The International History Review
ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20
‘We Have Been Making History’: The League of
Nations and the Leticia Dispute (1932–1934)
Pierre-Etienne Bourneuf
To cite this article: Pierre-Etienne Bourneuf (2016): ‘We Have Been Making History’: The
League of Nations and the Leticia Dispute (1932–1934), The International History Review, DOI:
10.1080/07075332.2016.1245673
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1245673
Published online: 26 Oct 2016.
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Date: 27 November 2016, At: 20:23
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1245673
‘We Have Been Making History’: The League of Nations and
the Leticia Dispute (1932–1934)
Pierre-Etienne Bourneuf
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS
This article sheds a historical light on the League of Nations’ role in
the settlement of the Leticia dispute between Peru and Colombia
(1932–1934). It first describes how the Geneva organization
conducted the negotiations with the two opposing parties and
reached an agreement for the establishment of a temporary
territorial administration of Leticia. Then, it examines the work of
the International Commission, scrutinizing the challenges the
Commissioners had to overcome to fulfil their mandate. Based on
the League of Nations’ archives, this research contributes to a more
comprehensive understanding of the settlement of the Leticia
dispute. It also shows the innovative character of the Geneva
organization’s intervention to maintain international peace.
Leticia dispute; League of
Nations; international
commission; peacekeeping
1. Introduction
‘This is one of the great days in the history of the League. A dispute, which threatened to
involve two noble peoples in the horrors of war has just been settled through the application of the principles, the intervention of the methods, and the collaboration of the organisations of the League.’1 This is how the president of the Council of the League of Nations,
Augusto De Vesconcellos, welcomed the final agreement on the Leticia dispute between
Colombia and Peru in May 1934. Despite the Council president’s solemn statement, the
intervention of the Geneva organization and its contribution to the settlement of the dispute remains marginally studied. The modern literature on the dispute tends to interpret
the League’s role as a mere instrument of the powers involved and focuses therefore primarily on the state actors and their national concerns.2 Even general studies of the
League’s history cover the Leticia case only superficially.3 The settlement of the dispute is
considered a success of secondary importance and is overshadowed by the Geneva
organization’s failure to cope with several contemporaneous crises, including the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the collapse of the international economy and the failure
of the World Disarmament Conference.
Nevertheless, the relevance of the League of Nations’ involvement in the Leticia dispute can be appraised from different perspectives. First, it represents one of the few
achievements of the League in the quest to preserve peace, standing alongside earlier
efforts—notably, the resolution of the Aland Crisis (1920–1921) and the border dispute
between Greece and Bulgaria (1925).4 In May 1933, the two opposing parties accepted a
CONTACT Pierre-Etienne Bourneuf
[email protected]
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2
P.-E. BOURNEUF
proposal presented by the Council. The Colombian territory of Leticia, which had been
occupied by Peruvian forces since 1932, was administrated for one year by an international commission appointed by the League. Even if the final agreement by which Bogota
re-established its authority over the territory was reached under Brazilian mediation, the
Geneva organization played an active role in reaching this peaceful settlement. This success is even more relevant as it was achieved outside Europe, the League’s traditional area
of influence, in collaboration with the United States and Brazil, both of them non-members states.5
Second, Leticia can be seen as a forerunner of the modern peacekeeping operations. It
stands for one of the first cases—if it is not the very first one—of ‘interventionist conflict
resolution through ad hoc temporary governance’.6 Unlike in other cases during the interwar period, such as the Saar Basin, the international territorial administration of Leticia
was not executed under the First World War peace treaties. It resulted from the Council’s
decision to find a solution to a specific dispute.7 Furthermore, the League’s intervention
allowed for the first time the deployment of a military force under the flag of an international authority to maintain order and stabilize a conflict area.
This article aims to fill a gap in the literature by exploring the Geneva organization’s
intervention in the settlement of the Leticia dispute. It will first focus on the diplomatic process that made the establishment of a temporary international administration possible. In
particular, it will examine the progressive involvement of the League and determine how
an agreement was finally reached between Peru and Colombia. Contrary to most of the
existing literature, the analysis of the League’s intervention will not be exclusively based on
documents published in the Official Journal. In fact, the Council itself limited its action to
formal debates and approved decisions already negotiated. Ad hoc committees conducted
the diplomatic work, sometimes in a confidential manner. The unpublished minutes of their
meetings show the role of the League during the consultations with the parties.
The article will then focus on one of the most innovative aspects of the League’s intervention: the establishment of a temporary international administration. It will describe the
work of the International Commission in Leticia and its contribution to the final settlement
of the dispute. Notably, it will highlight the difficult conditions and the challenges—which
remain often underestimated—the Commissioners were confronted with to fulfil their
mandate.
The purpose is thereby not to demonstrate that the League of Nations was the sole
actor that contributed to the settlement of the dispute. On the contrary, the support of
member and non-member states was crucial for that. Taking into consideration the
League’s perspective, however, provides a more comprehensive understanding of the
Leticia case and its final settlement. It sheds light on the original aspects of the process
that led to the resolution of the dispute and more generally on the Geneva organization’s
role to maintain peace.
2. The Leticia dispute and the beginning of the League’s involvement
The dispute between Colombia and Peru erupted on the night of 31 August 1932, when a
group of armed men coming from the Peruvian district of Loreto attacked and seized
Leticia, a Colombian port located on the Upper Amazon. No garrison was present and the
assailants easily took control of the township and the surrounding area expelling the
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
3
Colombian authorities. Although the dispute resulted from a combination of economic
and political factors, the Peruvian action was in great part motivated by the resentment
n-Lozano Treaty signed in 1922 by which Peru ceded the so-called
against the Salomo
‘Leticia Trapezium’ to Colombia. It came into force in 1928 and two years later the territory
was officially transferred to Bogota, despite the fact that many Loretanos continued to
consider the region demographically, historically and economically as Peruvian territory.8
The action against Leticia took both the Colombian and the Peruvian governments by
surprise. However, after having first condemned the subversive act of the irregular forces,
the Peruvian president, Sanchez Cerro, changed position stating that the events in Upper
Amazonia were the result of irrepressible patriotic aspirations.9 The appeal to nationalist
rhetoric set in motion a dangerous spiral of confrontation. During the following weeks,
patriotic fervour enflamed the Colombian and the Peruvian public opinions. The Parliaments of both countries approved special loans for national defence and the governments exploited the incident to strengthen their position domestically.10 This escalation
of tensions caused some apprehension in the neighbouring countries. Brazil and Ecuador
had strong interests in Upper Amazonia and there was a concrete risk for them to be
drawn into the hostilities in case of war.11
In this context, Colombia started preparations for a military expedition to restore her
authority over the Leticia region. Yet, assembling and dispatching this force required time
as the only available option was sending a naval squad 1, 700 kilometres up the Amazon
River. This interval gave the forces occupying Leticia the possibility to fortify their positions and the Peruvian army to concentrate troops at the border with Colombia. At the
same time, it also allowed for attempts to settle the crisis.
In October, Peru proposed to submit the dispute to the Washington Conciliation Commission under the Treaties of Gondra and Washington. The initiative was however
rejected by Colombia on the grounds that the troubles in Leticia were ‘strictly and exclusively’12 a domestic issue. After this refusal, another diplomatic attempt was made with
the opening of direct negotiations between the two countries in Rio de Janeiro under the
auspices of Brazil. Still, despite the Brazilian mediation, the tensions increased.
At the beginning of 1933, the Colombian flotilla, composed of six vessels and about
1500 men, was reported to be ready to steam up the Amazon River. Even though Bogota
declared that the mission was limited to the restoration of its sovereignty over the Leticia
territory, the Peruvian reaction was bellicose. The Commander of the Peruvian troops in
Iquitos, the capital of the district of Loreto, warned that he had taken ‘all military measures’ to defend his compatriots who were ‘legitimately occupying the Leticia zone in virtue of the professed principles of the free determination of nationality’.13 It became clear
that the Peruvian army was ready to assist the irregular forces to resist against the Colombian expedition. The Leticia dispute seemed more and more likely to escalate towards a
full-scale war.
