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is an enthusiastic historian who likes to find the subtleties and contradictions of
policy and practice. The subject of the 1973 coup in Chile was a perfect topic for
communicated with me as his advisor
to explore this interest.
consistently throughout the project, and he impressed me when he took the initiative to
contact the National Archives in Santiago, Chile, and community members with various
connections to the Coup. Although the National Archives never returned hi s calls or
emails, his motivation to obtain these documents speaks well of his research skills. He
was able, however , to obtain some interesting sources from community members.
Jegan this project last year with a teacher who has since left the school, so I
have only worked with him for this past year. During this time, the areas that
focused on were finding sources from different perspectives, developing his analysis, and
using citations effectively. I witnessed his creative process with this paper through our )
meetings, and it has been passed through turnitin.com as well, thus, I can say with
confidence that this paper is
V
; own work.
Th1s declaration must be signed by the supervisor: otherwise a grade may not be issued.
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I spent
~est
of my knowledge, the extended essay
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IS
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c:J
E reasoned argument
4
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F analysis and evaluation
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D
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2
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4
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4
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e of examiner 1. - ----;
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18 Cardiff use only:
8:
Extended Essay- HISTORY
The involvement of the CIA in the 1973 coup in Chile
Research Question:
Exam ine the ro le of the United States and more specifically the role of the CIA, in the
undermining of the rule of President Allende and ultimately in the 1973
Chilean coup d'etat.
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Abstract:
This extended essay discusses the 1973 military coup in Ch ile, orchestrated by
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Augusto Pinochet and the Chilean military, and supported by the U.S. It undertakes an
investigation of the actua l role of the CIA in the downfall of Allende. This essay analyses
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the glan of action of the United States to undermine the Socialist government elected in
Ch ile in 1970, and how it specifica lly hel~ed the rise of radical opposition groups in the
country. It thus focuses the fo llowing research question: Examine the role of the
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United States and
underminin
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specifically the role of the CIA, in the
of the 'ru le of President Allende and ultima~ely in the
1973 Chilean coup d'etat.
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The scope of this extended essay is restricted to the actions of t he
Ce ntral Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1964 to 1973, the period in wh ich
Allende rose to power and eventua lly assumed the presidency of the Chilean
republic. This essay
does~rxpl ore
the actual coup_ nor the human rights
1
violation t hat have occurred directly during and after the event.
The investigation and ana lysis und erta ken, wh ich is sepa rated in f ive
sections (Introduction, U.S origina l actions in Ch ile, Economic destab ilization,
olitical destab ili zation, their Outcome and im pact, and a co nclusion) reaches
thg_ !;_o nclus ion that the actions done by the U. S and the CIA resu lted in the
creation of a nationa l mood and situation favorable for a coup or revolt of
some kind to occur against Allende . It was, for exa mple, thanks to the
horrib le econom ic situation, a resu lt of the blockade of loans and aids to Ch ile,
that the country plun ged in a deep economic crisis during Allende's
presidency, resu lting in a drastic radicalization of the opposition group and
parties, those latter being certa in that Allende's socia list government was
bring ing the country to complete and utter bankruptcy and co llapse.
Word count: (300)
Table of Contents:
Page 2 ............ .............................................. Abstract
Page 4 .......................................................... 1ntroduction
Page 6 .............................. .......................... U.S Original Policies Regarding Allende
Page 8 ........................... ..............................Economic Destabilization
Page lO ....................................................... Political Destabilization
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Page 12 ...................................................... 0utcome and Impact of Covert Actions
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Page 14 ....................................................... Conclusion
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Introduction :
The rise of social ist governments in Southern America during the Cold War was
consistently met with strong hostility from the United States. Common examples
encompass the repeated attempts to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba starting
with the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, but also with the continent wide counter-guerilla
warfare orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency. However, the participation in
the overthrow of Salvador Allende's democratically elected regime and the support for
the establ ishment of Pinochet's dictatorship was, and still is, one of the most
controversial and unclear American involvement in the region due to both its symbo lical
nature and the repercussions it had on the Chilean people.
