Globalisation, Divestment and Human Rights in Burma

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Globalisation, Divestment and
Human Rights in Burma
Judith A. White
University of Redlands, USA
With increasing globalisation, over the last 15 years several multinational corporations (MNCs) from the US, UK, France, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Canada
and elsewhere have invested in Burma, thus forging the requisite economic
partnerships with the Burmese military government. According to the US State
Department, the Burmese military regime is directly involved in drug trafficking, as
well as displacing, torturing and killing innocent Burmese citizens. This article
explores the roles and ethical positions of MNCs as they conduct drilling, extraction,
construction, sales, tourism and manufacturing operations that impact local
workers, the natural environment and human rights, while economically bolstering
the military regime. In this article I examine the pros and cons of divestment while
analysing various ethical perspectives on corporate social responsibility in Burma.
According to Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace laureate and leader of Burma’s
democracy movement, if MNCs want to help develop a democracy and free-market
economy in Burma, they need to divest until a democratically elected government is
established.
Judith White, PhD in Organisational Behaviour from Case Western Reserve
University, is an Assistant Professor of Management at the University of
Redlands. She writes and publishes in the areas of business ethics, learning
and development, and organisational behaviour. Her interests include social,
organisational and personal change, and human rights.
● Burma
● Divestment
● Globalisation
● Human rights
● Multinational
corporations
● Social
responsibility
u
University of Redlands, School of
Business, 1200 East Colton Ave.,
PO Box 3080, Redlands, CA 923730999, USA
!
<
[email protected]
www.redlands.edu
* I'd like to thank my colleagues Sandra Waddock and Karen Paul for reading earlier drafts of this, and
Joanna Breman at the Investor Responsibility Research Center for her assistance as I combed through
the Burma files at the IRRC. I also want to express my admiration and gratitude to Aung San Suu Kyi
and U Tin Oo for their unwavering courage and vision of freedom.
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Introduction and globalisation
Basically, we will tolerate a fair amount of unethical behavior from a person, firm, or nation
with whom we just have business dealings, but when matters reach a point of a dramatic
threshold, most people say you just don’t do business with that type of person. I don’t
think China reaches that point, but if any country might qualify as passing that threshold,
it would be Burma (Donaldson, quoted in Millman 1996: 17-19).
in burma,1 multinational corporations (mncs) invest in the construction,
timber, natural gas, tourism and manufacturing sectors. Research suggests MNCs are
inconsistent in their investments in unstable environments, responding to economic,
political and social forces while simultaneously constrained to maintain organisational
equilibrium (Haley 1990, 2000). Proponents for divestment in Burma maintain that as
MNCs divest they pressure the non-elected government to step down and allow the
democratically elected government to establish democratic economic, political and
social reforms, leading to higher economic standards and stability in the region (White
1998). Opponents of divestment believe MNCs provide jobs while enhancing shareholder value.
Through low trade barriers and economic costs, in developing countries MNCs can
sell cheaper products to consumers (Friedman 2002). But low wages in developing
countries make it impossible for workers to obtain adequate education, nutrition,
healthcare or housing. In exchange for utilising human and natural resources, MNCs
transplant aspects of Western culture to indigenous cultures, such as McDonald’s, TV,
and T-shirts and jeans, with negative effects (Friedman 2000; Korten 1999, 2001;
Mander 1991; Mander and Goldsmith 1996; Schlosser 2001). In Burma, Halliburton,
UNOCAL, Caterpillar, United Technologies and others operate natural gas pipelines and
employ forced labour, violating US sanctions and the UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Breman 1999). Thus it can be said that MNCs maintain a double standard: exploitation abroad and higher standards at home.
As global citizens and legal entities with a social contract, MNCs can be seen to have
responsibilities to honour the social, cultural, economic and political contexts in which
they operate, including accountability to employees, shareholders, communities and
physical habitats, while simultaneously honouring the United Nations Code of Conduct
for Transnational Corporations (DeGeorge 1993; Waddock 2002). Proponents of investment see MNCs providing jobs for local Burmese and profits for shareholders, while
proponents for divestment see investment as economic and social support for a brutal
military regime while the corporations knowingly participate in or tacitly collude with
human rights abuses. This paper focuses on ethical, moral and economic perspectives
on corporations’ social responsibility related to human rights and democracy.
Political and historical background of Burma
Burma has a population of 50 million people (US Department of State 2004) and over
one hundred languages and dialects. The nation was formed in the 11th century under
a Buddhist king, but in 1886 the British took it over as a colony. Burma gained
independence from Britain in 1947, and from 1948 to 1962 civil unrest, military coups
and leadership changes continued. In 1962, General Ne Win suspended the constitution, closed off the country from the outside world, and promoted ‘The Burmese Way
1 The military changed Burma’s name to ‘Myanmar’ in 1989, but ‘Burma’ is used by democracy
advocates throughout the world and throughout this paper.
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to Socialism’, which led to three decades of political, environmental and economic
decline. The non-elected government combined the judicial, legislative and executive
powers into one military-led party, nationalising all businesses and property.
In 1988 hundreds of thousands of Burmese demonstrated for democracy; thousands
were killed, and tens of thousands were beaten, tortured and imprisoned. In 1989 Aung
San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition party National League for Democracy (NLD), was
placed under house arrest for six years. In 1990 the NLD won 82% of the parliamentary
seats in open elections but the military nullified the results, imprisoning and torturing
thousands of supporters of the democracy movement (Shin et al. 1996; Flynn 1997; US
Department of State 1997, 2002).
