Journal of Theoretical Politics
http://jtp.sagepub.com/
Veto Players and Referendums Around the World
Simon Hug and George Tsebelis
Journal of Theoretical Politics 2002 14: 465
DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400404
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/14/4/465
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
Additional services and information for Journal of Theoretical Politics can be found at:
Email Alerts: http://jtp.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://jtp.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Citations: http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/14/4/465.refs.html
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(4): 465±515
0951±6928[2002/10]14:4; 465±515; 027705
Copyright & 2002 Sage Publications
London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi
VETO PLAYERS AND REFERENDUMS AROUND
THE WORLD
Simon Hug and George Tsebelis
ABSTRACT
The literature on referendums comes to con¯icting assessments: for some
authors referendums are equivalent to direct democracy, for others, a poor
and unfounded substitute. In addition, existing classi®cations use very diverse
criteria, and theoretical models lead to different results depending on whether
the underlying assumptions re¯ect a single- or multi-dimensional policy space:
single-dimensional models lead to speci®c policy predictions, while multidimensional models typically identify paradoxes connected with referendums.
We present a multi-dimensional model of referendums that leads to generalizations of the single-dimensional models. This multi-dimensional model makes
predictions about how various provisions for referendums affect policy
stability and the relationship between voter preferences and policy outcomes.
To assess the relevance of these predictions we present information about
referendum procedures all around the world on the basis of our model. Linking
this information with existing empirical work on the effects of referendums
suggests that our theoretical predictions are largely borne out.
KEY WORDS . institutional analysis . referendums . veto players
No act of [representatives] can be law, unless it has been rati®ed by the people in person;
and without that rati®cation nothing is a law. (Rousseau, 1947: 85)
[W]e are deluding ourselves if we consider the referendum and the popular initiative of
legislation as modern equivalents and substitutes of direct democracy. (Sartori, 1962: 256)
If the people speak in meaningless tongues, they cannot utter the law that makes them
free. (Riker, 1982: 239)
Introduction
Institutional provisions for referendums are increasingly being added to new
constitutions (e.g. in Eastern Europe, see Auer and BuÈtzer, 2001). More and
more important questions are decided by referendum (e.g. recent changes of
Simon Hug acknowledges the partial ®nancial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grants 8210±046545 and 5004±0487882/1) and the research assistance of Anke Tresch.
George Tsebelis acknowledges support by the Russell Sage Foundation.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
466
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
constitutions in Venezuela and Australia, rati®cation of international treaties
in the European Union, etc.). Increasingly scholars advocate greater use of
referendums (e.g. Budge, 1996; ZuÈrn, 1996; Abromeit, 1998; Ackerman,
1999; Schmitter, 2000; etc.). But in the theoretical literature Riker's (1982)
warning against populism together with recent work on `problems with
referendums' (e.g. Brams et al., 1997, 1998; Lacy and Niou, 2000), or the
`referendum paradox' (Nurmi, 1997a, b, 1998) still cast some doubt on the
usefulness of referendums. We argue that ultimately the difference in assessments can be attributed to inadequate attention paid to the institutions
regulating referendums. More speci®cally, scholars tend to neglect the
important question of who controls the referendum agenda. We argue that
this question is in fact separated into two parts: (1) who asks the question
and (2) who triggers a referendum.
But the existing literature has a series of additional shortcomings. Some
authors classify referendums without paying attention to the strategic
choices of the different actors involved. The more theoretical studies come
to con¯icting conclusions depending on whether they assume that the underlying policy space is single-dimensional or has multiple dimensions. Singledimensional models lead invariably to sharp predictions of outcomes,
while multi-dimensional models underline possible paradoxes. In this respect
the referendum models mirror the rest of the spatial voting literature which
leads to median voter results in single-dimensional models and in chaos when
more dimensions are introduced. This discrepancy is particularly damaging
to the study of referendums, because actual referendums sometimes address
a simple question, in which case a single-dimensional model is a reasonable
approximation, while at other times they are used to ratify whole constitutions, in which case single-dimensional models are inadequate.
We present a multi-dimensional model of referendums on the basis of veto
player theory (Tsebelis, 1995a, 1999, 2000, 2002). According to this theory
veto players are actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the
legislative status quo. Every government of a country represents a certain
con®guration of veto players.1 As the number of these actors and the ideological distances among them increase, a signi®cant change in the status
quo becomes more dif®cult (policy stability increases). The possibility of a
referendum introduces one additional veto player in each country: the population. As a result, it moves policy outcomes closer to the preferences of
the median voter (if such a voter exists), but, provided that the remaining
1. See Tsebelis (2002) on how to identify and count veto-players as a function of the prevailing institutions (presidential or parliamentary regimes, uni-cameral or multi-cameral legislatures,
required simple or quali®ed majorities) and the prevailing political game (number of parties in
government, ideological distances among them).
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 467
veto players keep their powers, it also makes signi®cant policy changes more
dif®cult.2 These are the similarities of all referendums. The differences among
them stem from institutional differences about who asks the question and
who triggers a referendum. We explain the signi®cance of these differences
and, on the basis of them, examine the institutional details of referendums
all around the world. In particular, we argue that if the same actor (whether
it is an existing veto player or not) controls both the formulation of the question and the triggering of the referendum, other veto players lose their ability
to veto outcomes and hence the number of veto players actually decreases.
With our model we address the shortcomings in the different streams of
the referendum literature: unlike the con¯ictual conclusions of single- and
multi-dimensional models in the theoretical literature, we analyze referendums exactly the same way whether the underlying space has a single or
multiple dimensions; we distinguish referendums on the basis of the strategic
choices of the actors involved; we do so by paying attention to the institutions regulating referendums; ®nally, we come to conclusions consistent
with the empirical evidence on the effects of referendums.
The paper is organized in ®ve sections. Section I reviews the different
approaches in the literature. We show that each one of these approaches
has serious shortcomings on the theoretical or the empirical level. Section
II introduces a model of referendums on the basis of veto player theory.
This model compares the institutions of a representative democracy and a
representative democracy combined with referendums. Section III develops
the model further and points out the differences between referendums
depending on who is empowered to ask the question and who triggers a
referendum. On the basis of this classi®cation, we discuss the consequences
of various types of referendums. Section IV uses the veto players model to
study the institutions of referendums around the world. In Section V we
show how well existing empirical evidence resonates with the theoretical
claims we advance. The conclusion suggests avenues for further research.
I. Different Literatures on Referendums
The literature on referendums can be subdivided in three groups. The ®rst
is empirical and often presents classi®cations of the institutions allowing
citizens a direct say on policies. Each of these classi®cations emphasizes
particular aspects of the referendum process, but most are disconnected
from any theoretical framework. The other two groups consist of theoretical
2. We will show later that our argument holds even in multi-dimensional spaces where such a
median rarely exists.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
468
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
models that examine referendums as games among different actors. However, the ®rst of these two groups assumes that the questions asked can be
represented on a single dimension and as a result the outcomes of different
procedures can be calculated and identi®ed, while in the second group the
multi-dimensionality assumption leads to a series of paradoxical and disturbing results.
Classi®cations
At the most basic level authors often distinguish between referendum and
initiative (e.g. Ranney, 1978: 69; Magleby, 1984; Cronin, 1989). The referendum in this crude distinction is de®ned as a vote on a measure adopted
by parliament. The initiative, however, allows citizens to propose a ballot
measure, which may be adopted in a popular vote. Often, authors add a
second criterion distinguishing whether the measure appearing on the
ballot is a constitutional amendment or a statute or law (e.g. Ranney,
1978: 69). These distinctions between two basic forms of referendums are
questioned in part by authors like Smith (1976), who rely on the functional
properties of the referendum device. Smith (1976) argues that referendums
can either be pro- or anti-hegemonic, and either controlled or uncontrolled.3
Combining these two criteria, Smith (1976) arrives at a fourfold classi®cation
to which he adds an additional residual category, namely that of nonfunctional referendums, de®ned largely by their non-signi®cance. This classi®cation, obviously, does not only rely on institutional properties of the
various referendum devices, but considers mostly contextual elements.
A classi®cation based much more heavily on institutional characteristics
appears in Suksi (1993: 28f ). This author proposes four dichotomous criteria
to distinguish among different institutional provisions allowing for referendums. First he distinguishes between referendums that are mandatory and
facultative. The second criterion discriminates between decisive and consultative. The third one distinguishes between pre-regulated and non-preregulated referendums, while the last one concerns whether citizens play an
active or passive role in launching a referendum. The combination of these
four dichotomies leads to a classi®cation with (theoretically) 16 possible
types, several of which, however, are largely irrelevant since they do not
appear in reality.
In an attempt resembling Smith's (1976) classi®cation, Hamon (1995) proposes several classi®cations emphasizing the control various actors have over
the referendum process. The most interesting aspect of his classi®cation
effort is a simple table (Hamon, 1995: 24) showing possible combinations
3. Smith (1976) uses referendums as a generic term, also comprising initiatives.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 469
between the author of a measure appearing on the ballot and the actor
triggering the referendum process. Both sets of actors comprise parliament,
government, the head of the state, parliamentary opposition and the citizens.
While some combinations do not exist in reality, the classi®cation nevertheless goes a long way in emphasizing the difference between triggering a referendum and formulating the question.
Uleri (1996) proposes a largely inductive classi®cation relying on six
dichotomous criteria, which in part resembles the ones proposed by Suksi
(1993). Uleri (1996) arrives, however, only at a fourfold typology, comprising decision-promoting initiative, decision-controlling initiative, decisionpromoting referendum and decision-controlling referendum. Among the
latter he distinguishes between rejective and abrogative votes. This classi®cation attempt is picked up by SetaÈlaÈ (1999) and combined with some of Suksi's
(1993) criteria. Mueller (1996: 177f ) distinguishes among four types of referendums, namely the constitutionally mandated referendum, the governmentinitiated referendum, the citizen initiated veto and the citizen initiative. Hug
(1999) derives an almost identical classi®cation by employing two criteria
proposed by Suksi (1993), namely whether a referendum is required or not
and whether voters are actively involved or not in triggering a referendum.
For the non-required referendums, which are launched actively by the
citizens, however, he introduces as an additional distinction the criterion of
whether the ballot measure is proposed by the government or another
actor. These latter two classi®cations are almost identical, since both authors
explore the consequences of these four types of referendums in a strategic
context. In such a strategic context it is of prime importance to know who
triggers the referendum and who detains the agenda-setting power.
