History as a Double-Edged Sword:
Historical Boundaries and Territorial Claims
David B. Carter∗
Department of Politics
Princeton University
July 7, 2015
Word Count: 11,027
Abstract
Recent evidence suggests that historical boundary precedents play a central role in the
outbreak, character and long-term consequences of territorial disputes. The institutional theory of borders holds promise in explaining why leaders find old borders to
be so attractive as new borders. However, the mechanisms that link historical precedents to territorial claims and their consequences are not fully specified in the extant
literature. I argue that there are three key arguments that can explain why boundary
precedents are associated with subsequent disputes: ease of justification, perpetual conflict over territories of particular value, and persistent coordination around old borders.
I argue that the coordination mechanism is essential to understanding the connections
between historical boundary precedents and territorial disputes.
∗
Thanks go to Scott Abramson, Jon Quong, Jon Riley, Annie Stilz, participants of the 2015 Politics, Philosophy, and Economics annual conference, as well as the editors of Politics, Philosophy, and Economics for
comments and suggestions. Any mistakes remain my own responsibility. Email: [email protected].
1
Introduction
Disputes over territory are central to patterns of conflict and cooperation in international
relations. There is an abundance of evidence that the presence of territorial claims profoundly
affects factors as wide-ranging as trade, democratization and military conflict.1 Despite a
large literature that convincingly demonstrates the importance of claims over territory for
international relations, little work theoretically explores leaders’ incentives to make particular
types of claims. Recent empirical work suggests that how claims are made matters greatly,
as territorial transfers meant to end disputes have quite different effects depending on how
new borders are drawn.
The bulk of writing on the role of territory in conflict suggests that states contest territory
because it contains economically valuable resources, ethnic kin, or is of military-strategic
utility. It is undoubtedly true that these factors are relevant to the making of claims and
their resolution (or lack thereof). However, it is misleading to think that how leaders make
claims is driven by these indicators of value. In fact, the shape of territorial claims typically
does not suggest that leaders are maximizing proximate resources or other characteristics
that give territory value. Rather, territorial claims tend to follow historical precedents,
meaning that claims are drawn along prior political boundaries (Murphy, 1990; Abramson
and Carter, 2015). While the incentives to make claims are affected by the presence of factors
such as energy reserves or ethnic kin, claims often enclose a small portion of resources or
fail to to enclose significant numbers of kin. Most leaders appear to be making claims in a
highly constrained way, but exactly why this is the case is poorly explained.
I argue that much is to be learned from connecting the process of territorial claims to
outcomes of settlements. Much recent theory about how leaders pursue territorial claims
1
I use the terms territorial claim and territorial dispute interchangeably here. Both refer to a claim that
one state makes over territory that is presently controlled by another (neighboring) state. It is typical in the
literature to also require territorial claims to originate from the executive of the revisionist state and to be
clearly and publicly stated.
2
assumes that leaders are rational and strategic.2 Most leaders pursue territorial claims with
rather specific aims in mind and the idea that leaders simply want “more” territory and thus
claim as much as they can is easy to rule out (Goemans and Schultz, 2014a). The claims
made are quite precise and are also typically relatively small. I argue that leaders selectively
make claims over specific pieces of territory estimating 1.) how costly a claim will be to
his or her state’s reputation and 2.) how desirable and easy it would be to prospectively
integrate the territory into his or her state.
A body of recent empirical evidence suggests that historical boundary precedents are
central to territorial claims and the consequences of territorial settlements. Three related
pieces of evidence are particularly important here. First, leaders are much more likely to
make territorial claims over a piece of territory for which there is a historical boundary
that serves as a precedent (Abramson and Carter, 2015). Second, when new borders are
drawn to settle a claim, leaders overwhelmingly choose to draw borders that follow historical
precedents (Carter and Goemans, 2011). Third, territorial settlements that follow historical
precedents are much less likely to result in future dispute and armed conflict. Moreover,
new borders drawn to follow precedent are also associated with higher levels of trade and
economic exchange. All in all, these findings strongly suggest that leaders very often make
territorial claims that are designed to “work” more effectively.
The theoretical framework that best explains these patterns is the institutional theory of
borders (Simmons, 2005; Carter and Goemans, 2011; Abramson and Carter, 2015). In short,
the institutional theory argues that borders are institutions that coordinate individuals’
political and economic behavior and improve social welfare when they are widely known and
clearly demarcate states’ jurisdictions.3 However, despite providing unique explanations to
many recent findings that make clear the role of historical precedents in territorial disputes,
2
For a seminal treatment, see Huth (1996).
This claim holds in a world of states whose territories are demarcated by borders, i.e, the real world.
It is not obvious that this is true if territorial states with borders is not the dominant form of political
organization internationally.
3
3
extant theory does not effectively unpack how the origins and history of a border precedent
itself affect leader behavior and outcomes. A consequence of this shortcoming is that the
mechanisms behind why historical boundary precedents are so important are underspecified.
There are three main routes by which the importance of historical precedents can be
explained. First, one set of arguments suggests that historical precedents primarily facilitate
leaders’ justifications over territorial claims. A second argument suggests that territorial
claims tend to be bounded by historical borders because leaders continue to contest the
same territories of great value that were historically contested. In other words, claims are
made along precedents because border changes that resulted from perpetual conflict over the
most valuable territories made these highly desirable areas especially dense with historical
borders. A third argument focuses on the importance of borders’ coordinative effects, and
relies on the idea that coordination around political boundaries exhibits increasing returns
across time. I argue that mechanisms that work via borders’ “sticky” coordinative effects
are essential to explaining the role of boundary precedents in territorial disputes.
Persistent coordination explains more cases and provides the most solid framework for
understanding several important facts. First, the coordination explanation explains why
leaders are selective in which historical precedents they choose to contest. In short, while
most territorial claims follow historical precedent, most historical precedents are not claimed.
The idea that precedents are disputed because they are easier to justify has difficulty on this
point. While the idea that precedents systematically bound the most valuable territories can
also explain leaders’ selectivity in making claims, it does not do a good job explaining why
claims so often contain little strategic or economic importance (Johnson and Toft, 2014).
Moreover, it is unclear why claims settled along precedent would be associated with better
long-term outcomes if perpetual contestation of especially valuable land drives the connection
between claims and precedents. While the idea that the ease of justification drives precedentbased territorial claims does a poor job on its own, I argue that justification to international
and domestic audiences is still important to understanding why leaders’ perceive greater
4
opportunity to make credible and more widely accepted territorial claims. In sum, I propose
a framework in which ease of justification provides leaders with opportunity to make claims
and path-dependent coordination effects provide incentive.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the relevant literature, highlighting the key findings and arguments that form the basis for this article. Second, I develop
a theory of territorial claims that incorporates variation in precedents, tying them to the
prospective settlements and the probability of armed conflict. Next, I discuss a puzzling
set of facts about the role of historical precedents in territorial disputes and suggest how
integrating theory over dispute onset, management, and resolution can explain them. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications that this emerging literature and my
arguments have for normative theory.
