Dafoe, J. W. (1943). Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919. Canadian
Historical Review, 24(3), 233-248.
lgOe Canadian
itoriœal
VOL. XXIV
CANADA
TORONTO,SEPTEMBER,1943
AND
THE
PEACE
CONFERENCE
No. 3
OF
1919
WITH thesecond
world
warentering
upon
itspenultimate,
if
not final, stage, the ill-fated Peace Conference of 1919 comes
out of the shadows; and is again being examined, judged, and
weighed for what it can give of information, instruction, and
warning for the guidanceof the victors. Opinion about the treaty
which came out of this Conferencehas gone through many phases
in the.past twenty-four years. After the hopeful enthusiasmwith
which the treaty was greeted by the general public had waned,
as it becameapparent that these hopeswere misplaced,the view
.that it imposeda Punic peacewhich the Germanswere justified
in circumventing and resisting by every available expedient was
so vigorously advanced, especially in the United States, that all
opinion critical of these conclusions,was under a veritable taboo.
This became a stock argument in all pleas for appeasement.
Accordingto this theory France was the villain of the peace; it
was provisions of the treaty upon which she was insistent, supplemented by provocative coursesfollowing the war, that put
Germany, which desired to be peaceful, in a state of mind that
explained, and even justified, the rise of Nazism and the emergence of Hitler as a tribal god.
With Nazi Germany fully embarked upon its project of
conqueringthe world and seemingly far advanced along the road
to this end, a very different opinion took firm possessionof the
general Allied mind. This is that the Germany army, realizing
in 1918 that it could not win, played a huge confidencegame upon
the victorious Allies with the unwitting but very effective aid of
the President of the United States. It is held that no peace that
could have been made, and no post-war concessionsthat might
have been yielded would have deflected the German army, which
was in command behind the scenes, for a single day from its
purpose of renewing the conflict under conditions which would
make certain the overthrow of Germany's foes. By this theory
233
234
TtiE
CANADIAN
I-IISTORICAL REVIEW
France appearsas the one nation which then and afterwards knew
what Germany was up to; and sought unavailingly to take the
blinkers from the eyes of the too-trustful nations.
The
truth
lies somewhere
between
the
two
extremes
and
historians may well be in high dispute about its exact whereabouts a century hence. The contemporary judgment that the
secondexplanation, while it overstates the case, is much nearer
the truth than' the earlier pro-German view is not likely to be
dislodged from the post-war mind. But certain conclusions
drawn from the Paris Conferenceare pretty obvious, and they
are not without warningfor the victoriousAllies as they approach
the problemsof replacingwar with peace. It is clear now that,
whether the Germans approached President Wilson in October,
1918, with honest or dishonestintent, the whole proceedinghad
quite unforeseenconsequences. One of the countriesmaking war
on Germany undertook to fix the terms of peacewith the enemy
without
consultation
with
its associates.
It
is to be borne
in
mind that the United States did not consider itself an ally of
Great Britain, France, and the other combatant nations; it was
only an AssociatedPower. It then undertookto tell its associates,
who had been longer in the war and had made much heavier
sacrifices,that they must accept these conditions under the threat
that failing this the United Statesmight make a separatepeace
with Germany, as it ultimately did. The thesis that the catastrophic sequenceof events, beginningwith the deep and sharp
differencesbetween the victorious nations while they were consideringthe peace, and continuingdown through the years until
the whole peace structure went up in the flamesof battle, was
the direct result of the entertaining by President Wilson of the
approachesmade in October, 1918, through Switzerland, can be
strongly maintained and with no lack of documents which seem
to support it. One consequence
was that the Peace Conference
was never held. All that was held was a meeting of the Allied
and AssociatedPowerswhichwrestledwith the problemof shaping
a peacewithin the Wilsonianstipulationsand presentedits findings
to the Germans, declining to enter into verbal discussionof the
terms with them. The commentsof General Smuts upon this
failure are conclusive;and so for that matter are the protests
of generous-minded young men, recorded in Harold Nicolson's
Peacemaking(London, 1933), Nicolsonhimself being one of them.
An armistice solely on military grounds which could have been
obtained owing to the hopelessness
of the German positionabout
which there is no longer dispute; a preliminary free discussionby
CANADA AND TIlE PEACE CONFERENCEOF 1919
235
the victoriousnationsto determinethe terms of peacewhich they
were preparedto offer, to be followedby a real peaceconference-this would have been the logical course;and there will always be
those who will contend
that
had it been followed a workable
and
durable peace would have been obtained.