Theoretical One-dimensional Models
The last two classi®cations also tie in very closely with existing theoretical
models of referendums. While early models in the public choice tradition
simply presumed that referendums would correct any type of rent-seeking
behavior of government (see Mueller [1979] for a discussion of this literature), Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979) studying different types of
school-bond referendums and demonstrated how required referendums
may lead to policy outcomes quite far away from the one preferred by voters.
Extending Romer and Rosenthal's (1978, 1979) work, Steunenberg (1992)
proposes a generalization of these insights over a whole set of possible institutions for policy-making in a single dimension. Gerber (1996) presents a
model more closely re¯ecting the initiative process. However, this earlier
work is limited in two ways, namely by assuming ®rst complete and perfect
information for all actors involved in the decision-making process and,
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
470
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
second, that the policy to be decided can be represented in a one-dimensional
policy space.
Relying on more recent work in the agenda-setting literature, several
authors relaxed the ®rst limitation by assuming some informational asymmetry among the actors involved. Lupia (1992, 1994) focuses on the limited
information voters may have about ballot proposals and ®nds that endorsements by interest groups may provide helpful decision cues.4 Matsusaka and
McCarty (2001) propose a model of the initiative process where both the
legislature and an interest group fail to know the voters' exact preferences.
They ®nd that for most preferences the initiative process allows for policies
more closely aligned with the voters' wishes. A similar model of the initiative
process appears in Besley and Coate (2001). While they consider two policy
issues that have to be decided, in equilibrium only one of them appears on the
ballot, while the other is resolved in the legislature. Hence, despite the two
issues, voting on the ballot proposal is represented on a single dimension,
and the two authors also ®nd that the voters' wishes are more closely
re¯ected in policy outcomes if initiatives are possible. Moser's (1996)
incomplete information model of the popular referendum process comes to
a similar conclusion. Hug (1999) explores the effect of incomplete information for four types of referendums and ®nds that the effects of these institutions differ. In general, however, for most preference pro®les voters (i.e. the
median voter) are better off having referendums at their disposal which they
may trigger themselves or which are required. While these theoretical models
relax the complete information assumption of previous models, they do not
question the assumption of a single-dimensional space.
Theoretical Multi-dimensional Models
The multi-dimensionality of policy decisions in referendums appeared
much more strongly in work relying on social-choice-theoretic approaches.
McKelvey (1976) and Scho®eld (1978) demonstrated the importance of
agenda-setting. In their analysis the agenda-setter could produce literally
any outcome by sequencing appropriately the questions and exploiting the
different preferences among the different individual actors. Based on their
®ndings Riker (1982) argued strongly against the existence of a Rousseauean
`general will' in multi-dimensional policy spaces.
Related to these theoretical models is recent work on some paradoxes
which may occur in referendum voting, because either policies are multidimensional or voters vote on various non-separable proposals at the same
4. Bowler and Donovan (1998) provide persuasive empirical tests of these implications as well
as others in the context of referendum voting in the United States.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 471
time. Brams et al. (1997, 1998) and Saari and Sieberg (2001) focus on the
problem of multiple measures appearing on the same ballot. While they
are concerned with the fact that possibly no voter has voted for the winning
`combination', Lacy and Niou (2000) explore this problem from the angle of
non-separable preferences. Provided that various ballot measures are related,
voters may have preferences over a particular ballot measure which are
dependent on the outcome of another ballot measure. But since voting
occurs simultaneously over all ballot measures at the same time, voters
with non-separable preferences cannot condition their vote on the outcome
of another ballot measure. Lacy and Niou (2000) suggest that referendums
are not very good at resolving the problems stemming from non-separable
preferences and suggest that legislatures deal more effectively with these
issues. Hence, they advocate the use of normal legislative procedures for
issues where voters may have non-separable preferences. Brams et al.
(1997, 1998), however, suggest using approval voting to overcome the
problems of multiple ballot measures.
Nurmi's (1997a, b, 1998) work relates much more strongly with social
choice theory and suggests a series of paradoxes that may appear in referendums. While this theoretical and empirical work related to social choice
emphasizes important problems of referendums, it is useful to take a step
back. Work in this tradition assumes well-behaved preferences over individual proposals while emphasizing that these preferences may be nonseparable from those on other proposals. In addition, this work, with the
exception of Nurmi (1997a, b, 1998) does not consider how referendums
interact with representative democracy. In conclusion, the disorderly image
of positive and negative results ®nding also re¯ection in our quotes at the
beginning of our paper persists when one focuses on the accounts in
the literature. Multiple criteria and different classi®cations characterize the
more empirically oriented literature, while speci®c outcomes or paradoxes
dominate the more theoretical approaches. Our goal is to provide a uni®ed
framework for the study of referendums and to demonstrate two points.
First we show that the actual provisions prevailing around the world can
be understood on the basis of our framework and, second, we demonstrate
that the results generated by empirical analyses are congruent with the expectations generated by our theory.
II. Veto players, Direct and Mediated Democracy
Our analysis of the institutional frameworks of referendums is based on the
concept of `veto players' and expands on the work of Tsebelis (1995a, b,
1999, 2000, 2002). According to Tsebelis (1995a) a veto player is an individual or collective player whose agreement is required for a change of the
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
472
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
status quo. This de®nition can be applied to all countries and allows for identifying the actors involved in policy-making whether they are individual (like
Presidents with the power to veto legislation) or collective (governments, one
or both chambers of parliament, parties) actors. Tsebelis (1995b) demonstrates that in countries under a parliamentary regime the actual veto players
are most of the time the parties in government.5 Tsebelis demonstrates both
theoretically (Tsebelis, 1995a, 2002) and empirically (1999, 2002) that the
number of veto players and the ideological distances among them make
changes to the status quo more dif®cult. In addition, he points out (2000)
how the interactions in referendums can be understood on the basis of the
veto player framework.
What difference does it make if outcomes are selected directly by the
people or indirectly by the people's representatives in parliament? By de®nition outcomes selected by parliament will be preferred over the status quo by
a majority in parliament, while outcomes selected by a referendum will be
preferred by a majority of the voters. In a single dimension the outcome
will be determined by the corresponding median voter, but in multiple
dimensions such a median voter very rarely exists. The number of policy
dimensions involved in a referendum is an open question. Sometimes multiple issues are lumped together; at other times efforts are made to separate
issues and decide them one at a time. For example, on the one hand, referendums are sometimes used to approve (or disapprove) whole constitutions;
on the other hand, the Italian Constitutional Court decided to exclude a
popular proposal on the basis that it contained `such a plurality of heterogeneous demands that there was a lack of a rational, unitary matrix that
would bring it under the logic of Article 75 of the Constitution' (quoted in
Bogdanor, 1994: 63±4).
This section will ®rst make the argument that in our model (in sharp contrast with the literature that we reviewed) the number of underlying dimensions makes very little difference. The second issue that we will address is
that the preferences of such an `as if ' median voter may be signi®cantly
different from the policy selected by existing veto players.
Median and `As If ' Median Voter Preferences in Referendums
If we consider a group of people voting by majority rule whether to accept
a proposal or reject it (and keep the existing status quo (SQ)), the set of
5. However, there are exceptions, for example if the President of the Republic has veto power
over legislation (Portugal) or ordinances (France), or in bicameral systems, if the upper chamber's approval is required and a different majority controls this chamber (Germany some of
the time).
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 473
outcomes that can defeat the SQ form the win-set of the status quo: W(SQ).
Social choice literature (Ferejohn et al., 1984) has identi®ed an area within
which W(SQ) is located. This area is a circle centrally located within the
group of voters. More precisely, Ferejohn et al. make the assumption that
voters' preferences are represented by points in space and each voter is
indifferent between two alternatives equal distance from their ideal point
(Euclidean preferences); they draw all the `median' lines within the voter
population.6 They then consider the smallest circle intersecting all these
lines and call it the `yolk'. If the yolk has center Y and radius r, and the
segment SQY has length d, they show that W(SQ) is included in a circle
(Y, d ‡ 2r), and includes a circle (Y, d 2r).7
We will take this ®nding as the departing point in our analysis.8 As a result,
the boundaries of the win-set of the status quo are located between two
circles; both of them with center Y, one with radius (d ‡ 2r) and the other
with radius (d 2r). It has also been shown (with computer simulations)
that on average the size of the radius of the yolk (r) decreases as the
number of voters increases (Koehler, 1990).9 Consequently, for the millions
of people who are the potential participants in a referendum, in most
countries or states r is (most of the time) exceptionally small. As a result,
the win-set of the status quo is contained between two circles that differ
little from each other: 4r, when r becomes smaller and smaller.
What the previous two paragraphs indicate is that for a large population,
the median voter may not exist but all median lines pass through a very small
area (of radius r), so an `as if' median can be very well approximated by the
center Y of the yolk of the population. In addition, the win-set of the status
quo for such a large population is also very well approximated by a circle
with radius d. In other words, the multiplicity of voters simpli®es rather
than complicates the problem of identi®cation of the median voter and the
win-set of the status quo.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the argument. The yolk of
the population is very small and has center Y. The win-set of a point that
has distance d from Y is the shaded area in the ®gure, and is located between
the two circles with radii (d ‡ 2r) and (d 2r), so it can be approximated by
the circle (Y, d).
6. Median lines have on both sides of them majorities of voters (including the points on
them).
7. If d > 2r; otherwise such a circle does not exist.
8. The interested reader can ®nd a simple proof of these statements in Miller et al. (1989).
9. We underline `on the average' because one can ®nd counterexamples. For example, if the
voting population has only three distinct preferences, then there is no difference between such a
population and a three-member voting body.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
474
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Figure 1. Win-set of a Large Group of Voters
Representative Democracy
Consider a country with ®ve parliamentary parties, A, B, C, D and E, three of
which are required to form a parliamentary majority (a simple example of
that would be if each one of them had 20 percent of the seats). Where
would a parliamentary decision be located? If we know nothing about the
parliament's decision-making except that it requires a simple majority
(think of a decision taken in a presidential system where coalitions depend
on the issue under consideration), then we have to locate the intersections
of any three of the circles with centers A, B, C, D and E. We have shaded
these areas in Figure 2. If we know some additional information about
parliament's decision-making we can incorporate it in the calculations, and
identify the win-set of the status quo more accurately. For example, if we
know the parties that form the government of a parliamentary system, we
will identify the win-set of the status quo by considering each one of them
as a veto player and ®nding the intersection of their win-sets. Figure 2 indicates with dark shade the area where the outcome will be located if the parties
forming the government are A, B and C in a parliamentary system government (where coalitions are, by de®nition, stable). In the remainder of the
paper, when we use the term `parliamentary' we will imply a system with
stable majorities, while when we use the term `presidential' we will imply
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 475
Figure 2. Win-set of Status Quo in Representative Democracy
the possibility of different coalitions depending on the issue. What happens if
representative democracy and referendums are combined?
