Neopatrimonialism and variance in
Central Asian regime stability
The cases of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
Feddo Timmerman (studentnr. 5615291)
AP Politiek Leidershap in een globaliserende wereld
20-06-2011
1
Chapters
1. Introduction
p. 04
2. Theoretical Framework
p. 07
2.1 The End of the Transition Paradigm
p. 07
2.2 Different regime trajectories of postcommunist states
p. 08
2.3 Development of neopatrimonial rule in Central Asia
p. 12
2.4 The nation-state building process after 1991
p. 14
2.5 Final remarks
p. 18
3. Data and Methods of Analysis
p. 19
4. Regime stability in the Central Asian region: the case studies of
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
p. 23
4.1 Limitations to the nation-state building process in Central Asia
p. 23
A. Clan-based and tribal loyalties
p. 24
B. The presence of various ethnic minorities
p. 26
C. The rise of religious fundamentalism
p. 28
D. Addressing sovereignty
p. 30
4.2 Summary of A, B, C and D
p. 33
2
4.3 Political strategies and regime stability in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan
4.3.1 Republic of Uzbekistan
p. 35
p. 36

Strategy 1: Centralization of power into the executive branch
p. 38

Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena
p. 41

Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media
p. 42

Strategy 4: Foreign policy
p. 44
4.3.2 Republic of Kazakhstan
p. 45

Strategy 1: Centralization of power into the executive branch
p. 47

Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena
p. 49

Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media
p. 50

Strategy 4: Foreign policy
p. 52
4.3.3 The Kyrgyz Republic
p. 54
Kyrgyzstan under President Akayev (1990-2005)
p. 54

Strategy 1: Centralization of power into the executive branch
p. 56

Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena
p. 58

Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media
p. 60

Strategy 4: Foreign policy
p. 62
Kyrgyzstan under President Bakiyev (2005-2010)
p. 62