It is only at this point that the dispute was officially presented to the League. On 2 January 1933, Bogota informed the Council about the occupation of Leticia and its decision to
restore order in region.14 The Colombian communication was not a formal appeal, but the
press reports indicating a risk of military escalation pushed the Council to send a telegram
to the opposing parties appealing to them to refrain ‘from any action which was not in
strict conformity with the Covenant’ and inviting them to present their views to the
Council.15
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P.-E. BOURNEUF
During the following weeks, both countries replied that they were acting in accordance
n-Lozano Treaty settled the
with the Covenant and in good faith.16 For Bogota, the Salomo
borders between Colombia and Peru. It was ratified by both countries and deposed at
the League of Nations in 1928. The fact that a fraction of the Peruvian population was hostile to the regime that signed the treaty in 1922 had no effect on its validity. The situation
created by the Leticia occupation was an internal issue and the restoration of Colombian
sovereignty was legitimate. Bogota had no aggressive intentions in sending a military
force. Its sole objective was to restore the public order within its own territory.
n-Lozano Treaty, but
On the other hand, Lima did not contest the validity of the Salomo
17
considered it ‘immoral’. It had been concluded by a dictatorial regime without consulting the population. Leticia had been Peruvian for centuries and, by establishing a Colombian enclave in Peruvian territory, the treaty ‘destroyed the geographical, economic and
moral unity of the Department of Loreto’ and ‘awakened irredentism’.18 In order to repair
this ‘injustice’ and to avoid future conflicts, Lima demanded a rectification of the
borders.19
Regarding the occupation of Leticia, the Peruvian government rejected any accusation
of aggression or forcible retention of the territory, as the government had no link with the
groups who seized it. To justify its support of the occupying forces, Peru stated that it was
not defending the territory of Leticia, but its nationals who were occupying it.20 Lima
could not neglect ‘its obligation’ to protect the ‘defenceless’ Peruvians, who were facing
the threat of a violent repression ‘for the sole offence of claiming the right to decide their
own nationality’.21 The use of the language of self-determination to support territorial
claims in front of the Geneva organization was not new.22 To support its position, the
Peruvian government associated the question of Leticia with the precedents of Fiume
and Vilna, both occupied by irregular troops driven by nationalist motives.23 However, it is
clear that the financial crisis of the beginning of the 1930s acted as a powerful accelerant
on the flames of nationalism.24
Following the demand addressed to the League by Lima ‘to order the suspension of all
measures of force’,25 the Leticia dispute was finally put on the Council’s agenda on
24 January 1933 and 26 January 1933 under Article 11 of the Covenant. During the first
session a three-member committee—composed of the representative of the Irish Free
State, Sean Lester, of Spain, Salvador de Madariaga, and of Guatemala, Jose Matos—was
appointed to investigate and report to the Council. With the support of the League’s
Secretariat, the ‘Committee of the Council’ (also called ‘Committee of Three’) became the
key actor in the negotiations. Under the chairmanship of Lester, it collected the information, conducted the discussions with the parties and prepared the decisions that were formally approved by the Council.
From Geneva, the assessment of the Leticia dispute was clear. The Peruvian occupation
was in contradiction with an international treaty recognized as valid by Colombia and
Peru. The resort to force in order to obtain territorial modifications could not be tolerated.
However, despite this clear view on the dispute, the Council was cautious and limited its
actions to the dispatch of telegrams to both parties. The Council reminded Lima that, as a
member of the League, it was its duty to ‘refrain from any intervention by force on Colombian territory’ and to ensure its military forces ‘should not hinder Colombian authorities
from the exercise of full sovereignty and jurisdiction in territory recognized by treaty to
belong to Colombia’.26 To the Colombian government, the Council expressed the hope
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
5
that Bogota would exercise ‘all possible clemency’ and ‘take strictest precautions’ to limit
its actions ‘strictly to the preservation of order in their own territory’.27
This balanced approach was the result of the combination of different considerations.
First, it reflected both the spirit of the Covenant and the limits of the Geneva organization.
The role of the League was to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the dispute. The organization had limited means and could not adopt binding decisions. As noted later during
the discussions in Geneva, the League was not a ‘super-state’ and imposing a solution to
the parties was contrary to the Covenant.28 Then, although the dispute was clear from a
legal perspective, the Committee of the Council knew that its settlement was possible
only through a political agreement. A strong condemnation of Peru might have radicalized Lima’s position, increasing the tensions in the region. At the same time, the League’s
action was also influenced by ‘the shadow of the Monroe Doctrine’.29 The United States
were already diplomatically involved in the dispute—both behind the scenes, with bilateral consultations with the parties involved, and publicly, by supporting the Brazilian
mediation—and the League wanted to avoid giving the impression to interfere in Latin
American affairs. In this respect, Frank Walters observed that ‘the fear of offending the
United States’ by taking too active interest in the Western Hemisphere explains why no
great powers were represented in the Committee of the Council.30 Finally, the League’s
caution can be explained taking into consideration that at this stage it was not clearly
established whether intervening would have been politically appropriate.
The delegates in Geneva knew that when the dispute was brought to their attention
some diplomatic efforts had already been made in Rio de Janeiro and Washington. However, they were not informed about the state of the negotiations. They were aware that a
few weeks earlier the Brazilian government had presented a proposal that envisaged the
return of the Leticia territory to Colombia after a short temporary administration by Brazil.
Once order was restored, direct negotiations could start in Rio de Janeiro to settle the dispute.31 The plan was accepted by Colombia but the Peruvian government demanded
some modifications. In Lima’s view, Brazil should administrate the Leticia territory during
the entire period of negotiations. If no agreement was to be found, Leticia should be
returned to the Peruvian forces. For Bogota these conditions were unacceptable and the
Brazilian mediation reached an impasse, even if formally it remained open. Given this situation, Colombia resorted to other diplomatic options. On 22 January, only two days before
the Council meeting, Bogota sent a telegram to Washington demanding an intervention
of the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.32
When the Council met, the Brazilian mediation was still formally in progress and Washington had not replied yet. The League’s caution was probably influenced by the will not
to prejudice these initiatives. This position is reflected in a note sent by the SecretaryGeneral of the League, Eric Drummond, to the American Consul in Geneva, where he
wrote that at this point it would be ‘advisable to abstain from further action (…) as it was
felt that any new suggestions emanating from Geneva now might create confusion’.33
3. The intervention of the League under article 15
While the negotiations still stalled, the situation deteriorated quickly. At the beginning of
February 1933, the first fighting occurred when the Colombian expeditionary force
approached the occupied territory. Following the escalation of hostilities, Bogota broke
6
P.-E. BOURNEUF
off diplomatic relations with Peru on 15 February and demanded the League’s intervention invoking Article 15 of the Covenant.34
The Council met in an extraordinary session on 21 February. This rapid reaction was
facilitated by the fact that at this point the United States openly supported its action. This
decision corresponded to an evolution of Washington’s foreign policy towards Latin
America. Although the Monroe Doctrine remained a central element, the adoption of a
multilateral approach allowed the US government to maintain stability in the region while
bypassing resentment against American interventionism. According to Bryce Wood, contrary to the Chaco War, no alternative regional solutions seemed viable and the League’s
involvement in the Leticia question was regarded as ‘a natural development.’35
Article 15 provided for a two-step procedure. First, the Council should attempt conciliation of the parties. If the dispute is not thus settled, it should then adopt a report containing recommendations that were ‘deemed just and proper’ regarding the case.36 This
report was not binding and only laid out guidelines for the resolution of the dispute. However, if unanimously adopted by the Council members (the votes of the disputing parties
were not taken into account), a state going to war with any party to the dispute complying
with the Council’s recommendations would violate the Covenant and expose itself to
sanctions.37
Interestingly, the League’s Secretariat discreetly suggested to Colombia to resort to
Article 15.38 This initiative was motivated by the will to restore confidence in the Covenant’s machinery after the failure to face the Manchurian crisis. The procedure entailed
fewer obstacles to the League’s intervention than under Article 11, which had revealed all
its limits after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.
Following Article 15, the Council asked its Committee to negotiate with the parties in
order to find a formula for conciliation. The discussions that followed with the Colombian
and Peruvian representatives show clearly that the League could not accept Lima’s claims.
Yet, the Committee of the Council rejected any dogmatic legal approach to the dispute,
adopting an impartial position and great political flexibility to de-escalate the tensions.
Lester explicitly described this approach when he stated: ‘without any doubts the Council
is always ready to affirm the law if it appears necessary, but we should find the means to
appease the warlike mentality on both sides’.39
The compromise finally proposed on 25 February by the Committee was very similar to
the Brazilian initiative presented a few weeks earlier.40 It was based on the observation
n-Lozano Treaty and consequently
that both countries accepted the validity of the Salomo
both recognized the Colombian sovereignty over the Leticia territory. The plan envisaged
the evacuation of the Peruvian forces and the appointment of a commission by the
League to administrate the Leticia territory for the duration of the negotiations, which
should have begun and been carried out ‘with all expedition’.41 An ‘international force’
composed of Colombian troops should be placed under the authority of the Commission
to maintain order. The League was not supposed to participate in the negotiations, but
the Council was ready to offer its good offices to the parties if needed.