There is the very different theory that peace, obtained along
traditional lines of negotiations, would have been no more enduring than that which was reached by other methods, in view
of the arrogant denial of complete defeat by the German army
leadersand their propagandists;and that, taking the long view,
Wilson's coursein intervening and virtually taking charge of the
shaping of the peace, while it failed for the moment, has borne
fruit in the now all but universal determination to make a peace
this time which will establish and make fully operative those
principlesof a wide and enduringpeacewhich fell by the wayside
in the interval between the two wars because mankind was not
ready for them, though for a brief period lip servicewas paid them.
There is the certainty that the reorganizationof the world, following Allied victory, will be along lines deriving from the "great
experiment," as Lord Cecil has termed it, whichwas initiated when
the keeping of the world's peace was entrusted to the incomplete
and untried machinery of the League of Nations.
This article is not an attempt fully to appraise the work and
the worth of the Paris Peace Conference; and what has been said
thus far does not go beyond the purpose of furnishing a background for the considerationof a by-product of the Conference
which has exerciseda profound influenceupon the constitutional
development of the British nations and through this has raised
questions which may again prove troublesome when post-war
reconstruction becomesthe most pressingof international problems. The PeaceConference(the term has to be acceptedthough
strictly speaking it is a misnomer), was a catalytic agent which
broke up the traditional Empire and replaced it with a brother-
hoodof nations,thoughbothpopularusageandlegald•finition
have been slow to record the change. The record of Canada's
approach to the Conference,the nature and extent of its participation in Conferenceactivities and decisions,and the subsequent
validation of these innovations, constitute the most important
chapter in the history of Canadian constitutional development.
It is a record with
which
Canadians
who are interested
in the
questionof Canada's status and Canadian responsibilitiesshould
be familiar; but heretofore the story could only be got in its
entirety by the tedious processof going to the original sources,
236
THe. CANADIAN' HISTORICAL R•.WEW
as noted in a wide variety of volumes. Fortunately this is no
longer necessary. Professor G. P. deT. Glazebrook, at the in-
stance of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, has
written a compactand readableaccountof the part Canadaplayed
in the Paris Peace Conference;and has accompaniedthe record
with a commentary of value upon the effects of these activities in
Canada and elsewhere.
• This monographof some 150 pages
shouldbe givena wide readingin Canada;it will throw light upon
dark placesin the nation's knowledgeand thinking.
The evolutionof the Empire towardthe statusof a Leagueof
British nations owing allegianceto a common Crown was under
way in the first years of the twentieth century, but the rate of
progresswas all but imperceptible;
and had the world peace
remainedunbrokenit might well be that even today the colonial
relationship of the Dominions to Great Britain would be but
slightly impaired. When war came in August, 1914, it was
acceptedas a matter of courseas an Empire war; and the Canadian
parliament met with the single purpose of carrying out the
obligation•f which it was the solejudge--created by the action
of the British government in declaring war. Between that date
and November, 1918, much had happenedto strengthenopinion
in Canada that Canadian participation in the war had been that
of a nation defendingits right to existenceand not simply the
contributionby a loyal colonyto the war effort of a superior
state. When in responseto a summonsfrom Lloyd George,Sir
Robert Borden and his colleaguesleft post-hastefor Great Britain
in the first week of November, 1918, they carried with them the
convictionthat it wouldbe their duty to securedirect representation for Canada at the Peace Conference.
No such idea was in
Mr. Lloyd George's mind when he sent out the call. He desired
the presence in London of representatives of the Dominions in
order that they might take part in the deliberations which would
determine the line to be taken by the British delegatesat the
Inter-Allied Conferenceswhich were to precede the PeaceConferenceitself. This was in keeping with earlier official statements
by the British government which had been placed on the record.
Sir Robert
Borden told the Canadian
House of Commons in
January, 1917, of the British government's"intention to consult
the overseasDominions respectingthe terms of peace." Sir
Robert, after his arrival in London,lost no time in making it
known, in conversation,that the procedurethus suggestedwould
•G. P. deT. Glazebrook, Canadaat the Paris Peace Conference(Toronto, 1042,
pp. 156, $2.00).
CANADA AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919
237
no longer satisfy Canadian opinion. "I well remember," says
Sir Alfred Zimmern in his book The Third British Empire, "a
certain day in December, 1018, when, as I was working in my
room in the British Foreign Office, somebody entered, in a condition of much excitement, and told me that Canada wished to
be representedat the Peace Conferenceand was even taking an
interest in the League of Nations. It was very inconvenient."2
It was very inconvenient becauseit had already been arranged
that the Great
Powers were each to have five seats at the Confer-
ence council table, with no provision for the Dominions which
ranked, technically at least, as colonies.
