Congress and the Politics of Statutory Debt Limitation
Author(s): Linda K. Kowalcky and Lance T. LeLoup
Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1993), pp. 14-27
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
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DebtLimitation
ofStatutory
andthePolitics
Congress
UnivesityofMissouri-St.Louis
LindaK.Kowalckyand LanceT LeLoup,
Most analystsview the statutorylimit of federal
debt as archaic....Voting separatelyon the debt
is hardly effective as a means of controlling
deficits, since the decisions that necessitateborrowing are made elsewhere. By the time the debt
ceiling comes up for a vote, it is too late to balk
at payingthe government'sbills....
JamesBlum,CongressionalBudgetOffice(1990)
tatutorydebt limitsenacted by Congresshave not only
failed to curtailthe government'sgrowing tide of red
Li ink, but, ironically,they have become a favoritevehicle
for expanding federal programs and expenditures.
Nonetheless,debt limitationlegislationhas long been a congressionalritual. Even in the face of the obvious politicaldifficulties associated with sanctioning trillions of dollars of
debt, members of Congresscling to the tradition. Perhaps
because enactingstatutorylimitson federalborrowingis perceived as a hollow exercise, it has attractedlittle scholarly
attention.Yet since 1917, statutorydebt limitshave played a
role in federal borrowing,congressionaloversight, and the
legislativeprocess. In this article,we examine the politicsand
policy consequences of statutorydebt limitationand explore
the complex member goals that help explain why Congress
has doggedly maintainedthe practice.
At first glance, the practice seems anomalous, given the
growing importance of electoral incentives in explaining
congressional behavior (Mayhew, 1974). For the majority
who must vote for it, the debt-limitvote allows little credit
taking and is potential fodder for the negative campaign
of an opponent. Contemporarytheories of legislative politics stress the reciprocal nature of the structureand procedures of the U.S. Congress and the needs of its members
(Cooper, 1981; Davidson and Oleszek, 1976; Sinclair,
1991). The conventional wisdom about congressional
behavior would lead one to expect members to seek protection from these votes, particularly in the House of
Representatives where limited floor debate and amendment restrictions can shield members (Fenno, 1978;
Weaver, 1986).
The periodicbut inevitableneed to increasethe debt ceiling has long provokeda partisanpoliticalresponse.As federal debt ballooned in the 1980s and 1990s, the debate has
become more politicizedthan ever. Insteadof becoming less
frequent,debt-limitvotes have increasedin numberand controversyin recent years. We believe that, despite the apparently unattractiveand politically risky aspects of debt-limit
votes, they serve memberneeds in other ways. Our analysis
suggests three general types of membergoals which may be
achieved.
14
BorrowingResrint and Ovrsight of the ExecutiveBranch
Despite the fact that outside experts have consistently
reportedto Congressthat the debt limitis ineffectiveat curbing borrowing,many membersbelieve that it serves a useful
function. This argumentappearedto be especially powerful
with fiscal conservativesthroughthe 1970s. Some members
claim,at least publicly,thatthe debt limitacts as a real check
on borrowing.Othersbelieve that,even if it does not act as a
constraint,it has symbolicimportancein demonstratingcongressionalattentivenessand concernwith burgeoningdebt.
In addition, the debt limitation bills have provided
Congress with an opportunityto review and comment on
administration economic policy and to oversee the
Departmentof the Treasury. The committeehearingshave
given membersthe opportunityto examine and questionspecific practices dealing with Treasury borrowing, to hear
budget and fiscalpolicy directlyfromTreasury
administration
officials, and to put their statementson record. Oversight
was more importantin the early years of this study;priorto
the enactmentof the Budget and ImpoundmentControlAct
of 1974, the debt-limitbill was one of the few opportunities
economic plans for
for reviewingand debatingadministration
the forthcomingfiscal year. Before 1974, congressionalbudgets were no more than an aggregateof individualappropriations and revenue bills. Committee hearings and floor
debateson debt-limitextensionspartiallyfilledthatgap.
Partisan and Ideological Goals
The debt bill has for decades provided an unparalleled
opportunityfor politicalopportunism,the articulationof conservativeeconomic values, and clarifyingpartisandifferences.
A substantialnumberof legislatorsin both houses may speak
and vote againstthe debt limitwith the knowledgethatit will
ultimately pass. Over the years, a consistent ideological
theme has appeared in the debate and votes, especially
among Republicansand fiscal conservatives.Some members
based theircongressionalreputationon balancingthe budget
and the evil of government borrowing. Self-proclaimed
"watchdogs" like H.R. Gross (R-IA) made a career of
denouncing government waste and prolificacy,particularly
relishingopposing the debt bills. Fiscalmoderatesand liberals, usuallyDemocrats,acceptingKeynesianpreceptsand the
inevitabilityof extending borrowing authority,often found
themselveson the defensiveand soft pedaled theirsupport.
Partycontrolof Congressand the presidency,as we shall
see, is the crucialvariablein explainingvoting alignmentson
debt legislation.The majoritypartyin Congress-particularly
underunifiedpartycontrolof government-is responsiblefor
governing,includingthe obligationto pay the nation'sbills.
1993,Vol.53,No.1
Review*January/February
Public
Administration
In contrast, the minority party has no such obligation and
instead has an opportunityto score politicalpoints and establish a public record against government borrowing. This is
particularlytrue of the House Republicans,who, as a "permanent" minoritywith little influence on budget outcomes, use
the floor debate and debt vote as policy platforms(Jones,
1970). Partycontrol of the White House is also important,as
members are likely to be less critical when the proposal
comes froma Presidentof theirparty.
"Must-Pass"
Legislation
Finally,debt limitationbills also can achieve certainproceduralobjectivesby facilitatingthe passage of controversiallegislation. The bills have become increasingly attractive in
recent years as a way to overcome the legislativelogjam in
Congress.Because failureto extend borrowingauthorityultimately results in governmentdefault and the failureto make
benefit paymentssuch as Social Security,the legislationmust
pass. As divided government and legislative gridlock have
increased, debt-limit bills accordingly have become more
important.They have attractednot only germaneamendments
dealing with the budget and debt but a host of nongermane
amendmentsas well. At times, however, the relationshipmay
be reversed,with attractiveamendments-such as increasesin
Social Securitybenefits-added to make the debt extension
vote more palatableto reluctantmembers.
Fiscal Norms and the
Evolutionof the Debt Liit
Hostilityto borrowingby the federal governmentand the
ideal of a balanced budget go back to the beginning of the
Republic.While governmentborrowingand federaldebt have
always had economic consequences, their politicalsymbolism
has been equally important.The meaning of the symbolism
has changed significantlyover the years, however. Issues surroundingfederaldebt were most sharplyframedin the 1790s
by AlexanderHamiltonand ThomasJefferson,reflectingtheir
very differentvisions of the powers and responsibilitiesof the
federal government. Behind Jefferson's opposition to
Hamilton'ssanctioningof federaldebt was the notion of "corruption,"meaningnot merelygraft,but an underminingof the
basic republicannatureof government(Savage, 1988, ch. 4).
In Jefferson'sview, a government saddled with debt would
weaken its constitutionalfoundationsbecause of the resulting
social and economic inequality;the wealthy aristocracy,speculators,and bankerswho financedthe debt would gain financial leverage on the government.In 1798,Jeffersonproposed
a balancedbudget amendmentto the Constitutionto eliminate
the federal government'sability to borrow (Savage, 1988, p.
106). Two generationslater,AndrewJacksonechoed the same
themes, urgingthe reductionof debt and limitson the sources
of federalrevenues,particularlythroughtariffs.
The symbolic importanceof federal debt and a balanced
budget shifted after the Civil War, a deficit-financed war
foughtto defend, not undermine,the Constitution.Duringthe
next 70 years of Republicandominance,federalspendingwas
significantly expanded to support capitalism and industry.
These expenditureswere financed through a system of high
PublicDebt:A Symposium-Congress
andthePolitics
of Statutory
DebtLimitation
tariffsthatwere justifiedas necessaryto preventdeficitsand to
retiredebt (Savage,1988, p. 122). In reality,expanded federal
spendingwas also needed to preventbudget surpluses,which
were consideredas undesirableas deficits.By the turn of the
century, as a result of the Progressivemovement, balancing
the budget became an importantsymbol of efficiency and
integrityin government.As revenuesbecame more dependent
on income taxes ratherthan tariffs,Republicanopposition to
federalborrowingsolidified.
Congress first enacted legislation to statutorilylimit the
borrowing authority of the U.S. Treasury as part of the
Second LibertyLoanAct in 1917, as a means of consolidating
Treasuryborrowing following the United States'sentry into
WorldWarI (CongressionalRecord,Sept. 24, 1917, pp. A991A993; Cantorand Stabile, 1990). Until 1940, the borrowing
authority of the Treasury remained remarkably stable;
between 1921 and 1931, it stayed unchangedat $43.5 billion.