Territorial Claims: The Existing Evidence
A large body of literature explores the consequences of territorial claims for patterns of
conflict and cooperation. This literature shows that disputes over territory are one of the
best predictors of a wide range of undesirable outcomes. Accordingly, understanding the
origins of territorial disputes, the consequences of ongoing disputes and the routes by which
such disputes are settled is an extremely important endeavor for scholars of international
relations. The role of historical precedents has only more recently received attention in this
literature.
Territorial claims are closely associated with interstate conflict and war. In a survey
of interstate wars from 1816–1992, Hensel (2000, 65) finds that over fifty percent of wars
included issues of disputed territory. Both Vasquez (1993) and Holsti (1991) corroborate this
trend analyzing interstate wars across a much broader time period. For instance, Vasquez
shows at least 79% of wars from 1648–1990 were fought over territory-related issues (Vasquez,
1993). Moreover, territorial wars also tend to be the most violent, as disputes with territory
5
at stake are much more likely to escalate to full-scale war (Kocs, 1995; Vasquez and Henehan,
2001) and relatedly more likely to lead to fatalities than disputes over non-territorial issues
(Hensel, 2000, 72–74). This literature demonstrates that to understand the outbreak of
interstate war requires attention to territorial disputes.
The strong connection between war and territorial claims motivates a large literature
that explores why some territorial disputes are militarized and others are not. In a seminal
paper, Starr and Most (1976) suggest that borders are associated with war because proximity
provides “opportunity” to interact (peacefully or otherwise). If opportunity combines with
factors that provide neighbors with “willingness” to fight, such as alliance politics (Siverson
and Starr, 1990), then perhaps we can explain the much higher propensity for bordering
states to fight than non-contiguous states. This basic framework has been widely applied
since, as Goertz and Diehl (1992) apply it in the seminal treatment of territorial changes and
war and more recent treatments such as Senese (2005) update and extend the framework. In
fact, tying disputed borders to willingness as in Senese (2005) helps to deal with Vasquez’s
criticism of many explanations for why contiguity is a cause of conflict, as it identifies when
neighbors’ interactions should be hostile rather than peaceful (Vasquez, 1995).4
The finding that territorial disputes are a leading cause of military conflict and war led
scholars to further unpack the relationship by theorizing more precisely about the process
of territorial disputes. Huth (1996) is seminal in this regard, as he introduced an influential
theoretical framework that posits territorial disputes go through three phases: (1) the initiation of a dispute, (2) the territorial dispute stage, where states decide how to manage their
conflicting claims, and (3) a resolution stage that disputants reach if they decide to end their
dispute. In addition to providing a clear and useful concept of a territorial dispute and the
process through which they arise and are resolved, Huth (1996) also collected important data
that distinguishes among disputes in terms of the key characteristics of the territory. Thus,
scholars were able to nicely identify whether a dispute is over territory that contains ethnic
4
See also Reed and Chiba (2010) on contiguity and conflict.
6
kin of a revisionist state, contains important natural resources, or is territory of strategic
military value (e.g., Huth and Allee (2002); Chiozza and Choi (2003); Tir (2003); Simmons
(2005); Carter (2010); Huth, Croco and Appel (2011); Schultz (2013)).5
The management of active territorial disputes and their resolution have received the
bulk of attention in the literature on territory and conflict. The characteristics of disputed
territory are a key focus, with a wide range of scholars exploring how the presence of ethnic
kin, economically valuable resources, or strategic military value affect dispute behavior.
Huth (1996) finds that territory with strategic value or the ethnic kin of a challenger state
are more prone to escalation and violence, while economic value is associated with peace. His
explanation for this finding is that territory with symbolic importance or strategic military
importance cannot easily be divided for mutual gain, while economic value can be jointly
exploited peacefully. The presence of a territorial dispute and violent conflict is indeed found
to depress trade and investment (Simmons, 2005; Lee and Mitchell, 2012). Numerous studies
such as Tir (2003) and Gleditsch (2007) replicate the finding that borders that major ethnic
groups straddle are prone to violence. Strategically valuable territory is also consistently
found to lead to entrenched disputes, as adversaries rarely wish to concede military advantage
to an opponent (Chiozza and Choi, 2003; Carter, 2010).
The fact that active territorial disputes are a primary cause of war has made their settlement of great interest to conflict scholars. Disputes over territory that is important for ethnic
reasons or of strategic military value are found to be more difficult to peacefully settle (Huth,
1996; Huth and Allee, 2002; Chiozza and Choi, 2003). Moreover, democratic disputants are
found to be more apt to peacefully settle their disputes (Huth, 1996; Huth and Allee, 2002),
a finding consistent with the larger “democratic peace” finding that democracies tend to not
fight each other (Babst, 1972; Small and Singer, 1976; Bremer, 1992; Russett, 1993; Dixon,
1994; Schultz, 2001; Gartzke, 2007).6 Relatedly, Mitchell (2002) shows that the proportion of
5
Another important effort along similar lines is the Issues Correlates of War (ICOW) data (Hensel, 2001;
Mitchell and Hensel, 2007).
6
Although see Gowa (2000) or Gowa (2011) for critiques.
7
democracies in the international system has an effect on all states’ propensities to peacefully
resolve territorial claims. Recently, the literature has put much more focus on the role of
international institutions and international legal principles in facilitating peaceful settlement
(Mitchell and Hensel, 2007; Allee and Huth, 2006; Gent and Shannon, 2010; Huth, Croco
and Appel, 2011).
In contrast to the large body of literature that analyzes dispute escalation and settlement,
there is comparatively little work on the origins of territorial disputes. Huth (1996) is
an important exception, as he explores the correlates of territorial dispute initiation and
persistence. Huth (1996) finds that territory of economic and strategic value is especially
likely to be disputed. However, the shape of claims is not explored by Huth (1996), so it
is not clear whether claims are really drawn to enclose resources or certain populations or
not (Goemans and Schultz, 2014b). Moreover, as noted by Murphy (1990), most claims
do not neatly contain ethnic kin or economic resources. Rather, territorial claims tend to
follow prior historical boundaries. Abramson and Carter (2015) provide broad evidence of
this, showing that the number and frequency of territorial claims in post-1815 Europe are
best explained by the presence of multiple competing historical precedents close to current
boundaries. The authors build on an institutional theory of borders that emphasizes how
borders coordinate individuals’ economic and political behavior in a way that is “sticky” and
does not go away quickly when borders are changed (Simmons, 2005; Carter and Goemans,
2011).
History, Dispute Settlement and Making a Claim
An assumption that undergirds much of the literature analyzing the settlement of disputes
is that settlement leads to “good” outcomes. This line of thinking is not surprising given
that we know that active territorial disputes are associated with higher probabilities of
violence and less economic exchange. In fact, Gibler shows that the settlement of territorial disputes is associated with a significantly higher probability that neighbors are both
8
democratic (Gibler, 2007, 2012). Moreover, he demonstrates that the connection between
territorial disputes and democratization does much to explain the fact that democracies do
not fight each other. Accordingly, on average, the settlement of territorial disputes should
be beneficial and associated with regional peace and prosperity. However, not all territorial
settlements are “created equally”. I argue that to understand how leaders make claims, we
need to understand the consequences of different types of claims. It is essential to think concurrently about the onset of disputes and how disputes are managed and settled as leaders
care about the long-term consequences of a claim in addition to more immediate payoffs.
