Finally, the result to
the first hypothesis tested by this study was positive.
102
CHAPTER SIX
EXECUTIVE, JUDICIARY AND THE ROLE OF RIVERS STATE HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Our major focus in this chapter is to validate the result from our primary and
secondary data on the increasing role of the Legislature in conflict management vis-à-vis the
Executive and Judiciary in whose primary constituency conflict management resides.
Hypothetically, we stated that ‗if the Executive and Judiciary fail to manage conflicts
effectively, then the involvement of the legislature in conflict management is likely to
increase.‘ The major indicators of failure of the Executive and the Judiciary to manage
conflicts are:
Insensitivity of the Executive and the Judiciary towards the management of conflicts in
Rivers State
As identified in Appendix 2, there were not less than sixty (known) conflicts in Rivers
State, there has been no intervention on most of the conflicts till date by any of the organs of
government. A study of the table would indicate that most of the conflicts have persisted
from 1999 till date. The question that may agitate our minds is ‗why has there not been
known solution to these conflicts?‘ the answer is simple, there has not been serious interest
from governmental institutions to resolve the conflicts. In Rumuekpe crisis for instance, the
whole Community was sacked, there was arson and wanton destruction of lives and
properties, yet, no known solution has been canvassed. The Community is still deserted. The
Executive and the Judiciary from 1999 to date have not provided any solution to the problem.
What was the cause of the problem? – ‗oil led development‘. The Legislature as it were in the
current Assembly has put structures in place to resolve the conflict through its House
Committee on Energy & Natural Resources. Recently, meetings were held between a section
of the Community and Total E&P, the Committee made a Resolution which all parties have
endorsed. (See annexure 4 for details). Also, the House Leader who incidentally represents
103
the Community is making efforts to resolve the matter. Therefore, the intervention of the
Legislature is mostly related to the lackadaisical attitude of both the Executive and the
Judiciary to intervene in the conflict. Commenting on the matter, the Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Hon. Bipi Evens states:
The Rumuekpe conflict is age long. From the Petition as well as
the Committee Resolution, you will notice that the people had been
in court with the oil companies for a long time and no clear
resolution has been reached, so, the family that met us decided on
an out of court settlement, the Committee has been able to mitigate
on the matter and the conflict almost completely resolved. From
the Resolution, it is noteworthy to note that all the parties signed, it
shows the acceptance of the Legislative option to conflict
management by the people. From what we have achieved, we can
attribute the intervention of the Legislature on the conflict to the
inaction of both the Executive and the Judiciary.
Similarly, in an interview with a Petitioner, Mr. Anthony from Rumuekpe
Community, he states that:
The Rumuekpe conflict could be attributed to both the failure of
the Executive and the Judiciary in the State. In America and other
known democracies in the world the lost of properties and lives is
almost considered a sacrilege, In Israel for instance, because of the
release of one citizen in captivity, the Country released hundreds
of Palestinians, these are societies that have value for human lives.
The Rumuekpe conflict is age long, many lives and properties
worth millions had been lost and the community devastated. I have
not been to my community for over a decade, we are refugees in
many neighboring communities, yet, we have government. We
went to court and have been in court all the while before a
Legislator advised us to seek Legislative intervention. Initially, we
had no confidence in the Legislature, but, today, I can say that the
failure of the Executive and the Legislature has led to the success
which we can celebrate from this Committees‘ verdict. Indeed, we
are delighted with the Legislature‘s effort.
Further to this, in the three conflicts under study; viz: the Ogu conflict, AggahEgbema conflict and Labour Unions in Tertiary Institutions, the insensitivity of the Executive
and the Judiciary was very prominent. In Ogu conflict for instance, the Executive at the State
level feigned ignorant of the conflict because of its interest to recapture the control of the
Council from the ANPP. The ruling PDP had a prominent son of the Local Government,
104
Chief George Sekibo, then Special Adviser to the Governor on Special Project as its Leader.
In a sane society, should Sekibo not report the matter to the Governor who then would set up
a Judiciary panel of inquiry and other far reaching conflict resolution mechanisms put in
place? Commenting on the above, Mr. Samuel Angar, a victim of the conflict states:
I lost my two-story building and other personal effects to the
conflict. It was a war of survival by the ruling PDP at the State
level and the ANPP at the Local Government level. When we saw
the war coming, we wrote petitions to the Commissioner of Police
and the State Governor, but no action was taken by the Executive
until the war ensued. It was not easy. This action is tantamount to
Executive lousiness. If the Legislature had not intervened, may be,
the conflict would have persisted. You can see that when the
Executive is interested on a matter, they have a way of driving
home there point. I schooled in the United Kingdom and I know
how responsive a government could intervene on matters that
concern the citizens. Indeed, we do not have a government in
Nigeria, all these points to one factor; Nigeria appears to be a
failed State.
Similarly, a closer examination of the conflicts that have consistently engulfed the
Labour Unions of Tertiary Institutions in the State shows no clear departure from the
ineptitude of the Executive and the Judiciary in conflict management. In an interview with
Engr. Ekulor, Secretary of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), Rivers State
University Chapter, he states as follows:
The problem in RUST and indeed all the other higher Institutions
with the Rivers State Government as their proprietor is that of
insensitivity. Insensitivity of the government on one hand, and the
management team on the other hand. You will agree with me that
the Ivory Tower is not expected to be associated with politics. In
RUST where I lecture, government plays lip – service and politics
with everything. The appointment of the Vice Chancellor for
instance was flawed with irregularities and did not go through due
process; ASUU protested, but the Visitor apologized. ASUU then
requested that the right thing should be done, but the Visitor
rebuffed ASUU‘s request. ASUU then sought judicial option to the
matter in 2008. From 2008 when ASUU went to court, the
Judiciary in the State failed to deliver judgment on the matter till
five years later, after twenty two adjournments had been made on
the suite. Even when judgment was delivered, the Judiciary ruled it
was out of its jurisdiction to hear the matter, thus, referred it to the
National Industrial Court for arbitration. The Judiciary is expected
105
to be the last hope of the common man, but the Judiciary in the
State is arm-twist and in support of Executive actions. The Sixth
Assembly through its Committee on Education led by Hon.
Maureen Tamuno intervened in the crises in the University, upon
an overture by the Committee, the University Unions in the
Institution listened to the Legislature and suspended the Industrial
action they embarked upon and accepted the olive tree as proposed
by the House; apart from the financial benefits which were paid
after the House had prevailed on the Executive to propose a
Supplementary Appropriation Bill which received accelerated
hearing, no other decision as directed by the Committee was
honoured by the Council and Administration, this to me is
insensitivity. The Government should under normal circumstance
realize that any contribution to education is not a waste but a
service for the growth and development of the society.
From the submissions of by the ASUU Secretary, RUST, we can deduce that
insensitivity of the Executive and the Judiciary lead to the exacerbation of conflicts in the
State, this is as demonstrated in the Legal tussle between ASUU and the University
Management, Council and the Visitor which lasted for about five years with twenty two
adjournment before justice delivery and none invitation of ASUU for dialogue by the
Executive till the intervention by the Legislature. The table below clearly describes
respondents view on the matter:
Table 6.1: Opinion of the respondents’ on a leading role played by the Executive and
the Judiciary in conflict resolution in Rivers State
SN RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
1
Strongly agree
2
NO. OF RESPONSE
%
15
7
Agree
7
3
3
Strongly disagree
130
59
4
Disagree
60
27
5
No response
8
4
220
100
Total
Source: Data from framework
106
Table 6.1 shows that the respondents disagreed in strong terms that the Executive and the
Judiciary have been active in conflict resolution. The table indicates that 59% and 27%
making a total of 86% were vehement in their resolve. Only 10% of the population agreed
that the two Institutions are active in conflict management. Commenting on the foregoing,
Barr. Ikenga Uzo, a staff of the Ministry of Justice interviewed states: ‗As legal officers of
the Ministry of Justice, we handle so many cases, as a person, so many matters have been
handled by me, some we win, others we lose. The Ministry of Justice in Rivers State has been
very active in conflict management; almost every day, we go to court and the magistrates and
judges are up to their responsibility. However, you know that an oil economy is a vector to
conflicts; there abound so many conflicts in the State. The impact of what we are doing may
not be extremely significant‘.
Contributing to the foregoing, a Magistrate in the Rivers State Judiciary who chooses
to remain anonymous opines that ‗we in the judiciary have resolved so many matters. Many
litigants come with different cases and almost every day of the working week when courts are
in session, we trash cases, we are not idle at all; we are very busy. The adjournments that you
are talking about are not caused by us, but the lawyers. All the same, the legal system in
Nigeria is still evolving.‘
Growth of Criminal Violence
Another indicator of Executive and Judiciary failure is the growth of criminal
violence. As the State becomes criminal in its oppression of its citizens, so lawlessness
becomes more apparent. Criminal gangs take over the streets of the cities and villages. Arms
and drug trafficking become more common. Kidnapping for ransom is almost
institutionalized as the order of the day, incessant armed robbery of home, banks, business
premises and commuter almost a daily occurrence. Ordinary, anomic behaviors become the
norm. The Police Force set up to protect lives and properties become paralyzed and
107
ineffective. For protection, citizens naturally turn to warlords like Ateke Tom, Boy Loaf, late
Soboma George, Asari Dokubo and other strong figures who express or activate ethnic or
clan solidarity as well as ‗masters of town‘, thus offering the possibility of security at a time
when all else, and the State itself, is crumbling. High rates of urban crime and the rise of
criminal syndicates testify to an underlying anarchy and desperation. That was the Rivers
State at the period covered by this study and beyond. The spate of conflicts rose to crescendo
in the State during the period under review, especially between 2006 and 2008, anarchy was
let loose and there was the militarization of Port Harcourt the State capital and its environs.
It is important to note that in most of the conflicts that engulfed the State, the executive and
judiciary were more interested in conflict management than conflict resolution. While
conflict management is interim, conflict resolution is permanent.
In an interview with Dumnu, the Clerk, House Committee on Public Complaint and
Petitions (2004-2007), he states:
The House Committee on Public Complaint and Petitions within
the period I served as Clerk was very active. Many Rivers State
people had confidence in the ability of the Legislature to resolve
their problems. We received cases like unlawful dismissal,
termination or retrenchment of Staff, oil spill/pollution with no
adequate clean-up/remediation activity or compensation, company
ineptitude to honour memorandum of understanding with host
communities, chieftaincy wrangling, youth restiveness, land
disputes among others. While some of the matters predated the
Committee, others were fresh. The conflicts were very numerous
and it showed a systemic failure of the primary institutions viz the
executive and judiciary which in a presidential system hold strong
jurisdiction over conflict resolution. The legislature is expected to
play a quasi role and not a full role, but, the reverse became the
case, thus, we mediated, arbitrated and resolved many of the cases
and united people that once saw themselves as enemies. Prominent
in our score card were the Aggah-Egbema conflict, the Ishukwa
chieftaincy and youth conflict over the nomination of contractor
for a project by Nigerian Agip Oil Company, the Kpor internal
crisis, among others.
The response from Dumnu flows with the respondents answer to question 24 of the
questionnaire:
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A follow up question was asked, ‗to what extent has the effects of the Executive and
Judiciary been on conflict management in the State?‘ The response is as represented in the
table below.
Table 6.2: A table showing respondents’ view on the question ‘to what extent has the
efforts of the Executive and Judiciary been on conflict management in the State?
SN RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
NO. OF RESPONSE
%
1
Very meaningful
130
59
2
Meaningful
60
27
3
Very unmeaningful
15
7
4
Not meaningful
7
3
5
No response
8
4
220
100
Total
Source: Data from framework
Respondents were disenchanted with the efforts made by the Executive and the Judiciary in
conflict management in the State. This is as demonstrated in their response. Out of the 220
persons that returned their questionnaire, only 10% believed in the ability of the Executive
and the Judiciary to resolve conflict, while 86% do not have confidence in the ability of these
two institutions to manage conflicts. From the table above, you can see the reason for the
increasing role of the Legislature in conflict management. There is general peoples‘ apathy
towards the second and third institutions of government, this stems from previous
experiences as highlighted by a petitioner, Mr. Onisofien:
Over the years, were taught and we believed on the role of both the
Executive and the Judiciary in conflict management. We thought
from what we got from our teachers that like other developed
societies, conflicts would reduce, but we are surprise to realise that
conflicts are exacerbating. The two institutions that have the
primary domain for managing conflicts have failed Nigerians. We
now sleep with our eyes open because you do not know what may
happen to you in the next minute. Hoodlum steal, kidnap, maim
and kill innocent citizens without recourse to the law. You can see
where we are, there is a complete state of insecurity in the land.
May I use this medium to commend the Legislature in the State for
109
the passage of two high impact bills targeted at restoring peace in
the State, namely – ‗the Secret Cult and Similar Activities
Prohibition Law‘ and the ‗Anti-kidnap Law‘.
Contrary to the above, Amadi, a magistrate in the State Magistracy opines that ‗the
Judiciary has been very active in conflict resolution, we have resolved so many cases,
however, the basic challenge is, the population of our country is very large, how would you
feel the impact of pouring a litre of oil in a river? Therefore, it is difficult to clearly feel the
impact of what we have done and are still doing, given that so many conflicts and crises
abound in the State in particular and the nation at large. But, is it possible for us to have a
conflict free society? The right answer is yours‘.
Question 26, which is a follow-up to question 25, sought to know ‗in a scale of 100,
the response from respondents was alarming. The respondents were asked ‗in a scale of
100%, how would you rank the effort of the executive and the judiciary in conflict
resolution?‘ The answer elicited from the respondents is as presented in the graph below:
Fig. 6.1: A graph showing respondents’ view to a question ‘in a scale of 100%, how
would you rank the efforts of the Executive and Judiciary in conflict resolution?’
