Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 1
Command Relationships in the World War II China-Burma-India Theater
Patrick G. Skelly
Oh what a tangled web we weave, When first we practise to deceive!
- Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832), Marmion.
Thesis
Allied command relationships in the China-Burma-India Theater of World War II all
focused on China. For better or worse, the tangled web converged on one man and one family:
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Soongs. There was a second man there as well, upon
whom we must focus - the catalyst, motivator, object, and scapegoat for the tangling and
untangling: Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell.
This paper will bring a sense of perspective to the military, political, personal, and
international pressures, as much as such a broad task can be done in a single paper.
Introduction
The Stilwell Papers (1948) - a blend of General Stilwell's diary/journal, letters to his
wife, and annotations by editor Theodore H. White - is not by itself sufficient to understand the
full history of Stilwell's three years in World War II China. But it is a fitting resource to tie
together (and raise questions for exploration) in other works such as the American official
histories of the China-Burma-India Theater by Romanus and Sunderland (2002, 1987, 1990) and
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare by Matloff and Snell (2002, 2004); the British-oriented
history Allies of a Kind by Thorne (1978); and a family history collation, The Soong Dynasty, by
Seagrave (1985).
The 'struggle' over authority, responsibility, and objectives was principally between
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Kuomintang Chinese government and Supreme
Allied Commander of the China Theater, and Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Joint Chief of Staff of
the China Theater and Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces China-Burma-India.
There were many other relationships, positive and negative, self-serving and supportive,
and frequently being triangular among people wearing multiple hats.
This paper focuses on the primary triangle, which involved Chiang Kai-shek, Joseph
Stilwell, and Claire Chennault:
- Chiang as Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese armed forces, and Chennault as his 'air advisor';
- Chiang as Supreme Allied Commander of the China Theater, and Stilwell as his Allied Chief of
Staff and controller of U.S. Lend-Lease to China;
- Chennault as Commanding General of the 14th Air Force. and Stilwell as Commanding
General of U.S. Forces in the Theater.
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 2
Key American generals discussed in this paper are:
- Gen. George Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army;
- Lt.Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, successor in command to Gen. Stilwell;
- Maj.Gen. Claire Chennault, CG 14th AF;
- Maj.Gen. Patrick Hurley, President Roosevelt's personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek,
Setting a Strategy
When [Field Marshal Sir John] Dill [British Joint Staff Mission to Washington] sent
Marshall a British study urging that nothing be done in Burma, the Army's Chief of Staff was
moved to offer in rebuttal an exposition of his own views [21 Dec 1942] on CBI strategy:
... I am confident the individual Chinese soldier will fight, has no nerves, requires a
minimum of food, clothing and similar supplies, and should, if properly led, trained and
equipped (which has never been the case in the past), give a good account of himself.
The success of limited operations in Burma will afford increased protection to the
air freight route to China and help to maintain this slender supply link to our AmericanChina Air Task Force until such time as a land route can be opened. Upon the opening of
a land route to China, we propose to move supplies for this air task force in increasing
quantities and build up this force to where it will be extremely effective against the
enemy.
Our present operations in China are severely restricted by the limitations of the air
freight route from India to China, which necessitates early offensive action to facilitate at
the earliest possible moment the opening of a land route to China. (Romanus &
Sunderland, 2002, p. 250)
Geography
China was occupied by the Japanese in the coastal reaches and northeast, held by the
Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung in the northwest and west, and by the
Kuomintang (Nationalists) in the south and southeast. That is about as specific as one can get in
a single sentence.
Burma was held in the center and south by the Japanese from 1942, with the optimum
flow of traffic from occupied ports and Rangoon south-north into China.
India, to the west, thus became the only avenue of supply into China, and that only by air
until 1944, overflying the mountains of north Burma.
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 3
Which Ally Sits at the Chinese Table?
Why would the United States, rather than Great Britain, have been designated the World
War II mentor and supporter of China? It was a 'diplomatic' decision: 'most palatable' for the
states involved.
Look first at the reasons or prejudices against Great Britain. It was an active imperialist,
especially in Asia; its interests in China were in most senses only commercial; there were China's
residual memories of the 'unequal treaties' of the 19th Century; and most importantly, Churchill
did not feel that their stature was such that the "Big Three" should become the "Big Four".