Leaders make territorial claims strategically. Thus, claims are made in anticipation of
how they will resonate with the affected population and with their credibility among other
international actors. Territorial claims are risky and come with considerable costs. The large
literature surveyed above on the consequences of territorial disputes for states’ relations make
clear that leaders pay a range of costs for opening new territorial claims. As Goemans and
Schultz (2014a) point out, we should expect leaders to carefully make bounded claims, unless
they are the rare type of leader that seeks unlimited aims and are not worried about costs.7
However, exactly how leaders make limited claims is surprisingly under-theorized.
The empirical evidence suggests the importance of historical boundaries, both internal
and international, as well as historical connections to claimed territory. Huth (1996) shows
that a previous loss of territory by a potential challenger state and ties to the territory
through shared language and ethnicity are associated with claims. In a paper on Africa,
Goemans and Schultz (2014b) demonstrate that claims tend to be made when a politically
dominant ethnic group is split by the border, which provides much needed nuance and microfoundation to the connection between shared ethnicity and claims. Murphy (1990) argues
that historical boundaries are important to new claims, particularly if we want to understand their shape, although he does not provide a theory for why this would be true or broad
empirical evidence. Abramson and Carter (2015) demonstrate that post-1815 European ter7
Adolf Hitler is the typical historical example used of such a leader.
9
ritorial claims are best explained by the presence of multiple competing historical precedents
in proximity to current borders.
If leaders are indeed careful and strategic in making claims, we should expect leaders
to generally make “good” claims. In other words, we should expect the claims made to
typically be the least disruptive in terms of risk of conflict and trade, and to offer the
highest prospective payoff from future settlement. There is in fact much variation over
how costly different territorial claims are and how lasting prospective settlements are. The
evidence suggests that historical precedents are associated with more lasting and peaceful
settlements, even in the hard cases where the settlements follow violent conflict.
A number of scholars show that the manner in which territorial settlements are made
greatly influences how likely they are to reduce future conflict. Peacefully negotiated territorial settlements are found to be much less likely to result in future dispute and violence than
settlements that result from military conflict (Tir, 2003, 2005a,b). Gibler and Tir (2010) argue that peaceful transfers lead to a “positive peace” that is not only devoid of threats and
militarized interaction, but is peaceful and prosperous. In contrast, territorial settlements
that result from violence tend to be fragile and are much more likely to break down into
future dispute and war. Prorok and Huth (2015) relatedly show that territorial transfers
consistent with international legal principles are more likely to be lasting and lead to peace.
This makes sense in tandem with the findings of Gibler and Tir (2010), as disputes in which
international law clearly points towards a particular solution are known to be less violent
and more ripe for peaceful settlement (Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011, 2012, 2013).
A recent set of papers demonstrates that the historical status of transferred territory is a
key factor. Carter and Goemans (2011) demonstrate that in well over a majority of the cases
in which leaders transfer territory as the result of violence, “new” borders are drawn along
prior administrative frontiers. Moreover, the evidence suggests that leaders’ propensity to
choose borders that follow precedent is related to function. New boundaries that are drawn
following violent conflict are significantly less likely to be disputed and fought over in the
10
future if they follow prior administrative frontiers. One problem with the finding that peaceful transfers lead to peace and violent transfers lead to violence, e.g., Gibler and Tir (2010),
is that it is hard to disentangle the reasons two states peacefully (or violently) transferred
territory from the reasons they have peaceful (or conflictual) relations subsequently. The
fact that the results in Carter and Goemans (2011) compare violent transfers that follow
administrative precedents to violent transfers that do not follow precedents sidesteps this
issue.
Carter and Goemans (2014) extend this finding by showing that violent transfers that
follow administrative frontiers actually resemble peaceful transfers in terms of their subsequent probability of peace. In fact, as time passes neighbors that experienced either a
peaceful or violent transfer with precedent become less likely to experience dispute and
conflict, while neighbors that violently transfer territory with no precedent are increasingly
likely to violently dispute their border again. This evidence is largely consistent with the
findings of scholars such as Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) and Prorok and Huth (2015) as
well, as a clear historical precedent often suggests that international legal principles such as
uti possidetis clearly favor one claimant to a dispute.
The sharp distinction between new boundaries that follow a historical precedent and those
without precedent is also found in the economic realm. Simmons (2005) demonstrates that
territorial disputes depress bilateral trade flows. She argues that border disputes increase
investor uncertainty due to a heightened potential for conflict and future border changes.
Carter and Goemans (2015) show that not all border changes are equally damaging to trade.
While there is a drop in bilateral trade flows between neighbors following any territorial
transfer, the drop in trade flows is less severe following peaceful transfers relative to violent.
Moreover, there is a large difference in the long-term effects of territorial transfer on trade
flows depending on whether the new border follows historical precedent or not. Trade rebounds significantly more quickly following violent transfers that follow historical precedent
than after violent transfers that do not follow precedent. In fact, trade flows recover after
11
violent transfers that follow precedent much like they do after peaceful transfers.
In sum, territorial settlements that follow historical precedent are much more likely to
result in peaceful and prosperous relations than settlements without precedent. This is true
even in the hard case of territorial transfers that follow violence, which the extant literature
has shown to be associated with a heightened risk of future conflict.
History and the Shadow of the Future
At this point, the role of historical precedents plays a complicated and in some ways ambiguous role in territorial disputes. On the one hand, the presence of historical precedents are a
negative force in the sense that they provide greater incentive for leaders to open territorial
disputes. On the other hand, conditional on there being an open dispute, a dispute undergirded by historical precedent is usually preferable to a dispute with no precedent. Moreover,
when settlements occur that reflect states’ claims over territory with historical precedent,
these settlements are more peaceful and less apt to be re-litigated. Accordingly, I argue that
historical precedents are a double-edged sword.
Precedents and the Emergence of Territorial Claims
In thinking about what kinds of territorial claims leaders make and why they have incentive
to claim neighboring territory, it is useful to delineate the costs and benefits of making a
territorial claim. We start with the association between the costs of territorial claims and
leaders’ perceived opportunity to make them. Territorial claims are quite costly to states
(e.g., (Vasquez and Henehan, 2001; Simmons, 2005)). However, not all prospective claims
carry equal costs for leaders. In particular, territorial claims bounded by historical precedent
are much less costly for states to make. This relatively low cost for claims provides leaders
with a greater opportunity to make claims bounded by precedent relative to those lacking
precedent.
12
Leaders bear several costs for making territorial claims. First, territorial claims must be
justified to both international and domestic audiences. Internationally, claims that demonstrate a leader has limited aims and that have a well-accepted justification carry fewer costs.