70
60
50
40
Y-Values
30
20
10
0
0
20
40
60
80
Source: Data from framework
100
120
140
110
Respondents‘ responses show a total discontent of people with the role of both the executive
and judiciary in conflict resolution. An overwhelming 86% were disenchanted with the role
of the two arms of government and whose jurisdiction conflicts are expected to be resolved.
In view of the glaring failure of these two organs of government to speedily resolve conflict
and enhance political stability, the legislature in the growing political lexicon – ‗inter
penetration of power‘ advertently intervenes in conflict management which in the words of
Hon. Wokocha is ‗quasi judicial function‘. Thus question 27 of our questionnaire as reflected
in the table bellow illustrates the feelings of the people on the reason why the legislature
intervenes in conflict management.
Table 6.3: Opinion of the Respondents’ on ‘what motivates the legislature to be involved
in conflict management?
SN RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
NO. OF RESPONSE
%
1
Because the executive and judiciary
have failed to permanently resolve
conflicts in the State
160
73
2
Because the legislature is one of the
arms of government, thus has the
power to resolve conflicts
20
9
3
Because
the
legislature
managing conflicts
likes
10
5
4
Because
it
is
constitutionally
guaranteed for legislature to intervene
5
2
5
No response
18
8
Total
220
100
Source: Data from framework
The table above shows that 73% of the population interviewed hold the opinion that the
failure of both the executive and judiciary to resolve conflicts leads to the increasing role of
the legislature in conflict management. In an interview with Zaga Phimia, a former Clerk,
House Committee on Public Complaint and Petition (2007 -2008), he states:
111
Conflict management is not a primary role of the legislature but an
acquired function due to the representative function of the
legislature because, constituents may at any point raise petitions to
their Representatives to resolve. In this process, the
Representatives are obliged to hear such matters as either motion
on the floor of the House or petition referrals to Committees. Most
often, the issues raised are conflictual in nature. This accounts for
why the legislature is inundated with petitions. It is important to
note that governmental institutions saddled with such
responsibility at both the executive and legislative divides like the
Courts, Public Complaints Commission, Consumer Protection
Council and Federal Environmental Protection Agency among
others are weak in the dispensation of justice. Therefore, the
legislature is the willing window for conflict management, which
is why the ordinary man in the street rushes to the House for
conflict management.
Table 6.4: Respondents’ responses to the question ‘Do you think that the failure of the
Executive and Judiciary to reduce conflicts in communities in the state could stall good
governance and increase the role of the legislature in conflict management?’
SN
1
2
3
RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
NO. OF RESPONSE
Yes
180
No
20
No response
20
Total
220
Source: Data from framework
%
82
9
9
100
An analysis of the figure generated from the above table explains the reason for the
increasing role of the Legislature in conflict management because the legislature is the direct
representative of communities; therefore, once there is conflict, they would likely be aware.
Importantly, unlike the executive and the judiciary, the legislature dispenses conflicts and
reconciles parties faster than the other two institutions. Consequently, warring parties prefer
Legislative action where no money is spent for filing of suits, hiring of lawyer to name but a
few. Commenting on the foregoing, Amini-Philip in an interview states:
Development cannot take place in conflictual environment, which
is why people must be at peace for development to strive.
Government has everything in its hand- power, authority and
money; therefore, it can stop conflict because it is one of its
cardinal functions to maintain law and order. So, for any society
where government fails to stop conflict, it is not a responsive
government. Conflicts stiffen development and government is
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rattled whenever it occurs. In 2007, all activities were almost put
on hold in Rivers State and indeed the Niger Delta, anarchy was let
loose because of the militancy, government had to look for a way
to nip the causes of the conflict on the bud, the Rivers State House
of Assembly rose to its responsibly by legislating on cultism and
kidnapping, the House also waded on some prominent conflicts
like the ‗cotton channel‘ that engulfed the three Calabari Local
Government. The Legislature has actually been on the fore front in
conflict management and be commended for that. Executive and
Judicial actions are always slow, most often, before the conflicts
are resolved, lives and properties may have been lost, the Judiciary
took over twenty years to conclude a land dispute between
Nwebiara and Baraku in Gokana Local Government of Rivers
State, the conflict still persist because the judgement appears
questionable, this accounts for the increasing role of the legislature
in conflict management.
Table 6.5: What would be your ideal outcome on the role of the legislature in conflict
management?
SN
1
2
3
4
5
6
RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
NO. OF RESPONSE
Increased political stability and
18
deepening of democratic values
Respect for rule of law
20
Increased political awareness and
10
participation of the people in
governance
All of the above
160
None of the above
Nil
No response
20
Total
220
Source: Data from framework
%
8
9
5
73
Nil
9
100
The respondents‘ responses to question in table 14 were fascinating, with the exception of 9%
that had no comment to the question, about 91% have confidence in the ability of the
legislature to resolve conflict. This is an indication that most of the citizens are disenchanted
in the style of both the Executive and the Judiciary to conflict management. Finally, the last
question in our questionnaire sought to know the opinion of the respondents on ‗if the
involvement of the legislature in conflict management would engender political stability and
foster a better relation with other branches of government?‘
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Fig. 6.2: A bar chart showing responses to a question ‘if the involvement of the
legislature in conflict management would engender political stability and foster a better
relation with other branches of government?’
Source: Data from framework
The response as presented in the bar chart above reveals that government is one, and
therefore works in co-ordinate relationship. As demonstrated in the results from the
questionnaire, about 180 representing 82% strongly agreed and agreed that the involvement
of the legislature in conflict management would engender political stability and foster a better
relation with other branches of government. Only about 14% strongly disagreed and
disagreed and about 4% had no contribution. In support of the respondents‘ view, the
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Dr. George Nweke in an interview states;
‗government is one, there are differences in function of organs of government, but the central
goal is to ensure political stability. Therefore, there is no water tight separation of powers by
governmental institutions in conflict management‘. In the sixth Assembly of Rivers State
House of Assembly, the Hon. Commissioner for Energy & Natural Resources wrote the
House Committee on Energy & Natural Resources to intervene on a face-off between the
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Ministry and (Bourmbom Inter Oil) – a logistic company involved in oil and gas over the
refusal of the Company to honour the invitations of the Ministry to a meeting. The
Committee intervened and resolved the matter and went further to reconcile the relationship
between the Ministry and the company. The House Committee on Education has in like
manner intervened in conflict between some of the Tertiary Institutions and contractors
handling projects in those Institutions over contract failures. Similarly, the committee waded
into conflicts between the Post - Primary Schools‘ Board and some developers of property
over illegal encroachment and development of properties in government land. Some of the
request letters and Committee Resolutions are attached as appendices to this research.
Table 6.6: Chi – Square Tests
Chi-Square Tests
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by -Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
Value
11.015a
11.308
3.444
4
4
Asy mp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.026
.023
1
.063
df
440
a. 0 cells (.0%) hav e expect ed count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 5.00.
From the Chi-square distribution table, we find that at d.f. = 4 and at α = 0.05 level of
significance, then X2.05 = 9.4877
Since the Test statistics, X2 ( = 11.015), is GREATER than X2.05 (= 9.4877); also since p (=
0.026) < α (=0.05), we reject the null hypothesis (H0) and conclude that:
H1:
There is a significant association between failure of executive/judiciary and
intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State polity;
Strength of Relationship: The low value of 0.156 for the test statistics, contingency
coefficient, indicates that there is a weak relationship between the two variables
In conclusion, this chapter reviewed the efforts of the Executive and Judiciary vis-àvis the role of Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict management. The review
established that the Executive and Judiciary actually are involved in conflict management and
have resolved many conflicts in the State, but the legislature, symbolized by the Rivers State
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House of Assembly, is increasingly becoming involved in conflict management. The reasons
for these are: high cost and delayed litigation processes with so many pending matters in
court without determination, lackadaisical attitude of the executive over conflict issues,
conflict management rather than resolution approach of the two arms of government among
others. However, matters that are sent to the legislature are dispensed with without much
delay and without any filing cost. Parties in the conflicts are reconciled and made to continue
to cohabit and live in harmony with one another. These factors account for why many
petitioners prefer legislative options for conflict management, and it accounts also for the
increasing role of the legislature in conflict management. The study further establishes that
the involvement of the legislature in conflict management would engender political stability
and foster better relationship between the legislature and other arms of government. The chi
square test result shows a significant relationship with the hypothesis tested. Thus, the high
value of 0.626 for the test statistics, contingency coefficient, indicates that there is a fairly
strong relationship between the two variables. The submissions above therefore affirm the
position of our second hypothesis which is ‗If the Executive and Judicial arms of government
fail to successfully manage conflicts, then the involvement of the legislature in conflict
management is likely to increase‘. Therefore, the hypothesis tested positive.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE LEGISLATURE, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL
STABILITY IN RIVERS STATE
In this chapter, we shall explore the link between the Legislature, conflict
management and political stability in Nigeria with particular reference to Rivers State. The
role of Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict management will be given adequate
attention.
The Rivers State House of Assembly, Conflict Management and Political Stability
Stability requires a commitment by everybody to fairness, rule of law, fair and
equitable representations in a plural society. To achieve this, we must embrace fiscal
federalism, develop our economy so as to provide jobs for our army of unemployed youth
and the older population and reduce poverty. Political stability is seen as a government‘s
forced or coerced exaction of compliance to its wishes by people. Conceived in regime
stability, political stability is seen as the personal survival of people in power. This leads to
the conflation of personal security and state security, leading to what Ibeanu (1997:1)
describes as ―a paradox of security,‖ the fact that national security comes into contradiction
with the security of nationals. Importantly, political stability deals with the overall stability
of the state, irrespective of the life span of a government. ‗An important component of
stability is legitimacy, for it is the level of feeling of empathy to the State by the people that
determines whether compliance is willingly given or is forcefully extracted (Hart, 2011)‘.
For such empathy to exist, the political system must show itself to be capable of responding
to the needs of the people, in regulating political behavior, and in welding the populace into
an integrated people-nation. ‗Political stability deals with economic responsiveness and
rebuilding of social capital among the numerous component parts of the country, which
many years of military rule have destroyed (see Anderson, 2011)‘. The task of political
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stability in Nigeria today has three major components, namely, economic recovery, social
regeneration and democratic consolidation.
Political stability according to Babangida (2010) is the continuation of the exercise of
power by those freely elected by the people of the country for specific periods with definite
mandates which conformed with the fundamental objectives and directive principles of states
policy clearly defined in chapter 11 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
1999 (as amended).―There, it is clearly stated that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a
state based on the principles of democracy and social justice.‖ To him, Nigeria is still in
evolution but, to mature, it needs commitment on the part of the political leadership, who
would do the right thing and put the national interest above sectarian and ethnic interests.
According to him, ―leadership is the most important element needed to build a nation.
Nigerian politicians must demonstrate the seriousness of purpose needed to build a virile
nation. Our country, according to him, needs clear-headed, public-spirited leaders at every
level to propel this country to a higher stage of development than is presently the case.‖ He
stated further that putting the wrong people in leadership positions was one of the banes of
political stability, stressing that ―if we had the right calibre of people at the helms of affairs,
then it would be much easier to practise democracy in truth and in deed. The meaning of
democracy is no longer in doubt. Democracy is the government of the people by the people
and for the people. So, there is no midway house to democratic government.‖ Commenting
on the foregoing, Ajibola (2010) said that ‗if the nation must have a stable polity, we must
work towards a parliament that is truly representative of the people and continue to have an
independent judiciary, which would continue to serve as the bastion of hope. We must
ultimately have an executive that will endear itself to the populace through responsiveness
and astute governance. The citizenry are quick to express their acceptance or rejection of a
government over the attitude of its executive arm. Nonetheless, the three legs of the tripod,
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the executive, legislature and judiciary, based on Montesquieu‘s philosophy, must remain
firm at all times‘. The achievement of all these would guarantee accountability and
transparency, which are the major indicators of good governance. Good governance would in
the long run engender political and economic stability, which would discourage conflict in
the final analysis.
Increase in the number of resolved matters on conflicts by the Legislature
The symbol of the legislature in Rivers State is the Rivers State House of Assembly.
The structure and composition of the Rivers State House of Assembly has been analyzed in
the background studies. Within the period under review, the Rivers State House of Assembly
passed so many Bills and made Resolutions. These Bills and Resolutions have been catalysts
for engendering political stability in the State. Table 4 and 5 of the appendix illustrate the
number of Bill and Resolutions that the House passed from 1999 to 2011 with respect to
conflict management.
A review of the Bills passed and Resolutions on motions presented as indicated in
Tables four and five of our appendix shows the commitment of a House desirous of
maintaining peace and order which are basic indices for good governance. In table four for
instance, the House Resolved the Ogu and Aggah-Egbema conflicts among others. Many
other conflicts were resolved at the Committee level. The Labour Unions in the tertiary
Institutions‘ conflicts were resolved at the Committee stage.