(Thorne, 1978, p. 135)
To America's advantage the perceived imperialistic tendency was less - Philippines and
Hawaii - and it was overshadowed by a perception as having an educational and missionary role
for the Chinese. As an example, perhaps even setting the pattern for many other Chinese
families, Charlie Soong and his six children were all U.S. college graduates: Wesleyan, Harvard,
Wellesley, Vanderbilt. (The Soong family is briefly introduced in an appendix to this paper.)
A Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) in conjunction with the 2nd Sino-Japanese War
(1937-1945) placed the World War II Anglo-American forces in an awkward position. We were
trying to reverse the Japanese incursion onto the Asian mainland. At the same time Chiang,
ostensibly the leader of one of the 'Big' Allies, was focused more on strengthening the
Kuomintang (Chiang Kai-shek) position against the Chinese Communist Party (Mao Tse-tung).
Anglo-American Command
Stilwell's principal interaction with the British, who had overall responsibility for ChinaBurma-India Theater - later the SouthEast Asia Command - was in the organization of training
facilities for Chinese troops in India, air access from Assam into China and Burma, and the usual
logistics headaches. There is nothing remarkable to be reported in the context of this paper.
Stilwell served as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC, under Vice Admiral Lord Louis
Mountbatten.
His closest and most effective working relations were with those who were in combat
with him:
- Lt.Gen. William Slim, General Officer Commanding, British 14th Army in Burma, and
- Maj.Gen. Orde Wingate, General Officer Commanding, Chindit Long Range Penetration
Group.
On the American side, among those with Stilwell in combat during the 1944 Burma
Campaign, were:
- Maj.Gen. Frank Merrill (Marauder Long Range Penetration Group),
- Brig.Gen. Haydon Boatner (Chinese troops),
- Brig.Gen Frank Dorn (everywhere),
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 4
- Brig.Gen Donald Old (air support),
- Brig.Gen. Lewis Pick (Ledo Road engineers),
- Col. Rothwell Brown (Chinese tankers),
- Col. Frank Hunter (Marauder Long Range Penetration Group), and
- Col. J.W. Stilwell, Jr., his G-2.
Working with Stilwell in command, staff, and support aspects were
- Maj.Gen. Clayton Bissell, Commanding General, 10th Air Force,
- Maj.Gen. Claire Chennault, Commanding General 14th Air Force,
- Maj.Gen. Thomas G Hearn, Chief of Staff, China-Burma-India (CBI),
- Maj.Gen. Daniel Sultan, Deputy Commanding General, CBI in New Delhi,
- Maj.Gen. Raymond Wheeler, Commanding General, Services of Supply, CBI.
Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell's Responsibilities
General Stilwell wore too many hats, a point later acknowledged by Washington; he was,
in 1944:
- Chief of Staff, China Theater; reporting to Generalissimo [Gmo.] Chiang Kai-shek, Supreme
Allied Commander, China Theater.
- Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India Theater; reporting to Gen.
George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, SouthEast Asia Command; reporting to ViceAdm. Lord
Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, SouthEast Asia Command.
- Commanding General, Northern Combat Area Command [Burma]; reporting to ViceAdm. Lord
Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, SouthEast Asia Command; and under
temporary operational control of Lt.Gen. William Slim, General Officer Commanding, 14th
[British] Army.
- Commanding General, Chinese Army in India; reporting to Gmo. Chiang Kai-Shek, Supreme
Allied Commander, China Theater; and with liaison to himself as Commanding General,
Northern Combat Area Command [Burma] (Romanus & Sunderland, 1987, p. 6)
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek: An Assessment
The fundamental barrier to prosecuting World War II on the Asiatic mainland was the
credibility and tunnel vision of the Chinese Kuomintang government leader, Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek.
On the matter of credibility he would agree to an action simply to close discussion, with
no intention of following through or, worse, while intending to act in the opposite manner.
The matter of vision is that until Chiang Kai-shek was personally menaced by the
Japanese, the real enemy was Mao Tse-tung and the forces of the Chinese Communist Party. The
diversion of war materiel into arms caches for use against the CCP after the Japanese annoyance
was removed, or diversion of monies into personal caches, were symptomatic of this. This is
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 5
perhaps related to what some Westerners think of as a cultural characteristic of the Han Chinese:
'we will assimilate the foreigner, fight among ourselves'.