The writer, who had been asked by the government to represent the Department of Public Information at these conferences,
reachedLondonearly in December,and he can testify that during
that month the Canadian claim to direct representation in the
Peace Conference was the occasion for much discussion and a
considerable shaking of heads. It was, by any test, a revolutionary proposition. What becameof the cherishedsolidarity of
the Empire if Canada, with the certainty that the other Dominions
would follow suit, claimed and obtained a right of representation
which would give its representativesthe right, if they dared to
exercise it, to take a line in the Conference which might conflict
with the policies urged by the British representatives?
The concernof the British government was natural and understandable. They had agreed with the other Great Powers as
recently as December 2, which was later than the date at which
Sir Robert Borden had given informal expressionto his views,
that the British Empire delegation would number five, matching
theirs. How explain the appearance at the council table of an
additional ten, all of whom would appear to the representatives
of the other Powers to be British extras? The expedient of the
panel was discussed,by which representativesof the Dominions
would fill the fifth seat on the panel by a procedure of selection
related to the special interests of each Dominion. This was
not satisfactory to the Canadian delegation; and a day came,
December 31, when Sir Robert Borden at a meeting of.the British
delegation gave formal notice that Canada would require direct
representation.
There is no record of his statement and of the argument with
which it was supported; but it may be assumed that it rested
upon the declaration by the Imperial War Conferenceof 1017
2Alfred Zimmern, The Third British Empire: Being a Courseof Lecturesdeliveredat
Columbia University, New York (ed. 8, New York, 1934), 81.
THE
238
CANADIAN
HISTORICAL REVIEW
that the Dominions were "autonomous nations of an Imperial
Commonwealth," and was strengthened by a recital of the
servicesof Canadian troops in the field as a vindication of this
status. Not as a threat but as a plain statement of fact, Sir
Robert said that in view of conditions calling for their presence
at home the Canadian
ministers
would not attend
the Conference
if their duties were limited to sitting in an ante-room, available
for a call for consultation
when
needed.
After
Sir Robert
had
completedhis statement silencedescendedupon the delegation;
but it was broken a moment later when Lloyd George said:
"When Canada makesa requestlike that, there is only one answer:
it must be yes." I do not vouch for the exact language, but I
do for its purport, my information being beyond question. Thus
in a moment a great stride in the evolution of the Commonwealth
was taken. Sir Robert, by an understanding, had included the
other Dominions in his advocacy of direct representation, and
Lloyd George's statement, of course, applied equally to them.
In making this and other statements with reference to the
courseof eventsin London and Paris, I have refreshedmy memory
by consultingmy copy of the despatcheswhich I sent to Ottawa.
These were not iournalistic in character but were of the nature
of officialcommuniqu•s. They were written from the insidewith
as careful consideration given to what should be left out as to
what should be put in; and, as they were handled by the cable
companies, they purported to be cablegrams from Sir Robert
Borden to Sir Thomas White, acting Prime Minister. A direction
in the despatchitself identified them as going from me to M. E.
Nichols who was in charge of public information at Ottawa.
They were placed by him at the disposalof the Canadian press.
The despatcheswere thus vetted in every case by Sir Robert
Borden, and my copy showsoccasionalchangesand eliminations.
These limitations cramped my style as a journalist--there was
no room for speculation, for deductions based upon assembled
facts, or for racy descriptions of dramatic incidents, such as
marked the proceedings at Paris. But what they lack in
picturesquenessthey gain in solidity--they are an authentic
record of what
went
on in London
and Paris to the extent
that
the principals thought it advisable to make the facts public at
that
time.
The advance guard of the Canadian contingent, six in number,
iourneyed from London to Paris on Saturday, January 11, 1919,
and took up residencein the Majestic Hotel. Sir Robert Borden
wasin the party; hiscolleagues
remainedin Londonfor a few days.
CANADA AND TIlE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919
239
All the British Prime Ministers--Lloyd George, Botha, Borden,
Hughes, and Massey--seized the occasionto be early on the
ground. On Sunday night Sir Maurice Hankey (now Lord
Hankey) broke the news that at a preliminary meeting that
day of representativesof the Great Powers,objections,amounting
to a veto, had been taken to recognizing the Dominions as entitled to direct representation. I well recall the sensationamong
the Dominion groups which followed the receipt of these bad
tidings. Most accounts put the sole responsibility for making
this objection upon President Wilson and Robert Lansing, the
American Secretary of State; but the report that was current
that evening indicated a very critical attitude upon the part of
the French as well. Algiers,they suggested,was as much entitled
to representation as the Dominions; and this was taken up by
the French press which harped upon the topic for days. But
it was not the French opposition that disturbed the Dominion
Prime Ministers; they knew that, while United States opposition,
if persistedin, would be fatal to the Dominion rights, the French
would give way if American consent were secured. There were
excited informal discussionsby the Dominion groups, and it was
arranged that a meeting should be held in the morning in Sir
Robert's room, after which Lloyd George was to be seen.