Leaders that make claims along historical precedent are able to signal that they have limited
aims as the basis for their claims are bounded by an identifiable linear frontier. When a
leader makes a claim based on a specific historical precedent, this provides a relatively clear
boundary around the neighboring territory that her state wants to integrate. This helps
signal that a leader is not an expansionist type with unlimited aims by putting a specific
demarcation around the claim (Goemans and Schultz, 2014a). Accordingly, other leaders
with interests in the region are much less threatened by clearly bounded and limited claims
as they have fewer worries about the scope of such claims. Consequently, when leaders
make claims bounded by historical precedent they are less likely to face counterbalancing or
aggressive push-back from third parties.
It is fairly trivial to see why it is not credible for a state to justify a territorial claim
by bluntly stating the need for more resources or land. Such claims will make a leader and
her regime appear to be expansionist and dangerous as they do a very poor job signaling
limited aims. In fact, a justification for making a claim that explicitly rests on the “need”
to expand ones borders at the expense of neighboring states is a fairly bald-faced statement
of expansionism. Accordingly, territorial claims of this kind between neighboring states are
quite rare, with the example of Germany in the 1930s serving as a prominent but atypical
example (Goemans and Schultz, 2014a).
Claims that follow prominent alternative principles such as ethnicity, language, religion,
or even to place a border along “natural frontiers” also do a poor job signaling limited aims.
The distribution of ethnic groups or religious brethren are never clearly bounded by a linear
frontier, as groups intermingle and any new boundary will still leave minority populations
on the “wrong” sides of the border. Consequently, drawing a clear boundary defined by
ethnicity becomes a difficult bargaining problem (Carter and Goemans, 2011). For example,
13
many prominent observers and policy-makers criticized the application of uti possidetis to
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the early and mid-1990s arguing that much better
borders could be drawn to reflect ethnic distribution (for example, see Owen (1995) or Ratner
(1996)). However, the reason why drawing new borders to better enclose ethnic groups has
long been viewed as “opening a pandora’s box” is that any potential new border (for the state
gaining territory) would necessarily still leave many co-ethnics in the “wrong state”, which
suggests that more co-ethnics could be enclosed if more territory was transferred. However,
moving the border to benefit the co-ethnics of the gaining state will always have the opposite
effect for groups who wish to remain in the state losing territory. These problems make it
difficult for leaders to credibly make limited claims that are explicitly justified by a need to
enclose co-ethnics.
Natural frontiers, while also seemingly attractive, often do not provide clear linear boundaries around a claim either. For example, although a principle such as the highest ridge of
a mountain range seems straightforward, in practice it is often difficult to unambiguously
identify. First, a mountain range or river often does not extend for the full expanse of
two states’ shared frontier. Second, even when a river or mountain range is long enough
to potentially form a natural boundary between two states, identifying how to connect the
highest ridge of a given mountain range or the correct river to demarcate a boundary can
be difficult in practice. A good example of the difficulty of using a mountain range to draw
a boundary comes from the example of France and Spain attempted to draw a border using
the Pyrenees. Although seemingly straightforward, in practice neither side could agree on
where the relevant mountain crest was. Peter Sahlins outlines the difficulties encountered
by the French in making claims along the crest of the Pyrenees in negotiation of the 1660
Treaty of the Pyrenees, noting that “when Haro (the Spanish minister) and Mazarin (the
French minister) met on the Isle of Pheasants, the French minister reintroduced the notion
of “dividing mountain crests”. . . As the two ministers debated the issue, it became clear that
they held very different ideas of where the Pyrenees lay (Sahlins, 1989, 39).” The Eritreans
14
and Ethiopians had a similar problem with identifying rivers based on treaties between Italy
and Ethiopia in the early 19th century, as they agreed on the name of the river that would
help demarcate a portion of the frontier but disagreed on which of multiple rivers in the area
the treaty identified.8
Historical precedents are associated with more credible and less costly territorial claims
for reasons beyond simply providing clear and limited bounds. As noted by Murphy (1990),
since the principle of state sovereignty was codified in the Treaty of Westphalia, the notion
of historical possession has played an important role in justifying territorial claims. It is
not hard to understand why, as reclaiming what is rightfully yours is a much more compelling position to take than demanding a neighbor’s land to enclose more territory, people
or resources. International law has developed in a way consistent with this point, as historical precedents are reflected in prominent international legal principles relevant to territorial
claims. International law has become increasingly important to the management and resolution of territorial disputes. For instance, Huth, Croco and Appel (2011) demonstrate that
legal principles have strong effect on disputants propensities to pursue peaceful versus violent
means of resolution. In many cases, uti possidetis codifies the notion that historical boundaries are important to legally sound territorial claims.9 Other principles such as effective
occupation also apply to disputed areas and emphasize the importance of precedents. In any
event, the increase in the importance of international law to dispute management and resolution in the last half century has only heightened the importance of historical boundaries
to claims.
Claims over historical precedent are also easier to justify to domestic audiences. Tying
new territorial claims to history facilitates leaders’ abilities to use nationalist arguments
domestically to justify a dispute. It is important to note that leaders do not necessarily
8
See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Decision regarding Delimitation of the Border between
Eritrea and Ethiopia. 2002 ILM 1057, UN Document S/2002/423.
9
Uti possidetis does not cover boundaries below the level of constituent republics, which rules out a
number of potential precedents (Carter and Goemans, 2011, 286).
15
make historically based claims in a way that is impartial or even accurately portrays her
state’s or peoples’ role in the contested land historically. Claims need not have much actual
historical connection to an ethnic or national group, but the presence of alternative historical
borders provides greater opportunity for leaders to make a claim as they can justify this claim
internationally and also rhetorically tie it to nationality at home.
History and the Potential Benefits of Claims
Although I have outlined a number of reasons why historical precedents provide less costly
potential claims, it is still not clear why leaders want to integrate this territory into their
state. In other words, what are the potential benefits to integrating territory bounded by
precedent for a potential challenger? Surely the answer is not simply because a claim can
credibly be made to it, as territorial claims are known to be costly and are accordingly
rather rare. In other words, while claims that follow precedent might carry fewer costs, if
they do carry costs it is unclear why all such potential claims would be beneficial enough to
outweigh them. Moreover, the empirical record makes clear that claims are relatively rare
(Abramson and Carter, 2015). Needless to say, there are many more historical precedents
than claims. It is just not very plausible that leaders (or states) are maximizing the amount
of territory they could plausibly have by taking every opportunity to make a credible claim.
This raises the question of what incentive leaders have to dispute and prospectively integrate
land bounded by historical precedents. I outline two possible explanations here.10
The first possibility is consistent with the conventional wisdom that territorial claims are
made to systematically enclose areas of greater economic or military value to states. The
idea is that leaders tend to make claims that follow historical boundary precedents because
these old borders systematically enclose land that is of particular value to states. The fact
that states perpetually contest territories of particular economic and military value explains
why these lands contain multiple historical precedents and experience a high volume of
10
The following discussion expands upon several points made in Abramson and Carter (2015).