One characteristic seemed to set Joseph Stilwell apart from Chiang Kai-shek and made
him appear the lesser man in the eyes of Chiang. Stilwell did not require others to treat him
'according to his station'. As he perceived it, the better man is often so because he is a fortunate
man rather than a fortuned man. Although 'Vinegar Joe' was thought by many to be acerbic, you
could always knew where you stood with him, and that he would not be a 'fair-weather' friend.
General Stilwell, in undated notes from his diary, probably October 1944, is seen as
agreeing with this characterizations of Chiang Kai-shek:
[He] hates the so-called Communists. He intends to crush them by keeping any munitions
furnished him and by occupying their territory as the Japs retire.
[He] will not make an effort to fight seriously. He wants to finish the war coasting, with a
big supply of material, so as to perpetuate his regime. He has blocked us for three years
and will continue to do so. He has failed to keep his agreements." (Stilwell, 1948, pp.
340-341)
Madame Chiang Kai-shek: An Assessment
Madame Chiang Kai-shek (Soong May-ling) was actively involved in the governing of
China, including its military aspects, over the years. From what is found in the studies referenced
here, she was responsible for bringing in and supporting American pilot Claire Chennault, who
created the American Volunteer Group, "Flying Tigers", later transformed into the 14th Air
Force. She was, when available, Stilwell's interface with Chiang. She was in many ways the
public face of Chiang and China to the world. Yet, to use the polite euphemism, she 'abandoned
her post' from June 1944 until May 1945, living quietly in Brazil and the United States.
(Seagrave, 1985, pp. 376-416)
In late November [1942] Madame Chiang arrived in the United States and was met in
New York by [President Roosevelt's personal representative and advisor, Harry Hopkins].
After telling Hopkins that she had come to the United States only for medical treatment
and rest, "in the same breath she proceeded to raise many questions relating to China and
the United States." In the course of her interview with Hopkins, Madame Chiang made it
"pretty clear she does not like Stilwell and expressed the greatest admiration for
Chennault." Her expressions found a willing listener, for Hopkins was an enthusiastic
supporter of Chennault in the highest Administration circles, which, thanks to
[Presidential personal representative Wendell] Willkie, the U.S. Naval Attaché [Marine
Col. James] McHugh, and returning members of Chennault's task force, were now fully
aware of Chennault's claims and grievances. (Romanus & Sunderland, 2002, p. 254)
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 6
Major General Claire L. Chennault and Air Power vs. Ground Forces
China, in 1942, had some 300-plus divisions on paper - under-strength, ill-equipped, in
need of training. Even before Stilwell's arrival in theater, a plan had been developed for the U.S.
to properly organize, train, and equip a 'real' thirty division Chinese force.
With the loss to Japan of Rangoon in March 1942, ready land access for transport of
supplies to China was lost. Until 1944, with the opening of the Ledo Road and construction of
pipelines, only air resupply ('over the Hump') was possible.
The Air Service Command in China would require a certain amount of Hump tonnage to
support either trucks or transport aircraft. Yet Chennault was asking [16 September 1942]
every ton of Hump tonnage for tactical operations of the China Air Task Force.
(Romanus & Sunderland, 2002, p. 189)
The real restraint on Chennault was the inability of the Hump to support his operations.
In his memoirs Chennault charges Stilwell with studied neglect of the airline to China,
but Stilwell ... was always asking for more transports than OPD would allocate. Whether
Stilwell should have devoted more time to his relations with the commander of the China
Air Task Force is a major question, but, for whatever reasons, Stilwell did not, and
Chennault drew his own conclusions. (pp. 251-252)
The difficulties in moving men and materiel by air went far beyond just the number of
transport aircraft available. There were shortages in aircrews, groundcrews, security forces,
construction workers and heavy equipment for constructing airfields and associated structures,
and ground or sea transport at both ends. In China airfields were built essentially by hand. We
did not have C-5s or C-17s to bring in the heavy equipment.