Information about this meeting which came to me unofficially
at that time was that Sir Robert was for a fight to the
finish and that he remained of this opinion even after the other
Dominion Ministers--including Mr. Hughes, Australia's fighting
man, and General Botha, and the indomitable General Smuts-concededdefeat, sayingthat the fight waslost unlessa compromise
allowing a single representative from each Dominion could be
arranged. But Sir Robert says in his Memoirsa that when they
weakened he gave up also. Far be it from me to question the
diary, but it must be said that there was nothing in Sir Robert's
bearing or manner to suggestthat he was prepared to strike his
flag. Sir Robert's whole project of a Commonwealth of autonomous British nations, which had become his first concern, was on
the anvil that morning. The situationwassavedby Lloyd George
and by President Wilson--by Lloyd George'svigorous argument
that the Dominions, in view of their remarkable contributions
to the war, were entitled to representation;by President Wilson
who concededthe force of this argument and withdrew his objection which he said had been based upon the indirect enlargement
of the representation allotted to the grouped British nations.
3Henry Borden (ed.), RobertLaird Borden:His Memoirs (2 vols., Toronto, 1938).
240
THE
CANADIAN
HISTORICAL REVIEW
Mr. Lansing would have persisted in his resistance had the
Presidentnot cut the groundfrom under his feet. They doubtless
both felt, Lansing more sharply and more accurately than his
chief,that this enlargementwouldgive riseto party controversyin
the United
States.
But at that
time President
Wilson
believed
that American public opinion was solidly behind him and that he
could afford to be compliant and good natured. Had he foreseen
politicaldevelopment.
s in hiscountryand that the representation
of the British Dominions in the League of Nations, which followed
almost automatically the precedentset by the Conference,would
give his Republican enemies a weapon with which they could
strike him and his party down and destroy utterly his plans for
a post-war world guarded from war by collective security, he
might have remained intransigent.
In the despatch to the Canadian Department of Public Information which duly appeared in the Canadian newspapers,
this highly explosiveand dangerousincident was treated as though
it was nothing more than a slight disagreementin a Sunday School
meeting. The sendingof the despatch was held up for a day as
it had to be formally passedupon by Sir Robert Borden and then
by Lloyd George. I had succeededin writing it with all due
diplomatic reserve, for my copy came back to me without change.
A portion of the despatch is herewith reproduced:
Paris, Jan. 14- The British dominionsoverseasare to be representedin the
peace conferenceupon a basis in substantial agreementwith the proposition
submittedon their behalf to the imperial war cabinet in London by Sir Robert
Borden. This proposalwas that the dominionsshouldbe given equal statusin
the conferencewith the smaller allied nations, and, in addition, should have their
representatives
upona panelfromwhich the British delegationshouldbe drawn.
The imperial war cabinet acceptedthe plan, but as the effect would be to
increasethe total British representationin the conferencewhenevermatters of
special interest to one of the dominions,or of universal concern,came up, the
questionwas remitted to the allied great powersfor consideration. The matter
has been the subjectof discussionat the informal conversations
which have been
goingon betweenthe representativesof the great allied powersfor somedays past.
Lloyd Georgepowerfullyadvocatedthe right of the British dominionsto special
treatment in representationin the conference.
The anticipation that someof the allied powersnot familiar with the family
relationshipof the British nationswould questionthe proposedarrangementas an
undueenlargementof the British representationwas verified, but after the presentation of the British case the point was handsomelyconceded,and the matter
settledin keepingwith the wishesof the Dominions....
This solutionof complexand difficult problems,which involved the possibility
of seriousdisagreementamongthe allies,is a reflectionof the spirit which animates
theseinformal meetingsof the allies and is a happy augury of the amicablesettlement of other perplexingquestions. The hearty acceptanceby the great powers
of this plan of British representationis, of course,a matter of the utmost conse-
CANADA AND TIlE
PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919
241
quenceto the British dominions. Not only is it an acknowledgment
that they
have, by their devotionto the allied cause,earnedthe right to take a direct part
in fixing the conditionsof peace,but it is an internationalrecognitionof the status
of the British empire as a family partnershipof British nations.