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In Chile during the year of 1970, an openly Socialist government was elected
democratically for the first time in South America. The socialist party president, Salvador
9
Allende, was the one to lead this new national order. The man was a true veteran of
presidentia l campaigns, having run for office for four consecutive t imes, only winning at
his fourth attempt by a close majority. His ties with the Chilean Communist Party, Fidel
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Castro, and Marxist intellectuals made him a rather controversial political figure in the
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region .
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However, despite the ideological victory for the continent's, and Chile's, left wing
?\._...intellectuals and politicians, the elections were marked by a series of scanda ls, strong
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and somet imes violent political feuds, as well as underground resistance and plotting by
right wing nationa list parties. Hence, the results of the elections were far from fully
representing Chile's political scene, and growing adversity towards the new government
was clearly prese nt.
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Ex-politica l leaders, such as Frei, Chile's president from 1964 to 1970 and a
Christian Democrat (loca l Right I Center Right political .p arty) led the official charge
against Allende's government. M ilitary officers also were at the source of the turmoil. It
is from th is institution that the orchestrators of the future coups mainly originated, such
as Roberto Viaux in 1970 (a fa iled coup), or Genera l Pinochet in 1973 1•
The instability in the country rose throughout Allende's presidency. A sharp
.rncrease .rn cnt1
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part1es, rn add'1t1on
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extremely precarious and suspicious economic situation, due to exterior factors which
w ill be looked at later in this essay, unquestionab ly led to the radicalization of nationa list
groups.
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The tipping point was reached on September 11 h, 1973. A right wing alliance of
army officers and civil officials, a group which bui lt up throughout the presidency until
encompassing a sizable proportion of the army and right wing parties, launched their
"golpe", or coup, in Santiago de Ch ile. The plotters made it clear that their actions were
made for Chile, stating the "economic, socia l, and mora l crisis destroying Chile" and
assigning the responsibility of such a crisis on the "Marxist regime". Yet, the population
was not harmonious on the situation, and neither was the army. It seemed evident that
the illegitimate use of force on the government without the consent of the majority of
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t he popu Iation was f ores had owing a rat h erg Ioomy f uture.
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Recently declassified documentation from the CIA, as well as relatively common
experience of first hand
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observe~s, proves the extensive involvement of the United
States in the issue. However, the rea l puzzle is to determine the importance of
suclfr,1\?
involvement in the final result, that is, the coup of 1973.
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"Church Report- Appendix." U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Web. 28 Nov.
2011. <http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp>.
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To investigate this topic is extremely interesting, as it allows for a greater
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especially re levant in today's society, due to the necessity of cooperation between the
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U.S and Ch il e economically. A necess ity which does not alleviate slight tensions
originating from sometimes negative views of the U.S, especially regarding what is
t hought as w hat was, at times, an imperialist and self-centered policy towards the
region. This helps us expla in the frequent actions by Chile to remain as independent as
possible from the U.S, exemplified by the sustaini ng of very good relations with Ch ina,
and the EU, amongst others.
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In order to answer this issuE~/his
essay- will describe and analyze each type of
American invo lvement in Chile in the t ime period preceding the coup, as well as the
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coup itself. It will divide them in econom ic destabilization, political destabilization, and
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f inally their impact and effect on Chi le, and eventually the coup. 11._will, at each step,
.)D'J'~ ,•ana lyze and recognize the impact each action had on Chile's condi~on, and on the fin:
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outcome.
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1. U.S original policies regarding Allende
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To be able to discern the invo lvement, and importance, of the CIA involvement in
Chile's coup, it is primordia l to describe the organization's action dating from as early as the
beginning of Allende's presidency.
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It was in November 61h, 1970 that the Un ited States first decided to undermine the
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Chilean Socia list state and eventually esta blish a new government that would work alongside
the American fore ign policy. There are documents, however, that prove that the United
States
~c~, and par~IA,~concerned regarding Al lende's rise to
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from as early ast n 1964, and assertions such as this one: "It is fir~ and continuing
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policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup" were common. Discussion s with
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start being seen in 1970 with several telephone discussions, the most notable of them
being betwee n Kissinger, t hen the US national adviser, and Jresident
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for the U.S govern ment, t he new order in Chile was "pro-Castro" and "anti-American", and
that t he ea rly, and failed, moves to prevent Allende's rise to power were "premature".
