After the L’Aquila Trial
PREAMBLE
On 20 November 2015, the Italian Supreme Court finally
brought to an end the so-called “L’Aquila Trial” (see Appendix A), which concerned a meeting of experts that took place in
L’Aquila on 31 March 2009, under the prompt of the Italian
National Civil Protection (NCP).
For varied reasons, among which certainly was the fact
that all official documentation related to the L’Aquila trial was
in Italian language, much of the international discussion was
based on second hand sources and thus inevitably susceptible to
be easily influenced by the spreading of imprecise information
(see Appendix B).
In this brief opinion paper, we thus try to clarify some
issues regarding this controversial case that we feel were not
adequately emphasized or touched upon in past discussions on
this subject, as well as to share our views on the consequences
that this trial has had on the way seismic risk is perceived and
acted upon by Italian society.
In 2012, at the end of the First Trial (conducted in L’Aquila
by a single local judge, as usually is the case in Italy for the first
step of a legal proceedings, see Appendix A), the defendants were
each condemned to a six year jail sentence. In addition, they were
also convicted with the payment of more than 1 Million Euro
compensation and a perpetual ban from working in the public
sector. This sentence was then effectively overturned by the Appeal Court (which was instead conducted by three judges) in late
2014, where six of the defendants were found not-guilty (on the
grounds that “il fatto non sussiste,” i.e., the alleged conduct was
not committed) while the seventh one, B. De Bernardinis, who
served as Deputy Director of NCP at the time of the earthquake,
received a reduced two years sentence in relation to the death of
13 of the aforementioned 29 victims. In November 2015, the
Supreme Court of Italy confirmed the appeal sentence.
THE ALLEGATIONS AND THE TRIAL
The allegation of the prosecutor was that of a crime of manslaughter, committed by the defendants “in cooperation among
themselves,” for the following reasons:
……for the fault consisting in negligence, imprudence, malpractice……
Some relatives of the
THE STORY
performing, in the occasion of the
L’Aquila earthquake victims
meeting, an assessment of the risks
pressed charges against
The aforementioned experts meeting
related with the seismic activity onparticipants of an experts
was summoned by the Director of NCP
going in the L’Aquila territory since
meeting that took place a
at that time, G. Bertolaso, because of
December 2008, that was approxifew days before the event.
the confused situation in the L’Aquila
mate, generic and ineffective with
area following a series of “earthquake
reference to the activity and duties
predictions”—in different locations
of forecast and prevention [of the
around the region—made by a local technician, G. Giuliani,
Major Risks Committee (MRC)]….
working on radon monitoring. The final straw, prompting
…….supplying, on the occasion of the meeting, both
the meeting the day after, was an ill-advised press release by
with statements to the media and through the drafting
the Regional Civil Protection (RCP) of 30 March 2009, where
of the meeting minutes, to the NCP, to the RCP, to the
it was stated that “no more shocks are foreseen.” A few days later,
Municipality, and to the L’Aquila population, incomon the night of 6 April 2009, an M w 6.3 earthquake struck the
plete, imprecise and contradictory information on the
L’Aquila town and the subsequent collapse of buildings killed
nature, the causes, the hazard and future evolution
309 people in the L’Aquila area.
of the scrutinized seismic activity……
Late in 2009, some relatives of the victims pressed charges,
The motivations for the first sentence are reported in a
arguing that the latter allegedly changed their habits after hearbulky document of more than 900 pages and largely build
ing of the outcome of the experts meeting, and consequently
on the allegations of the prosecutor. They range from the dedecided to stay at home the night of the earthquake, in spite of
scription of the earthquake sequence and its presumed precurthe fact it was preceded by a number of significant shocks. In
sors, to the duties of the MRC, to a detailed analysis of the 31
June 2010, seven (out of 19) participants in the meeting, the
March meeting and the scientific assessments of the defendso-called “L’Aquila Seven,” were thus indicted for the manants, to an analysis of the earthquake risk assessment. The final
slaughter of 29 victims of the earthquake.
doi: 10.1785/0220150261
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part is devoted to assess the so-called “causative connection,”
that is, the manner in which the alleged wrong information led
to the consequences in question.
As mentioned above, the Appeal Court overturned the
first sentence almost entirely, concluding that, for six of the
seven defendants, the accusations were wholly unsubstantiated.
The appeal sentence motivations are rather severe on the arguments of the judge of the First Trial; after discussing the motivations of its first trial counterpart and demolishing most of
its argumentation and reasoning, the appeal sentence asserts
that no blame can be assigned to the scientists as far as the
scientific evaluations performed in the meeting are concerned.