In the years that followed, however, the exigencies of the
Great Depression and the United States' entry into the
Second World War sharply increased the need for public
borrowing.This requiredthe Democratsto attemptto alter
the political symbolism of deficits and debt, a difficult and
uncomfortable task. Keynesian theories legitimized deficit
spending but confronted the powerful balanced budget
norm. Republicanopponents of Roosevelt attackedthe New
Deal and the deficits associatedwith it, establishingthe foundations of partisanconflict over federal borrowingthat continue throughthe presentday.
In 1945, Congressoverwhelminglyapproved a permanent
debt ceiling of $300 billion. The seven years following 1945
provided little opportunityfor partisanpolitics over the debt
ceiling. Between 1945 and 1953, only one amendmentwas
made to the Second LibertyLoanAct-in 1946 to decreasethe
debt-limitceiling from $300 billion to $275 billion. Although
the EmploymentAct of 1946 justifiedborrowingto counter
downturnsin the business cycle, fiscal orthodoxy opposing
deficit spending and the accumulationof government debt
remainedstrong(Stein,1969).
Equally importantwere congressionalnorms and institutional arrangementsthat gave conservativesfirmcontrolof the
authorizingand appropriationsprocess. Indeed,the appropriationscommittees,especiallyin the House, took pride in their
role as the "guardiansof the Treasury"and regularlyappropriated funds below the levels requestedin the President'sbudget (Fenno, 1966). Other importantcommittees,such as the
tax-writing House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees,were guided by powerfuland conservativechairmen. The norms and structuresthat favored conservative
approaches to government finance would eventually prove
inconsistentwith majoritypreferencesin Congress.
The symbolicimportanceof federaldebt remainscentralto
understandingCongress'srole and performance.Overthe past
40 years, extending the federal government's borrowing
authority has become necessary more frequently and has
become increasinglycontentious.Today, the nationaldebt is
risingfaster,borrowinglimitsare reachedsooner and must be
raised by larger and larger amounts. Table 1 shows the
expansion of debt subjectto statutorylimit over the past 50
years, increasingfrom $43 billion in 1940 to nearly$4 trillion
15
Table 1
Debt Subject to Statutory Limit, End of Fiscal Year,
1940-1996 (in millions of dollars)
End of
Fiscal Year
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
Debt Subject
to Limit
43,219
49,494
74,154
140,469
208,077
268,671
268,932
255,767
250,381
250,965
255,382
253,284
257,233
264,220
269,379
272,348
270,619
269,120
275,395
282,419
283,827
286,308
295,374
302,923
308,583
314,126
316,293
323,143
348,534
End of
Fiscal Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1974
1975
1975
1976
TQ
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991 estimate
1992estimate
1993estimate
1994estimate
1995 estimate
1996estimate
Debt Subject
to Lmit
356,107
372,600
398,650
427,751
458,264
475,181
534,207
621,556
635,822
699,963
772,691
827,615
908,723
998,818
1,142,913
1,377,953
1,572,975
1,823,775
2,110,975
2,336,014
2,586,869
2,829,770
3,161,223
3,583,342
3,986,360
4,327,897
4,548,462
4,736,441
4,912,801
Source: Budget of the United States FY1992, part 7, pp. 74-77.
today. Table2 comparesfive-yearperiodssince 1950, showing
the number of times the debt limit had to be increased,the
averagedurationof the limit,and the percentageincreaseover
five years. The limit increasedonly 2 percent between 1951
and 1955;between 1986 and 1990, it increasedby nearly 120
percent.In the early 1950s,the limitwas adjustedtwice for an
average duration of 30 months. In the last 5 years of the
1980s, it had to be raised 15 times for an averagedurationof
only four months.
In the pages that follow, we trace the politics of statutory
debt limitation,focusing on its managerial,partisan,and procedural implications.We divide our analysis into the years
before and afterthe adoptionof the congressionalbudget process in 1974. Many importantproceduralchanges occurred
after 1974, but until 1990, at least, the statutorydebt-limit
votes remainedimportant. By examiningthese changes over
the past four decades, we hope to explain why Congresscontinues to engage in the difficult and seemingly unpalatable
task of raisingthe debt ceiling when it has a negligibleeffect
on fiscal discipline. Congressionaldebates, voting patterns,
amendments,and rule changes within the House and Senate
will help us draw some conclusions about the relationship
between Congressand the public debt. Finally,we assess the
prospectsfor debt limitationlegislationin the future.
16
StatutoryDebt Legislation:1953-1975
The Debt Limitas ManagerialOversight
The Eisenhower Era,1953-1960
PresidentDwightEisenhowertook office in 1953 as a fiscal
conservative, having run on a platform that unequivocally
stressed a reductionin federal spending and the goal of balancing the federal budget. In his first State of the Union
Address,his commitmentto "reducethe planned deficits and
then balancethe budget"headed Eisenhower'slist of domestic
initiatives (Public Papers of the President, 1953, p. 19).
Nonetheless,Eisenhowerwas the firstRepublicanPresidentto
feel the tension between the balanced budget ideal and the
prescriptionsof compensatoryfiscalpolicy duringan economic downturn. Although Herbert Stein (1969) argues that
Eisenhower helped legitimize Keynesian economics, Ike
remainedfirmlycommittedto the fundamentalmoralcorrectness of a balanced budget. In a study of economic policy
makingduringthe Eisenhoweryears,John Sloan(1991) shows
that the balanced budget norm ultimatelygained ascendancy
over compensatoryfiscalpolicy.
Underscoring Eisenhower's interpretationthat the 1952
election carrieda mandatefor conservativefiscalpolicies were
the congressional election results that established narrow
Republican majorities in the House and Senate. However,
sharedpartyaffiliationand commitmentto reducingthe federal debt did not ensure cooperationbetween Congressand the
requestWhiteHouse. In 1953,the Eisenhoweradministration
ed an increasein the debt limit,citing the costs of the Korean
War and the cold war defense buildup as the reason for the
increase. The House acted promptlyon the request,but floor
debate made clear that Republicanmemberswere not entirely
comfortablein their positions as supportersof an increased
debt limit. Although House Republicans overwhelmingly
request on the final vote, their
approvedthe administration's
floor comments were peppered with rhetoriccalling for the
President to put the nation's "fiscal house in order"
(Congressional Record,July 31, 1953, p. 10704). House
Democrats voted nearly two to one against the increase.
Apparentin many of the speeches was the members'belief
that the debt ceiling should be used as an congressional
Table 2
Comparison of Increases in the Debt Limit in
Five-Year Periods, 1951-1990
Percentage Increase
in Borrowing
Average Number of
Number of
Months before
Times Debt Limit Authority over
Limit Was Reached
Five Years
Increased
Year
2.2
30.0
2
1951- 55
12.0
4.3
5
1956- 60
7.5
8
11.9
1961- 65
12.0
20.4
5
1966 - 70
6.0
50.6
10
1971- 75
5.5
11
55.4
1976- 80
5.0
12
105.7
1981- 85
4.0
117.8
15
1986- 90
part7, pp 74-77.
Source:Budgetof the UnitedStatesF5Y1992,
1993,Vol.53, No. 1
Review * Januaxy/Febniary
PublicAdministration
Table 3
Roll-CallVoting on Debt-LimitBills in
U.S. House of Representatives, Selected Years,
1953-1960 (Vote on Final Passage)
choices by the administration
was buttressedby the apparent
when Congressraisedthe debt
flexibilityof the administration
ceiling by an amountless than thatrequested.
Congress'sview that the statutorydebt limit could curb
borrowing was manifest in the dubious distinction it drew
between "temporary"
and "permanent"
debt limits. Enacting
Year Bills
Vote
Democrats
Republicans
temporaryratherthat permanentincreasesin the debt ceiling
For Against
For Against
For Against
reflectedthe hope that the debt would eventuallydecrease. It
1953 HR6672
239 158
69 125
169 33
was viewed as a means of checkingfurtherspendingby forc1955 HR6992
267 561
134 43
133 13
ing presidentsand membersof Congressto pay regularatten1958 HR9955
328
186 29
71
142 42
tion to the size and growth rate of the debt. During one
HR13580 286 109
166 44
120 65
1959 HR7749
debate, SenatorHarryByrd (D-VA)noted that "thisadditional
256 117
168 69
88 48
1960 HR12381
140 114
223 174
temporaryextensionshould be regardedby the Administration
60
83
as an indicationof Congressionalnotice that it should not be
Source: CongressionalQuarterlyAlmanacs,1953-1960.
repeated again" (Congressional Record, June 30, 1955, p.