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The United States policy regarding socialist and Marxist governments throughout .
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t he world was straightforward; t he prevent ion at all cost of their increase and spreading.
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common fear dominated such a po licy, the domino effect theory. This was the strong beliefV
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t hat an increase in Communist governments in a region would lead in an exponential
propagation of socia list left wing pa rties, ideologies, and movements. The fact that a new
"anti-America n" government arose in the American sphere of influence made the
involvement of t he U.S inevitable and predictable. Hence, and despite the fact t hat th,e
concerned government was democratica lly elected, it seemed that it wou ld not escape
strong pressures, and opposit ion. For the U.S, democracy in unaligned countries took a
secondary role, wh ile econom ic liberalism and opposition to communism became the one
critical aspect to be propagated.
As said earl ier, the CIA presence in Chile dates back from 1964, yet the agency's
goals were ma inly to prevent t he rise of Allende, and to help the Christian Democrats along
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with t he other right wing pa rties to effectively use
propagand~. We can see~ shift from
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interested polit ical gu idance to the support of po lit ica l unrest as soon as the Chilean 1970
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elections resu lts were made public, on September 151h. At that exact date, the CIA backed up
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by the~hite ~buse, as proven by the :e:f~re~d ~ep~i~~- between Nixon and
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Kissinger, chose to adopt a new po licy that would lead to the removal of Allende from power.
Here, different measures organ ized in plans of actions, called tracks, were adopted or readopted 2 . They were all made to he lp ensure a move by the Chilean military aga inst the new
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Track I w~s composed by a w ide array of sub sections such as; Political Actions,
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Propaganda, an Economic Pressures. Track I, however, was on ly a reasserti on of a plan to
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prevent Allende to rise to power and was-thus already in place sin ce the 1960's: Track IVon
the other hand, was introduced during the meeting b o k an approach of a much
more involved and participative type, as it asked for a direct U.S rol e in the organization of a
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military coup. Yet, the agency was left unchecked by the White House and its local
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representatives, such as the U.S ambassador to Chile. It thu s allowed for Covert Actions of a
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very free nature, without political restrictions, and hence allowed for multiple contacts by
the CIA in several of Chile's mi litary instit ut ions, namely the Carabineros (the local law
enforcing body), but also w ith t he co nventional armed forces.
It must be sa id that in the short run, neither tr ck I no II hpd the effect
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wanted; preventing Allende to access to office in early November. They instead grad ually
destabilized the country and favored a mood of distrust in Chile's political sphere, due to the
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high amount of propaganda ~aving been distributed in accordance to tr ack I, b~t also due to
the many contacts having been made in the mi lita ry, paramilitary, and political opposition,
that wou ld actively engineer the right cl imate for a co up, in accordance to t rack II.
2. Economic Destabilizations
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As it has been st ated above, eco nomic destabilizations and pressures were part of Track
1. This thus means that the undermining of different econom ic aspects of the Chilean
conomy was underway since t he mid-1960s. However, such econom ic destabilizations were
increased to a much more significant level w hen Allende was voted in, due to the urgency of
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removing him from power.