As an example, in the appeal sentence one can read that:
A MATTER OF RISK COMMUNICATION?
A TRIAL OF SCIENCE?
CONCLUSIONS
The indictment of the “L’Aquila Seven” raised significant attention and elicited a strong reaction from the general public,
the media, and the scientific community (see Appendix C).
The initial perception was that science had been put on
trial; “….supplying, ……incomplete, imprecise and contradictory information on the nature, the causes, the hazard and future evolution of the scrutinized seismic activity……”
As a matter of fact, during the First Trial, more than 30
scientists were questioned on issues of earthquake hazard, earthquake prediction, earthquake sequences, active faults, and so on,
with the consequence that scientific activities did end up being
heavily scrutinized. Seventy pages of the first sentence are devoted to the analysis of earthquake risk and its components (according to the judge: earthquake history, earthquake sequence,
earthquake hazard, probabilistic predictions, building vulnerability, and earthquake exposure). Ultimately, the defendants were
accused of carrying out an approximate earthquake risk assessment, which is indeed a scientific activity.
Further, in the prosecution and the first sentence, it can be
read that, for instance, the defendants are deemed guilty because of a number of scientific statements they made. Moreover, the judge explained which statements, in his opinion, the
defendants should have made and which they should not have.
All the above cannot but lead one to the conclusion that
this was indeed also a trial of scientists and that science was
purposely brought into the trial; not a trial of scientific theory,
but of allegedly bad scientific practice.
Many have searched for a lesson from this very unfortunate
story, which, needless to say, significantly and lastingly damaged
the lives of individuals who had dedicated their professional
careers to the mitigation of seismic risk. Probably there is more
than one single issue that can be learnt from this whole affair.
To start with, and most definitely, the idea of calling an
experts meeting at L’Aquila was not a good one; it had, from
the beginning, the effect of transferring onto the shoulders of a
few individuals—in a very short amount of time—the burden of
the lack of earthquake preparedness that responsible institutions
and officials had not cared to implement over the years.
Second, risk communication policies can and must be improved, or, perhaps more accurately, they have to be properly
established in Italy. This should not apply only to all emergency management public bodies and institutions, which certainly should take the place of scientists in such situations, but
also to media and communication professionals.
More worryingly, however, the L’Aquila trial had, and still
has, the effect of driving the public focus on earthquake sequences as if they represent the only, or at least the main source
of seismic risk. As a result, there is now an increased, and still
mounting attention on how to manage alleged “earthquake
emergencies” connected to an on-going earthquake sequence,
while risk communication should instead insist on passing the
message that in earthquake prone areas there is a permanent
high seismic risk, that is, a “permanent emergency” motivating
the need of communicating risk and emergency management
The second part of the allegations against the defendants is
related to the topic of risk comminication, which did gain traction among those commenting and writing about the trial.
However, the seven defendants communicated very little; indeed, and as discussed in Appendix B, five of them did not
communicate anything at all after the meeting (and so they
should not, since that was not their role). Instead, all the victims, according to the depositions of their relatives, were influenced by some selected words extracted from the “the glass of
wine” interview (which took place before the experts meeting,
but was broadcast afterward, refer Appendix B for further details), a theory that was seemingly confirmed by the Appeal
The [Appeal] Court believes that the extensive discussions
Court, basing the sole conviction of De Bernardinis on this
held during the first trial do not allow
interview only.
to make a convincing case for the acHence, this interview, or, rather,
cusations ascribed to the defendants.
selected parts of it, represents—in
Science was purposely
the trial—the whole of the alleged risk
brought into the trial; not a
Only De Bernardinis was sentenced to
(mis-)communication that has been
trial
of
scientific
theory,
but
two years, albeit with reference to a reduced
discussed and written about by so
of
allegedly
bad
scientific
number of victims, as described previously.
many. But it was nothing more than an
practice.
The Supreme Court, having the role of
interview rushed by a journalist who,
checking whether the appeal trial was peras frequently happens in these situaformed in a regular and legally conforming
tions, managed to squeeze out of a pressed—and ill advised
manner, upheld the appeal verdict.
—expert a statement that could make the headlines.
