Background Notes On The Notion Of Weak State As
Employed In International Relations Studies
Notes made in preparation of the Florence Blue Bird
Overcoming State Weakness: An Agenda for State
Reform in Eastern Europe Conference
These notes are made in preparation of the Florence Blue Bird conference, a
conference focused on the issue of weak states in SE Europe. Due to the many
dimensions of the concept of "weak state" a preliminary work of conceptual
clarification is needed. This preparatory work is even more topical because due to the
large number of important issues to be discussed during the conference, not all
aspects of the "weak state" theme could be covered during the formal discussions and
panels. The following notes have the objective of preparing the groundwork for
approaching one specific dimension of the "weak states" issue: the international one,
i.e. weak states in the international system. Before being defined and considered an
object of systematic inquiry in political science and institutional theory, the issue of
weak states has accumulated a long history in international relations studies. The
following notes are based on that literature and are structured with the intention of
offering the Blue Bird participants a glimpse to the ways the issue was
conceptualized in the international relations studies arena. To facilitate the reading
of the material the references to the sources of the notes are embedded directly into the
text at the end of each note, paraphrase or citation.
In the study of international relations, it is not the size of a state that matters, but
rather its relative strength. The term "weak states" has been adopted because it can
be applied not only to small, weak states but also to countries of considerable area
that are, nevertheless, weak in their capacities to protect, maintain, or further their
national interests. The international relations theory take the unequal distribution
of strength among states into account by recognizing the existence of a order of
states based upon five gradations: super powers, great powers, middle powers,
small powers (states), and mini-states.
It is impossible to define any of the groups of states in the international hierarchy
1
in one concise, precise, statement. States are not static entities. Their position on
the continuum is constantly being challenged, tested, and changed. This dynamic
situation cannot be captured by a simple set of measures; instead, a very large set
of criteria must be used. Some are easily quantified, while others are highly intuitive
and qualitative.
As Michael Handel noted, the main danger lies in simplistic attempts to evaluate
the relative position of states in the international system by concentrating primarily,
if not exclusively, on those characteristics which are relatively easy to quantify and
tabulate, while neglecting to take into account many really important- but
somewhat intuitive-criteria. The tendency to focus on what is measurable results
from the desire, shared by many social scientists, to find clear-cut, unambiguous
answers and definitions where they do not exist, in other words, to define the
indefinable. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System. Frank Cass,
1990, pp. 49-52.
The simplest definitions of weak states are negative. For example: "A small state is
any state in the international system that does not belong to the category of the
powers ... ." or "within the European historical development one should treat as
Small States all those states which in the prevailing political system do not belong
to the Great Powers. Paul Herre quoted in Michael Handel, Weak States, 1990,
p.11.
Such definitions fail to characterize weak states positively; nor do they reveal
enough about the great powers to make a derivative definition of weak states
possible. However they reveal the fact that the definition is relational. Is part of a
semantic network and in order to make it functional it is necessary, therefore, to
define the co-related term "great power."
The exercise in defining what a "strong state" is could pave the way of a better
understanding of weak states in international relations. It is clear that more than
one set of criteria is needed to define the position of a state in the international
system. Historically, the single most important yardstick for the measurement of
military power has been the population size of a given state. This remained the
basic standard for evaluating the military might of states well into the 20th century.
However what counts is not the absolute size of a population but rather the socalled "effective population", that is, the part of the population which can be
armed and educated to operate modern sophisticated systems. Herman Kahn and
Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000, New York: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 132-133n.;
Nadav Safran, From War to War (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 256-265.
Additional criteria must therefore be introduced to correlate a nation's population
2
with its economic, industrial, and social capacity. The two major indicators are the
Gross National Product and the GNP per capita. The problem with the GNP
index is that the absolute size of a GNP may not reveal much about the structure
of an economy. A relatively large GNP can be based primarily on agricultural
products, whereas a small GNP can be based on modern sophisticated industry.