Representative Democracy and Referendums
Denmark provides some interesting examples of the differences between
the outcomes from representative democracy and referendums. As Vernon
Bogdanor (1994: 72) puts it:
It may seem a paradox that the Single European Act, which could not have gained a
majority in the Folketing, received a majority in the country, while Maastricht, which
enjoyed the support of parties with 80 percent of the seats in the Folketing, was rejected
by the voters in 1992.
Figure 3 helps us think the potential paradox through.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
476
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Figure 3. Difference of Results Between Direct and Representative Democracy
There is no reason to believe that the two processes (representative democracy and referendum) will lead to the same outcome. In fact, we do not even
know that the preferences of the public will be centrally located within the
preferences of the parties. Even the most pure proportional representation
systems like Israel or The Netherlands cannot guarantee representation for
minorities of 0.5 percent, for example. Systems with higher thresholds like
Sweden's 4 percent or Germany's 5 percent exclude many more. In addition,
the existence of electoral districts may create serious differences between the
preferences of the voters and their representatives.10 Finally, parliamentary
institutions (like committees, quali®ed majorities) may also create discrepancies between popular preferences and parliamentary outcomes (see Tsebelis,
2002).
10. The literature on referendum paradox (Nurmi, 1998: 336±7) shows one mechanism
generating such a discrepancy.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 477
In Figure 3 we present how a referendum interacts with the parliamentary
arena. In order to capture the differences in preferences between the people
and their representatives we represent the center of the yolk Y 0 generated
by the preferences of the people not in the center of the parties' preferences.
On the basis of the analysis for median voter preferences, the outcome of a
referendum will be located inside the hatched area called W 0 (SQ). On the
basis of the analysis for representative democracies, the outcome of a presidential system would be anywhere in the area W(SQ), while the outcome of a
parliamentary system with parties A, B and C in government would be
located in the very dark area. One can see that the possible solutions under
representative democracy and referendums have several points in common,
but the preferences of the population and the political parties do not necessarily coincide. This is only part of the story because there is no guarantee
that the coalition prevailing among the voters would be politically the
same as the coalition prevailing in parliament. For example, the parliamentary government A, B, C would produce an outcome located inside the
very dark area, while the outcome of a referendum could be anywhere
inside the hatched area in Figure 3.
If a parliamentary decision has to be rati®ed by the population (as is
frequently the case in constitutional matters) then the outcome has to be
located in the intersection of the parliamentary and the popular win-sets.
In other words, referendums create one additional veto player in the
decision-making process: the people. There are two results from this introduction of a new veto player: ®rst, it becomes more dif®cult to change the status
quo (Tsebelis, 1995a). Second, the ®nal outcomes will approximate the preferences of the `as if ' median voter better when the possibility of a referendum
exists (whether the actual decision is made by a referendum or not).11 But
the institutions that regulate referendums affect both of these results.
III. Institutions Regulating Referendums
From the perspective of the veto player theory two main criteria are fundamental. First, we have to know who may trigger the process of a referendum.
Second, we need to know who is able to frame the question of the popular
vote. These two crucial questions underlie, in part, some of the classi®cations
discussed earlier, but they are seldom pursued to their ultimate conclusions.
Stating these questions clearly and using them as the main criteria for a
classi®cation of different institutional provisions for referendums has the
11. Gerber and Hug (2001) discuss in detail these direct and indirect policy effects of institutional provisions allowing for referendums.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
478
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
additional advantage of allowing theoretical claims on referendums to be
easily tied into insights gained about representative democracy from veto
player theory.
Figure 4 employs these two basic questions to derive a fourfold classi®cation which comes very close to the ones proposed by Mueller (1996) and Hug
(1999). There are some slight differences. Mueller and Hug de®ne distinctions
among referendums on the basis of what government and opposition do
though these concepts may not be well de®ned in presidential systems.
Here we make distinctions on the basis of the behavior of actors identi®able
in every political system: veto players and non-veto players.12 This allows us
to make a much clearer distinction with respect to the two main criteria. How
these criteria are used is best presented in a treelike fashion in Figure 4. First,
Figure 4. Questions De®ning Different Categories of Referendums
12. There is an additional minor distinction, namely that even in parliamentary systems
`government' and `veto-players' are not always identical (see footnote 6).
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 479
we have to distinguish between referendums that are required and those that
are not. Obviously, in the former case the question of who triggers the referendum process is irrelevant. Non-required referendums come in different
forms and shapes and distinguish themselves by the two criteria. With respect
to the question of who decides to trigger a referendum, two possibilities have
to be taken into consideration. First, a veto player in the normal legislative
arena might trigger a referendum. Second, an actor who is not a veto
player in the representative system might trigger a referendum: popular
vetoes and initiatives are prime examples. When a non-veto player triggers
a referendum the crucial question becomes who asks the question. In the
Italian case the question is asked by parliament, since referendums may
only strike existing laws (or parts thereof ) from the books. In other cases,
an actor who does not have veto player status in the legislative arena may
ask the question. Popular initiatives, for instance in the States of the USA
or in Switzerland, are the main examples. This much more ®ne-grained
classi®cation into four major types allows a very detailed analysis of the
policy consequences of the various types of referendums. We discuss these
policy effects for each referendum separately.
Required Referendums
At the most basic level required referendums introduce an additional veto
player. Apart from the veto players whose support is normally necessary
to change policies, required referendums add the hurdle of the support of
the voters. For policies that are the object of required referendums, e.g. constitutional amendments in many countries or changes in the voting age in
Denmark (see Table 1), the status quo can only be changed if the change is
preferred by the new veto player, namely the voters. Thus, any new policy
has to belong to the win-set of the status quo as de®ned by the voters' preferences. In most cases this win-set corresponds to the set of policies that is preferred by a simple majority of the voters to the status quo. Often, however,
provisions for required referendums specify quali®ed majorities.13 The
13. For instance in the federal system of Switzerland constitutional changes require a majority not only among the voters, but also among the cantons which make up the federation. In
Italy, however, a referendum outcome is only valid if turnout exceeds 50 percent. In Denmark,
a rejection of a bill transferring some aspects of national sovereignty to an international organization is only valid if at least 30 percent of the voters having participated at the last election reject
the bill. If less than this minimal percentage of votes against a proposal it is deemed to be
accepted by the voters. This almost resembles the rules under which Napoleon held the ®rst
national referendum in Switzerland on adopting a new constitution for the Helvetic Republic.
Although roughly 56 percent of the voters rejected the new constitution Napoleon declared it
adopted, since the citizens having failed to vote were obviously in favor (MoÈckli, 1994: 60).
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
480
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
model can easily accommodate such differences in majority requirements
(e.g. Tsebelis, 2002). They simply affect the nature of the veto player introduced by referendums. In countries with no turnout criterion the veto
player is simply formed by the collectivity of participating voters. In
countries with a turnout requirement, some form of quali®ed majority of
voters makes the decision. Despite these considerable variations we limit ourselves in this paper to explore the consequences of referendums of various
types under the assumption of simple majority requirements. Under this
assumption our model predicts that policies in issue areas subject to required
referendums will belong to the intersection of the parliamentary win-set
(W(SQ) in Figure 3) and the voters' win-set (W 0 (SQ) in Figure 3). Figure 3
illustrates that a majority of voters will not be worse off due to required
referendums, because required referendums rule out elements of the parliamentary win-set that are worse than the status quo for a majority of
voters.
Veto player Referendums
From the previous discussion it becomes clear that only under extremely rare
conditions would the possible outcomes of the two processes (the win-sets of
representative democracy and referendums) be identical. In terms of actual
outcomes, they can be identical even when the win-sets differ, or different
even when the win-sets are the same. This obviously gives considerable
leeway to the veto player who may trigger a referendum, and even more so
if this veto player may also formulate the referendum question. We ®rst
consider veto player referendums in which a veto player may trigger a referendum, but the normal legislative procedures leads to the formulation of the
ballot question. Then we move on to the case where the same veto player
formulates the question and triggers the referendum.
Let us focus on Figure 3 and see under what conditions different veto
players actually would call for a referendum. In a purely representative
system the policy outcome would belong to the win-set of the status quo
W(SQ). But any policy not belonging to W 0 (SQ), the voters' win-set of the
status quo is open for a referendum challenge. In order to simplify our
calculations, let us assume that a referendum has no political costs for the
agenda-setter. Obviously, this is an incorrect assumption, but one can
address it easily by adding these costs in the calculations. For instance, if
the legislative process led to an outcome in the small petal of the win-set to
the lower right, most likely B, but certainly C would trigger a referendum
which would result in the rejection of the new policy by the voters. Thus if
B and C are veto players and can trigger a referendum, the referendum
threat will lead to the adoption of a policy in the intersection of the two
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 481
win-sets W(SQ) and W 0 (SQ).14 For the case in which the veto player triggers
a referendum and asks the question we will consider the two different cases of
`parliamentary' and `presidential' systems (stable coalition of parties A, B
and C in the ®rst case and any coalition of three of A, B, C, D and E in
the second). In each of these cases we consider two possible agenda-setters:
party A and party E (the ®rst is part of the parliamentary system government, the second is not).15
Under complete information the referendum agenda-setter is guaranteed
to get his/her most preferred point from the popular win-set of the status
quo (W 0 (SQ) in the picture).16 Given that both A and E are located outside
W 0 (SQ) they can achieve the points A0 and E 0 respectively when they control
the referendum agenda. The question is: Can indirect democracy offer to the
referendum agenda-setters a more attractive alternative? In order to answer
this question we have to calculate the win-set of these two points W(A0 ) (see
Figure 5) and W(E 0 ) (see Figure 6).