Strategy 1: Centralization of power into the executive branch
p. 63

Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena
p. 66

Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media
p. 67

Strategy 4: Foreign policy
p. 68
4.4 Overview of the results on Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
p. 69
5. Conclusions
p. 73
Appendix
p. 76
Bibliography
p. 78
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1. Introduction
The Freedom House world map of 2011 does not include a free country in the entire Central
Asian region, despite initial optimism sweeping the continent after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union in 1991. According to Freedom House (2011), a free country ‘is one where there
is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent
civic life, and independent media’ (Freedom House 2011: 03). Of the five Central Asian
postcommunist states, only Kyrgyzstan is classified as partly free, which means that there is
limited respect for political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2011: 03). In the states
surrounding Kyrgyzstan, full-fledged autocratic regimes have taken hold of their populations
and show no signs of implementing democratic and political reforms any time soon.
Strongmen are ruling almost unchallenged the countries of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan since independence was achieved in 1991. On the contrary, two presidents in
Kyrgyzstan were ousted by popular revolts in 2005 and 2010, and the country is currently
facing an unstable period under the leadership of a weak interim-government. Tajikistan is
still recovering from a civil war and remains one of the poorest countries in Central Asia
(Freedom House 2011: 06-07). As much of the literature on waves of democratizations
exhibited the firm believe that democracy, with ebb and floods, would eventually reach every
geographic area and touch upon every autocratic state in the world, the Central Asian
countries are thus far proving the very opposite. Hence, Central Asia is increasingly perceived
as an important geographical area by a wide array of international and regional actors and
functions as a vital transit corridor of oil – and gas pipelines, linking the east to the west. The
region contains considerable oil – and natural gas reserves and metallurgical resources. The
increasing geo-political significance of the region in a dawning age of multipolarity urges us
to more fully grasp political developments in the region.
This thesis would like to address the variance of regime stability in Central Asia, as recent
developments in Kyrgyzstan clearly deviate from the overall authoritarian persistence in the
region. This thesis postulates a central question that needs to be answered: What explains the
variance in regime stability in a highly authoritarian region? The five Central Asian states
have developed into an authoritarian bloc, and the political leadership bows on neopatrimonial
rule to maintain power, combining a strong presidency and formal state structures with
informal patronage networks. Explanations of resource-related wealth, deleterious effects of
international aid and remoteness to the West are well known examples in the literature to
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explain consolidation of neopatrimonial rule. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have developed into
stable, almost unchallenged authoritarian regimes. Strongmen Islam Karimov and Nursultan
Nazarbayev have ruled their respective countries with firm hand since their states were
established in 1991. Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, have considerable oil- and
natural gas reserves and metallurgical industries. In the case of Uzbekistan, one of its most
profitable sectors is the cotton industry. Hence, both presidents rose from the highest ranks
from the former communist parties, by serving as First Secretaries before the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The Kyrgyz Republic is quite the opposite. Since declaring itself as an
independent state, it has faced internal turmoil in 2005 and 2010 which resulted in the change
of political leadership. Both Presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev were ousted
from public office after mass protests against their oppressive, autocratic rule. The first
president of the country, Askar Akayev, was the only president in the Central Asian region
who did not rise to power during the communist era; instead he headed the National Sciences
Academy. After two decades, Kyrgyzstan has developed into an unstable, challenged
authoritarian regime, and is a resource-poor country when compared to Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan.
This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive picture by focussing on initial challenges to the
nation-state building process (1991-2000) and subsequently political strategies utilized by the
presidents (2001-2010) to consolidate power. This thesis aims to explain variance in regime
stability across the three selected case studies of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Initial limitations towards the nation-state building process were posed by clan-and tribalbased loyalties, the presence of various ethnic minorities, the rise of religious fundamentalism
and their newly gained sovereignty. In order to explain this variance, this thesis introduces a
further subquestion in order to explain variance in regime stability among the three case
studies: how do political strategies adopted by the presidents explain regime (in) stability?
Political strategies pursued by the political leadership showed striking similarities. However,
the way they interacted with the initial limitations on the nation-state building process
explained their relatively success in consolidating their respective regimes. Four analytical
categories have been construed in order to systematically compare the empirical results. First
of all, all presidents have centralized power into the executive branch, excluding the
legislative and judiciary branches as partners in the nation-state building process. Second, the
electoral arena has been confined to pro-presidential parties through the manipulation of
electoral and parliamentary laws. Third, religious fundamentalism, civil society and
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independent media outlets have all been suppressed. Finally, foreign policy has been used to
consolidate the regional and international positions of the presidents.
This thesis will first introduce the theoretical framework that provides background to the rise
of hybrid regimes during the 1990s, exemplified by the different regime trajectories in
postcommunist states. These developments corresponded with the end of the transition
paradigm, which showed that not all states in the world were on the path of democratization,
urging scholars, policy makers and political analysts alike to take into account the diversity of
regime types. Hence the concept of neopatrimonialism is discussed and its central
characteristics in post-independence Central Asia. This section discusses the development of
their respective nation-state building processes. The third section provides the reader with
data and methods that were employed during the research. The fourth section will introduce
the empirical results, with section 4.1 describing the initial challenges which are theorized as
boundaries wherein political strategies had to be formulated. Section 4.2 provides a summary
of the initial challenges and relates the threat they pose on regime stability to Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Section 4.3 provides an oversight of the employed political
strategies, which shows striking similarities and some differences between the three case
studies. Section 4.4 provides an overview on the similarities and differences of the political
strategies between the three case studies. Finally, conclusions are presented in section 5.
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2. Theoretical Framework
This theoretical framework will start with an account of the literature on the rise of hybrid
regimes in the 1990s. The first section introduces the end of the transition paradigm in order
to explain why recent political developments towards authoritarian consolidation in
postcommunist states are no longer compatible with the path of democratization. Instead,
hybrid states consolidated and were governed by so-called hybrid regimes that combined an
authoritarian state with ‘democratic’ features, such as artificial multiparty elections. These
hybrid regimes are either characterized by ‘feckless pluralism’ or ‘dominant power-politics’.
The development of neopatrimonial rule will be discussed in relationship to Central Asia.
Hence, the initial phase of the nation-state building process will be discussed, including the
official discourse on the nation and the creation of a political-legal framework, which resulted
into the congruence of the nation-state building process with the political legitimacy of the
political leadership. The final section provides a conclusion of the discussed scholarly work
and explains how it underpins further research to explain variance in regime stability.
2.1 The End of the Transition Paradigm
In the latter decades of the 20th century, much scholarly attention and resources were devoted
to explaining waves of democratization, favourable pre-conditions for democratization and
consolidation of democracy. The general assumption underlying the democratization
literature, clothed within an end-of history jacket, is that every state in the world eventually
would make a transition towards a democratic regime type. Different authoritarian regimes
and full-fledged dictatorships would prove themselves to be unviable options in the long-term.
Huntington (1991) most notoriously spurred debates within the scholarly community by
introducing the third wave of democracy. 1 The concept of the third wave of democracy was
informed by political developments within authoritarian regimes and following transitions to
democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 80s. After the literature
on the third wave of democratization reached its zenith in the first half of the 1990s, it ran into
more troubled waters during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Diamond (2002) referred to a
‘new wave of scholarly attention to the varieties of nondemocratic regimes and to the rather
astonishing frequency with which contemporary authoritarian regimes manifest, at least
1
S.P. Huntington (1991) was among the first to theorize the spread of democracy in terms of waves,
characterized by ebb and flood, which was captured in his book The Third Wave of Democracy. See
Bibliography.
7
superficially, a number of democratic features…this new intellectual upsurge partly reflects
the exhaustion of the “third wave” of democratic transitions’ (Diamond 2002: 23).
The rise of hybrid regime types that were neither full-fledged democracies nor outright
dictatorships brought the existent unidirectional bias in the literature on transitions of states
towards democratic regime types into troubled waters. Transitions resulted in states accepting
the formal separation of the executive, legislative and judicial branches, and allowed for
limited pluralism in the electoral arena by creating a highly controlled multiparty system.
Further, these regimes circumscribed civil society and independent media outlets which were
viewed as penchants of democracy. As a consequence, scholarly work shifted its focus on
democratization towards explaining the rise of so-called hybrid regime types, or its various
colourful pseudonyms, varying from ‘semidemocracy’, ‘virtual democracy’, ‘electoral
democracy’, ‘pseudodemocracy’, ‘illiberal democracy’ to ‘semi-authoritarianism’, ‘soft
authoritarianism’ and ‘electoral authoritarianism.’ Partly explaining this exotic cocktail of
authoritarianism with democratic features or democracies with adjectives is the intensification
of exogenous forces of globalization, democratization, and securitization and its impact on the
state and its capacities in the last decades (Robinson 2008: 569-574). 2 These exogenous
forces left post-communist states with less time to build up sufficient state capacities to
effectively rule their territories as opposed to the developed states of the Western world.
More articles during the 1990s and the early 2000s were primarily concerned with the rise of
hybrid regimes. Different regions in the world showed resistance towards internal and
external pressures of democratization, remaining hybrid in nature with some regimes even
showing signs of further consolidation of authoritarianism. ‘Particularly in Africa and the
former Soviet Union, many regimes have either remained hybrid or moved in an authoritarian
direction. It may therefore be time to stop thinking of these cases in terms of transitions to
democracy and to begin thinking about specific types of regimes they actually are’ (Levitsky
& Way 2002: 51). Carothers (2002) criticized what he called the ‘transition paradigm’, where
transition processes of different non-democratic regimes in the world were all approached as
democratizing, a view widely shared among aid-assistance organizations and Western-based
democracy promotion communities. Both scholars and policy-makers should move beyond
this ‘universal’ transition paradigm, as most recent political developments towards
2
Guillermo O’Donnel wrote on so-called democracies with adjectives. See Bibliography.
8
authoritarianism are outside its explanatory power, and hinders effective policy making.
Instead, they should realize that ‘what is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle
ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most
common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the
postcommunist world’(Carothers 2002: 18). Most postcommunist states are finding
themselves in what is called a gray zone, somewhere between democracy and outright
dictatorship. This trend has also been noticed by Diamond (2002): ‘One of the most striking
features of the “late period” of the third wave has been the unprecedented growth in the
number of regimes that are neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian’
(Diamond 2002: 25).
Way and Levitsky (2002) are primarily concerned with ‘competitive authoritarianism’, which
allows for four arenas of contestation, which gives opposition forces the chance to compete
with the ruling regime, although all four are heavily tilted in favour of the incumbent regime.
These four arenas include the electoral arena, the legislative arena, the judicial arena and
finally the media (Levitsky and Way 2002: 54-58). In full-blown authoritarian regimes, all
four arenas have been co-opted by the regime or are virtually non-existent, posing no
challenge or whatsoever towards its legitimacy. Competitive authoritarian regimes, who allow
for some contestation in the four arenas, are characterized by ‘feckless pluralism’, referring to
competing political parties and organizations that struggle for power according to the rules of
the political game. The Kyrgyz Republic under President Akayev (1990-2005) fell into this
category. However, a huge gap exists between the political elite and the wider public, who do
not feel represented by the oftentimes corrupt and insufficient political body.
Another group of hybrid regimes developed dominant-power politics, where the lines between
the dominant party and formal state structures has been blurred, with weak and poorly
performing state institutions and a bureaucracy decaying under the one-party rule. Besides
sub-Sahara Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, dominant-power politics are to be found
in Eurasia and the Central Asian states (Carothers 2002: 9-14). Jason Brownlee (2009)
employed an institutional approach to explain dominant power-politics and durable forms of
authoritarianism, that ‘is premised on the notion that ruling parties underpin durable
authoritarianism by providing a political setting for mediating elite disputes and preventing
elite defections to the opposition’ (Brownlee 2009: 42). The Republics of Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan most closely approach this category of hybrid regimes. Authoritarian regimes
9
characterized by dominant-power politics also experience widespread political apathy among
the population they rule.
2.2 Different regime trajectories of postcommunist states
This section provides a specific overview on the diversity of the postcommunist regime
trajectories. In more recent years, scholarly work has focussed on what is sometimes called
the fourth wave of democratization in postcommunist states, stretching from Eastern Europe
to Central Asia (McFaul 2002; Bunce 2003). 3 However, it is important to note that this term
is a highly debateable one, and is not broadly used by scholars in the field of political science.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to new insights about the direction of transition
processes that took off around 1989 and 1991.The postcommunist states of Europe, Eurasia
and Central Asia provided for new empirical evidence on transition processes, showing
divergence in regime trajectories along geographical lines. Closer to the European Union
(EU), postcommunist states with liberal democratic regime types consolidated. States located
near the Russian Federation, have experienced semi-democratic or full-fledged authoritarian
consolidation, such as the states struggling in post-Soviet Eurasia and particularly in Central
Asia.
How do we explain the divergence in outcome of regime types in the postcommunist states of
Europe and the former Soviet Union? Ekiert et al (2007) diagnose the state of democracy in
Europe and authoritarian persistence in the former Soviet Union within the framework of the
IV General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, where the divergence in regime types as a result
of different transitions across postcommunist states had been discussed. 4 They concluded that
‘the most obvious fact is that fifteen years after the collapse of the communist regimes, there
is a wide range of political systems in the region that can be grouped into three categories:
democratic, semidemocratic and autocratic’ (Ekiert et al 2007: 11). Bunce (2003) argues that
much literature on the third wave of democratization fall short of explaining specifically the
different types of regimes that emerged in postcommunist states, and in general the rise and
persistence of authoritarianism. ‘First and most obviously, a major rationale for analyzing the
postcommunist cases is their extraordinary variability, not their similarity’ (Bunce 2003: 191).
3
Michael McFaul (2002) wrote on the fourth wave of democratization in his article Transitions from
Postcommunism. Valerie Bunce (2003) urged the reader to rethink the third wave of democratization in her
article Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience. See Bibliography.
4
The Club of Madrid is made up by former presidents and ex-prime ministers. Its mission is the strengthening of
democratic values and to provide for leader-to-leader support in tackling global, regional and national
democratic leadership challenges.
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The postcommunist countries that ultimately joined the EU after the initial transition period
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 have proven to be the most
successful in reaching a democratic regime type. Those countries have developed functioning,
democratic institutions (comparable to their counterparts in Western Europe) and proved
commitment to their constitutions by upholding political rights and civil liberties. Among the
most successful cases are Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic States, Hungary, Romania
and Bulgaria, who all became EU-member states during the last decade. According to Ekiert
et al (2007), the political and economic reforms had already been more advanced during the
mid-1990s than the reforms found in other former Soviet countries. They also noticed a
striking convergence among EU-members and official candidates in political and economic
reform ‘overhauling their states, economies and welfare systems’ (Ekiert et al 2007: 08).
The other group of postcommunist states that can be labelled either semidemocratic or
authoritarian is compromised by parts of Central Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Eurasia and
Central Asia. Among the hybrid regimes are countries such as Albania, Moldova, Ukraine,
Macedonia, Georgia and Armenia. The most oppressive regimes are to be found in Belarus,
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (until 2010).
Rose (1997) noticed that ‘it would be wrong to describe all unfree countries as having tried
and failed to become democracies; often their leaders have actually succeeded in establishing
an undemocratic regime designed to serve their own interests’(Rose 1997: 95). This group
shows higher levels of poverty, income disparity, economic difficulties, and massive
corruption. As the five states of Central Asia developed into a notoriously authoritarian bloc
within the postcommunist world, that same development did not bring regime stability to the
region. General explanations of authoritarianism in this region are the so-called natural
resource curse, as the states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are endowed with
oil-and natural gas reserves (Gawrich et al 2010: 05). In the cases of Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan the deleterious effects of international are cited as reasons for authoritarian rule.
Remoteness to the West seem to contribute to authoritarian consolidation in all five states of
Central Asia (Way and Levitsky 2005: 51-53). The coloured revolutions in Georgia (2003)
and Ukraine (2004) brought down long-standing dictatorships in both countries. In 2005,
Kyrgyzstan experienced its own coloured revolution, which came to be known as the Tulip
Revolution. Even a staunchly autocratic Uzbekistan experienced a popular uprising in
Andijan (2005), where dozens of demonstrators against the regime were shot down by
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security forces. The coloured revolutions showed that regime stability was not guaranteed for
the political leadership of the Central Asian states.
2.3 Development of neopatrimonial rule in Central Asia
Independence in Central Asia was achieved during the year 1991. ‘Independence was
proclaimed on … 31 August (1991, F.T.) in Kyrgyzstan, 1 September in Uzbekistan, and 9
September in Tajikistan. The others followed later: 27 October for Turkmenistan and 16
December for Kazakhstan’ (Roy 2009: 130). Since 1991, the presidents of the five new
established states in Central Asia have started their respective nation-state building projects in
order to avoid foreign interference and internal collapse. After one decade, all five
presidential republics exposed minor differences in their restrictions of political rights and
civil liberties (Gawrich et al 2010: 02). The rule of patron presidentialism and
neopatrimonialism had gained more salience to classify the convergence of the authoritarian
regime types in Central Asia. This new emphasis on neopatrimonialism arose simultaneously
‘with the drawbacks of democratic transitions experienced in the 1990s or the emergence of
“hybrid regimes”’ (Erdmann & Engel 2006: 08). The concept of neopatrimonialism had been
applied to explain authoritarian tendencies on the African continent, but rarely was it used to
explain political developments in Central Asia. Ilkhamov (2007) noticed that although ‘the
concept of neopatrimonial regime has been used widely with respect to developing countries,
it was surprisingly neglected by scholars studying the state-building process in Central Asia
and the post-Soviet space more generally (Ilkhamov 2007: 67).
Erdmann and Engel (2006) define neopatrimonialism from a Weberian tradition as the
mixture of two types of domination, namely more traditional patrimonialism and legalrational bureaucratic domination. Traditional patrimonialism is primarily concerned with
privatized power relationships between the ruler and the ruled, including political and
administrative relations, and there exists no differentiation between the private and public
sphere. In contrast, under neopatrimonial rule there formally exists a distinction between the
private and public realm, which can be placed within the framework of legal-rational
bureaucracy or ‘modern’ stateness (Erdmann & Engel 2006: 18). Despite the existence of
formal structures and rules, in practice, the separation between both the private and public
realm is not always observed. ‘Naturally these spheres are not isolated from each other; quite
to the contrary, they permeate each other; or more precisely, the patrimonial permeates the
12
legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions and effects’ (Erdmann & Engel 2006: 18).
The penetration of the legal-rational bureaucracy by the patrimonial system leads to insecurity
about the behaviour (and predictability) and the role of state institutions. This inherent
insecurity leads to three consequences, which are typically to be found in states where
neopatrimonial rule developed. Firstly, actions of state institutions or agents are incalculable,
as various actors who hold significant financial and political stakes in the political leadership
try to overcome their insecurity by operating on ‘both the formal as well as the informal logic
of neopatrimonialism’ (Erdmann & Engel 2006: 19). Secondly, state institutions operating in
an environment of institutionalized informality are incapable of achieving their purpose of
enhancing public welfare and fail to deliver positive political goods. Finally, states where
neopatrimonial rule consolidated are indicated by Erdmann & Engel (2006) as a separate type
of political culture. Erdmann & Engel (2006) confine the development of neopatrimonial rule
to the realm of authoritarian regimes, where the mixture of patrimonialism and legal-rational
bureaucracy is most explicit.
In the case of post-independence Central Asia, two central features have developed within the
course of two decades, which are shared by all five Central Asian states. The first feature is
the strong position of the ruling elite and the president vis-à-vis the legislative and judicial
branches and society. Gawrich et al (2010) view the strong position of the president and his
regime in Central Asia as the result of systematic concentration of political power, which
involved the co-optation of different groups by making them stakeholders in the existing
political arrangements. Hence, the accumulation of formal power into the hands of the
president and his close surroundings is legitimized by establishing ideological leadership or
personality cult (Gawrich et all 2010: 13). The most extreme examples in the region have
been the personality cult surrounding President Niyazov of Turkmenistan (1990-2006).
Golden statues of the president were erected throughout the country, nationalist ideologies
were made mandatory course materials at schools, and the president proclaimed himself
Turkmenbashi, or the father of all Turkmens.
The second shared feature of Central Asian states have been the penetration of formal state
structures by informal patron-client networks, with economic and political resources