The idea of the establishment of an international commission bore different advantages and emerged rapidly during the discussions. First, the delegates in Geneva considered that the disputing parties could not oppose this proposal as they both had already
agreed on the principle of a temporary administration of the Leticia territory during the
Brazilian mediation. Secondly, the proposal enabled to solve the sensitive issue of the
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
7
evacuation of the territory avoiding any collision between the Colombian and Peruvian
forces. Finally, it allowed ‘to introduce a pacificatory element into the territory for the purpose of exercising benevolent authority’ in order to create the conditions for the two parties to find a lasting settlement through direct negotiations.42
The Committee of the Council did not see the evacuation of the Peruvian forces only as
a fundamental step to decrease the tensions in the Upper Amazon, but considered it a
matter of principle. De Madariaga—who was the most active member of the Committee
alongside with Lester—declared during the discussions that the League of Nations
wanted ‘to avoid creating a precedent where a country, following an incident or with
other reasons, could enter the territory of a neighbor State and that negotiations could
start on the base of a fait accompli’.43
However, behind the defense of international law principles, the plan proposed by the
Council was balanced and took into consideration the interests of both opposing parties.
De Madariaga openly recognized that the deployment of Colombian troops placed under
the authority of an international commission would allow Peru to accept the evacuation
of the territory without losing face.44 At the same time, this solution guaranteed that the
Peruvian population would not be mistreated.
To obtain Lima’s acceptance, Lester recalled that the principles on which the Committee’s proposal was based reflected those defended by Peru at the League of Nations a few
years earlier. In December 1931, the Peruvian delegate in charge at that time declared
before the Council that ‘no State [was] entitled to oblige another – having invaded its territory – to enter upon direct negotiations on the bearing and legal value of treaties previously existing between the two States’. He also added that ‘the exercise of the right
possessed by each State to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its nationals
must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of the other State’.45
This statement was reproduced in the public report submitted to the Council to
increase the pressure on Peru. The members of the Committee also stressed during the
discussions that the formula presented was the best option considering Lima’s own interests. When the Peruvian delegate asked what would happen should the negotiations fail,
the Committee replied that there was no doubt that Leticia was Colombian and that it
should be returned to Colombia. De Madariaga, however, noted that there was no reason
to fear failure of the negotiations. On the contrary, this procedure would—‘at least theoretically’46—give Peru an opportunity to obtain some concessions from Colombia. In case
of a rejection of the League’s formula of conciliation, the Council would adopt a report
and the chances to reach a satisfactory solution for Lima would be close to ‘zero per
cent’.47
On the other hand, the Committee insisted with the Colombian representative that the
proposal of international administration was not incompatible with the recognition of the
Colombian sovereignty over Leticia. De Madariaga declared that the plan consisted of a
system where the authority over the territory was given de facto to a Commission of the
League of Nations, but de jure the territory remained under Colombian sovereignty.48
When the Committee’s report containing the formula of conciliation was adopted by
the Council on 1 March, Colombia had already accepted it. Lester commented on the plan
for ‘the formation of an international army to take over temporarily a disputed territory’,
writing: ‘We have been making history in Geneva this week.’49 But the Peruvian opposition
rapidly cooled down Lester’s apparent enthusiasm. Lima did not reject the League’s plan,
8
P.-E. BOURNEUF
but formulated a series of counter-proposals. In particular, the Peruvian government
asserted that the deployment of Colombian troops, even under the authority of the Commission, could not be defined as international. Additionally, the presence of this detachment would be likely to increase the tensions with the local Peruvian population,
preventing therewith the pacification of the territory.50 For this reason, the Peruvian representative proposed to the Committee of the Council that Brazilian troops should be
deployed in Leticia until the completion of the negotiations. Lacking political support, he
rapidly abandoned this request, demanding instead that the maintenance of order should
be implemented by elements of the local population selected by the Commission.51 After
another refusal, Peru expressed its doubts about the possibility to reach an agreement
through the procedure of conciliation and proposed to submit the dispute to arbitration.52
At this point, the Committee recognized that the conciliation did not offer ‘a basis of
solution to the dispute’ which could be recommended for adoption.53
4. The ‘Geneva agreement’
Following the failure of the conciliation procedure, the Council adopted a report on
18 March containing its recommendations to settle the dispute. Noting that ‘the presence
of Peruvian forces in Colombian territory [was] incompatible with the principle of international law’, the Council recommended the ‘complete evacuation’ of the Leticia territory
‘and the withdrawal of all support from the Peruvians who have occupied that area’. As
soon as this condition was fulfilled, negotiations should start to find a settlement ‘which
shall be just, lasting and satisfactory’ for both parties.54 The report was adopted by unanimous vote, but the Peruvian government rejected it. Nevertheless, in conformity with Article 15, it followed that if Peru resorted to force to prevent Colombia from executing the
Council’s resolution, it would have exposed Lima to sanctions.55
The adoption of the report did not put an end to the League’s involvement in the dispute. During the same meeting, an Advisory Committee was appointed ‘to watch the situation, assist the Council’ and to ‘help the Members of the League (…) to concert their
action and their attitude among them-selves [sic] and with non-member states’.56 It was
composed of the Council’s members with the United States and Brazil, which accepted to
participate as observers. Both agreed to cooperate with the League, emphasising that
they maintained their freedom of action and their independence of judgment with regard
to any recommendations approved in Geneva. From that moment on, the ‘Committee of
the Thirteen’ as it was also called, took over the role of the ‘Committee of the Three’ and
followed the dispute for the Council. At the same time, it also became a platform to coordinate the efforts of all the powers involved in the dispute. Lester was appointed chair of
the new organ to guarantee the continuity of the diplomatic work.
While the possibility to impose an arms embargo was discussed, the decisions taken in
Geneva did not appear to have an impact on the situation in Upper Amazonia, where the
€epi, a military post
hostilities expanded.57 On 27 March, the Colombian force captured Gu
located on Peruvian territory on the Putumayo River. A few days later, the Advisory Committee was informed that a Peruvian cruiser and two submarines had crossed the Panama
Canal and were heading to the Upper Amazon. The minutes of the Advisory Committee’s
meetings show that this information was a source of anxiety in Geneva, as the arrival of
these naval units in the region could only contribute to escalating the hostilities. The issue
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
9
of the Peruvian naval squad also created some tensions within the Committee. Although
the member States of the League were held to refrain from any acts against a unanimous
resolution of the Council, the Peruvian ships were re-supplied in a Dutch and a British
port.58
In spite of the growing tensions, the British and Italian delegates at the Advisory Committee reported to their colleagues on 6 April that the Peruvian representative had
informed them privately that his government was ready to negotiate a political settlement
based on the League’s proposal presented in February. Following this news, the Committee immediately requested Lester to explore if an agreement was possible.59 Recognizing
this opening as a unique opportunity to preserve peace and showing his pragmatic determination to avoid a war, the Irish representative declared: ‘If there is a real hope of reaching an agreement, there is no doubt that the Committee will not be slave of forms.’60
During the following weeks Lester worked closely with Drummond to find a new compromise between the opposing parties. Even if at this point Peru seemed to be open to an
agreement, Colombia became more intransigent. Bogota felt in a stronger position after
the resolution of the 18 March and stressed that the Colombian public opinion would
refuse any solution contrary to an immediate return of the Leticia territory under Colombian sovereignty. Several weeks passed by before the situation evolved. Despite the diplomatic efforts, the political climate changed because of internal developments in Peru. On
30 April 1933, Sanchez Cerro was assassinated. His successor, Oscar Benivades, adopted a
more conciliatory policy. Furthermore, his personal and cordial relations with Alfonso
pez, the leader of the Colombian Liberal Party, also facilitated the revival of the
Lo
negotiations.61
Thanks to this political evolution Lester was finally able to present a document containing the procedure to implement the Council’s recommendations to the parties on 10 May.
This proposal provided the basis for the formal agreement, which was signed in Geneva
on 25 May.62 The ‘Geneva Agreement’ provided for the immediate suspension of hostilities and was based on the same points as the plan presented in February: (1) the evacuation of the Peruvian forces from Leticia; (2) an international administration by a
Commission appointed by the Council and (3) the opening of direct negotiations to settle
the dispute.