16
contemporary territorial claims. These especially valuable territories have multiple historical
precedents as borders in these areas frequently changed due to perpetual contestation and
fighting over them. Contemporary leaders have incentives that are similar to those of leaders
who sought these territories historically; the prospective benefits of gaining this valuable
land explain why they make territorial claims that follow historical precedents. Thus, the
observation that most territorial claims follow historical precedent does not necessarily mean
that resources or strategic territory do not drive claim-making. While this idea is consistent
with the existing focus on economically valuable resources or strategically located territory,
the systematic connection with historical precedents is a theoretical innovation.
The second and more novel explanation relies on the idea that claims which follow precedent are attractive due to the persistent coordination effects of old borders on a wide-range
of individual behavior. This explanation builds upon the institutional theory of borders,
which posits that borders are international institutions that establish jurisdiction and coordinate political and economic behavior of individuals on both sides of the line (Goemans,
2006; Carter and Goemans, 2011). A key point here is that boundaries vary in terms of
their institutional effectiveness. It takes time for boundaries to become well-established
among the population (Carter and Goemans, 2014) and uncertainty over the true location
of a boundary hampers its ability to coordinate behavior (Simmons, 2005). However, once
boundaries become recognized and coordinate the expectations and behavior of many they
exhibit increasing returns to coordination. Increasing returns derive from the fact that as
most individuals coordinate their behavior around an institution, this shapes expectations
and provides incentive for others to do so as well (Pierson, 2000, 2004). For example, it is
well known in the economics literature that well-established political boundaries have large
effects on trade and economic exchange (McCallum, 1995; Trefler, 1995; Feenstra, 2002).
Increasing returns to coordination also imply that well-established boundaries exhibit
path-dependent effects. Once in place for a period of time, political boundaries coordinate
individuals’ behavior across multiple dimensions in ways that become harder and harder to
17
swiftly alter. For instance, economic actors build trade networks around existing boundaries
because these jurisdictional lines dictate the transaction costs, e.g., tax rates or tariffs, of
doing business in one locale versus another. Changing boundaries does affect behavior, but
the influence of borders’ is “sticky” and takes time to dissipate (Carter and Goemans, 2014,
2015). In other words, as political boundaries remain in place for a period of time, they
exhibit increasing returns as more and more individuals coordinate their behavior around
them, which makes their effects more costly and difficult to reverse (see Pierson (2000, 254)
for a general theoretical treatment). Thus, political borders exhibit path dependence in the
sense that once the population learns to coordinate around them, their effect on behavior
will be persistent and “sticky.”
A key implication of the observation that well-established boundaries have persistent
effects on coordination is that historical precedents make particularly attractive territorial
claims for leaders. The fact that established historical precedents are remembered and continue to affect behavior makes these boundaries relatively attractive for a leader to prospectively integrate into her state. These old borders can be implemented at lower administrative
cost as old institutions can be revived with lower adjustment costs because behavior, e.g.,
via trade networks, is still affected by these old lines. Accordingly, new boundaries that
follow well-established precedent are also much less disruptive in the economic and security
realms.
Empirically, there is a burgeoning body of work that corroborates the idea that wellestablished boundaries have path-dependent effects. For example, Wolf (2005) demonstrates
that internal trade in inter-war Poland was significantly influenced by the old and supposedly
erased partition boundaries. In a similar vein, Wolf, Schulze and Heinemeyer (2011) show
that the large number of border changes that resulted from post-World War I treaties had
surprisingly small effects on central European trade in the 1920s because the new borders
in fact followed existing administrative lines, i.e., trade district boundaries. Carter and
Goemans (2015) also demonstrate that the effect of boundary changes on trade flows is
18
highly conditional on whether the “new” boundary follows an historical precedent. While
all border changes are initially disruptive of trade flows, the territorial transfers that occur
along historical precedent recover very quickly relative to boundaries that are truly new.
Carter and Goemans (2014) show very similar temporal effects in the security realm, as new
boundaries that follow precedent are relatively unlikely to be disputed or fought over, an
effect that strengthens as these borders remain in place post-transfer.
In sum, I identify two main explanations for why leaders have the incentive as well as
the opportunity to dispute along historical precedents. First, it is possible that persistent
conflict among states over the most valuable territories explain why historical precedents
and contemporary territorial claims are clustered in the same areas. In this explanation,
the historical precedent itself is not central to why leaders want the territory. Rather, the
resources or strategic territory bounded by the precedent drives leaders to claim it. A second
and more theoretically novel explanation focuses on the persistent coordination effects of
historical precedents. In this explanation the sticky coordinative effects of the border itself
provides the incentive for leaders to dispute it.
Where Do Precedents Come From? Does it Matter?
The varied histories of historical precedents can help us understand what drives leaders’
incentives to make claims along them. I discuss two main dimensions along which the
histories of precedents vary that can provide guidance over the source of incentive for leaders
to claim it. First, the manner in which an historical boundary becomes a precedent can
affect leaders’ subsequent propensities to make a claim along it. Second, as Abramson and
Carter (2015) suggest, the actual history of the precedent as an international boundary can
affect how attractive it is to leaders.
Border changes can be mutually agreed upon, meaning peaceful, or they can be contentious and violent. In other words, a boundary can change (and become a precedent) as
19
a result of war or a boundary can change as a result of peaceful negotiation. The existing
literature on territorial transfers makes much of this distinction, as peaceful transfers of territory are found to be much more likely to lead to subsequent peace, while the opposite is
true of violent transfers (Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Tir, 2003, 2005a,b; Gibler and Tir, 2010).
This distinction is also potentially relevant to understanding why leaders have incentive to
dispute along historical precedents, as war plays a much more prominent role in the idea
that persistent fighting over valuable lands drives claims that follow precedent. If perpetual
conflict over territories of great value is responsible for such areas having multiple precedents and also experiencing higher volumes of territorial claims, then we would expect these
precedents to have been more often produced violently. In short, we would expect the most
sought after historical precedents today to have been the most fought over historically.
If multiple precedents and subsequent claims reflect perpetual conflict over territories of
great value, then the historical boundaries themselves are simply epiphenomenal. In other
words, leaders’ observed tendency to dispute historical boundary precedents is derivative of
these lines systematically bounding territory of economic, military, or political value. Accordingly, any empirical assessment of territorial claims should not find that the existence
of historical precedents matters once the presence of valuable resources or strategically located territory is accounted for. However, it is possible that the increasing importance of
justifying claims internationally, e.g., the increased importance of international law, and domestically, e.g., the rise of democracy, also contributes to the importance of precedents, while
the presence of especially valuable territory provides incentive. If this is the case, we would
expect interaction between characteristics that make territory valuable and the presence of
historical precedents.
If persistent coordination effects explain why leaders have incentive to claim along historical precedents then the method of transfer is less important. There is no reason to think
that leaders would be more likely to dispute along precedents that had been fought over.