distributed on the base of loyalty. Erdmann & Engel (2006) defined this feature as
institutionalized informality, ‘which means that the power of the top relies on granting
personal favors to the lower levels’ (Gawrich et al 2010: 13). The granting of personal favours
13
by the president and his regime to lower levels within the administrative apparatus of the state
or key economic sectors competing clan-based networks and makes their financial well-being
inseparable from the ruling regimes. This leads Hale (2006) to conclude that ‘when a patronal
president is firmly entrenched in his or her office, therefore, those who have a significant
financial or political stake in society are likely to avoid anything resembling a challenge to the
regime (Hale 2006: 308). In post-Soviet Central Asia, loyalty is based on more traditional
family or ethnic ties. Others are still based on the old ties that were forged within the
communist parties during the Soviet-era. More recently, new loyalties have been forged
around business cycle, which restricts the financial well-being to family members and close
friends of the president, often referred to as the inner circle. The presidents of the five Central
Asian states do face a certain level of elite contestation at the top level, where different clans
or key supportive elites compete with each other for personal favours.
2.4 The nation-state building process after 1991
The presidents of the newly independent republics in Central Asia were confronted with the
double task of nation-state building and the further consolidation of their respective regimes.
According to Akçali (2003), the ex-communist political and bureaucratic elites of Central
Asia quickly transformed themselves into national elites and initiated a top-down approach in
order to build up their independent states. The presidents presented themselves as the national
leaders of the new republics by resorting to a discourse of nationalism and traditionalism and
by transforming the communist parties into pro-presidential republican parties (Akçali 2003:
410). Melvin (2004) argues that ‘rather looking at the contemporary regimes of Central Asia
as representing a continuation of previous political forms in the region, it is important to stress
their transformative character’(Melvin 2004: 12). According to Melvin (2004), the essence of
the new presidential regimes that rose to power in 1991 were the restructuring of the state and
society under the banner of traditionalism, while simultaneously promoting stability and
security. It led Akiner (2003) to conclude that due to the limited time of consolidating the new
states ‘national security came to be regarded as synonymous with regime security, which in
turn was understood as maintaining the incumbent presidents in power’ (Akiner 2003: 434).
The first origins of state-building in Central Asia dated back to the period between 1924 and
1936 when the official Soviet policy of ‘national delimitation’ introduced the concept of
territorial-based nationality to the steppe area, where nomadic and sedentary peoples had lived
together for centuries. Generally, the more traditionally nomadic people have been the ethnic
14
Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz and the Turkmen. The more sedentary people have been the Uzbeks and
the Tajiks (Akçali 2003: 418). The Soviet policy of national delimitation carved the area up
into five temporary administrative units, which were destined to merge into the Stalinist ideal
of one Soviet people (Sovietski narod), where national attachments (viewed as pre-modern
attitudes during the Soviet-era) were eventually made irrelevant by further promotion of
modernization (Akçali 2003: 414-418). These five administrative units developed seven
decades later into the current five Central Asian states, that already during the Gorbachevyears started to emphasize their ‘national’ identities as opposed to the ideal of one Soviet
people. When independence was suddenly achieved in 1991, the political leadership was not
only confronted with the task of state building on the remnants of ‘shallow’ Soviet
administrative institutions, but they also had to address the challenge of modern nationhood
for the first time in history. ‘In the post-Soviet era, nation-building and state-building go hand
in hand, as there is now an attempt to build an independent state that derives its legitimacy
and support from the nation’(Akçali 2003: 417). Matveeva (1999) noticed the limited time the
new regimes had to secure channels through which power could be exercised in a top-down
fashion. Institutions that were once part and now a legacy of the Soviet system had to be
transformed into formal structures with real power, in which the state could expand its reach
throughout its territory in order to solidify its authority.
The presidents had to address the difficulties of political and economic re-adjustment after the
break up of the Soviet Union, which also led to the complexity of reshaping the nation
(Akiner 2003: 445). Through a combination of official discourse on the nation and the
creation of a political legal-framework, the presidents sought to address initial challenges to
their nation-state building projects from the start. The presidential republics introduced new
historical writings, national anthems, national flags, currencies, linguistic policies, and
national glory and pride in order to remove symbols from the Soviet past. This was partly an
attempt by the political leadership to be further disassociated from their Communist origins.
The political legal-framework, incorporating the official discourse on the nation, had been
made up by the adaptation of national Constitutions in the early 1990s, which formally
instituted the executive branch, the legislative branch and the judicial branch. ‘The elites
became defenders of national independence, justifying their post-Soviet existence by national
sovereignty and utilizing national identity in order to legitimize their rule’ (Akçali 2003: 426).
Although economic policies were initially based on market principles, they generally failed to
15
deliver the same standards of public welfare, health and education as was the case during the
Soviet-era, which led to steep economic declines in the first decade of independence.
Embarking upon their new national ideology based on their own respective histories and
cultures, initial challenges toward the nation-state building project emerged that were latent
during seven decade of soviet rule. Kubicek (1998) identified factors limiting the presidents in
their nation-state building project, including low levels of economic development, traditional
culture, weak civil societies, the leading role of the old nomenclature in Central Asia and
finally ethnic cleavages (Kubicek 1998: 29). Akçali (2003) discerned four limitations to the
nation-state building process that confronted the political leadership, including local and/or
tribal loyalties, the presence of ethnic minorities, the rise of religious fundamentalism and the
problems with external sovereignty. These limitations largely overlap with the challenges to
the nation-state building process as identified by Matveeva (1999), which are the danger of
fragmentation along regional, tribal or clan lines, the presence of various ethnic minorities and
the rise of radical Islam in the region (Matveeva 1999: 24-27). Clan-based and tribal loyalties
permeated the formal structures of the state, the recruitment process of state officials largely
defined the development of neopatrimonial rule in the early years of independence. Collins
(2002) defined clan politics as one of the most distinctive feature of the Central Asian region,
which has persisted throughout the seven decades of Soviet rule. ‘Familiarity with Central
Asia suggests we need to reflect more thoroughly on the key, if informal, role that clans play
in shaping events and driving formal political realities throughout the region’(Collins 2002:
141). Further, in defining centre-periphery relationships, the presidents had to address their
multi-ethnic societies, which provided for subidentities that threatened the official discourse
of nationalism, as the titular nationality did not constitute an overwhelming majority in all of
the five Central Asian states.
In search of identity, Islam took a more prominent role among the Central Asian societies and
the political leadership made use of Islamic symbols and traditions to enhance their political
legitimacy. Although Islam had been suppressed during the Soviet-era, thousands of mosques
and hundreds of Muslim schools and colleges were opened, which led to a greater
commitment of younger Central Asians to faith and greater awareness of Islam (Akiner 2003:
447). This development led to the congruence of the state with religion. It simultaneously
posed a threat to the rule of the presidents as new Islamic movements, such as Wahabbism,
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fell outside the state accepted
16
version but infused mosques and schools with their deviating doctrines. These religious
movements posed a direct threat to the presidential republics, by offering alternative versions
to the dominant Sunni population, such as the institution of an Islamic caliphate in Central
Asia, especially when general welfare standards decreased sharply during the 1990s. These
groups found followers in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan.
Prior to 2001, the IMU had strongholds in Talebani-ruled Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
adhered to the idea of violent insurrections into Central Asia in order to bring down the new
established secular regimes (Akiner 2003: 448).
With independence declared upon the five former Soviet-administrative units, the political
leadership suddenly had to address their state’s sovereignty vis-à-vis the giant regional
powers Russia and China, as they feared interference of these foreign actors into their
domestic affairs (Matveeva 1999: 26). As all foreign relationships were handled by Moscow
during the Soviet-era, the new states had to integrate into the international community and to
define their foreign policies. This task had to be carried out in a timely fashion, as the
presidents of the five Central Asian states found themselves confronted with problems of
border demarcations, uncontrolled border crossings, the lack of a regional regulatory
framework for water-management and conflicting territorial claims of their neighbours.
These problems arose simultaneously with the decreasing political and military influence of
Russia in the early years of Central Asia’s independence. Border problems, the civil war in
Tajikistan (1992-1997) and the unstable situation in Afghanistan had intensified the
trafficking of drugs and weapons and refugees flows in the region. The porous borders also
served radical Islamic movements to stage military incursions into southern Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
17
2.5 Final Remarks
The postcommunist trajectories have resulted in different regime types, varying from liberal
democracies in Eastern and Central Europe to full-fledged authoritarian regimes in the former
Soviet Union. Already during the late 1990s, social scientists became increasingly concerned
with the rise of hybrid regimes, which combined an authoritarian state with democratic
features such as multiparty elections. In contrary to earlier literature on democratization that
made the claim that these hybrid regimes would eventually develop into stable democracies,
the varied outcomes of regime trajectories of the postcommunist states proved the opposite.
Especially in the former Soviet Union, hybrid regimes and full-fledged authoritarian regimes
have consolidated since 1991. However, less research has been conducted to explain variance
in regime stability between the five Central Asian states, which are in need of new
explanations since two presidents were toppled in Kyrgyzstan as opposed to the incumbent
presidents in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
18
3. Data and Methods of Analysis
This thesis provides for an explanation of variation in regime stability in the highly
authoritarian region of Central Asia. Scholarly literature has been used to write up the
theoretical framework (section 2.1-2.5). This section provides an overview on the rise of
hybrid regimes during the 1990s and the different regime trajectories of postcommunist states
to show that transitions do not necessarily lead to democratic regime types. Different
trajectories resulted in various regime types, varying from liberal democracies in the states of
Central Europe to highly authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. The concept of neopatrimonial
rule has been applied to capture political developments in Central Asia since independence
was gained in 1991, discussing the top-down initiated nation-state building projects and initial
challenges that confronted this process. After the first decade of independence, the five
regimes of the Central Asia became characterised by their strong presidencies and patronclient networks. However, as the broader convergence of the five Central Asian states into
one authoritarian bloc has been often described, less research has been conducted to explain
variance in regime stability.
The central focus of this thesis is on the variation of regime stability between three states of
Central Asia, with the use of case studies as the method of analysis. This thesis uses
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as case studies to provide an answer to the central
research question: what explains the variance in regime stability in a highly authoritarian
region? The presentation of empirical results has been divided into two sections. In section
4.1 the identified limitations to the nation-state building process that had to be overcome in
the early years of regime consolidation are further elaborated upon. These identified
challenges are clan- based and tribal loyalties, the presence of various ethnic communities, the
rise of radical Islam and addressing external sovereignty. The initial challenges were
especially evident between 1991 and 2000, capturing the first decade of independence. This
has also been the used timeframe to discuss these challenges in this thesis. It is theorized that
these initial challenges functioned as boundaries for the formulation of political strategies by
the presidents in order to consolidate their presidential regimes. When successfully
formulated within the boundaries, it has led to regime stability. If political strategies crossed
the fixed boundaries, it has resulted in regime instability.
19
Section 4.3 presents the empirical results on political strategies employed by the presidents of
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Political strategies have been analyzed during the
second half independence, encompassing the period 2001-2009. In order to answer the central
research question, the case studies are guided by the following subquestion: how do political
strategies adopted by the presidents explain regime (in) stability? Four categories of political
strategies have been used to compare the three countries in a systematic way. These four
categories are centralization of power into the executive branch (1), control of the electoral
arena (2), control of religious fundamentalism, civil society and media (3) and finally foreign
policy (4). The first three categories respond to the initial challenges of clan-based and tribal
loyalties, the presence of various ethnic minorities and the rise of religious fundamentalism.
The latter is concerned with addressing the external sovereignty of the new established states,
and the consolidation of the presidential regimes in the international realm.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been selected as case studies because both countries have
developed into stable, authoritarian regimes and share important commonalities. First of all,
both President Islam Karimov from Uzbekistan and President Nursultan Nazarbayev from
Kazakhstan were former First Secretaries of the Communist Party and have ruled their
countries ever since independence was gained in 1991. Second, both states are endowed with
natural resources which generate revenues to maintain a strong presidency and to secure
regime stability through to co-option of informal patronage networks. President Karimov has
been able to extract sufficient revenues from its decreasing oil- and natural gas reserves and
the cotton industry to maintain an almost unchallenged, stable regime in the course of two
decades. Kazakhstan has developed itself into the economic leader of Central Asia and
presides over the largest oil- and gas reserves in the region. This has provided President
Nazarbayev with ample revenues to maintain his strong presidency and to pay for its vast
patron-client networks to secure regime stability. Turkmenistan is largely comparable with
both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan’s first president, Saparmurat Niyazov (19912006), was also a former First Secretary of the Communist Party, and the state has been
equally endowed with vast oil-and gas reserves which underpins a strong presidency and
regime stability through the widespread use of patron-client networks. However, this case is
different because Turkmenistan experienced a peaceful political succession as the first state in
Central Asia.
20
Kyrgyzstan has been selected to explain the variance in regime stability, as the country saw
the ouster of two presidents in the course of two decades. Kyrgyzstan’s first president, Askar
Akayev (1991-2005), was a physicist from the National Academy of Sciences who rose to
power in 1991 and was hailed as a champion of democracy in the West. President Akayev
was ousted in April 2005 when the country staged widespread protests against his rule which
came to be known as the Tulip Revolution. The Tulip Revolution became part of the coloured
revolutions that swept across Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). The revolution brought to
power former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who became acting president of the
Kyrgyz Republic from 2005 until 2010. President Bakiyev was ousted in 2010, as he failed to
deliver on the promises of the Tulip Revolution. As the country is relatively scarce on natural
resources to generate revenues, the country had been depended on international financial
support in order to deal with a depleted national budget. The heavily reliance on
predominantly Western financial aid was accompanied with conditions of political reforms
and democratization in the early years of 1990, as opposed to the closed regimes of President
Karimov in Uzbekistan and President Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. Despite the fact that
Kyrgyzstan is relatively resource poor, except for its hydropower sector and gold mines, both
presidencies were characterized by central features of neopatrimonial rule. They both
employed political strategies to strengthen the presidency and to co-opt northern and southern
clans through the mechanisms of patron-client networks. Tajikistan is also a relatively
resource poor country and equally depended on foreign aid. However, Tajikistan has been the
only Central Asian state that faced civil war from 1992 until 1997 and President Emomali
Rahmon developed a strong presidency since 1994 despite a lack of natural resources, which
sets it apart from the selected case studies.
In order to compare the political strategies across the three cases primary sources have been
used to provide for the most up-to-date information that is available on the region. A
limitation to the found empirical results is that they are based on English-language sources,
provided by Western-based institutions. This incorporates the risk of a biased view on the
region, although great effort has been put forward to provide for a value free analysis of the
four presidencies. The empirical results are based on all Freedom House’ Nations in Transit
reports (2003-2010) for Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Although these reports
provide for detailed information on political developments in the selected case studies, they
are further complemented by Bertelsmann Foundation Country Reports of 2007 and reports of
the International Crisis Groups to provide for diversity in the use of primary resources. On the
21
base of these reports four categories of political strategies have been construed to compare the
three cases within the timeframe of 2001-2009. Hence, each country section contains data
from several indexes, including the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
2010, the World Bank Group Ease of Doing Business Index 2010, the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index 2011, and finally the Reporters
Without Borders Index 2010.
The analyses of political strategies pursued by the political leadership are presented per
country section, starting with Uzbekistan (section 4.3.1), Kazakhstan (section 4.3.2) and
finally Kyrgyzstan (section 4.3.3). By using four categories of political strategies empirical
evidence is systematically organized and presented in the same manner per country section. In
section 4.4 a summery table is presented in order to provide the reader with a proper overview
of the similarities and differences between the political strategies analyzed for Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This summary table also gives an indication of how the pursued
political strategies explain variation in regime stability across the case studies. In section 5
conclusions are drawn based on the empirical results and will take into account the
generabilization of these results to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
22
4. Regime stability in the Central Asian region: the case studies of Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
The first section will provide an oversight of the initial challenges on nation-state building in
Central Asia, providing background to the political strategies pursued in the second decade of
independence. These initial challenges functioned as boundaries wherein the presidents had to
operate and which subsequently informed their political strategies to consolidate their regimes
during the first decade of independence (1991-2001). Challenges in the initial period of
nation-state building were identified as clan-based and tribal loyalties, the presence of various
minorities, and the rise of religious fundamentalism. Hence, the new established presidential
republics had to address their external sovereignty. The second section presents the strategies
adopted by the political leadership which has resulted in regime consolidation in the cases of
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and to regime instability in Kyrgyzstan. The advantage of
choosing two stable authoritarian regimes and one unstable authoritarian regime provides us
with further insights in the success of certain strategies in order to explain variation in regime
stability among states in a highly authoritarian region.
4.1 Limitations to the nation-state building process in Central Asia
After seven decades of Soviet rule, the new established states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan were confronted with challenges that ultimately defined their respective nationstate building projects and the variation in regime stability in the second decade (2001-2010).
The most prominent challenges to the nation-state building process of the five Central Asian
states and regime stability since 1991 were constituted by clan-based and tribal loyalties, the
presence of various ethnic minorities, and the rise of religious fundamentalism. The political
leadership had to address the sovereignty of their new states and their preferred roles within
the international community in order to prevent foreign interference. These challenges had to
be neutralized or contained by the presidents in the first ten years after 1991, which informed
variance in regime stability from 2001 to 2010. These initial challenges needed further
attention to safeguard accumulated wealth by the presidential family which has been secured
through the restriction of political and economic resources to a selective inner circle.
23
A. Clan-based and tribal loyalties
In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the presidents had to deal with clan-based and
tribal loyalties and identities, which were either organized locally and/or in regional based
networks. ‘Despite Soviet efforts to eliminate their importance in Central Asia, clan ties
remain an important element of politics in the region’ (Bond & Koch 2010: 536). Already
during Soviet times, regional Communist Party leaders attempted to reinforce their power by
favouring clans or tribes from their own region through the distribution of important positions
in the administrative apparatus of the nascent state (Akçali 2003: 421). Collins (2002) defines
a clan as an informal social institution, where actual or notional kinship are based on blood or
marriage which forms the central bond among its members. They serve as identity networks,
enhancing norms and trust and a sense of reciprocity among both non-elite and elite members
(horizontal dimension). These networks provided for political, social and economic
opportunities to its members, who in return had to support elite members with their personal
loyalty and showing respect to their status (vertical dimension). Competing clans informally
divided central states offices and economic resources to further their own well-being. These
political and social practices have subsequently led to the penetration of official state
structures by informal clan-based networks.
The presidents, whose initial political survival depended upon these local and regional clanbased networks, needed to balance these competing clan interests from the early 1990s
onwards. Starr (2006) refers to the relationship between regional power brokers and their
networks on the one hand, and the president and his regime on the other hand, within the
Central Asian context as ‘Politics B’. Whereas ‘Politics A’ is concerned with the power
balance between presidents and challenging opposition leaders in parliament, ‘Politics B’
addresses the permanent struggle of presidents with these local and regional power brokers
and networks (Starr 2006: 07-12). Thus, political legitimacy and regime stability became
dependent on the durability of pacts between different clans, orchestrated from the top
government levels through the distribution mechanisms of political and economic spoils.
Political distribution can be explained as the penetration of the state apparatus by the most
powerful clans in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Economic distribution among the most
powerful clans underpinning the political legitimacy of the ruling presidents and his
surroundings includes, among others, the national bank, security forces, and the profitable
industries of natural resources. Hence, the regime had to make sure different clans perceived
the distribution of revenues between them as fair and balanced.
24
Clans are still the link between state and society, which heavily influences presidential and
parliamentary elections, as clan-based voting remained dominant in Central Asian societies,
particularly in a traditional society such as Kyrgyzstan. Both economic and political