Even when two industrial countries are being compared, the industry of one may
be better geared to the production of military hardware than the industry of the
other. (Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000, New York:
Macmillan, 1968), pp. 132-133n.) Thus further information on the economic
structure of a country is needed in order to evaluate its real strength. For a state to
qualify as a great power, it has to rank very high in all or most of categories.
Definitions based on military power and the capacity of a super or great power to
defend itself under even the most adverse conditions are also useful in
understanding weak states: “... a super power is one over which the joint military
efforts of all non-super powers would be unable to achieve a military victory,
because the latter are not likely to survive a nuclear onslaught; in other words:
super power = militarily invincible power”. Laszlo Reczei, in Schou and
Brundtland (eds.). Small States in International Relations, p. 73. “A Great Power
was a state which could insure its own security against all comers”. Rothstein,
Alliances and Small Powers, p. 296. “A state may be defined as a Great Power if its
total destruction would require coalition of all other states to accomplish. Heinrich
von Treitschke, Politics (New York: Macmillan). “[A great power is] a state which
cannot be defeated in war by any other state or coalition of states without it
exacting comparable costs from its opponents”. David Vital, The Survival of Small
States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict (London: Oxford University
Press, 1971).
From all these definitions it follows that one of the major characteristics of a weak
state is the inability to secure its own existence, especially against a great power, or
even against another weak state supported by a major power. Robert 0. Keohane,
"Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," International
Organization, 23 (Spring 1969), 293. However since the second half of the
twentieth century the great powers have been dependent (to varying degrees) on
the military aid and support of the United States. So, despite their weapons, and
sophisticated military industries, even the great powers are, in the final analysis,
incapable of completely securing their own independence against a super power.
To the extent that this dependence on the super powers is increasing, the gap
between the super powers and great powers is widening. At the same time, the line
dividing the great powers from weaker countries is becoming less distinct. Michael
Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
3
Another important qualitative characteristic of the states' powers found in the
literature is the worldwide scope of their interests, as contrasted to the more
limited interests of the less powerful nations. William E. Paterson, "Small States in
International Politics," Cooperation and Conflict, 4 (1969), 122. In the case of a
big power its interests reach beyond its frontiers; therefore its basic foreign policy
consists of protecting and safeguarding its sphere of interests. For a great power,
therefore, there exists a sphere of influence beyond its borders; any interference
with this constitutes a danger, just like interference within its frontiers- naturally, it
will defend itself against such interference. Laszlo Reczei, in Schou and Brundtland
(eds.). Small States in International Relations, pp. 74-75. Weak states do not have
the strength to actively defend and secure their survival and interests beyond own
borders. Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968),
p. 57. Ironically, the conditions which most vitally affect the existence of a weak
state lie outside its borders to an even greater extent than for the great powers.
These conditions of self-preservation, in fact, are primarily the influences exerted
by the great powers themselves Michael Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
Some authors suggested defining states on the basis of the scope of their influence
on the international system. He refers to the great powers as "system-determining"
states. A great power is a state whose leaders consider that it can alone exercise a
large, perhaps decisive impact on the international system. The weaker the state,
the less its influence on the international system and the greater the impact of the
great powers upon it. Robert 0. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in
International Politics," International Organization, 23 (Spring 1969), 293.
This difference in the scope of interests between the great powers and the weak
states has been reflected in international organizations since the Congresses of
Vienna (1815) which made a formal distinction between states of general interests
(system-wide interests) and states with limited interests. A similar distinction was
made at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. All states which were recognized
as powers (Principal Allies) were assigned permanent seats in the Council of the
League of Nations. Later, the great powers were given permanent seats in the
United Nations Security Council as well as the right of veto. The power of veto is
sometimes accepted as an important means of distinguishing between the great
powers and all other states. Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law,
pp. 348-378; H. W. V.Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris,
I (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 249.; F. P. Walters, A History of the
League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 45-46.