In 1991, Aung San Suu Kyi received the Nobel Peace Prize; in 1995 she was released
from house arrest but kept under strict military surveillance. Between September 2000
and May 2002 Aung San Suu Kyi and the government engaged in ‘secret talks’, the only
result of which was the release of 160 of the 1,600 political prisoners (ALTSEAN 2002a;
US Department of State 2002). The NLD wants to hold free and open elections, or have
the 1990 election results honoured, but the military government, also known as the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), refuses both. Since May 2003 Aung San
Suu Kyi has again been under house arrest (US Department of State 2004).
Economic background
Burma’s average per capita income is $300 (US Department of State 2004). Prior to the
military takeover in 1962, Burma was the ‘Rice Bowl’ of Asia, producing and exporting
rice to most of South-East Asia. Burma has substantial mineral, natural oil and gas, fishing and timber resources. From 1988 to 1995, the government permitted partial expan-
Figure 1 aung san suu kyi making a presentation to an audience at a festival
at her home; in the background is the executive cabinet of
the national league for democracy
Photo: Judith White
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sion of the small private sector, leading to slight economic growth, but political and social
obstacles persisted and continue today, inhibiting significant economic reform. These
obstacles include overt and covert state involvement in economic activity, including drug
trafficking, state monopolisation of leading exports, a bloated bureaucracy, arbitrary and
opaque governance, corruption, poor infrastructure, and disproportionately large military spending, at the expense of social development spending and stable prices (ALTSEAN
2003a, 2003b, 2003c). From 2002 to 2003 Burma’s imports fell by 14.2%, while its
imports increased by 2%, according to the Xinhua News Service (2004).
Widespread poverty has resulted from more than four decades of military rule as
villagers are forced to leave their farms to serve in the military. Compared to other SouthEast Asian countries, Burma is near the bottom with regard to levels of education,
healthcare and protein consumption (UNICEF 2002). Child labour is neither legal nor
prohibited, and employers are not required to abide by any health and safety standards
or provide sick leave, benefits or maternity leave (US Department of State 2002).
Social background
Among the 50 million people in Burma are more than 30 minority ethnic groups, some
of the largest being the Shan, Karen, Wa, Rohingya, Mon, Karenni, Burman and Chin.
Approximately 95% of the people are Buddhist. The government spends 28 cents per
child, or 0.5% of the GNP on education each year; approximately 60% of all children
attend school, but less than 5% complete secondary school. Since 1988, universities have
been open for only 40 months and have reduced one year’s study content into three
months to minimise the time students spend together and to avoid the possibility of
students organising opposition demonstrations. Two-thirds of university courses are
offered only through correspondence, so as to inhibit students from gathering to form
political opposition (ALTSEAN 2000).
The World Health Organisation (WHO) ranks Burma second to last among 191
countries with the regard to the quality of its healthcare. Infant mortality is 95 per 1,000
births. Burma has the second lowest level of protein intake in all of South-East Asia,
and, according to UN statistics, at least half a million Burmese are HIV-positive and a
third of children under five years old are malnourished (ALTSEAN 2001; UNICEF 2002).
Human rights abuses
Since the 1988 demonstrations for democracy when thousands of citizens were
imprisoned, tortured and killed, the US State Department, Amnesty International, the
United Nations and others have documented continued human rights violations.
Political prisoners are routinely tortured, denied medical treatment, food, and access to
family and legal counsel (Agence France Press 2003; Barnes 2003; Fink 2001; NCGUB
1997; US Department of State 2004).
The military, in business partnerships with MNCs, forces hundreds of thousands of
Burmese, including women and children, to work without pay, against their will, under
harsh conditions and threats of violence; building roads, gas pipelines, dams, and
buildings, including hotels and a new airport (Fink 2001; Associated Press 2001).
Approximately 70,000 child soldiers have been conscripted for unpaid combat,
surveillance and portage for the army (Harkin 2001; ALTSEAN 2003c). Soldiers use force
to enter villages to recruit labourers, take over land, raping and murdering along their
path (ALTSEAN 2003a; NCGUB 1997; Seng 2003; US Department of State 2004). Civilians
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who refuse are beaten, tortured, raped and forced to work; some flee to refugee camps
in Thailand. More than 100,000 Burmese refugees in Thailand work in the sex industry,
the illegal drug trade, heavy construction or on rubber plantations (Schulz 2001).
Since the ’60s foreign missionaries have been forced out of Burma in a campaign of
religious persecution. The predominantly Christian Karen, one of the larger ethnic
minority groups in Burma, along with hundreds of thousands of other ethnic minorities,
are subject to social and economic repression and physical attacks. In response, many
have fled to refugee camps or to fight in the jungle as armed guerrillas. Thai military
collude with the Burmese military as they attack the camps, forcing the Karen back to
Burma (DVB 2003; NCGUB 1997; Maung 19992; US Department of State 2004).
Privacy is restricted through physical surveillance, wire tapping, and censorship of
mail, printed publications and the Internet. The media, most of which is government
controlled, is saturated with propaganda warning people to beware of dangerous
Western influences and disruptive groups supporting upheaval and disturbance
(ALTSEAN 2001; Amnesty International 2001; US Department of State 2002) (see Figs.
2 and 3).
As of February 2004, approximately 1,300 political prisoners are currently in
detention, some for as long as 24 years for offences such as writing a poem, play or letter
that is critical of the government (Barnes 2003). The UN and Amnesty International
report widespread and extremely harsh prison conditions, including torture, beatings
and denial of medical care, violating the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Agence France Press 2003; Amnesty International 2001; Fink 2001; US Department of
State 2004). In September 2002 the UN investigated allegations that Burmese soldiers
raped 600 ethnic-minority Shan women, in an effort to suppress the Shan liberation
movement (Kao Wao and SWAN 2003).