Figure 5 presents exactly the same con®guration of players as Figure 3 and
identi®es the point A0 , which is the best outcome the referendum agendasetter can achieve (A0 is the intersection of the line AY 0 ) with the circle
(center Y 0 , radius jY 0 SQj). Figure 5 also identi®es the win-set of A0 instead
of W(SQ), since player A can introduce a referendum and obtain A0 as the
outcome. Out of this win-set A will consider only the points included in
the circle (A, AA0 ), and trigger a referendum for any point further away
than A0 . There is only one possible coalition that can approve points inside
the (A, AA') circle: A, D and E. Consequently A has to select this coalition
in order to get an outcome which is preferred over A0 (preferably A?). In our
idealized `presidential' system this is what will happen. In the case of a
`parliamentary' system with A, B and C in government the situation is
more complicated. Note that there is no point that all three parties A, B
and C prefer to A0 because A0 is in the unanimity core of A, B and C.
14. If B and C are not veto-players who can trigger a referendum, for instance if A, D, E form
a coalition, then the outcome in the small petal of the win-set to the lower right will not be challenged in a referendum. Since this scenario is only possible in a popular veto, we will cover it
later.
15. We consider that agenda-setting belongs to single parties, because then it is easy to identify the proposal that they will make. If several parties (say `the government') control the referendum agenda they will have to negotiate among them what proposal they will make. We have
nothing to say about these negotiations, except that feasible outcomes have to be within W 0 (SQ).
Note also that E is not a veto-player. We include this counterfactual case (see Figure 6) in order
to show the underlying strategic calculations under all possible con®gurations, whether they exist
in actual political systems or not.
16. In the absence of complete information such precise calculations are impossible. Actors
will select points that they think are inside W 0 (SQ) but they may be wrong in which case the
voters will reject the proposal.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
482
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Figure 5. Possible Outcomes When A Controls the Referendum Agenda
A has to choose between keeping the government in place or leading a
government to resign. Similarly, parties B and C may offer to approve outcome A0 and avoid a referendum, or they might prefer to delegate their disagreement to a referendum. These calculations lead to three possible
outcomes: (1) government ABC remains in power and adopts A0 without a
referendum; (2) government ABC remains in power and A0 is adopted by
referendum; (3) the government resigns, and is replaced by another coalition
which selects a feasible point from W(A0 ).
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 483
Figure 6 presents exactly the same con®guration of players as before, but
assumes that player E can introduce a referendum, so identi®es the win-set of
point E 0 instead of SQ. Out of this win-set only the points included in the
circle (E, EE 0 ) can be considered, because E would prefer to trigger a referendum than to accept a point further away than E 0 . There are three possible
coalitions that can approve points inside the (E, EE 0 ) circle: (ABE), (ADE),
and (CDE). Consequently E has to select one of the available coalitions. In
the case that any coalition is possible (the `presidential' system), E will select
his own ideal point supported by (ADE). In the counterfactual case of a
`parliamentary' system with (ABC) in government the situation would be
more complicated. E could use his/her advantage of referendum agendasetting to try to negotiate a different government: indeed, players A, D and E
may prefer a new coalition government. If the parties in government want to
stick together, E will trigger a referendum and the government will lose.
In all these calculations some previous existing veto players lose their
ability to participate in political decision-making. Instead of calculating
W(SQ) we were basing our calculations on what the referendum agendasetter could obtain (points A0 or E 0 ). In addition, we saw that a presidential
system, where parties can shift coalitions on the basis of the subject matter
under consideration, was a more ¯exible system than a parliamentary one,
where the existing government coalition was unable to adapt to the new
policy environment generated by the referendum not only when a non-veto
player controlled the agenda (case of E being the agenda-setter), but also
when agenda-setting belonged to an existing veto player (the case of A). A
parliamentary system can produce similar outcomes by delegating a political
issue to a referendum and leaving it outside the political con¯ict of the main
parties. For example, in the UK the referendum on participation in the EU
had this special treatment because both parties were divided and could not
handle the issue without serious damage to their unity (Bogdanor, 1994).
Given these calculations, strategically thinking parties in the legislature
(particularly if, for some reason, they want to avoid a referendum) can
assure the referendum agenda-setter that they will do anything in their
power to make the legislative process end up in an area that is at least as
good for him/her as the result of a referendum. These mental experiments
lead to the following conclusions. First, the position of referendum
agenda-setter translates into signi®cant policy advantages: if a veto player
controls the referendum agenda, s/he cancels other veto players as such.
This is a very different analysis than the one presented by referendum advocates who consider referendums the expression of the will of the people (see
earlier quote by Rousseau). Second (and this is a consequence of the ®rst),
the legislative outcomes of representative democracy are altered if referendums are possible (Gerber and Hug, 2001).
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
484
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Figure 6. Possible Outcomes When E Controls the Referendum Agenda
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 485
Popular Veto
If popular vetoes are possible, the outcome of the legislative process has to
lead to policies contained in the win-set of the status quo de®ned by the
voters. If this is not the case, an actor may trigger a referendum, provided
that s/he prefers the status quo to the policy adopted. In Figure 3 this
would suggest that in the parliamentary arena a policy is adopted which
lies outside W 0 (SQ), the set of policies the voters prefer to the status quo.
If an actor prefers the status quo to the proposed policy and has the capacity
to trigger a referendum, it can ensure that the outcome will remain the status
quo.
An illustrative example in this respect is the ®rst Danish Maastricht referendum. While a large majority accepted the Maastricht Treaty in the rati®cation debates, a minority exceeding one-sixth of the members of parliament
voted against the Maastricht Treaty and forced a referendum.17 This minority in parliament evidently preferred the status quo to the Maastricht Treaty.
As the ®rst referendum showed, a majority of the Danish voters also preferred the status quo to the Maastricht Treaty, suggesting that this treaty
was not in the win-set of the status quo.
Hence, popular vetoes allow non-veto players to force a return to the
status quo ante. How this status quo ante is de®ned may differ quite considerably. For instance, in the ®rst Danish referendum on the Maastricht
Treaty referred to earlier the status quo corresponded simply to the arrangements under the Single European Act (SEA). In other cases the status quo
ante is more complex. For instance, the Italian referendum that struck any
reference to proportional representation from the electoral law for the
Senate (Newell and Bull, 1993), led to a situation where the senators had
to be elected by majority rule. In this case the status quo ante is quite different from the one enforced by the Danish voters.
Popular Initiative
So far, we have dealt with referendums where the question was asked by
existing veto players. Now we focus on referendums delegating agendasetting powers to the winner of a competitive process. If different groups can
become agenda-setters (both asking the question and triggering) of a referendum by winning the right to present their question to the electorate (signature
collection) the legislative outcome will depend on how competitive the
17. This example also illustrates that members of parliaments may launch a popular veto
simply by voting against a bill. Provided that a rejection by a quali®ed minority automatically
triggers a referendum, the mechanisms of such votes correspond perfectly to popular vetoes
(Table 2).
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
486
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
selection process is. If all potential players are included in the selection process the only way that one can select proposals that will not only defeat the
status quo but other proposals as well is to make proposals that are supported by a majority, which means that the process will converge towards
the preferences of the `median voter'.
If some of the potential agenda-setters (particularly the ones with preferences similar to the `as if ' median voter) are excluded from the process,
then the remaining ones may be more extreme and the legislative outcome
may be further away from the preferences of this voter. As a consequence
of this analysis, we have to focus on the process of selecting the agendasetter and assess how competitive it is. This selection obviously depends on
the criteria for the quali®cation of a ballot measure. These criteria comprise
the number of signatures of citizens required to qualify the ballot, how much
time the quali®cation process can take, etc. All these elements thus create
hurdles a group has to cross. Gerber (1999) links this with the notion that
popular initiatives are launched either by broadly based citizen groups or
special interest groups. She argues that given the hurdles a group has to
cross to qualify a proposal, broadly based citizen groups, which will collect
signatures in part or mostly through volunteers, will mostly submit moderate
proposals. This simply because only moderate proposals, i.e. proposals close
to the center of the yolk, will ®nd suf®cient support in the population to allow
volunteers to collect enough signatures. Special interest groups, which often
rely on paid signature collectors, may make either moderate or more extreme
proposals, depending on how strongly they feel about a particular policy.
Consequently, if, for example, what is required is signature selection by
volunteers, then, demands that are supported by a majority of the population
are likely to get the volunteers necessary for their placement on the ballot,
and initiatives that do not have enough volunteers are unlikely to be supported by a majority. Consequently, such a process is a competitive one
and one can expect that the outcome will be located close to the preferences
of the median voter.
If, however, what is requested for an issue to be placed on the ballot is
signature selection by remunerated professionals, it is possible that organized
groups with ideal points far away from the median voter are also able to
participate, in which case the selection process for agenda-setting may translate into outcomes away from the preferences of the median voter. In all
cases, the selected outcome has to be closer to the preferences of the
median voter than the status quo.18 So, again, despite the fact that the `as
18. We have to repeat here that the radius of the yolk is assumed 0, otherwise the selection of
a point that is further from the center of the yolk than the status quo by up to 2r could not be
excluded.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 487
if' median voter makes the ®nal decision, the result depends crucially on the
preferences of the agenda-setter.
Institutions for Referendums and Their Policy Consequences
Our model makes predictions in two related domains. First, it shows how
referendums, by introducing a new veto player and possibly eliminating
existing ones, affect the potential for policy change. Second, it also shows
that referendums affect considerably policy outcomes, namely in such a
fashion that voters (i.e. the median voter) are never worse off having provisions for referendums. Both predictions relate closely to the concerns in the
general literature on referendums. But our predictions are of a much sharper
nature, provided we have information on the institutional rules regulating
referendums and, even more importantly, can determine clearly the identity
of the actors able to trigger a referendum and to ask the question. Thus,
before discussing in more detail our predictions and how they relate to
empirical studies on referendums, we provide information on provisions
for referendums in constitutions of countries around the world.