The discussion of "strong states" or “great powers” has set the stage for a more
4
precise approach to the problem of defining and characterizing the "weak states".
In looking for that definition it should be noted that the weak states form the
largest class of states and have the most diverse membership- a fact which make it
still more difficult to assign them any common denominator other than their
overall relative weakness. Nevertheless, some of the weak states are not totally
lacking in strength.
Many scholars have tried to suggest an upper limit for weak states in terms of their
population. Thomas Masaryk and Sir J. A. R. Marriott quoted by saw as weak all
those European states whose populations were under 20 million. R. P. Barston set
his maximum at 10-15 million. 10 million has been suggested by Simon Kuznets.
David Vital, quoted by the same author has refined this approach by proposing
one limit for developed weak states (10-15 million) and another for
underdeveloped ones (20-30 million) (Quoted in Michael Handel, Weak States,
Frank Cass,1990). All such limits are highly artificial. The size of population cannot
serve as a satisfactory criterion.
The use of multiple criteria in evaluating the position of weak states leads to a
better understanding of their relative strength. On the whole, weak states score
relatively low on most of the criteria used. And the larger the combination of
criteria employed, the lower the weak states score in comparison to the great and
middle powers. A number of non-quantitative definitions of weak states also
appear in the literature. Whereas one of the most important characteristics of the
great powers is their military strength and capacity for self-defense, the weak states
are continually preoccupied with the question of survival. They have difficulty in
defending themselves against the great and middle powers, against a coalition of
weak states, or even against a single weak state. These states are characterized by
their military weakness. Michael Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
The small state is state which, because of its lack of power, is unable to achieve
[has to renounce] its political goals vis-a-vis most other states. The states called
"small powers" generally have-can only have-defensive ambitions. They seek to
survive as such. . . the nations called "great powers" desire to possess the capacity
that we have called offensive. Aron, Peace and War, p. 83.
A weak states is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by
use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other
states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in
its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states
involved in international politics. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 29. Nils
Orvik, "NATO: The Role of the Smaller Members," Atlantic Community
Quarterly, 4 (Spring 1966), 92.
5
The large-small distinction is based on the degree to which a country can credibly
cover its own security needs at any given period of time. 71. Orvik, "NATO,
NAFTA and the Smaller Allies," Orbis, 12 (Spring 1968), 455. small state ... is a
state which is unable to contend in war with the great powers on anything like
equal terms. Their military weakness made them diplomatically weak. As a result
they played an insignificant role in world politics. The great powers generally
ignored them as vassals rather than as equals. Amry Vandenbosch, "The Small
States in International Politics and Organization," The Journal of Politics, 26
(1964), 294. Some scholars have referred to weak states as consumers rather than
producers of security. See, for example, Vandenbosch, "Small States in
International Politics," p. 301.
In most of these definitions and descriptions, the weak states are contrasted, either
explicitly or implicitly, with the great and super powers and not with other weak
states. Ths approach is misleading. Since the gap between the military capacities of
weak states and great powers is so pronounced, such definitions are merely
statements of the obvious. It is much more meaningful to compare weak states
with other weak states. In this century, weak states have fought one another, thus
endangering their own existence, no less than have the great powers. It is, in any
case, usually more important for a small state to provide for its defense against
possible enemies in its own subsystem than to defend itself against a super power.
Between weak states, the enormous gap in power disappears. They can and do
successfully defend themselves against one another. Michael Handel, Weak States,
Frank Cass,1990.
Therefore, when speaking of the ability or inability of a weak state to defend itself,
one must immediately ask, "Against whom?" The ability of all states to defend
themselves by their own efforts is a relative one. The super and great powers can
do so better than the weak states, but they are not totally self-reliant. Michael
Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass, 1990.
The claim that weak states in the modern world have only defensive capabilities
and must renounce the use of power to achieve offensive goals is considered by
many authors a fallacy in the study of weak states.