distribution mechanisms to co-opt powerful clan networks and the establishment of a oneparty rule or ‘parties of power’ are highly important conditions for the functioning of
authoritarian regimes in Central Asia (Matveeva 1999: 36). The penetration of formal state
structures by informal patronage networks on the national, regional, district and local levels
have led to widespread corruption. All five Central Asian states are two decades later
qualified among the most corrupt states in the world on the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index 2010. 5 ‘In the post-Soviet context, this informal aspect of
power relations is identified and articulated through the notion of ‘clan’ networks, often
considered as a source of state corruption’ (Ilkhamov 2007: 68).
In Uzbekistan, three dominant clan-based networks centred on the regions of Bukhara,
Tashkent and the Fergana Valley. President Karimov had to maintain a relative balance
between the three regions to secure state and regime stability, although its legitimacy mainly
depended upon the Samarkand region (Roy 2000: 18; Akçali 2003: 422). In Kazakhstan,
President Nazarbayev faced tribal and regional divisions at the onset of the nation-state
building process. However, due to stronger Russian influence during the Soviet-era and the
large groups of ethnic Russians in the early 1990s in the northern provinces of Kazakhstan,
tribal opposition is weak and the distribution of political and economic spoils is mainly
informed by ethnic instead of tribal or clannish considerations. The main Hordes or tribal
federations that divide the ethnic Kazakhs into the Great Horde (Ulu Zhuz), the Middle Horde
(Orta Zhuz) and finally the Little Horde (Kishi Zhuz). President Nazarbayev, who himself is a
member of the Great Horde, has promoted his fellow tribesman and ethnic Kazakhs in the
recruitment process to state offices and powerful positions in the private sector. Not only has
this reinforced the power of the presidency in the political system of Kazakhstan, it also
continues to strengthen the patron-client relationships which underpins neopatrimonial rule in
the region.
In contrast to the situation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, clans from the northern and
southern regions have fought for political domination in Kyrgyzstan even during Soviet-
5
See Appendix.
25
times. The northern clan represents the Chui, Issyk-Kol, Naryn and Talas regions, and the
southern clan represents the Batken, Jalalabad and Osh regions. ‘In fact, the division between
the northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan is one of the biggest threats to the nationstate building process in the country’ (Akçali 2003: 423). The first president of Kyrgyzstan,
Askar Akayev (2005-2010), found his political legitimacy in the more Russified and
politically and economically advanced northern regions, from where Akayev recruited fellow
clan members to state offices. After the Tulip revolution of 2005, President Bakiyev (20052010) rose to power, who found his legitimacy in the more impoverished, mainly rural
southern provinces. The two regions continued to enforce a divisive split on Kyrgyz national
identity during the first decade of independence, and continued to define political
developments between 2001 and 2010 (Bond & Koch 2010: 532).
B. The presence of various ethnic minorities
The challenge of achieving nationhood and building a unitary state was complicated by the
presence of various ethnic minorities that crossed the borders of the five Central Asian states.
Hence, it posed an additional problem to regime stability as the presidents tried to rally
support behind a discourse of nationalism in order to achieve modern statehood and a sense of
one, fixed community. ‘None of the Central Asian states is mono-ethnic, and nowhere does
the titular nationality constitute an overwhelming majority…minorities loyalty to the newly
established states was often doubted, especially when they lived in border areas abutting on
their kin states’ (Matveeva 1999: 25). The region had not been unfamiliar with ethnic tensions
in the past. Only a couple of years before the presidents unilaterally declared state
independence in Central Asia, ethnic tensions within the Ferghana Valley exploded into
ethnic conflict between Meskhetian Turks and ethnic Uzbeks around 1989. This event was
followed up by conflicts between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in the city of Osh, which
is located in the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley. Ethnic conflicts were ended in 1990.
26
Uzbekistan (27.3 million): Uzbek (80%), Russian (5.5%),
Tajik (5.5%), Kazakh (3%), Karakalpak (2.5%), Tatar (1%)
Kazakhstan (15.7 million) Kazakh (53.4%), Russian (30%),
Ukrainian (3.7%), Uzbek (2.5%), German (2.4%), Uygur (2%),
Volga Tartars (1.7%)
Kyrgyzstan (5.3 million): Kyrgyz (53%), Russian (18%),
Uzbek (13%), Uygur, Dungabe, Chinese and others (16%)
Table 1. Presence of ethnic minorities in Central Asia 6
The initial demographic situation certainly constrained the presidents in defining centreperiphery relationships to enhance their control over multi-ethnic areas. Two problems had to
be dealt with within the broader framework of the nation-state building process, namely the
widespread presence of Russian minorities after the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 and the
presence of various ethnic communities crossing official borders which could lead to severe
interregional tensions between Central Asian states. In the early 1990s, the presence of large
groups of Russian minorities had forced the presidential republics to recognize the Russian
Orthodox Church as an official state religion. However, dual citizenship was never granted to
the Russian minorities, and as the demographic picture changed in favour of the titular
nationalities, most qualified Russian workers emigrated to the Russian Federation. The
emigration flow of Russians reached its peak during the mid 1990s, when policies promoting
the native language in state bureaucracy and politics relaxed (Akçali 2003: 415). Further,
various ethnic communities living in different parts of the country posed a challenge to
centre-periphery relationship, as local administrations performed as the first levels of the
centralized unitary state.
Several policies were adopted and proposals made to marginalize the influence of ethnic
minorities on the functioning of the unitary state. In Uzbekistan the Latin Script was adopted
in 1993, replacing the Cyrillic script to reduce Russian influence. President Karimov has
addressed the presence of ethnic minorities through emphasizing ‘ethnic harmony’ and
‘stability’ and made repeated calls for reconciliations in the wake of rising ethnic tensions
(mainly in the Ferghana Valley). However, as ethnic Uzbeks make up for the majority of the
population and the Uzbek language instituted as the official language, one could gradually
discern a predominance of Uzbeks in social, political and economic life of the country (Akçali
2003: 425). When Kazakhstan achieved independence in 1991, a census from that year
6
Numbers are based on the latest census provided by Freedom House (Freedom House 2007a; 2007b; 2010c).
27
estimated that ethnic Russians accounted for almost the same proportion as ethnic Kazakhs.
However, around 1999, the ethnic Kazakhs had attained an ethnic majority due to large scale
emigration of ethnic Russians fuelled by nationalist policies, for example the recognition of
Kazakh as the official state language (Cummings 2002: 11-15). In both republics of
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the Russian language has been maintained as the language of
‘inter-ethnic communication’ (Akçali 2003: 415).
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, large parts of the Kyrgyz population were unable to speak the
native language, leaving Russia as a second state language. The regional divide between north
and south in Kyrgyzstan posed the most direct challenge to the political legitimacy of
President Akayev and President Bakiyev. In Kyrgyzstan political leadership continuously
needed to balance between the Northern and Southern provinces during the first decade of
independence. Not only were the southern provinces more agricultural and conservative, but
also the most multi-ethnic, as the majority of the Uzbek communities live near the border with
Uzbekistan. Ethnic tensions between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz have regularly occurred in the
south. Generally, riots in Kyrgyzstan find their history in general feelings of
underrepresentation by the central government in Bishkek (either dominated by the north or
the south) and land allocation problems between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south
(Bond & Koch 2010: 531-532). Another problem for the Kyrgyz leadership had been the
presence of Uyghur minorities, who have been closely monitored and suppressed by Kyrgyz
authorities since independence, complying with Beijing’s demands not to recognize the cause
of Uygur freedom fighters in neighbouring Xinjiang.
C. The rise of religious fundamentalism
From the late 1990s onwards, the rise of radical Islam posed a direct threat to the nation-state
building process as it challenged the congruence of religion with the state (Melvin 2004: 29).
In order to prevent alternative religious movements from staging a challenge upon the
political legitimacy of the presidents, two strategies were employed that restricted the freedom
of religion and that would undermine the appeal of alternative Islamic movements. The
presidents allowed only two religions to be officially registered in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan, which were the state-accepted version of Islam and the Russian Orthodox
Church. Alternative religious movements were not allowed to officially register and became
targets of security forces. The other strategy was the embracement of Islamic symbols and
rhetoric to increase the political legitimacy of the president and his administration. Islam has
28
been the dominant religion among the peoples of Central Asia since the 18th century, with a
majority of the Central Asian Muslims professing Sunni Islam, adhering to the principles of
the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. ‘This is the form of Islam that currently receives the
support of the political leadership throughout the region’ (Akiner 2003: 447). Shiites are also
present in Central Asia, albeit relatively few in number, which has limited the influence of
Iran in the region (Roy 2009: 143). 7
All the states of Central Asia recognize and associate themselves with Islam, as is reflected in
their membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). 8 None of the five
Central Asian states mention Islam or Sharia in their constitution. For example, the
constitutions of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan explicitly refer to the secular nature of their
respective states. Since independence, regimes have struggled with the proper role of religion
in their societies, which found renewed strength and importance since the suppression of
religion and religious activities under Soviet-era Socialism ended (Hann & Pelkmans 2009:
1517). According to Hann and Pelkmans (2009), the political leadership in Central Asia had
intensified there efforts to integrate their perceptions of religion with the nation state-building
process, in order to enhance and maintain political legitimacy: ‘Although the nation has
become the ultimate ‘imagined community’, an exclusively secular ideology of nationhood is
inadequate. Instead, older forms of religion are being adapted to serve new purposes: nothing
less than the sacralisation of the modern state’ (Hann & Pelkmans 2009: 1519). According to
Alkçali (2003), Islam is recognized as part of cultural heritage in Central Asia but is rejected
as a guiding principle for public and political life. ‘All the states recognize the presence of
Islam and take steps to mobilise a certain Muslim legitimacy, while at the same time
controlling the clergy and putting down radical Islam’ (Roy 2009: 159).
In more recent years, the rise of radical Islamism has posed a significant challenge to the
congruence of religion and the state, thus directly posing a challenge to the legitimacy of the
presidencies in Central Asia. ‘After the breakup of the Soviet Union, groups formed on the
basis of these beliefs and the idea of replacing the secular regime with an Islamic state took
shape’ (Naumkin 2006: 129). Matveeva (1999) identified the rise of Islamic radicalism in the
late 1990s as constituting a longer term threat to regime stability and security in Central Asia.
7
The Hanafi doctrine of Sunni Islam (closely connected to Sufism) accepts additional texts besides the Qu’ran
and the principles of Sharia rule.
8
Tajikistan (since 1992), Turkmenistan (since 1992), Kyrgyz Republic (1992), Kazakhstan (1995), and
Uzbekistan (since 1996).
29
The increasing influence of Salafism, which promotes strict interpretations of a more ‘pure’
Islam, posed an increasing threat towards the nation-state building process as initiated by the
presidents. The most well-known movements are Wahhabism, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (The
Liberation Movement) as well as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). These
movements call for the recreation of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia, with the Islamic
state based on Sharia rule. 9 Differences do exist in the preferred means these movements use
to achieve their goals. The transnational movement Hizb Ut-Tahrir officially refrains from the
use of political violence in their official doctrines, whereas the IMU has made the violent
overthrow of the Central Asian governments a top priority, particularly in Uzbekistan.
Already in 1992, President Karimov ordered a government crackdown on radical Islamic
groups in the Ferghana Valley, which directly challenged his rule by demanding the creation
of an Islamic state. Armed IMU units with strongholds in Taleban-Afghanistan launched a
number of terrorist attacks between 1996 and 2001 in order to overthrow President Karimov
and to establish Sharia rule in Central Asia’s most populated state, ‘as well as home to the
main historical centres of Central Asian statehood and Islamic culture (Naumkin 2006: 128).
Activities from the Hizb Ut-Tahrir and IMU remained limited to the more conservative and
sedentary southern areas of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the first decade of
independence. However, its potential threat continued to be exaggerated by security forces in
order to receive more financial means from the central government (ICG 2003: 17).
D. Addressing sovereignty
Challenges also arrived from outside Central Asia and between the states of Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, threatening the presidential republics in their recently achieved
status of independence. Among the most salient challenges to their sovereignty were problems
of border demarcation, uncontrolled border crossings by illegal traders and Islamic
movements, and conflicting territorial claims with China and Russia. Tensions over border
demarcation involved mainly the presidential republics of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. For
example, Turkmen-Uzbek, Uzbek-Kazakh, Uzbek-Tajik, Uzbek-Kyrgyz and Kyrgyz-Tajik
borders are still disputed among the Central Asian states. From a broader geopolitical
perspective, the presidents had to pledge to the central government in China not to support
Muslim separatists in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, in exchange for recognition of
9
Hizb Ut-Tahrir is a movement that appeared first to the scene among Palestinians in Jordan in the 1950s and
has developed a committed following within the most conservative areas of Central Asia, encompassing the
Ferghana Valley, the southern provinces of Jalalabad and Osh in Kyrgyzstan and the Sugdh-region in Tajikistan.
The movement has an estimated 15.000 to 20.000 members across Central Asia (ICG 2003: 17-18).
30
their borders by China (Akçali 2003: 411). Another problem that continues to challenge
regime stability up until today is the failing state of Afghanistan. The unstable situation in
Afghanistan created regional and transnational problems of arms-and drug trafficking through
the mountainous areas of Central Asia and the country is still viewed as a stronghold of
potential radical Islamic groups that could stage a challenge to the secular leaderships of
Central Asia.
In order to address their external sovereignty, the new states joined international institutions
such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
viewed as ‘serious attempts to be involved in the international arena as sovereign states on
their own’ (Akçali 2003: 412). Hence, the Central Asian states joined different regional
organizations to increase economic and security cooperation, such as the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Central
Asian Union (CAU) in order to affirm their independent statehood. ‘These organizations are
potentially of crucial importance for Central Asia, since many of the most urgent problems
that face these new states are of a transnational nature, such as water management,
environmental degradation, terrorism, trafficking in drugs, arms and humans, and illegal
immigration’ (Akiner 2003: 453). Most regional attempts at closer economic and security
cooperation proved futile, lacking organizational capacity and the commitment of
participating states.
From an international perspective, Central Asian leaders had to seize upon their natural
resources to generate revenues in order to finance their neopatrimonial regimes. Central Asia
has considerable amounts of proven oil and gas reserves still to exploit. Kazakhstan is
estimated to have between the 30 and 40 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, distributed
among the four main oil –and natural gas fields of Tengiz, Karachaganak, Kashagan and
Kurmangazy (ICG 2007: 07). Most producing oil fields are located near or off shore the
Caspian Sea, with the notable exception of the Karachaganak field, which is located in the
northwest near the Russian border. An estimated 84 per cent of Kazakh oil exports flows
through Russia, with half of its exports distributed to the Russian owned Transneft system
(ICG 2007: 09). Uzbekistan presides over a mere estimated 600 million barrels of oil reserves,
which are expected to decline steadily. ‘The fields are mostly near exhaustion; hence the
decline in production since the 1990s, after an initial spurt in the post-Soviet period made the
country temporarily self-sufficient’ (ICG 2007: 09). According to the ICG (2007), investment
31
in the oil-and gas industries are insufficient to further develop Uzbek refinery capacities and
adding to the problem are the uncertainties surrounding the provided estimates by government
authorities (ICG 2007: 09).
Kazakhstan’s proven natural gas reserves are 11th in the world. Due to increased foreign
investment into its natural gas reserves, production has been raised gradually from 25.2 billion
cubic meters (Bcm) in 2005 to 25.7 Bcm in 2006 (ICG 2007: 12-13). The proven reserves are
almost all located inside West Kazakhstan, with a joint venture between the state-owned
KazMunaiGas (KMG) and Gazprom as the main exploiters. Natural gas reserves ranks
Uzbekistan seventeenth in the world, but estimates made by the government-controlled
Uzbekneftegas are impossible to confirm, as the company has been regularly accused of
exaggerating reserves and production numbers to attract foreign investment (ICG 2007: 16).
Uzbekistan produces an estimated 35 Bcm of natural gas per year, with more than 20 Bcm
lost due to deteriorating transport and distribution systems and widespread corruption within
the gas sector. The largest investors are Gazprom and some state owned Asian companies.
Upstream states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan each take 0,5 Bcm of the total production
per year, in exchange for water supplies to the agricultural sector in the downstream states of
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, Uzbekistan will transit within the foreseeable future
mainly Turkmeni gas through the Central Asia Centre pipeline to Russia (ICG 2007: 16-17).
The energy resources of the Central Asian region and broader geo-strategic interests in the
area draws increasing attention from the Russian Federation, Iran, China and India, who all
seek to counterbalance Western influence in the region and to increase their own investments
in the lucrative oil and gas sectors.
The Central Asian region has been strategically important since 2001, when military
operations in Afghanistan urged the United States and NATO to get involved in the region.
For both the US and NATO, security interests and the state-building process in neighbouring
Afghanistan demanded attention towards the Central Asia. US military bases are located in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which are vital to supply international coalition forces engaged in
Afghanistan, whether in state-building activities or fighting Taleban-affiliated insurgent
elements. Further, spill-over effects from the Afghanistan war, such as refugee flows, drugs
and weapons trafficking and terrorist insurgencies into Central Asia increasingly concerns the
Western front. Since the War on Terrorism was launched by the Bush-administration after the
events of 9/11, the US have sought closer ties with Uzbekistan, providing increased military
32
and economic aid, while being silence on its lack of democratic progress and large scale
violations of human rights (Luong & Weinthal 2002: 68-70). Further, Kyrgyzstan provided its
military base at the Manas international airport and tendered air space right for US warplanes.
The increasing interest and involvement of the United States in the former backyard of the
Soviet Union has ignited increasing involvement of the Russian Federation that tries to
safeguard its dominant position by providing economic aid packages and by building up its
military presence by leasing military bases across the region.
4.1.2 Summary A, B, C and D
The initial challenges posed upon the nation-state building process in the early years of
independence have subsequently informed the political strategies that were employed to
consolidate the presidential regimes from 2001 until 2010. The discussed challenges
functioned as boundaries that the presidents had to take into account in their search of regime
stability, which were characterized by strong presidencies and economic and political cooptation of informal networks through patron-client networks. As table 2 indicates, the
challenges varied in the degree of threat they posed upon the regimes in Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
In Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, clan-based and tribal loyalties have been neutralized through
the revenues generated by their natural resources. These revenues enabled the presidents to
build a unitary state out of their multiethnic societies, with the titular nationality enjoining
more advanced positions in the administrative apparatus and economic sectors of both
countries. Although both presidents presented themselves as promoters of ethnic harmony,
linguistic policies and an appeal on nationalism have excluded ethnic minorities from
important positions in the political and economic sphere, which are controlled by an inner
circle of friends, family members and senior government officials selected on clan-based
criteria. Hence, revenues have been used to provide the presidents with extensive control over
security forces, which have successfully enforced other clans and ethnic minorities to comply
with the state. Further, in the case of Uzbekistan, the security apparatus has successfully
suppressed and contained religious movement as the Hizb Ut-Tahrir and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the first decade of independence. The threat of Islamic
movements to the President Nazarbayev’s rule in Kazakhstan is believed to be virtually nonexistent.
33
In Kyrgyzstan, regional preferences during the first decade of independence continued to pose
difficulties on the creation of a unitary state, with President Akayev forced to strike a balance
between both the northern and southern regions. The regional divide between North and
South has been further complicated by ethnic tensions in the southern regions of Jalalabad and
Osh where a large group of ethnic Uzbeks resides and where ethnic conflicts occur
regularly. 10 As a relatively resource poor country, the republic had been dependent upon
international financial flows, and had to comply with international conditions of political and
economic reforms, before both presidents sought ways to consolidate their powers in the same
manner as their colleagues in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The boundaries of clan-based and
tribal loyalty and ethnic diversity continued to be most persistent in the case of Kyrgyzstan,
which greatly limited President Akayev and later on Bakiyev in their choices of political
strategies to consolidate their regimes in contrast to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 11
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
x
x
xx
Ethnic diversity
x
x
xx
Radical Islam (and
Xx
x
x
X
x
xx
Clan-based and
Tribal Loyalties
other competing
alternatives)
Foreign Policy
Table 2. Limitations on the nation-state building process in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
x = neutralized challenge (1991-2001)
xx = continuing challenge (1991-2011)
10
The Osh-region is located within the Kyrgyz-part of the Ferghana Valley, which remains a highly problematic
sub region due to overpopulation, land crises, unemployment and social unrest (Naumkin 2006: 128).
11
Kyrgyzstan’s main economic assets are its hydropower sector and gold mines, which have been badly
managed and perform poorly due to widespread corruption.
34
4.3 Political strategies and regime stability in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
This section will present the strategies employed by the political leadership of Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The nation-state building process has been initiated by the
presidents within the framework of a top-down approach, with the state as the primary
instrument to provide for their political legitimacy. The presidents of the new established
republics had to address both the challenges of state building and the creation of nationhood,
which has (un)intentionally led to the congruence of the independent state with the policies of
the political leadership. In order to answer the central research question, this section is guided
by a further subquestion: how do political strategies adopted by the presidents explain regime
(in) stability? As the pursued political strategies will show, none of the examined presidents
in the three selected case studies had been sincerely concerned with the creation of a
democratic state, including its formal separation of powers, the creation of a vibrant civil
society and an independent media to report on government activities. The pursued political
strategies show striking similarities, however, their interaction with the identified four
limitations ultimately provide for new insights in explaining variation of regime stability. The
pursued political strategies are analyzed within the period of 2002 until 2009, and grouped
into four different analytical categories:

Strategy 1: Centralization of power into the executive branch

Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena

Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media

Strategy 4: Foreign policy
These four political strategies find common ground with the four arenas of contestation within
competitive authoritarianism, as discussed in the theoretical framework, which included the
electoral arena, the legislative arena, the judicial arena and the media (Way and Levitsky
2002: 54-58). However, in the cases of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the analyzed
political strategies were in need of different categories, as they more or less overlapped and
complemented each other. The first strategy identified among the three selected case studies is
the centralization of power into the executive branch, which is defined as the subordination of
the legislative and judicial branches to the president, and the control of the president over all
levels of administration below the centre. It also includes the revenues to pay for patron-client
networks and the security forces to ensure regime stability. The second strategy is the control
35
of the electoral arena by the executive branch, restricting the electoral process to propresidential parties that are in favour of the regime and supportive of presidential policies.
The third strategy encompasses the suppression of religious fundamentalism, civil society and
independent media outlets. Civil society in relationship to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan mainly includes the activities employed by foreign financed NGOs promoting
human rights, political reforms and democratization. Local and regional NGOs are largely coopted by the state. The final strategy is concerned with foreign policy, as the presidents of
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continuously have to balance the interests of foreign
powers in the region and to translate those interests into further consolidation of their regimes.
This section will first discuss the rule of President Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, who has
been in power since 1991, heading an almost unchallenged, stable authoritarian regime.
Second, the rule of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan will be discussed. Similar
to his colleague in Uzbekistan, he has presided over an almost unchallenged, stable
authoritarian regime. Finally, the turbulent presidencies of Askar Akayev (1991-2005) and
Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010) will be discussed. Section 4.4 provides a summary table to
show why the followed political strategies have led to a challenged, unstable authoritarian
regime in Kyrgyzstan. 12
4.3.1 Republic of Uzbekistan
Since independence, former First Secretary of the Communist Party and long-time President
Karimov has consistently reaffirmed his government’s commitment to the establishment of a
modern secular state and a gradual transition to a free market economy (Bertelsmann
Foundation 2007a: 03). In practice, the state continues to dominate the economic and political
sphere as well as all activities within Uzbek society. While the long term aims of the
government are democracy and a social market economy, both are continuously substituted
for short-term interest of political bargaining and office-seeking, with economic and political
distribution mechanisms in place to shift resources among regional informal networks. The
expansion of the state into the economic, political and social life since independence is a
result of the mutual dependency between the nation-state building process and the political
legitimacy of President Karimov. Uzbekistan experienced economic decline in the early years
of independence as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but started to record
12
This section will primarily discuss and compare the presidencies of Akayev (1991-2005) and Bakiyev (20052010), as the current provisional government is primarily dealing with both authoritarian legacies.
36
economic growth again from 1998 onwards. 13 From 2002-2006, average annual GDP growth
was around the 6.0% (ICG 2007: 21). Oppressive economic regulations are still in place to
stifle small- and medium seized businesses and to prevent successful entrepreneurship outside
the president’s control, ranking Uzbekistan 150th out of 183 countries on the World Bank
Group Ease of Doing Business Index 2010. 14
The first signs of neopatrimonial rule became clear in the early 1990s, when Islam Karimov
sought ways to create a strong presidency combined with patron-client networks to co-opt
competing clan networks into the state structures. Declining revenues generated by the limited
oil- and natural gas reserves and from the annual cotton harvest provided President Karimov
throughout the analyzed period with sufficient resources to maintain a stable regime on the
base of neopatrimonial rule. An extensive security apparatus is at the disposal of the
president, who has used repressive measures to maintain control and to silence his critics.
Corruption is believed to be widespread within the administrative apparatus, due to the
entrenchment of formal state structures by informal patronage networks. ‘Corruption in
Uzbekistan should be viewed in the light of the state’s tight control over the economy, media,
education system, and civil society. Since independence, Uzbekistan has not substantially
deviated from the Soviet legacy of a closed economy and endemic red tape’
(Freedom House 2005a: 21). The Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions
Index 2010 ranks Uzbekistan 172nd out of 178 countries, sharing its low ranking with
Turkmenistan. 15
In the course of two decades, a set of complementing strategies have been developed and
employed to further strengthen the domestic, regional and international position of President
Karimov, a process combining heavy-handed suppression of domestic opposition and a policy
of window dressing concerning international governance standards, at least until the coloured
revolutions swept across Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). Already in
the early 1990s, opposition members and student protests in Tashkent addressed popular
grievances with stagnating levels of income, lack of jobs and the lack of opportunities to
participate in public affairs (Freedom House 2003a: 02). Pressurised by these protests,
Karimov’s regime resorted to several strategies that consolidated its position and neutralized
13
GDP contracted negatively from 1991-1997, with average annual GDP growth declining with -1.6% per year
(ICG 2007:21).
14
See Appendix.
15
See Appendix.
37
its opponents. The Andijan uprising in 2005 posed the most significant threat to Karimov’s
rule thus far in Uzbekistan’s post-independence history, when thousand local residents
protested the arrest of popular business by government authorities. In his conduct of economic
and political policies, President Karimov continued to ensure no alternative power base could
develop that has been able to challenge his rule from the administrative apparatus, private
sector as well as civil society. Venues through which alternative voices and ideas could be
staged, such as opposition parties, mosques, international media outlets and NGOs were close
monitored, harassed and/or closed by government authorities. 16 When it comes to foreign
policy, President Karimov tends to switch strategic partnerships between the West, Russia and
China.
Strategy 1: Centralization of power into the executive branch
Power has been increasingly centralized into the executive branch of the presidential republic,
by extending the presidential term from five to seven year through popular referendums and
by violating the constitutional fixed two-term limit. Presidential elections serve to select the
incumbent president, as presidential challengers are mainly functioning to provide the Uzbek
people with an artificial menu of choice. For example, in a popular referendum held in 2002,
the presidential term of President Karimov was extended from five to seven years. President
Karimov’s first term began in 1991 when he won his first presidential election against his
opponent Muhammed Solih, leader from the later banned Erk party (Freedom House 2009a:
03-04). 17 In 1995, with the adaption of a constitutional amendment by parliament, Karimov
secured another first term that would officially expire in 2000. During the presidential
elections of 2000, another five year term was secured, and a popular referendum held in 2002
extended the presidential term from five to seven years. In the presidential elections of 2007,
President Karimov continued his rule despite its violation of the constitution, extending his
rule until the presidential elections of 2014.
Within the highly, centralized political system of Uzbekistan, 12 provincial governments
(veliats), the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan and the city government of Tashkent are
under firm control of the president. ‘The government in Tashkent selects all regional and local
16
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index 2010 ranked Uzbekistan 163rd out of 178 participating states.
See Appendix.
17
Dissatisfied members of the large Birlik party established the Erk Party during the Gorbachev-years,
anticipating the collapse of the Soviet Union and possible change in leadership. After the first presidential
elections in December 1991, both parties were banned by President Karimov (Freedom House 2004a: 03).
38
officials. Residents of provinces, districts, cities, towns, and villages have no voice in the
selection of these officials. Local and regional officials are selected on the basis of their
perceived allegiance to President Karimov and ability to carry out orders from the central
government’ (Freedom House 2009a: 12). The chief executives of the provincial governments
(hokims) are appointed and dismissed by the president as he sees fit. The president controls all
local governing structures through the mechanisms of financial dependence and the
appointment of regional and local governors. This facilitates the process of regular reshuffles
of public officials by President Karimov. The regional governors are important to the
executive branch as they wield significant control over the local economy and regional clans.
The appointment of regional and local officials favours the central chain of command from
Tashkent, as the officials are obliged to comply with fixed quotas of revenues, mainly
extracted from the agricultural sector and the cotton industry. “Uzbekistan’s financial system
is unitary. Veliats and municipalities are responsible for collecting revenues (taxes and other
mandatory payments), but expenditure decisions are made at the national level’ (Freedom
House 2004a: 08). Within these patron-client networks, corruption thrives between the
different layers of government. Policies enforced at the provincial level and within the
autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan must comply with national laws and presidential
decrees. These reflect the top-down nature of the nation-state building process in Uzbekistan.
‘Sharp imbalances in the distribution of power and resources to the advantage of the central
government characterize its relations with its sub-national agencies’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung
2007a: 07). Hence, traditional Mahalla’s or local self-governing units, which are not part of
the political system, are equally controlled by the central government and function as a
vehicle for regime policies. They are used to quell political dissent at the local level and
function as surveillance entities, monitoring religious movements believed to be practicing
outside the boundaries of state-accepted version of Islam, by making use of community
policing and extrajudicial trials.
Despite the fact that Uzbekistan’s Constitution (1992) formally provides for the separation of
powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches, these enshrined principles
have been gravely violated by the executive branch. Between 1991 and 2004, the legislative
body was made up by a unicameral parliament (Oily Majlis) which counted 250 seats, with
members of parliament belonging to official registered political parties. Through a popular
referendum in 2002, an Upper Chamber counting 100 seats was created to check the Lower
Chamber in its functioning and to enhance legitimacy of government policies and presidential
39
decrees. Since the parliamentary elections of 2004, the creation of a bicameral parliamentary
had been formalized. The Lower Chamber had been reduced to 120 seats, while 84 members
of the Upper Chamber were indirectly chosen by regional councils and the remaining 16
members directly appointed by President Karimov. As the regional councils are directly
appointed by the executive branch, President Karimov further enhanced the powers of the
executive branch to the detriment of the legislative body. From 2008 onward, a small change
was made in the composition of the Lower Chamber, which is currently counting 150 seats,
with 16 seats directly reserved for the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan. 18
The judicial branch in Uzbekistan has been a three tiered system including a Constitutional
Court, Supreme Court and Supreme Economic Court, which are subordinated to the Ministry
of Justice. Judges are directly appointed by President Karimov to serve for a five year-term,
and they can equally be dismissed during their tenure. During trials of human right activists,
NGO employees, alleged members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizbut-Tahrir and other non-official religious groups, judges are closely followed by state officials
to prevent the defamation of the judiciary (Freedom House 2006a 16). Executive agencies,
such as the Office of the General Prosecutor engages in ‘telephone justice’, telling the judges
upfront how to rule in high-profile cases (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007a: 07). 19
The centralization of powers into the presidency has been accompanied by a culture of rentseeking elites who are neutralized by the president through the use of patron-client networks.
President Karimov has used wealth generated by the oil-and and gas reserves and the annual
harvest of the cotton industry for the economic benefit of his inner circle. Another method has
been Karimov’s penchant to take over successful businesses run by private citizens. President
Karimov has used his position to benefit his family members, most notably his two daughters
Lola and Golnara. ‘To be viable, significant business ventures in the country must often
partner with one of Karimov’s two daughters’ (Freedom House 2006a: 18). The business
interests of Karimov’s daughters include telecommunications companies, soft-drink contracts,
and involvement in the energy industry. Hence, Karimov’s daughters have high-profile
ownership of elite restaurants and clubs throughout the country. ‘Companies that compete
with those owned by the Karimov’s confront the power of state authority…businesses that
18
This movement was installed due to the ongoing ecological disaster in Karakalpakstan and the shrinking Aral
Sea as a result of poor water management in the region, particularly in the upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007a: 16).
19
During the Soviet-era, this practice was called telefonoe pravo (Freedom House 2006a: 16).
40
simply do well, such as restaurants, are often closed by the state authorities or are forced to
sell to one of the Karimovs for a minimal price’ (Freedom House 2006a: 18).
At all government levels public officials profit from their public responsibilities as
gatekeepers. Ordinary people experience daily difficulties with obtaining elementary services
without paying bribes (Freedom House 2005a: 21). Revenues extracted from corruptive
practices are used to maintain elaborate networks of loyalties, and as long as this practice is
sustainable, it seems to stabilize President Karimov’s rule over Uzbekistan. ‘Clientelism is the
main mechanism of this ‘network’-based political system…the president has created patronclient networks designed as ‘we-groups’ largely to ensure his control of the competition over
resources’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007a: 09). Although different groups competing for
resources carry the names of their original regions, such as Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent,
and Fergana, co-opted clans and groups are increasingly formed around state resources
available to them as part of the presidential strategy of consolidating power (Bertelsmann
Stiftung 2007a: 09). ‘The extensive regulatory state, the urgent and constant need of
individuals to be in compliance, a poorly paid civil service and the rarity of bribery
investigations all collude to make corruption rampant in Uzbekistan’ (Freedom House 2006a:
17).
Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena
Laws ruling on parliamentary elections have been amended and manipulated by the executive
branch several times in 1997 and 1999 (Freedom House 2004a: 03). The parliamentary
elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009 have all been qualified as seriously flawed according to the
international election-monitoring standards by the Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODHIR), which is part of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). 20 The Central Electoral Commission (CEC), with the chairman of the 14member board directly appointed by the President, ensures the prerogative of participation is
confined to only a limited set of pro-presidential parties, which are inseparable from the state,
reflecting the workings of dominant-power politics within authoritarian regimes. This has
been accomplished through the mechanisms of high requirements of official registration and
full control of the CEC over the nomination process of eligible candidates to run for
Parliament. In the latest parliamentary elections of 2009, only four official registered parties
20
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan (Last viewed on 25 May 2011).
41
were allowed to participate. The Liberal Democratic Party (or ‘Party of Bankers’), the Peoples
Democratic Party (former Communist Party), the Adolat Social Democratic Party and Mili
Tiklanish all delivered presidential approved representatives to the Lower House of
parliament. The Birlik and Erk Party, that were created during the Gorbachev-years of
perestroika and who challenged Islam Karimov in the first presidential elections of 1990,
have been denied registration ever since, along with the Free Farmers and Party of Agrarians
and Entrepreneurs. Another challenge to Karimov’s rule came when several opposition parties
united under the banner of the Sunshine Coalition in late 2004, led by Sanjar Umarov. The
coalition was a response to the highly restricted electoral arena and President Karimov’s
heavy-handed suppression of the domestic realm. Not surprisingly, this coalition has been
denied official registration by the central government.
Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media
In order to prevent domestic opposition against President Karimov and his government
several measures were in place which continued to target political opposition parties, Islamic
movements, human rights defenders, international NGOs and (international) media outlets.
Within two decades, opponents of President Karimov were increasingly linked to Islamic
radical groups and prosecuted on the grounds of posing a serious threat to the constitutional
order of Uzbekistan (Freedom House 2003a: 02). Several events have provided Karimov with
a pretext to strengthen the National Security Service (successor of KGB) and the Ministry of
Interior (police forces) in order to intensify the impact of government responses to crush
dissidence. In 1999, terrorist attacks directed against Karimov’s rule nearly killed the
president in the capital city of Tashkent. In the aftermath of the attacks, more than 7000
people were arrested on the grounds of alleged participation. In the April and June of 2004, a
string of suicide bombings in the cities of Bukhara and Tashkent led to the arrest of 169
people. In a response to the Andijan popular uprising in 2005, President Karimov launched a
campaign to rid the country of alien ideologies, which has been partly influenced by the
coloured revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005).
The Andijan popular uprising in 2005 posed the most significant challenge to President
Karimov’s rule since independence. Leading up to these protests were the arrest of 23
successful and popular businessmen by government authorities in the Ferghana Valley. The
businessmen openly embraced Islam and conducted their business affairs in accordance with
their religious beliefs. All businessmen were officially arrested on the grounds for alleged
42
membership of a group called Akromia. The arrests led to unprecedented protests in the
modern history of Uzbekistan, which involved an estimated thousand local residents outside
the courthouse and the Andijan prison where the Akromia defendants were detained by Uzbek
authorities. The official government view explained the events as a response by the Uzbek
military to armed men that stormed the prison. Various informal sources of witnesses reported
that they were awaited on May 13, 2005 by Uzbek military forces who shot indiscriminately
into the crowds. After the terrorist attacks of 2004 and the Andijan revolt in 2005, the Uzbek
National Security Service stepped up its surveillance of religious communities. ‘During the
governments fight against terrorism and radical Islam, police and National Security Service
(NSS) forces arrested and tortured thousands of nonviolent Muslims’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung
2007a: 08).
Independent activities employed by NGOs have been made virtually impossible in
Uzbekistan’s circumscribed civil society. Although policies were already highly repressive,
this trend intensified after the Rose Revolution (2003) in Georgia. International financed
NGOs promoting democracy, civil rights and political reforms played a crucial role in the
overthrow of president Eduard Shevardnadze and the installation of Georgia’s new president
Mikhail Saakashvili (Freedom House 2005a: 10). Already in 2003, President Karimov had
suppressed the activities of NGOs that do not receive funding from the government,
particularly targeting international financed NGOs that promoted civil rights and political
reforms. ‘Civil society has been subjected to considerable pressure from the authorities, who
regard NGOs as “subversive organizations” and an instrument used by the West to encourage
“color” revolutions’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007a: 16). Since 2005, the regime has undertaken
extensive efforts to transform registered NGOs into so-called Government Organized NGOs
(GoNGOs), with the vast majority compelled to join the National Association of NGOs. Only
members of this association are able to participate in the political process of Uzbekistan,
albeit as ‘puppets’ and with its activities firmly controlled by the government.
Independent media outlets were equally repressed during the early 1990s, and repressive
policies intensified after the Andijan uprising in 2005. Although official statistics counted 93
non-governmental media, 34 cable TV providers, 4 news agencies, 597 newspapers and 145
magazines published and operating in the country in 2008, ‘there are lists of forbidden topics,
words and visual materials for all forms of media, the obvious targets being private initiative
and freedom of thought (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007a: 07). Partly to reduce critical voices in
43
its handling of the Andijan events of 2005, President Karimov closed down foreign
broadcasting companies such as the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Radio Ozodlik (Freedom
House 2009a: 02). The Karimov regime has declared Uzbekistan as ‘an enemy of the
internet’, regularly blocking sites critical of the government. Independent journalists have
been increasingly prosecuted, predominantly on charges of libel against government officials
or President Karimov and his administration (Freedom House 2005a: 14-15). In 2007,
independent journalist Alisher Saipov was murdered in Kyrgyzstan, a correspondent well
known for her criticism of Karimov’s regime. President Karimov fiercely denied any
involvement of his administration in this event (Freedom House 2008a: 633).
Strategy 4: Foreign policy
Foreign policy has been mainly tailored to the situation confronting President Karimov.
Between the period 1991-2004, Karimov sought to reduce direct economic dependence on
Russia, and its foreign policy turned Westward for security reasons (Freedom House 2007a:
652). Under the umbrella of the US-led War on Terrorism in 2001, Karimov allowed the
United States and Germany to station troops in Uzbekistan ‘in hopes of gaining international
recognition and financial support’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007a: 03). The coloured revolutions
in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and eventually Kyrgyzstan (2005) introduced a shift in the
orientation of Karimov’s foreign policy, seeking rapprochement through political and military
alliances with the Russian Federation and China. Uzbekistan became a member of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and a signature country of the Russian-dominated
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Following the popular uprising in Andijan in May 2005, Uzbekistan moved further away from
the West, as the international community increasingly condemned the oppressive domestic
policies of President Karimov and urged the country to return to the path of political and
economic reform. This shift in strategic partnerships occurred when Karimov’s refusal of an
international investigation into bloody suppression of the Andijan uprising in 2005 led to
sanctions imposed upon the country by the US and the EU. In a response, the US was
expelled from its military base in the country and Asian economies were granted privileged
access to Uzbekistan’s cotton industries and British and US companies were banished from
the local market (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007a: 02). Since 2008, the US has been granted
rights again to use a military base in its efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, which is essential to
regime stability in Uzbekistan. The West sought to restore ties with Uzbekistan after militants
44
targeted vital supply routes located inside Pakistan that support NATO operations in
Afghanistan (Freedom House 2010a: 570).
Under President Karimov, Uzbekistan has had a strained relationship with its regional
partners. President Karimov’s policies showed no commitment to ensuring political and
economic stability in the region, despite Uzbekistan’s participation in various organizations.
Its foreign policy serves to further consolidate the position of President Karimov, although
tensions over trans-boundary water resources, unresolved border conflicts, and transnational
problems such as drugs-trafficking and radical Islamic movements (finding their origins
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) pose a considerable threat to Uzbekistan’s stability and
security. Uzbekistan continues to have border disputes with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, which are posing a significant challenge on developing stable
relationships (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007a: 21). To contain Islamic insurrections in
Uzbekistan, President Karimov mined the border with Tajikistan and no air connection
between Tashkent and Dushanbe has been established until today. Uzbekistan has also
regularly criticized Kyrgyz authorities for a lack of control and willingness to combat the
presence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) on its territory, further adding to
already restrained relationships over water resources. Further, the large ethnic Uzbek
communities residing in the south of Kyrgyzstan are excluded from their homeland. This