Rather, the factor that matters most for mechanisms that rely on historical borders persis20
tent coordinative effects is how well established the precedent was as a functioning border
before being “removed” from the map. Historical borders that were in place for longer periods of time will typically have had much greater influence on individual behavior (Abramson
and Carter, 2015). The idea that borders exhibit increasing returns to coordination along
them implies that time is a key factor. In fact, how well established a precedent was as a
border institution should matter regardless of factors such as how the precedent ceased to
be a border and whether the precedent is historically part of a contemporary state. Thus,
to assess the idea that persistent coordination effects drive leaders’ propensities to dispute
along historical precedents it is essential to account for the time a precedent was in place as
an international border.
If the connection between historical precedents and contemporary claims is a byproduct of
perpetual conflict over the most valuable pieces of land, our expectations are quite different.
Specifically, we would not expect leaders to systematically claim precedents that are relatively
well-established. It is important to point out that this is not simply because how wellestablished a precedent was as a border is not important to this explanation. Rather, if
precedents reflect border changes that are the product of perpetual conflict over especially
valuable territories, the precedents most subject to subsequent claims, i.e., those that enclose
the most value, would not have been in place for long periods of time. In short, frequent
border changes over especially valuable territories implies that these “valuable” precedents
were not in place for long periods in which they could become well-institutionalized as
political boundaries.
Of course, even the most well-established precedents will cease to coordinate behavior if
enough time has passed since they ceased to be functioning borders. As boundary precedents become very old, more recent borders should increasingly exert influence on individual
behavior. The idea that boundary institutions exhibit increasing returns as they remain in
place suggests that changing them will not lead to quick changes in their effects on individual behavior (Pierson, 2004; Abramson and Carter, 2015). However, once new borders are
21
established they should slowly start to exert effect on behavior, unless they are completely
ignored by the state and not at all enforced. In contrast, if perpetual conflict over territories
of great military and economic value drive the connection between precedents and subsequent claims, then it is not clear why the age of the precedent matters. Rather, leaders claim
precedents to enclose the economically and militarily valuable territory that they bound.
In sum, if path-dependent coordination effects matter, time is important to border precedents role in territorial claims in two key ways. First, border precedents that were functioning
borders for a significant period of time should be more attractive to draw claims around than
precedents with relatively short lives. Second, as a border precedent becomes older, the attractiveness of making a claim along it should diminish. Moreover, it is important to note
that the coordinative mechanism behind why precedents matter suggest that this temporal dynamic will be observed regardless of whether a precedent was created peacefully or
violently and whether the precedent is an old border of a contemporary state, i.e., a potential claimant. In contrast, if the observed connection between historical precedents and
subsequent claims is attributable to perpetual conflict over especially valuable territories,
we should observe that the precedents leaders claim enclose territory rich in economic resources or of military-strategic importance. Furthermore, perpetual contestation suggests
that precedents in these areas would not be especially well-established, as conflict over these
resources would leave precedents that are not well-institutionalized in its wake. After all,
in this explanation conflict over these valuable territories are responsible for the presence of
multiple precedents in the first place.
Existing Evidence and the Primacy of Coordination
Although there is much work left to be done on the sources of territorial claims and why
historical precedents play a central role, there is evidence in the existing literature that helps
adjudicate between the two explanations. While there remain gaps that need attention in
the empirical record, the existing evidence suggests that persistent coordination provides a
22
more compelling explanation.
The idea that perpetual conflict over territory of great value drives the connection between precedents and claims finds relatively little empirical support. Although there is no
direct evidence that explores leaders’ propensities to contest precedents created violently
relative to precedents created peacefully, Carter and Goemans (2014, 2015) provide evidence
that the method of transfer is less important than whether a transfer follows historical precedent or not, a finding also consistent with Wolf, Schulze and Heinemeyer (2011). Relatedly,
Abramson and Carter (2015) show that the connection between historical precedents and
subsequent claims is not causally mediated by the propensity for militarized conflict. However, it is important to note that future data work is needed that directly codes whether the
border changes that produced precedents resulted from military engagement or not.
There is surprisingly little evidence that claims are drawn to efficiently enclose ethnic kin
or economic resources. Murphy (1990) examines three prominent territorial claims that the
conventional wisdom suggests are driven by religion, ethnicity, or oil resources, showing that
historical precedents play a much more important role in the shape of all three. More systematically, Abramson and Carter (2015) demonstrate that the estimated effect on territorial
claim emergence of the presence of competing historical precedents near current borders is
unaffected by inclusion of these factors. Moreover, they find no consistent interactive effects
between valuable resources and historical precedents.
In contrast, there is an emerging body of evidence that supports the empirical implications central to the idea that persistent coordination drives precedent-based border claims.
Wolf (2005) demonstrates that the pre-World War I partition borders continue to significantly
affect internal trade flows in inter-war Poland. Moreover, consistent with the persistent coordination explanation, the effects of these old borders are very strong in 1919 and wane
somewhat over the next decade and a half. Carter and Goemans (2014) demonstrate that
violent territorial transfers that follow precedent are much less likely to be disputed than
those without precedent and that this effect strengthens over time. Wolf, Schulze and Heine23
meyer (2011) and Carter and Goemans (2015) show that trade patterns following territorial
changes are much less severely effected when the new boundaries are historical precedents.
In the most direct empirical assessment, Abramson and Carter (2015) show that leaders’
propensities to make precedent based claims increases as the precedents are better established and reflect historical boundaries that were more recently removed from the map. As
noted above, neither of these findings are consistent with the idea that perpetual conflict
drives the density of precedents and subsequent claims in especially salient areas. In sum,
the existing empirical evidence suggests the primacy of the coordination explanation.
Why Are Claims Difficult to Resolve?
The preceding arguments and evidence suggest that leaders systematically make territorial
claims that follow historical precedents. Moreover, existing evidence suggests that the claims
that follow precedent lead to better outcomes (Carter and Goemans, 2011; Wolf, Schulze and
Heinemeyer, 2011; Carter and Goemans, 2014, 2015; Prorok and Huth, 2015). However, this
generates a major puzzle relative to the empirical record: if leaders are systematically making
“good” claims, then why are territorial disputes so difficult to resolve? In fact, Abramson
and Carter (2015) demonstrate that claims over historical precedents take longer to resolve,
even though they are not systematically more violent.11 I argue that the shadow of the
future looms larger when claims are made along historical precedents, which leads states
to hold out longer before settling disputes. Moreover, the persistent coordination effects
explanation does a better job explaining why territorial settlements that follow precedent
are longer lasting and more peaceful.
A focus on long-term payoffs is the key to explaining why states bargain longer over
territorial claims that follow historical precedent. States bargaining over disputed territory
consider both the immediate and long-term implications of a territorial settlement. The long11
They demonstrate that the areas in which multiple precedents do not lead to claims because they are
more likely to host military conflict.
24
term implications of territorial settlements are especially important to leaders as borders are
institutions fundamental to defining the state (Goemans, 2006). Compounding the salience
of borders for states is the fact that border settlements are relatively costly and difficult
to overturn once neighbors formally agree on a line. In other words, disputants think of
territorial settlements as very likely to be permanent. The permanence of settlements is a
trend that has gained considerable steam since World War II, to the degree that scholars
commonly refer to the fixity of agreed upon borders as a “norm” (Zacher, 2001; Atzili, 2012).