The "weakness" of weak states is frequently mistaken for peacefulness,
nonaggressiveness, and the desire to maintain the status quo. There is little
evidence that small states are more peaceable than great powers. It is rather that
the former are less militarily effective than the latter, not more peace loving.... If
the exercise of state power is ever morally questionable we cannot help noticing
that small states exercise it as readily as they can. There seems little evidence that
6
the political initiatives of small states, however constrained, are characterized by a
greater delicacy of scruple, or perceptibly more prudence, than those of greater
neighbors . . . we may reach the conclusion that the belief in the superior virtues of
small states is a romantic illusion. Michael Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
Small states, in short, are great powers writ small. They behave as much like great
powers as they can. Nor should we blame them for this. They belong to an
international order which requires them to exercise what power they have. Nor can
they escape from this international order without ceasing to exist as states. Any
distinctiveness in small state behavior arises not from any qualitative difference
between small states and others but from the limitations their smallness places
upon their capacity to implement significant decisions in foreign policy. Robert
Pumell, The Society of States: An Introduction to International Politics (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 98-99. Naturally it is often in the interest of
weaker states to appear more virtuous and moral than the more powerful states.
Weak states pursue a de facto policy of nonaggression for pragmatic reasons.
Michael Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
Small nations have no imperial ambitions-not because they are better than any
other nations in any way, but because the actual facts of their situation bar them
from imperialistic ambitions. Robert Pumell, The Society of States: An
Introduction to International Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973),
pp. 98-99.
There is no reason why weak states cannot be effectively aggressive against other
weak states. The belief in the pacific nature of weak states is a myth. Weak states
are actively pursuing policies aimed at changing the status quo in their favor. In
other words, there is no direct correlation among size, relative power, and
aggression. The aggressive behavior of states must be explained by other factors.
Michael Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
The correlate of the weak states peacefulness myth is the myth that the strength of
the great powers has been confused with aggression and imperialism: “There
seems to have been a positive correlation between the war likeness of a state and
its relative power. The "great powers" in all periods of history have been the most
frequently at war, and the small states have been the most peaceful .... The more
important reason for the excessive belligerency of great powers, however, lies in
the structure of the balance of power, which practically assures that all great
powers will enter wars which threaten the balance in order to preserve it, a
responsibility which smaller states do not have”. Quincy Wright A Study of War,
II, 848-849. However it is not accurate to minimize the offensive capabilities of
weak states and to imply that aggression is the prerogative of the powers alone.
7
Other characterizations of weak states stress the fact that because of their general
military and economic weakness they do not weigh heavily in the international
balance of power. Their shifting from one side to another is of no consequence to
the overall balance among the great and super powers. Some scholars consider that
from the point of view of the great powers, the difference between middle powers
and weak (small) states may be stated as follows: the defection of a middle power
might prove critical to the balance of power, but if a weak state switched sides, it
would not upset the balance. It is true that the value of a single weak state may be
minimal. But if a weak state shifts its position, there is always the possibility that
this action will have a contagious or catalytic effect on other weak states.
Therefore, for psychological as well as political and military reasons, it is in the best
interests of a super power to prevent such a move, whether by force or by positive
rewards Michael Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
It has been observed that the range of interests of the super and great powers is
characteristically global. Annette Baker Fox combines their marginal importance to
the great powers with their limited range of interests: "We can think of small states
as those whose leaders (as well as those of other powers) recognize that their own
state's political weight is limited to a local arena rather than to the global one, that
they are dependent upon outside political forces for much of their security, and
that their particular state's interests may be dispensable in the eyes of one or more
great powers. Fox, "The Small States in the International System 1919-1969,"
International Journal, 24 (1968/1969), 751. Small powers are almost by definition
"local" powers whose demands are restricted to their own and immediately
adjacent areas . . . the power of the small state is narrow in "domain" however
much or little may be its "weight." Fox, The Power of Small States, p. 3. Barston,
"The External Relations of Small States," in Schou and Brundtland (eds.), Small
States in International Relations, p. 41; William E. Paterson, "Small States in
International Politics," p. 122.