9573). As confidencein the statutorydebt limitas an oversight
tool declined, members' frustration grew. When the
instrumentof oversightand controlover the executivebranch.
Democrats
recaptured the White House, partisan divisions
Two commentsby Republicansare illustrative.
over statutoryborrowingauthoritybecame even sharper.
The purpose of the debt limitis to discouragethe
bureaucrats, Republican and Democrat, from
TheDebtLimitas PartisanIdeology:
wasting the money appropriatedby the Congress
The
Era,1961-1969
Kennedy-Johnson
(Rep. RichardPoff, R-VA,CongressionalRecord,
The Democraticvictory in the 1960 presidentialelection
July 31, 1953,p. 10704).
heralded
a change in economic policy making as well as a
One of the reasonsfor the [debt]limitwas so that
shift in partycontrolof the WhiteHouse. PresidentKennedy
we could reexamine the operations of the
broughtwith him a cadre of economists eager to implement
Secretaryof the Treasuryas far as managementof
policies reflecting the "new economics" of the Keynesian
the debt is concemed...(Rep.Daniel Reed, R-NY,
which included increased federal spending during
school,
CongressionalRecord,July 31, 1953, p. 10705).
recessions as a means of stimulating the economy. They
On the other side of the capitol, the Senate Finance introducedthe concept of the "full-employment"
budget that
Committeerefusedto reportlegislationfor the request,despite rationalizedgovernmentborrowingif the economy were not
presidentialthreatsthat Congresswould be have to be called operatingat full capacity(Heller, 1967). In testimonybefore
into a special session if necessary. Afteran 11-4 vote to table the Senate Finance Committeeon the FY62 budget, Budget
the request, the Republicancommitteechairmannoted "that Director David Bell told members that the projected deficit
the Treasurycould get by until the first of the year as is" was "deliberately planned as an antirecession measure"
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1953, p. 409). The (CongressionalRecord,June 28, 1962,p. 12154).
Treasurydid justthat, in partas a resultof revisedbudgetestiThe administration
gained some Republicansupportat first
mates and throughthe sale of gold reserves. The Eisenhower
because
many
believed
that the restraintof the Eisenhower
administrationhad confronteda RepublicanCongresson an
administration
its
during
last two years had let the economy
importantcomponent of the nation's financial management
and lost. Moreover,it signaledthe startof a patternthatmade stagnate. Keynesianeconomics was made more palatableby
debt ceiling legislationa componentof the broadereffortsby being presentedin the formof a tax cut for individualsand businesses, the latterappealingto an importantRepublicanpolitical
fiscal conservativesto controlgovernmentspending.
base-the businesscommunity.These factorsmade it possible
Ironically,Eisenhowerhad greatersuccess in extendingthe to attract40 of 153 House Republicanvotes in 1961 and 60 of
government's borrowing limit after losing his Republican 158Republicanvotes in 1962forthe debtextensions(Table4).
majoritiesin Congressin 1954. Table 3 examines House roll
James Sundquist (1968, p. 49) suggests that Republican
call votes on the debt-limit bills between 1953 and 1960.1
Although support from members of his own party declined votes for the tax cut and the concomitanthigherdeficitsmeant
steadily throughout his term, from 1955 on a majority of that "theyjoined the Democratsin abandoningthe notion that
Democratssupported administrationrequests to increase the the budgetshould be balanced."The evidence suggests,howceiling. Democratsopposed the debt limitonly in 1953 while ever, that afterthe firsttwo debt-limitvotes, ideologicallines
they were in the minority. As Republican support waned, and Republicanopposition to extending borrowingauthority
stiffened, most notably in the House. The Democrats'new
Democraticsupportincreased.
economic perspectivewas of limitedsuccess in changingthe
Failureto respond to administrationrequests in a timely perception of the deficit and the debt. According to many
fashion sometimesforced stop-gapmeasuresto avoid default. accounts, membersof Congressand even the PresidenthimThe Treasury'sabilityto work underthe previouslimitdespite self were sometimes dubious (Harris, 1964; Stein, 1969;
the Senate's refusal to grant the Eisenhoweradministration's Sundquist,1968). In its advocacyof Keynesian-basedpolicies,
request in 1953 weakened the President'scase. Moreover,the the Kennedy administrationmade no secret about the effect
belief that the debt ceiling reflected a set of discretionary on federaldeficitsbut made a point of insistingthat the full-
PublicDebt:A Symposium-Congress
andthePolitics
of Statutory
DebtLimitation
17
Table 4
Roll-CallVoting on Debt-LimitBills in Congress,
1961-1967 (Vote on Final Passage)
Bill
Year
House
1961 HR7677
Vote
For Against
231 148
Democrats
For Against
191 35
Republicans
For Against
40 113
1962 HR10050
251 144
191
46
60
98
HR11990
1963 HR6009
HR7824
HR8969
211
213
221
187
192
204
175
179
202
212
219
187
39
32
17
32
9
1
2
0
153
172
158
147
HR11375
HR8464
HR15202
HR4573
203
229
199
215
182
165
165
199
203
223
198
213
58
43
44
26
0
6
1
2
154
122
121
173
HR10328
HR10867
197
217
211
196
197
217
35
20
0
0
176
176
Senate
1962 HR11990
55
34
43
14
12
20
1963 HR6009
60
24
45
11
15
13
HR7824
57
31
45
12
12
19
HR8969
50
26
39
13
11
13
1964 HR11375
48
21
36
9
12
12
1965 HR8464
1966 HR15202
61
50
26
17
49
40
10
8
12
10
16
9
54
23
42
11
12
12
60
30
45
15
15
15
1964
1965
1966
1967
1967 HR4573
HR10867
Source: CongressionalQuarterlyAlmanacs,1961-1968.
employmentbudget would be in balance. Nonetheless, fiscal
conservatives in Congress professed "astonishment"and
"shock,"complainingthat the administration"seemsto regard
the federal budget as a tool for testing economic theories"
(Congressional Record,June 28, 1962, p. 12163).
Voting patterns through the 1960s revealed pronounced
House-Senatedifferences among Republicans.Nearly half of
the Senate Republicanssupported legislation to extend borrowing authority.The bills tended to pass easily since approximately80 percentof the SenateDemocratsalso supportedthe
legislation. In the House, however, with members facing
reelection every two years, Republicanopposition became
nearly unanimous, and with 30 to 40 defections among
Democrats, debt increase measures passed only by narrow
and House leadership
margins. As a result,the administration
had some difficulty putting together majoritiessufficient to
pass the necessary increase. In order to gain support at all,
congressionalleaders were forced to keep the increases low
and the durationof the increaseshort,which resultedin more
frequentvotes.
Floor debate reveals that many membersviewed a vote to
increase the statutory debt limit as a referendum on the
nation'seconomic policy and the differentpositionsof the two
parties. The link between debt ceiling votes and administration budget policy served to intensify partisan ideological
attacks. ManyRepublicanmembersarguedthat havingvoted
for reduced appropriationsduringthe prioryear, they had no
obligation to support the currentproposal for increasingthe
debt limit. Illinois RepublicanHaroldCollier'scomments on
the House floorwere typical:
18
Because I have personallyvoted in a responsible
manner on all authorizationand appropriation
bills since I have been a memberof this body..., I
refuse to be a rubberstampfor any administration
when the debt limit legislationhas been brought
before us...(CongressionalRecord,June 18, 1964,
p. 14360).
Politicalalignmentschanged little duringLyndonJohnson's
presidency,despite his legendarylegislativeskills. Proposed
increasesin the statutorydebt limits evoked the same united
Republicanopposition in the House, made increasinglyrancorous by Republican perceptions that Johnson was using
VietnamWarcosts to cover borrowingfor domesticprograms.
The administration'sattempt to sell government securities,
which were exempt fromthe debt-limit,was viewed as a gimmick designed to disguise the actual levels of federal spending. It only increasedRepublicanperceptionsthat the administrationcould not be trusted.2
Two significantevents occurredin 1967: the first outright
defeat of debt-limitlegislationand the firstpermanentincrease
in the debt ceiling since 1959. Not surprisingly,afteryears of
clingingto the fantasythatborrowingwas only temporaryand
would soon fall to lower levels, the increasein the permanent
debt ceiling was highlycontentious. Opponentsportrayedthe
permanentnatureof the increaseas an admissionof defeat in
effortsto curb federalspending. Furthermore,it was evident
that the belief in the ceiling as a means of controlling the
deficit was slowly being put to rest. RepresentativeJoe
Skubitz(R-KS)spoke for most Republicans:
Mr.Chairman,I resent most stronglythe very fact
that for the ninthtime since I enteredCongressin
1963, the Membersof this body are considering
another raise of the public debt limit.... Today,
every Membermust surely realize how meaningdebt figure.
less we have made this "permanent"
I would further question how any of us can
believe that we will today be voting on any debt
dollar limit which will be realized other than on
paper (Congressional Record, June 7, 1967, p.