While various studies provide partial information about the institutions
allowing for referendums, none relate this information with the notion of
veto player which in our analysis is crucial for understanding the relationship
between referendums and representative democracy. For instance, Suksi
(1993) presents information for most countries on whether their constitutions have provisions for referendums and classi®es them according to his
dichotomous criteria. Similarly, the Research and Documentation Centre
on Direct Democracy (http://c2d.unige.ch) provides information on the institutions present in the countries around the world. But both these sources do
not directly provide information on whether or not veto players trigger a
referendum and formulate the question, so they do not provide the crucial
information identi®ed in Figure 4. We provide this information in Tables 1
and 2 in the Appendix. In collecting this information we relied heavily on
Suksi's (1993) work, but updated it considerably, adapting it to the needs
of our classi®cation presented in Figure 4. A major criterion in this classi®cation distinguishes between required and non-required referendums. In
Table 1 we list all countries that have provisions for required referendums
and explain the issues subject to such referendums as well as the date of
the constitution consulted.19
19. Suksi (1993: 138, 142) ®nds that in 56 out of his 160 analyzed constitutions there appear
references to referendums on constitutional amendments. Among them 32 explicitly refer to
required referendums for constitutional changes. Six other constitutions introduce a required
referendum for international treaties, namely Congo, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Singapore, and
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
488
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Overall we identify 54 constitutions containing provisions for required
referendums. The number of constitutions allowing for non-required referendums (Table 2) is slightly smaller (47). For all of these 47 countries we provide detailed information on who may trigger a referendum and the identity
of the actors who ask the question.20 We use this information to determine
whether a veto player or a non-veto player may trigger a referendum and formulate the question to be submitted to the voters. As our theoretical model
clearly indicates, it is this information which is crucial to assess the effect of
institutions allowing for referendums.21 Table 2 illustrates the wide variety
that exists in the institutional provisions allowing for non-required referendums. Predominantly, we ®nd that existing veto players may trigger a referendum and retain absolute control over the agenda. Only a few constitutions
contain provisions for popular vetoes or popular initiatives.
The information contained in Tables 1 and 2, combined with the insights
from our model allow us to qualify claims prevalent in the literature on referendums which discuss the policy and stability-inducing effects of referendums. With respect to the stability-inducing effects of referendums, the
literature is replete with examples and discussions. Neidhart (1970), for
instance, discusses in detail the case of Switzerland, for which he argues
that the popular veto has made policy changes very dif®cult. Cronin (1989:
222), however, suggests that `direct democracy devices . . . have been an occasional remedy, and generally a moderate remedy, for legislative lethargy . . .'.
Reviewing the evidence of whether referendums have a conservative bias,
Gallagher (1996: 237) comes to the conclusion that there is no clear evidence
in support of this view nor its counterpart.
These differences in assessment relate directly to the ®ndings based on our
model. Generally speaking, referendums introduce an additional veto player
into the political game and thus diminish the potential for policy change.
While this stability enhancing effect is present in all types of referendums
Zaire (Suksi, 1993: 143). For each of these countries we consulted the most recent constitution
and report the detailed procedures that lead to a required referendum in Table 1. Given that
countries in Eastern and Central Europe (e.g. Lesage, 1995; Auer and BuÈtzer, 2001) adopted
new constitutions in the 1990s, often with provisions for referendums, we also systematically
consulted these constitutions and list provisions for required referendums in these countries in
Table 1.
20. Again, we used Suksi's (1993) work to identify all countries that had non-required referendums according to the constitutions he consulted. In addition, we checked all constitutions of
countries from Eastern and Central Europe to determine whether they had provisions for nonrequired referendums. For all these countries we determined the relevant articles in the constitution to determine the exact procedures for holding such referendums.
21. While several other sources also provide lists of provisions allowing for referendums,
none of them identi®es the actor triggering a referendum and formulating the question for the
voters in terms of veto-players.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 489
of our classi®cation (Figure 4), our model also identi®es the cases that lead to
the elimination of veto players: if the same player (whether an existing veto
player (veto player referendums) or not (popular initiatives)) controls both
triggering and asking the question. First, in a veto player referendum, if a
subset of the normal legislative veto players can both trigger a referendum
and ask the question, then this cancels out the remaining veto players in
the legislative arena (other parties in government). An example for this
type of referendum is the provision of Belarus' constitution allowing the
President to trigger a referendum and to ask any question. The effect of
such powers clearly transpired in the referendums in 1996 in which President
Lukashenka broke a stalemate with parliament (Stone, 1997).22 Proposals
for increasing the president's powers would never have been passed in parliament. But Lukashenka appealed over the heads of the parliament to the
Belarusian voters and changed policy in an area where representative democracy would not have produced any change.
The other type of referendum eliminating existing veto players, and thus
not necessarily decreasing the potential for policy change, is the popular
initiative. Again, this comes about because the power to set the agenda in
these referendums is vested in an actor who is not a veto player in the
normal legislative game. If citizens can submit their own policy proposals
and trigger a referendum, they cancel out the powers of existing veto players.
Thus, countries having provisions allowing for the popular initiative may see
the potential for policy change actually increase. Given that this increase
comes about through reducing the power of the legislative veto players,
namely political parties, it is hardly surprising that few constitutions contain
provisions for such referendums. Overall, 11 constitutions23 allow for such
referendums, but many of these provisions, mostly in East European countries, have hardly been used. At the national level Switzerland uses such
popular initiatives most frequently. In several policy domains, for instance
environmental protection, this institution is credited with having triggered
signi®cant policy changes. A case in point is a constitutional amendment
in favor of protecting the Alpine region against automotive traf®c through
the Alps, which Swiss voters adopted 20 February 1994, to the chagrin of
most elected of®cials. This constitutional amendment basically ruled out
the construction of any additional roads crossing the Alpine regions,
which might lead to increased traf®c through or across the Alps. This new
22. Strictly speaking, the constitution in force required the parliament to agree to a referendum, but the supreme court allowed the referendums to go forward which resulted in a considerable overhaul of the constitution, giving the president increased powers, including the power to
launch a referendum on any question he chooses.
23. The following countries have such provisions: Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Moldova, Philippines, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and the Ukraine.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
490
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
constitutional amendment originated in a signature petition proposing this
change to the constitution. Most observers were surprised by the outcome
since it endangered in part the delicate negotiations with the European
Union on bilateral agreements and transport.24
The remaining types of referendums, namely the required referendum and
the popular veto, leave the powers of the veto players in the representative
arena untouched, and thus these provisions decrease the potential for
policy change. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that this decrease in the potential for
policy change might re¯ect the wishes of the framers of the constitution.
Often required referendums apply to constitutional amendments, changes
in borders, transfer of powers to international organizations etc. For such
policies, obviously, it is desirable to have a limited potential for change.
Similarly, popular vetoes often also apply to policy areas that are of central
importance. Thus, for instance, the Danish constitution in article 20 requires
a majority of 83.3 percent of all members of parliament for bills involving
transfers of powers to supranational organizations. Thus, parliamentary
minorities of at least one-sixth can force a referendum vote, such as the
one leading to the negative outcome in the ®rst referendum on the Maastricht
Treaty (e.g. KoÈnig and Hug, 2000). Again, provisions for such popular
vetoes decrease the potential for policy change, as the opt-outs negotiated
by the Danish Government after the Maastricht referendum clearly illustrate. A partial exception to this stability enhancing effect of popular vetoes
appears with the practice in Italy labeled referendum abrogativo. Article 75
allows for referendums on enacted laws, but also allows for the elimination
of parts of laws. Since laws are often artful packages, allowing referendums
on elements of these packages also reduces, to some degree, the power of the
parliamentary veto players. A clear case in point is the Italian referendum of
19 April 1993 with which the Italian voters canceled a disposition in the
electoral rules employed for the election of the senate. More precisely, the
referendum largely eliminated proportional representation from the election
of the senate. As a consequence of this referendum, the government of
Giuliano Amato resigned and the resigning prime minister proclaimed the
end of the ®rst Republic (Newell and Bull, 1993: 607). In some sense it was
the culmination of the radical changes that the Italian political system had
undergone since the thorough judicial investigations of the partitocrazia
carried out under the label of mani pulite.
24. Bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland were negotiated in the aftermath of
Swiss citizens' rejection of the European Economic Area, a treaty concluded between countries
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the EU. Swiss voters accepted the bilateral
agreements on 5 May 2000, and at the time of writing EU member countries were in the process
of ratifying these agreements.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 491
The investigations started by prosecutors from Milan divulged the massive
corruption of the Italian party system. Reformist forces attempted through
numerous referendums to force changes in the Italian system. Referendums
in Italy allow citizens to collect signatures to force a vote on most legislation
and parts of it, long after it has been adopted (Table 2). However, referendum challenges face two important hurdles. First, they have to be accepted
by the constitutional court. Of the 13 referendums submitted to the court
in 1993, only 10 were allowed to proceed. Second, for a referendum outcome
to be decisive, the turnout has to exceed 50 percent. On 19 April 1993 this
threshold was easily passed with a turnout of 77 percent, and a yes vote of
82.73 percent. While the adopted referendum only struck a paragraph
from the electoral law for the senate, its consequences were considerable.
Parliament, which already had attempted unsuccessfully to fend off the
referendum by adopting its own changes, went into action and overhauled
the election laws in their entirety (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte, 1993).
Elections became much less proportional and the plurality element came to
predominate. Only after these changes did alternation between two major
ideological blocks became possible.
Thus, only if the institutional rules allow parts of a bill to be struck down
in a referendum may the popular veto increase the potential for policy
change. If only entire laws can be struck down, policy stability never
decreases. Given that the potential for policy change differs under the various
types of institutions allowing for referendums, Gallagher's (1996: 237) mixed
assessment of the conservative bias of referendums is perfectly understandable. Depending on the precise institutional provisions referendums may
increase or decrease policy stability. Our model suggests clear links between
institutions and potential for policy change. Table 1, by listing all countries
with required referendums, indicates where we would expect referendums to
lead to increased policy stability (only in the policy areas where such referendums are possible). The countries listed in Table 2, by allowing non-required
referendums to occur, often reduce the number of relevant veto players and
thus mostly have reduced policy stability. But this reduced policy stability is
only to be expected if the agenda-setting in the referendum process is either in
the hands of non-veto players or a subset of the veto players.