became clear when President Karimov quickly ordered the expatriation of Uzbek refugees
back to Kyrgyzstan after ethnic conflicts in 2010 ended, suspicious of support among this
community for Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU.
4.3.2 Republic of Kazakhstan
The creation of a strong economy and the preservation of social stability were part of the
nation-state building process from the very beginning. President Nazarbayev proclaimed both
objectives as critical preconditions for undertaking necessary political reforms and
democratization in the long term (Freedom House 2005b: 01). Similar trends in Kazakhstan’s
regime-trajectory are to be found within the rest of Central Asia. However, its spiralling
economic growth due to its vast natural resources and particularly rising oil exports, and its
dynamic financial and banking sector, made the country more prosperous than the other states
in the region (Freedom House 2005b: 04). Although the country faced steep economic decline
in the early 1990s, it achieved economic growth already in 1996 due to mass privatization and
the sell-off of large enterprises in the oil, gas, electricity and metals sectors in the mid45
1990s. 21 From 2002-2006, Kazakhstan’s average annual GDP growth was around the 9.8%,
due to the steady increase in oil production, a surge in oil prices and large volumes of foreign
direct investment (FDI) made Kazakhstan the economic leader of Central Asia (ICG 2007:
21). According to the UNDP Human Development Index 2010 Kazakhstan ranked 66 out of
183 participating countries, leaving President Nazarbayev in control of the most developed
Central Asian country on the combined dimensions of health, education and income. 22 After
the credit crunch of 2008, annual GDP growth slowed down to an average 5.4% per year, with
resources from the National Oil Fund stabilizing the economy and the ailing banking system
(Freedom House 2009b: 252). Kazakhstan ranked 59th out of 183 countries on the Ease of
Doing Business Index 2010, with only Kyrgyzstan enjoining a higher score on this index in
the Central Asian region. 23
By building a strong and personalized presidential regime, President Nazarbayev has been
able to consolidate his rule and has prevented an independent power base from developing.
Nazarbayev’s inner circle of family members exerts formal and informal influence over vital
economic resources and political positions (Freedom House 2005b: 01). The second group
faring well with the monopolization of economic resources is a limited stratum of government
officials, technocrats and entrepreneurs (Freedom House 2009b: 253). Powerful financial
groups fully control the parliament, the top political offices, independent, pro-regime mediaoutlets and act in accordance with regime interests. Through extensive patron-client networks,
underpinning neopatrimonial rule in Kazakhstan, political opponents, regime critics, business
rivals and opposition media outlets are silenced through coercion, cooptation and
criminalization, with revenues generated by its natural resources supplying for a strong
security forces (ICG 2007: 03-04). According to TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2010,
Kazakhstan is ranked 105th among 178 states, making it the least corrupt state in Central Asia,
although corruption is believed to be widespread in the overall administrative apparatus. 24
In the course of two decades, President Nazarbayev succeeded to neutralize the initial
challenges confronting his nation-state building process, and to consolidate his regime in the
domestic, regional and international realm. By embarking upon a combination of relatively
21
Kazakhstan’s average annual GDP growth contracted negatively from 1991-1996, and noted -6.3% throughout
the first five years of independence (ICG 2007: 21).
22
See Appendix.
23
See Appendix.
24
See Appendix.
46
liberalized economic and repressive political policies since the early 1990s, President
Nazarbayev and his regime made sure no alternative power base could develop. Kazakhstan
has most successfully addressed the initial challenges, and formulated political strategies to
achieve regime stability did not conflict with these boundaries. However, Kazakhstan is
marked by some elite contestation at the top level, as large financial holdings are competing
for presidential favours. Thus far, President Nazarbayev succeeded in balancing all financial
mega holdings, through the continuing distribution of political and economic spoils. These
mega holdings assert a repressive influence over civil society and are in control of most media
outlets, restricting the media market to pro-presidential news coverage and as a contributor to
the personality cult surrounding Nursultan Nazarbayev. NGOs have been largely co-opted by
state structures, and increasing harassment of human rights activists, independent journalists
and closure of opposition media outlets have taken place from 2001-2009. 25 Foreign policy is
characterized by its multi-vector principles, binding the interests of foreign actors into
Kazakhstan’s natural resources while simultaneously avoiding dependency on one of the
involved foreign actors in the region.
Strategy 1: Centralization of power into the executive branch
President Nazarbayev has increasingly centralized power in the executive branch, to the
detriment of the legislative and judicial branches. The adaption of a new Constitution in 1995
gave unchecked powers to the presidency, with subsequent amendments conferring special
rights on the “first president”, which have been used to remove term limits and to offer
Nazarbayev and his inner circle immunity from prosecution. The presidential elections held in
1999, 2005, and 2011 have all failed to meet international standards on holding ‘free and fair’
elections. 26 Nazarbayev extended his term of office by procuring another seven year-term in
the presidential elections of 2005 (Freedom House 2006b: 01). Kazakhstan’s military and
national security service are firmly controlled by the president, who also nominates the head
and key members of the National Security Service (Freedom House 2007b: 312). Its extensive
security apparatus have been financed from the revenues generated by its natural resources
(ICG 2007: 04). Within the unitary and centralized administration, the president fully controls
the appointment of administrative heads (akims) of regions (oblast) and districts (raions).
These officials directly owe their position to the president, making them stakeholders in
25
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index 2010 ranked Kazakhstan 162nd out of 178 participating
countries, leaving only the highly repressive regimes of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan behind. See Appendix.
26
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan (Last viewed on 25 May 2011).
47
Nazarbayev’s regime. In order to prevent the development of an independent power base,
these officials are continuously rotated in the same manner as in Uzbekistan. Further, regions
within Kazakhstan are officially responsible for providing social services, such as education,
local law enforcement, and medical assistance (Freedom House 2010b: 264). Regions are not
allowed to keep their budget surpluses, which are redistributed to needier areas within
Kazakhstan. Only the akims of the two oil-rich regions of Almaty and Astana exert more
influence over budgetary matters, as they extract revenues from foreign investors in order to
finance several ‘social and financial welfare projects’. However, even these arrangements are
concluded on the base of informally negotiated revenue-sharing rates with the central
government (Freedom House 2010b: 265). Local authorities (maslihats) have no budgetary
autonomy, and are required to transfer large parts of their revenues to higher authorities
(Freedom House 2010b: 264).
Parliament (Mazhilis) has been captured by powerful, regime-connected financial interest
groups. The Lower House (Mazhilis) counts 67 seats, and is fully controlled by the Nur Otan
party, which provides for a political platform where the country’s business and financial elites
are represented. Nine members of the Lower House are directly appointed by the President,
and represent the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan (Freedom House 2009b: 254). This
body has been instituted to represent ethnic minorities within the unitary state of Kazakhstan.
The Upper House or Senate consists of 39 deputies, with seven directly appointed by the
president and 32 members selected through indirect election procedures. The assemblies of 14
regions, the capital city of Astana and the former capital Almaty all select two senators, with
the other 15 senators directly appointed by president Nazarbayev.
The judiciary branch has been subordinated to regime interests, and acts in accordance with
presidential decrees. President Nazarbayev holds the constitutional right to propose nominees
for the Supreme Court, who need to be approved by the Senate. These presidential nominees
are recommended by the Supreme Judicial Council, which comprises the chair of the
Constitutional Court, the chair of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor general, the minister of
justice, senators, judges and others appointed by the President. ‘The president may remove
judges, except for members of the Supreme Court, on the recommendation of the minister of
justice’ (Freedom House 2008b: 18). Three quarters of the judges are state employed and
highly corrupt, reinforcing the political interests of the regime in courts (Bertelsmann Stiftung
2007b: 07)
48
The centralization of powers in the executive branch has been financed by revenues generated
from Kazakhstan’s vast oil-and natural gas reserves (ICG 2007: 03-04). By pursuing marketreforming policies, the president had to deal with several financial holdings controlled by his
inner circle of family members and key supportive elites. In 2004, ten financial groupings or
‘mega holdings’ were controlled by Nazerbayev’s inner circle, including his two daughters,
son-in-laws and top public officials. These mega holdings control key economic assets, media
outlets, and are represented by the Nur Otan party in parliament, which controls all seats in
Parliament (Freedom House 2009b: 254). The president’s eldest daughter, Dariga
Nazarbayeva, headed the state news agency Khabar from 1996 to 2003 and was part of the
influential Nazarbayeva-Aliev group, which controlled almost all of the Kazakh media
outlets. However, Rakhat Aliev, the President’s son-in-law who was married to his eldest
daughter, became increasingly critical of President Nazarbayev and fell out of grace with the
president in 2007, being charged ‘with forming an “organized criminal group”, engaged in
money laundering, extortion, and kidnapping’ (Freedom House 2008b: 05). In his position as
ambassador to Austria and residing in that country at the time, Kazakhstani courts tried Aliev
in absentia and sentenced him to twenty years in prison. Nazarbayev’s other son-in law and
head of one of the largest financial holdings in Kazakhstan, Timur Kulibayev, currently serves
as chairman of Kazmunaigaz, the state railway company Kazahstan Temir Zholy, energy
company Samruk Energo, and finally as deputy chairman of the Samruk-Kazyna National
Welfare Fund (Freedom House 2010b: 256). 27
Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena
In a similar fashion like Islam Karimov, President Nazarbayev manipulated electoral and
parliamentary laws to strengthen pro-presidential parties. Parliamentary elections were held
on 10 and 24 October 1999, 19 September and 3 October 2004, and finally on 18 August
2007. 28 The chairman and two members of the seven-member board of the Central Election
Commission are appointed by the President (Freedom House 2009b; 2010b). Nur Otan has
become the largest and only pro-regime party controlling all seats in the Lower House of
Parliament since the latest parliamentary elections of 2007. The party merged with Assar
(founded by the president’s eldest daughter Dariga Nazarbayev), the Civil Party of
Kazakhstan and the Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan, in order to further consolidate a stable,
political party system (Freedom House 2008b: 05). Due to an insurmountable seven percent
27
28
Timur Kulibaev is married to Dinara Nazarbaeva, the youngest daughter of President Nazarbayev.
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan (Last viewed on 25 May 2011).
49
threshold, the six parties who contested the elections failed to win any seat in Parliament.
These parties were Ak Zhol, Aul (Nomadic Migratory Camp), the Democratic Party of
Kazakhstan, the Party of Patriots, Rukhaniyet (Spirituality) and the Social Democratic Party
(Freedom House 2008b:07).
Although officials claim that a one-party system is conducive to providing stability and
democratization, the Lower House has passed a bill that at least two parties must be
represented in Parliament (Mazhilis), irrespective of the seven percent threshold (Freedom
House 2009b: 256). “He has embraced a purely formal democratic agenda by holding regular
elections (none has been recognized as “free and fair” or meeting international standards) and
erecting a multiparty system composed of loyal, pro-regime parties” (Freedom House 2006b:
01). Although Nur Otan has won all seats in the latest parliamentary elections of 2007, one
seat in parliament has been reserved for an opposition party, as is required by law. However,
by developing dominant-power politics to underpin President Nazarbayev’s rule over
Kazakhstan, the electoral arena has become increasingly intolerant to other opposition parties.
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (banned in 2005 as extremist), its successor Alga
Kazakhstan (Forward Kazakhstan) and Nagyz Ak Zhol are among those opposition parties to
be continuously targeted by the government, as they include prominent opposition figures that
could pose a challenge to the political legitimacy of Nazarbayev. ‘Amendments to laws on
election, right to public assembly, and controlling “extremism”, have imposed severe limits
on the ability of non-regime candidates or parties to campaign’ (Freedom House 2006b: 02).
Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media
The Ministries of Justice and Interior, together with the National Security Service (NSS), have
intensified monitoring ethnic groups, religious congregations, the opposition, independent
NGOs and civil rights advocacy. Nazarbayev’s regime has been eager to prevent any
alternative power base from developing that could challenge his rule and the accumulated
wealth of his inner circle. In February 2005, a new law on extremism was passed. This law
has been further complemented by strict anti-terror legislation, specifically targeting
‘extremist and terrorist activities’ and financial support for terrorist organizations
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007b: 08). Although the threat of Islamist radicalism poses a marginal
challenge to President Nazarbayev, it has been manipulated after several terrorist Kazakh
suspects had been arrested in the south who were allegedly involved in the terrorist attacks
that shocked Uzbekistan in 1999 and during the year 2004. By issuing a presidential decree in
50
2006, President Nazarbayev placed twenty minority religious groups on the list of ‘nontraditional’ and categorized them as ‘sects’. Among others, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hare
Krishna devotees and non-registered Islamic movements falling outside the state-accepted
version were blamed for bringing subversive elements and extremism to Kazakhstan.
Reportedly, raids on religious institutions, fines for failing to acquire registration, the
expulsion of foreign missionaries, seizure of assets and obstacles to the distribution of
religious literature were among the most used tactics by Nazarbayev’s administration
(Freedom House 2010b: 260-261). This legislation also included further restrictions on
political parties, media outlets, and religious organizations. Partly explaining these
developments have been the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) and the Tulip Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan (2005), which resulted in a change of political leadership, fuelled by a vibrant
civil society, independent media outlets and relatively well organized opposition parties.
The oil-based prosperity has been used by the regime to create an inhospitable legal and
political environment for civil society groups, opposition parties and ordinary citizens
advocating democratization and political reforms (Freedom House 2006b: 10-13). By
wielding its economic power, employing mechanisms of political control and seizing upon its
electoral mandate, the regime has forced NGOs to cooperate with the state. Financial aid is
increased for those NGOs participating in social and infrastructural development through the
distribution of social contracts and procurements. Increasing efforts are made to disburse aid
to government-controlled NGOs that support governmental policies (Freedom House 2007b:
307). ‘NGOs engaged in advocacy for civil rights and political reforms remain dependent on
foreign donors and find their activities under continuing surveillance through financial audits
and other forms of political control’ (Freedom House 2007b: 307). Hence, the vast majority of
the 4000 registered NGOs in 2008 remain inactive, and less than 10 per cent of these NGOs
are engaged in the protection and promotion of civil liberties, human rights and minority
protection. After the passing of the controversial law in 2005 to control extremist and terrorist
activities, NGOs acting independently from the state have become virtually non-existent
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007b: 08-09).
The privately-owned but pro-government media outlets have worked actively to promote
President Nazarbayev and his achievements on economic growth and democratic policies.
These media outlets are affiliated with key members of the regime and the Nur Otan party,
and are controlled by politically entrenched large financial groupings loyal to the President
51
(Freedom House 2010b: 261). Although some debate is allowed on social economic issues,
the president and his inner circle remain completely above judicial scrutiny, with a pliant
judiciary fully protecting senior government officials, unless they fall out of personal favour
with the President. The criminalization of independent media-outlets through libel suits
prevents the dissemination of alternative views and information to reach the Kazakh people.
Opposition media face continuing charges on the grounds of violating Article 318 of the
Criminal Code which protects “the honor and dignity of the president” (Freedom House
2010b: 262).
In 2009, two critical weeklies, Respublika and Taszhargan, were forced to close after losing a
libel-suit which was instigated by the government. With a pliant judiciary demanding the
payment of exorbitant fines, the government ensured that no more investigative and critical
articles would be written by these two independent weeklies (Freedom 2010b: 262). In
December 2010, Gennady Pavluk, a prominent Kyrgyz opposition journalist, was pushed
from a sixth-floor window in the former Kazakh capital Almaty, allegedly by Kyrgyz security
forces. As a further indication of a highly restrictive media environment, the Kazakh
government never demanded an official investigation from the Kyrgyz government (Freedom
House 2010b: 262). Access to the internet is also tightly controlled by Nazarbayev, while
opposition websites continue to be blocked and limits are imposed on registration of Internet
domain names (Freedom House 2007b: 307). The state-owned Kazakhtelecom and its
subsidiaries own a near monopoly on the country’s internet services, and have acted in
accordance with instructions from President Nazarbayev and his security forces (Freedom
House 2010b: 263).
Strategy 4: Foreign policy
The foreign policy of Kazakhstan is known as multi-vectored, seeking stable relationships
with the West, Russia and China. No strong ideological content is to be found in its foreign
policy directions. Kazakhstan has combined a more European-oriented foreign policy and
intensified strategic relationships with Russia and China. Partly informed by the high levels of
economic growth and liberal economic policies the country earned the rotating chair of the
OSCE in 2010. This happened despite a poor record on the observance of human rights and
the country’s failure in holding ‘free and fair’ presidential and parliamentary elections that are
in compliance with international standards. During Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE,
52
promoting security and stability among the 56 participating states were the central themes,
pushing civil liberties and human rights to a second place. 29
The ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy is motivated first of all by geopolitical motivations, as
Kazakhstan is a landlocked country, which complicates access of its oil- and natural gas
reserves to world markets. Due to its vast oil-and natural gas reserves, good relationships with
the Russian Federation and its neighbours are of vital importance, as President Nazarbayev
needs the revenues to pay for his highly centralized government and extensive security
apparatus. As already noticed, the Russian Federation controls nearly all pipelines from
Central Asia to the West, which makes it an inevitable partner in all energy deals in the
region. Second, its foreign policy is informed by the republic’s need to secure alternative oil
pipeline routes, as Russia’s Gazprom has been the dominant exploiter of oil- and gas pipelines
in the region since 1991. This reality has led Nazarbayev to improve bilateral ties with China.
In 2004, Kazakhstan and China agreed on the construction of an oil-pipeline running from the
Karagandy region in Kazakhstan to Alashankou in China (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007b: 18).
Despite such efforts, President Nazarbayev continues to emphasize its solid relationship with
Russia, by stating in 2007 that ‘Kazakhstan is absolutely committed to shipping most of its
oil, if not all of it through Russian territory’ (ICG 2007: 12). The third reason for conducting a
more neutral foreign policy is the presence of the US, the Russian Federation and China in the
region. President Nazarbayev is interested in binding interests of these foreign actors into
Central Asia, complemented by Kazakhstan’s efforts to improve ties with neighbouring states
in order to enhance security and stability. The overarching aim of its foreign policy is to avoid
becoming dependent on the West, Russia or China. ‘To date, Kazakhstan has succeeded in
conducting a safe multi-vector foreign policy that has managed to avoid intensifying
geopolitical collisions between the United States, China, and Russia and their allies
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007b: 18).
29
The commitment to security and stability was incorporated in the ‘Astana Commemorative Declaration
Towards a Security Community’, adopted on 3 December 2010 by the OSCE. See literature list.
53
4.3.3 The Kyrgyz Republic (1990-2010)
Kyrgyzstan has been the only Central Asian republic that experienced a so-called ‘coloured
revolution’ in 2005, and experienced twice the change of leadership as a result of popular
protests in March 2005 and April 2010. Kyrgyzstan has faced continuous internal turmoil
since independence, as the divisive clan-based and tribal loyalties between the northern and
southern provinces and the presence of a large group of ethnic Uzbeks in the south have
strained the political leadership in achieving regime stability. This had severe consequences
for Kyrgyz overall development after two decades of independence, with the UNDP Human
Development Index 2010 ranking the Kyrgyz Republic 109th out of 169 participating
countries, indicating its bad performance on the areas of health, education and income
developments. 30
On the contrary to their colleagues in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, both presidents Akayev
and Bakiyev failed to neutralize clan-based and tribal loyalties and the divisive split between
the northern and southern regions. Hence, they failed to deliver a peaceful resolution to
reoccurring ethnic tensions between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south, most notably in
the Kyrgyz part of the densely populated Fergana valley. Moreover, the strong divide led to
regionalism in the political arena, with the distribution of political and economic resources
either in favour of the northern clans (President Akayev 1990-2005) or the southern clans
(President Bakayev 2005-2010). According to TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2010,
Kyrgyzstan ranked 164th out of 178 countries, indicating pervasive corruption has taken hold
of the state’s administrative apparatus and economic sectors after two failed presidencies. 31
Kyrgyzstan under President Akayev (1990-2005)
The post-Soviet history of Kyrgyzstan is marked by an initial period of democratic progress
during the early 1990s and an authoritarian backlash from the year 2000 onwards. The first
president of the former Soviet Republic, Askar Akayev, started the nation-state building
process by attracting international support for economic reforms and by starting a political
transformation towards a more democratic state. This created different starting conditions
than elsewhere in Central Asia. The international community had been eager to provide the
30
Only Tajikistan performed worse than Kyrgyzstan on this index, a country that still suffers from the aftermath
of a civil war between 1992 and 1997. See Appendix
31
See Appendix.
54
small country with financial support, as President Akayev was a former intellectual and was
heralded as a champion of democracy in the West (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007c: 03). During
the Soviet-era, the small republic had already been dependent on Moscow to subsidize its
budgets, and its level of economic development in the early years of independence has been
half the value since 1989, due to the break up of Soviet trade patterns and production chains
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c:16). A relatively vibrant civil society and numerous
independent media outlets were able to develop in the first decade of independence, which
provided for an alternative powerbase, especially when President Akayev began employing
the same strategies to consolidate power in the late 1990s as his counterparts in Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan. The rapid implementation of rapid market-reforms the Kyrgyz Republic
acquired membership of the World Trade Organization on 20 December 1998, due to its
embracement of policy prescriptions of international financial institutions. 32 This included
privatization of small and medium-seized businesses, relinquishment of exchange rate
controls and the achievement of the convertibility of the Kyrgyz som (Bertelsmann Stiftung
2007c: 04). 33
In the early years of independence, civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, freedom of religion and conscience, were upheld and led to relatively more vibrant
civil society and competitive electoral arena than in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. There were
three main causes that underpinned Kyrgyzstan’s relatively vibrant civil society: political
liberalization in the early years of independence, extensive support from the international
community in financial terms and through foreign sponsored NGOs, and finally the selfreliance of the population as the quality of state institutions and the social welfare system
rapidly decreased (Freedom House 2003c: 06). During the mid-1990s, following regional
trends in the creation of centralized, unitary states and strong presidencies, President Akayev
excluded the legislative body as a partner in the nation-state building process, with the
seriously flawed parliamentary and presidential elections of 2000 as a final blow to the
country’s reputation as an “island of democracy” in the Central Asian region (Freedom House
2003c: 01). However, by increasingly restricting political and economic spoils to his inner