Had all of the Hump aerial supply capacity been available to Chennault, he still would
have wanted - and needed - more in order to accomplish the missions which he had in mind. But
there were very real limits inherent in air-only resupply of fuel, ammunition, and bombs 'over the
Hump' into forward bases in China. (Matloff, 2004, pp. 196-197)
The allocation of tonnage posed a fundamental issue. Unless Stilwell could divide Hump
tonnage between the Chinese Army and Chennault according to strategic needs as the
situation demanded, his influence on [Operation] ANAKIN [the relief of Burma] would
be limited to what he could persuade the Chinese to do by devices of rhetoric and the
force of personality. (Romanus & Sunderland, 2002, p. 240)
'Stilwell proposes, Chennault disposes.' General Chennault, by going around General
Stilwell, his military superior, to Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, T.V. Soong, Gen. Arnold,
Gen. Marshall, Henry Morgenthau Jr., Harry Hopkins, and President Roosevelt became the de
facto controller of which supplies could be air-lifted into China in 1942-1944. (Thorne, 1978;
Seagrave, 1985)
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 7
... [Stilwell had warned] that the activities of Chennault's 14th Air Force, on whose behalf
Roosevelt had altered the allocation of Hump supplies in 1943, could well provoke a
response from the enemy that the Army was not yet strong enough to meet. ... Chennault
himself, whose rivalry with Stilwell for the ear of Washington continued, and who had
beguiled both Chiang Kai-shek and Roosevelt with his promises of great gains from a
small investment, was now reduced to crying out [26 May 1944] that 'we are ... faced
with the possible loss of China as an allied base unless drastic counter-measures are
promptly taken.' 'What I am trying to find out', declared the President for his part, 'is
where is the Chinese Army and why aren't they fighting, because the Japanese seem to be
able to push them in any direction they want to.' (Thorne, 1978, p. 427)
Aviators can devastate a ground objective. But it requires a 'grunt' standing there, armed
and ready, in muddy combat boots and cold, wet socks, to say "I own this spot".
Was the Chennault Plan Realistic?
[Stilwell met with] inertia in the Chinese Ministry of War and General Staff and an evergrowing tendency on the part of Chinese in high places to adopt the attitude ... that
Chennault and his China Air Task Force should do the fighting in and for China. Nothing
loath, Chennault was now claiming that with 105 fighters, 30 medium bombers, and 12
heavy bombers he could defeat Japan. The Generalissimo's diplomatic correspondence of
[9 January and 23 February] 1943 suggests Chennault's claims had decisive effect on the
Generalissimo's policies. (Romanus & Sunderland, 2002, p. 251)
The Battle for Midway, June 1942, gives us some hard data which ought be considered by
realists. Japanese forces there lost 330 plans; American losses were 150; that is, roughly 40 per
cent of the Japanese losses. This happened at about the same time that Chennault was promoting
his strategy of 160 China-based planes to defeat Japan. (p. 261)
With roughly the same number of planes as we lost at Midway, Chennault proposed to
defeat the Japanese war machine. Somewhere in recent readings I saw that Chennault postulated
ten enemy planes downed for each American Volunteer Group or 14th Air Force loss. Brilliant
tactics will certainly help, but could it improve the ratio four-fold - 40% loss down to 10% loss.
It's hard, but not impossible, to believe. Yet, if the Japanese air forces had 2,500 planes - a not
unlikely number - Chennault would have lost all of his planes while the Japanese still had 1,000
left.
There Is an End to Everything
In the summer of 1944 Japanese strengths and Chinese weaknesses were quickly
changing the ground combat map in China.
As August waned, the Generalissimo was committed "in principle" to giving Stilwell
command in China. Events along the Salween did not suggest there would be any speedy
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 8
relief for China by a victory on that front, while in east China the Japanese had not as yet
met effective resistance. ... Defeats in the field place great strain on coalitions; events on
the Salween and south of Changsha would be felt as far away as Washington. (Romanus
& Sunderland, 1987, p. 398)
... President Roosevelt turned his attention to China and sent [Maj.Gen. Patrick J.] Hurley
to China to negotiate the transfer of command. The Generalissimo said he would give
Stilwell command, and the complicated question of defining that command was then
taken up. While attempts were being made to clarify Stilwell's proposed status and as
Stilwell was growing ever more suspicious that he was to be simply "an over-all stooge"
for the Generalissimo, a setback on the Burma Road made the Generalissimo threaten to
withdraw his Yunnan force from the North Burma Campaign. Stilwell was appalled and
reported as much to Marshall. (p. 442)
Stilwell's message reached the President and Marshall at the OCTAGON Conference.