Apart from predicting various degrees of stability as a function of the precise institutions allowing for referendums, our model also links these institutions to policy consequences. Our analysis suggests that provisions for
referendums generally lead to policies more closely related to the preferences
of the voters. The effects of referendums differ, however, according to the
exact institutional provisions and which actors (veto players or nonveto players) the latter empower to set the referendum agenda. While the
information provided in Table 2 would allow for much more stringent
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
492
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
empirical tests of our theoretical predictions, existing empirical analyses of
the policy consequences of referendums largely omit the effects that different
con®gurations of veto players may have. Thus we can only relate our predictions with respect to policy consequences on the basis of the classi®cation of
referendums presented in Figure 4.
Despite this limitation the predictions based on our model strongly resonate with most of the empirical evidence from systematic studies on the
policy effects of referendums. Given that provisions for popular initiatives
were present only in a handful of countries at the national level, few, if
any, studies have attempted or succeeded in demonstrating empirically the
effect of such referendums on policy outcomes in cross-national analyses.
In studies focusing on the effect of institutional provisions at the subnational
level, both in the United States and Switzerland, the results suggest that provisions for popular initiatives and, to a lesser extent, provisions for popular
referendums lead to policies closer to the voters' ideal-point. Gerber (1996,
1999) shows for two policies, namely laws on parental consent for teenage
abortion and the death penalty, that in states with the popular initiative
the policies adopted correspond more closely to the voters' preferences
than in states without the initiative. Similar effects appear in Gerber and
Hug (2001) for a series of policies aiming at protecting minorities. Most
closely related to the theoretical insights discussed in this paper are Hug's
(1999) empirical results. Replicating and extending Gerber's (1999) work,
he demonstrates that the voters' preferences are the most closely re¯ected
in the presence or absence of the death penalty in states that allow for
popular initiatives. The relationship between voter preferences and policy
outcome in states with the popular veto is weaker, and still weaker is the
relationship in states with no non-required referendums. Only in the work
by Lascher et al. (1996) and Camobreco (1998) do authors report evidence
counter to our theoretical results. Matsusaka (2001), however, convincingly
challenges the empirical strategies that these authors employ.
Only partly related to this work attempting to demonstrate the effect of
voter preferences on policy outcomes is the literature dealing with the
effect of provisions for referendums on economic outcomes. Several studies
show that initiative states (and cantons) have lower tax burdens, lower
de®cits, etc.25 Since voter preferences do not enter directly into these empirical models, they only indirectly test propositions related to the theoretical
conclusions of this paper.
25. KirchgaÈssner et al. (1999) review in detail these studies, and Matsusaka (1995, 2000) provides discussion of the literature on the American states.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 493
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to organize our understanding of referendums
and the institutions that regulate them in a theoretically consistent and
empirically accurate way. We saw that the overall assessments of referendums have been controversial: for some authors referendums are the expression of popular will, for others the connection between popular will and
referendum outcome cannot be established. We also saw that classi®cations
of referendums do not use the same criteria, and that some of these criteria
are based on strategic considerations (like who takes the initiative) while
others are based on obscure principles (pro- or anti-hegemonic, controlled
or uncontrolled). Finally, even the theoretical approaches come to different
conclusions depending on the dimensionality of the underlying space: singledimensional approaches can calculate the results of a referendum as a function of the preferences of different actors; multi-dimensional approaches
stress cycles, paradoxes and inadequacies in outcomes.
In order to deal with all these variations in assessments and approaches, we
introduced a multi-dimensional model which enabled us to understand and
explain all these discrepancies. Our model was based on the theory of veto
players, which identi®es the individual or collective actors that are required
to agree for a change of the status quo. On the basis of veto player theory,
we concluded that referendums introduce one additional veto player, the
median voter of the population (or a very close approximation of it, the
center of the yolk of the population). In addition, a circle very well approximates the outer bound on outcomes that are preferred over the status quo by
this new veto player, as if the millions of voters participating in a referendum
were a simple individual.
On the basis of our model, the introduction of the mere possibility of a
referendum shifts the outcomes of legislative politics closer to the population
median. The reason is that legislative outcomes that would replace the status
quo by a point that the median voter dislikes more than the status quo can
immediately be defeated by a referendum, so successful policy choices have
to be located inside the set of preferences of the median voter. Empirical
studies corroborate this expectation. Viewing referendums as the introduction of one additional veto player in a political system leads to the prediction
that the stability of outcomes increases.
The other major consequence of our model is the identi®cation of the institutions that shape not only referendum outcomes, but also the outcomes of
the legislative game when referendums are possible. On the basis of our
analysis the institutions regulating agenda-setting in referendums signi®cantly affect the possible outcomes. Agenda-setting in referendums is divided
in two parts. The ®rst is who triggers the referendum (required referendum,
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
494
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
existing veto player or non-veto player). The second is who asks the question
(veto player, non-veto player). On the basis of the answers in these two questions referendums are divided into four different categories: required referendums (where the question is asked by veto players), veto player referendums
(veto players both trigger and ask the question of the referendum), popular
vetoes (non-veto players trigger, but veto players ask the question), and
popular initiatives (non-veto players both trigger and ask the question).
The more agenda-setting is divided, the more likely that competition
among the different actors involved may lead the referendum results to
approximate the preferences of the median voter. For this reason, popular
initiative institutions should be studied on the basis of by whom and under
what conditions issues can be placed on the ballot. We believe that the differences in assessments of referendums existing in the literature (as discussed in
the introduction of this article) can be attributed to the differences in agendasetting processes. People who dislike referendums pay attention to the question of who controls the agenda of a referendum and why this actor triggered
it; people who like referendums assume a competitive popular initiative process.
At the empirical level, existing systematic studies largely support the
theoretical implications we derive. Institutions allowing for referendums to
be triggered by veto players or non-veto players lead to policies that re¯ect
more closely the voters' preferences. The strongest additional effect of voter
preferences on policy outcomes appears under institutional provisions allowing for popular initiatives. However, as Hug (1999) shows, this stronger
effect diminishes quite considerably as the signature requirement increases.
But decreasing signature requirements also corresponds with an increasing
number of referendums. Thus, constitutional framers should balance well
between different institutional provisions for referendums and the costs
they wish to impose on possible users of these institutions.
While existing empirical research lends some credence to our theoretical
model, future research should carry out more stringent tests. More precisely,
the information provided in Table 2 on the veto players in control of the
referendum agenda in non-required referendums allows for much more
precise predictions of the policy consequences, even on multi-dimensional
issues. In particular, if provisions for referendums cancel out other veto
players our model would predict policy outcomes much more heavily in¯uenced by the veto player in control of the referendum agenda. Such stringent
tests would give constitutional framers much more material on which to
base their decision whether to introduce provisions for referendums in new
constitutions.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 495
APPENDIX
Table 1. Required Referendums Around the World
Country
Constitutional Provision for Required Referendum
Constitution
Used
(revised)
Antigua-Barbuda
Art. 47, constitutional amendments, two-thirds of all the
members of the House must approve amendment
1981
Australia
Art. 128, constitutional amendments, law must be passed 1901
by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament
or by one House of Parliament and submitted by the
governor-general
Austria
Art. 44, total revision of constitution after adoption in
Lower House and absence of objection in Upper House
1929
Bahamas
Art. 54, constitutional amendments, after two-thirds
(three-quarters for some Articles) majorities in both
Houses adopted amendment
1973
Bangladesh
Art. 142, constitutional amendments, a bill, passed by
two-thirds majorities, which provides for the amendment
of the Preamble or any provisions of Art. 8, 48, 94[0r],
56, 95 or 142
1996
Botswana
Art. 89, constitutional amendments, after passage by
two-thirds majority in the Assembly
1966
Colombia
Art. 377, constitutional amendments to Ch. 1 of Title II,
after passage in Parliament
1991 (2001)
Congo
Art. 172, international treaties for cession, exchange or
addition of territory proposed by the president must be
adopted by referendum
1979 (1992)
Croatia
Art. 135, for the association of the Republic of Croatia
in alliances with other states, after passage in Parliament
by a two-thirds majority vote
Art. 137, constitutional amendments, after vote by
two-thirds in National Assembly, provided the
constitution is completely revised, or the amendment
refers to the powers of the National Assembly or to the
rights and duties established in the constitution
1990
Cuba
1976
Denmark
Art. 88, constitutional amendments, after passage by
two separately elected Parliaments
Art. 28, changes in the voting age, after passage by
Parliament
1953
Dominica
Art. 42, constitutional amendments, after approval by a
three-quarters majority in Parliament
1978
Egypt
Art. 189, constitutional amendments, after approval by
two-thirds of the members of the Assembly
1980
continued on next page
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
496
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
El Salvador
Art. 89, constitutional amendments on the creation of a
Central American republic after passage by Parliament
1983
Gabon
Art. 113, international treaties, if they involve territorial
changes
1975 (1991)
Gambia
Art. 226, constitutional amendments, after passage by
three-quarters majority in Assembly
1970 (1996)
Grenada
Art. 39, constitutional amendments, after passage by
two-thirds of the members of the House, amendments to
some sections of the constitution have to be adopted in
a referendum
1974
Guatemala
Art. 280, 173, constitutional amendments, after a