circle, President Akayev failed to balance northern and southern clans, and extensive media
32
The Kyrgyz Republic is still the only Central Asian state that is full member of the WTO. Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan both have observer status within the international body. (www.wto.org, last viewed on 15 June
2011)
33
The World Bank Group Ease of Doing Business Index 2010 ranked The Kyrgyz Republic 44th out of 183
countries, which has been the highest score for any Central Asian country. See Appendix.
55
coverage on corruption in his administration and the manipulation of presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005 led to widespread popular protests in the capital city
of Bishkek, which eventually ousted the first president from power during the Tulip
Revolution of 2005.
Strategy 1: Centralization of power into the executive branch
Similar to the adopted Constitutions in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the drafted Constitution
of Kyrgyzstan (1993) enshrined democratic principles, including the formal separation of
powers. In contrary to the regime trajectories under the leadership of his colleagues Islam
Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbayev, President Akayev embarked upon more Westernoriented policies, partly explained by the country’s dependency on international financial
support to start the nation-state building process and a lack of natural resources to generate
revenues to support economic development. Already in 1994, the Soviet-era Parliament
(Jogorku Kenesh) and the president disagreed on the distribution of power between the two
institutions, with the former purposely constraining President Akayev in the implementation
of reforming policies. Deputies in Parliament demanded the transfer of power from the
presidency into the position of the prime minister, while President Akayev counteracted these
proposals by winning a presidential confidence referendum in 1994. After deputies of
Parliament continued to oppose reform proposals and refused to attend parliamentary
sessions, Parliament was dissolved and subsequently referendums held in 1994, 1996, 1998
and 2003 changed more than half of the original Constitution and transferred most powers
into the presidency. ‘The system of checks and balances among the branches of power was
drastically altered…the Kyrgyz government became a clearly presidential state with a weak
legislative branch and a subservient judiciary’ (Freedom House 2007c: 05).
The parliamentary elections of 1995 and 2000 resulted in a Parliament much more compliant
and supportive of President Akayev’s policies than the Soviet-era parliament during the early
1990s. The formal state structures have been permeated by informal patronage networks
similar to the situation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The proper functioning of the
administrative apparatus in Kyrgyzstan had been constrained by low funding, corruption and
subversion of formal institutions by informal patronage networks at all levels of government
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 10). Regional governors were regularly reshuffled by
President Akayev, especially before parliamentary and presidential elections. Contrary to the
controlled governance structures in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Presdient Akayev introduced
56
a system of local government in 2000 that granted local governments more political and
financial independence. Due to a lack of proper communications infrastructures connecting
the centre with the regions throughout the mountainous landscape, local government officials
were most concerned with issues that immediately affected their constituencies. However,
political life at the local and village level remained completely dominated by governmentappointed local administrators, who on their base of clan ties not only showed their loyalty to
President Akayev, but were also able to mobilize support among Kyrgyz voters.
The legislative body had been reduced from the Soviet-era Parliament of 350 seats to a
bicameral parliament of 105-seats in 1994. This move had been primarily informed by the
experience of dealing with an obstructive parliament of the early 1990s which posed a
challenge on President Akayev’s rule. In contrary to the servitude of the legislative bodies in
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, parliament in Kyrgyzstan continued to challenge the presidency
by claiming the constitutional right to control the nomination process of ministers. Clearly
this was done in an effort to curb presidential patronage power which alienated southern clans
from the political process. It also held investigations into the government’s use of security
forces to spy on members of parliament (Freedom House 2005c: 02). Partly in response to
these political developments, and partly anticipating the parliamentary and presidential
elections in March and October 2005, President Akayev further reduced the size of parliament
to 75 seats, ‘thus in less in than 15 years of independence, the citizens of Kyrgyzstan have
seen the size of their national legislature shrink from its original 350 members to 105 and now
to 75’ (Freedom House 2005c: 10).
The judicial branch has been separated into the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and
the Higher Arbitration Court since the early 1990s. President Akayev could directly influence
judges and procurators through the constitutional right to appoint and dismiss the procuratorgeneral, procurators at the regional level, the procurator of the city of Bishkek and the military
procurator. President Akayev used the judiciary primarily to silence government critics, which
intensified from the late 1990s onwards. ‘Opposition politicians, journalists, and newspapers
were often fined, jailed or shut down (Freedom House 2006c: 15).
In tandem with his colleagues in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, President Akayev relied on a
smaller circle of trustees who proved loyal to his rule. ‘Increasingly positions of political
authority and economic power came under the control of the president’s “family”, a
57
euphemism for the narrow elite affiliated with Akayev either through kinship or personal
loyalty’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007c: 03). In the first decade of the nation-state building
process, President Akayev had been relatively successful in cutting deals and mobilizing
support from both northern and southern clans, whereas the opposition had been unable to
gather support outside the capital city of Bishkek (Freedom House 2003c: 02) Concessions
made during the 1990s by the central government to southern clans included the political and
economic distribution of respectively government positions and regional subsidies. However,
due to opposition media coverage it became clear that Akayev’s family was monopolizing on
political power, creating a ‘mega-clan’, with representatives from southern provinces
increasingly excluded from political offices in Bishkek (Bond & Koch 2010: 538). Losing his
ability to strike a vital balance between the north and the south, President Akayev opened the
door to the Tulip Revolution of 2005. At the same time, the central government failed to
deliver on the promises of its economic reform policies, ‘plunging the country into deep
economic recession and the majority of the population into poverty, as major interest groups
and political clans snatched up the fruits of the privatization process’(Freedom House 2004c:
02).
Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena
Similar to his counterparts in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, President Akayev has constrained
opposition parties in their participation of parliamentary elections, in order to secure a
majority that approves of presidential decrees. Akayev’s government changed election laws
prior to all parliamentary elections (1995, 2000, 2005) which created additional difficulties
for
opposition
parties
to
participate
and
to
make
proper
preparations
(Freedom House 2003c: 03-05). 34 None of the presidential and parliamentary elections held
during Akayev’s tenure had been judged as ‘free and fair’ since 1991, falling short of
international standards despite the more liberalized policies pursued in the early 1990s. The
electoral arena under President’s Akayev had been more characterized by feckless pluralism.
Multiple political parties were allowed to compete for parliamentary seats, but electoral and
parliamentary laws were tilted in favour of the Akayev regime.
During Akayev’s tenure a multiparty system was built, without real significant limitations on
political parties. This changed gradually in the latter part of the 1990s, when political power
34
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan (Last viewed on 25 May 2011).
58
became more concentrated in the executive branch. Regional and local administrations that
operated in the orbit of President Akayev were in a better position to influence and control the
nomination process, as the majority of the voters lived in rural areas or were employed by
influential state-controlled enterprises. Hence, this ensured that pro-presidential parties and
independent candidates supportive of President Akayev would obtain a majority in the
Parliament. In comparison to the highly restricted political arena in Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz Republic counted more than 40 official registered parties, groups
and organizations from which nominated candidates would vie for a seat in the parliamentary
elections. Instead of the region’s dominant power-politics, the Kyrgyz Republic was better
characterized by feckless pluralism, which allowed for multiparty elections in a governmentcontrolled electoral arena. However, most parties were separable from the state, as opposed to
the situation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The largest parties in Kyrgyzstan during the first
decade of independence were the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan, the National Revival
Party, Moya Strana (My Country) and the Ar-Namys (Dignity Party). Political parties in
Kyrgyzstan had limited experience in government and their influence further decreased when
party activities were increasingly circumscribed in the early 1990s.
The tremendous loss of seats for the opposition parties in the parliamentary elections of 2000
led the Akayev regime to operate in a more authoritarian manner against it critics as it felt
strengthened by a weakened opposition. President Akayev showed less tolerance towards
political opponents, resulting in the arbitrary arrest of a southern local Member of Parliament,
Azimbek Beknazarov, which brought new life to the north-south divide. Other challengers of
the regime were either denied registration by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) or
faced political motivated criminal charges, such as the former Prime Minister and popular
opposition candidate Felix Kulov. The arrest of MP Beknazarov led to a bloody confrontation
in the southern Jalalabad region, where six demonstrators were shot by government’s forces
and sixty more suffered severe injuries, the bloodiest confrontation between the government
and society since the Kyrgyz Republic gained independence (Freedom House 2004c: 06). The
falsified presidential elections and parliamentary elections of 2000 made President Akayev
increasingly unpopular and led to a more organized political opposition, who united under the
banner of the Movement for Resignation of President and for Reforms for People (Freedom
House 2004c: 02). These same mistakes were repeated by the Akayev regime during the
parliamentary elections of 2005, when it became clear that Akayev loyalists were winning 90
59
percent of the 75 seats in Parliament, despite the high unpopularity of the presidential
administration (Freedom House 2006c: 06). 35
Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media
As the electoral arena became more restricted in the late 1990s and laws ruling parliamentary
elections were more tilted in favour of pro-regime parties, President Akayev became
increasingly intolerant to religious movements, NGOs and independent media outlets. Within
the framework of the US-led War on Terrorism, government crackdowns on religious
movements and alleged members of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir had intensified, which had worsened
the precarious human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan. Another targeted group had been the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). This movement has been accused of conducting
military incursions staged from Tajikistan during 1999 and 2000, and of gathering support
among southern ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. These events led to a limited military clash
between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, who both hunted on members of the IMU. Hence,
President Karimov was convinced that the radical Islamic movement used Kyrgyzstan as a
stronghold to challenge his regime. Bilateral relations were already strained between the two
countries due to tensions over the process of border delimitations, the management of transboundary water management and Akayev’s failure to contain Uzbek refugee flows towards
Uzbekistan. The threat posed by movements such as the IMU were largely diminished since
the military operations of the US started in neighbouring Afghanistan in 2001, which largely
destroyed training sites and IMU strongholds.
In the last five years of his presidency, President Akayev had stepped up his efforts to
prosecute alleged members of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which were perceived as posing a
substantial threat to stability and the security of the Kyrgyz Republic. In 2003, law
enforcement agencies conducted several operations against Hizb-ut-Tahrir supporters in the
southern provinces through extraordinary policing measures. Despite the use of Islamic
radicalism by the Akayev government as a pretext to intensify government crackdowns, the
real threat of these religious movements remains unclear. Already in 2005, Freedom House
noted that ‘specialists in the region and beyond remain divided over whether radical Islam
poses a serious threat to the stability of Kyrgyzstan’ (Freedom 2005c: 08). The harsh
measures to control religious movements resulted in the alienation of devoted Muslims in
35
Even President Akayev’s two daughters were elected to Parliament during the parliamentary elections of 2005,
further fuelling the upopular image of widespread corruption and clientelism among the president’s inner circle.
60
Kyrgyzstan from the central government, which further undermined Akayev’s political
legitimacy. On the contrary, Christian groups were allowed to convert Kyrgyz and Uzbeks to
Christianity (Freedom House 2005c: 13).
In order to co-opt and monitor NGOs, trade unions and other social groups between the state
and society, President Akayev created in 2004 the Agency for Relations with Society. This
agency was especially focussed upon NGOs receiving Western foreign aid and who primarily
dealt with issues of democratization and human rights. In 2004, Kyrgyzstan had over 5,000
registered NGOs, which were closely monitored by the Agency for Relations with Society.
Prominent members and leaders of these NGOs were targets of the tax police, suffered
physical attacks from unknown assailants and were subject of critical articles of progovernment media outlets (Freedom House 2005c: 12). Informed by the prominent role of
civil society and especially Western-financed NGOs in the Rose Revolution of 2003 in
Georgia, the central government became increasingly intolerant of independent activities that
could culminate into an insurmountable challenge to his rule (Freedom House 2006c: 12).
Although President Akayev allowed the NGO sector to expand during his presidency, the
sheer number of NGOs prevented any one organization from gaining more influence
(Freedom House 2006c: 12).
The same co-optation mechanisms were used in the area of media, where two important
factors contributed to the control of media outlets by political and economic elites supportive
of the Akayev regime. First, government and government-related media outlets received
financial support in the form of mailing and tax privileges, while independent media outlets
critical of the government had to pay regular mail taxes and 20 per cent value-added tax.
Second, the government-owned enterprise Uchkun had been in charge of the country’s major
printing press, threatening opposition-oriented publications with non-publication (Freedom
House 2005c: 18). ‘The independent media in Kyrgyzstan remain in a precarious position
owing to the difficult economics of the newspaper industry in a developing society, the
dominant position occupied by state owned or state-supported media outlets, and official
efforts to impede the development of alternative voices in the media (Freedom House 2005c:
03). Although some 628 media organizations were registered with the Ministry of Justice in
2004, only 45 newspapers and 15 television and radio stations were actually operating
61
(Freedom House 2005c: 13). 36 The increasing role of the state in religious affairs and the cooptation of NGOs and media outlets led to a restrictive environment that was limited to
supportive groups of Akayev’s regime.
Strategy 4: Foreign policy
President Akayev clearly steered the small republic in the direction of the Western world from
the early 1990s onwards in his search of international financial support for the country’s
depleted budget. The US-led War on Terror (2001) provided President Akayev with a pretext
for the suppression of his domestic realm, as government crackdowns were framed as
targeting only extremist elements in society, while in practice Akayev sought ways to
consolidate his regime through the creation of a strong presidency and the employment of
patron-client networks to finance the loyalty of his inner circle. President Akayev provided
the US with a base at the Manas International Airport in 2001, which the US needed to
conduct military operations in Afghanistan. This policy was conducted in the hope that
Western criticism on human rights violations would diminish, while President Akayev
simultaneously tried to strengthen his international position, which had been tarnished by the
negative political developments surrounding parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000
and 2005.
Kyrgyzstan under President Bakiyev (2005-2010)
After the social upheaval of 2005, the so-called Tulip Revolution, all political forces in
Kyrgyzstan declared their support for democracy as a strategic, long-term goal, with a
renewed commitment to building a social market economy. President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a
southerner and former prime minister under Akayev, gathered support during the Tulip
Revolution on promises to strengthen parliament vis-à-vis the presidency, to restore a
completely independent media, and to clear the state apparatus from corruption (Freedom
House 2007c: 03). After being elected as president in 2005, he named Felix Kulov, a
northerner, as his prime-minster to symbolize the union between the north and south. During
his first two years in office, it became clear that President Bakiyev was not interested in
delivering to the promises of the Tulip Revolution. Instead, President Bakiyev continued to
centralize power in the presidency. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007c) already warned in 2007 that
‘the drive for a re-consolidation of authoritarian power in a region conspicuously short of
36
There were 500 newspapers or periodicals and 128 broadcast outlets (Freedom House 2005c: 13).
62
democracies should not be underestimated (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007c: 02). Independent
journalists criticizing the government were either prosecuted or faced increased physical
harassment by government authorities, public demonstrations were not allowed or abruptly
ended by violent government crackdowns, and opposition forces and parliament were left out
the political process through the manipulation of electoral and parliamentary laws and the
creation of a pro-presidential Ak Zhol bloc, which followed the same trend of dominant
power politics as described in the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Freedom House 2008c:
312).
President Bakiyev surrounded himself with an inner circle of family members and
predominantly recruited southerners to the administrative apparatus. Ties between regions and
parliament became criminalized, and drugs trafficking in the southern provinces went
unabated. President Bakiyev and his administration had not delivered on its promise to
effectively combat corruption and to implement political reforms. Hence, no viable long-term
economic policies were formulated to secure investment in key economic sectors such as the
hydropower sector and gold. Prime Minister Kulov resigned already after his first year in
office, which broke the symbolic union between the north and the south (Freedom House
2008c: 325). In April 2010, President Bakiyev fled the country amidst widespread popular
protests over pervasive corruption in the hydropower sector and erupting conflicts between
ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in the south, which was allegedly stirred up by uncontrolled
elements in the security forces still loyal to the ousted president. President Bakiyev failed to
consolidate his regime amidst clan-based and tribal loyalties, a multi-ethnic society and by
conducting an ‘opportunistic’ foreign policy.
Strategy 1: centralizing power into the executive branch
As part of the legacy inherited from the Akayev-era, the powers that were already vested into
the executive branch, or the presidency, were not effectively restricted, resulting in a
permanent struggle between the president and the parliament in the first two years. This
struggle included control over the nomination process of the prime minister and his cabinet
and the implementation of promised constitutional amendments to check executive powers
and to strengthen parliament. Through a referendum on the Constitution and electoral laws in
October 2007, the presidency maintained its extensive powers over the legislative and judicial
branches. President Bakiyev could dissolve parliament and instituted a required 80 percent
majority for a presidential impeachment. Finally, President Bakiyev claimed the constitutional
63
right to appoint and dismiss government officials, in order to facilitate the process of quick
reshuffling of government officials.
Powerful positions were redistributed among key members of his pro-presidential political Ak
Zhol bloc. In 2008, President Bakiyev replaced the heads of all security structures and filled
the vacant positions with members of his family and close friends, similar to the situation in
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This trend intensified after the presidential elections of 2009,
when Bakiyev decreased the number of ministries and state agencies in order to eliminate
corruption and to promote more efficiency in the public sector. The National Security Service
(SNB), the ministries of Interior, Defence and Foreign Affairs were placed under Bakiyev’s
control (Freedom House 2010c: 293). Formally, the reform of government was explained as a
cost-benefit operation in order to balance the national budget. Informally, President Bakiyev
restricted the reduced number of ministries and state agencies to members of his inner circle.
‘President Kurmanbek Bakiyev surrounded himself with loyal political supporters interested
primarily in retaining their positions with the continuity of the current political regime’
(Freedom House 2009c: 289).
Political and economic independence of cities and villages were largely overturned by
President Bakiyev after 2007, by recruiting many incumbent local officials into the propresidential Ak Zhol bloc. As the unicameral parliament fell short of local representation,
local governments increasingly provided for a direct link with the central government in
Bishkek. The Constitution of 2007 provided President Bakiyev with the right to appoint new
governors and local administrators, which facilitated the quick reshuffling of public officials
before elections were held. ‘Former President Akayev had used similar techniques, appointing
new governors before elections to increase the chances of winning (Freedom House 2008c:
335). During the local elections of 2008, local public employees, school teachers, regional
governors and town mayors were increasingly compelled to support Ak Zhol candidates or
risked losing their jobs (Freedom House 2008c: 335). Local institutions were restricted in
addressing social tensions, and could only act upon directives from the central government in
Bishkek, which allowed ethnic tensions in Northern and Southern regions to escalate from
time to time, as it increasingly showed the inability of local authorities to act independently
64
(Freedom House 2010c: 299-300). 37 This became palpable when President Bakiyev fled the
country amidst ethnic conflicts between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the southern Osh province,
with local authorities incapable of containing violence between both ethnic communities.
The new Constitution (2007) enhanced presidential powers to the detriment of the functioning
of parliament. Although Bakiyev had to deal with a pro-Akayev parliament in his first year as
president of the Kyrgyz Republic, he called for pre-term parliamentary elections in 2007
which resulted in a majority for the pro-presidential Ak Zhol bloc. During these parliamentary
elections, parliament had 90 seats up for election, instead of the 75 seats during President
Akayev last year in office (Freedom House 2008c: 328). Similar to the legislative branches in
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, it increasingly functioned as a rubber-stamp institution of
presidential decrees, albeit to a lesser extent, as tensions remained even within the propresidential party as will be discussed below. Dominant power-politics became the modus
operandi in the Kyrgyz Republic during Presidents Bakiyev’s tenure. Hence, the president
increased his personal leverage over the CEC similar to his colleagues in Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan (Freedom House 2010c: 295).
The Constitutional Court continued to comply with regime interests which were a clear sign
that judicial independence had further deteriorated in the post-Akayev era.
Pervasive
corruption had permeated the judicial branch, and it has been characterized by a low level of
professionalism. The new adopted constitution in 2007 allowed President Bakiyev to directly
appoint judges on the one hand and with the Ak Zhol dominated parliament to more easily
dismiss heads of the Constitutional and Supreme Court on the other hand. The Office of
Prosecutor and other top-level executive officials also increased their direct influence over
judges. In 2008, Supreme Court chairman Kurmanbek Osmonov was removed from his
position due to his continuing criticism of President Bakiyev and the implemented
constitutional reforms in 2007 (Freedom House 2009c: 296). The judiciary would remain
under firm control of the presidency during Bakiyev’s tenure, ‘as it is one of the primary
mechanisms he has used to silence political opponents and business competitors’
(Freedom House 2009c: 297). Both President Akayev and President Bakiyev tailored the
Constitution to further their own interests, resulting in the centralization of power in the
37
Since the early 1990s, local authorities have exploited interethnic rivalries to further interests of ethnic
Kyrgyz, leading regularly to violence against Dungan, Chinese, Uighur, Uzbek, and Russian ethnic communities
(Freedom House 2010c: 300)
65
presidency and the accumulation of wealth confined to an inner circle (Freedom House 2008c:
328).
Strategy 2: Control of the electoral arena
The pre-term parliamentary elections of December 2007 saw the pro-presidential Ak Zhol
bloc winning a majority of the parliamentary seats. ‘Twelve competing political parties