The South East European states offer what Handel citing Herre calls "an excellent
example of the small states' provincialism and their narrow, even egocentric,
outlook": Balkan statesmen have rarely been able to look beyond the Balkans. They
have seen very clearly only the interlocking relationships between European bigpower politics and their own parochial Balkan polities and have consciously taken
them into account in pursuing their national aims. It was the practice of turning the
big powers into instruments of the small states about which the Serbian prime
minister, Pashitch, spoke almost cynically, after the end of the Balkan Wars in
August 1913, to the Serbian charge d'affaires in Berlin: "I could have risked a
European war during the First Balkan War in order to acquire Bosnia, but since I
feared that we would then be forced to make considerable concessions to Bulgaria
8
in Macedonia, I first wanted to secure Macedonia for Serbia and only then proceed
to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina." Die Kleinen Staaten Europas, p. 374 (quoting
translation by Handel).
In other words, the outlook of weak states and their leaders is provincial or
parochial. "Where the great affairs of the world impinge on them directly, the
leaders of a small power will therefore generally find themselves operating in the
light of their own regional interests, conflicts and fears." Vital, The Inequality of
States, p. 29.
This narrower outlook has considerable advantages. Because weak states are able
to focus their attention on a limited range of foreign policy problems, they have a
relative advantage over decision-makers in the super and great powers. Policymakers in weak states have a closer knowledge of issues involved and fewer
distractions. But when weak states are faced with problems of a much wider scope
or with issues directly involving the great or super powers, the information
available to them is often inferior, so that they find themselves dependent on the
powers. For weak states, the question is often simply, "Is it good or bad for us?"
They can then try to act on the answer to the best of their abilities. But for a super
power, the most appropriate action in one part of the world might actually weaken
its position elsewhere. Possibly the main advantage a small power's foreign
minister has over his great-power colleague is that he is not obliged to adopt a
position on every international issue that arises. (Andrew, Defence by Other
Means, p. 53. Annette Baker Fox, "Small State Diplomacy," in Stephen D. Kertesz
and M. A. Fitz-simmons. Diplomacy in a Changing World (South Bend, Ind.:
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1959), p. 340.
Attempts have been made to define the behavior of weak states as relatively
passive and reactive in contrast to the more active and dynamic roles of the great
powers. One frequently finds them referred to as "objects". Andrew, Defence by
Other Means, p. vii; Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and
Organization," p. 294. More sophisticated works take into account the bargaining
leverage of the weak states and the frequent instances of their manipulating great
powers for their own ends, and thus avoid such belittling metaphors.
Some authors differentiate between two components in the conduct of foreign
policy of a given state: an initiating element and a reactive element. The policy of
each state is a mixture of the two. Usually, the more powerful a state is, the more
the initiating element is evident in its foreign policy. Michael Brecher, The Foreign
Policy System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 15-16. For smaller
powers this normally is more a matter of reacting to situations created by others
over whom they have little or no control, than it is of taking the obvious and direct
9
measures that would, on the face of it, seem the simplest way of getting what they
want. Not all of the smaller powers fully recognize the limitations on their abilities
to take initiatives and see them through. They respond to situations presented to
them by those more powerful than themselves and that most of their decisions
have been on how to deal with situations they had little or no part in creating.
Michael Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
It will prove more productive to find a correlation between foreign policy and
ideology, a leader's character, a state's geographic location, and its regional
problems. Size and stage of development may have little bearing on a pursued plan
of foreign policy. Patrick L. McGowan and Klaus-Peter Bottwald, "Small State
Foreign Policies: A Comparative Study of Participation, Conflict and Political and
Economic Dependence in Black Africa", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19,
No. 4. December 1975, pp. 469-500.(Quoted by Handel).