Nevertheless, the agreement contained significant modifications compared to the previous formula of conciliation. The Commission was to be dispatched to Leticia within a
period of thirty days and to administrate the territory in the name of Colombia. Its mandate could not exceed one year and the Colombian government accepted to cover the
expenses. The Peruvian forces should withdraw from Leticia upon the arrival of the Commission.63 An accompanying letter specified that the Colombian forces should evacuate
the Peruvian post of G€
uepi at the same time.64 Contrary to the February proposal, no reference was made to the nationality of the troops deployed to maintain order. The Commission was free ‘to call upon military forces of its choice’ as long as they did not exceed
what was essential for the maintenance of order.65 Finally, the agreement granted the
Commission significant autonomy specifying that it had ‘the right to decide all questions
relating to the performance of its mandate’.66 Regarding the direct negotiations between
the parties, the Council proposed their opening as soon as the first recommendations (the
evacuation and the establishment of the Commission) were executed and reiterated his
offer of good offices.67
10
P.-E. BOURNEUF
The plan resulting from the League’s conciliation was innovative and presented strong
analogies with modern peacekeeping.68 It was consent-based and its objective was to
insulate the territory from hostilities while Peru and Colombia negotiated an agreement.69
At the same time, it provided the means for an impartial international authority to stabilize
the region through a temporary administration. For this, the creation of the ‘international
force’ was a key element of the Geneva Agreement. It also represented the most contentious point of the negotiations.70
From the beginning, Colombia made clear that it would accept the creation of this
force only if it was exclusively composed of Colombian troops. Bogota’s position was
grounded in political, practical and moral considerations. The Colombian government
stressed that it had all the rights in the dispute and that the establishment of an international administration over an undisputed Colombian territory was already a great sacrifice.71 Additionally, the deployment of forces from other countries would be considered a
humiliation. It would give the impression that the Commission did not fully trust Colombia.72 The presence of detachments of other nationalities, such as Brazilian contingents,
side by side with Colombian soldiers could worsen the situation. It would be difficult to
avoid incidents between troops of different nationalities caused by ‘Peruvian intrigues’.73
Alternatively, the deployment of American troops would certainly have provoked a negative reaction of the public opinion in the other Latin American countries.74
Behind the Colombian intransigence, there was the objective to avoid losing control
over the Leticia territory. The League’s proposal gave no guarantees for the success of the
negotiations. Were they to fail, the presence of Colombian troops in Leticia—albeit temporarily ‘internationalized’—would allow Bogota to easily keep control over the territory.
The Colombian representative recognized during the discussions that accepting foreign
troops such as Brazilians could complicate the dispute in the long term because it would
be more difficult to push them out of Leticia than the Peruvians.75
For Peru, on the other hand, the presence of Colombian troops was in contradiction
with the international character of the proposed force. It would also go against the ‘neutralization’ of the Leticia territory, which was ‘the sole guarantee of peace for the parties
while negotiations are proceeding’.76 This is the reason why Lima demanded that the
force should be composed of troops coming from countries that were not part of the dispute. The Peruvian perspective was, at least in part, shared in Geneva. Even Drummond
conceded that it was difficult to say that a force entirely composed of troops of one country could be considered international.77 Nevertheless, it was clear that the presence of
Colombian forces was a sine qua non condition for Bogota to accept the League’s proposal. In light of this situation, the Committee of the Council adopted a pragmatic stand.
When the Peruvian government asked to officially define the term ‘international forces’, it
replied that they were forces placed under the sole authority and control of the international Commission without specifying its composition.78
The Geneva Agreement reflects the same pragmatic approach. It did not indicate the
nationality of the troops, who were to compose the force in order to avoid the opposition
of the Peruvian public opinion. However, with what Lester called a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’, the two parties accepted via an exchange of strictly confidential notes that the
Commission—under the Council’s instructions—was to call only Colombian troops.79
When the Norwegian delegate stressed the contradiction between the official agreement
and the content of the confidential notes, Lester replied: ‘The solution proposed is
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11
probably not the most suitable one, but it was the only one that received the approval of
both parties.’80
5. The transitional international administration
In conformity with the Geneva agreement, an international commission was rapidly dispatched to Upper Amazonia and took over the administration of the Leticia territory on
23 June 1933, after the evacuation of the Peruvian forces. It was composed of an American
(Colonel Arthur Brown, replaced in February 1934 by the Major-General Edwin Winans), a
Brazilian (Captain Alberto de Lemos Basto) and a Spaniard (Captain Francisco Yglesias,81
replaced by Guillermo Giraldez in April 1934). To assist them, the League of Nations
assigned a member of the Secretariat as Secretary of the Commission (Armando Mencia,
replaced by Carlos Garcia-Palacios in November 1933). The composition of what became
officially the ‘Commission for the Administration of the Territory of Leticia’ reflected political interests in Latin America, although it was mostly justified with practical reasons.82
The Geneva Agreement left great autonomy to the Commission, although the League’s
Secretariat provided some support for its establishment. In particular, following a memorandum prepared in Geneva, the Commissioners agreed on a rotating presidency based
on alphabetical order. The reason behind this administrative organization was pragmatic:
it was considered politically opportune that the American Commissioner chaired the Commission at the beginning of its mandate83. The Commission accepted also the suggestion
to adopt a flag as a distinctive emblem. It was white with a dark blue inscription: Sociedad
de Naciones Comision [sic] Leticia84 and was to be flown side by side with the Colombian
flag. It was the first time that a flag of the League of Nations was officially used. Flags
were considered a state symbol and the Geneva organization never adopted emblems
that could make it appear to be a ‘super-state’ or a ‘super-government’. However, the
League’s Secretariat considered that in this specific case adopting a banner was consistent
with other precedents like the Danzig Harbour Board or the Central Commission for the
Navigation on the Rhine.85
The establishment of international administration over the Leticia territory was a complex task. At a personal level, the unpublished final report of Garcia-Palacios provides
interesting insight into the uncomfortable conditions in which the members of the Commission had to work.86 No accommodation was ready for them when they arrived in Leticia. There were about 60 inhabitants in the township and more than half of the houses
were destroyed or uninhabitable.87 During the first months of their mandate, the Commissioners lived and worked on two steamships.88 The houses that were built for them were
far from the European standards of comfort. They consisted of stilt houses with palmthatched roofs—which according to Garcia-Palacios offered a ‘relative cover’ against the
tropical rains, but were particularly appreciated by rats and bats to make their nests.89 The
Colombian government proposed to buy special wooden houses, considered more
adapted to the personal comfort of the Commissioners. Yet, the Commission refused the
offer to avoid excessive or superfluous expenses.90 Given the economic context of
the early 1930s, keeping the budget of the international administration under control
remained a constant priority for the Commissioners during the whole period of their
mandate.
12
P.-E. BOURNEUF
Working and living in a tropical rainforest climate presented some challenges, in particular in relation to hygienic conditions. Despite the high temperatures, humidity and the
absence of running water, Garcia-Palacios reports that the circumstances were relatively
good for the members of the Commission, even if they had to be careful to avoid infections from water, animals but also ‘the inhabitants’ lack of hygiene’.91 During its mandate,
the Commission reported cases of malaria, typhus and beriberi. Garcia-Palacios adds that
most of the local population seemed to be affected by syphilis.92
The hardships of the living and working conditions were increased by isolation.
Supplies had to be carried by boat from Manaus, a Brazilian township more than 1,000
kilometres away. Furthermore, communication with the outside world was irregular and
problematic. Leticia had only a telegraph connection with Bogota. The telegrams that
were not sent via the Colombian capital could take several days before being delivered.93
The postal service was often interrupted for weeks.94 Despite the installation of a radio
during the international administration, the feeling of isolation affected the morale of the
Commissioners. Garcia-Palacios wrote that he sometimes had the impression to live in ‘a
sort of desert’.95 This feeling was increased by the lack of distractions. The Commissioners
left Leticia occasionally to visit Colombian or Peruvian officials and for patrols. They could
take also leaves of a few weeks. However, their life was monastic and during regular weekdays, they went to sleep by nightfall.96
In practical terms, the work of the Commission had no precedent. During their mandate, the Commissioners were responsible for virtually all aspects of life in Leticia, from
the slightest personal problem of daily life to major political issues with international
implications.97 The amount of work that was done by the Commission is impressive. Its
members met officially 103 times98 and they established a bureaucratic structure in the
middle of Amazonia, installing an office ‘with archives, secretaries and typing machines’99
at the Commission’s headquarters. This sparked some criticism from Colombian officials
who considered that the Commission was ‘too administrative’ and ‘exaggerated its work
down to the smallest detail’.100 Garcia-Palacios commented that had the Commission not
carried out its mandate as diligently, it would have been criticized all the same.101
The Geneva Agreement granted the Commission extensive powers with regard to its
functions and jurisdiction. The Commissioners considered that their mission was to
administer the territory placed under their responsibility ‘directly and independently’.102
They also insisted on developing cordial relations with Leticia’s inhabitants. The reasons
behind this policy were of political and pragmatic nature. When the Commission started
its mandate, it had to cope with a certain distrust emanating from the local population,
which was in great part in favour of the Peruvian occupation and had not been informed
about the decisions taken in Geneva.103 Establishing an impartial administration was considered crucial to avoid any provocations and appease the minds.