competed for 90 seats distributed on the base of proportional representation…although less
than half of the voters showed their support for Ak Zhol, the new proportional system allowed
the
pro-regime
party
to
occupy
over
70
percent
of
Parliament
seats’
(Freedom House 2008c: 328). Only the opposition Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan
(SDPK) was able to win seats. Instead of forging one unified pro-presidential bloc, Ak Zhol
experienced a split between two competing camps in the spring of 2008 over the preferred
direction of privatization plans for Kyrgyzstan’s energy sector. The first camp centred on
business interests, who favoured Kazakh investors to privatize the country’s major
hydropower sites. The opposing camp was mainly informed by political interests, as Maksim
Bakiyev (the president’s son) preferred involvement of Russian investors into the energy
sector. The control of energy resources became a divisive factor for Kyrgyz political and
economic elites, as it would pave the way for increased political leverage in the future.
President Bakiyev promoted his son Maksim Bakiyev to head the Central Agency on
Development, Investment, and Innovation, which controlled all foreign financial inflows and
the country’s national hydroelectric and gold companies. This move clearly favoured the inner
circle and the political side which his son represented, with the strengthened security forces
preventing public officials from further defections (Freedom House 2010c: 294).
Despite the fact that real opposition parties were severely constrained in their participation in
parliamentary of 2007 and presidential elections of 2009 during Bakiyev’s tenure, they also
faced serious internal problems and a lack of alternative plans to reduce corruption and to
promote democratization of state structures. Members of Parliament of the Ak Zhol bloc gave
continued support to the president and the state over which he presided, bearing in mind that
they owed their parliamentary seat to the current political regime and knowing that public
defections would not anymore be tolerated. The dominance of the Ak Zhol bloc in parliament
brought the state-crime relationship into a new light, as high-profile criminals infiltrated
parliament and President Bakiyev mobilized criminal elements as agents of intimidation
66
against opposition members, journalists, and human rights activists. 38 Maksim Bakiyev and
Zhanysh Bakiyev (president’s younger brother) were allegedly in control of all legal and
illegal business activities, with the president’s elder brother Akhmat Bakiyev supposedly in
control of organized crime and drug trafficking in southern Kyrgyzstan (Bond & Koch 2010:
540-541). Further, government officials and loyal business elites related to the Ak Zhol bloc
were allegedly involved in the embezzlement of revenues from the hydropower sector by
illegal selling of hydropower at the Toktogul reservoir, instigating parliamentary hearings in
2009. These events led to severe electricity shortages during the winters, which angered urban
and rural residents alike, and which were part of the events that led to the ouster of President
Bakiyev in April 2010 (Freedom House 2009c: 298).
Strategy 3: Control of religious fundamentalism, civil society, and independent media
President Bakiyev became increasingly intolerant of religious freedoms in Kyrgyzstan,
especially after the presidential elections of 2009 and the government overhaul that followed,
which strengthened his grip on the security forces and the internal police (through his tight
control over the Ministry of Interior). A law was adopted that raised the number of members
required for a religious organization to receive legal registration from 10 to 200. President
Bakiyev received key support from the Spiritual Administration of Muslims (SAM) and the
Russian Orthodox Church, both condemning the spread of other Islamic movements and
strains of Christianity. In order to control religious fundamentalism, President Bakiyev
envisioned a greater role for the SAM in the ordinary and spiritual lives of Kyrgyz citizens, as
the president himself campaigned in the presidential elections 2009 on Islamic traditions and
symbolism within the state-allowed version of Islam (Freedom House 2010c: 297). Another
wave of violent attacks and assassinations in 2009 targeting journalists, human right activists,
NGOs and independent media outlets further silenced critics of the Bakiyev regime.
President Bakiyev showed no intention to cooperate with civil society groups or political
opposition parties, instead denying them the right to stage peaceful demonstrations. Bakiyev
followed up on the repressive attitude during the latest years of Akayev’s presidency, in order
to prevent an independent power base from developing. The media increasingly functioned as
a tool of the Bakiyev regime, as independent journalists and media outlets were targeted by
unknown assailants, intimidated or even closed by government authorities. Kyrgyzstan’s
38
More than five MPs were killed since President Bakiyev took power, among others former presidential aide
Sadyrkuloy and Ak Zhol-lawmaker Kadyraliyev (Freedom House 2010c: 293).
67
media landscape was highly circumscribed during Bakiyev’s presidential tenure. Russian
mass media still enjoyed a high share of Kyrgyzstan’s media market, making the Kyrgyz
people dependent upon Moscow’s view of foreign and domestic news reports. ‘As a result,
the Kyrgyz audience is heavily exposed to the Russian government’s interpretation of
international developments’ (Freedom House 2010c: 299). Although Kyrgyzstan started its
early years of independence with great emphasis on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly
and freedom of religion, these were severely restricted in the last year of Bakiyev’s
presidency, joining the poor records of its neighbours. 39
Strategy 4: Foreign policy
President Bakiyev proved to be capricious in conducting his foreign policy, similar to his
counterpart in Uzbekistan. During his short tenure from 2005 until April 2010, Bakiyev was
mostly concerned with controlling domestic affairs and the strengthening of his regime vis-àvis parliament and Kyrgyz society. President Bakiyev’s foreign policy was highly
opportunistic, wielding an anti-Western rhetoric within the framework of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, in order to seek closer cooperation with the Russian Federation. 40
Similar to his colleague Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, Presidents embarked upon more
suppressive measures to control the domestic realm, which intensified after the coloured
revolutions. This was symbolized by allowing Russian investors to be involved in the
development of Kyrgyz energy sector.
Against the background of a SCO resolution calling upon Kyrgyzstan to set a timetable for
US forces to leave the Manas military base, President Bakiyev threatened the U.S. not to
extend its lease contract with the Kyrgyz government. After the Russian Federation granted a
$2 billion dollar loan guarantee in 2009, President Bakiyev suddenly reneged on his pledge to
expel US forces and instead negotiated a new lease contract for the use of military base near
the Manas International Airport which was approved in July 2009 (Bond & Koch 2009).
According to Freedom House (2010c), the leadership in Bishkek appeared to be foremost
interested with maximizing its own wealth, which subsequently informed its foreign policy
39
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index 2010 ranked the Kyrgyz Republic 159th of 178 participating
countries. See Appendix.
40
Due to its large prison population, Bakiyev’s supporters in Parliament and the President himself began a
public discussion on the re-instatement of capital punishment in order to reduce costs, with the Security Council
secretary Madumarov and SNB chairman Sutalinov proposing legalisation of public executions. In 2007, public
debates on legalizing polygamy were obviously a first sign of anti-Western rhetoric (Freedom House 2010c:
300-301).
68
activities (Freedom House 2010c: 301-302). Business elites in Bishkek benefitted
economically from the US military presence, which included services such as cargo
transportation, food supplies and gas sales (Freedom House 2010c: 302). By proving to be an
unreliable partner within the international community, President Bakiyev quickly lost support
from both Russia and the US, thus undermining his political legitimacy both in the domestic
and international realm.
4.4 Overview of the Results on Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
The empirical results clearly show that the set of political strategies are showing striking
similarities across the three case studies. As table 2 shows, the political strategies employed
by President Karimov of Uzbekistan and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan have
been repressive since the early 1990s, whereas President Akayev employed relatively liberal
policies in the early years of independence (1990-1995). These were later substituted for more
repressive policies, which were continued by President Bakiyev (2005-2010). Further,
political strategies in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan successfully addressed the boundaries set by
the initial challenges to the nation-state building process during the first decade of
independence. In Kyrgyzstan, the gradual transition from liberal to more repressive policies
had failed to address those initial challenges.
First of all, in all three cases power has been centralized into the executive branch, which
resulted in compliant legislative and judicial branches. Through the uncontrolled use of
constitutional referendums, the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were not only able
to bypass an initially two- term constitutional limit, but were also successful in extending their
presidential terms from five to seven years. Further, both President Karimov and Nazarbayev
were successful in building an unitary state out of a multi-ethnic society and the incorporation
of clan-based and tribal loyalties into the functioning of the administrative apparatus. In the
case of Kyrgyzstan, more authority has been vested into the presidency through constitutional
referendums under President Akayev from the mid-1990s onwards. This same practice was
continued by President Bakiyev until his ouster in April 2010. However, the centralization of
power into the executive branch failed both to address the reality of a highly multi-ethnic
society and to neutralize the divisive split between the northern and southern regions.
69
In Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan the electoral arena has been most successfully controlled, with
pro-presidential parties filling almost all seats in a pliant legislative body. Manipulation of
electoral and parliamentary laws, full control over the Central Electoral Commision (CEC)
and harassment of ‘real’ opposition candidates served to ensure a pro-presidential majority in
both cases. In the case of Uzbekistan, four pro-presidential parties were allowed in the course
of two decades, which are all equally supportive of the president and his administration. In
Kazakhstan, different parties eventually merged into the pro-presidential Nur Otan party,
which control all seats in parliament. Both cases are examples of dominant power-politics that
are inherently dependent on current regime and the state. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, electoral
and parliamentary laws were also tilted in favour of pro-presidential parties from 1990-2005.
However, opposition parties were allowed to compete for parliamentary seats, and no
significant registration requirements were demanded. During Akayev’s tenure, the Kyrgyz
republic was more characterized by feckless pluralism. During Bakiyev’s presidency, the propresidential Ak Zhol bloc controlled the majority of the seats in parliament, and opposition
candidates were more severely repressed than during the Akayev era, resulting in fewer
candidates competing for parliamentary seats. This led to dominant power-politics in
Kyrgyzstan between 2005 and 2010, as the pro-presidential Ak Zhol bloc became inseparable
from the state.
Policies controlling religious fundamentalism, civil society and independent media outlets
have been more repressive in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Both President
Karimov and President Nazarbayev employed heavy-handed measures to ensure no
alternative power base would develop that could challenge their political legitimacy. Seizing
upon revenues generated by their respective natural resources, an extensive security apparatus
has been build to suppress alternatives voice that deviate from official state policies. The
congruence of state with religion has led all four presidents to suppress alternative religious
movements, most prominently the Hizb Ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU). Suppression of religious movements has been most salient in Uzbekistan, where
different terrorist attacks against Karimov’s rule occurred in 1999 and 2004. In the case of
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, NGOs have been incorporated into state structures, with
international financed NGOs (especially those concerned with human rights and civil
liberties) continuing targets of government harassment and re-registration difficulties.
Independent media outlets have been made harmless through government harassment of
independent journalists and libel suits against media outlets. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, a
70
relatively vibrant civil society and independent media outlets were able to develop in the first
decade of independence. From the late 1990s onwards, the same repressive methods were
employed by Akayev and Bakiyev to contain NGOs and independent media outlets in their
criticism of both administrations. However, media coverage of corruptive practices in both
administrations could not be prevented, leading up to the Tulip Revolution in 2005 and the
ouster of President Bakiyev in April 2010
In their conduct of foreign policy to address their newly gained sovereignty, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan avoided dependency on neither Russia nor the West. President Karimov has
changed strategic partnerships several times in the course of two decades. In the early years of
independence, its foreign policy was more Western-oriented, merely to decrease full
dependency on Russia. Later on, President Karimov relied more on strategic partnerships with
Russia and China, mainly informed by angst over the coloured revolutions that swept the
region and the Andijan uprising in 2005. However, Uzbekistan’s strategic location within the
overall framework of the War on Terror has pushed the US to maintain close ties with
Karimov’s regime despite its poor records on human rights and democracy. Kazakhstan has
embarked upon a multi-vector foreign policy, conducting a Western-oriented policy through
its membership of the OSCE and maintaining strategic partnerships with Russia and China.
Kazakhstan has mainly exploited its vast natural resources to attract and bind foreign interests
into the country’s energy sector. Throughout the two decades of independence, President
Nazarbayev succeeded in avoiding dependency on any foreign actor or alliance. In
Kyrgyzstan, foreign policy during President Akayev’s rule was more Western-oriented, as it
heavily relied on international financial support for its depleted budgets, and to secure
political legitimacy. President Bakiyev substituted this foreign policy for a more opportunistic
direction, using both Russia and the US to provide for revenues in order to maximize wealth
among his inner circle.
71
Political strategies
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Repressive early 1990s *
Repressive early 1990s *
Liberal early 1990s/ repressive
2000-2009 **
(2001-2009)
* Addressed initial
boundaries
** Failing to address initial
boundaries
Centralization of power into
Extending presidential terms,
Extending presidential terms,
Akayev: constitutional
the executive branch
constitutional referendums,
constitutional referendums,
referendums, positions
positions distributed to inner
positions distributed to inner
distributed to inner circle
circle
circle and wealthy financial
(northern provinces)
groups
Bakiyev: constitutional
referendums, positions
distributed to inner circle
(southern provinces)
Control of the electoral arena
Manipulation of electoral and
Manipulation of electoral and
Manipulation of electoral and
parliamentary laws, four pro-
parliamentary laws,
parliamentary laws,
presidential parties allowed
One pro-presidential party
Akayev: pro-regime parties,
allowed (Nur Otan), one seat in
various opposition parties,
parliament reserved for
independents (fairly liberal)
‘opposition party’
Bakiyev: dominance of Ak
Zhol party (repressive)
Control of religious
Strengthening security forces,
Strengthening security forces,
Akayev: relatively free
fundamentalism, civil society
harassment of NGOs,
harassment of NGOs,
environment for religious
and media
suppressing media outlets
suppressing media outlets
movements, NGOs, media
outlets
Bakiyev: Strengthening security
forces, harassment of NGOs,
suppressing media outlets
Foreign policy
Changing strategic partnerships
Multi-vector foreign policy
Akayev: Western-oriented
(1990-2005)
Bakiyev: Opportunistic
(2005-2010)
Table 3. Summary table on similarities and differences of political strategies in
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
72
5. Conclusions
The increasing geopolitical importance of Central Asia in the 21st century as a vital energy
corridor between the East and the West urged this thesis to address causes of variance in
regime stability in a highly authoritarian region. Central Asia is characterized by the complex
workings of neopatrimonial rule, where strong presidencies are supported by extensive clanbased patron-client networks that penetrate all layers of government. The region is too
important to collapse for both economic and security reasons for all involved actors in the
region, such as the US, the Russian Federation, China and to a lesser extent the EU and India.
State collapse would most likely entail conflicts between competing clans over scarce
economic and political resources, escalating conflicts between various ethnic communities
and would provide new strongholds to radical Islamic movements. The stability of oil-and gas
supplies would severely be disrupted, and the already poorly managed scarce water resources
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would have extremely negative consequences for the
agricultural sector in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Further, drugs and weapons trafficking
would pose a direct threat to both the region and the broader international community, as
transnational criminal networks would be able to thrive without government interference.
Variance in regime stability in Central Asia is explained by how successful political strategies
employed by the political leadership addressed and neutralized the initial challenges to the
nation-state building process in the first decade of independence (1991-2001). In Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan, the set of political strategies were highly repressive from the early 1990s
onwards, in order to prevent an independent power base from developing. Clan-based and
tribal loyalties were co-opted through the distribution of political and economic spoils and the
presence of various ethnic communities inside both territories were effectively marginalized
by the creation of a centralized, unitary state. Further, the electoral arena has been restricted to
pro-presidential parties, who are inseparable of the centralized government and encapsulated
into state structures. Both states succeeded in combining repressive domestic policies with a
foreign policy that avoided dependency on any of the major actors that are active in the
region. Religion, civil society and media outlets are all tightly controlled by the central
government. Uzbekistan’s strategic importance for military operations in Afghanistan and
Kazakhstan’s vast reserves of natural resources have contributed in both cases to a solidified
international position of both President Karimov and President Nazarbayev.
73
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, both President Akayev (1990-2005) and President Bakiyev (20052010) failed to address the clan-based and tribal loyalties that continued to split the northern
clans from their southern counterparts. Further, both Presidents failed to build a unitary state
out of a multi-ethnic society. Ethnic conflicts on the local levels continued to erupt regularly
over discriminative land allocation policies and a general feeling of underrepresentation by
the central government in Bishkek. Contrary to their counterparts in Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan, the early period of independence was marked by more liberalized economic and
political policies, due to the fact that the Kyrgyz Republic had been dependent on
international financial support for its depleted budgets. This dependency served the
development of a relatively more vibrant civil society and critical media landscape than
elsewhere in Central Asia. Under President Akayev the electoral arena was more
characterized by feckless pluralism, with various political parties competing for parliamentary
seats within a pro-governmental environment. When President Akayev began to rely on a
closer inner circle of family members, friends and senior government officials, extensive
media coverage on widespread corruption and cronyism among northern clans led to
widespread protests across the country. The final blow to his presidency came when
independent media outlets reported on manipulated parliamentary elections in 2005, which
eventually led to the Tulip Revolution and Akayev’s ouster from Bishkek.
The same mistakes were repeated during President’s Bakiyev presidency, who continued to
centralize power in the executive branch while failing to address the imbalance between the
regions and the ethnic tensions in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Instead, a dominant propresidential Ak Zhol bloc gained control of Parliament that gave unconditional support to the
President and his administration. Similar to the Akayev-era, President Bakiyev began to rely
on an inner circle of family members, friends and business associates from the south, who
sought to maximize wealth through their monopoly on vital economic assets and political
positions. Although repressive policies intensified to control for civil society activities and
critical independent media outlets, reports on criminalization and widespread corruption
quickly diminished President Bakiyev’s popularity. Especially the electricity blackouts in
urban and rural areas during the winter of 2008, attributed to widespread corruption in the
hydropower sector, resulted in popular anger that eventually exploded in popular protests and
ethnic conflicts in April 2010.
74
To summarize, three main conclusions can be drawn from the empirical results on variance in
regime stability in Central Asia which answer the central research question: what explains
variance in regime stability in a highly authoritarian region? First of all, the most stable,
authoritarian regimes have been able to develop in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Both
countries possess considerable natural resources which generates revenues to finance
neopatrimonial rule and extensive security apparatus in both republics. The political
leadership in both countries embarked upon repressive policies since the early 1990s,
successfully centralizing power in the executive branch, restricting the electoral arena to propresidential parties, and suppressing religious movements, civil society and independent
media outlets. Both Presidents succeeded in consolidating their international position through
its foreign policies. This finding should hold for Turkmenistan, which is also a country
equally endowed with vast oil-and natural gas reserves to finance its neopatrimonial rule and
security forces.
Secondly, an unstable and challenged authoritarian regime developed in The Kyrgyz Republic
in its first two decades of independence. The republic had been dependent on foreign financial
aid, which left the political leadership vulnerable for aid conditions. This resulted in a more
liberalized economic and political environment in the early 1990s, which resulted in a more
vibrant civil society and independent media outlets. These proved to be vital in the ouster of
both Presidents, as neopatrimonial rule and corruptive informal patronage networks had been
subject of critical media coverage. Further, the four political strategies failed to address the
initial challenges on the nation-state building project, leaving the unitary state vulnerable to
the divisive split between northern and southern regions and ethnic violence. These results
should be applicable to the Republic of Tajikistan. Tajikistan experienced a violent regional
divide in its early years of independence, which led to the only civil war in the region between
1992 and 1997. President Emomali Rakhmon equally depends on foreign aid to finance the
country’s depleted budgets and presides over a fractious clan- and tribal based society.
Finally, as long as enough revenues are generated to finance neopatrimonial rule and
extensive security forces in the region, stability and security are secured. However, if
financial means decrease or collapse in the medium to long-term future, the international
community must stand by to prevent instability and insecurity in this highly fluid region, as
the negative consequences of state collapse will be equally felt in both the East and the West.
75
Appendix
Country
Rank (N=178 countries)
Score (10-0)
Kazakhstan
105
2.9
Tajikistan
154
2.1
Kyrgyzstan
164
2.0
Uzbekistan
172
1.6
Turkmenistan
172
1.6
Table 3. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 41
Note: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 ranks countries on a scale from 10
(very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).
Country
Rank (N=183 countries)
Kyrgyzstan
44
Kazakhstan
59
Tajikistan
139
Uzbekistan
150
Turkmenistan
….
Table 4. World Bank Group Ease of Doing Business Index 2010 42
Note: Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1-183. A high ranking on the index means
that the regulatory environment is more conducive to starting and operating a local business. The index
measures the country’s percentile rankings on 9 topics.
41
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (Last viewed on 25 May 2011).
42
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (Last viewed on 25 May 2011).
76
Country
Rank (2010)
Score 0-1
Europe
& World average
Central Asia
Kazakhstan
66
0.714
0.717
0.624
Turkmenistan
87
0.669
0.717
0.624
Uzbekistan
102
0.617
0.717
0.624
Kyrgyzstan
109
0.598
0.717
0.624
Tajikistan
112
0.580
0.717
0.624
Table 5. UNDP Human Development Index 2011 43
Note: The Human Development Index combines indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment
and income and sets a minimum and maximum for each dimension, called goalposts, and shows
where each country stands in relation to these goalposts, expressed as a value between 0 and 1.
Country
Rank (N=178 countries)
Score (0.00 -100)
Tajikistan
115
34,50
Kyrgyzstan
159
63,00
Kazakhstan
162
68,50
Uzbekistan
163
71,50
Turkmenistan
176
95,33
Table 6. Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index 2010 44
Note: The Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index measures the violations of press freedom in the
world, reflecting the degree of freedom that journalists and news organizations enjoy in each country,
and efforts made by government authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. The
country’s individual scores are valued between 0 (high score) and 1(low score).
43
44
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/ (Last viewed on 25 May 2011).
http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html (Last viewed on 25 May 2011).
77
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