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What were at f irst merely actions to reduce the wea lth of the Chilean
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quickly evolved into a nationwide desta bilization in both financia l and monetary fronts. In
order to have such a w ide impact, t he CIA and t he concerned U.S officials had to resort to
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multinational firms with strong holdings in the countrl . By far the most influ ential one, and
the most recurrent in declassified documents is the ITI. The ITI was, and still is, a
multinational with a· wide range of branches. At the time, it owned most of the Chilean
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national telephone company, and funded the "Mercurio", a very popular right w ing
7
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newspaper. Such corporations took diligently the role of stopping investments in Chile, laying
off workers, and doing all the possible efforts to sustain a negative internal economic
situation. They publiGiy stated that the reason was the unsafe econom ic situation of Chile, due
to the rise of socia lism and the nationalization of businesses
American firms were also the main owner of Chile' copper industry, owning up to 80% of
the industry. The fact that the copper industry represented at the time four fifths(seefootnote 3l of
the export revenue of the country.._ really made this presence critical. Th is also entailed that at
any decis ion of nationalization, high taxation, and redistributive policies by the Socialist
government would encounter solid resistance from the American firms, and even hars~ er
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threats by the U.S government
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father simple nature; to drop the price of coppe:r by
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selling a large amount of the good in the international market, creating a large surplus, and to
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cut off Ch ile from various international aids(tootnotes3 and 4 l. That latter part was rath er
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complicated, as despite the strong influence of the U.S in the international financial and
monetary organizations of the time, it could not coerce the entire world in stopping all help
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towards Chile. Hence the cooperation of American banks such as the U.S export-important
bank helped to keep such pressures very much alive
.Also, the goal to remain as invisible as possible in the whole Allende-case made it
important for the U.S to remain reasonable in the international stage. However, foreign aid in
3
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"Church Report -US Economic Policies section." U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) .
Web. 28 Nov. 2011. <http :/ /foia .state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp>.
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Chile did drastically fa ll. A ta,4 ;eleased in t he U.S department of state website, as part .of
the freedom of information act, shows extremely well the drop in money flowing in Chile
during the Allende presidency. To give an idea of magnitude to the reader, the World Bank
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loans to Chile reduced from 19.3 to 0 million dollars between 1970 and 1971, and "U.S
econom ic aid" from 29 mi llion dollars to 8 million dollars.
Despite the effective interna l destabilizations, it is without doubt the external actions
made by the U.S that drove Ch ile in a vert iginous economic collapse. It is of the utmost
importance to say that at that t ime, Chile was dependent on international aids in order to pay
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back its debt, and above all, in a stable copper price. Chile's primary export being copper and
revenues from that industry making up t he majority of the GOP, a drop in value of that
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commodity wou ld have sertous effects for the country's balance of payments.
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In the very short term, these did not seem to influence to a great extent Allende's
government, as t he momentary infatuation of the Chilean people and the wave of optimism
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that shook the country made any economic degradation pass unnoticed. However, the
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inability for Ch ile to end what seemed to be a deep economic crisis gradually accentuated the
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changes in ministers and cabin ets, and greatly contributed in the fall in popularity of Allende's
government, and the important drop in public support. This was further aggravated when
Ch ile's credit rating was downgraded harshly by two full grades: from B to
~and tootno~3•4l . ''
th is last point being an obvious effect of the lack of international aid.
3. Political Destabilizations
The discontent and hosti lity towards Allende's government due to the bad economic
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situation were also increased due to the politica l mingling the CIA was partaking between
1970 and 1973.
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"Church Report- Table 2: Financial Aid." U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) . Web.
28 Nov. 2011. <http:/ /fo ia.state.gov/Reports/ ChurchReport.asp>.
5
Hersh, Seymour M . The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit, 1983.
Print.Page 277
Political actions destabilizations by the CIA follow two periods. The few months
immediately fo llowing the election of Allende (from September to October 1970), and the
actions perpetrated during t he ru le of Allende.
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The very f irst politica l actions by the CIA were to convince Frei to participate in a special,
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constitutional scheme wh ich wou ld see him
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6
elected . Th is scheme included an extensive propaganda program in the goal to sway Chile's
parliament against Allende, and allow for a re-election.
Despite the legality of the plan, as well as the substantial sum of money unlocked for
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Frei and his supporters, the man declined. This led to the validation of Allende's triumph in
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the presidential elections and forced the CIA to move i nt~c~ nd the later stages of
involvement.
During Allende's ru le, the CIA used large amo unts of funds to support Chile's opposition
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parties. It is possible that the main goal of this action was to establish a united right wing in
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order to further diminish the power of the current government. This idea is reinforced by the
fact that no right w ing party was den ied funding7 • This policy led to a sharp increase in
propaganda, as party radios and newspaper multiplied. The CIA also took a large part in
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'(Y'\:{~"/.) ~ increasing directly the propaganda in the country. Most of the c,IA propaganda was conveyed
~¢~)'through t he "Mercurio" and its sub divisions; however books and pamphlets were made in
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. numbers in order to affect all the Chilean popu lation. This is undeniably a key reason for
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the gradua l loss of popu larity that Allende suffered from, and for the increased strength of
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the opposition. By effectively setting the Chileans vicariously against their president, who was,
~ after all, elected by a small margin in the first place, the eventual support for a coup_was
certainly increased amongst the popu lation. The over politicization of the Chileans and the
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CIA. Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activiti~_s, 15 Spt to 3 Nov. Rer;:>. Web.