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the basis of its assessment of both the latter as well as the apto society. Such permanent risk, caused by the high seismic vulpeals lodged by the lawyers of the defendants and civil parties.
nerability of Italian building stock, should be the main focus of
A Third Degree Trial is possible at the Supreme Court,
prevention and preparedness initiatives, which represent the
which is tasked with the checking of whether formal errors have
background for creating the conditions to increase the resilbeen committed in the Appeal Trial; in such a case the appeal
ience to earthquake hazard and therefore manage and mitigate
sentence can be declared as “null” and a
the emergency associated with an earthnew Appeal Trial is requested. The Suquake sequence.
preme Court discussed the L’Aquila case
Indeed, the lack of seismic risk
The alleged risk (mis-)
—on 20 November 2015—at the request
awareness of Italian society has been dracommunication regarded
of the defendants and, on the other side, of
matically exposed by the L’Aquila case,
some passages of an
the Chief Prosecutor of L’Aquila and some
where people were—and still are, like
interview that one of the
victims’ relatives. The Appeal Sentence was
in most parts of Italy—wholly unaware
defendants gave before the
confirmed.
of the earthquake vulnerability/safety of
experts meeting.
A separate thread of the L’Aquila
their homes, in spite of several initiatives
Trial is now ongoing against G. Bertolaso,
on earthquake risk awareness and mitigafollowing the release of the recordings of a phone call that he
tion that were locally organized throughout the years.
entertained with the Head of the RCP on 30 March 2009; he
We thus continue to be convinced that the main earthis accused of being the main instigator of the attempt to
quake preparedness deficit in our society concerns the rereassure the population by means of the experts meeting.
duced levels of both general earthquake education as well
A number of civil trials, connected with compensation reas seismic upgrading of existing structures. The pertinence
quests, are also still ongoing.
and effectiveness of the latter, in particular, was wholly dismissed by the judge of the first trial, who wrote in his sentence
that “the statement that earthquake risk can only be reduced
APPENDIX B
by strengthening the buildings is as obvious as it is pointless
and useless.” We cannot but continue to hope that the future,
SOME INACCURACIES
unlike the present, will see our entire society (not just scientists and engineers) striving to prove him wrong.
As mentioned already in the main text, for varied reasons,
among which certainly the fact that all official documentation
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
related to the L’Aquila trial was in Italian language, much of
the international discussion, including many of the publicaThe authors would like to express their gratitude to the contions listed in Appendix C, was based on second hand sources
structive comments of two anonymous reviewers and the ediand thus inevitably susceptible to be easily influenced by the
tor, which have contributed to a significant improvement of
spreading of imprecise information.
this opinion paper, as well as to Helen Crowley, for her careful
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, such past disand thorough proofreading of the manuscript.
cussion has also been heavily influenced by the first sentence
justification, which was ill-advisedly taken as the factual truth
APPENDIX A
by many of the authors listed below, overlooking the fact that
the law requires a judge to record in writing only those aspects
that he/she believes to support his/her decision—as demonTHE TRIAL(S)
strated by the Appeal Court and then confirmed by the Supreme Court, the first sentence justification was indeed an
By “L’AquilaTrial” we refer here to the three trials that the seven
inevitably biased document, containing also a number of facdefendants had to undergo before a definitive sentence could be
tual inaccuracies and misconstructions.
passed, in accordance with Italian law on legal proceedings.
Instead, the significant body of documentation and eviAfter the indictment of June 2010, the First Trial (First
dence produced by the defence lawyers, as well as the recordDegree Trial, according to the Italian terminology) started in
ings of the depositions of the defendants and witnesses, were
September 2011 and ended in October 2012 with the first sennot readily available to the (international) public and were also
tence. According to the usual procedures in Italy it was convery scarcely considered by the media, and consequently hardly
ducted in L’Aquila by a single local judge.
studied by many of those writing about the subject. The factual
The Appeal Trial also took place in L’Aquila, under the
value of such material was recognised by the Appeal Court,
request of both the defendants as well as some of those victims’
where such evidence was extensively used.
relatives that were excluded from the compensation payments
One of the main sources of inaccuracy was the manner in
set by the First Trial judge. It started in September 2014 and
which the allegations were reported, the whole text and translaended in November of the same year, and was conducted by
tion of which are found at https://eagris2014.files.wordpress.
three judges (also coined as the Appeal Court). Unless new,
com/2014/10/allegation‑initial‑document.pdf. This happened
important evidence is produced, the Appeal Court has the task
also as a consequence of the first, public announcement of the
of confirming, revising, or even rejecting the first sentence, on
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that of advising the NCP alone, and foresee no operative
duties of any nature, not least that of communicating with
the general public.
the indictment was not based on the missing earthquake
To avoid a repeat of the type of misunderstandings or misalert – this had already been given by the earthquake
interpretations that took place during the first trial, the
sequence – but on the missing warning to leave home,
law has now been updated, and the current operational
model of the MRC envisages that:
which was read and interpreted as stating that the defendants
• meetings of the MRC can only take place at the headfailed to predict that an earthquake was imminent.