Mr. Glazebrook is mildly satirical over a dispositionby Canadians to see "one of the greatest--if not the greatest--peace
settlements of modern times as a necessarybut faint background
to the coming of age of a former colony." Each nation taking
part in the Peace Conferencenaturally judges it by what it got
out of it or did not get out of it; and on that basisit is proper and
inevitable that Canadians should think of the Peace Conference
as the occasion when Canada claimed, obtained, and exercised
the powerswhich alonejustified its participation in the proceedings_
of this international gathering. In the purposeswhich it had
directly in hand the Conference failed tragically; but it had
various by-products and of these the most notable was the emergenceof the overseasBritish Dominionsas international entities.
The significanceof these developmentswas not fully realized at
the time in the Dominions themselves or in Great Britain; but
Sir Robert Borden, the colleagueswho co-operated with him in
this enterprise, and the able advisers who assisted him, knew
what they were about, and the consistencyand firmnessof their
course in every matter affecting Dominion rights and powers
indicatethat they workedfor the fulfilmentof a clearlydefined
programme. In this fact there is an explanation of the reasons
for the choice by Sir Robert Borden of Arthur Sifton and C. J.
Doherty as his associatesat the Conference,a matter about which
Mr. Glazebrook is somewhatcurious. It is obvious,he says,that
there were one or two other ministerswho might equally well have
been chosen.
Not
for the business in hand.
Sir Robert
was
aware that Mr. Sifton and Mr. Doherty shared his views.
The
opportunity to apply the principles of Dominion status which
had been affirmed in 1917 must be seized; and he knew that both
by inclination and equipment they could be counted upon to
stand with him if the issuehad to be fought out.
Both Mr. Sifton
and-Mr. Doherty were experiencedpublic men. They were very
able lawyers whose experienceincluded years of service on the
bench. Sir Robert was equally fortunate in his chief assistants-the late Mr. Loring Christie and Mr. Oliver Mowat Biggar.
These five men made a formidable group, and for the services
they rendered Canada in establishing her position as a nation
among nations there is no measure of value. The fourth Canadian minister, Sir GeorgeFoster, was much engagedwith economic
242
THE
CANADIAN
HISTORICAL
REVIEW
matters comingbefore the Conference;in the record of the struggle
for Dominion rights his name does not once appear. That he
was not in sympathy with at least someof the views and activities
of his colleaguesis evident from the terms of a vigorous letter
addressedby Mr. Sifton to Sir Robert Borden in May protesting
against a deliveranceby Sir Georgewhich ran counter to the case
he was seeking to uphold.
The achievement of the Dominions in getting independent
membershipin the Conferencegave the Canadians a key with
which they opened doors, some of which were double-locked.
The strength of their positionwas not in the least affectedby the
fact that the body in whichthey had won membershipby so stiff
a fight never had control of affairs, and becamea mere listening
and registeringagency. The five major Powers, describedas
having "general interests,"with their twenty-five membeksin
the Conference,continuedto run things as a separatebody; this
group in turn was displacedby the already-establishedSupreme
Council which was made up of two representativesfrom each
Great
Power.
Further
sub-division into the Council of Four
madeup of Prime Ministers,and the Councilof Five, in which
the Foreign Ministers of the Great Powerstook part, added
further complications. An effort to give control to the Conferenceproperby speeches
of protestin plenarysession,
the most
directof whichwasmadeby Sir Robert Borden,gaveClemenceau
an opportunityto make a displayof his arrogance,his audacity
and, if the wordis permissible
with sogreat a man, hisimpudence.
In memory I can still see him, with an air of bored cynicism,
tellingthe protesting
smallernationsin effectthat they were
thereby courtesy,and that the Great Powerswhichhadwonthe
war proposed
to fix the termsof peace. By thistimethe original
programmewhich provided for an Inter-Allied Conferenceto
enablethe nationsto reachgeneralagreementon the largeissues
of thepeace,to befollowedby a Conference
in whichthedefeated
nationswould take part, had been abandoned. On February 2,
I find in my despatchfrom Paristhe definiteannouncement
that
"this is to be an imposedpeace." The explanationof this profoundchangein the originalpurposeis beststated by Dr. Shotwell.4 In brief it is that when the various commissionsappointed
by the Inter-AlliedConference
beganto functionalongthe lines
laiddownby the steeringcommittee(theSupremeCouncil),their
objectivesbecamethe reachingof final decisions
insteadof the
preparation
of tentativesolutions
to be furtherconsidered
by the
4James
T. Shotwell,
At theParisPeaceConference
(NewYork, 1987),89-40.