two-thirds vote to amend constitution in the National
Assembly
1985
Guyana
Art. 164, constitutional amendments, after majority of
Parliament has approved amendment to certain parts of
the constitution
Art. 79, constitutional amendments, after passage by
Parliament of an amendment to the status of the
Church under Art. 62
1980
Iceland
Ireland
Jamaica
Art. 46, constitutional amendments, initiated in the
Lower House and after passage in both Houses
Art. 49, constitutional amendments, after passage by
two-thirds majorities in both Houses
1944
1937
1962
Japan
Art. 96, constitutional amendments, initiated in the
Diet and after passage by two-thirds majorities in both
Houses
1964
Kiribati
Art. 69, constitutional amendments, after passage by a
two-thirds majority in Parliament
1979
Korea, South
Art. 130, constitutional amendments, after passage by a
two-thirds majority in the National Assembly
1987
Latvia
Art. 76, 77, amendments to Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, or 77 of the
Constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in
Parliament
1922 (1998)
Liberia
Art. 91, constitutional amendments, after passage by
two-thirds majorities in both Houses
Art. 148, amendments to Art. 1, Chs 1 and 14 of the
constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in
Parliament
1984
Lithuania
1992
Macedonia
Art. 74, 120 changes of borders or association with or
dissociation from a union, after passage by Parliament
with two-thirds majority
Mali
Art. 115, international treaties, treaties involving
1974 (1991)
surrender, exchange, or addition of territory, after
passage by Parliament
Art. 66, constitutional amendments, after adoption of
1964
amendment to certain articles of the constitution by
Parliament
continued on next page
Malta
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
1991
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 497
Mauritius
Art. 47, constitutional amendments, changes to Art. 57(2) 1985
require referendum and then passage by unanimity in
Assembly
Moldova
Art. 141, 142, 143, constitutional amendments, regarding 1994
the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as
well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the
state, after passage by a two-thirds majority in Parliament
Morocco
Art. 104, 105, constitutional amendments after adoption
of constitutional change by both Houses by two-thirds
majorities
1972
Myanmar-Burma
Art. 194, constitutional amendments, after passage by
three-quarters majority in Assembly
1974
Nauru
Art. 84, constitutional amendments, after passage by a
two-thirds majority in Parliament
1968
Paraguay
Art. 290, constitutional amendments after passage by
majorities in both chambers
Art. XVII, constitutional amendments, after being
proposed by a three-quarters majority of congress or a
constitutional convention, which may be called by a
two-thirds majority of congress, or congress may submit
the proposal for such a convention by a simple majority
to the people
1992
(2000)
1987
Romania
Art. 147, constitutional amendments, after passage by
both chambers by two-thirds majority, or in case of
disagreement, by a three-quarters majority of members
of both Chambers
1991
Samoa
Art. 109, constitutional amendments, after passage by
two-thirds majority in Parliament of an amendment to
Art. 102 (territorial changes)
Art. 77, international treaties, after President proposes
territorial changes
1960 (1962)
Philippines
Senegal
1963 (1989)
Sierra Leone
Art. 108, constitutional amendments to certain sections,
after passage by two-thirds majority in Parliament
1978 (1991)
Singapore
Art. 5, constitutional amendments, amendments to
certain sections of constitution adopted by two-thirds
majorities in Parliament
Art. 6, international treaties, surrendering of Singapore
police or armed forces after passage by two-thirds
majority in Parliament
1963
Slovakia
Art. 7, 83, international treaties, entering a state alliance
after passage of a constitutional law by three-®fths in
Parliament
Art. 168, constitutional amendments, total revision or
partial revision of the preliminary title, Ch. II, Section 1
of Title I, or Title II, after passage by two separately
elected Parliaments with two-thirds majorities in both
Houses
1992
Spain
1978
continued on next page
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
498
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Sri Lanka
Art. 101, constitutional amendments, amendments to
Art. 77 after passage by two-thirds majority of all MPs
1977
St Christopher
and Nevis
Art. 38, constitutional amendments, after passage by
two-thirds majority in Parliament
1983
St Lucia
Art. 41, constitutional amendments, after adoption by
three-quarters majority in Parliament
1979
St Vincent
Art. 38, constitutional amendments, after adoption by
the House by a two-thirds majority
1979
Switzerland
Art. 140, constitutional amendments, international
treaties, urgent executive orders in con¯ict with
constitution, after passage by both Houses of Parliament
2000
Ukraine
Art. 156, amendments to Chs I, III and XIII of the
constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in
Parliament
1996
Vanuatu
Art. 86, constitutional amendments, after passage by a
majority in Parliament, provided two-thirds of the
members are present
1979
Venezuela
Art. 345, constitutional amendments, after the proposal
is accepted by a majority in both Houses
1999
Zaire (Democratic
Republic of
Congo)
Art. 200, 263, international treaties that involve secession, 1997
exchange or annexation of territories after rati®cation by
President and adoption of constitutional law, adopted by
two-thirds majorities in both chambers, and some
constitutional amendments, also adopted by two-thirds
majorities in both chambers
Sources: Blaustein and Flanz (1971±), Suksi (1993: 142±3), Kurian (1998), Research and
Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy (http://c2d.unige.ch/, accessed November 2000)
and Auer and BuÈtzer (2001)
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Austria
Art. 44, al. 3, for
constitutional
amendment
Armenia
Art. 111, for
constitutional
matters
Art. 112, for
legislative
matter
Albania
Art. 150, laws
Art. 177,
constitutional
amendments
Argentina
Art. 40, laws
Country and
Constitutional
Provision
One-third of lower
house
Art. 44 (1) Constitutional laws
or constitutional provisions
contained in simple laws can be
passed by the House of
Representatives only in the
presence of at least half the
members and by a two-thirds
majority of the votes cast, they
shall be explicitly speci®ed as
such. (2) Any total revision of
the Federal Constitution shall
Parliament,
Government
Parliament,
Government
House of Deputies
Congress
President in agreement with the
majority of the Parliament, the
Parliament
Two-thirds majorities in
Parliament
Parliament
Existing Veto player
One-®fth of members
of Parliament
50,000 voters
Non-veto player
Agenda-setter
President in agreement
with the majority of the
Parliament, the Parliament
Parliament
Existing Veto-player
Who Triggers
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
1929
1995
1853 (1998)
1998
Constitution
Used
(Revised)
continued on next page
Non-veto player
Table 2. Agenda-setters and Triggers in Non-required Referendums
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 499
Majority of Lower House
President,
Parliament (83 members
out of 125)
Azerbaijan
Art. 95, 109
Existing Veto player
Non-veto player
Who Triggers
Art. 43, for
statute
Country and
Constitutional
Provision
Agenda-setter
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
President
Parliament
If the House of Representatives
so decides or if the majority of
members of the House of
Representatives so demands,
every enactment of the House of
Representatives shall be
submitted to a referendum upon
conclusion of the procedure
pursuant to Art. 42 but before its
authentication by the Federal
President
upon conclusion of the procedure
pursuant to Art. 42 but before its
authentication by the Federal
President be submitted to a
referendum by the entire nation,
whereas any partial revision
requires this only if one-third of
the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate so
demands
Existing Veto player
Table 2. continued
Non-veto player
1995
Constitution
Used
(Revised)
500
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Cameroon
Art. 36, for
important
projects,
Art. 63, for
constitutional
amendment
Central African
Republic
Art. 26, bills
Chile
Art. 117,
constitution
Colombia
Art. 155, 378:
constitution
Croatia
Art. 135,
association with
other states
Congress
Brazil
Art. 49
Bulgaria
Art. 84
Proposal by 5% of
citizens
Proposal by Government
Proposed by at least one-third
Proposed by at least
1998
of the MPs, the President or the one-third of the MPs
government; preliminary decision
on association/separation taken
by majority of two-thirds of the
continued on next page
total number of MPs
Majorities in both
chambers
President or Government;
majority of preliminary
decision on two-thirds of
the MPs
1991 (2001)
1989
Constitutional amendment
proposed by the two chambers
President of the Republic
1972
PreÂsident de la reÂpublique
1986 (1996)
1971
1988 (1993)
Decision taken by the Parliament
(National Assembly)
Congress
450,000 nationals
(6.25%): at least 30,000
in every region and the
town of Minsk
1996
President or Parliament
450,000 nationals
(6.25%): at least 30,000
in every region and the
town of Minsk
President, Parliament majority of
both chambers
President on proposal of
Government
Decision taken by the
Parliament (National
Assembly)
PreÂsident de la reÂpublique
President, Parliament
majority of both chambers
Belarus
Art. 74, 84
Art. 74
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 501
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Ecuador
Art. 104,
constitutional
amendment or
important
questions for
the country
Denmark
Art. 42, bills
Art. 20
delegation
of powers
international
organizations
Art. 80, 81, 87
Country and
Constitutional
Provision
President of the Republic
Proposed by the Chamber
of comitats; decision taken
by the Chamber of
representatives; requested
by the Government;
decision taken by the
President of the Republic
with the countersignature
of the President of the
Government
Existing Veto player
One sixth of MPs
One third of MPs
Non-veto player
Who Triggers
Agenda-setter
President of the Republic
Bill has been passed by the
Parliament
Parliament
House of Representatives
President of the Republic may, at
the proposal of the Government
and with the countersignature of
the Prime Minister
Existing Veto player
Table 2. continued
Non-veto player
1984
1953
Constitution
Used
(Revised)
502
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Greece
Art. 44.2,
questions of
national
importance
20,000 voters
President on proposal of
the Cabinet and an
absolute majority of MPs;
President on proposal
submitted by two-®fths of
MPs and adopted by
three-®fths majority
President;
200,000 citizens
at least half of each
chamber of the Parliament
President
President and the two chambers
President
Georgia
Art. 74
Art. 102,
constitution
President, on proposition of
Government or both chambers
President, on proposition
of government or both
chambers
President on proposal of the
Cabinet and an absolute majority
of MPs; President on proposal
submitted by two-®fths of MPs
and adopted by three-®fths
majority
President
President
Parliament
Three-®fths majority in
Parliament
President on proposal of
government, majority of
MPs
Parliament
Parliament
Gabon
Art. 18
Estonia
Art. 105,
legislative
Art. 162,
constitutional
amendments
France
Art. 11, bills
affecting the
state and its
institutions
Art. 89,
constitution
200,000 citizens
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
continued on next page
1975
1995
1975 (1997)
1958
1992
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 503
500,000 voters or ®ve
Both Chambers of Parliament
regional councils
Request is made by one Majorities in both Chambers
®fth of the members
of either Chamber
or by 500,000 electors
Parliament
Italy
Art. 75, laws
Art. 138,
constitutional
amendments
Iran
Art. 59
Parliament
Parliament shall have the right to
call a national referendum.
A majority of two-thirds of the
votes of the MPs present is
required to pass the
law on national referenda.