<http://www .gwu .edu/~nsarch iv/NSAE BB/NSAE BB8/chOl-0 1. htm>. Page 5
"CIA Activities In Chile." CIA. Web. 20 Feb. 2012. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsa rchiv/news/200009 19/0l­
Ol.htm>.
7
increase in a strong assertive opposition in a time of crisis greatly increased the tensions in
the political sce nes. The va rio us cliches and lies about the socialist "regime" also added fuel to
the fire, and reduced the w ill of the parties of opposite political spectrum and allegiances to
rationally discuss the future of the country. Intolerance and anger thus took a greater
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im portance than democratic debat e, for both the government and its opposition.
In addition to the support of public parties and opposition, money was put to the
disposition of private groups. Such support was very small in t he first years of Allende's
presidency, as the hope for an opposition victory in the 1973 elections was directing the
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actions of the Cl . The defeat of the opposition in these elections, however, marked a
complete change in t e actual destabili zations. In stead of promoting official parties, the CIA
8
saw an advantage in increasing civil unrest to sway the army against Allende's government
.
The declassified documents su pport the idea that money was indeed unlocked for
private groups, as high as a million dollars. However, they are quite elusive in the promotion
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of strikes. It see ms that t he CIA indi rectly promote~ by handing out money to private
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right w ing groups which then red istributed the money to people ready to go against Allende's
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presidency. Fo llowing such process, strikes erupt ed in the country, t he major ones being t he
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miner strikes and the trucker's one, which paralyzed the country. One of the anti-AIIende
groups supported, "Patria y Libertad", was also one of the orchestrators of pa ram ilitary
actions in the country, as well as arm s trafficking and sabotage, needless to say that t he rise
0
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of such an organization did not quell the growing tensions.
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However,
.... no report of connections with Pinochet and/or other actual military officials
emerged, and there seems to be no explicit link between the 1973 Pinochet coup and t he U.S
.,
w ill.
I
Despite t he fact t hat Allende was supported by only a ~ mall- majority of t he popu lation,
and that hence he had a rather big opposit ion, it is t hanks to the American efforts that th e
8
see footnotes regarding Church Report and CIA reports from earlier pages
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politica l opposit ion took such a magnitude. As seen In the evidence 'provided above, the 1,1se
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of propaganda and party funds wi~ doubt playe~rengthening the
opposition and keeping it organized. This added to the economic destabilizations made
1
certain the creation and executi?n of coups.
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4. The Outcome and Impact of Covert Actions
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The cumulating effect of the CIA involvement in Ch il e had, in all certainty, a drastic
imp~ Yet, did it determine and caused the coup of 1973? )' -t-B~'t \ \'
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With the coll ection of data and examples on the
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£_o~e~ctions perpetrated, (it is clear
that Pinochet was not expected by the CIA to effectively start a coup, let alone to bring it
to success. Statements from 1970 described him as a man who efficiently obeyed order,
~
yet who did not seem likely to be a leader in any political
turmoh~lt thus seems that
the actua l coup, and its preparation were done without the direct support of the CIA. This
is backed up with the fact that nowhere in any of the declassified documents is Pinochet
extensively discussed previous to 1973. He is simply not present.
--
This is because the CIA did not have to create a coup themse lves. The effects of all the
destabilization policies helped to put the country in a state of volatility. The propaganda
did its work in the military, and the Allende government
;raduall~lost the· support of the
t"-
most influential groups and institutions in the country; that is the army, and the higtu!f
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classes.
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9
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CIA. Biographic Data- Augusto Pinochet. Tech. Web.
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<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarch iv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch17-02.htm>.
10
Streeter, Stephen M. ""Destabilizing Chi le: The United States and the Overthrow of Allende"."