quarters of the NCP, in Rome
In what follows, we try to shed some clarity on some of the
• such meetings may be partially open to guest scientists
most prominent misunderstandings featured and spread
who will contribute to the discussions
around the L’Aquila case reporting:
• the outcome of such MRC meetings is a summary of
1. The professional background and affiliation of the defendants,
the discussions and conclusions to the Head of NCP,
all seven of whom were often quoted as being “seismologists”
who then may report to the Prime Minister, if deemed
and “members of the Major Risks Committee (MRC),”
necessary
while, in reality only three were actually seismologists and
4. the scope of the 31 March 2009 meeting, quoted by the prosonly four were actually members of the MRC:
ecutor and judge of the first trial as being that to “provide
• F. Barberi, volcanologist, deputy chair of the MRC
the citizenship with information on the earthquake sequence
• E. Boschi, seismologist, at the time president of the
of the last weeks,” was instead explicitly defined in the offiItalian National Institute for Geophysics and Volcancial letter that called for the gathering as being that of underology (INGV), member of the MRC
• G.M. Calvi, earthquake engineer, academic, member of
taking “a careful analysis of the scientific and civil protection
the MRC
aspects of the sequence ongoing for four months.”.
• C. Eva, seismologist, academic, member of the MRC
The prosecutor and judge of the first trial referred also to the
• G. Selvaggi, seismologist, head of the earthquake monrecordings of a phone call between the head of NCP, G. Beritoring centre of INGV, who, under
tolaso, and the head of the RCP,
the request of Boschi, presented sciwhere a “media operation” was alentific data collected through geoThe permanent risk caused
luded to. However, the defendants
physical monitoring
by the high seismic
were never aware of such phone
• B. De Bernardinis, hydraulic engivulnerability of Italian
call and its contents (not until it
neer, deputy head of the NCP
building stock should be the
was released to the media in
• M. Dolce, earthquake engineer, head
main focus of prevention
2010), and the Appeal Court did
of the Earthquake Risk Office of
and preparedness
establish that the scope of the
the NCP
initiatives.
meeting could not but be defined
2. The alleged nature of the gathering of 31
by the official letter that called
March 2009, erroneously considered to
for the gathering.
be a meeting of the MRC, when it was instead a meeting
5. the interview of B. De Bernardinis, also coined by some as
of experts called for by the head of the NCP—by law, ofthe “glass of wine interview,” took place before the meetficial meetings of the MRC can be convened by its chair
ing of 31 March 2009. The journalist asked permission to
only and must feature the presence of at least 10 of its
broadcast it after the meeting, so that the interview could
members.
be portrayed as reflecting the discussions that were to take
In order to be able to “deem it” an official meeting of the
place; such permission was denied, but the interview was
MRC and justify the application of laws that refer to pubstill broadcast afterward.
lic bodies, the judge of the first trial decided to explicitly
The interview started with the journalist noting that he was
consider that, out of the 15 non-MRC members that took
naturally not going to ask the interviewee for a “miracle prepart in the meeting, G. Selvaggi, B. De Bernardinis, M.
diction” or for reassuring the citizenship. During the interDolce, the Mayor of L’Aquila, the Head of the RCP and
view, reference to “…alertness, because L’Aquila is well
an officer of the RCP were to be assumed as being memknown to be an area of high seismicity” and other similar
bers of the MRC for the occasion (though then the latter
statements were made, but they somehow got lost afterward.
three were not indicted).
The “glass of wine” was actually first mentioned by the jourThe Appeal Court duly dismissed such arbitrary assumpnalist, who asked the interviewee “so, should we have a glass
tion, and confirmed that the gathering of 31 March 2009
of wine?,” to which De Bernardinis agreed, noting that there
was not and could never be considered a meeting of the
was no reason to raise further agitation—already present—
MRC.
ahead of the meeting.
3. the legal duties of the MRC, which was established in 1982
6. the minutes of the meeting, summarizing the discussion
through Art. 9 of Law 225/92 as the “National Commisthat took place, were released after the earthquake struck
sion for the forecast and preventions of Major Risks,” are
(as often is the case, minutes of meetings involving several
allegations provided by the Chief Prosecutor of L’Aquila, the late
A. Rossini, in an interview on 3 June 2010:
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Massimiliano Stucchi
20132 Milano, Italy
[email protected]
Rui Pinho
University of Pavia
via Ferrata 1
27100 Pavia, Italy
[email protected]
Massimo Cocco
Italian National Institute for Geophysics and Volcanology
via Vigna Murata 605
00143 Rome, Italy
[email protected]
Further material and discussion on the trial, in both English and Italian languages, can also be found in the following
websites:
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