This approach caused some frictions with Colombia. For Bogota, the Commission was
administrating the Leticia territory in Colombia’s name and could thus be regarded as a
Colombian entity.104 This triggered some disagreement with regard to the nature and
scope of the Commission’s powers, in particular concerning the laws applicable under the
international administration and the appointment of local officials.
The Commission considered that Colombian law was—at least in part—suspended as a
consequence of the Geneva Agreement.105 Garcia-Palacios observes that the resolutions
of the Commission were taken respecting Colombian law ‘wherever possible’ but ‘in many
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
13
cases’ they followed custom norms or, ‘quite often’, personal judgment.106 The decision to
dismiss Colombian officials, such as the municipal judge or the Leticia mayor, also caused
some irritation in Bogota.107 The Commission considered that the reinstatement of the
Colombian administration would create tensions and could interfere with its independence. For this reason, only officials considered essential, like the notary public were reestablished. At the same time, the Commission recruited some employees but it was
decided that no Peruvians or Colombians could work for the international administration
to guarantee its impartiality.108
6. The work of the international commission
Regarding the functioning of the Commission, each Commissioner took the responsibility
to oversee a specific area of administration. The important decisions were approved collegially, but the Commissioners had great autonomy in their respective field of responsibility.109 The activities of the Commission were essentially limited to Leticia. Nevertheless, its
members periodically visited the surrounding territory by boat and by airplane to monitor
the situation, collect information and show the population that the Commission’s jurisdiction was effective.110
Although the American Commissioner was also in charge of the matters relating to
communications and the census of the population,111 the most sensitive issues he had to
supervise were the payment of claims in respect of property lost, reconstruction (most of
the houses had been damaged or destroyed during the Peruvian occupation) and the
return of refugees. Thanks to the financial support of the Colombian government, a total
of 138 claims for compensation were taken into consideration.112 Garcia-Palacios notes
that this issue sparked criticism within the local population. The inhabitants tended to
exaggerate their losses and the Commission decided to approve the claims only after
what locals considered long and useless investigations.113 Although the reparations
approved were often lower than the ones claimed by the victims, the work of the Commission contributed to bringing Leticia back to normality after the Peruvian occupation. At
the end of the international administration, there were about 250 inhabitants.114
The Brazilian member of the Commission supervised public works, health and education. One of the greatest challenges in this administrative area was the lack of local manpower. Despite this problem, all the public works were completed at the end of the
mandate of the Commission. Roads were constructed, as well as electric light installed in
official buildings and on the main street of the township.115 Among the buildings repaired
or built, there were two schools, a hospital, a wireless station and even a casino for officers.116 Regarding the sanitation of the township, the Commission drained marshes and
assisted the health inspector sent by Bogota in launching campaigns against venereal diseases.117 In this regard, the Commission largely contributed to the development of Leticia’s infrastructures.
Finally, the Spanish Commissioner was put in charge of maintenance of public order. It
was the most sensitive responsibility of the Commission and ‘at certain times all other
administrative action was subordinated to this aim’.118 From the beginning it was decided
to apply ‘a policy based on pacific means and persuasion’119 rather than coercion. For this,
the management of the Colombian contingent and the implementation of the Commission’s regulations were the most important matter.
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Deciding on the number of troops that the international force should be composed of
was a sensitive issue. The balance between the number of troops strictly necessary to
maintain order but also to deter any new attempt of coup de force and the will to avoid
provoking the inhabitants of the Leticia territory or the Peruvian military was extremely
delicate to find.
Initially the Commission demanded that Colombia send a force of 150 men.120 However, noting that the evacuation of the Peruvian forces proceeded without incidents and
that the situation was stable, the Commissioners considered fifty men to be enough. This
contingent—composed of regular Colombian troops armed with light weapons—arrived
in Leticia by boat three days after the beginning of the international administration. At
first the Commission considered that an important military presence in Leticia would be
counterproductive. Only nine disarmed men were deployed in the township while the
rest of the troops stayed on board of the steamship by which they arrived.121 Their mission was to police the township and guard the landing stages on the river. Due to the lack
of roads, this was the best way to keep Leticia secure. The officers were instructed to use
persuasion and to call the members of the Commission in case of any trouble.122
Despite the arrival of the Commission, a latent state of anxiety persisted in Leticia.
Although Lima stated that no attacks against Leticia were to be tolerated, tensions were
constantly re-ignited by rumours of imminent coups. Even the ‘injudicious remarks’ of a
man ‘in a state of intoxication’ on an imminent Peruvian attack were sufficient to cause a
panic.123 Considering that the excitement caused by rumours might lead to disturbances,
the Commission took measures to reassure the population and increase the military force
in Leticia discreetly but continuously.
Between July 1933 and August 1933, thirteen, then 25 armed men were deployed in
Leticia124. At the same time, a night and day patrol service was established. Finally, the
whole contingent was transferred to Leticia in September. The number of troops was
then increased to seventy-five men in February 1934 to assure the fulfilment of their
duties.125 The transfer of the force ashore and the increase of its number did not modify
the Commission’s policy. The instructions given to the Colombian Commandant of the
force remained clear: confrontations should be avoided.
Although the troops wore brassards bearing the letters ‘SDN’ for identification126, the
term ‘international force’ was rapidly abandoned due to Colombia’s opposition. The term
had been used during the discussions, but Colombia stressed that it did not appear in the
Geneva Agreement and stated that calling the force ‘international’ would have given a
‘bad impression to the Colombian public opinion’.127 Still, the Commission’s authority was
never contested. Colombian officers reported back on a daily base and followed the
instructions of the international administration. In its final report the Commission acknowledged the contribution of the Colombian troops to the success of the international administration, ‘both by the efficiency of the services that have rendered and by the unfailing
correctness, discipline and good conduct of all concerned’.128
Regarding the policy to maintain order, the Commission adopted a series of regulations. As it appeared that the situation in Leticia was calm but could be destabilized by
external forces, the first of these regulations concerned the ‘entering, leaving and settling
in Leticia’.129 No restrictions were imposed to enter or leave the township. The only obligation was to sign in and out with the soldiers on duty. Individuals or families wishing to
remain in Leticia for more than twenty-four hours were required to apply for a special
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
15
permit.130 Any individual who refused to comply with these rules or who was considered a
potential threat to the public order could be denied access to the town or, in case of an
incident, be arrested. The Commission also banned weapons. Soldiers were authorized to
arrest any person carrying a weapon without a permit from the Commission.131
Surprisingly, the most sensitive issue to guarantee order appeared to be the organization of private parties. As Garcia-Palacios notes, alcohol was an essential component of
festivities in Amazonia and for these occasions the population was always able to get a
local eau-de-vie—described as strong enough to be used to refill petrol lamps132—,
despite a regulation forbidding to serve alcoholic liquors after 8 pm. Fuelled by alcohol,
conversations often escalated intense political discussions, which could easily turn into
brawls. In order to prevent incidents, the Commission approved a regulation regarding
‘festivities, dances, meetings and traffic in Leticia’.133 All private meetings were forbidden
after 9 pm during the week and 2 am during the weekends. Groups of more than four persons could not stay in the streets after this time without special authorization.134 Despite
these rules, the Commissioners’ nights remained often restless until the end of their
mandate.