Drug production and trafficking in Burma
Burma is the world’s second largest opium producer, accounting for 80% of South-East
Asia’s production while supplying 60% of the heroin in the US (ALTSEAN 2001; US
Department of State 2004). Opium production doubled after the military took power in
1988. Burma manufactures millions of dollars of amphetamines, exporting these to
Thailand. The US and Thailand have criticised the SPDC for ignoring drug trafficking
groups and drug eradication (ALTSEAN 2001). The US government believes that the
Burmese government is directly involved in laundering money for the illegal drug
industry to finance the army, infrastructure projects and joint ventures. For example,
Myanmar MayFlower Bank is directly owned by drug traffickers (ALTSEAN 2002a;
Bernstein and Kean 1996; US Department of Treasury 2003). Some MNCs have joint
ventures, with Burmese firms acting as front companies for heroin dealers who collaborate with Burmese generals (Schulz 2001).
Multinational corporations in Burma
Burma does not have a free market and the military government, the SPDC, dictates
prices, wages and exchange rates. Foreign investors face a corrupt bureaucracy which
disregards investment contracts when it is expedient to do so. The army’s own holding
company, Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH), is the country’s largest firm
2 Personal communication, Mae Tao Medical Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand.
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Figure 2 military personnel checking id at the entrance to
a festival at the home of aung san suu kyi
Photo: Judith White
Figure 3 propaganda billboard typical of those found throughout
rangoon and posted in state-controlled newspapers
Photo: Judith White
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with a registered capital of $1.4 billion. The Defence Ministry’s Directorate of Procurement holds a 40% stake in UMEH. Because the SPDC spends 40% of the national budget
on the military, 40 cents of every foreign investment dollar coming to the SPDC is spent
on the army, a major partner in most joint ventures (ERI and SAIN 1996). Total direct
foreign investment for 2000 was $300 million, compared with Thailand’s $6.6 billion
in the same year.
In Burma, 50 US and 275 non-US companies including UNOCAL, Halliburton, Caterpillar, Federal Express, Baker Hughes, Pottery Barn/Williams Sonoma and Compaq
Computer operate through direct investments or equity positions, partnerships, subsidiaries or partnerships with the military. Citibank and US Export Bank loan Thai companies Shin Satellite and Bagan Cybertech funds to set up satellite-receiving stations and
Internet access in Burma (ALTSEAN 2002c). Most non-US companies in Burma are from
Asia, including Mitsubishi, Mazda, Sony, Suzuki, Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai.
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Republic of Kores, China, Indonesia, Switzerland, the Bahamas,
the UK, Thailand, Canada, Germany and Australia have parent companies and/or subsidiaries in Burma (ALTSEAN 2003d) including British American Tobacco, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and the courier DHL, owned by Germany’s Deutsche Post.
The largest foreign investments have been the construction of two natural gas
pipelines, Yadana and Yetagun. The Yadana project involved UNOCAL with 28.26% share
of equity, TotalFinaElf with 31.24%, Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Burma’s
state-run oil and gas business with 15%, and Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTTEP)
with 25.5%. France’s TotalFinaElf operates this $1.2 billion project. British Premier Oil,
previously in partnership with PTTEP and MOGE, withdrew its investment in 2002.
Mitsubishi is building a $70 million storage facility as part of the Yetagun field project,
and will lease it to MOGE for 15 years (ALTSEAN 2000a). To avoid consumer boycotts and
US laws governing business with rogue states, UNOCAL established its Asian headquarters in Malaysia and sold off its refineries, tankers and ‘Union 76’ service stations
(Lawrence and Tolley 2003).
The International Labour Organisation, democracy advocates and international
human rights groups have criticised foreign-funded garment manufacturing in Burma.
Workers earn eight cents an hour or $3.23 for a 48 hour week, less than the national
average, sewing for Nautica, Jordan, Fila, Kmart, Wal-Mart, Family Dollar and Montgomery Ward (Harkin 2001). The US imported $454 million worth of apparel from
Burma in 2000, and $470 million in 2001, constituting 28.5% of all Burmese exports
other than illicit drugs (ALTSEAN 2002a; Varley 1998).
Divestment in South Africa
The situation for MNCs vis-à-vis Burma is similar to the situation in South Africa during
the ’70s and ’80s. In South Africa, divestment3 referred to the sale of stock so that
investment portfolios eliminated companies with holdings in South Africa or those that
performed poorly on the Global Sullivan Principles.4 Disinvestment was the withdrawal
of corporations from South Africa in one of several forms: the withdrawal of new capital;
the withdrawal of available credit from banks throughout the world; the selling-off of
operating units in South Africa by MNCs based in other countries; or entirely cutting off
3 In this paper, I use the term ‘divestment’ to include both the withdrawal of corporations from Burma
as well as non-participation in any form of economic support, including portfolio holdings and bank
credit, until the Burmese military regime withdraws and honours a democratically elected government.
4 See http://globalsullivanprinciples.org/principles.htm, accessed 4 March 2004.
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operations in South Africa (Massie 1997; Paul and Aquila 1988). In 1987, the state of
California restructured its investments so that $90 billion would be divested of companies doing business in South Africa. When comparing the performance of several investment funds without holdings in companies doing business in South Africa to those with
holdings in companies doing business in South Africa, the South Africa-free portfolios
had similar or better financial performance (Paul and Aquila 1988).