As noted above, a growing body of evidence shows that settlements which follow historical
precedents are less likely to be subsequently disputed and fought over and also enjoy much
healthier economic relations. An important implication of this is that settlements that follow
historical precedents are more stable and thus will be seen as more permanent by disputants.
Accordingly, for states worried about the long-term consequences of settlement, the shadow
of the future looms larger over potential settlements that follow historical precedents, as
disputants expect such settlements to be quite permanent.
Fearon (1998) theoretically analyzes this dynamic, as he demonstrates that a longer
lasting prospective settlement leads states to bargain harder to reach it. Territorial disputes
are well known as one of the more difficult issues that states bargain over. Moreover, despite
all of the upsides of territorial claims that follow precedents relative to claims with no
precedent, these claims take longer to resolve (Abramson and Carter, 2015).12 Given that
settlements along historical precedent are easier to implement and lead to less dispute and
uncertainty over function in the future, states take this into account when negotiating such
claims. Thus, claims that follow precedent are known to be harder to reverse, which increases
the stakes for disputants as they know that any settlement is going to be relatively permanent
and costly to reverse.
Finally, I argue that the coordination mechanism is essential to understanding why dis12
It is important to point out that this study does not provide any evidence over how claims are resolved
or whether claims were militarized or peaceful before being resolve. Accordingly, more exploration of these
issues is needed to fully understand how precedent based claims effect the propensity for dispute resolution.
25
putes over precedents take longer to resolve. The idea that the shadow of the future is longer
for disputes over precedent relies on the idea that settlements that follow historical borders
are longer lasting. The idea that historical boundaries are easier to justify does not provide
much of an explanation for this. In short, if historical boundaries are attractive simply because they make it easier for leaders to justify new claims, there is no reason to expect claims
along precedent to be stronger final settlements unless there are not alternative precedents
to choose. In other words, why wouldn’t leaders simply find another precedent to justify a
new claim? Second, if perpetual conflict over the most valuable territory explains why some
areas have more precedents and claims, it is not clear why we would expect settlements that
follow these precedents to be longer lasting. Rather, we would expect continued contestation
over these especially valuable territories, an expectation inconsistent with existing evidence.
In contrast, the coordination mechanism can nicely explain why settlements along precedent are longer lasting and hence, cast a longer shadow on the future. If individuals on the
ground already have experience coordinating around an historical precedent then implementing this precedent as a new border will be much easier than establishing a completely new
border. Accordingly, unforeseen problems and incidents are also less likely when a boundary
is returned to an historical precedents, which also contributes to a lack of conflict and dispute. Again, the key factors to understand which precedents will make good settlements are
the amount of time a precedent was in place and its age. Claims over better established and
more recent precedents will take longer to resolve and will result in more lasting precedents
than less established and very old precedents.
Conclusions and Implications
The arguments developed here in combination with the empirical evidence in the extant
literature provide more clarity over the role of history in contemporary territorial claims.
The idea that historical borders matter in contemporary territorial disputes primarily due
26
to their sticky coordinative effects on the population provides a nuanced explanation for the
importance of history in conflict among neighboring states. Historical precedents do not only
provide leaders with a way to justify their claims to domestic and international audiences.
Rather, old borders arise as attractive new borders because coordination around political
boundaries exhibits increasing returns, which implies that coordination around old borders is
not easily reversed. Although claim justification is important and helps us explain empirical
patterns, persistent coordination is necessary to explain the full range of cases and outcomes
in territorial disputes.
There are a number of interesting implications of this argument and the evidence supportive of it for normative theory. First, the idea that leaders claim historical boundaries in
large part because the local population are already coordinating around these lines suggests
that the territorial claims we observe tend to be the “good” ones. This is a counterintuitive
point, as territorial claims are widely known to be associated with violence and war. It is
important to note that I am not saying these territorial claims are “unconditionally good”,
but rather that they are amongst the most benign from the set of possible territorial claims.
It is also important to note that most territorial claims do not result in militarized conflict
(Huth, 1996) and that the claims that are based on precedent are less violent than those that
are not drawn along precedent (Carter and Goemans, 2011). Moreover, the persistent coordination explanation for precedent-based claims suggests that old boundaries also coordinate
behavior without a claim, which suggests that such claims are less disruptive than claims
with no precedent. Accordingly, theorists should consider the idea that claims bounded by
historical borders are better justified and can lead perhaps even improve long-term social
welfare under certain conditions.
From the standpoint of leaders considering the diverse (and infinite) set of possible territorial claims to make, this theory also suggests that more “legitimate” claims are often also
socially better claims. It is important to point out again that the ease of justification does
not do as well explaining the variety of relevant cases and outcomes in territorial disputes.
27
However, justification does work in tandem with the coordinative effects of well-established
precedents in a way that pushes rational leaders to make better claims. These points do not
detract from the fact that many territorial claims and disputes lead to war and suffering, e.g.,
the Turkey-Cyprus dispute. Rather, I argue that the institutional theory suggests that out of
all possible populations of territorial claims, we observe one of the “better” ones. Moreover,
these arguments also suggest that claims made without precedent should be viewed with
skepticism, as has been the case in disputes between Georgia and Russia over portions of
Georgia.
Finally, if we simultaneously consider the connection between territorial disputes and war
and the role of historical precedents in territorial claims, new light can be shed on the longterm decline of inter-state war.13 The idea that leaders systematically make territorial claims
that follow historical precedent and that these precedents make more stable and lasting new
boundaries suggests that interstate territorial conflict should slowly decline. Schultz (2015)
corroborates that both the number of disputes and total area disputed have been consistently
on the decline since the mid-1960s. Given the massive amount of evidence tying territorial
disputes to war and battle deaths, the decline in territorial claims is a plausible explanation
for the observed downward trends in the incidence and severity of interstate war. The
institutional theory of borders put forth in this article provides solid theoretical footing on
which we can make sense of these broad trends. The majority of ongoing territorial claims
follow historical precedents, so as these disputed boundaries become settled we observe
increasingly permanent settlements and fixed borders. Accordingly, the set of interstate
wars that have historically been linked to territorial disputes has also declined considerably.
13
See Lacina, Gleditsch and Russett (2006) or Pinker (2012), for example.
28
References
Abramson, Scott and David B. Carter. 2015. “The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes.”
Unpublished Manuscript .
Allee, Todd L. and Paul K. Huth. 2006. “Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International
Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover.” American Political Science Review 100(2):219–
250.
Atzili, Boaz. 2012. Good Fences, Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Babst, Dean. 1972. “A Force for Peace.” Industrial Research pp. 55–58.
Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2):309–341.
Carter, David B. 2010. “The Strategy of Territorial Conflict.” American Journal of Political
Science 54(4):969–987.
Carter, David B. and H.E. Goemans. 2011. “The Making of the Territorial Order: New
Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict.” International Organization 65(2):275–
310.