15055).
The Debt Limitas Must-PassLegislation:
The Nixon-FordEra, 1969-1976
RichardNixon was elected to office during a period of
intensified political conflict resulting from the sharpened
debate in Congressover the war in Vietnam. Membershad
become accustomedto using partisanargumentsin debates
on debt limits;divided governmentand growing interbranch
conflictwould do nothingto curb that practice. Additionally,
during this period, the genesis of a pattern developed that
would eventually become full blown in the mid-1970s and
1980s:the use of the debt ceiling vote as a vehicle for other
legislativematters.
The pattern of Republican support that existed under
Eisenhower reappeared under Nixon and his successor,
Gerald Ford. The Presidentreceived initial support for his
requests to extend borrowing authority before Republican
support waned, causing Nixon and Ford to depend on support from House Democrats to supply the necessary votes
53,No. 1
PublicAdministration
Review * January/February
1993,
Vol.
Table 5
Roll-CallVoting on Debt-LimitBills in Congress,
1969 - 1976 (Vote on Final Passage)
Year Bill
House
1969 HR8508
1970 HR17802
1971 HR4690
1972 HR12910
HR15390
HR16810
1973 HR8410
HR11104
1974 HR14832
1975 HR2634
HR7545
HR8030
HR10049
HR10585
1976 HR11893
HR14114
Senate
1969 HR8508
1970 HR17802
1971 HR4690
1972 HR12910
HR15390
HR16810
1973 HR8410
HR11104
1974 HR14832
1975 HR2634
HR8030
Vote
For Against
313
9
236 127
228 162
247 147
211 168
221 163
261 152
253 153
191 190
248 170
175 225
223 196
178 217
213 198
212 189
184 177
67
64
80
53
78
61
72
58
58
70
72
18
19
0
29
3
11
19
34
38
20
21
Democrats
For Against
173 52
129 68
123 100
155 78
113 109
80 142
134 97
160 65
116 97
186 94
129 137
163 115
136 130
200 76
166 97
147 92
36
33
43
25
42
33
48
44
35
46
43
14
12
0
17
2
8
3
10
21
10
11
Republicans
For Against
140 41
107
59
105 62
92
69
98
59
141
21
127
55
88
93
75
93
62
76
46
88
60
81
42
87
13 122
46
92
37
85
31
31
37
28
36
28
24
14
23
24
26
4
7
0
12
1
3
16
24
17
10
10
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1961-1968
(Table 5). In the meantime, members discovered that debt
ceiling legislation was a useful vehicle for other legislative
matters. Proposed amendmentswere not new to debt limit
legislation; the difference was in their germaneness to the
issue. Previously,amendmentshad been primarilyconcerned
with the mechanicsof debt management:the interestrateson
governmentbonds, sales of government-ownedcertificates,or
more often reductionof the size of the increaseitself. In the
House, Ways and Means CommitteeDemocratCharlesVanik
(D-OH) unsuccessfullyattemptedto offer two amendmentsto
the 1970 debt ceiling bill:one to reducethe debt limitincrease
and another to cut the militarybudget by $6 billion. Two
amendmentswere offered in the Senate to the same bill: one
to postpone a congressionalpay raise until the federalbudget
was balanced and the other to establishan overallceiling on
federalexpenditures.
The issue that became most closely associatedwith debtlimit legislation during the Nixon administrationwas Social
Security. Senate debate on the 1971 debt bill was dominated
by discussionof the SocialSecurityprovisions,overshadowing
the original purpose of the bill. It was the first of three
instances when the Senate would attach popular Social
Securitylegislationto a debt ceiling bill. Controversialamendments, such as one suspending bombing in Cambodia,
became more common. Delay in enactingdebt limitsincreas-
PublicDebt:A Symposium-Congress
andthePolitics
of Statutory
DebtLimitation
ingly threatenedto disruptgovernmentoperations;a filibuster
against a campaign finance reform amendmentdelayed the
approvalof a 1973 debt ceiling bill until two days after the
expirationthe previous"temporary"
limit.
The strategyof using essential debt ceiling extensions for
legislativepurposeswas adoptedby the Presidentas well. In
the debt ceiling bill he sent to Congress in 1972, President
Nixon included a controversialspending ceiling and provisions to give the Presidentbroad impoundmentpowers with
which to meet that limit. Althoughthe provisionswere later
deleted altogetherin conference,it is a telling example of the
potentialof the "must-pass"
bill for both ends of Pennsylvania
Avenue.3
Despite the changes in the politics of statutorydebt limitation, a consistent theme from earlier periods remained:the
attemptto cut proposed debt limit increaseslinked with the
expressed need to curb federalspending. By this time, however, many membersrecognizedthe need for additionaltools
for Congressto exert greatercontrol over spending and borrowing. Supportgrew for creating an entirely new congressional budgetprocess.
StatutoryDebt Limitation
afterBudgetReform,1976-1990
TheBudgetandImpoundmentControlActof 1974
Frustrationwith growing debt, the piecemeal appropriations process in Congress,and antipathytowards the Nixon
administration
helped forge a bipartisancoalitionin supportof
budget reform.Expectationsof reformwere high. In reporting
in 1974 the last debt ceiling extensionbefore the enactmentof
the budget act, the Waysand MeansCommitteenoted thatthe
debt bill would provide "some over-allcongressionalcontrol
over the budget until Congress enacts legislation creating a
legislativesystem for examiningand controllingbudget totals
and budget components" (Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report,May 25, 1974, p. 1402).The Joint StudyCommitteeon
Budget Control (1973, p. 8) concluded that "the failure to
arriveat congressionalbudgetarydecisions on an overallbasis
has been a contributoryfactor in the size of these deficits."
Memberswere also concernedabout the disintegrationof the
appropriationsprocess. By 1974, only 45 percent of outlays
were under the jurisdictionof the appropriationscommittees
(Joint Study Committee on Budget Control, 1973, p. 10).
Backdoorspending and rapid growth in entitlementsundermined the more traditional means of legislative control
(Weaver,1988). Increasingly,Congressfailed to pass spending
bills by the startof the fiscalyear. Between 1972 and 1975,not
a single appropriationbill was passed on time, and in several
instances,no spendingbill was ever passed (Schick,1974,pp.
310-311).Ratherthan eliminatingthe old authorization-appropriationsprocess, the Budget and ImpoundmentControlAct
of 1974 superimposeda new budget process over the old system. The House and Senate budget committees, the
CongressionalBudget Office, and a strict timetablewere all
created by the act (LeLoup,1980; Schick, 1980). The budget
act made no specific changes or references to the Second
LibertyLoanAct, but section 310 of the act providedthat the
19
budget resolution would "specifythe amount by which the
statutorylimit on the public debt is to be changed and to
direct the committeeshaving jurisdictionto recommendsuch
change"(PublicLaw93-344,TitleIII,Section310 (3)).
procedures remained separate. The Ways and Means
Committeeattemptedto link the two actions informallyby
enacting debt ceiling legislation immediatelyafter the adoption of the budget resolution.
It was generally believed that the process would help
reduce federalborrowingby requiringa majorityof members
to go on record supportinga deficit and an increase in the
nationaldebt beforethe fact. Underthe old system,when congressionaltaxing and spending decisions produced a deficit,
the statutorydebt ceiling had to be raised after the fact. With
the requiredvotes on first and second concurrentresolutions
on the budget, reformersbelieved thatCongresswould be less
likely to allow a deficitor expand the nationaldebt. Suchoptimism would prove unfounded as budgets remained unbalanced, and the politics of statutorydebt limitationwas left
largelyunchangedby budget reform.
By 1979, however, a majorityof House members were
ready to eliminate the troublesome debt limitation vote.
Gephardtdevised an approachthat avoided the constitutional
problem. His amendment provided that the debt limit,
approvedas part of the concurrentbudget resolution,would
be insertedin a joint resolutiondeemed to be passed by the
House. It would then automaticallybe sent to the Senate to
await action and final approval,and then the signatureof the
President(HR 5369, H Rept. 96-472). Supportfor the change
was solid; the House defeated a motion to strikethe amendment fromthe bill by a vote of 132-283(CongressionalRecord,
Sept. 26, 1979,p. H26349).
Lookingat the patternsof debt growthbefore and afterthe
implementationof budget reformsuggests it had little effect
on debt limitation. The debt continued to accumulate at
approximatelythe same pace in the five years after budget
reformas it had in the previousfive years. The debt expanded even more rapidly in the 1980s, triplingin less than ten
years. Budget reform also had no noticeable impact on the
growing frequency of debt extensions (Table 2). In 1976,
congressionalleaders attemptedto synchronizethe statutory
debt limit with the government'snew fiscal year. A 15 month
extension runningthroughSeptember30, 1977, was adopted.