It is instructive to note that increased interest in the ability of the Legislature to
resolve conflicts is as a result of renewed confidence and the failure of the Executive and the
Judiciary to effectively manage conflicts in the State. As indicated in the tables above, the
Rivers State House of Assembly has been very active in conflict management. Commenting
on the above, Elder Martins Amabebe, a member of the 9th Governing Council of RUST
states:
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The Rivers State House of Assembly has not done badly on
conflict issues that were brought to its notice. One of such critical
issues was the lingering conflicts that bedeviled the Rivers State
University of Science and Technology. The Council, University
Authority and the Executive could not provide solutions to the
conflict, but, the intervention of the Legislature made the
difference. It is important for us to note that conflict management
is not a direct responsibility of the Legislature, but, as major
stakeholders in the political process, they are increasingly getting
involved in conflict management. You will agree with me that the
role of the Judiciary is to intervene in disputes between parties, but
the judicial system we have is not effective in conflict management
rather, it creates bottlenecks that prolong the conflict. The
Executive has often times been political in the handling of the
conflicts; the RUST situation is a case study. Executive actions
have often time precipitated further conflicts. In all, I give kudos to
the Legislature, because its intervention which stems from its
oversight functions have greatly deepened our democracy and
enhanced political stability.
The nature and dynamics of conflict and the processes of conflict management differ
from sector to sector in society. However, the driving forces for conflict relationships remain
largely the same. These forces consist of the perceptions by one or more individuals or
groups of conflicting or diverging values, aspirations, needs or interests in society, that
hamper the full realisation or fulfilment of one‘s own values, aspirations, needs or interests.
If these perceptions are intense enough, they are transformed into actions to redress the
perceived problem by mobilising resources to promote one‘s own interests at the cost of
others, resulting in an escalation of tension among the parties concerned (Anstey 1991:4).
The specific issues around which conflict is generated, the manifestations of the conflict and
the conflict management strategies and processes, however, are different in the social,
cultural, organisational, economic, technological and political sectors of the society.
However, the most important thing is, at the end, how do the conflicting parties accept the
Resolution of the House?
Within a democratic system for instance, conflict refers to those disputes that cannot
be resolved according to the rules of the democratic game. Democratic conflict resolution
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consists of an application of the existing rules of the democratic game, either through the
clarification, interpretation and enforcement of these rules and policies by the existing organs
of government, or through a process of peaceful discussions and consensus-building among
different stakeholders around an outcome that is acceptable to all parties concerned. If this is
not possible, policy-making bodies can amend the rules of the game in an attempt to mobilize
the support of the main stakeholders to the conflict. In contrast to democratic political
conflict management, conflict management in authoritarian or totalitarian states frequently
comprise a reliance on more unilateral, top-down enforcement actions by the bureaucracy,
police or military forces, rather than attempts to mobilize popular support and consent for a
specific outcome (Louise & Fanie, 2001).
This study identifies four major approaches to conflict management; these are conflict
suppression, conflict avoidance or prevention, conflict regulation and conflict resolution.

Conflict suppression
As mentioned above, conflict management in authoritarian and totalitarian systems
frequently takes the form of conflict suppression through bureaucratic rule enforcement by
the police or armed forces (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:220). Conflict
suppression as a democratic strategy of conflict management can only work in the short term,
because it does not change attitudes or address the root causes of the initial outbreaks of
conflict, but can only address the most extreme manifestations of underlying disagreements
and/or frustrations that spill over into violent interactions among stakeholders in the dispute
(Louise & Fanie, 2001). Conflict suppression can only be a lasting conflict management
approach if it is applied in conjunction with other strategies that address longer term root
causes (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse‘s ‗deep prevention measures‘ - 1999:97). Nigeria
just emerged from a draconian military government; conflict suppression method was applied
in Umuechem crisis, Ogoni crisis and many other conflicts in Rivers State then. Commenting
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on this, the Deputy Speaker of Rivers State House of Assembly states inter alia: ‗we from
Ogoni witnessed the brutality applied by the Abacha military regime on the Ogonis. Their
mission then was to exterminate our leaders, gauge us, so we will not have any body to speak
for us again and we would be put in disarray. They tried, they suppressed us but democracy
came and UNEP Report was published, we are laughing last, that is Nigeria for you. The
Ogoni case is a microcosm of other oil bearing communities in our dear state (Leyii, 2012)‘.

Conflict prevention
The most ideal democratic conflict management approach is probably conflict avoidance
or prevention. This approach to conflict management assumes the existence of good
governance practices and foresight of political elites in order to steer away from potential
future conflict situations by enacting rules, implementing pragmatic policies and strategies
that will avoid violent or other outbursts of dissatisfaction. In an interview with Rt. Hon.
Amachree, Speaker, Rivers State House of Assembly, he stated as follows:
A basic conflict management strategy adopted by the Legislature
in Rivers State is conflict prevention model. This involves the
Working on high impact Bills predicated on conflict prevention
like the Rivers State employment Bill, 2000; Rivers State Land
Use (Prohibition of Extortion) bill, 2010; the Secret Cult and
Similar activities (prohibition) Bill 2004, the Anti Kidnap Law;
among others. We have also created Standing Committees
especially on Public Complaints and petitions and line
Committees on special areas of activities within the jurisdiction of
the State. Finally, we propose motion and make resolutions that
are germane to conflict prevention in the State. These are critical
things we can do to restore things we can do to restore the
confidence of our constituents on us. From the feedback I get from
Members, I am satisfied that those involved in conflicts mitigated
by us go back home satisfied.
An analysis of the statement above by the Speaker of the Rivers State House Assembly
shows that the House is mindful of the nature of conflicts in the State, and has positioned
itself for conflict management. Also, Mr. Speaker‘s statement indicates that the parties in
conflicts brought to the House accept the Resolutions of the House. It also flows with the
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response derived from (Section B, No. 11) of the questionnaires on the subject ‗In your
opinion, is the Rivers State House of Assembly aware of the various conflicts in the State?‘
Out of 220 questionnaires retrieved, 180 representing 82% affirmed that the Rivers State
House of Assembly is aware of the various conflicts in the State. Conflict prevention also
assumes a more explicit distinction between interests and needs, and a more explicit focus of
governments on real need satisfaction than interest satisfaction (Burton 1990:242). ‗Conflict
prevention‘ according to Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999:48) connotes a proactive
capability within societies to predict and avoid destructive conflict by the spread of the
problem-solving method and philosophy throughout all relevant institutions, discourses and
practices. In practice, however, it is impossible to predict in advance all conflicts that may
erupt in society and implement policy strategies to avoid them. The best any government can
do is to apply the principles of good governance as judiciously and pragmatically as possible,
but to accept that some conflicts are hard to prevent, and that they have to be dealt with in
another way once they erupt. Find attached as annexure 4, the Secret Cult and Similar
Activities (Prohibition) Law, 2004 as well as the Anti Kidnap Law for ease of reference.

Conflict regulation
Many observers find it difficult to understand why some conflicts seem to be intractable;
an example of such is (the Niger Delta crisis and the Boko Haram insurgence). If the
differences among the participants are so big that agreement is impossible, the conflict will
obviously continue. Most violent conflicts cause massive costs on the societies concerned, so
there is usually a large segment of the population which will benefit from the conflict ending.
In essence, a simple cost-benefit calculation lies behind decisions to stop or continue a
conflict. If the participants either individually or collectively assess the comparative
advantages of stopping such conflict and adopting more peaceful ways of settling their
differences, to be less than the prevailing benefits accruing from the conflict, they will be
123
reluctant to stop the conflict. In other words, if they perceive the costs of continuing with the
prevailing conflict to be less than the costs they will incur in stopping the conflict and
entering into a different mode of interaction, they will decide to continue with the conflicts
status quo, the ‗Boko Haram‘, the Jos as well as the Niger Delta insurgences are worthy of
note. Zartman, (1994) states explicitly that if the commitments of one or more of the
participants to a negotiated settlement are absent (eg because a mutually hurting deadlock
does not exist, or if they are not persuaded that the benefits of a settlement outweigh the costs
of maintaining or relinquishing the status quo), then clearly, conflict will continue. In support
of the above argument is Heywood, (1997:4) as he states that ―…the heart of politics is often
portrayed as a process of conflict resolution, in which rival views or competing interests are
reconciled with one another. However, politics in this broad sense is better thought of as a
search for conflict resolution than as its achievement, as not all conflicts are, or can be,
resolved.‖
Conflicts that cannot be prevented, have to be accepted and regulated as effectively as
is possible if they prove to be protracted and even insoluble, and cannot be resolved. Political
conflict management for instance does not always result in a full resolution of the conflict. It
frequently results only in a partial resolution or a de-escalation of the scope and intensity of
the conflict from a wide-spread, violent confrontation among stakeholders to a more limited,
less violent interaction (Burgess 1997:77). A case in point is the Niger Delta conflict.
Although conflicts are not fully resolved in this way, this approach can transform destructive
violent conflicts into much more constructive non-violent conflicts and even into
democratically acceptable levels of political interaction (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse
1999:12).
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Acceptance of Legislative Resolutions on conflicts matters by the conflicting parties

Conflict resolution
This is the last stage in conflict management; once conflict erupts, prevention is obviously
not an option anymore; the best strategy is to try and resolve the conflict. Acceptance and
regulation only becomes an option once resolution is also not possible. Resolution implies a
primary focus on the deep-seated roots of the problem, as well as the creation of conditions
within which such attempts at resolution can be implemented and pursued relatively
effectively. It therefore means that a short term focus on a de-escalation of the conflict into
more peaceful, rational, less violent and emotional interaction among the conflicting parties
as well as a long term focus on the elimination of those trigger factors that led to the eruption
of the conflict, that is, to bring about structural changes that will eliminate the conflict may be
required.
This approach to conflict resolution conceptualizes the phenomenon as a
comprehensive and rational social engineering exercise, especially in cases of intractable or
protracted conflict with deep-seated, multiple and complex causes. Conflict resolution in this
sense is also closely identified with peaceful, democratic strategies of social and political
transformation in society. This may necessitate a total transformation of the context within
which the conflict takes place, and/or a structural, functional, cultural, psychological,
economic, or technological transformation regarding the stakeholders and/or the issues
involved.
This conceptualization of conflict resolution inevitably also implies that it may
frequently turn out to be a time consuming and costly exercise (the Niger Delta and Jos crisis
as well as the Boko Haram insurgence). A comprehensive assessment of conflict resolution,
indicates that ―most cultures handle conflict in an authoritative, coercive and if necessary,
violent manner as was the case in Odi, Bayelsa State and Zaki Biam, Benue State among
others under President Obasanjo.
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Conflict resolution can be applied by the conflictual parties themselves without
external facilitation or mediation, or it can be applied with the assistance of impartial
mediators or facilitators. International and local experiences with intractable and violent
conflicts show that conflicts cannot be resolved without internal and external intervention at
some or other stage of the process: In the Ogu crisis, Educational Institution‘s conflicts and
many oil company activities - led conflicts in Rivers State, example Ishikwa crisis, the Rivers
State House of Assembly had to set up Ad-hoc Committees as well as directed the Standing
Committees of the House on Education, Public Complaints and Petition, Energy and Natural
Resources to name but a few, to resolve these conflicts. The primary and main responsibility
for preventing, managing and transforming violent internal conflict lies with the domestic
populations of the countries in question. But many of these conflicts have external as well as
internal causes, and in protracted wars, indigenous resources for peacemaking are often much
debilitated, if not deliberately targeted by those with an interest in prolonging the violence.
Nearly all commentators agree that outside assistance is usually essential for bringing the
fighting to an end and ensuring that there is no subsequent relapse into war, and is more often
than not also necessary for helping to prevent the slide into war in the first place. These
external interventions can take the form of changing mutual perceptions or interactions in
various indirect or direct ways. These interventions include individual or collective attempts
at persuading conflicting parties to settle, pressurizing them in various direct or indirect ways
(sanctions, embargoes, boycotts) as indicated in Malian coup d‘être case 2012, holding joint
educational or training conferences or workshops, bringing the parties together for the first
peace talks, advising, initiating, organizing and guiding peace talks or involvement in and
even control of the whole resolution process. Organizing public hearing as was the case in
Ogu crisis, committee meeting with the parties – the case applied in Tertiary Institution
Industrial Unions and Management as well as Isikwa matter. Globally, special envoys have
126
been appointed for this purpose, (Tony Blair UN- Middle East, Kofi Anan – UN Syria,
Adulsalami Abubakar AU Daffur Region among others).
In an interview with Hon. Tamuno, former Chairman of House Committee on
Education on the spate of conflicts in Rivers State and the models adopted by the Committee
under her headship as Chairman in 2007 – 2011, she states inter alia:
The 1999 Constitution empowers the House to use Committees;
committees are used to resolve most conflicts brought before the
House and this forms part of the oversight function of the House.
The House Committee on education under me as Chairman treated
many petitions from all the Labour Unions in the tertiary
institutions in Rivers State as well as Nigeria Union of Teachers
NUT against their Governing Councils and the Executive arm over
the payment of emoluments and outstanding arrears as a result of
wage increases and other agreements as negotiated and arrived at
the national level for implementation by States. As we noticed that
the education industry was almost grounded in the State as a result
of the breakdown of negotiation between the executive and the
affected Unions, we made sure that as a House and a Committee
on Education, we met with the Unions, the Governing Councils
and prominent heads of the MDA on Education; our series of
meetings and consultations made Unions suspend strike actions
embarked upon by them. On our part, we were able to include in a
supplementary appropriation for 2008 the outstanding areas of
remuneration and allowances owed the unions by the government,
we also reconciled Governing Councils with Management as well
as the Ministry of Education. Through that means, we were able to
resolve the conflicts and all the parties honoured our Resolution.
The statement from Hon. Tamuno above shows the willingness of the Legislature to
manage conflicts and the parties to honour the Committee Resolution. The Committee
Resolution on the Industrial Action by Trade Unions of Tertiary Institutions owned by the
Rivers State Government is attached as annexure 5. In view of the forthrightness of the
Committee, the Industrial Unions accepted the Committee Resolution and call off their strike.
