Uncertainty as a cause of war
• Uncertainty and credibility problems cause bargaining
failure and war
International Conflict:
The Question:
• If states were completely informed about p and c, states
will never fail to achieve a peaceful settlement and avoid
war?
Three Fundamental
Causes of War
A Quick Answer: No.
• Bargaining fail and states may not be able to achieve
peaceful settlement even under complete information.
 Credibility of commiments
Credibility of Commitments
2
Credibility of Commitments
• Credibility
– Same as in previous lecture on uncertainty.
– The issue is whether the opponent believes that one’s
commitment will be honored.
• Commitments
– Generally, two kinds of commitments
– Negative commitment, or a threat
• E.g., commitment to the use of force.
• Information theory of war
– Positive commitment, or a promise
Why Credible Commitments?
Uncertainty and the lack of enforcement mechanisms
Why Credible Commitments in Int’l Dispute?
For S1 and S2 to agree on a negotiated settlement, they
must also agree
– that they will comply with the agreement in the future.
– that they will not use military power (or future
bargaining power) to re-negotiate the agreement
•How is that possible?
• E.g. commitment not to use force
• Commitment theory of war
3
4
Bargaining over future bargaining power
Credibility of Commitments
Credible commitments & Bargaining failure
• Suppose S1and S2 can agree on a settlement x today.
• If S2 can utilize military power to demand the change of x
to y, there is no reason why S1 can agree on x today
Strategic environment
• The issue at stake between S1 and S2 can influence their
relative military capabilities
• An agreement today may change the bargaining power
for S1 and S2 influences.
Three scenarios in which credibility problem causes a war
1. Bargaining over future bargaining power
2. Preemptive war (Bush doctrine)
3. Preventive war (Power transition)
Main Thesis
 If the states are bargaining over future bargaining power
in the future, a peaceful settlement today will be difficult.
5
6
Golan Heights
Bargaining over future bargaining power
Source: CIA Factbook
Example: Territorial disputes
• The disputed territory generates a strategic advantage
– Golan heights (Northern Israeli border with Syria)
– Strategically crucial => Arab-Israeli Conflict (1948 through today)
• The disputed territory generates economic development
– Rhineland (Western German border with France and Belgium)
– Natural resources + Logistic = Industrialization
7
West Bank of Germany and Rhine River
8
Bargaining over future bargaining power
Source: Wikipedia
Example: Territorial disputes
• The disputed territory generates a strategic advantage.
– Golan heights (Northern Israeli border with Syria)
– Strategically crucial => Arab-Israeli Conflict (1948 through today)
• The disputed territory generates economic development
– Rhineland (Western German border with France and Belgium)
– Natural resources + Logistic = Industrialization
Territorial concession leads to greater military power
An agreement today can generate an incentive to use
force in the future
9
Bargaining over future bargaining power
Bargaining over future bargaining power
Territorial change q to q’
 Change in relative power p to p’
 Change in the bargaining range
• Military capabilities (esp. disarmament)
– Alleged the WMD programs leading to the Iraq War
– Nuclear program and chemical weapons by Libya
– Nuclear program of North Korea
– Nuclear program of Iran
Agreeable to S2
S1
0
q
pc1
Strategic Consequence
S2
q’
p'c1
p+c2
10
 An agreement today to dismantle nuclear capabilities today
 A strategic advantage to the other side and an incentive to attack in
the future
p'+c2 1
11
12
Bargaining over future bargaining power
Bargaining over future bargaining power
Can we credibly commit not to use force, forgoing the strategic
advantage rendered by the agreement today?
The Problem:
Reaching an agreement to avoid war today can generate
• An incentive to initiate armed conflict and
• An incentive to renegotiate the agreement tomorrow
• Golan heights
– PKO (To monitor cease fire agreement)
• Rhineland
The Solution:
• To provide reassurance (or commitment) not to use force
in the future.
• Remove the fear of attack in the future
The Further Problem:
The lack of credible commitment causes bargaining failure
– Locarno treaties (demilitarization)～ failed in 1936
– ECSC → EEC → EC → EU ～successful
• Iraq
– failure with the 2003 Iraq War
• North Korea
– de facto nuclear power
• Libya:
– Disarmed in December 2003 (coercive diplomacy)
• Iran: ???