Web.<: http ://www.humanities .m cmaste r.ca/~streete/pdf/Destabilizing_Chil e.pdf>. Page 13
tt
ex
The economic measures also helped to discredit the Chilean government and their
policy, backing up the points stated in the anti-socialist propaganda, conveyed with the
"\
help of the ; Mercuricf: The country was moving towards bankruptcy. The strategic antiAll ende strikes, indirectly supported by t he CIA, such as the truck driver strike 11 put in
place in the country a commo n feeling of catastrophe and complete failure of the
"socialist regime", and ~ ly the workerf remained faithful to Allende, giving him enough
----
votes to continue his mandate in the first months of 1973.
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Henceforth, it is reasonable to state that even if Pinochet' s coup was not directly
supported by the CIA, its success is to be attributed to the destabilization efforts of the
US. Without the alienation of the army, the economic destabilization, the su pport for
param ilitary groups such as "Patria y Libertad", and the widespread use of propaganda
such a coup wou ld certa inly not have occurred, or, to say the least, certa inly not as swiftly
as it did.
The Pinochet coup, a true deus ex mach ina solving the Chilean socialist problem, truly
12
t hrill ed the CIA
•
It effectively incarnated the long term success of track I and tra~k II, as
no tangible proofs regarding the U.S involvement were present. The US perpetrated a
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successfu l, behind-the-stage, intervention, without any noteworthy international ['~ l~
p_.v'.-
condemnations .
5. Conclusion
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11
"Church Report -Support For Private Sector Organizations section" U.S. Department of State Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Web. 28 Nov. 2011. <http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp>.
12
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"CIA Activities In Chile." CIA. Web. 20 Feb. 2012. <http ://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20000919/0101.htm>.Awareness of the Coup Plotting in 1973 section.
~I
The United States involvement in Ch ile sti ll is a source of mystery, questioning, and
tensions locally. Documents are still censored and I or not declassified, and thus, the true
extent of the CIA in the country cannot, in all certainty, be determined. Yet, the action of
.
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underm ining a democratica lly elected government, and supporting a dictator V.:ithout popular
legit imacy, left non erasable marks in Chile's history and common experience. It ts a
remarkable feat of the Chilean people to still have faith in such a historically destructive
~ neighbor, and in democracy itself.
Chile still is heavily affected by the long years of the Pinochet rule. There is little sociar
programs, little nationa l cohesion in between social classes, and little distribution of the
enormous wea lth generated by the country's successfu l economy. This added to the trauma
of the Ch ilean people regarding protesting and express ing opinions in a democratic way has
put Ch ile in a dire position.
The actual responsibility of the United States in th e overthrow of Allende is of course a
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very controversial issue, and historianS regularly disagree on the exact extent of the role of the
U.S. This is mainly due to \ he lack of documentation, as a lot of files have been declassified
with large amount of censoring. Add itionally, it is impossible to know the exact action of the
CIA in the coup, for documents are still unrevea led . However, this investigation only used
Aiv
docum ents that have been declassified, and hence re lies on factual data rather than
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speculation
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that tru ly allowed for sufficient distru st, if not hatred, towards Allende to build up ie
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Chilean society.
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WORK CITED:
CIA. CIA Activities in Chile. Tech. Web. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch1702.htm>.
c/
CIA. Biographic Data- Augusto Pinochet. Tech. Web.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch17-02.htm>.
I
J CIA. Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 Spt to 3 Nov. Rep. Web.
<http://www .gwu. edu/~nsa rchiv /NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/chOl-Ol.htm>.
J IJ} "Church Report " U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act (FOIA}. Web. 28 Nov. 2011.
<http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp>.
d
Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit, 1983.
Print.
Streeter, Stephen M. "(/Destabilizing Chile: The United States and the Overthrow of Allende"." Web.
' It <: http://www.humanities. mcmaster.ca/~streete/pdf/Destabilizing_Chile.pdf>.
d~-c
..c-c. c..
-~ '
"The Pinochet Fi le." The George Washington University. Web. 28 Feb. 2012.
<http://www .gw u.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB110/index.htm>.
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