Commenting on the why the Unions honoured the overture from the Committee, the
Chairman of ASUU, RUST Dr. Igwe states;
Conflict management is a multifaceted in nature. It depends on the
parties involved. Any conflict that involves the Executive and
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other parties, the Legislature stands tallest to resolve it. Most of the
conflicts have to do with laws and the laws are enacted by the
Legislature. From my finding, the Legislature appears to be the
best institution to manage and resolve conflicts because of its
composition; men and women with diversity in representation,
because of this; they are better equipped to know the primordial
factors that precipitate the conflicts. The ability of the Legislature
to effectively resolve conflicts determine to a large extent the zeal
and confidence of the people to continue to sent conflicting matters
to it. There have been a lot of mixed feelings on the ability of the
Executive to timely resolve conflict. Most of the respondents for
instance, said the Executive has both party and personal interest to
protect. This interest overrides the general goal. This accounts for
its failure in intervening in RUST conflict. On the other hand, the
Judiciary is regarded as the last hope of the common man, how
effective has the Judiciary demonstrated this? What we have is
numerous delayed judgments with series of adjournments on
salient matters. The industrial dispute that was resolved by the
House Committee on education between our union, employers and
proprietor was as a result of the integrity we have on the House.
That House resolution was honoured by all parties. Therefore, the
involvement of the House in conflict management would greatly
engender political stability in the State.
On his part, the Chairman of House Committee on Local Government Hon. Odili
Lucky avers that ‗the oversight function of the House over Tertiary Institutions in the State
through the House Committee on Education and Local Government Councils especially
resolved debilitating conflicts that beclouded the Institutions and Councils over impeachment
of Chairmen and the payment of severance allowances to former political appointees and
Councillors‘. The answer from the two Chairmen above flows with the responses generated
from question 12 of the questionnaire which seeks to know the role played by the House in
these conflict.
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Fig 7.1: What role has the legislature played on these conflicts?
Source: Data from framework
From the responses generated from the questionnaire, out of the 220 questionnaires
received, 150 (68.%) respondents confirmed that the Rivers State House of Assembly has
played the role of mitigation and reconciliation of parties, 50 (23%) respondents aver that the
House has been indifferent and 20 (9%) said that they are not aware of any role played by the
House. The answer elicited from the question therefore suggests the obvious fact that the
Rivers State House Assembly is active in conflict management. A follow-up question was
asked on what the Legislature in Rivers State has done to promote awareness on conflict
management; the response from those interviewed was as follows: Publicity of its activities
through the mass media had 50 (23%) responses; 20 (9%) responses were akin to the hosting
of Legislative/Civil Societies dialogue; 160 (73%) respondents answered ‗all of the above‘;
while 10 answered ‗none of the above. An analysis of the above subject shows that only
about 5% of the respondent said that the Legislature in Rivers State has nothing on ground to
promote awareness on conflict management, while the rest 95% were sure of the activities of
129
the legislature predicated on conflict management. Commenting on the foregoing, Amadi
Emeka, Clerk House Committee on Agriculture as well as Education avers:
The Rivers State House of Assembly most often publicizes its
activities in a popular Television programme the ‗Assembly
Watch‘. The programme is used to chronicle the activities of the
House both in plenary and Committees. Conflicts resolved or at the
verge of being resolved are brought to the fore in the programme.
Beside the Assembly Watch, the other media houses in the Press
Corp also air the activities of the House. Public hearings are
organized by Standing Committees as well as Ad-hoc Committees
on conflicts matters and others, the last being the one organized by
the House Committee on Education on ‗perceived deplorable
condition of academic programmes in the Rivers State University
of Science and Technology‘; the hearing was held pursuant to
petitions by the University Unions and a motion thereafter. Public
hearing was also organized on the Ogu crisis. I am aware that
through this processes the House publicizes its activities especially
conflict managed by it and it deepens the people‘s confidence on
the House.
Table 7.1: How effective is the role of Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict
management?
SN
1
2
3
4
RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
NO OF RESPONSE
Very effective
130
Effective
44
Very ineffective
30
Ineffective
20
Total
220
Source: Data from framework
%
59
19
13
9
100
Those who see the role of the legislature as very effective were 50%, followed by
effective 27%, then very ineffective 14% and ineffective 9%. An analysis of the table reveals
that about 77% of the respondents are satisfied with the effectiveness of the legislature in
conflict management; only 23% was not satisfied. This therefore shows the acceptability of
the role of the legislature in conflict management. Commenting on this, a Community leader
in Ishukwa Community states ‗We have been having problems with Nigerian Agip Oil
Company NAOC, we went to the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Community Affairs, they could
not resolve the matter, we went to court, no solution, but when we tried the House of
130
Assembly, we had justice, NAOC not only conceded to our request, but updated our
Memorandum of Understanding MOU with them; therefore, the House of Assembly is very
apt in conflict management‘. A follow-up question was asked thus ‗will you accept the
assertion that the Rivers State House of Assembly has been successful in conflict
management‘. The respondents answered in this order:
Table 7.2: Would you accept the assertion that the Rivers State House of Assembly has
been successful in conflict management?
SN
1
2
3
4
5
RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
NO OF RESPONSE
Strongly agree
120
Agree
50
Strongly disagree
25
Disagree
15
No response
10
Total
220
Source: Data from framework
%
54
23
11
7
5
100
Table 7.2 above shows that about 77% of the responses generated could attest to the fact that
the Rivers State House of Assembly has been successful in conflict management, while 18 %
do not believe in the assertion, 5% were indifferent. Commenting on the success of the House
in conflict management, Ho. Brown Onari the Chairman of the House Committee on
Information and Training, states:
Right from inception in 1999 to date, a study of the activities of the
House reveals that so many matters of urgent public importance
related to conflict management were presented and resolutions
taken immediately, also, motions predicated on conflict
management were proposed and resolutions immediately taken. A
good example is a motion on Ogu conflict. Others are Suspension
of some Chairmen of Councils, Oil industry operations related
conflicts, Chieftaincy and communal conflicts, Choba–Wilbros
crises and a number of others. In Ogu crisis, the House had to
suspend the sitting Council Chairman, Mr. Mina Tende and the
Special Adviser to the then Governor on Special Project now
Distinguished Senator of the Federal Republic; Senator George
Thompson Sekibo and finally, NUT Rivers State wing suspended
its industrial action due to the intervention of the House Committee
on Education. Same applies to all the Tertiary Institution‘s Union
in 2010; we made a supplementary appropriation to provide
131
payment of the arrears of their salaries. Bills aimed at managing
conflicts were presented and passed after due legislative action,
some of the Bills are the Secret Cult and Similar activities
prohibition Bill, Anti Kidnap Bill, Rivers State employment Bill
amongst others. The office of the Clerk is open for you to verify
these claims; this is the age of freedom of information. Indeed, the
House has been very pro-active in conflict management. That is
why many petitioners have confidence in the House and have been
very willing to present their matters to the House‘.
A follow-up question on how sensitive is the Legislature in conflict management
received the response of the respondents thus: Highly sensitive 120 (55%), Sensitive 50
(23%), highly insensitive 30 (17%), Insensitive 10 (5%), No comment 10 (10%). The above
figure flows with the responses generated in question 16.
On the question; ‗would you agree to the fact that the intervention of Rivers State
House of Assembly in conflict management is likely to increase political stability?
Respondents‘ response to question 19 of the questionnaire was intriguing; the question sought
to know ‗if the legislature is successful in managing conflicts, then political stability is likely
to increase?‘ The response generated is presented in a table below:
Table 7.3: If the legislature is successful in managing conflicts, then political stability is
likely to increase?
SN
1
2
3
4
5
RESPONSE FROM QUESTION
NO. OF RESPONSE
Strongly agree
130
Agree
60
Strongly disagree
15
Disagree
7
No response
8
Total
220
Source: Data from framework
%
59
27
7
3
4
100
The above table shows that 86% of the respondents believe that if the Legislature is
successful in managing conflict, then political stability is likely to increase. Commenting on
the foregoing, David, a lecturer in Ignatius Ajuri University of Education and active member
of ASUU states:
132
The intervention of the Legislature in conflict management has
actually deepened peace and political stability; let us look at the
University Unions and Government over the payment of the
arrears of salaries as a result of wage increase, the Unions wanted
to go on strike, but the House Committee on Education intervened,
the House caused the Executive to come up with a supplementary
Appropriation Bill, the arrears were included for Rivers State
University of Science and Technology, my Institution, Rivers State
Polytechnic and Rivers State College of Arts and Science. Before
this time our Unions wrote series of petition to the Executive but
no definite effort was put in place until the House intervened. The
House has also intervened in many other conflicts, a few I can
vividly remember are the Ogu crisis, Choba–Wilbros crisis,
Rumuekpe crisis, the crisis that rocked some Local Government
Councils over impeachment as well as payment of severance
allowance to elected and appointed political office holders in the
Councils and many others. In all, I can score the House a ‗B‘ for
conflict management in the State.
Respondents‘ responses to a follow up question which seeks to know if the
intervention of the Legislature in conflict management could engender peace and political
stability in the State was intriguing, 160 respondents representing 73% aligned themselves
with the view that the intervention of the Legislature in conflict management has deepened
peace in the State, while 29 (13%) alluded to the claim that the intervention of the Legislature
in some conflicts in the State had exacerbated conflicts in the State, and 30 (14%) had no
comment. Commenting on the above, one of the respondents from Rumuekpe Community
Chief Odigiri, who incidentally was a petitioner, explains:
The Rivers State House of Assembly has been assisting to stem the
tide of hostility in the State. The haul mark of this was the passage
of Employment Law in 2002 and many motions that were in
respect of the implementation of the Law. The House through its
oversight activities has brought the international oil companies
IOCs as well as other companies operating in the State to bow to
pressure by host communities. Before this time, most of our people
are not in the employ of the companies, but now the House has
made it possible by bringing us together to draft Memorandum of
Understanding MOU with the companies. This MOU clearly
defines issues of employment, Corporate Social Responsibility and
host community contracts. This effort of the Assembly has assisted
us to address those issues that hitherto caused conflicts in our
community. You know that many of our land had been polluted by
oil spillage, but the House has assisted our community to compel
133
Total E&P Nig. Ltd for instance to embark on clean – up and
remediation activities; this was achieved through a meeting
convoked by the House Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources. The Total example is a microcosm of other companies.
In conclusion therefore, I will say that the House is trying but more
needs be done because most of our communities are in one form of
conflict or the other with these IOCs.
Other critical indicators of the involvement of the Legislature in conflict management
are the withdrawal of cases from courts, willingness of conflicting parties to take conflicts to
the Legislature and greater public perception of the ability of the Legislature to resolve
conflict.
Table 7.4: Chi-Square Tests
Chi-Square Tests
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by -Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
Value
19.714
22.140
1.945
4
4
Asy mp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.001
.000
1
.163
df
440
From the Chi-square distribution table, we find that at d.f. = 4 and at α = 0.05 level of
significance, then X2.05 = 9.4877
Since the Test statistics, X2 (= 19.714), is GREATER than X2.05 (= 9.4877); also since p (=
0.001) < α (=0.05), we reject the null hypothesis (H0) and conclude that:
H1:
There is a significant association between RSHA Conflict Mgt Role and RSHA
Intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State polity;
Strength of Relationship: The low value of 0.207 for the test statistics, contingency
coefficient, indicates that there is a weak relationship between the two variables.
This chapter shows that the Legislature in Rivers State has been actively involved in
conflict management and its involvement has greatly enhanced political stability in the State.
However, in the words of Mitchell and Banks, (1996) ‗no single universal model of conflict
resolution currently exists, but different problem solving clusters of approaches, techniques,
methods, strategies and tactics have been developed and used with varying degrees of success
in different settings over time‘. Therefore, there are still pockets of conflicts in the State
134
which demand the attention of the government. However, it is important to note that from the
analysis of the submissions generated from the primary data; viz interview and questionnaire
methods, that our third hypothesis - ‘If the legislature is successful in conflict management,
then political stability is likely to rise’ tested was positive. This means that the involvement
of the legislature in conflict management in the State has reduced conflict and increased
political stability. This could be observed from the activities of the House as highlighted in
tables 4 and 5 of our appendix.
135
CHAPTER EIGHT
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1.
SUMMARY
Over the years, the legislature has not often been seen as a principal organ of
government in conflict management. This study therefore explores the rising role of the
legislative arm of government in conflict management and its implications for political
stability, focusing attention on the role of the Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict
management. The specific objectives of the study were to: (i) investigate the effects of
increased involvement of the legislature in conflict management for political stability; (ii)
analyze the impact of the direct interest of legislators in specific conflicts on the role of the
legislature in conflict management; and (iii) evaluate the link between the failure of the
Executive and Judiciary to reduce conflicts and the rising involvement of the Legislature in
conflict management in Rivers State.
We adopted both qualitative and quantitative survey methods; thus, we adopted both
primary and secondary methods in data collection. Primary data for the study came from
questionnaire and interviews with key informants knowledgeable in the areas of our interest.
A total of 250 questionnaires were distributed and 220 copies of the questionnaire were
returned, giving us a high response rate of nearly 90%. In addition, key informant interviews
were conducted with legislators, some key staff of the Rivers State House of Assembly, and a
sample of the executive and judicial arms of government. Secondary data came from official
documents, textbooks, journals, conference papers, government gazettes, magazines, news
papers and internet materials. We analyzed the data using both qualitative and
quantitative/statistical methods, mainly descriptive statistics, including frequency tables,
charts, percentages, graph and diagrams. Chi-square test was conducted to explore the
136
association between some of the variables. The study was based on the broad analytic
framework of separation and interpenetration of governmental powers.