CANADA AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919
243
real Peace Conference. "To •vork upon the final text in the
absenceof Germany," says Dr. Shotwell, "was to lose the per-
spectiveof Europeas a wholebecausein the very nature of things
the facts, even if established,were seenonly from one side." The
divergencesbetween the Fourteen Points and the text of the
treaty, as fashionedby the varioussub-commissions,
were largely
the result of recommendations to President Wilson by his own
experts who recognized"the logical and inevitable consequences
of an existing situation and of the historical forces which had
producedit." Discussionin a real PeaceConferencewould have
made impossiblethe creation of the myth that Wilson had been
tricked, by schemingEuropeans, into the betrayal of a confiding
Germany, by which the German mind was poisonedand public
opinion in the United States bedevilled. Dr. Shotwell bears
testimony that there was more questioning of the "imposed
treaty" by membersof the British delegationthan by the Americans.
When the League of Nations was created, the membersof the
Conference as listed in the annex to the Covenant
became its
original members. There was thus clear sailing for Canada so
far as enrolment on the membership list was concerned;but there
followed the first of a successionof strugglesto determine whether
they were real or tolerated members of the League. One can
search the list of members as set forth in the annex to the Covenant
without finding the name of Great Britain.
The British Empire
is listed as a member and under it are the names of the self-
governingDominionsslightlyindented. This listing represented
the first attempt to grapple with the problem presented by the
roles which the Dominions were filling. They were members of
the Conferencewith full membership rights and they were also
playing a part in the work of the Conferenceand of its various
commissionsas membersof the British Empire delegation. This
method of listing was an achievement by David Hunter Miller
and Dr. JamesT. Shotwell,both membersof the American group.
Very late one February night they were readingthe proofsof the
famous Miller-Hurst
draft
of the Covenant
which
was to be
presentedat a meeting of the plenary Conferencethe following
day. When they came to the problem of listing the membersin
the annex they found themselvesstumped. To list the members
alphabeticallywould have been to mark the British Dominions
as sovereignstates, a responsibility they were not prepared to
take. "Then it occurred to me," writes Dr. Shotwell, "to treat
the British Dominions as I had often done in syllabi in history
244
Tax
CANADIAN HISTORICAL REvIEw
courses in Columbia, that is to use a simple indention, which
would indicate a different category without changing the list as a
whole."5 This innovation was accepted; and it, or rather the
conditionswith which it sought to deal, gave rise to a whole series
of difficulties which kept the Canadians busy for the rest of the
Conferencesdifficulties which have not yet been wholly resolved.
If the Dominions were not states, as the list indicated, they
were subject to limitations in their membership: They could
not, for instance, be elected to the Council of the League of
Nations, nor to the governing body of the International Labour
Office, on two grounds: They were not independent states
and further, they were already representedby the personnominated to these bodiesby Great Britain in the name of the British
Empire. Mr. Glazebrook tells the story of how these handicaps
were overcomeand the objectives of the Canadians obtained in
spiteof obstacleswhich must have had the appearanceof complete
validity to those who raised them. With Sir Robert as chief
strategist, Mr. Doherty took charge of the League of Nations
difficulty while Mr. Sifton undertook the task of getting
full
status
for
Canada
in the
International
Labour
Office.
Mr. Doherty had a comparatively easy assignment. In the
declaration by Clemenceau,Lloyd George, and Wilson affirming
their agreementwith the view that the Dominionswere eligible
for electionto the Council,they saythat "if therewereany doubt"
about this right, "it would be entirely removed by the fact that
the Articles of the Covenant are not subject to a narrow or
technical construction." But the "technical" objections that
were not advancedagainstthe Canadianintentionsin the matter
of the League were maintained against the Canadian claims to
election to the governing body of the I.L.O. with vigour and
persistence,giving Arthur Sifton an opportunity, which he
joyously seized,to engagein battle with his peers.
The Canadians,saysMr. Glazebrook,sought"a statuswhich
corresponded
with their own idea of their country'spositionand
not that of the legalistsof other countrieswho insistedon using
the hard-and-fastclassifications
of an earlier day" (p. 81). Unless
"other countries" is intended to include Great Britain,
this
statement doesnot altogethercover the situation that developed.
The constitutional difficulties in the way were put forward and
vigorouslymaintainedby British officialsand principals. Quotations in Canada at the Paris Peace Conferenceindicate that
Mr. Glazebrook has had accessto the unpublished file of letters
•Ibid., 174.