7. The final agreement
No major incidents arose during the international administration of Leticia. This does not
mean that the Commission did not experience internal and external challenges. On an
internal level, its Secretary, Mencia, was suspended in September 1933 after weeks of personal and professional disagreements with the Commissioners. The Commission informed
Geneva that the Secretary was ‘unsuited to the responsibilities of the position’ and lost
the members’ confidence by maintaining an unauthorized telegram correspondence with
Colombian officials.135 Externally, the Commission was confronted with the hostility of the
Peruvian and Colombian press opposed to the international administration and the terms
of the Geneva Agreement. Insignificant episodes or even unfounded rumours were amplified to discredit the Commission or to attack the governments in Lima and Bogota. In
March 1934, the Colombian press launched a violent press campaign accusing Yglesias of
favouring Peru. It was the second time that a denigrating campaign was conducted
against the Spanish Commissioner. Despite the support of his colleagues, Yglesias decided
to resign to facilitate the work of the Commission.136
Regarding the relations with the Peruvian and Colombian governments, Garcia-Palacios
wrote that the Commission worked without any pressure.137 The relations with Lima
remained cordial despite the divergences on the Commission’s mandate and the attacks
of the press. In addition to the troops, Bogota offered full logistic support and covered the
expenses of the transitional administration. The contacts with the local authorities in Loreto were less transparent. The Commission discovered during the last days of its mandate
that a ‘secret service for espionage and agitation’ involving Peruvian officials in Iquitos
had been established in the Leticia territory.138 Despite the strong verbal reaction of the
Commissioners, the only consequence was the expulsion of the inhabitants involved.
Beyond the relations with their counterparts, the main concern of the Commission was
the uncertainty of the negotiations of a final agreement. The League was not directly
involved and the talks between the opposing parties started only in October 1933 in Rio
de Janeiro under the chairmanship of Brazil. For months, the two delegations were not
16
P.-E. BOURNEUF
even able to agree on an agenda. No information was available on the progress of the
negotiations and it seemed that both governments were more interested in military preparations than in finding a political solution to the dispute.139
With the passing of time, there were some apprehensions that no agreement would be
reached before the end of the Commission’s mandate. This uncertainty increased
the pressure on the Commissioners. Already in January 1934, they asked Geneva for guidance about the measures to be taken in this case.140 For months the issue remained unresolved, also because the League’s attention was focused on European issues, particularly
on the preparation of the Saar plebiscite. Eventually, the Advisory Committee met to hear
the views of Colombia and Peru in April 1934. Lima proposed an extension of the international administration for six months while Colombia demanded the Leticia territory to be
returned at the end of the international Commission’s mandate and insisted on an
increase in the number of troops to prevent any attack.141 This raised a serious question
for the League. On the one hand, a Peruvian attack in case of the negotiations’ failure
seemed highly probable judging from the information coming from the region and a
return to the pre-Geneva Agreement situation was regarded as an intolerable setback for
the League.142 On the other hand, a premature approbation of the Colombian’s request
could hamper the negotiations in Rio de Janeiro.
Despite the tensions, both the Advisory Council and the Commission adjourned their
decision. This move was made deliberately to maintain Lima and Bogota under pressure
as the Brazilian delegate informed the Committee that a compromise was still possible.143
Finally, almost against all expectations, the League was informed that a final agreement
had been reached in Rio de Janeiro on 18 May.144 With the signature of the ‘Protocol of
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’, the two countries recognized the Colombian sovereignty on the Leticia territory, accepted the demilitarization of their borders and refused
the use of force to settle their disputes.145
Following the signature of the Protocol, the Commission accepted to increase the force
under its authority to 150 men ‘to prevent any surprise action’ and to facilitate the transition to the Colombian authorities.146 Despite the apprehension of the Commissioners
regarding the reaction of the local population, the inhabitants of Leticia acknowledged
the announcement of the agreement with ‘apathy’ and ‘indifference’.147 The Commission
handed over the territory to the Colombian authorities without any incidents on 19 June
1934, after almost one year of international administration.
8. Conclusions
The signature of the Protocol did not appease all the tensions between Peru and Colombia. Due to parliamentary opposition, it entered into force only in 1935. Nevertheless, the
settlement of the Leticia dispute represents one of the few examples of successful interventions of the League of Nations to maintain international peace. The Geneva organization acted as a facilitator between all the parties directly as well as indirectly involved, and
played an active role in the settlement of the dispute. The Council’s decision to establish
an international administration over the Leticia territory was not taken to carry out the
responsibilities conferred under the Versailles Treaty, like in other cases such as for the
Saar Territory. On contrary, it was a response to an on-going crisis. In this regard, it ‘was
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
17
unique in the history of the League and set a precedent for the later practice of the United
Nations’.148
As noted by George Baer, a key factor for this success was that ‘the League served the
primary interests of all States associated with the dispute’.149 Leticia was a marginal crisis
and no great powers were directly involved, although no one had an interest in the outbreak of a war in the heart of Latin America, potentially involving other regional powers.
Even Colombia and Peru were financially and militarily not ready for a large-scale conflict,
despite the nationalist rhetoric of the political parties opposed to a settlement. The converging interests of the actors concerned—and in particular Washington’s support150—
offered the League the opportunity to intervene and converted its moral authority into
political credibility.
The Leticia case also shows that the Geneva organization was able to successfully cooperate with non-member states. The League provided a consultation and coordination platform for all the powers having a special interest in the dispute. The inclusion of Brazil and
the United States in the Advisory Committee was pragmatic and political. While it
strengthened the credibility of the League’s intervention, it simultaneously reflected the
will not to give the impression to interfere in Latin American affairs. This explains also why
representatives of what at that time were called ‘small powers’ conducted the negotiations. From this perspective, the League’s mediation gave some of them the opportunity
to gain in stature. In particular, de Madariaga, who had previously been head of the Disarmament Section, led a coalition of small powers during the Disarmament Conference and
later chaired the Council’s Committee on the Abyssinian crisis in 1935.151 Lester was
appointed High Commissioner of the Free City of Danzig in 1933—another territory under
the League’s supervision—and became successively Deputy Secretary-General in 1937
and Secretary-General in 1940.152
The political support provided by states was certainly fundamental for the settlement
of the dispute. However, the League’s role should not be underestimated. As noted by a
member of the Secretariat: ‘Our work is difficult, which is not surprising seeing that in the
nature of things questions do not come to the League unless they are sufficiently difficult
to make it impossible to deal with them otherwise.’153 The examination of the process
leading to the final agreement shows that the Geneva organization’s intervention was not
merely one of procedure. With the assistance of the League’s Secretariat, the Committee
of the Council and the Advisory Committee played an active part during the negotiations,
proving a surprising sense of innovation. Especially, Lester, de Madariaga and Drummond
revealed great diplomatic skills and political pragmatism. Beside the legal principles and
the mechanisms of the Covenant, they never forgot that the solution of the dispute was a
political one. Although it was clear from the beginning that Peru’s claim was legally
wrong, the League did not adopt a dogmatic legal course of action against Lima. On the
contrary, the delegates in Geneva worked on an exit strategy in compliance with international law but that was at the same time in the interests of the powers implicated. For
this, they elaborated a balanced compromise that could be accepted by both parties without losing face. In that sense, the ‘Geneva Agreement’, which provided for the establishment of a temporary international administration, represented a surprisingly modern
conflict resolution initiative.
It was the first time that such an operation was set up under the auspices of an international organization with the explicit purpose of deescalating a dispute threatening
18
P.-E. BOURNEUF
international peace. In this context, the Commission played a pivotal role in creating the
conditions for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The temporary international administration allowed for the evacuation of the Peruvian forces, guaranteed the monitoring of
the situation and stabilized the Leticia territory during the negotiations. Yet, the Commissioners’ work, each in their respective area of responsibility, demonstrated that it did not
only simply freeze the hostilities. They also supervised the reconstruction of Leticia and
the development of its infrastructures thanks to the Colombian financial support.
From this perspective, the contribution of the Commission to the settlement of the dispute should be emphasized. In conditions of daunting environmental and political challenges amplified by isolation, its members worked under high pressure. If the talks
proceeded slowly and their outcome remained uncertain until practically the expiration of
the international administration, the Commissioners were aware that a minor incident
could have serious political consequences, possibly leading to a renewal of the hostilities.
In this context, they took audacious decisions regarding the application of their mandate.
The territory under their authority was not legally internationalized, given that all the parties recognized Colombian’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Commission’s determination
to establish an independent and impartial administration contributed to appease the tensions. The implementation of a policy based on conciliation rather than force proved to
be effective. Although the troops placed under the Commission’s authority were not officially considered an ‘international force’ after all, the Leticia international administration
anticipated some aspects of the modern multidimensional peacekeeping missions.