A corollary of the assumed passive behavior of weak states is that they cannot
affect the structure of the international system, since this framework is an external
"given." Great powers determine the nature of systemic patterns; as such they can
alter the system or perhaps merely ignore its imperatives without suffering
grievously. Small powers on the other hand are much more limited in their
freedom by the nature of the systemic structure. For the most part they are
dominated by the system, in the sense that the opportunities they have are
dependent on the kind of system which exists. They can rarely create their own
opportunities. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 182.
Weak states are by no means impotent, helpless victims of the system. On the
contrary, they are quick to take advantage of the opportunities arising from the
nature of any given international system. They learn to manipulate the competition
between the great powers to their own ends, and in this way they exert a
considerable influence, even if not a critical one, on the system itself. It is therefore
difficult to accept the generalization that weak states tend to be more passive than
great powers. Such a statement confuses the limited strength of the weak states,
their light "weight" on the balance of power, and their occasional support of a
convenient status quo with passivity and resignation. Because weak states lack the
strength to sanction and reward, fewer viable policy options may be open to them.
But this condition is not the same thing as passivity. Michael Handel, Weak States,
Frank Cass,1990.
The actual and potential economic strength of a state, which often reflects its
military power, becomes more important for determining its rank in the
international hierarchy. Weak states may therefore be denned in economic terms. It
seems preferable to define a small nation as one which, while depending
10
comparatively heavily upon foreign trade both for supplies and sales markets,
makes only a modest contribution to the aggregate flow of international trade ... a
nation is small from the point of view of foreign trade when its dependence on
foreign markets is relatively great but its contribution to them small in absolute
terms. G. Marcy, "How Far Can Foreign Trade and Customs Agreements Confer
Upon Small Nations the Advantages of Large Nations?" in Robinson, Economic
Consequences of the Size of Nations, p. 268.
Most small countries have a more specialized export industry than large countries.
This follows from the distribution of natural resources over the world, from
regional differences in climate and traditions, and from advantages in specialization
and large-scale production. There is an a priori likelihood that small countries will
more often find themselves for periods in a favorable or unfavorable situation as
regards the trends and potentialities of their dominating exports. Economically, as
militarily and politically, the weak states are at a serious disadvantage when
compared with the great and middle powers. But even here, they can find ways to
compensate for their weakness. Michael Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990.
To sum up, the international relations theory made has made clear that it is
impossible to define any of the groups of states in the international hierarchy in
one concise, precise, statement. In terms of strength, states are not static entities.
Their position on the continuum is constantly being challenged, tested, and
changed. This dynamic situation cannot be captured by a simple set of measures;
instead, a very large set of criteria must be used. Some are easily quantified, while
others are highly intuitive and qualitative, yet no less important. Much of the
foreign policy behavior of the various states is based on intuitive evaluations by
policy-makers in trying to assess the relative strength and position of the
opposition, including judgments on national morale, quality of leadership, scope of
interests, organization, and the other states' perception of relative strength. The
main danger lies in simplistic attempts to evaluate the relative position of states in
the international system by concentrating primarily, if not exclusively, on those
characteristics which are relatively easy to quantify and tabulate, while neglecting to
take into account many really important- but somewhat intuitive-criteria. Michael
Handel, Weak States, Frank Cass,1990, pp.40-51.
The weak states are not entirely weak. They have important internal sources of
strength which they have learned to use to their advantage. They have also learned
to manipulate the strength of the great powers on their own behalf, and to draw on
this external source of strength to further their own national interests. But all in all,
the great powers are still more powerful than they are weak, and the weak states are
characterized by their relative weakness, not strength.
11
In evaluating the relative strength or weakness of a state, its geographic location
must be taken into account. This is a crucial factor in understanding the nature and
dynamics of weak states in international relations.
Since no single definition of a weak or powerful state is completely satisfactory, it
is necessary to find methodological substitutes that better reflect the complex
problem of characterizing the relative power of states. Such alternative methods
take into account contextual factors and the power differentials, while at the same
time acknowledging that the line between strength and weakness is not always easy
to distinguish in reality.
12