C•,N•m•,
•,m) THe. P•.•,c•. CONF•E•C•.
OF 1919
245
and documents in which Mr. Sifton set out from day to day, for
the information of Sir Robert Borden, the story of his endeavours
first with respect to the I.L.O. and afterwards in relation to the
Aeronautical Convention, to secure Canadian rights as he saw
them. They show clashesof opinion and will with G. N. Barnes,
member of the British delegation and two permanent officials:
Sir Malcolm Delevingne and Cecil J. B. Hurst (now Sir Cecil).
They defended, against demandsby Mr. Sifton and representatives
of other Dominions, provisions in the constitution of the I.L.O.
which barred representationin the governing body to all the
Dominions;it was held that they would be representedby the
memberappointedby the •Britishgovernment. Mr. Hurst explainedthe reasonwhy the claim couldnot be concededin a letter
to Mr.
Sifton
in these terms:
So long as the British Empire is to constitute a political unit, the relations
betweenthe various componentparts of that unit, howevercompletetheir autonomy, must differ from the relationsbetween two foreignstates. If the relations
betweenthem are the same as thosebetweenforeign states, all elementsof unity
disappear.
Therefore the objections must be regarded as conclusive. Sir
Robert Borden at this point intervened by having the Conference
authorize the drafting committee so to amend the Labour convention
as to make it conform
to the Covenant
in the character
of its membership and in the method of adherence. This should
have disposed of the difficulty, but the drafting committee remained obdurate and the controversy proceeded. After the
lapse of a week Mr. Sifton, addressing himself to Mr. Hurst,
suggestedthat the convention be amended in keeping with the
instruction of the Conference, and proceeded:
My only reasonfor bringingit to your attention is the seriousnature of this
questionso far as the Dominionsare concerned. I do not supposethat any of
them are particularly desirousof being representedon the governingbody, but
they are and will continueto be very much disappointedby a constitution,worldwide in its application,which distinguishesbetweenthem and the other members
of the Leagueof Nations. The fact of beingon the governingbody is an entirely
different matter from the right to be nominated therefor. There are, I am told,
numbersof peoplewho have no desireto sit in Parliament, but if the constitution
specificallyprovided that they could not, there would be considerabletrouble
in the country.
When the British resistanceto full Dominion membershipin
the Labour organization was r•moved, American objectionswhich
involved the whole question of Dominion representation in the
organization with special objection to representation on the
governing board, were only withdrawn when the matter was dealt
246
T•.
CA•m•A•
H•sroR•cA*.
REw•-w
with and settled by Wilson. While the Canadians were thus at
odds with both British and American officials with respect to
Dominion rights of representation in the Labour organization,
they foundthemselvesco-operatingwith the Americansin securing
adjustments to the constitutionof the Labour organizationwhich
respectedthe specialpositionwhich the governmentsof Canada
and the United States occupiedbecauseof the divisionof powers
affecting labour under their federal constitutions.
With Canada's right to membershipin the governing board
of the I.L.O. recognized,the somewhataggressiveMr. Sifton drew
Sir Robert's attention to the fact that the eight unspecifiedchief
industrial membersof the I.L.O. could each appoint a member of
the Council. "In my opinion," he added, "there is no doubt that
on any kind of a fair basisof ascertaininga member's industrial
importanceas respectslabor, Canada would be amongthe eight."
Direct action of this nature was not necessaryhowever: Canada
waschosena memberof the Board at the first meetingof the I.L.O.
These innovations by the Dominions, at the instance of
Canada,had beenentirely unforeseenby the British government;
and it is not surprisingthat they revealed somedoubts as to just
what their constitutional consequenceswould be. Sir Robert
Borden, speaking to the Canadian House of Commonson September 2, said that "the recognition and status accorded to the
British Dominions at the Peace Conference were not won without
constant effort and firm insistence."
He added that in all these
efforts they had the unwaveringsupport of Lloyd Georgeand his
colleagues. Arthur Sifton, wearied perhaps with three months of
incessant struggling, was not so sure; in a letter to a colleague
after his return to Canada he expressedhis personalview that the
granting of these concessions
meant nothing more "than flattery
of vanity."
One result of this sudden eruption of the Dominions into the
international scenewas a lack of clearnessand consistencyin the
use of the term "British Empire." The alert Mr. Sifton commented upon this as early as April 22 in a letter to Sir Robert
Borden: "In the new draft covenant in regard to the League of
Nations and annex thereto, the words 'British Empire' in the
annex and in Article 4 are apparently sometimesused as a designation for conveniently describing the aggregation of Great
Britain with its Colonies and the various Dominions, and sometimes for some purposesapparently meaning only Great Britain
and the territory for which its Parliament l•gislates. I notice
that the samewordsare usedin Article 8 of the original covenant."