Both ethical investing, divestment and disinvestment had important political consequences. In 1986 the US Congress passed an economic sanctions bill, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Bill, prohibiting new corporate investment in South Africa. In 1987
a deficit-reduction bill repealed the tax credits of US firms for taxes paid in South Africa,
imposing double taxation on profits earned there (Paul 1989). As the white South African government was increasing repression, control and surveillance in order to maintain apartheid, it lost legitimacy among democratic countries, through international
condemnation and boycotting of sports and cultural events. Paul and Aquila (1988)
concluded that ethical investing could benefit MNCs once apartheid ended, because, if
the majority black population gained control of the government, it might welcome the
assistance of MNCs in developing an economic infrastructure, including private enterprise.
During the ’60s George Houser of the American Committee on Africa promoted
disinvestment for banks doing business in South Africa, claiming that Americans had
a moral obligation to help end apartheid or the result would be greater violence
throughout Africa. Second, he argued that unilateral American disinvestment would
demonstrate international leadership and most likely be followed by other countries.
Third, Houser claimed that America needed to be sincere as well as be seen as sincere
by other countries, and enact its espoused values of freedom and equality for all. Lastly,
he pointed out that American trade and investment in South Africa was so small it would
not be a great loss to let it go. His efforts created a foundation for an increasing emphasis
on divestment, as shareholders, religious groups and university students lobbied and
protested for banks and investment funds to withdraw investments from South Africa
(Massie 1997).
Increasing international pressure in the form of sanctions and boycotts weakened the
South African economy, forcing a number of MNCs to divest. Thirty states, 150 cities,
counties and school districts across the US passed anti-apartheid legislation between
1976 and 1994, prohibiting government purchases from or investments in companies
doing business in South Africa. According to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, these efforts
were effective in weakening the apartheid government and bringing political change to
South Africa (Paul 1991; Paul and Aquila 1988; Posnikoff 1997). Eventually de Klerk
was forced to negotiate with Mandela, resulting in the fall of the apartheid regime
(Barber 1999).
Several parallels and differences can be drawn between South Africa and Burma. In
1996 and 2003 the US government passed trade and investment sanctions against
Burma. Internationally, activists have drafted shareholder resolutions for divestment
and disinvestment, boycotting consumer products, pressuring governments to impose
sanctions and bringing class-action suits against MNCs to end repression in Burma.
PepsiCo’s disinvestment in part was caused by consumer boycotts of PepsiCola and
PepsiCo’s TacoBell fast-food franchises. UNOCAL sold off its service stations and consumer products divisions, largely because of boycotts by activists. Amnesty International, Global Importune, EarthRights International (ERI), the AFL–CIO, the Interfaith
Center on Corporate Responsibility, Free Burma Coalition activists and CalPERS, along
with the US and other countries, continue to use legal means to persuade MNCs to divest.
But the extent of overall private US investment in Burma has never been as large as it
was in South Africa. Additionally, the anti-apartheid movement in the US came on the
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heels of the civil rights movement in the US, when white and black civil rights activists
felt it was a contradiction of conscience to work for civil rights at home and then tolerate
or economically collude in apartheid in South Africa.
No similar historical context exists for US activism for democracy in Burma. Similar
to South Africa, 27 US cities and the state of Massachusetts passed selective purchasing
laws to promote disinvestment and divestment in Burma, but these laws were ruled
unconstitutional following pressure from Japanese and European corporations. Additionally, unlike South Africa, beginning in the early ’60s Burma closed itself off to
Western investments and political and economic ideology, instead developing its own
brand of socialism. When it finally opened up to Western investment in the ’80s, MNCs,
and oil companies in particular, saw significant profits to be gained. The MNCs that
remain in Burma are reluctant to divest, justifying their presence as providers of jobs
and economic development (Fink 2001; Haley 2001; Santoro 1998; Sethi and Williams
2001).
Sanctions
It is now time to admit that the policy of constructive engagement with the SLORC is a
failure . . . . International pressure can change the situation in Burma. Tough sanctions,
not constructive engagement, finally brought about . . . the dawn of a new era in my
country. This is the language that must be spoken with tyrants—for, sadly, it is the only
language they understand.
The Archbishop Desmond Tutu on constructive engagement, 1994
In 1996, under pressure from advocates for democracy in Burma and human rights
activists, President Clinton signed legislation barring Burmese military officials from
entering the US and in 1997 imposed economic sanctions banning any new US investment in Burma. According to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, sanctions
were a response to the complete denial of political freedom in Burma and the military’s
failure to stop production and trafficking of illicit drugs. UNOCAL and USA Engage, a
coalition of 450 US companies, unsuccessfully opposed the use of unilateral sanctions
(Flynn 1997). In 2003, President George Bush signed the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act, freezing assets of Burmese military personnel in US banks and banning
all imports to the US (Cochrane 2003).
The European Union placed restrictions including an arms embargo; a ban on highlevel military personnel visits, defence links and visas; and a freeze on assets of senior
military members. The European Commission suspended Burma’s trading privileges
because of its use of forced labour (Associated Press 2003).
In 1998, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) urged its members to review
their relations with Burma to ‘ensure that such relations would not perpetuate the
system of forced or compulsory labor’ (ILO 1998). In 2001 the ILO called for an international ban on imported goods from Burma, which the US enforced with the 2003
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. The International Federation of Chemical,
Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM) has called on oil and gas companies
to ‘cease investment in Burma while the use of forced labour continues’ (Mahon 2001).
Aung San Suu Kyi consistently supports sanctions against new investments and bans
on imports from Burma, saying, ‘We always said—very, very clearly—that Burma is not
ripe for investment’ because today foreign investment benefits only wealthy Burmese
(Kraft 1996; ERI and SAIN 1996).