In conclusion, the settlement of the Leticia dispute is a surprisingly underestimated success of conflict resolution through an international territorial administration. It shows that
the Geneva organization has been unduly associated with a succession of failures that culminated with its replacement by the United Nations. Contrary to the image of a rigid and
bureaucratic organization sometimes conveyed in the literature, the settlement of the
Leticia dispute demonstrates the League’s political flexibility and sense of innovation.
Moreover, it reveals that what were called ‘the principles’ and ‘the methods’ of the Geneva
organization by the then Council president De Vesconcellos are still valid today and merit
to be explored further.
Notes
1. Council, Minutes 5th Meeting, 79th Session, 19 May 1934, League of Nations Official Journal
(thereafter LONOJ), xv (1934), 878.
2. Lester H. Woolsey, ‘The Leticia Dispute between Colombia and Peru’, The American Journal of
International Law, xvii (1933), 317–24; German Cavelier, La Polıtica Internacional de Colombia,
1903–1959, iii (Bogota: Editorial Iqueima, 1960); Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin
American Wars, 1932–1942 (New York: Colombia University Press, 1966); Jorge Basadre, Historia
de la Republica del Per
u, 1822–1933, xiv (Santa Cruz: Editorial Universitaria, 1968); Juan Miguel
Bakula, La polıtica internacional entre el Per
u y Colombia (Bogota: Editorial Temis, 1988); Alberto
Donadıo, La guerra col en Peru (Santa Fe de Bogota, Planeta, 1995); Carlos Camacho Arango,
n peruana de Leticia (Colombia, rıo Amazonas, sep‘Historia narrativa de la toma y ocupacio
tiembre de 1932)’, HiSTOReLo. Revista de Historia Regional y Local, viii (2016), 335–68.
3. Frank P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1960),
536–40; Frederick S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920–1946, (Leicester:
Leicester University Press, 1986). For the relationship between the League of Nations and Latin
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
19
America, see: Alan McPherson, and Yannick Wehrli, Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin
America at the League of Nations (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015).
Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘La gestion des conflits internationaux par la Soci
et
e des Nations:
retrospective critique’, Etudes
internationales, xxxi (2000), 675–90.
Brazil had been an ‘original member’ of the League of Nations, but left the organization in
1926.
Stahn Carsten, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration. Versailles to Iraq
and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 233; see also: Ralph Wilde, ‘From
Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration’, The
American Journal of International Law, xcv (2000), 583–606; Alan James, ‘The Peacekeeping
Role of the League of Nations’, International Peacekeeping, vi (1999), 157; Hitoshi Nasu, International Law on Peacekeeping (Leiden, Boston: Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 63.
For studies on international administration, see Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration. Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008); and Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration. How Trusteeship and the
Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Wood, United States and Latin American Wars, 175–80.
Woolsey, ‘The Leticia Dispute between Colombia and Peru’, 318.
Arnold Tonybee, Survey of International Affairs 1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1934),
442.
Ibid., 438.
Santos to Drummond, 2 Jan. 1933, L[eague of] N[ations] A[rchives], R3620, 1/531/531.
Committee of the Council, Report, 1 Mar. 1933, LNA, R3622, 1/2612/531.
Santos to Drummond, 2 Jan. 1933, LNA, R3620, 1/531/531.
Telegrams from the President of the Council to the Governments of Peru and Colombia, 14 Jan.
1933, LNA, R3621, 1/751/531; Drummond, Record of Interview, 13 Jan. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/
751/531.
Extract from the Minutes of the 1st and the 2nd Meeting of the 70th Session of the Council,
LONOJ, xiv (1933), 516–43.
Garcia-Calderon to Drummond, 19 Feb. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/756/531.
Garcia-Calderon to Drummond, 20 Jan. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/756/531.
Manzanilla to Drummond, 16 Jan. 1933, LNA, R3620, 1/531/531.
Manzanilla to Drummond, 26 Jan. 1933, LNA, R3620, 1/531/531.
Manzanilla to Drummond, 19 Jan. 1933, LNA, R3620, 1/531/531.
See Glenda Sluga, The Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2013).
Garcia-Calderon to Drummond, 20 Jan. 1933, LAN, R3621, 1/756/531.
Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–
1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 80.
Manzanilla to Drummond, 23 Jan. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/756/531.
Council, Telegrams from the President of the Council to the Governments of Peru and Colombia, 14 Jan. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/751/531.
Ibid.
Committee of the Council, Minutes 3rd Meeting, 28 Feb. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
Stephen Barcroft, ‘The International Civil Servant: The League of Nations Career of Sean Lester,
1929–1947’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Dublin, 1973), 48.
Walters, History of the League of Nations, 525.
The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State, 30 Dec. 1932, Foreign Relations
United States (thereafter FRUS), v (1932), 313.
The Colombian Minister (Lozano) to the Secretary of State, 23 Jan. 1933, FRUS, iv (1933), 418.
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State, 30 Jan. 1933, FRUS, iv (1933), 438.
Letter dated February 17th 1933, From the Colombian Representative to the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations, LONOJ, xiv (1933), 562.
20
P.-E. BOURNEUF
35. Wood, United States and Latin American Wars, 220. See also: Stephen Randall, Colombia and the
United States: Hegemony and Interdependence (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 145;
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co, 1948), 308–11.
36. Article 15, paragraph 3 and 4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
37. McKinnon Wood to Political Section and Secretary-General, 22 Mar. 1935, LNA, R3578, 3A/
39535/14803; Robert Kolb, ‘Article 15’ in Robert Kolb (ed.), Commentaire sur le Pacte de la
Societe des Nations (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2015), 599–692.
38. Colombie-Perou, 7 Feb. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
39. Committee of the Council, 1st Meeting, 23 Feb. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
40. Committee of the Council, Report, 1 Mar. 1933, LNA, R3622, 1/2612/531.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Committee of the Council, Minutes 1st Meeting, 23 Feb. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
44. Ibid.
45. Council, Minutes 2nd Meeting, 71th session, 1 Mar. 1933, LONOJ, xiv (1933), 605.
46. Committee of the Council, Minutes 3rd Meeting, 28 Feb. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
47. Ibid.
48. Committee of the Council, Minutes 1st Meeting, 23 Feb. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
49. Lester to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 4 March 1933, LNA, P129, 3.
50. Garcia-Calderon to Lester, 6 Mar. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/756/531.
51. Garcia-Calderon to Lester, 7 Mar. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/756/531.
52. Garcia-Calderon to Lester, 8 Mar. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/756/531.
53. Committee of the Council, Report of the Council provided for in Article 15, Paragraph 4, of the
Covenant, 16 Mar. 1933, LNA, R3622, 1/2612/531.
54. Ibid.
55. Walters, History of the League of Nations, 539; Article 15, par. 6 Covenant of the League of
Nations.
56. Council, Minutes 5th Meeting, 71st Session, 18 Mar. 1933, LONOJ, xiv (1933), 526.
57. Advisory Committee, Minutes 3rd Meeting, 5 Apr. 1933, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044.
58. Advisory Committee, Minutes 9th Meeting, 13 Apr. 1933, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044.
59. Advisory Committee, Minutes 4th Meeting, 6 Apr. 1933, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044.
60. Ibid.
61. Wood, United States and Latin American Wars, 228.
62. Procedure for Putting into Effect the Recommendations Proposed by the Council in the Report
which it Adopted on Mar. 18th, 1933, 25 May 1933, LNA, R3622, 1/4382/531.
63. Ibid.
64. Letter from the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the Representative of Colombia and
Peru, 25 May 1933, LNA, R3622, 1/4382/531.
65. Ibid.
66. Procedure for Putting into Effect the Recommendations Proposed by the Council in the Report
which it Adopted on Mar. 18th, 1933, 25 May 1933, LNA, R3622, 1/4382/531.
67. Ibid.
68. Norrie Macqueen, Peacekeeping and the International System (London: Routledge, 2006), 38.
69. Wilde, ‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond’, 588.
70. Advisory Committee, Minutes 8th meeting, 10 May 1933, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044.
71. Council, Minutes 2nd Meeting, 71th Session, 1st Mar. 1933, LONOJ, xiv (1933), 508.
72. Committee of the Council, Minutes 5th Meeting, 2 Mar. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Garcia-Calderon to Lester, 8 Mar. 1933, LNA, R3621, 1/756/531.