CANADA AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919
247
He suggestedthat the matter should be brought immediately to
the attention of Lloyd George. Article zt was redrafted for
its final appearance;but the annex remained unchanged,though
in a memoriandumaddressedto Lloyd George on May 3, his
attention was drawn to the anomaly and a suggestionmade that
it be corrected.
A somewhat more striking example of doubt as to how the
term should be used was the rejection of Sir Robert Borden's
memorandum of March 12 making suggestionsas to how, in
view of the constitutional changes then in progress, the peace
treaty shouldbe signed He wrote: "Under the generalheading
'The British Empire,' the .sub-heading 'The United Kingdom,'
'Dominion of Canada,' etc., would .be used as headings to distinguish the various plenipotentiaries." Instead, the five mem-
bersof thegovernment
of GreatBritainsigned
undertheheading:
"His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the seas,
Emperor of India"; while the Dominion representativessigned
under their particular territorial signification. No explanation
was ever made of the reasonfor the rejection of Sir Robert Borden's
formula. That he was right was universally admitted at the
Imperial Conferenceof 19213when his formerly discardedrecommendations were adopted for all future treaties bearing the signatures of plenipotentiaries of more than one British nation. This
decisionat Paris lendssupport to Sifton's estimate of the attitude
of personsin high quarters toward the Paris innovations;and
this inferenceis further supportedby the subsequentexchangeof
cablegramsbetween Borden and Milner respectingthe approval
of the treaty by Canada. Opposition members in the Canadian
parliament were able to make use of this failure to follow Sir
Robert's advice to disparage the Canadian achievements at
Paris and to representthe Dominion signaturesas mere surplusage.
Sir Robert Borden and Mr. Sifton were back in Canada when this
refusal was decided upon. Mr. Sifton went back post-haste to
Paris when Sir George Foster was called to Canada on urgent
family matters,but it wastoolate for him to do anythingaboutit;
he signedon the dotted line.
Eight yearsafter the signingof the PeaceTreaty and one year
after the Imperial Peace Conference had registered its opinion
about that mistake, I heard a very eminent British constitutional
authority, with whom Mr. Sifton had crossedswordsat Paris,
admit that this action, which was probably taken with his consent,
had had effects other than had been expected. In June, 1027, a
248
TI-IE C•N•N
H•sromcAL
R•.wEw
panel of speakers,headed by Sir Cecil Hurst, delivered a seriesof
lectures at the University of Chicago in the Harris Foundation,
on the subject, "Great Britain and the Dominions." In one of
the lectures Sir Cecil made this reference to the manner
in which
the peace treaty was signed:6
Satisfactorythoughthe form is in one respect,in that it recognizesthe distinct
international personality of the Dominions, it is unsatisfactoryin another respect,
in that it entirely omits Great Britain, and Great Britain is not a wholly negligible
part of the Empire. Great Britain only finds herselfwithin the League as an
unmentionedelement in the British Empire...
Whatever the purpose of this arrangement in the annex of the Covenant, it
has not worked well in practice. If the object was to lay stresson the unity of
the Empire as a political entity, the effect has been the opposite becausein the
ordinary work of the Leagueit has tended to render the words "British Empire"
synonymouswith Great Britain and 'to create the impressionthat the Dominions
were somethingoutsidethe Empire.
While he was in Chicago Sir Cecil conducted a Round Table,
in which he expounded the intricacies of Empire and Commonwealth relations to an audienceof perhapsa hundred men eminent
in academic and public life. When he concluded Professor W. E.
Dodd, afterwards United States Minister to Germany, rose and
asked him how these mysteries could be made intelligible to university students. Sir Cecil replied that the arrangement •was
not as complicatedas it sounded,and that in any event it worked
well.
The answer was sound and is to be borne in mind if further
complicationsshould arise a little further down the road to the
future, which is somewhat probable. It will also be well to bear
in mind something that Sir Robert Borden said some years ago
in an address at Queen's University: "Our commonwealth may
be regardedas a League of Nations owing a singleallegianceand
possessing
internationalrelationsthat are still in a state of development." As difficulties arise, Sir Robert added, they will be met
by the practical genius of the British people.
J. W. DAFOE
Winnipeg, Manitoba.
6Sir Cecil B. Hurst et al., GreatBritain and the Dominions(Chicago,1028), 01 if.