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Consumer boycotts and shareholder pressure
Since 1991 some companies have withdrawn from Burma because of direct pressure
from consumers concerned with its injustices and violations of human rights. The US
imported $454 million-worth of apparel from Burma in 2000 and $470 million in 2001
(ALTSEAN 2002c), constituting approximately 28.5% of all Burmese exports other than
illicit drugs. Until 2002, the US Department of Defence and the Pentagon were among
the main importers of clothing made in Burma, supplying its 1,400 PX stores (Rothschild 2001). Through boycotts, protests, petitions and phone campaigns, consumers
and human rights groups persuaded Federated Department Stores/Macy’s, Disney,
Eddie Bauer, Levi Strauss, Heineken, Carlsberg, PepsiCo, Reebok, Hanes (Sara Lee),
London Fog, Liz Claiborne, Reebok, Sears, Penny’s DaytonHudson, J. Crew, Ross,
Columbia Sportswear and other companies to divest (Flynn 1997; White 1999a).
Amoco, Texaco, PepsiCo, Apple Computer, Eastman Kodak and Hewlett-Packard also
left Burma in the late ’90s (Steiner and Steiner 2003; Velasquez 2001).
US-based Texaco and ARCO had been granted exploration concessions o a natural gas
project in the Gulf of Maraban, but withdrew after consumer and shareholder pressures
(ERI and SAIN 1996). Father Joseph Lamar of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility met with PepsiCo’s CEO, who claimed the company divested for moral reasons,
but, according to Father Lamar, the decision to divest was concerned with its image as
a result of a nationwide boycott of PepsiCo and its subsidiaries TacoBell and PizzaHut
(White 1999b).
Selective purchasing and divestment legislation
In 1996, the state of Massachusetts passed selective purchasing legislation in an effort
to support freedom and democracy in Burma. This legislation was intended to prohibit
the state government from awarding contracts for goods or services to companies doing
business in Burma. In response, Hewlett-Packard, Apple Computer, Motorola, Philips
Electronics and Eastman Kodak quickly divested. At that time Governor William Weld
of Massachusetts urged other states to follow suit, saying, ‘It is my hope that other states
and Congress will follow our example and make a stand for the cause of freedom’
(Economist 1997). Subsequently 27 US cities and counties passed selective purchasing
laws, including San Francisco, New York, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, Alameda County,
CA, and the city of Los Angeles. As a result, Ericsson of Sweden and Mitsubishi of Japan
lost multi-million-dollar contracts with San Francisco.
Because of the impact of the Massachusetts law on businesses, several European and
Japanese firms filed formal complaints with the US State Department regarding
Massachusetts’ selective purchasing law. The European Union requested the US to end
the selective purchasing law, suggesting that Massachusetts had violated the Government Procurement Agreement provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Flynn 1997). In 1999 the Federal government overturned Massachusetts’ selective purchasing legislation, nullifying all other selective purchasing laws.
Internal obstacles to conducting business in Burma
Toyota opened a dealership in Rangoon in 1998 after the government announced it
would allow imports of cars, but the import policy was never implemented. Ajinomoto,
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a Japanese seasoning manufacturer, closed its factory when the government imposed a
ban on the import of materials. Other Japanese and American companies have withdrawn from Burma largely because of the difficulty of conducting business efficiently
and without corruption (ALTSEAN 2000b). In 2001 the US State Department reported
on the difficulties and hazards of doing business in Burma, and the heavy-handed role
of the government.
The military junta that governs Burma has handed out privileges to a small elite of
favored companies and family members . . . The resulting socialist-style policies, including state monopolization of major exports, a large number of money-losing state
economic enterprises, a bloated bureaucracy slow to make decisions, and a tendency to
rely on administrative controls rather than market forces to steer the economy, have
dimmed prospects for development. Military intelligence is omnipresent in Burma.
Businesses should expect to have their activities and communications closely monitored.
Foreigners’ telephones are frequently tapped. The absence of a reliable rule of law in
Burma implies that anyone doing business—local or foreigner—faces the possibility of
arbitrary and capricious treatment. In the past few years a number of foreign businesses
have been expropriated by either local partners or government entities.
. . . The regime’s economic mismanagement is the chief cause of the continuing
downward spiral in Burma’s economy. The ruling generals have demonstrated little will
to implement economic reforms or to respond substantively to International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank recommendations. As such, there is little likelihood of
improvement in the business climate under the current regime (US Department of State
2002).
Moral, economic and political perspectives on divestment
We have to choose between a global market driven only by calculations of short-term
profit, and one which has a human face. Between a world which condemns a quarter of
the human race to starvation and squalor, and one which offers everyone at least a chance
of prosperity, in a healthy environment. Between a selfish free-for-all in which we ignore
the fate of the losers, and a culture in which the strong and successful accept their
responsibilities, showing global vision and leadership.
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations (Annan 1999)
Divestment in Burma, as it was in South Africa, is controversial, with supporters and
opponents arguing from economic, political, social and moral perspectives. Much of the
current discourse separates moral perspectives from economic, political and social ones,
putting boundaries around disciplinary approaches to ethical issues. Economic and
political systems are, at their root, based on philosophical views of human nature and
morality. Values embedded in socially constructed phenomena include moral, economic, political and social arguments for or against divestment.