This effort proved unsuccessful, however, since the ceiling
was either reached sooner than expected or a majoritywould
only supportan extension of shorterduration. Nor was there
any new "realism"about the exercise, despite expert testimony that separate statutory limitations now made even less
sense from a policy perspective.In addition,the fictionof the
temporary versus the permanent extension was continued
afterbudget reform.The permanentdebt limit stayed at $400
billion for almost a decade as the government'sactual borrowing needs grew to $925 billion. Not until 1983 did
Congress eliminate the distinction between the permanent
and temporarydebt limits.
The change in the process did not eliminateseparatevotes
on the debt ceiling in the House, althoughit reducedthem. If
the joint resolution sent to the Senate was amended in any
way, the House had to vote on the conference report. In
instanceswhere the limitwas reachedbefore a budget resolution had been approved,or in years where the House could
not approve a budget resolution on time, separate votes
would have to be taken.Table6 comparesthe numberof rollcall votes on debt limitationamendmentsand final passage
from 1976to 1990.It clearlyshows the increasein the number
of votes in recentyears. It also indicatesthat the House continued to be embroiledin controversialdebt votes, including
12 separatevotes in 1981. Sincethe adoptionof the Gephardt
amendment,however, the Senate has had significantlymore
roll calls on debt legislation,a total of 81 votes comparedto
48 for the House. Althoughthe Gephardtamendmenthas not
eliminatedvoting on controversialstatutorydebt limits in the
House, it has reducedthem.
Eliminationof the SeparateHouseVote
In 1979, fouryears afterthe implementationof the congressional budget process, the House of Representativesadopted
an amendmentby RichardGephardt(D-MO),eliminatingthe
requirementthat the House have a separatevote on the statutory debt limitation.As the budget process became more time
consuming and difficult, particularlyin the House, pressure
grew to reduce the numberof these highly contentiousvotes.
This had been tried once before. In 1978, the Ways and
Means Committeehad unsuccessfully attempted to link the
debt extension to the budget resolution. Many worried that
addinganotherburdento the alreadycontroversialbudgetresolution mightmake it impossibleto enact.
BorrowingRestraintandExecutiveOversight
Despite the economic, political, and institutionalchanges
that occurredduringthis period, some membersstill insisted
that the debt limitcould be used as a tool of fiscaldiscipline.
This argument resurfaced during a 1976 debate when
RepresentativeWilliam Ketchum (R-CA)claimed that if the
Table 6
Debt Limitation Votes in Congress, 1976-1990
(Amendments and Final Passage)
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
There was also a constitutionalproblem:the congressional 1981
budget was enacted through a concurrentresolutionbinding 1982
only on Congress and did not need the signature of the 1983
House
Senate
4
4
9
12
7
12
0
3
0
1
1
10
6
2
7
15
Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
House
Senate
6
6
4
5
0
3
3
7
13
14
16
0
0
1
President.The debt, however, had to be limited by statute, Source:Authors'
fromrecordsin Congressional
calculations
signed by the President.Memberswere not anxiousto involve
Almanacs,1976-1990.
Qularterly
the Presidentin the congressionalbudget process, so the two
20
Review* January/February
PublicAdministration
1993,Vol.53,No.1
Congressional
haveresulted
in
delays
intrustfunds,
underinvesting
delays
ofTreasury
auctions,
Social
borrowngfrom
andother
Security,
thegovernment's
actions
tomeet
obligations.
Ways and Means Committee,"had refused to accommodate
the big spenders and kept a lid on the debt, Congresswould
have to come to grips with its own profligacy"(Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1976, p. 87). During the 1979 House
debate over the Gephardtamendment,RepresentativeDelbert
Latta (R-OH), ranking minority member of the Budget
Committee,expressed the view of those who wished to retain
the separatevotes as an instrumentof fiscalcontrol.
This is not budgeting,it is flim flam to cover the
growth of big government. Unless this House
acts today the flim flam will be made worse by
allowingthis House to duck the entireissue of the
debt. Unless the provisionrelatingto futuredebt
increasesis removed from the bill there will be a
built-inescalatorfor futureexpansionsof the debt
set a minimumof 4 percentintereston SeriesE savingsbonds,
increasedby 20 percent the amount of long-termbonds that
the Treasurycould sell above the statutoryinterestrateceiling,
and extended the maximummaturityof Treasurynotes from
seven to ten years (PL 94-232). Similarspecific changes in
Treasurydepartmentactions were adopted throughout the
1970sand 1980s.
Congresshas also indirectlyaffected TreasuryDepartment
policy by waiting until the last possible hour to extend the
debt ceiling or actually letting it expire, something that has
occurredon numerousoccasions since 1976. Congressional
delays have resultedin underinvestingin trustfunds,delays of
Treasuryauctions,borrowingfrom Social Security,and other
actions to meet the government's obligations. Perhaps the
most seriousconsequencescame duringthe fall of 1985 when
Congresswas deadlocked over the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
mandatorydeficitreductionplan (see below). To keep up the
pressure on negotiators, Senate leaders refused to consider
temporary extensions of borrowing authority for nearly a
month after it expired. The Treasurywas requiredto take
severalstopgap actions, includingdisinvestingfrom the Social
Security and other federal retirementfunds (Congressional
QuarterlyAlmanac, 1985, pp. 457-458). Morethan any other
Treasuryaction, this spurreda strongcongressionalresponse,
and the final budget agreementin 1985 barredthe practicein
the future.
(Congressional Record, Sept. 26, 1979, p. H23669).
TreasuryDepartmentactionstaken in response to congresEven if frequent voting did not actually serve to reduce sional delays or the expiration of borrowing authority are
borrowing, some believed that at least the process helped summarizedin Table 7. As the table indicates,the administrapublicizethe problem.John Ashbrook(R-OH)explainedthat
tion had to adopt defensive measuresthroughoutthe 1980s to
allow the government to keep paying its bills. One of
In the consideration of the debt limit bills, our
Treasury's
problemsis that their transactionsare seasonal and
attentionis focused solely of the amountof debt
"lumpy,"not evenly spaced over the year. Heavy borrowing
this countryhas accumulated.We need to do this
takes place in the fourthquarterbecause no majorincome tax
from time to time. In budget resolutions,the debt
deadlines
occur.Althoughwe found no systematicaccounting,
limit tends to disappearin a morassof other figit is generallybelieved that delays in extending and allowing
ures. At least every once in a while we should
borrowingauthorityto expire has cost the governmenthunstop and realizewhat we are doing to this country
dreds
of millionsof dollars.4
by burdening it with an ever escalatingnational
debt (Congressional Record, Sept. 26, 1979, p.
H23669).
Although more frequentlya claim by Republicans,some
Democrats,when in the minority,also assertedthat the statutory debt limitleads to more borrowing. In 1983,when federal deficits were heading for an all-timerecord,a coalitionof
Republicansand Democratssucceeded in defeatingPresident
Reagan's request for a $225 billion increase in borrowing
authority.Led by WilliamArmstrong(R-CO)and RussellLong
(D-LA),the Senaterefusedto go along. In urgingdefeat, Long
warned his colleagues that "when you vote for this motion,
you are voting to continuethe biggest deficitsin the historyof
this country as far as anybody can see" (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1983, p. 241).
The debt limitcontinuedto serve as a means for Congress
to oversee Treasuryoperationsafterthe adoption of the new
budget process. As in previous years, Congressconsistently
reducedthe durationof the new borrowingauthorityto make
the amount of the debt smaller than that requested by the
President.Debt-limitbills were also still used to make specific
changes in Treasurypolicy. For example, in 1976, Congress
PublicDebt:A Symposium-Congress
andthePolitics
of Statutory
DebtLimitation
ClarifyingPartisan and Ideological Differences
Patternsof partisanshipthat appeared in the 1960s have
continuedin recentyears.As the debt has grown more rapidly
and debt legislationhas come to the floor more often, political
opportunismhas not diminished.CongressmanEdJenkins(DGA) concluded that opposition to the debt extension boiled
down to nothingmore thanpolitics.