The President approved a reply, and it was sent to Stilwell for delivery. ... (p. 442)
At a September 19 ceremony which might even have been the final act to 'anoint' Stilwell
as ground forces commander, Hurley presented the message to a translator. Stilwell intervened
and handed the message (already in Chinese) directly to Chiang, that being the specific direction
from Roosevelt. From Stilwell's diary:
Mark this day in red on the calendar of life. At long, at very long last, F.D.R. has finally
spoken plain words, and plenty of them, with a firecracker in every sentence. "Get busy
or else." A hot firecracker. I handed this bundle of paprika to the Peanut [Chiang] and
then sat back with a sigh. The harpoon hit the little bugger right in the solar plexus and
went right through him. It was a clean hit, but beyond turning green and losing the power
of speech, he did not bat an eye. He just said to me, "I understand." And sat in silence,
jiggling one foot. We are now a long way from the "tribal chairman" bawling out. Two
long years lost, but at least F.D.R.'s eyes have been opened and he has thrown a good
hefty punch. (Stilwell, 1948, p. 333)
The full message is found in Stilwell's Command Problems (Romanus & Sunderland,
1987, pp. 445-446). It has been suggested, because Stilwell personally delivered the message,
"The Generalissimo may have concluded that after speaking to [T.V.] Soong, Stilwell had framed
a harsh message, sent it to Washington, and arranged for it to be sent back as though coming
from the President." (p. 447)
That he thought this is plausible, and there is also a suggestion (p. 447) that Hurley may
have believed it as well. The result was that Stilwell, with only slight ceremony, was recalled and
had departed for China for Washington on October 22. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer was
Stilwell's replacement. However, the program of work for both Wedemeyer and Hurley was
significantly diminished from the charter which Stilwell had.
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 9
Money, Materiel, and the Soongs
A brief introduction to the Soong family is included as an appendix to this paper.
... It was also known that U.S. goods and munitions that had been sent to China were
being hoarded by her government, while [Henry] Morgenthau [U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, 1934 - July 1945] and his senior officials had in their hands a list of those
Chinese in high places - the Soong family being prominent among them - who were
believed to have benefited personally from the sale of American bonds and savings
certificates. Similarly the Director of the O.S.S., [William] Donovan, submitted a
memorandum to the President [Truman] in May [1945] in which he referred to the
possibility that T.V. Soong had been making money out of U.S. aid transactions.
Against this background, ... Treasury officials had for sometime been holding up
promised shipments of gold to China. ... Yet this strong line was abandoned in May 1945
when T.V. Soong reminded a shocked Morgenthau ... that in 1943 he, the Secretary had
promised in writing that, as part of the 1942 $500 million 1942 loan, China would be sent
nearly $200 million in gold, with no strings attached. Morgenthau decided that his pledge
would have to be honoured; the money, he observed, would go 'down the rat-hole', but
there it was. Shipments were therefore resumed, while in July the greatly-suspected H. H.
Kung was even allowed to take back to China in person $10 million of currency.
(Thorne, 1978, pp. 564-565)
Initial readings of the Romanus and Sunderland (2002, 1987, 1990) official histories of
the World War II China-Burma-India Theater raised a suggestion that significant portions of the
Lend-Lease supplies for China, most likely weapons and ammunition, were being diverted to
immediate use - or to caches for later use - by the Kuomintang against the Communist Chinese.
This seems likely, but has not been independently corroborated at this time.
Further readings of Thorne (1978), Matloff (2002, 2004), and Stilwell (1948) suggest also
phantom shipments, dummy corporations, and financial manipulations in various degrees among
members of the Soong family.
Although less scholarly, The Soong Dynasty (Seagrave, 1985, pp. 393-428) is a useful guide into
the political and business aspects of the Soong family.
In seeking further corroboration of Seagrave's work, American Air Strategy, 1939-1941 in
American Quarterly (Schaller, 1976, pp. 3-19) identified these corporations in which the Soong
family and close associates had significant financial or operational interests:
- American Volunteer Group ("Flying Tigers")
- Bank of China
- Central Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation
- China Defense Supplies
- China Lobby
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 10
- Civil Air Transport (CIA paramilitary arm)
- Universal Trading Corporation
Mentioned elsewhere as intersecting with Soong interests are the:
- Bank of Canton
- China National Aviation Corporation
- Southwest Transportation Company
Assessment
The objective of developing 'a sense of perspective to the military, political, personal, and
international pressures' has been met.