The three hypotheses tested positive. Over 75% of the respondents agreed that the
intervention of the legislature in conflicts management, especially the three conflicts used as
our case study, stabilized the situation and created opportunities for negotiations between the
parties involved. Find below, summary data of the statistics of the three hypotheses tested.
Table 8.1: Chi –square summary data
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS ON THE THREE HYPOTHESES
Level of significance (α) = 0.05
S/N
Dependent Independent
Variable
Variable
(X2) Chi
Statistics
Intervention
1.
2.
3.
Interest
Failure of
Executive/
Judiciary
RSHA
Conflict
Mgt Role
PValue
295.963
(X2.05)
Critical
Value
9.4877
0.000
Contingency
Coefficient
(Strength)
Significant
0.634
Intervention
11.015
9.4877
0.000
Significant
0.156
RSHA
Intervention
19.714
9.4877
0.001
Significant
0.207
Sig.
Remark
Strong
association
Weak
association
Weak
association
Source: SPSS Output Window ver. 15
Our chi-square test showed a strong association between intervention of the
legislature and reduction of conflict at 95% level of confidence, by reducing the level of
actual and potential violence and therefore increasing political stability. The impact of the
direct personal interests of legislators in the conflicts was to increase the involvement of the
State House of Assembly in the management of the conflict. However, the frequency
distributions and chi-square test showed that the intervention generally stabilized the
situation. There is a strong link between the zero sum approaches of the Executive and
Judicial arms of government to conflict management and their failure to manage conflicts
effectively, leading to a more prominent role by the Legislature. The bargaining and
balancing approach of the legislature served to provide more varied options and outcomes to
137
the parties in conflict and increased the likelihood of amicable resolution of the issues at
stake leading to increased political stability.
Finally, the causes, sector, symptoms and strategies for conflict management is as
summarized in the diagram below:
Fig 8.1: summary data of causes and management of conflicts
Source: Data from text books and internet materials
8.2.
CONCLUSION
The legislature is not often seen as a principal organ of government in conflict
management. This is regarded as the primary role of the Executive and Judiciary. In Nigeria,
and particularly Rivers State, the legislature is becoming increasingly involved in conflict
management and therefore in creating political stability. The legislature‘s role in conflict
management is defined by its ability to enact and oversee conflict prevention policies
implemented by the executive, thus, its oversight of the executive is a sine qua non to its
relative strength. Oversight refers to several procedures where the legislature brings the
138
executive to account for its action and inaction, and this is most often achieved through the
use of committees. However, a measure of a strong legislature goes beyond oversight of
government activities. A strong legislature is one that is able to act independently of the
executive, with its own budget. It can, if not initiate legislation, then at least amend it or send
it back to the executive for revision. With such structures in place, executive dominance does
not preclude a legislature‘s activism or its ability to shape solutions to conflict-prone
situations. The increasing role of the legislature in conflict management therefore is a step in
the right direction. This was the focus of this thesis.
8.3.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Each chapter in this study raised issues germane to this research, therefore, our
recommendations stem from these overarching ideas that have propelled the study.
Understandably, all recommendations might not be very feasible at the immediate but
futuristic. The extent to which each recommendation applies to any given State, as well as the
phasing or prioritization of some recommendations before others, is highly context-specific
because our case study was the Rivers State House of Assembly. These recommendations
reflect what are needed to help legislatures mature and increase in capacity to manage
conflicts, bearing in mind the failure of the executive and judiciary to positively resolve
conflicts in States. This study therefore provides a fulcrum to strengthen the legislature in
view of its great potential to contribute to conflict management.
Conflict management is an exercise in building trust between factions whose previous
interactions were often marked by tension and violence. The Legislative arm of government
allows factions to build relationships and make different compromises in less public settings.
They deal with the broader issues necessary to run the State, not only the issues that sparked
the conflict, but, bringing opposing factions together to take responsibility for the
management of the State, as opposed to focusing on their conflict grievances. Where regional
139
and ethnic chauvinism are strong, legislative committees can bring together legislators with
diverse identities to work together on issues. Where political party divisions override regional
divisions, regional-based groups can encourage legislators from deadlocked national parties
to build compromises on less divisive local issues on which they have shared interests. In
either structure, it is important to devise and enforce rules that ensure that opposition and
minority parties have a strong role in the policy-making processes as was observed in the 4th
Assembly of the Rivers State House of Assembly, 1999 - 2003. Therefore, it is imperative we
propagate the strengthening of the committee system in the legislature because it enhances
oversight that supports conflict management; it also guarantees accountability and
transparency that are indices for the evaluation of good governance. The committee system is
also a valuable vehicle for conflict management, because petitions are treated, public hearings
are conducted on conflict matters by these committees, the Ogu, the Aggah-Egbema saga and
the Labour Unions of Tertiary Institution‘s conflicts is a case study.
Conflict management requires critical and sensitive government policies, for which
the accountability of executive decision-making and its impact on peace building is vital. In
conflict-prone States, the legislature is often a disempowered institution in conflict
management. A stronger legislature can ensure that broader views are injected into the
executive and judiciary conflict management agenda, but this depends on several factors.
First, opposition parties must be cognizant of their role to check executive actions and to give
voice to minority concerns. Second, the legislature must have the autonomy, especially
budgetary autonomy, and the informational resources to engage in credible and meaningful
political dialogue with the executive branch especially on the issues fueling conflict. The
legislature must be included in the larger conflict management, democracy and national
development agenda. Government and other Agencies‘ interventions in several sectors, such
as the security sector or the media, should include the legislature to build its political
140
legitimacy and capacity to participate in the country‘s conflict management efforts.
Consequently, it is significant to develop the capacity of legislators and the legislative clerks
and other support staff to address conflict effectively. Human recourse development is a
desideratum to the attainment of this goal.
Executive resources tend to dwarf those of the legislature; the control over its own
purse then, is a centerpiece of its independence. The degrees of budgetary control range from
the ability to draft the budget to the ability to consider it in detail as well as amend and
approve it. The power to control internal budgets is recognized in guidelines for effective
legislatures (IPU 2006, CPA and World Bank Institute 2006), because it affects the autonomy
of the legislature. Budgetary autonomy is key to improving the legislature‘s capacity to
discharge its sundry functions. It enables the legislature to recruit competent staff, develop an
independent research capacity, invest in human resource development and implement its
oversight initiatives that command a greater degree of accountability from the executive. The
availability of budget alone will not contribute to the effectiveness of legislature in conflict
management, if the legislature does not allocate the budget to the activities that are designed
to improve its institutional capacity like the Committee system, research and statistics and
sundry others. A further alteration of the 1999 Constitution is on- going and it should
emphasis financial autonomy for the legislature. The independence of the legislature at the
second and third tier level of government could be further enhanced, especially in ensuring
that in the forth coming constitutional review, the accounts of the legislature at these levels
mentioned above are put as first charge just like we have at the national level. This would
prevent it from executive dictatorship of its budget and guarantee its independence; it will
also enable it to dictate and direct its programme especially, institutional development that
would include conflict management.
141
Constituents must have confidence in legislators and the role of the legislature in the
political system as the primary mode of communication and compromise between political
forces. If legislators do not bring their constituents‘ views to the bargaining table, these
grievances, particularly minority views frequently excluded from government processes,
often erupt into violence. Learning about constituent interests allows legislators to manage
existing tensions and produce policies that can more effectively deal with those needs that
were not met and which could result in emerging or renewed conflicts. Good communication
is essential and can be fostered by programmes such as constituency outreach programs, town
hall meetings, the legislature‘s civic education programs or partnerships with media outlets
and civil society organizations. Government and Donor Agencies need to recognize the
delicate balance for legislators between faithfully representing their constituents‘ explicit
desires, and exercising leadership to build compromises with opposing factions. Programmes
strengthening representation must be particularly sensitive to political context to ensure
legislators‘ adequate flexibility for conflict management. In view of this therefore, it is
necessary to improve communication between the legislature, legislators and their
constituencies to ensure that interests underlying current or future conflicts are represented.
Further to this, Legislators are encouraged to establish constituency offices that would assist
them to transmit intended and on-going government programmes as well as elicit imputes
from their constituents on their views on Local, State and National issues, including conflicts.
Strengthening the linkages between a legislature and the people is a necessary step for
promoting peace and stability in a fragile democracy like Nigeria‘s. The legitimacy of such
democracy rests on the ability of legislators to give voice to the expectations and interests of
their constituents; the population must see these tangible democratic dividends for the
political system to be sustainable. Representatives must be able to disseminate information
about their actions to their constituents, educate them on the political process, gather
142
constituent feedback and act upon suggestions. This enables them to manage constituents‘
expectations of the role, scope and constraints of legislative power, thereby ensuring that
people do not lose faith in their representatives, the legislature or peaceful forms of conflict
management when contentious issues are not satisfactorily addressed in the short term,
therefore, setting up of constituency offices is very imperative for the Legislators.
The representative function of legislatures is especially important in countries
polarized by ethnic chauvinism like ours, where certain minority groups and marginalized
individuals are frequently excluded from the governmental process. Effective representation
allows disputes to move from the battlefield to the political arena. When citizens feel that
their views are represented in government, and that their representatives will try to resolve
conflict with constituents‘ interests in mind, they are less likely to turn to violence to resolve
conflicts. Politics then becomes the primary mode of communication and compromise
between divergent social views. This function gains even greater urgency as unresolved
conflicts have a greater potential to degenerate rapidly into renewed violence. Effective
representation strengthens the rule of law by building the legitimacy of the legislature and the
government. As violent conflict is marked by the breakdown of the rule of law, its proper
restoration is a centerpiece for the conflict management ability of the governance institutions.
When citizens feel that their views are represented in governing institutions, they are more
likely to accept the legislature‘s authority to enact legislation to resolve conflict and the
executive‘s authority to implement and enforce it. Not only are legislators, if they understand
the expressed desires of the citizenry, better able to draft legislation to reflect the interests of
all sides, but the laws are also more likely to gain widespread support and therefore be
implemented effectively. With this increased legitimacy of the legislature comes the
increased confidence, particularly among warring factions, in the political arena as the viable
medium for conflict resolution. Conflicting parties are more likely to abide by government-
143
imposed conflict management measures if they feel that their views were considered when
these laws were drafted.
144
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152
INTERVIEWS
Akpan Adolphus
Dumnu Lekie
Odigiri Anthony
Amadi Emeka
Ekwulor
Odum Azubuike
Amachree Otelemaba
Esiegwu Ethelberth
Oforji Precious
Amadi Emeka
Evans Bipi
Ogele Emmanuel
Amini Philip
Ikenga Uzor
Ojirika Callistus
Brown Onari
Igwe C
Oruwari Adokye
Chioma Golden
Nweke George
Singerr Nelson
David Onwuchekwa
Nweke Ken
Zaga
Phimia
153
APPENDIX
Appendix 1. Table One: LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK
SN
Hypotheses
Variables
1.
If the interest of
Legislators in a
conflict is high
then the
Legislature is
more likely to
intervene in its
management
1. Interest of
Legislators in
a conflict
2. Legislative
Intervention
in conflict
management
Main Indicators
Data Sources
1. The Legislators is
interested in a conflict
where the conflicts
directly affect their
constituencies or it cuts
across their
constituencies.
2. The Legislators are
interested in a conflict
where the conflicts
impact their political
future.
3. The Legislators are
interested in a conflict
where the conflicts have
implications for the
ruling party.
4. The Legislators are
interested in a conflict
where the conflicts have
implications for the
Assembly.
5. Insensitivity of the
Executive and the
Judiciary towards the
management of most
conflicts in the State.
6. Poor implementation of
Judicial decisions on
conflicts in the State by
relevant Executive
bodies.
7. None implementation of
agreements reached
with Trade Unions,
Institutions and
Organizations and
Communities in the
State by the Executive.
8. Executive biases or
particular interest on
some conflicts in the
State.
9. Delay in justice delivery
by the Judiciary on
conflictual matters in
the State.
10. The conflicts are of
major public interest
1. Records of the
Clerk, Rivers
State House of
Assembly
2. Discussions
with Hon.
Members RVHA
3. Discussions
with some Staff,
RVHA
4. Civil society
Organizations
5. Petitions
6. Government
Gazettes
7. Libraries
8. Textbooks,
Journals and
Magazines
9. Resolutions
10. Bills/Laws
assented to
11. Hansards
12. Questionnaire
response by public
1. Increased participation of
Members in sponsorship of
conflict management
related Bills.
2. Increase in the
sponsorship of motions
related to conflict
management by
1. Records of the
Clerk, Rivers
State House of
Assembly
2. Discussions
with Hon.
Members RVHA
3. Discussions
Method(s) of
Data
Collection
Interview
Questionnaire
Documentary
Method
Method(s) of
Data Analysis
Interview
Questionnaire
Documentary
Method
Graphs, Tables,
Cross- Tabs and
Percentages
Chi – square
Content
Analysis
154
2.
If the Executive
and Judiciary fail
to manage
conflicts, then the
involvement of
the legislature in
conflict
management is
likely to increase
The failure of
the Executive
and Judiciary
to reduce
conflict
Legislators.
3. Invitation of persons
connected with the conflict
to brief the House.
4. Timely attendance of
Members to Sitting to
contribute to debates on the
conflicts.
5. Timely dispensation of
debate on the conflictual
motion or Bill
6. Timely attendance to
Committee meetings
scheduled to resolve the
conflicts.
7. Regular presentation of
petitions on conflictual
matters to House in
plenary.
8. Organization of public
hearing on the conflicts.
9. Regular Press briefing by
the Legislature especially
on the conflicts
10. Constituency outreach
programme to educate the
people on Legislative
actions on the conflict.