Ethical and moral codes of conduct
Within the global context of multinational operations, when considering divestment in
Burma, we can look at religion-based moral codes as well as intergovernmental and
corporate codes of conduct. Religious codes include the Ten Commandments, the
Koran, the Tao, the Eight Nobel Truths and the Golden Rule. The common ethos at the
core of each is Kant’s moral imperative to treat others as one would like to be treated,
without harm or offence. Some of the intergovernmental compacts and international
ethics and/or moral codes that provide guidance to MNCs include the United Nations
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, the United Nations Universal Declara-
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tion of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Helsinki Final
Act, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the International Labour Office
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy, the CERES Principles, and the Caux Roundtable Principles.
The CERES Principles are business ethics codes developed by business consortia,
focusing on environmental issues which include those found in Burma. The US has its
own White House Apparel Industry Partnership Workplace Code of Conduct with monitoring criteria, and corporations such as Liz Claiborne, Fruit of the Loom, Federated
Department Stores, Burlington Industries, James Apparel Group, Gap and Levi Strauss
have their own corporate codes of conduct, variously called Terms of Engagement,
Contractor Code of Conduct, and Ethical Standards and Employment Practices. Some
of these codes include explicit policy statements regarding human rights. While some
companies with codes have developed monitoring mechanisms, they also have been
criticised because some codes require the contractors to comply only with local laws or
lower standards found in developing countries (Varley 1998).
Donaldson’s (1989) criteria, with similarities to the UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, presents obligations or duties for corporations to abide by in order to
protect particular fundamental rights of people. MNCs should avoid depriving people of
their basic human rights and furthermore help protect others from being deprived of
these same rights of physical movement, freedom from torture, freedom of speech and
association, political participation, non-discriminatory treatment, physical security,
subsistence, a fair trial, and ownership of property.
Ethical reasoning
Ethical reasoning has multiple forms, including rights, justice, virtue, care and utilitarianism. The moral rights perspective considers that all human beings are entitled to
basic human rights of freedom and well-being regardless of their nationality, religion,
ethnicity, gender and so on. These rights, delineated in the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, include the rights to free association, speech, religion,
education, food, water, health, among others. The Burmese government, supported by
MNCs, violates basic, everyday civil and political rights of Burmese citizens. Paradoxically, Burma is predominantly Buddhist, and one of Buddhism’s core principles is nonharming.
From a rights perspective, divestment poses the rights of MNCs to profit in Burma
against the Burmese people’s entitlement to have their universally guaranteed human
rights honoured. The people of Burma have the right to be free from military abuse
through forced labour, dangerous refugee camps, disease, torture and extra-judicial
killings, along with the rights to freedom of speech, association, religion, movement
and press. They are entitled to earn a livelihood, but, as employees of MNCs, they are
forced to forfeit these rights and live virtually without basic healthcare, safety, nutrition,
education and freedom from persecution.
The ethic of justice requires that conflicting claims of each party be considered and
a resolution reached that takes into consideration these claims. From this perspective
we see the unjust policies of the military government, without a constitution to
guarantee fair treatment, harming innocent Burmese civilians. We consider which party
is being harmed the most, what is the nature of the harm, which party is gaining the
most and what is the nature of these gains. Additionally we look at what would be
considered treatment in this context, and whether the MNCs with their Burmese military
business partners are actively or passively colluding with the abridgement of human
rights and severe abuse of the people of Burma. Recently a US Federal court ordered
UNOCAL to appear in court as a defendant in a lawsuit by Burmese citizens who, as
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employees of UNOCAL, were abused while working as forced labourers: beaten, tortured
and raped (ALTSEAN 2001; Schultz 2001). When consumers and human rights activists
pressured clothing manufacturers including those mentioned above, concerning the
human rights abuses perpetuated in their factories, several companies divested (Breman
1999; White 1999a).
Virtue ethics, based on Aristotle’s theory that human beings are capable of reasoning,
refers to characteristics of a moral person as seen in his or her behaviour. A moral person
behaves in accordance with the virtues of honesty, generosity, sincerity, trustworthiness,
kindness, courage, among others. Aristotle was referring to individuals, not organisations, but we can ask whether corporations should be expected to act as virtuously. The
MNCs who remain in Burma, such as those who resisted leaving South Africa, argue
that they are virtuous in providing jobs and practising constructive engagement. One
of the primary guiding principles of the ethic of care, similar to the Buddhist ethic of
compassion to avoid, is to avoid harming others (White 1999b). Both the ethics of virtue
and care might suggest that corporations, in their unavoidable collaboration with the
Burmese military government, must cease their operations that result in clear abuse of
human rights.
Some of the corporations that divested publicly stated they did not want to be associated with a country that violates human rights, implying choice of virtuous moral
conduct over financially enhancing conduct (White 1999a). Aung San Suu Kyi has
repeatedly urged MNCs to wait until political democracy is established in Burma, and
then to act virtuously and assist in the development of free markets through investments
and consultation (White 1998).
The utilitarian framework focuses on the consequences of actions, weighing up costs
and benefits to see which is greater. If MNCs divest, in the short term they lose profits,
the military government loses fees and taxes and local Burmese lose jobs. In the long
term, once democratic reforms have been established, MNCs can return to help
strengthen Burma’s economy.
Political perspectives
The movement for democracy in Burma has consistently advocated complete divestment until the country has a democratically elected government. The US and other
Western countries have imposed sanctions against North Korea, Cuba and Iraq because
these countries have political despots that brutally repress their civilian populations
(Hiatt 2003). The killing, torture, rape, assault and imprisonment of tens of thousands
of innocent civilians in Burma would signal the need for both a complete embargo as
well as strong support for a regime change.