As to personalities, the 'good' were not as good as we might have thought, and the 'bad'
need to be seen and studied in the mores of their time and culture.
Personal Notes
In concluding any project like this, a researcher always has to wonder, "What if?" Could
ponderous and dignified Hugh Drum have made the grade? Could political Patrick Hurley have
kept Chiang happy in the dark days? Could Omar Bradley, the 'soldiers' soldier', have survived
the intrigues? I think the answer would be "no" for all three.
To a World War II combat soldier the simple blue and silver Combat Infantryman Badge
was the most cherished of all awards. It has only been awarded to one soldier for action while a
general officer: Lt. Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell (1883-1946).
On September 24, 1944, the day before Chiang Kai-shek told President Roosevelt that
Stilwell must leave, "Vinegar Joe" received what must have been the finest compliment of his
life. Here, from his diary for that day:
Madame Sun [Yat-sen] wants me to represent China at the Peace Conference. Says I
would do more for China than the Chinese. That I have a reputation among the Chinese
people for standing up for them. The Burma campaign made them feel respectable again.
(Stilwell, 1948. p. 335)
Patrick G. Skelly
MH540C, M.A. in Military History Program
Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont
November 23, 2006
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 11
References
Matloff, Maurice, & Snell, Edwin M. (2002). Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare:
1941-1942. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [CMH Pub 1-3]
Matloff, Maurice (2004). Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944. Washington DC:
U.S. Army Center of Military History. [CMH Pub 1-4]
Romanus, Charles F & Sunderland, Riley (2002). The China-Burma-India Theater of
Operations: Stillwell's Mission to China. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History.
[CMH Pub 9-1]
Romanus, Charles F & Sunderland, Riley (1987). The China-Burma-India Theater of
Operations: Stillwell's Command Problems. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
History. [CMH Pub 9-2]
Romanus, Charles F & Sunderland, Riley (1990). The China-Burma-India Theater of
Operations: Time Runs Out in CBI. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History.
[CMH Pub 9-3]
Seagrave, Sterling (1985). The Soong Dynasty. New York: Harper & Row. [ISBN
0-06-015308-3]
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W. (1948). The Stilwell Papers (Theodore H. White, Ed.). Cambridge
MA: Da Capo Press (Perseus Books). [ISBN 0-306-80428-X]
Thorne, Christopher G. (1978). Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against
Japan, 1941-1945. New York: Oxford University Press. [ISBN 0-19-520034-9]
Command Relationships - WW II - CBI 12
Appendix: The Soong Family
There were six children in the family of Charlie and 'Mammy' Soong, three daughters and
three sons. The daughters were, in their own right, not ONLY influential but inherently powerful.
Ai-ling Soong (Madame H.H. K'ung), 1890-1973,
apparently more finanacial astute than her husband, not just the eldest of the sisters but a natural
leader/director.
H.H. K'ung, 1881-1967,
reputedly the richest man in China; Minister of Finance, Governor of the Central Bank of China,
and Premier of the Republic of China (1938-1939).
Ching-ling Soong (Madame Sun Yat-sen), 1892-1981,
were China still imperial, she would have been the Dowager Empress; in her final days she was
named Vice-President of the Peoples Republic of China.
Sun Yat-sen, 1866-1925,
was the Provisional President at the founding of the Republic of China (1911-1912), frequently
referred to as the Father of Modern China, and as National Father in the present Republic of
China.
Tse-ven Soong (T.V.), 1894-1971,
Governor of the Central Bank of China, Minister of Finance, wartime Minister of Foreign Affairs
and personal representative of Chiang in Washington, postwar Premier of the Republic of China.
May-ling Soong (Madame Chiang Kai-shek), 1897-2004,
the public face of China to the Western world.
Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975,
Generalissimo and Premier of the Republic of China.
Tse-liang Soong (T.L.),
New York financier and banker, associated with his brother T.V. Soong in a number of business
and financial ventures.
Tse-an Soong (T.A.), -1969,
Chairman of the Bank of Canton, Hong Kong, associated with his brother T.V. Soong in a
number of business and financial ventures.