11. Regular town hall
meetings to educate the
people on Legislative
actions on the conflicts,
with some Staff,
RVHA
4. Civil society
Organizations
5. Petitions
6. Government
Gazettes
7. Libraries
8. Text
books/Journals
and Magazines
9. Resolutions
10. Bills/Laws
assented to
11. Hansards
12. Questionnaire
response by public
1.
1. Records from
press
2. Protest by
Labour Unions
and Members of
the Public
3. Discussions
with some Civil
Society
Organizations
4. Petitions
5. Government
Gazettes
6. Libraries
7. Text
books/Journals
and Magazines
8.House
Resolutions
9. Bills/Laws
assented to
10. Hansards
11. Questionnaire
response by public
12. Petitions
Interview
Questionnaire
Documentary
Method
Chi – square
Content
Analysis
1. Records of the
Interview
Graphs, Tables,
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
2. Increase in
Loss of lives and
properties by citizens.
Mass protest by the
citizens against the
government.
Increased cases of
strike and industrial
disputes.
Persistent cases of land
and other forms of
disputes in the State.
Increased communal
rift in the State.
6. Persistent cases of
kidnap
and armed
robbery and other
social vices.
7. Increased
unemployment as a
result of loss of jobs by
citizen especially in
conflict prone areas in
the State.
8. Suspension of
further investment in
capital social
infrastructure projects
in conflict affected
areas.
9. Low service delivery
in the conflict affected
areas in the State.
1. Increased participation of
155
the
involvement
of the
Legislature in
conflict
management
3.
If the
involvement of
the Legislature in
conflict
management is
successful, then
political stability
is likely to
increase
If the
involvement
of the
Legislature in
conflict
management
is successful,
then political
stability is
likely to
increase
2.
2. Increase in
political
stability
Members in sponsorship of
conflict management
related Bills.
2. Increase in the
sponsorship of motions
related to conflict
management by
Legislators.
3. Invitation of persons
connected with the conflict
to brief the House.
4. Timely attendance of
Members to Sitting to
contribute to debates on the
conflicts.
5. Timely dispensation of
debate on the conflictual
motion or Bill
6. Timely attendance to
Committee meetings
scheduled to resolve the
conflicts.
7. Regular presentation of
petitions on conflictual
matters to House in
plenary.
8. Organization of public
hearing on the conflicts.
9. Regular Press briefing by
the Legislature especially
on the conflicts
10. Constituency outreach
programme to educate the
people on Legislative
actions on the conflict.
11. Regular town hall
meetings to educate the
people on Legislative
actions on the conflicts
1. Increase in the number of
resolved matters on
conflicts by the Legislature.
2. Acceptance of
Legislative Resolutions on
conflicts matters by the
conflicting parties.
3. Willingness of
conflicting parties to take
conflicts to the Legislature.
4. High level of cases
withdrawal from courts
5. Greater public perception
of the ability of the
Legislature to resolve
conflict.
1. Obedience of Laws by
the citizens
2. Reduction on the
number of motions on
conflict related matters on
the floor of the House.
3. Reduction on the
number of petitions to the
House on conflict and other
related matters.
4. Reduction in communal
Clerk, Rivers
State House of
Assembly
2. Discussions
with Hon.
Members
RVHA
3. Discussions
with some Staff,
RVHA
4. Civil society
Organizations
5. Petitions
6. Government
Gazettes
7. Libraries
8. Text
books/Journals
and Magazines
9. House
Resolutions
10. Bills/Laws
assented to
11. Hansards
12. Questionnaire
response by public
Questionnaire
Documentary
Method
Cross- Tabs and
Percentages
1. Office of the
Clerk, Rivers
State House of
Assembly
2. Hon. Members
RVHA
3. Some Staff,
RVHA
4. Civil society
Organizations
5. Petitioners
6. Government
Gazettes
7. Libraries
8. Text
books/Journals
and Magazines
1. Records from
press
2. Commendation
of government by
Labour Unions
and Members of
the Public
3. Discussions
with some Civil
Society
Organizations
Interview
Questionnaire
Documentary
Method
Chi – square
Content
Analysis
Interview
Questionnaire
Documentary
Method
Graphs, Tables,
Cross- Tabs and
Percentages
156
and social rifts.
5. Implementation of
agreement reached by
parties in conflicts by the
Executive.
6. Fast dispensation of
justice.
7. Relative peace in the
State
4. Government
Gazettes
5. Libraries
6. Text
books/Journals
and Magazines
8. House
Resolutions
9. Bills/Laws
assented to
10. Hansards
11. Questionnaire
response by public
12.Petitions
Source: government publications, text books and internet materials
157
Appendix 2. Table Two: SELECTED CONFLICTS IN RIVERS STATE (1999-2011)
S/N
CONFLICT
LOCATION
1. Emuohua
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
TYPE
DATE
Communal, cultism, politics, oil Pre 1999, 2001,
wealth
2002, 2010
Choba/Wilbros
Oil wealth
1999, 2000
Ogbakiri
Chieftaincy, cultism, oil wealth
1999, 2010
Abua
Cultism, politics
1999, 2002, 2003,
2007
Abua/Odual Legislative Politics, leadership
2006
and Executive Council
over leadership/finance
Buguma
Politics, cultism, oil wealth
1999, 2003
Ogoni/Okrika
Communal (land)
2000
Rumuji
Chieftaincy, oil wealth, youth 2001, 2010
restiveness/cultism
Eleme/Okrika
Inter communal, land
2000
Abuloma/Okuru
Cultism, oil wealth
2001
Akuku Toru Legislative/ Politics, leadership
2001
Executive Council
Akuku Toru Legislative/ Oil wealth, youth restiveness/ 2003, 2007
Executive Council
cultism
Yeghe/Bori
Land
2002, 2003
Mogho/Kpor
Youth restiveness, land
2002
Kpor
Youth restiveness, chieftaincy
2005
Okrika
Cultism, politics
2002, 2003, 2005,
2007, 2008
Omoku Youth crises
Youth restiveness/cultism, politics, 2002, 2003, 2007,
oil wealth
2008
Rumuekpe
Chieftaincy,
youth 2002, 2003, 2010
restiveness/cultism, oil wealth
Tombia
Chieftaincy, cultism
2002, 2003
Kula
Chieftaincy, cultism, oil wealth
2003
Kaa/Bile
Oil wealth
2003
Egi youth
Oil wealth, leadership, youth Pre 1999, 2003,
restiveness/cultism
2004
Ogu
Politics
2001
Odemenenyi
Chieftaincy, youth
2003
Ozochi
Oil wealth
2003
Kani
Politics
2003
Aggah-Egbema
youth Youth restiveness/cultism, politics, 2003, 2007, 2010
crises
oil wealth
Okwuzi-Egbema
youth Youth restiveness/cultism, politics, 2003, 2007, 2010
crises
oil wealth
Mgbede-Egbema
youth Youth restiveness/cultism, politics, 2003, 2007, 2010
crises
oil wealth
158
30. Omuma
31.
32.
33.
34.
Cultism, politics
Nwebara/Baraku
Land
Kpor
Youth restiveness
Ataba (Andoni)
Chieftaincy
Akuku-Toru, Asari- Toro Cotton – channel
and Degema LGAs
35. Rumuodogo
Youth restiveness/cultism, oil
wealth
36. Oyigbo
Legislative/ Leadership, politics
Executive Council
37. Opobo/Nkoro Legislative/ Politics
Executive Council
38. College of Arts and College Unions/ Management
Science
39. Rivers State Polytechnic
Polytechnic Unions/ Management
40. Rivers State College of University Unions/ management
Education (Ignatius Ajuru
University of Education)
41. Rivers State University of University Unions/ Management
Science and Technology,
Port Harcourt
42. Nigeria Union of Teachers The Union & Rivers State
(NUT) Rivers State Wing Government over Teachers Salary
Structure and others
43. Soku
Oil wealth, youth restiveness/
cultism
44. Ishukwa, Ndoni
Oil Wealth
45. Eveku
Youth Restiveness/Cultism
46. Abonnema
Youth
Restiveness/Cultism,
Politics
47. Bodo/Mogho
Politics,
Youth
Restiveness/
Cultism
48. Ogbogolo
Chieftaincy, Youth Restiveness/
Cultism
49. Deeyor/Beghe
Land
50. Obrikom
Youth Restiveness/Cultism, Oil
Wealth
51. K.Dere
Cultism
52. Bomu
Cultism
53. Ogbo
Chieftaincy, youth Restiveness
54. Ihugbogo
Youth
Restiveness/
Cultism,
Politics
55. Erema
Oil
wealth,
Youth
Restiveness/Cultism
56. Umudioga
Communal, Chieftaincy
57. Obele
Communal, Chieftaincy
58. B. Dere and K.Dere
Youth Restiveness
59. Barako/Nwibiara
Inter Communal
2003, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010
1950s to date
2004
2004
2004
2005
2006, 2010
2006
2000, 2011
2000, 2007, 2011
2000, 2007, 2011
2000, 2007, 2011
2007, 2008
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007, 2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009, 2010
2009, 2010
2010
2010
2010
2010, 2011
2010
159
60. Ibaa
Cultism/Chieftaincy
2010
Source: This table was constructed with data from Institute of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, the Rivers State Government, Rivers State House of Assembly, and news
papers / internet materials.
160
Appendix 3, Table 3: SOME HOSTILITIES/KIDNAP CASES IN RIVERS STATE
SN
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Conflict Location
Port Harcourt
Type/Casualty
Baker Hughes top executive shot and
killed
Port Harcourt regional Norwegian rig offshore attacked and
water
16 crew members kidnapped
Port Harcourt region
SPDC Personnel attacked
Port Harcourt regional MEND attacked Nigerian soldiers and
water
killed 10 of their men
Okochiri (Okrika)
9 Nigerian soldiers were killed in an
ensuing battle with militants
Port Harcourt
1 Nigerian soldier killed in an attempt
to rescue oil workers kidnapped
Creeks
MEND seized 6 expatriate from
Chevron facility
Creeks
MEND held 8 foreigners hostage from
an offshore vessel
Off
Shore
Port MEND attacked three major oil pipe
Harcourt
lines belonging to NAOC
Port Harcourt
About 30 innocent citizens killed in a
ceaseless attack unleashed by masked
gun men, the hoodlum destroyed
many public institutions including
NNPC Mega station in Agree road
Creek
A Naval war ship attacked, one
personnel killed and five injured by
MEND. The ship was on hand to
protect SPDC facility offshore
Soku
JTF clashed with elements of MEND
Port Harcourt
Militants committed mayhem as they
attacked two Police Stations at Trans
Amadi and Borokiri; 11 persons
including the Police loss their lives
Port Harcourt
MEND attacked Petroleum tanker ship
that bused into flames at NPA
premises
Port Harcourt
Militant attacked a gun boat belonging
to the Navy
Kalaibiama Channel
Militants attacked Total Oil Nigeria
Ltd‘s MV Patience
Adamakri
MEND fighter crippled SPDC
facility(flow station)
Soku-Buguma
MEND‘s ‗operation cyclone‘ attacked
two major pipe lines belonging to
SPDC
Kula
MEND attacked and sabotaged an
SPDC pipe line
Date
10th May, 2006
2nd June,2006
2nd June, 2006
2nd October, 2006
4th October, 2006
22nd
November,
2006
1st May, 2007
3rd May, 2007
8th May, 2007
August, 2007
30th October, 2007
25th November, 2007
31st December, 2007
11th January, 2008
11th February, 2008
11th February, 2010
19th April, 2010
21st April, 2008
24th April, 2008
161
Source: The table was constructed with data derived from Internet materials and news
papers.
162
Appendix
4.
Table
Four:
MOTIONS
IN
RELATIONS
TO
CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT
S/NO
1
DATES
20/7/99
2
23/8/99
3
12/10/99
4
28/10/99
5
9/11/99
6
11/11/99
7
12/1/00
8
28/6/01
9 4/7/01
10 24/7/01
11 2/11/01
12 13/01/02
13 22/01/02
14 4/02/02
15 4/4/02
16 29/10/02
17 8/9/04
18 2/7/03
19 3/7/03
20 21/7/03
21 4/8/03
22 1/9/03
TITLE OF MOTIONS
SPONSORS
The immediate review and or outright revocation of
contract between the Rivers State Government and
Hotel Presidential, Port Harcourt
Revocation of right of occupancy of the filling stations
at Omoku Street, D-Line, Diobu, Port Harcourt.
Declaring Port Harcourt City a disaster area as a result
of over flooding during heavy rainfall and blockage of
drains.
Demolition of illegal market under the fly-over around
Isaac Boro Park
Suspension of all youth activities and illegal street
processions
Attitude of traditional rulers over chieftaincy crisis in
the state
Restraining all Local Government Council Chairmen in
Rivers State from preparing/implementing budget 2000
until the Local Government Bill is signed into law
Illegal blocking of access road to Borikiri sand field Hon. J.George
area
Fuayefika
Inadequate funding of Local Government Councils
Rescinding the House Resolution suspending the
Chairmen, Akuku-Toru L. G. A.
Rescinding the House resolutions suspending the
Chairman, Ogu-Bolo L. G. A. Hon. Mina Clever Tende
and the special Adviser Mr. George Sekibo
Increase in transport fare in the state
Inviting the commissioner for Economic and
Employment Generation on employment of Rivers State
indigenes by companies operating in the state.
Inviting the Managing Director/General Manager and
Operation Manager of Briston Helicopters on the
training programmes of the company
Saving the soul of Opobo Kingdom
Motion to control the construction of illegal structures
on government land in Port Harcourt and its environs.