Carter, David B. and H.E. Goemans. 2014. “The Temporal Dynamics of New International
Borders.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(3):285–302.
Carter, David B. and H.E. Goemans. 2015. “International Trade and Coordination: Tracing
Border Effects.” Unpublished Manuscript .
Chiozza, Giacomo and Ajin Choi. 2003. “Guess Who Did What Political Leaders and
the Management of Territorial Disputes, 1950–1990.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
47(3):251–278.
29
Dixon, William J. 1994. “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.”
American Political Science Review 88(1):14–32.
Fearon, James D. 1998. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” International Organization 52(2):269–305.
Feenstra, Robert C. 2002. “Border Effects and the Gravity Equation: Consistent Methods
for Estimation.” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 49(5):491–5–6.
Gartzke, Erik. 2007.
“The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science
51(1):166–191.
Gent, Stephen E and Megan Shannon. 2010. “The effectiveness of international arbitration
and adjudication: Getting into a bind.” Journal of Politics 72(2):366–380.
Gibler, Douglas M. 2007. “Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict.”
International Studies Quarterly 51(3):509–532.
Gibler, Douglas M. 2012. The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and International Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gibler, Douglas M. and Jaroslav Tir. 2010. “Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers.” American Journal
of Political Science 54(4):951–968.
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2007. “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War.” Journal of Peace
Research 44(3):293–309.
Goemans, H. E. 2006. Bounded Communities: territoriality, territorial attachment, and
conflict. In Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization, ed. Miles Kahler and
Barbara F. Walter. New York: Cambridge University Press chapter 2, pp. 25–61.
30
Goemans, H.E. and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2014a. “Aims, Claims and the Bargaining Model
of War.” Unpublished Manuscript .
Goemans, H.E. and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2014b. “The Politics of Territorial Disputes: A
Geospatial Approach Applied to Africa.” Unpublished Manuscript .
Goertz, Gary and Paul Diehl. 1992. Territorial Changes and International Conflict. London:
Routledge.
Gowa, Joanne. 2000. Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Gowa, Joanne. 2011. “The democratic peace after the cold war.” Economics & Politics
23(2):153–171.
Hensel, Paul R. 2000. Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict. In What
Do We Know About War?, ed. John A. Vasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
pp. 57–84.
Hensel, Paul R. 2001. “Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial
Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992.” International Studies Quarterly 45:81–109.
Holsti, Kalevi J. 1991. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Huth, Paul K. 1996. Standing Your Ground. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan.
Huth, Paul K., Sarah E. Croco and Benjamin J. Appel. 2011. “Does International Law
Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of
Territorial Conflicts since 1945.” American Political Science Review 105(2):415–436.
Huth, Paul K., Sarah E Croco and Benjamin J Appel. 2012. “Law and the use of force in
31
world politics: The varied effects of law on the exercise of military power in territorial
disputes.” International Studies Quarterly 56(1):17–31.
Huth, Paul K., Sarah E Croco and Benjamin J Appel. 2013. “Bringing Law to the Table: Legal Claims, Focal Points, and the Settlement of Territorial Disputes Since 1945.”
American Journal of Political Science 57(1):90–103.
Huth, Paul K. and Todd L. Allee. 2002. The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in
the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, Dominic D.P. and Monica Duffy Toft. 2014. “Grounds for War: The Evolution of
Territorial Conflict.” International Security 38(3):7–38.
Kocs, Stephen A. 1995. “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945–1987.” Journal of
Politics 57(1):159–175.
Lacina, Bethany, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Bruce Russett. 2006. “The declining risk of death
in battle.” International Studies Quarterly 50(3):673–680.
Lee, Hoon and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2012. “Foreign direct investment and territorial
disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(4):675–703.
McCallum, J. 1995. “National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns.”
American Economic Review 85(3):615–623.
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. “A Kantian System? Democracy and Third- Party Conflict
Resolution.” American Journal of Political Science 46(4):749–759.
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements.” American Journal of Political Science 51(4):721–737.
Murphy, Alexander B. 1990. “Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims.” Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 80(4):531–548.
32
Owen, David. 1995. Balkan Odyssey. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.”
American Political Science Review 94(2):251–267.
Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton
University Press.
Pinker, Steven. 2012. The better angels of our nature: a history of violence and humanity.
New York, NY: Penguin.
Prorok, Alyssa K. and Paul K. Huth. 2015. “International Law and the Consolidation of
Peace Following Territorial Changes.” Journal of Politics 77(1):161–174.
Ratner, Steven R. 1996. “Drawing a Better Line: Uti possidetis and the Borders of New
States.” The American Journal of International Law 90(4):590–624.
Reed, William and Daina Chiba. 2010. “Decomposing the Relationship Between Contiguity
and Militarized Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science 54(1):61–73.
Russett, Bruce. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War
World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sahlins, Peter. 1989. Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2013. “Whats in a Claim? De Jure versus De Facto Borders in Interstate
Territorial Disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(6):1059–1084.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2015. “Borders, Conflict, and Trade.” Annual Review of Political Science
18.
33
Senese, Paul D. 2005. “Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New
Joint Explanation.” American Journal of Political Science 49(4):769–779.
Simmons, Beth A. 2005. “Rules over Real Estate; Trade, Territorial Conflict and International Borders as Institutions.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(6):823–848.
Siverson, Randolph M. and Harvey Starr. 1990. “Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion
of War.” American Political Science Review 84(1):47–67.
Small, Marvin and J. David Singer. 1976. “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes,
1816–1965.” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1:50–68.
Starr, Harvey and Benjamin A. Most. 1976. “The Substance and Study of Borders in
International Relations Research.” International Studies Quarterly 20(4):581–620.
Tir, Jaroslav. 2003. “Averting Armed in International Conflicts through State-to-State Territorial Transfers.” Journal of Politics 65(4):1235–1257.
Tir, Jaroslav. 2005a. “Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term
Success of Partitions.” Journal of Peace Research 42(5):545–562.
Tir, Jaroslav. 2005b. “Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts between Rump
and Secessionist States.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(5):713–741.
Trefler, Daniel. 1995. “The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries.” American
Economic Review 85(5):1029–1046.
Vasquez, John A. 1993. The War Puzzle. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Vasquez, John A. 1995. “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality.”
Journal of Peace Research 32(3):277–293.
Vasquez, John A. and Marie T. Henehan. 2001. “Territorial Disputes and the Probability of
War, 1816–1992.” International Studies Quarterly 38(2):123–138.
34
Wolf, Nikolaus. 2005. “Path Dependent Border Effects: The Case of Poland’s Reunification
(1918–1939).” Explorations in Economic History 42:414–438.
Wolf, Nikolaus, Max-Stephen Schulze and Hans-Christian Heinemeyer. 2011. “On the Economic Consequences of the Peace: Trade and Borders after Versailles.” Journal of Economic History 71(4):915–949.
Zacher, Mark W. 2001. “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the
Use of Force.” International Organization 55(2):215–250.
35