Firstof all, there is always the politicalaspect of
it. I do not thinkanyone in this House has anyone
writing them asking them to vote to extend the
debt limit. There is no constituencyfor this type
of legislation,obviously....We reallyplay a game
with ourselves. When we have a Republican
Presidentin the White House, then many of the
Democratsdo not feel obligated to vote for the
debt limit legislation.When we have a Democrat
in the WhiteHouse, few, if any, Republicansfeel
any obligationwhatsoeverto vote for this legislation...[(yet)lall of us in privateagree that this has
to be done if the Governmentis going to continue
21
Table 7
Treasury Department Responses to Debt Limitation Expiration
Debt Limit Increases from September 1982 to October 1990. (In billions of dollars)
Date of Increase
Sept. 30, 1982
May26, 1983
Nov. 21, 1983
May25, 1984
July 6, 1984
Oct. 13, 1984
Nov. 14, 1985
Dec. 12, 1985
Aug. 21, 1986
Oct. 21, 1986
May15, 1987
July 30, 1987
Aug. 10, 1987
Sept. 29, 1987
Aug. 7,1989
Nov. 8, 1989
Aug. 9, 1990
Sept. 30, 1990
Oct. 9, 1990
Oct. 19, 1990
Oct. 25, 1990
Oct. 28, 1990
Amount of Limit
1,290.2
1,389.0
1,490.0
1,520.0
1,573.0
1,823.8
1,903.8
2,078.7
2,111.0
2,300.0
2,320.0
2,320.0
2,352.0
2,800.0
2,870.0
3,122.7
3,195.0
3,195.0
3,195.0
3,195.0
3,195.0
3,230.0
Expiration Date
Sept. 30, 1983
Permanent
Permanent
Permanent
Permanent
Permanent
Dec. 6, 1985
Permanent
Permanent
May15, 1987
July 17, 1987
Aug. 6, 1987
Sept. 23, 1987
Permanent
Oct. 31, 1989
Permanent
Oct. 2, 1990
Oct. 6, 1990
Oct. 19, 1990
Oct. 24, 1990
Oct. 27, 1990
Nov. 5, 1990
TreasuryActions at Closea
Moreor less timelyincrease(followed SocialSecuritybailout)
Delayedauctions,underinvestedtrustfunds;cash crunchgradual
Postponedauctions,underinvestedSocialSecurity
Cutback auctions,underinvestedSocialSecurity
Delayedauctions,underinvestedtrustfunds;cash not critical
GrammRudmaninterruption:cut late-Sept.auctionsto force crisis;
borrowedthroughFFB;activelydisinvestedtrustfunds
Moreor less timelyincrease
Used FFBtemporarilyto creditSocialSecurity;otherwisetimely
Used FFBauthority;underinvestedtrustfunds;cash not critical
Postponedsome auctions;cash ample
Postponedsome auctions;cash not critical
Postponedauctions(quarterlyrefunding)
Rescheduledsome auctions;otherwisetimely;cash ample
Moreor less timelyincreaseassociatedwith S&Lbill
Jackedup cash balancesto buy anotherweek
Moreor less timelyincreasebefore congressionalrecess
Moreor less timelyincreaseas partof budget summitweekend
Increasedas partof continuingresolutionaftersummitrejected
Borrowedup to limiton Oct. 19 pendingnext increase
Delayedseveralauctions
Compressedauctionsand settlementsinto this time period
Temporarylimittill reconciliationbill ($4,145.0)signed
a Actionslisted do not includesuspensionof savingsbond and state and local governmentseries (SLGs)sales, which are more or less routine
responsesto a debt ceiling interruption(especiallyafterexpirationof a temporaryceiling).
Source: KathyA. Ruffing,CongressionalBudgetOffice, 1991.
unpleasant task of extending the government's borrowing
to operate (CongressionalRecord,Sept. 26, 1979,
authoritywould be one of his administration'sfirst legislap. H26342).
actions. One of the few benefits accruingto the Senate
tive
RepresentativeBarberConable (R-NY)explained in clear Democrats from their newly acquired minority status was
politicaltermswhat was behindthe partisanstrategy.
the ability to force Senate Republicansto provide the votes
to extend borrowing authority. Between 1981 and 1987,
I do not see any reason why on an issue of this
when they regained a majority,only once did a majorityof
sort, given its comparativelack of significancein
country,
the
of
Senate Democratsvote for the debt limit. In many instances,
termsof controllingthe fiscalpolicy
they opposed it by margins of greater than 3 to 1. Even
why the minorityshould be requiredto let those
majorityMemberswho are from marginaldistricts
these numbersdo not reveal the full extent of their effortsto
hold Republicansenators'feet to the fire, particularlythose
have the benefitof votingagainstthis bill politically,
which you would have us deny to ourselves
Republicanswho had voted against the debt measures for
Record,Sept.26. 1979,p. H26343).
years. In a number of instances, Democraticsenators would
(Congressional
withhold their vote, standingaround the chamberwith their
Roll-callvoting since 1976 shows patternsconsistentwith
arms folded, waiting until a sufficient number of
earlier periods. Tables 8 and 9 show roll-callvotes on the
Republicansvoted in the affirmative.
passage of statutory debt extensions since 1976. With
Democrat Jimmy Carter in the White House, House
In the House, the patternchanged less dramatically,even
Republicansvoted as a bloc againstthe bills. They were usual- with a Republicanin the WhiteHouse. Becausethe Democrats
ly joined by anywherefrom 50 to 80 Democrats,often making remained the majorityparty in the House, Republicansstill
the final marginclose or actuallydefeatingthe bill. Also con- had the abilityto oppose the measures.Only in 1981, the first
sistent with earlier patterns, partisanship was much more extension of the debt ceiling after Reaganbecame President,
restrainedin the Senate, where Republicansgenerally split did a majorityof House Republicansvote for the legislation.In
evenly and Democrats generally supported the President. every subsequentvote, they opposed it by substantialmargins.
These party divisions also correspondclosely to House and The presence of a Republicanin the White House, however,
Senatevoting patternson budget resolutionvotes in the 1970s did have a measurable effect. The number of House
and 1980s (LeLoup,1979).
Republicansvoting for the debt extension,while still a minoriwas significantlygreaterthan those who supportedit durty,
election
the
with
1980s
in
the
Voting alignmentschanged
of a RepublicanSenate and President.In a purely political ing the late years of the Carteradministrationand earlier
(Table8). Thiswas despite the fact
move following the 1980 elections, congressionalDemocrats Democraticadministrations
much more rapidlyunderReagan
grew
borrowing
federal
that
only
made sure that the debt ceiling would be reached
weeks after Reagan's inauguration, assuring that the than Carter.
22
1993,Vol.53,No.1
Review* January/February
Public
Administration
Amendmentsto Debt-Limit
Legislation
Table9
Bills in U.S.Senate,
In the face of a growingdeadlockbetween the Republican Roll-CallVotingon Debt-Limit
President and the Democratic Congress, the statutorydebt 1977-1987(vote on final passage)
limit became increasinglypopular as a means to move bills
Democrats
through the legislative process during the 1980s. The Year Bill
Vote
Republicans
For Against
For Against
increased centralizationof authorityin Congress during the
For Against
1980s was associatedwith the so-called "fourbill system"that Carter
41
12
58
17
30
18
included the statutory debt limitation (Dodd and 1977 HR9290
62
40
22
1978 HR11518
16
31
15
Oppenheimer,1989, pp. 48-51). The abilityof the leaders to 1979
62
14
48
10
HR2534
33
23
control access to these bills, particularlyin the House, signifiHR5369
34 10
49
29
15
19
cantly strengthened their power. Amendmentsto the debt 1980 HR7482
20
6
24
67
14
43
limitation legislation in the past two decades encompassed
HJR569
54
46
8
39
9
30
both germaneand nongermaneamendments. Notabledifferences existed between the House and the Senate, largely Reagan
18
73
46
27 15
3
because of the Gephardtamendmentin 1979 and the abilityof 1981 HR1553
64
34
18 28
46
6
the House leadershipto controlthe rules. After1979,virtually 1982 HJR265
41
41
8 33
49
HJR519
8
all nongermaneamendmentsoriginatedin the Senate.
41
14 26
HJR520
50
36
15
Nongermane Amendments.
Majornongermaneamend-
ments to the statutorydebt limitationfrom the late 1970s to
the present are given in Table 10. Throughout the 1980s
especially, the statutorydebt limitationattracteda wide range
of amendments. These includedan attemptto invoke the War
Powers Act concerningmilitaryaction in Grenada,votes on a
nuclearfreeze, and congressionalinstructionsto negotiatorsin
the strategicarmsreductiontalks. Domesticissues often dealt
with taxes, includingattemptsto alterReagan's1981Economic
Table 8
Roll-CallVoting on Debt-LimitBills in U.S. House of
Representatives, 1977-1990 (Vote on Final Passage)
Year
Bill
Vote
For Against
Democrats
For Against
Republicans
For Against
164 87
194 81
157 115
206 59
162 99
196 74
191 73
209 53
197 70
214 52
208 44
16 114
19 121
8 133
27 113
5 129
9 128
3 149
3 145
3 142
5 146
0 154
Carter
1977 HR8655
180 201
HR9290
213 202
1978 HR11180 165 248
HR11518 233 172
HR12641 167 228
HR13385 205 202
1979 HR1894
194 222
HR2534
212 195
HR5229
200 215
HR5369
219 198
1980 HR7428
208 198
Reagan
1981 HR1553
1984 HR5665
HR5692
HR5927
HR5953
1985 HR3721
1986 HR5395
1987 HR2360
HR3022
305
150
211
138
208
300
216
296
263
104
263
198
282
202
121
199
124
155
155
104
142
79
124
212
197
219
222
68
148
108
178
130
31
44
28
21
Bush
1989 HR3024
1990 HR5355
231 185
221 205
181
175
63
76
150 36
46 115
90
69
59 104
84
72
88
90
19 155
77
96
41 134
50
46
122
129
Source:CongressionalQuarterlyAlmanacs, 1977-1990.