Multinational companies and development projects
initiated for their host communities
Proliferation of illegal schools in Rivers State
Hon. G. B.
Pidomson
Risonpalm management and private mill owners
Hon. Okey C.
Amadi
Construction of a fuel station in a residential areas
Hon. Jaja T. G
Removal of fuel stations from Rivers State indigenes
Hon. Lloyd J.
C
Motor cycle riders safety campaign
Hon. Sam-
163
23 14/4/04
Indiscriminate sitting of fuel stations in residential areas
24 24/8/04
The operations of commercial motor cyclist (Okada) in
Port Harcourt and its environs
Curbing the menace of Highway hawkers
Encroachment of government lands by some churches,
traders and individuals in Rivers State
Summoning the Executive Director, H. I. S Engineering,
tax and finance manager, Total Fina Elf to appear before
the House
Secret recruitment exercise by Shell Petroleum
Development Company in Rivers State
Implementation of the meat (inspection and sale) law,
1978
Rivers State Education (Return of schools)
Matters of urgent public impotence
Impeachment of the Chairman, Oyigbo Local
Government Area, Hon. Sunday Chukwudi Kanu
Compelling cooperate bodies and business concerns in
Rivers State to erect sign posts for identification
Transport committee on the report on the enforcement
of Ministry of Transport (MOT) test
Highlighting the obnoxious provision of Decree No. 13
of 1997
Impeachment and suspension of the chairman of
Opobo/Nkoro L. G. A, Hon. Christopher Ogolo
Investigating the chairman, Abua/Odual L. G. A
Shell at it again
25 20/10/04
26 16/2/05
27 7/3/05
28 9/3/05
29 21/3/05
30 4/4/05
31 7/7/05
32 8/8/05
33 7/9/05
34 21/9/05
35 25/01/06
36 11/5/06
37 30/5/06
38 29/8/07
39 15/10/07
40 6/11/07
41 19/11/07
42 19/11/07
43 20/11/08
44 8/01/09
45 9/01/09
46 30/1/09
47 14/7/09
Local Government investigations
Matters of urgent public importance: De-registration of
some students of Marketing Department by the Rivers
State University of Science and Technology Port
Harcourt.
Let‘s prepare for Local Government Elections
Students on Rivers State Government in Malaysia
(Third Batch)
Assessment and collection of revenue on behalf of
Rivers State Government by tax consultants
Diversion of public interest by an Italian Multinational
Company
Non-compliance with the Rivers State employment law,
2000 by companies operating in Rivers State
Inviting the caretaker committee chairmen and the
commissioner for finance on the activities of the
councils
Rivers State employment law 2000, with particular
Sam E.
Hon. Bazia J
N.
Hon. Lloyd
Hon. Nsiegbe
Hon. Lloyd C.
Hon. A.
Wokocha
Hon. Leyii K.
Hon. Okeah
A.
Hon. Ogiri H.
Hon. Lloyd J.
C.
Hon. Ewoh N.
Hon. Lloyd J.
C.
Hon. Ogiri H.
Hon. Ordu C.
Hon. Okeah
A.
Hon. Tamuno
M.
164
reference to Intel and its host communities
48 3/11/09
Motion to investigate the activities of the 23 L. G. A.
Chairmen of Rivers State in pursuant to section 7 of the
1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
49 9/3/10
Motion on the ongoing dualization of Elekahia/Rumuosi
Road, walling off of inhabitants and blockage of
preconstruction drainage network.
50 24/11/10
Matter of urgent public importance: Suspension of the
Chairman of Andoni Local Government Council
51 25/11/10
Suspension of the Chairman of Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni
LGC
Source: Office of the Clerk, Rivers State House of Assembly,
House Leader
Hon. Jones
Ogbonda
House Leader
House Leader
165
Appendix 5. Table Five: BILLS: 1999 to 2010
S/NO
DATES
TITLE OF BILLS
SPONSORS
12/6/01
Reconsideration of the Rivers State Parastatals
1.
Unified Pension Scheme Bill, 2000
13/6/01
Road Traffic (Amendment) bill, 2001
2.
20/6/01
Rivers State Physical Planning and Development House Leader
3.
Bill, 2000
25/6/01
Public and Political Holders Salaries, Allowances House Leader
4.
and Fringe Benefits Bill, 2001
05/07/01
Street Begging and Hawking (Prohibition) Bill,
5.
2001
Hon John Bazia
17/7/01
Noise Pollution Control Bill, 2001
6.
01/8/01
High Court (Amendment) Bill, 2001
House Leaer
7.
08/8/01
Marine Transport (Safety) Bill, 2001
8.
19/8/01
Rivers State Registered Bound Bill, 2001
House Leader
9.
Rivers State Appropriation Bill, 2002
House Leader
10. 26/11/01
Dehumanization and Harmful Traditional Practices Hon. Nwogu
11. 30/10/02
Bill 2002
E.
Magistrate Courts (Amendment) Bill, 2002
House Leader
12. 18/03/02
Local Government (Amendment) Bill, 2002
House Leader
13. 10/4/02
Rivers State Road Safety Commission Bill, 2002
14. 06/5/02
Primary Schools (Teaching of Indigenous Hon Anthony
15. 06/5/02
Languages) Bill, 2005
Wali
Passengers Welfare Scheme Bill, 2002
16. 15/05/02
Environmental Sanitation (Amendment) Bill, 2002 House Leader
17. 15/05/02
Review of the Local Government (Amendment) House Leader
18. 15/05/02
Law Bill, 2002
Rivers State Environmental Protection Agency, House Leader
19. 24/9/02
(Amendment) Law, Bill, 2002
Rivers State Ecology Endowment Fund Bill, 2002
House Leader
20. 25/9/02
Rivers State Appropriation Bill, 2003
House Leader
21. 06/12/02
Reproduction of Health Services Bill, 2003
House Leader
22. 04/3/03
Pension (Governor and Deputy Governor) Bill, House Leader
23. 15/7/03
2003
Rivers State Revenue High Court Bill, 2003
Hon. Lloyd
24. 28/10/03
Tourism Promotion Fund Bill, 2003
Hon. Ogiri H.
25. 04/11/03
Rivers State Education (Return of Schools) Bill, Hon. Pie Noah
26. 17/02/04
2004
Land Development (Provision of Roads) Bill, 2004 Hon.Wokocha
27. 01/3/04
Prevention of Transmission of AIDS (through Hon.
28. 02/3/04
Blood Transfusion) Bill, 2004
Wokocha A.
Contract Drafting and Vetting Fees Bill, 2004
Hon. Lloyd
29. 08/3/04
Rivers State Roads (Tolls) Bill, 2004
House Leader
30. 17/3/04
Rivers State Local Government (Amendment) Bill, House Leader
31. 07/4/04
2004
Secret Cult and Similar Activities (Prohibition) Rt.
Hon.
32. 08/6/04
Bill 2004
Amaechi R.
166
33.
25/8/04
Physical Planning and Development (Amendment)
Bill, 2004
Property Tax Bill, 2004
Agricultural Development Fund Bill, 2004
Real Property Tax Bill, 2004
Rivers State Appropriation Bill, 2005
Anti-Social Behavior (Prohibition) Bill, 2005
Hon. Kichner
I.
House Leader
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
18/10/04
19/10/04
25/10/04
16/11/04
03/01/05
39.
40.
41.
08/01/05
28/2/05
16/6/05
42.
43.
20/6/05
09/8/05
School Rights (Parents and Students) Bill, 2005
HIV/AIDS (Non-Discrimination) Bill, 2005
Rivers State Universal Basic Education Board Bill,
2005
Skill Acquisition Bill, 2005
Child Rights Bill, 2005
44.
45.
46.
14/9/05
26/9/05
07/11/05
Sand Dealing and Dredging Operation Bill, 2005
Supplementary Appropriation Bill, 2005
Block Molding Regulation Bill, 2005
Hon. Lloyd
House Leader
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
08/11/05
14/11/05
15/11/05
22/11/05
08/12/05
08/1/08
Hon. Lloyd
Hon. Lloyd
53.
22/01/08
54.
03/6/09
55.
16/8/09
56.
26/8/09
57.
02/9/09
58.
59.
60.
28/9/09
12/10/09
14/10/09
61.
62.
22/10/09
23/10/09
63.
09/11/09
64.
65.
09/11/09
23/11/09
Infrastructures Maintenance Agency Bill, 2005
Customary Court Law (Amendment) Bill, 2005
Limitation Law (Amendment) Bill, 2005
Rivers State Fisheries Bill, 2005
Rivers State Appropriation Bill, 2006
Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency
Law (Amendment) Bill, 2008
College of Health Science and Technology Law
(Amendment) Bill, 2008
Rivers State Traffic Management Authority Bill,
2009
Rivers State Political and Public Office Holders
Remuneration Law (Repeal and Re-Enactment)
Bill, 2009
Rivers State Finance (Control and Management)
Bill, 2009
Rivers State Public Private Participation in
Infrastructural Development Bill, 2009
Rivers State Hotel Licensing Bill, 2009
Rivers State University of Education Bill, 2009.
Rivers State Contributory Pension Scheme for
Employees in the Public Services Bill, 2009
Rivers State Child Right Bill, 2009
Rivers State Office of the Public Defender Bill,
2009
Rivers State Prohibition of Smoking in Public
Places Bill, 2009
Rivers State Arbitration Bill, 2009
Rivers State University of Science and Technology
(Amendment) Bill, No. 1, 2009
Hon. Chuku G.
House Leader
House Leader
Rt.
Hon.
Amaechi R.
House Leader
House Leader
Hon. Ikiriko
H.
Hon. Okey A.
Hon. Membere
A.
Hon Pidomson
Gabriel
Hon Wokocha
Hon. Kitchner
House Leader
Hon. Kitchner
Hon. Inimgba
I.
House Leader
House Leader
Hon.
Chidi
Lloyd
House Leader
Hon. Chidi L.
Hon. Chidi L.
Hon. Brown
O.
House Leader
Hon Okeah A.
House Leader
House Leader
House Leader
167
Rivers State Multi-Door Court House Bill, 2009
Rivers State Appropriation, Bill, 2010
Rivers State Statistics Bill, 2010
Rivers
State
Public
Procurement
Law,
(Amendment) Bill, 2010
Rivers State Land Use (Prohibition of Extortion)
70. 13/4/10
Bill, 2010
Rivers State Primary Health Care Management
71. 14/4/10
Agency Bill, 2010
Rivers State Law of Property and Conveyance Bill,
72. 20/5/10
2010
Source: Office of the Clerk, Rivers State House of Assembly
66.
67.
68.
69.
30/11/09
25/1/09
08/3/10
12/4/10
House Leader
House Leader
House Leader
House Leader
House Leader
House Leader
House Leader
168
Appendix 6: QUESTIONNAIRE
Department of Political Science
University of Nigeria
Nsukka
Dear Respondent,
This questionnaire is designed for research purposes to assess the role of the legislature in
conflict management in Rivers State. It covers the period 1999-2011. The research is in
partial fulfillment of the conditions for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
(Ph.D) in Political Science of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
To ensure that your response in completely anonymous, you are not required to indicate your
name. I wish to assure you that your response will be treated with utmost confidence and is
purely for research purpose.
Please note the success of this study depends very much on your willingness to offer an
unreserved answer to questions raised in an objective and truthful manner.
We appreciate your kind co-operation in this regards.
Thank you.
Anthony Egobueze
Researcher.
169
Please mark (√) against your choice from the responses provided. Kindly be as brief as
possible where your responses entail making some statements.
Name of Community/Institution --------------------------------------------Office Address------------------------------------------------------------------1. Are you engaged by any organization or Institution in the State? ------------------------------2. Department/Section/Unit?----------------------------------------------------------------------------3. What is your present rank?----------------------------------------------------------------------------4. How long have you been in the present position?-------------------------------------------------5. Are you a citizen or resident in Rivers State? Yes { } No { }? --------------------------------SECTION A
In this section, we are interested in the causes, nature and effects of conflict in Rivers State.
6. Has your Community or the Community in which you reside been bridled with or is
currently engulfed in conflict?
Yes [ ]
No [ ]
7. What in your opinion is or are the causes of conflict in Rivers State?
Oil wealth [ ], Chieftaincy [ ], Political [ ], Communal [ ], others, please state.
8. What in your opinion is the nature of the conflict?
9. What current knowledge do you have regarding conflict?
No knowledge [ ], Full knowledge [ ], No response [ ]
SECTION B
11. In your opinion, is the Rivers State House of Assembly aware of the various conflicts
in the state?
Yes [ ], No [ ], No response [ ]
12. If yes, what role has the State Legislature played in the conflict?
Mitigation/Reconciliation [ ], Indifference [ ], Not aware of any role [ ]
13. What has the legislature done to promote awareness on conflict management?
Publicity of its activity through the mass media [ ],
Hosting of Legislative Civil Societies Dialogue [ ],
No good measure has been put in place to create awareness on conflict management [ ]
14. What actions if any, has the Rivers State House of Assembly taken with regards to
conflict management?
Passage of high impact Bills and Resolutions on conflict related matters [ ],
Conducting of Public Hearing on conflictual matters [ ],
Reconciling of parties involved in conflict related issues [ ],
All of the above [ ],
None of the above [ ]
170
15. How effective is the role of the Rivers State House of Assembly in conflict
management?
Very effective [ ], Effective [ ], Ineffective [ ], Very ineffective [ ], No response [ ]
16. Will you accept the assertion that the Rivers State House of Assembly has been
successful in conflict management?