13
14
Preemptive War and the Bush doctrine
Preemptive War and the Bush doctrine
Second Class of the Commitment Problem and War
First Strike Advantage：
An ability to yield the advantage by attacking a potential
challenger preemptively before one is attacked.
• Development of new military technology that would
Strategic environment
• The first-strike advantage generates an incentive to
preemptively attack the other side.
– Nullify the challenger’s military power
– Inflict severe damage to the challenger
•Examples:
– Terrorism
– Nuclear war head and its vehicle
15
16
Preemptive War and the Bush doctrine
Preemptive War and the Bush doctrine
The bargaining range shifts depending on who strikes first.
• As the first-strike advantage grows, the gap between two
bargaining ranges widens
– Growing gap between p1and p2
– Diminishing c1and c2
Bargaining range when S2 strikes first
Bargaining range when S2 strikes first
Bargaining range when S1 strikes
first
S1
0 p2c1
Bargaining range when S1 strikes
first
S2
p2+c2
p1c1
p1+c2
S1
1
0 p2c1
17
S2
p2+c2
p1c1
p1+c2
1
18
Preemptive War and the Bush doctrine
Preemptive War and the Bush doctrine
Historically...
Wars rarely begin with preemptive attacks
Necessary Conditions for Negotiated Settlements
• Two bargaining ranges overlap
– The first-strike advantage must be diminished
National Security Policy
• Bush Doctrine（against terrorism)
• Israeli bombing of nuclear facilities
• An agreement on who strikes first and who will not
– Cannot be credible
– Iraq in 1981
– Syria in September 2007
– Iran (?)
Bargaining range when S2 strikes first
Bargaining range when S1 strikes
first
S1
•
S2
0 p2c1
p1c1
p2+c2
p1+c2
National Missile Defense (US, NATO, Japan, Australia)
– Aegis destroyers (SPY radar and Standard Missiles)
– F-35 fighters
Problem
• First-Strike Advantage can undermine the strategic balance,
generating an incentive to attack
1
19
20
Preventive war
Preventive war
Second Class of the Commitment Problem and War
Strategic environment
• Military balance is expected to change due to some
external factors
A.J.P. Taylor The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 18481918.
The war of 1866, like … the wars of 1870 and 1914 … was
launched by the conservative Power, the Power standing
on the defensive. Every war between Great Powers
[during this period] started as a preventive war, not as a
war of conquest.
• Status quo powers start major wars
• Major wars are a preventive war
• To prevent the exercise of greater powers by the
challenger
• Differential economic growth rate between S1 and S2 .
– Developing challenger S1 is inferior to S2 militarily
before economic growth but may surpass S2 after the
economic growth
Examples
– Germany (S1) and European major powers (S2)
before WWI
– The recent rise of China (S1) and relatively decline of
the U.S. (S2)
• Same logic applies to military technologies
21
22
Preventive war
Preventive war
S1 prefers peace x to war today, but prefers war to peace x
tomorrow
That is, even if S1 and S2 to x today, S1 has an incentive to
renege on x and renegotiate for x'
Bargaining range before
economic growth
S1
Bargaining range before
economic growth
pc1
S1
S2
x
pc1
p+c2
Bargaining range after
economic growth
S1
0
p'c1
p'+c2
p+c2
Bargaining range after
economic growth
S2
x'
S2
x
1
S1
23
0
S2
x'
p'c1
p'+c2
1
24
Preventive war
Preventive war
• S2 can have an incentive for a preventive war in order to
circumvent the change in the bargaining environment
induced by S1’s economic growth
But S2 prefers war to x'
Bargaining range before
economic growth
S1
Bargaining range before
economic growth
pc1
S1
S2
x
pc1
p+c2
Bargaining range after
economic growth
S1
0
p'c1
p'+c2
p+c2
Bargaining range after
economic growth
S2
x'
S2
x
1
S1
25
Preventive war
When power shift leads to a preventive war?
• A preventive war would not occur unless such a war
prevents the power shift
• This implies that such a war can be a large-scale war
– Historically, a large-scale preventive war occurs when
the turnover of the hegemony
– AJP Taylor’s observation of major wars during the
19th century Concert of Europe
• It is not conceivable that S2 can credibly commit to x and
not to use force in the future
27
0
S2
x'
p'c1
p'+c2
1
26