PublicDebt:A Symposium-Congress
andthePolitics
of Statutory
DebtIinitation
1983 HJR2990
HJR308
HJR308
1984 HJR654
HJR654
1985 HJR372
1986 HJR668
HR5395
HR5395
1987 HR2360
HR3190
HJR324
51
39
58
14
37
51
47
34
36
58
51
54
41
56
40
46
30
37
40
47
35
36
39
31
12
11
20
1
0
13
18
11
10
33
33
25
31
31
24
28
26
29
24
29
26
18
14
21
39
28
38
13
37
38
29
23
26
25
18
29
10
25
16
18
4
8
16
18
9
18
25
10
Source: CongressionalQuarterlyAlmanacs,1977-1990.
RecoveryTax Act (ERTA)reductionin income taxes, gasoline
taxes, real estate taxes, windfall profits tax, and tariffs of
imported oil. One of the more dramaticlegislative battles
involvingthe debt limitationoccurredin 1980 when Congress
includeda repeal of PresidentCarter'simportedoil fee as part
of the bill. Carter'sveto was crushedby overridevotes of 33534 in the House and 68-10 in the Senate in what was a low
point in his legislative
record (Congressional
Quarterly
Almanac, 1980,pp. 273-274).
What had once been only a tacit legislative strategywas
now openly exploited by congressionalleaders. One of the
more extreme examples of this was seen in 1982, when
MajorityLeaderHowardBakermade the dubious promise to
senatorsthat they could use the debt-limitbill as a vehicle for
pet legislationthat had been bottledup all session. The result
was over 1,400 proposed amendmentson nongermaneissues
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1982, pp. 44-45). The
Senatespent five weeks debatingscores of amendmentswith
most of the time consumed by SenatorJesse Helms (R-NC),
who was determinedto limit federal court jurisdictionover
school prayer and busing. It became clear that the amendments would topple the bill, and Bakerwas forced to renege
on his promise.A bipartisanagreementthat no amendments
whatsoever would be allowed on the bill, including those
alreadyadopted,facilitatedfinalpassage.
Despite the rangeof amendmentsofferedto debt-limitlegislation,the recordof success was not impressive;few of the
amendmentswere enacted. Althoughthe potentialof the debt
23
Table 10
MajorNongermane Amendments to Statutory DebtLimit Bills in the Senate, 1978-1987
Table 11
Major Budget Process and Deficit-Related
Amendments to Statutory Debt-Limit Bills, 1978-1987
1978 To requireequal per capitaspendingby state
1979 Presidentialveto repeal of oil importfee*
Indexingpersonalincome tax rates
Acrossthe boardincome tax cut
1981 Reducetax deductionfor businessmeals
To orderFed to lower interestrates
To modifyERTAtax cut
1982 Reduceperiod for long-termcapitalgains
To allow voluntaryschool prayer
To ban busing to achieve integration
1983 To invoke WarPowersAct to force withdrawalfromGrenada
To orderJapanto eliminatenontariffbarrierson beef
negotiatorson nucleararmsreductions
To instructSTART
1984 Nuclearfreeze proposal
To limittax on imputedinterest
To exempt certainreal estate sales fromtaxation
1985 To increasefederalgas tax
To reduce spendingof CommodityCreditCorporation
1986 Deficiencypaymentsto farmers
To repealwindfallprofitstax
To increasetariffon importedoil
Droughtaid to farmers
Insurancefor AIDSvictims
To createnew federalcrimeof money laundering
1987 Repealcongressionaland federalpay raises
1978 House:To eliminateseparatevote on debt ceiling
1979 House:To eliminateseparatevote on debt ceiling
Balancedbudgetamendment
Senate:RequiringBudgetCommitteeto submit
balancedbudget
Senate:Limitfederalrevenuesto 20.5 percentof GNP
1980 Senate:To enhance President'srescissionpowers
1982 Senate:Eliminatedistinctionbetween temporaryand
permanentdebt limit
1983 Senate:Eliminatedistinctionbetween temporaryand
permanentdebt limit
Senate: Expresssupportfor line-itemveto amendment
Senate:To requirethatamendmentsto debt
bills be deficitneutral
1984 Senate:Federalspendingfreeze
1985 House:OrderTreasuryto restoredisinvested
SocialSecurityfunds
House & Senate:Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
mandatorydeficitreduction
Senate: Requirespendingincreasesbe offset
with spendingcuts, not tax increases
1986 Senate& House:To reinstateGramm-Rudrnan-Hollings
mandatoryprovisions
Senate:To exempt SocialSecurityadministrative
expenses fromsequester
II,
1987 Senate& House:Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
reinstatingmandatoryprovisionsand amendingtargets
Senate:To providePresidentwith line-itemveto
* Senateand House.
Source: Authors'compilationfrom CongressionalQuarterly
Almanacs,1978-1990.
Source:Authors'compilationfrom Congressional Quarterly
Almanacs, 1978-1990.
limitationas "must-pass"legislation appears high, it has not
proved an effective means in practice for adopting nongermane legislation.It has, however, been much more important compromise that was unpopular, but in the words of one
as a vehicle for budget and deficit-relatedmeasures.
cosponsor,was a "badidea whose time had come"(LeLoupet
Budget and Deficit-RelatedAmendments. Majorgermane al., 1987, p. 85). Pressurewas maintainedon negotiatorsby
amendmentsfrom the late 1970s to the present are summa- successfullyblockingany attemptto enact stopgap borrowing
rized in Table 11. In 1978, as we have seen, the House authority.When SocialSecurityand other benefit checks were
attemptedto eliminate separatevotes on the debt limit. This in jeopardy in November, temporary authority was finally
effort was successful in 1979 with the adoption of the extended. The key compromisethat allowed the bill to pass
Gephardt amendment. The same year, an amendment was involved an agreement that any across-the-board cuts
offered in the Senateto instructthe budget committeeto sub- (sequesters)would fall equally on domestic and defense promit a budget resolutionprovidingfor a balancedbudget in the grams.The bill set deficit targetsfor five years and required
coming years. Otherbudget-relatedamendmentsincludedlim- automaticcuts in nonexempt programsunless Congressmet
iting federal revenues as a proportion of GNP, a spending the targets.
freeze, support for a line-item veto, and a requirementthat
The statutorydebt limit would prove critical in 1987 as
amendmentsto increasespendingbe offset by tax increasesor well. When the SupremeCourtstruck down the automatic
spending cuts. The most importantbudget-relatedrider was across-the-boardcuts in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
because of
mandatorydeficit reductionlaw the role of the ComptrollerGeneral, proponents set out to
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
thatwas adopted in 1985 and amendedin 1987 and 1990.
restorethem (Bowsher v. Synar, 1986). Althougheffortsfailed
As frustrationwith exploding deficitsand ballooningfeder- in 1986,they succeeded in 1987 by holdingthe debt limitation
"fix"was adopted.
al debt came to a head, a scheme for mandatorydeficitreduc- hostage until a Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
tion became the dominant issue in Congress in late 1985 Othersattemptedto use the debt-limitbill to force President
(LeLoupet al., 1987). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Reaganto a budget summitwith Congress.Once again, the
Deficit ControlAct of 1985, better known by the name of its debt bill was the focal point of the partisanbattle between
sponsors as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,was offered as an Reagan and the DemocraticHouse and Senate. Conferees
II,
amendmentto that year's debt limitationlegislation. Its suc- finally agreed in Septemberon Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
cess was propelled by the political concerns members had which fixed the constitutionalflaw and revised the deficit tarwith voting againstanythingthat purportedto reduce deficits. gets. Perhapsthe greatestaccomplishmentof the bill was the
Over a period of three months,delicate negotiationsbetween extension of the debt limitationfrom $2.1 trillionto $2.8 trilthe DemocraticHouse and the RepublicanSenate produceda lion, the largestincreasein historyand enough to last through
24
Review* January/Febmary
Public
Administration
1993,Vol.53,No.1
Figure 1
Party Support for Debt Ceiling Extensions, House, 1945-1990
-_ 10 0
90
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early 1989, after the presidentialelection. The compromise,
however, did little to restore confidence in the ability of
Althoughcongressionalresponseshave changed over time,
Congressand the Presidentto curb growing deficits. Several
weeks later,U.S. stock marketssufferedtheirworst decline in many themes have remained consistent, including the high
degree of significanceattachedto statutorydebt ceiling votes.
history.