77. Committee of the Council, Minutes 2nd Meeting, 25 Feb. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
78. Committee of the Council, Minutes 5th Meeting, 2 Mar. 1933, LNA, R6229, 1/9055/531.
79. Lester to Santos; Lester to Garcia-Calderon, 11 May 1933, LNA, COL136, 1/133375/4322.
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80. Advisory Committee, Minutes 8th Meeting, 10 May 1933, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044.
81. The name of the Spanish Commissioner is spelled Iglesias and Yglesia. This article follows the
spelling found in the official documents.
82. Advisory Committee, Minutes 11th Meeting, 26 May, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044.
83. Secretariat of the League of Nations, Memorandum au sujet de la Commission devant se rendre a Leticia, 29 May 1933, ALON, COL136, 1/13375/4322.
84. A flag is preserved in the League of Nations’ Archives. See also: Brown to Drummond, 20 June
1933, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/4332.
85. Walters, Memo, 1 Jun. 1933, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/4332.
86. Garcia-Palacios, Rapport final du Secretaire de la Commission, September 1934, LNA, R3633,
11/14584/4332.
87. Commission for the Administration of the Territory of Leticia (thereafter Commission), 1st
Report, 3 Sep. 1933, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
88. The Commission established itself on land mid-November. Commission, 2nd Report, 3 Mar.
1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
89. Garcia-Palacios, Rapport final, Sept. 1934, LNA, R3633, 11/14584/4332.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Garcia-Palacios, Informations concernant la situation a Leticia du 1 avril au 1 mai, 30 Apr. 1934,
LNA, R3633, 1/4731/4332.
94. Garcia-Palacios to Walters, 5 Feb. 1934, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/4332.
95. Garcia-Palacios, Informations concernant la situation a Leticia du 1 avril au 1 mai, 30 April 1934,
LNA, R3633, 1/4731/4332.
96. Garcia-Palacios, Rapport final, Sep. 1934, LNA, R3633, 11/14584/4332.
97. Garcia-Palacios to Walters, 5 Feb. 1934, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/4332.
98. Commission, Libro de Actas, LNA, COL133 bis, 1/13375/4332.
99. Garcia-Palacios, Rapport final, Sep. 1934, LNA, R3633, 11/14584/4332.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Commission, 2nd Report, 3 Mar. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
103. Commission, 1st Report, 3 Sep. 1933, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
104. Brown and Mencia to Avenol, 2 July 1933, LNA, COL 134, 1/13375/4332.
~o, 4 Dec. 1933, LNA, COL 135, 1/133375/4332.
105. Yglesias, Garcia-Palacios to Carren
106. Garcia-Palacios, Rapport final, Sep. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/14584/4332.
107. Commission, 2nd Report, 3 Mar. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
108. Garcia-Palacios to Walters, 5 Feb. 1934, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/4332.
109. Commission, 2nd Report, 3 March 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
110. Garcia-Palacios, Informations concernant la situation a Leticia du 1 f
evrier au 1 mars 1934, 1
Mar., LNA, R3633, 1/4731/4332; Garcia-Palacios to Walters, 2 Mar. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7580/
4332.
111. Commission, 3rd Report, 30 Apr. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
112. Commission, 4th Report, 19 Jun. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
113. Commission, 2nd Report, 3 Mar. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
n de Leticia y su territorio, 22 May 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/
114. Giraldez, Informe sobre la poblacio
7023/4332.
115. Commission, 4th Report, 19 Jun. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
116. Report Submitted by Dr. Alfonso Parra, Health Officer at Leticia, to the Colombian Government
and the Commission for Administering the Territory of Leticia, 22 May 1934, LONOJ, xv (1934),
949.
117. Garcia-Palacios, Informations concernant la situation a Leticia du 15 avril au 30 avril, 30 Apr.
1934, LNA, R3633, 1/4731/4332.
118. Commission, 2nd Report, 3 Mar. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
119. Ibid.
22
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
P.-E. BOURNEUF
Commission, Libro de actas, 22 Jun. 1933, LNA, COL133 bis, 1/13375/4332.
Commission, 2nd Report, 3 Mar. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
Ibid.
Garcia-Palacios, Rapport final, September 1934, ALON, R3633, 11/14584/4332.
~o and Captain Ancizar, 26 Jul.
Ibid.; Commision de administracion de Leticia to Major Lodon
1933, COL 136, 1/13395/4332.
Commission, 3rd Report, 30 Apr. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
Mencia to Drummond, 20 Jun. 1933, LNA, COL134, 1/13375/4332.
Mencia to Drummond, 20 Jun. 1933, LNA, COL134, 1/13375/4332. Teixidor to Walters, 21 Jun.
1933, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/4332.
Commission, 4th Report, 19 Jun. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
Commission, Reglamento sobre entrada, salida y establecimiento de personas en Leticia, 16
Jul. 1933, COL136, 1/13395/4332.
Ibid.
Commission, Instrucciones sobre el uso de armas en Leticia, 19 July 1934, LNA, COL134, 1/
13395/4332.
Garcia-Palacios, Rapport final, Sep. 1934, LNA, R3633, 11/14584/4332.
Commission, Libro de actas, 18 Aug. 1933, LNA, COL133 bis, 1/13375/4332.
Commission, 2nd Report, 3 March 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
Yglesias to Avenol, 18 Sep. 1933, LNA, COL 134, 1/13375/4322; see also: Brown to Avenol, 27
n de
Nov. 1933, LNA, COL 135, 1/13375/4332; Yglesias, Informe que el presidente de la Comisio
n del territorio de Leticia presenta a la Comisio
n sobre el Secretario General Docadministracio
tor Armando Mencia, 17 Sep. 1933, LNA, COL135, 1/13375/4332.
Garcia-Palacios to Walters, 5 Feb. 1934, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/4332.
Garcia-Palacios, Rapport final, Sep. 1934, LNA, R3633, 11/14584/4332.
Commission, 4th Report, 19 Jun. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
Advisory Committee, Statement by Chairman of the Advisory Committee, 11 Apr. 1934, LNA,
R3630, 1/3477/3044; Advisory Committee, Minutes 13th session, 12 April 1934, LNA, R3630, 1/
3477/3044. For an overview of the negotiations, see: Lester H. Woolsey, ‘The Leticia Dispute
between Colombia and Peru’, The American Journal of International Law, xxix (1935), 94–9.
Commission to Avenol, 23 January 1934, LNA, COL135, 1/13375/4322; Walters to GarciaPalacios, 19 January 1934, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/4332.
Advisory Committee, Minutes 13th Meeting, 12 Apr. 1934, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044; Muarta,
Belaunde, Sotomayor to President Committee of the Council, 21 Mar. 1934, LNA, R3622, 1/
6738/531; Advisory Committee, Statement by Chairman of the Advisory Committee, 11 Apr.
1934, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044; Commission to Avenol, 23 Jan. 1934, LNA, R3632, 1/4731/
4332; Santos to Drummond, 4 Apr. 1934, LNA, R3622, 1/6738/531.
Garcia-Palacios, Informations concernant la situation a Leticia du 1 avril au 1 mai, 30 Apr. 1934,
LNA, R3633, 1/4731/4332.
Advisory Committee, Minutes 13th Meeting, 12 Apr. 1934, LNA, R3630, 1/3477/3044.
Mello de Franco to Avenol, 18 May 1934, LNA, R3622, 1/6738/531.
Nieto-Caballero to Avenol, Agreement of Rio de Janeiro between Peru and Colombia, 11 Jun.
1934, LNA, R3622, 1/6738/531.
Commission, 4th Report, 19 Jun. 1934, LNA, R3633, 1/7023/4332.
Garcia-Palacios, Informations concernant la situation a Leticia du 15 mai au 31 mai, 27 May
1934, LNA, R3633, 1/4731/4332.
Carsten, Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration, 236.
George W. Baer, ‘Leticia and Ethiopia before the League’ in The United Nations Library (Geneva),
and the Graduate Institute of International Studies (eds), The League of Nations in Retrospect:
Proceedings of the Symposium (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1981), 282.
Walters, History of the League of Nations, 525.
Ibid., 510, 679.
Yannick Wehrli, ‘Sean Lester, Ireland and Latin America in the League of Nations, 1929–1946’,
Irish Migration Studies in Latin America, vii (2009), 42.
Walters to Garcia-Palacios, 2 Mar. 1934, ALON, R3336, 1/7580/4332.
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Daniel Jug, Laura Keller and the anonymous reviewers for their precious comments. I would like also to express my gratitude to Jacques Oberson, archivist at the League of
Nations Archives, for his assistance. The documents in French and Spanish quoted in the article are
translated by the author.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.