Strongly agree [ ], Agree [ ] strongly disagree [ ], Disagree [ ], No response [ ]
17. How sensitive is the Legislature in conflict management in Rivers State?
Highly sensitive [ ], sensitive [ ], highly insensitive [ ], insensitive [ ], No response [ ]
18. Would you agree to the fact that the intervention of the Rivers State House of
Assembly in conflict management in the State is likely to increase political stability?
Strongly agree [ ], Agree [ ], strongly disagree [ ], Disagree [ ], No response [ ]
19. Do you think that if the Legislature is successful in managing conflict, then political
stability is likely to increase?
Strongly agree [ ], Agree [ ], Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ], No response[ ]
20. Has the intervention of the Legislature in conflict management engendered peace
and political stability in the State?
The intervention of the Legislature in conflict management has deepened peace [ ],
The intervention of the Legislature has exacerbated conflict in the State [ ], No response [ ]
SECTION C
21. What in your opinion makes the Legislature to intervene in conflict?
When the interest of its member is affected [ ], Because it is its constitutional responsibility
[ ], Because of its zealousness as a law making body [ ]
22. In your view, do you think that because the interest of a member of the legislature is
affected by conflictual situation, the legislature would be timely in the management of
the conflict?
Strongly agree [ ], Agree [ ], strongly disagree [ ], Disagree [ ], No response [ ]
23. Do you see conflict management as one of the responsibilities of the Legislature?
Yes [ ], No [ ], No response [ ]
SECTION D
24. In your opinion, the Executive and the Judiciary has played leading roles in conflict
resolution in Rivers State?
Strongly agree [ ], Agree [ ], strongly disagree [ ], Disagree [ ], No response [ ].
25. To what extent has the effort of the Executive and Judiciary been on conflict
management in the State?
Very meaningful [ ], Meaningful [ ], Very Un-meaningful [ ], Not Meaningful [ ],
No response [ ].
26. In a scale of 100%, how would you rank the efforts of the Executive and Legislature
in conflict resolution?
171
27. What in your opinion motivates the legislature to be involved in conflict
management?
Because the executive and the judiciary have failed to permanently resolve the conflicts [ ],
Because the Legislature is one of the Institutions of government [ ],
Because the Legislature likes managing conflicts [ ], No response [ ]
28. Do you think that the failure of the executive and the judiciary to reduce conflicts in
communities in the state could stall good governance and distort the provision of social
services and increase the role of the legislature in conflict management?
Yes [ ], No [ ], No response [ ].
29. What would be your ideal outcome in terms of the role of the legislature in conflict
management?
Increased political stability and deepening of democratic values [ ],
Respect for rule of law [ ],
Increased political awareness and the participation of the people in governance [ ]
All of the above [ ], None of the above [ ], No response [ ].
30. Would you agree that the involvement of the legislature in conflict management
could engender political stability and foster a better relation with other branches of
government?
Strongly agree [ ], Agree [ ], Strongly disagree [ ], Disagree [ ], No response [ ]
172
Appendix 7: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS:
1. In your opinion, do you think that Rivers State is bridled with conflicts?
2. If yes, what in your opinions are the causes for these conflicts?
3. How would you rate the relations between the Rivers State House of Assembly and its
constituents?
4. Do you see the Legislature being a true representative of the citizens?
5. What in your opinion led to the Ogu, Egbema and Tertiary Institutions Union‘s
conflict in Rivers State?
6. Which organ(s) of Government is or are responsible for conflict management?
7. Do you see the intervention of the Legislature in conflict management as a result of
the failure of the Executive and the Judiciary?
8. Do you see personal interest of the Legislators as the reason for the intervention of the
Legislature in the conflict?
9. Beside personal interest, what other reasons motivate the Legislature to intervene in
conflicts?
10. In your opinion, has the Rivers State House of Assembly been result oriented in the
management of conflicts in the State?
11. Do you not think that the State Legislature has been sectional in conflict
management?
12. What in your opinion are the reasons why the citizens go to the Legislature instead of
the Executive and the Judiciary to resolve conflicts?
13. What basic measures have the Legislature adopted in conflict management in Rivers
State?
14. Has the intervention of the Legislature in conflict management engendered political
stability?
15. What indicators could we see to evaluate the success of the Legislature in conflict
management?
173
Appendix 8: CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS
Variables: Interest and Intervention
Hypothesis:
H0:
There is no significant association between interest and intervention in conflict
management in the Rivers State polity;
H1:
There is a significant association between interest and intervention in conflict
management in the Rivers State polity;
Crosstabs
[DataSet1] D:\Data Files\Customers\Tony\Ana-Tony-Chi=30Jan13A.sav
Issue for Hyp 1 * Level of Response Crosstabulation
Issue f or
Hy p 1
Interest
Interv ention
Total
Count
Expected Count
Residual
Count
Expected Count
Residual
Count
Expected Count
Strongly
Agree
180
97.5
82.5
15
97.5
-82.5
195
195.0
Agree
20
13.5
6.5
7
13.5
-6.5
27
27.0
Lev el of Response
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
10
5
70.0
32.5
-60.0
-27.5
130
60
70.0
32.5
60.0
27.5
140
65
140.0
65.0
No Response
5
6.5
-1.5
8
6.5
1.5
13
13.0
Total
220
220.0
220
220.0
440
440.0
Issue for Hyp 1 * Level of Response Crosstabulation
% of Total
Issue f or
Hy p 1
Total
Interest
Interv ention
St rongly
Agree
40.9%
3.4%
44.3%
Lev el of Response
St rongly
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
4.5%
2.3%
1.1%
1.6%
29.5%
13.6%
6.1%
31.8%
14.8%
No Response
1.1%
1.8%
3.0%
Total
50.0%
50.0%
100.0%
174
Chi-Square Tests
Value
295.963a
348.675
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by -Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
4
4
Asy mp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.000
.000
1
.000
df
238.614
440
a. 0 cells (.0%) hav e expect ed count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 6.50.
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Contingency Coef f icient
Value
.634
440
Approx. Sig.
.000
a. Not assuming the null hy pothesis.
b. Using the asy mptotic standard error assuming the null hy pothesis.
Source: SPSS Output Window ver. 15
Computation
Using the formula for Chi-square (X2) test for independence, we have:
X  
2
i
j
(fij  e ij )2
e ij
= 295.963
Where: fij = observed frequency for each category in row i and column j
eij = expected frequency for each category in row i and column j
n = number of rows = 5;
m = number of columns = 2
d.f. = (n – 1)(m – 1) = (5 – 1)(2 – 1) = 4
p = 0.000
Interpretation:
From the Chi-square distribution table, we find that at d.f. = 4 and at α = 0.05 level of
significance, then X2.05 = 9.4877
Since the Test statistics, X2 (= 295.9637), is GREATER than X2.05 (= 9.4877);
also since p (= 0.000) < α (=0.05), we reject the null hypothesis (H0) and conclude that:
H1:
There is a significant association between interest and intervention in conflict
management in the Rivers State polity;
175
Strength of Relationship: The high value of 0.634 for the test statistics, contingency
coefficient, indicates that there is a strong relationship between the two variables
Variables: Failure of Executive/Judiciary and Intervention
Hypothesis:
H0:
There is no significant association between failure of executive/judiciary and
intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State polity;
H1:
There is a significant association between failure of executive/judiciary and
intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State polity;
Crosstabs
[DataSet1] D:\Data Files\Customers\Tony\Ana-Tony-Chi=30Jan13A.sav
Issue for Hyp 2 * Level of Response Crosstabulation
Issue
Failure of
Count
f or Hyp Executive/Judiciary Expected Count
2
Residual
Interv ention
Count
Expected Count
Residual
Total
Count
Expected Count
Very
meaningful
15
13.5
1.5
12
13.5
-1.5
27
27.0
Meaningf ul
7
9.0
-2.0
11
9.0
2.0
18
18.0
Level of Response
Very
unmeaningful Unmeaningf ul
130
60
142.5
50.0
-12.5
10.0
155
40
142.5
50.0
12.5
-10.0
285
100
285.0
100.0
No Response
8
5.0
3.0
2
5.0
-3.0
10
10.0
Total
220
220.0
220
220.0
440
440.0
Issue for Hyp 2 * Level of Response Crosstabulation
% of Total
Very
meaningful
Issue
f or Hy p
2
Total
Failure of
Executiv e/Judiciary
Interv ention
Meaningf ul
Lev el of Response
Very
unmeaningf ul Unmeaningf ul
No Response
Total
3.4%
1.6%
29.5%
13.6%
1.8%
50.0%
2.7%
6.1%
2.5%
4.1%
35.2%
64.8%
9.1%
22.7%
.5%
2.3%
50.0%
100.0%
176
Chi-Square Tests
Value
11.015a
11.308
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by -Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
4
4
Asy mp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.026
.023
1
.063
df
3.444
440
a. 0 cells (.0%) hav e expect ed count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 5.00.
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Contingency Coef f icient
Value
.156
440
Approx. Sig.
.026
a. Not assuming the null hy pothesis.
b. Using the asy mptotic standard error assuming the null hy pothesis.
Source: SPSS Output Window ver. 15
Computation
Using the formula for Chi-square (X2) test for independence, we have:
X  
2
i
j
(fij  e ij )2
e ij
= 11.015
Where: fij = observed frequency for each category in row i and column j
eij = expected frequency for each category in row i and column j
n = number of rows = 5;
m = number of columns = 2
d.f. = (n – 1)(m – 1) = (5 – 1)(2 – 1) = 4
p = 0.026
Interpretation:
From the Chi-square distribution table, we find that at d.f. = 4 and at α = 0.05 level of
significance, then X2.05 = 9.4877
Since the Test statistics, X2 (= 11.015), is GREATER than X2.05 (= 9.4877);
also since p (= 0.026) < α (=0.05), we reject the null hypothesis (H0) and conclude that:
H1:
There is a significant association between failure of executive/judiciary and
intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State polity;
177
Strength of Relationship: The low value of 0.156 for the test statistics, contingency
coefficient, indicates that there is a weak relationship between the two variables.
178
Variables: RSHA Conflict Mgt Role and RSHA Intervention
Hypothesis:
H0:
There is no significant association between RSHA Conflict Mgt Role and RSHA
Intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State polity;
H1:
There is a significant association between RSHA Conflict Mgt Role and RSHA
Intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State polity;
Crosstabs
[DataSet1] D:\Data Files\Customers\Tony\Ana-Tony-Chi=30Jan13A.sav
Issue for Hyp 3 * Level of Response Crosstabulation
Issue f or
Hyp 3
Total
RSHA Conflict Mgt Role Count
Expected Count
Residual
RSHA Intervention
Count
Expected Count
Residual
Count
Expected Count
Strongly
Agree
130
130.0
.0
130
130.0
.0
260
260.0
Agree
40
50.0
-10.0
60
50.0
10.0
100
100.0
Level of Response
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
20
30
17.5
20.0
2.5
10.0
15
10
17.5
20.0
-2.5
-10.0
35
40
35.0
40.0
No Response
0
2.5
-2.5
5
2.5
2.5
5
5.0
Total
220
220.0
220
220.0
440
440.0
Issue for Hyp 3 * Level of Response Crosstabulation
% of Total
Issue f or
Hy p 3
RSHA Conf lict Mgt Role
RSHA Interv ention
Total
Strongly
Agree
29.5%
29.5%
59.1%
Lev el of Response
Strongly
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
9.1%
4.5%
6.8%
13.6%
3.4%
2.3%
22.7%
8.0%
9.1%
Chi-Square Tests
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by -Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
Value
19.714
22.140
1.945
440
4
4
Asy mp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.001
.000
1
.163
df
No Response
1.1%
1.1%
Total
50.0%
50.0%
100.0%
179
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Contingency Coef f icient
Value
.207
440
Approx. Sig.
.001
a. Not assuming the null hy pothesis.
b. Using the asy mptotic standard error assuming the null hy pothesis.
Source: SPSS Output Window ver. 15
Computation
Using the formula for Chi-square (X2) test for independence, we have:
X  
2
i
j
(fij  e ij )2
e ij
= 19.714
Where: fij = observed frequency for each category in row i and column j
eij = expected frequency for each category in row i and column j
n = number of rows = 5;
m = number of columns = 2
d.f. = (n – 1)(m – 1) = (5 – 1)(2 – 1) = 4
p = 0.0001
Interpretation:
From the Chi-square distribution table, we find that at d.f. = 4 and at α = 0.05 level of
significance, then X2.05 = 9.4877
Since the Test statistics, X2 ( = 19.714), is GREATER than X2.05 (= 9.4877); also since p (=
0.001) < α (=0.05), we reject the null hypothesis (H0) and conclude that:
H1:
There is a significant association between RSHA Conflict Mgt Role and RSHA
Intervention in conflict management in the Rivers State polity;
Strength of Relationship: The low value of 0.207 for the test statistics, contingency
coefficient, indicates that there is a weak relationship between the two variables.
180
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS ON THE THREE HYPOTHESES
Level of significance (α) = 0.05
Independent
Variable
(X2) Chi
Statistics
Intervention
Interest
5.
Failure of
Intervention
Executive/
Judiciary
6.
RSHA Conflict
RSHA
Mgt Role
Intervention
Source: SPSS Output Window ver. 15
S/N
4.
Dependent
Variable
PValue
295.963
(X2.05)
Critical
Value
9.4877
0.000
Contingency
Coeff.
(Strength)
Significant
0.634
11.015
9.4877
0.000
Significant
0.156
19.714
9.4877
0.001
Significant
0.207
Sig.
Remark
Strong
association
Weak
association
Weak
association
181
Contingency coefficient. A measure of association based on chi-square. The value ranges
between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating no association between the row and column variables and
values close to 1 indicating a high degree of association between the variables. The maximum
value possible depends on the number of rows and columns in a table.