The political benefits of divestment are several. First, divestment would send a strong
signal to the military that political, social and economic oppression and abuse of human
rights are not acceptable. Second, complete divestment would most likely bring about
the fall of the military regime, similar to the effects of sanctions and boycotts in South
Africa, as discussed above. Third, divestment would demonstrate solidarity with the
Burmese and international movements for democracy in Burma, again signalling to the
military government the widespread support for democracy in Burma. Fourth, divestment has a greater chance of bringing about change than does constructive engagement,
judging from the effects of constructive engagement so far in Burma, and in the past
in South Africa (Haley 1990, 2001; Lipton 1988; Paul 1991; Schultz 2001; Viljoen 1987).
Over the past year, while the military has released some political prisoners, it frequently
arrests people on charges of speaking about political change, writing about democracy,
meeting with others to discuss politics, and other expressions of basic human rights (US
Department of State 2004). Aung San Suu Kyi says there has been no substantial
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progress in moving the military away from their position of unilateral control and their
refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue for political change. Despite requests from
the democratic opposition, the military refuses to convene a new constitutional convention or hold open and free elections (US Department of State 2004).
MNCs defend their investment in Burma just as they initially defended their
investments in South Africa during the ’80s, as discussed above: through constructive
engagement they can pressurise the military to bring about needed political, economic
and social reforms to the country. During that period PepsiCo and other MNCs used the
slogan, ‘Free Trade Leads to Free Societies’, assuming that open markets would promote
a capitalist-style economy that in turn would require a democratic political system.
Judging from what we can observe today in Vietnam and China, we see that, while their
markets are opening to multinational corporations, the communist political system
prevails, with its single ruling party and curtailment of human rights. Despite researchers’
efforts, it is difficult to predict what would have occurred in South Africa without international pressure for divestment (Suzman 1986; Paul and Aquila 1988; Unger and Vale
1985–86).
Economic perspectives for divestment
Because constructive engagement has not worked thus far in Burma, it may be only
through economic sanctions that the international community can pressurise the
military to hand over power to the already democratically elected government or hold
open, nationwide elections. Once democracy has been established, MNCs can assist in
the development of a Burmese-style free-market economy, but, because Burma has been
isolated for more than four decades, free markets will take time to develop. Companies
that demonstrate their intention to help establish a democratically run country will have
a clear advantage. Burma needs improved housing, healthcare and education, along with
the development of efficient manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, fishing and construction sectors. The country will be ready for new technology, telecommunications and the
use of sustainable development for invigorating its timber, oil, precious stone and
natural gas industries.
Some scholars and practitioners suggest that respect for human rights contributes to
economic growth. Amartya Sen claims that capitalism works in part because countries
value mutual trust and respect for the rule of law and an understanding that corruption
is an illegitimate form of exchange (Schulz 2001). Arthur Leavitt, of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, said, ‘In today’s global economy, where capital crosses borders
almost instantaneously, there is an unprecedented need for openness and cooperation
. . . [T]he enduring trait of all markets is that in exchange for capital, they demand
information’ (quoted in Schulz 2001: 84). Burma has rigidly restricted the flow of
information and ideas for more than four decades.
Additionally, doing business in Burma is difficult. Under military dictatorship for the
past 40 years, basic infrastructure has crumbled, leaving deteriorated roads, dilapidated
telecommunications and corrupt government bureaucracy. As a consequence of the
continuously failing economy and devaluation of the national currency, the kyat has
gone from approximately 150 to the dollar in 1999 to 500 to the dollar in 2003. To own
a computer or fax machine requires a licence and registration with the government,
while to be caught without a licence can result in a long-term prison sentence.
Financial data from more than 35 companies with investments in Burma suggest that,
while they profited in Burma, their losses from divestment did not significantly harm
them. After succumbing to consumer boycotts, some MNCs claimed their allegiance to
universal standards of human rights. For those that divested due to shareholder and
consumer pressures, their reputations were vulnerable and weakened by their involve-
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ment with Burma. PepsiCo, Penny’s, Federated Department Stores, Liz Claiborne, Eddie
Bauer, Levi Strauss and Sara Lee/Hane’s heard from their customers and shareholders,
and their public relations specialists put a positive spin on their withdrawal (White
2002).
MNCs’ investments benefit the repressive Burmese military government economically. The regime requires a stake in all profits resulting from any successful business
projects by requiring MNCs to pay a steep tax based on profits. Often MNCs are required
to enter into an economic partnership with the government.
Economic perspectives against divestment
Loss of profits from divesting is a concern of corporations already invested in Burma.
Labour, land, security, taxes and raw materials are relatively inexpensive, even if
gratuities are added and profits shared with the military. By divesting, a corporation
leaves its on-the-ground capital investments including buildings, pipelines or telecommunications networks, and spends additional funds to start again in another country,
thereby cutting into profits. Closing a factory, bottling plant, distribution centre or sales
office and relocating to another developing country is relatively inexpensive compared
to the potential loss of shutting down a pipeline. An oil company would incur much
larger costs when leaving behind materials, equipment and hardware of a pipeline construction project. The Yetagun pipeline, built to extract and transport natural oil and gas,
cost $1.2 billion and is estimated to be profitable for 50 years, especially because the
SPDC provides unpaid forced labour and military security.
Those MNCs that remain in Burma to build oil and natural gas pipelines, roads and
hotels claim that they boost the Burmese economy as they help Burma prepare for free
trade and open markets in the future.
Another argument against divestment is that, while it may contribute to the decline
of the ruling regime, it could result in harsher economic, political and social conditions
and more chaos. From a utilitarian perspective, increasing investment and assisting in
the economic development of Burma would result in greater good in both the long and
short term.