The practiceof periodicallyincreasingthe debt ceiling appears
After nearly half a century, there are signs that the debt
to be somethingof a puzzle. Eachvote calls attentionto the
limitationmay finallybe receding in prominenceand imporincreased size of the debt, a patternabout which members
tance. The statutorydebt limit did not play a criticalrole in have been
clearly uncomfortable. Treasury officials have
1990 during the adoption of the Omnibus Budget repeatedly made plain to
Congressthat the ritualserves no
ReconciliationAct, which included the Budget Enforcement useful functionand thata one-timevote to remove
the statutoAct (CongressionalBudget Office, 1991, pp. 43-57). In fact, ry debt ceiling altogetherwould put an end to these
votes.
members seem increasinglywilling to forego voting on the Yet despite the disagreeableposition the vote puts them
in,
controversialmeasures.No significantamendmentshave been and despite its limitedutilityas a managementtool, Congress
adopted since 1987. In 1990, the debt limitheld a low profile has maintainedthe practice.
among the largerbudget issues: extensionswere simplyrolled
We believe the puzzle is, in part,explainedby the way in
into the stopgap continuingresolutionsuntil a finalagreement
which
the votes have served members'needs in other ways.
was reached (CongressionalQuarterlyWeeklyReport,October
Our
examination
of the 57 debt ceiling increasessince 1945
6, 1990, p. 3187). At one point, negotiatorsmade an effortto
show
that
such
motivations
do exist. Member goals have
extend the debt limitationfor the full term of the agreement,
which would have eliminated such votes for five years. evolved to reflect changes in legislativeinstitutions,the relaFinally,in compromise,negotiatorsagreedto extend the debt tionship between Congress and the executive, and norms
limit to an amount that they believed would last until early within Congress. Yet it has not been the case that the emergence of one purpose has replaced those before it. Rather,
1993, afterthe presidentialelection.
new goals have been encompassedwithinformerpractices.
Althoughevents since 1987 suggestthatCongressis turning
The membergoals we identifiedinclude:(1) managerialconaway from the statutorydebt limitationas an effectivepolicy,
cerns:controlof spendingand oversightof the executivebranch,
oversight, or even political tool, it has not yet disappeared
(2) clarifyingpartisanand ideologicaldifferenceson economic
from the scene. To date, the Senate has not seriouslyconsidpolicy,and (3) exploitationof debt ceiling'smust-passstatusas a
ered adopting the equivalent of the Gephardtamendment,
vehicle for other legislation. The earliestperiod of the study
which would simply make the debt limit part of the budget seemed
to be dominatedby debt managementconcerns. Given
resolution. When the limit is reached in early 1993, Congress the conservative
natureof Congressand the executive at the
will once against have to decide how to deal with the debt time, balanced
budgetswere valuedas a goal by executiveand
limit in the context of broaderbudgetaryissues. Once again, legislaturealike. As a result,member
debate focusedpredomithe debt ceiling could be the vehicle for,major changes in nantlyon the TreasuryDepartment's
explanationfor the request
budget policy and the congressionalprocess.
andwithadmonitionsaboutthe rateof spending.
Summaryand Conclusions
PublicDebt:A Symposium-Congress
andthePolitics
of Statutory
DebtLimitation
25
Figure 2
Party Support for Debt Ceffing
Senate, 1960-1990
Nixon-Ford
............
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100
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'84
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Once those valuesbecameless hegemonic,congressional tanceof debtlegislationmayhavereachedits peakin the late
debatebecameincreasingly
focusedon the differentpositions 1980s. The institutionof budgetsummitsand the Budget
of the two majorparties.Theminority
was motivated
primari- EnforcementAct may have reducedthe debt ceiling to a
ly by electoralconcernsand the majoritywith governing minorissue in comparison
with long-termtaxingand spendneeds. Thisfissurewas widenedby the Kennedyadministra-ingdecisions.Thosesamelong-term
agreements
willnotonly
tion's attemptto alterfiscalnormswith its embraceof the diminishthe frequencyof the votesbutalsotheirpotencyas a
"neweconomics."WhenRichard
toolanda legislative
deviceas well. Untilnew preceNixontook office,partisan- partisan
shipin debateon the debtceilinghadbecomethe rulerather dentsare clearlyestablished,it is too soon to drawthe final
the exception.Thispatternof partisanship
has been remark- curtainon the importance
of statutory
debtlimitation.
ably resilient over the past 40 years. The patterns of
Lance T. LeLoup is the directorof the Public Policy
Republicanand Democraticsupportfor debt limitationbills ResearchCentersand professorof politicalscience at the
since 1950are shownin Figures1 and2. Republican
opposiof Missouri-St.Louis.He haswrittena numberof
tion in the Housewas nearlyunanimousunderDemocratic University
andarticleson American
books
politicsandthe federalbudget
administrations,
and, afterinitialsupport,declinedsharply
process, most recently Congressand the President: T7ePolicy
throughoutRepublicanadministrations.
On the otherhand,
(Wadsworth,
1993). He is currently
workingon a
House Democratswere eitherdividedor tendedto support Connection
book
examining
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
and
otherdeficit
the Presidentregardlessof his party and, except during
reduction
schemes.
Republican
controlin the 1980s,SenateDemocrats
tendedto
LindaK. Kowalckyis an assistantprofessorof political
supportraisingthe limit.
of Missouri-St.Louisandis a formerstaff
science,
University
TheNixonpresidencyalsomarkedthe adventof whatwas
member
of
the
U.S.
Houseof Representatives.
Herresearch
to be a long period-interrupted
by only the Carteradminis- interestsincludecongressional
committees
andcongressionaltration-of divided government. Partisandisagreements executiverelations.Sheis currently
workingon a studyof the
between Congressand the executiveinevitablyslowed the House
andMeanscommittee.
Ways
policy-makingprocess. As a result,memberssearchedfor
Notes
alternativeways to accomplishlegislativepolicy goals. Its
must-passnaturemadelegislationincreasing
the statutory
debt
Theauthorswishto acknowledge
Acknowledgment:
Patrick
Taylor,gradceilingthe perfectchoicefor riders.Theincreasedfrequency uateresearchassistantatUM-St.Louis,andKathyRuffingof theCongressional
of thesevotes, spurredby rapidlyrisingdebt,only increased BudgetOfficefortheirinvaluable
assistance
in thisproject.
theirattraction.By the 1980s,the debtceilingbillas a vehicle 1. All the Senatevotestakenduringthisperiodwerevoicevoteswiththe
exceptionof a votein 1960on HR12381,whichwaspassed84-0.
for amendments
had becomethe norm. Legislative
deadlock
surrounding
the sale of
and the constraintof deficitselevatedtheirpoliticalsalience 2. Fora discussionof the issuesand controversy
Participation
see
Certificates
(PC's),
Congressional
Quarterly
Almanac,
andconvenience,butwerestillno guarantee
thatthe propos1967,p. 317.
alswouldbe adopted.
3. The provisionswere actuallydeletedin a secondHouse-Senate
conference on the measure.Thefirstconferencereportgrantedthe President
Whatof the future?Afternearlyhalfa century,the impor-
26
PublicAdministaionReview * JanuaIy/FebnLarY
1993,Vol.53, No. 1
considerableleeway in this regard,and it was rejectedby the Senate, 27- Harris,Seymour,1964. Economicsof the KennedyYears. New York:Harper
and Row.
39.
4. In 1978,for example, it was estimatedthat a lapse in the statutoryauthori- Heller,Walter,1967. New Dimensionsof PoliticalEconomy. Cambridge,MA:
ty cost the Treasury approximately $15 million. In 1984, Treasury
HarvardUniversityPress.
SecretaryReganwrote Congressthat postponementsof two Octoberauc- Joint Study Committee on Budget Control, 1973. Recommendationsfor
tions would cost $400 millionin higherinterest.
Improving Congressional Control over Budgetary Outlay and Receipt
Totals,April18, 93d Cong., 1st sess.
Jones,
Charles,1970. TheMinorityPartyin Congress.Boston:LittleBrown.
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Bowsherv. Synar,1986. 106 S. Ct.3181.
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PublicDebt:A Symposium-Congress
andthePolitics
of Statutory
DebtLimitation
27