As long as MNCs operate in Burma they provide jobs for expatriate executives and
managers, and low- or no-pay, often high-risk, dangerous jobs for the Burmese, working
in construction, manufacturing, mining, forestry, transportation and pipeline projects.
MNCs argue that these sometimes dangerous and consistently poorly compensated jobs
are better than no jobs at all, denying their participation or contribution to the exploitation of employees. Some MNCs believe that they are getting in on the ground floor of
the future free-market in Burma, guaranteeing future profits. Additionally, shareholders, managers and corporate executives gain from the increased business activity
and profits of companies such as Federal Express, Halliburton, United Technologies,
Baker Hughes, Daewoo, Samsung, Hyundai, Mitsubishi and others. These companies
have not succumbed to consumer and/or shareholder pressure.
Social issues related to divestment
The government healthcare expenditure in Burma is less than $2 per person annually;
the likelihood of adequate care following a work-related accident or illness is negligible.
MNCs, while providing benefits to their home-country and expatriate employees, are not
required by Burmese law to provide benefits to Burmese employees. As a result, the
state of health is poor, with a mortality rate of 54 years and an increasingly high rate of
AIDS (ALTSEAN 2001; 2003a).
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Subsistence wages, unsafe working conditions and lack of healthcare negatively
impact a country’s economic growth. According to Doug Cahn, vice president of Reebok
International, ‘Good-quality products are made in good-quality workplace conditions’
(quoted in Schulz 2001). If corporations want loyalty from workers, they need to respect
their human rights and treat them with fairness and dignity. Children working in
sweatshops cannot attend school, develop health problems more easily, and, as adults,
are a burden to society, whereas those who are educated can be productive adult wageearners and contribute to the country’s economic development through their participation in the marketplace. In the short term, child labour benefits the family and the
employer; in the long term, it benefits no one and harms many.
Conclusion
Globalisation raises pragmatic and philosophical issues for all stakeholders. In this
article I examined the question of whether it is ethical, moral or socially responsible to
maintain a separate standard of human rights in Burma. Disenfranchised nations are
beginning to actively challenge the dominating influence of multinational corporations
throughout the world (Korten 1999; 2001; Mander et al. 2001). As MNCs benefit from
globalisation, do they have obligations as corporate global citizens to act morally and
ethically across national boundaries? As MNCs expand their use of local and international
codes of conduct, their positions will change accordingly (DeGeorge 1993; Donaldson
1989; Werhane 1994; Williams 2000). As in South Africa, it is difficult to judge whether
it is more harmful for the people of Burma to lose jobs as a result of divestment and
disinvestment, or more painful to live under a repressive and abusive military-led
government. Some analysts suggest that the most recent US legislation banning all
imports means a loss of 80,000 jobs in Burma (Cochrane 2003). Would it be better to
work, even under conditions of forced labour and violent brutality, rather than not work
at all? Does the military government use the presence of MNCs to justify its abusive
treatment of its citizens, or are the citizens better off because some of them are working?
This is a difficult issue for anyone to address, including those who directly experience
the daily physical consequences. Over the last 15 years the people of Burma have
consistently supported the establishment of a democratically elected government and
the withdrawal of the military-led government.
Based on the analysis above, companies can justify constructive engagement or
divestment/disinvestment in Burma. Companies that choose to maintain their investments provide jobs for some of the local Burmese population. They demonstrate a model
of large-scale private enterprise to the Burmese government and people. Some analysts
argue that because Burma, like North Korea, has an agrarian, subsistence economy,
sanctions do not pose a threat to the ruling military elite who will survive (D. Steinberg
quoted in Cochrane 2003). These firms benefit from operating without the restrictions
of labour laws mandating overtime pay, benefits, non-discriminatory hiring and union
contracts, while receiving government-provided security and economic partnerships
without government monitoring. Practically, managers accept the challenges of bribing
local officials, a decaying infrastructure and underdeveloped technology in an uncertain
economic environment. They contend with a poorly educated, undernourished workforce, child and forced labour, in a country without a significant healthcare system.
While they may be required to enter into a financial partnership with the Burmese
regime, MNCs earn profits for shareholders while providing goods and services to a small
number of people in Burma and beyond. MNCs can justify their presence as ‘getting in
on the ground floor’ or ‘gaining an economic foothold’, waiting for the day when Burma
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takes steps to modernise the country while loosening restrictions on foreign investment.
Many MNCs may see the human costs of operating under the Burmese dictatorship; yet
they don’t believe they have an obligation to get involved in the domestic political affairs
of another nation. This type of ethical and practical examination can be seen in the case
of Levi Strauss in China, where over the past 15 years the firm had pulled out of China
because of human rights abuses, then re-examined its financial losses, and subsequently
reinvested in China.
For other firms and their managers, the decision to divest and/or disinvest entails
seeing the implications of their business practices on all stakeholders while surfacing
issues of ethical relativism and the power of global economics and technology with its
impact on less developed countries. Some of these firms claim ethical reasons; others
claim economic reasons; and some both (White 1998). From an ethical perspective,
exchanging profits for exploitation is seen as unjust and violating universal human
rights. Some corporations’ ethics codes or mission statements explicitly exclude using
forced or child labour, paying bribes, or paying taxes to countries with records of human
rights abuses. For some MNCs the cost of doing business in Burma is too high: severely
decaying infrastructure, an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy, and uncomplimentary
publicity amid pressures from human rights activists. Through their withdrawal or
refusal to invest in Burma they support the establishment of a democratically elected
government. In the future they expect to profit in Burma while participating in a
sustainable, free-market economy. This will raise per capita income and the standard of
living, while contributing to increased government spending on healthcare, education,
basic infrastructure and technology.
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