President has the right to initiate
national referendums
Parliament
Existing Veto player
President on proposal
Lower House
of majority of Senate
and at least one-third of
MPs of Lower House
Two-thirds of MPs
Iceland
Art. 26
Non-veto player
Agenda-setter
Ireland
Art. 27 and 47,
bills
President when he refuses
to ratify a bill
Hungary
Art. 19, 30a
Existing Veto player
Who Triggers
Supreme electoral court on
proposal of President or
the congress
Parliament,
President
Guatemala
Art. 173
Country and
Constitutional
Provision
Table 2. continued
Non-veto player
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
1948
1937
1979
1944 (1994)
1985
Constitution
Used
(Revised)
504
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
President on accord from
bureau National Assembly
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Art. 66,
constitutional
amendments
Liechtenstein
Parliament
Art. 66, laws
Art. 64, 66, laws
Art. 78,
constitution
Ivory Coast
Art. 14
Latvia
Art. 72, 74,
legislative
President
1500 citizens or four
communities
1000 citizens
1000 citizens
One-tenth at least of the
voters can present a
draft revision
(completely elaborated)
of the constitution to
the President, who
submits it to the
Parliament; if the
Parliament amends it, a
referendum must be
held
Parliament
Parliament
One-tenth of the voters, Parliament
provided law is not
adopted by a threequarters majority
or by ®ve regional
Councils, provided
amendment has not
been adopted by
majorities of two-thirds
in both Chambers
1921 (1992)
continued on next page
1000 citizens, provided
proposal has not been
adopted by Parliament
One-tenth at least of the
voters can present a
draft revision
(completely elaborated)
of the constitution to
the President, who
submits it to the
Parliament; if the
Parliament amends it, a
referendum must be
held
1998
1960
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 505
Majority of two-thirds of the
Deputies
Parliament
Proposed by the President
of the Republic, the
government or at least 40
Deputies; decision taken
by majority of two-thirds
of the Deputies
150,000 nationals
Parliament
Parliament
Existing Veto player
Majority of two-thirds of
Deputies
Majority of deputies
Macedonia
Art. 68, 73
Art. 74,
changing
frontiers
Art. 120,
entering,
leaving
supranational
organization
300,000 nationals; onequarter of the
Parliament, provided
amendment deals with
Art. 1 or Chs 1 and 14
300,000 nationals
1500 citizens
1500 citizens
Non-veto player
Agenda-setter
Majority of two-thirds of
Deputies
Parliament
Parliament
Existing Veto player
Who Triggers
Lithuania
Art. 9, laws
Art. 147,
constitution
Art. 64, 66,
constitutional
amendments
Art. 66 bis,
international
treaties
Country and
Constitutional
Provision
Table 2. continued
300,000 nationals; one
quarter of the
Parliament
1500 citizens, provided
proposal has not been
adopted by Parliament
Non-veto player
1991
1992
Constitution
Used
(Revised)
506
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Government;
President
Government;
President
King, except if both
Chambers have adopted
law by two-thirds
majorities
President after
consultation with President
of National Assembly,
Supreme Court
Morocco
Art. 69 (70)
Niger
Art. 49
200,000 citizens (8.5%)
covering at least a half
of the nation's districts
and municipalities and
in their turn each of
those districts and
municipalities must be
represented by at least
5000 registered signers
in support of the
initiative; one-third of
the Parliament
President, Parliament
Moldova
Art. 66, 75, 88
Art. 141, 142,
constitution
(provisions
regarding the
sovereignty,
independence
and unity of
the state, as
well as those
regarding the
permanent
neutrality of
the state)
President
Cabinet
President
President on proposal of
the Cabinet or National
Assembly
President, Parliament
Mali
Art. 41, laws
Three-quarters majority
of the members of the National
Assembly and the Senate
President in the Council of
Ministers
Madagascar
Art. 140,
amendment to
constitution
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
1989 (1996)
1972 (1996)
continued on next page
200,000 citizens (8.5%)
covering at least a half
of the nation's districts
and municipalities, and
in their turn each of
those districts and
municipalities must be
represented by at least
5000 registered signers
in support of the
initiative; one-third of
the Parliament
1994
1974 (1992)
1975 (1992)
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 507
Existing Veto player
Art. 125, 144
Art. 90, on
sovereignty
President in agreement
with the Senate, the
Parliament (absolute
majority, at least half of
the Deputies being present)
One-®fth of the
Deputies
12% of voters
If amendments are not
adopted by two-thirds
majorities, referendum
is required
10% of voters
Non-veto player
Who Triggers
Philippines
Art. VI, 32
Art. XVII, 2,
constitutional
amendment
Poland
President, Senate
Art. 235,
revision of
Chs I, II or XII
of the
constitution
Peru
Art. 206
constitution
Country and
Constitutional
Provision
Agenda-setter
House of Representatives (Sejm)
by a majority of at least twothirds of votes in the presence of
at least half of the statutory
number of Deputies, and by the
Senate by an absolute majority of
votes in the presence of at least
half of the statutory number of
Senators
President in agreement with the
Senate, the Parliament (absolute
majority, at least half of the
Deputies being present)
Parliament
Constitutional amendments
adopted by absolute majority in
congress
Existing Veto player
Table 2. continued
12% of voters
10% of voters
Non-veto player
1989 (1997)
1987
1993
Constitution
Used
(Revised)
508
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Slovenia
Art. 170,
constitution
Art. 90 II, 97 I,
99 II, legislative
Art. 168, 169,
Government
170,
constitution
President declares the
referendum if the National
Council proposes
resolution presented by the
Deputies of the National
Council or the
Government
President on proposal of
Prime Minister,
consultation with
Assemblies, Constitutional
Court
Senegal
Art. 46, bill
Slovakia
Art. 93, 95, 98,
102
Art. 86, 93, 95,
96, 102
President
President after having
asked the Parliament's
advice
Two-thirds majorities in
both Chambers, or threequarters majority in joint
session
Russia
Art. 84
Art. 146,
constitution
Romania
Art. 90
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
30,000 voters,
20 Deputies
Government
1989
1992
1963 (1999)
1993
1991
continued on next page
40,000 nationals
National Assembly
40,000 nationals, onethird of Deputies
30 Deputies
350,000 nationals
National Assembly
Parliament
Parliament
At least 30 (out of 90)
Deputies
President declares the
referendum if 350,000
nationals sign petition
Parliament
President
Two-thirds majorities in both
Chambers, or three-quarters
majority in joint session
President
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 509
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Upper and Lower House
Majorities in both Houses
Majority in Riksdag
100,000 citizens
If constitutional
Two-thirds majority in
amendment gets less
Parliament
than four-®fths and
more than two-thirds in
assembly
50,000 citizens or
8 cantons
Switzerland
Art. 140, 141
Art. 141, some
international
treaties
Art. 138, 193
Togo
Art. 144
Upper and Lower House
One-tenth of the
Riksdag on a bill
propose motion, which
must be supported by
one-third of MPs
Cabinet
President
Cabinet
President
Existing Veto player
Approved by more than
two-thirds in Parliament
Non-veto player
Agenda-setter
President, if amendment is Supreme Court
adopted by a majority
larger than two-thirds
Existing Veto player
Who Triggers
Sweden
Art. 15
Sri Lanka
Art. 103,
constitutional
amendments
subject to
Art. 101
Art. 103, bills
Art. 104
Country and
Constitutional
Provision
Table 2. continued
100,000 citizens
Non-veto player
1979 (1992)
2000
1975
1977 (1988)
Constitution
Used
(Revised)
510
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
President, Parliament
President may submit bill
or a treaty to ratify
10% of citizens or
two-®fths of the
Assembly may submit
proposals
3,000,000 citizens
(signatures collected in
no less than two-thirds
of the Oblasts, with no
less than 100,000
signatures in each
Oblast)
President
Parliament
Three-®fths majority of the total
number of members of the
Assembly
National Assembly
10% of citizens or
two-®fths of the
Assembly may submit
proposals
3,000,000 citizens
(signatures collected in
no less than two-thirds
of the Oblasts, with no
less than 100,000
signatures in each
Oblast)
1967
(1996)
(1996)
1982
1959 (1991)
Sources: Blaustein and Flanz (1971±), Suksi (1993), Kurian (1998), Thibaut (2000), Trechsel (2000), Research and Documentation Centre on Direct
Democracy (http://c2d.unige.ch/, accessed May 2000) and Auer and BuÈtzer (2001).
Uruguay
Art. 331,
constitutional
changes
Ukraine
Art. 72 I
Art. 72 II
Tunisia
Art. 47
Turkey
Art. 104,
legislation for
amending the
constitution
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 511
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
512
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
REFERENCES
Abromeit, Heidrun (1998) Democracy in Europe. Legitimising Politics in a Non-State Polity.
Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Ackerman, Bruce (1999) `The New Separation of Powers', Harvard Law Review 113: 634±729.
Auer, Andreas and Michael BuÈtzer, eds (2001) Direct Democracy: The Eastern and Central
European Experience. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) `Issue Unbundling via Citizens' Initiatives. San
Antonio', Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice
Society, 9±12 March.
Bowler, Shaun and Todd Donovan (1998) Demanding Choices. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Blaustein, A.P. and G.H. Flanz, eds (1971±) Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Dobbs
Ferry: Oceana Publications.
Bogdanor, Vernon (1994) `Western Europe', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds) Referendums Around the World, pp. 24±97. London: Macmillan.
Brams, Steven J., D. Marc Kilgour and William S. Zwicker (1997) `Voting on Referenda: The
Separability Problem and Possible Solutions', Electoral Studies 16(3): 359±77.
Brams, Steven J., D. Marc Kilgour and William S. Zwicker (1998) `The Paradox of Multiple
Elections', Social Choice and Welfare 15 (2): 211±36.
Budge, Ian (1996) The New Challenge of Direct Democracy. Cambrige: Polity Press.
Camobreco, John F. (1998) `Preferences, Fiscal Policies, and the Initiative Process', Journal of
Politics 60(3): 819±29.
Cronin, Thomas E. (1989) Direct Democracy. The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
D'Alimonte, Roberto and Alessandro Chiaramonte (1993) `Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano:
Quali OpportunitaÁ?', Rivista Italiana die Scienza Politica 23(3): 513±47.
Ferejohn, John A., Richard D. McKelvey and Edward W. Packell (1984) `Limiting Distributions
for Continuous State Markov Voting Models', Social Choice and Welfare 1: 45±67.
Gallagher, Michael (1996) `Conclusion', in Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds) The
Referendum Experience in Europe, pp. 226±52. London: Macmillan.
Gerber, Elisabeth R. (1996) `Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives', American
Journal of Political Science 40(1): 99±128.
Gerber, Elisabeth R. (1999) The Populist Paradox: Interest Group In¯uence and the Promise of
Direct Legislation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Simon Hug (2001) `Legislative Responses to Direct Legislation', in
Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin (eds) The Impact of Referendums on Liberal Democratic Institutions: A Comparative Perspective, pp. 88±108. London: Macmillan.
Hamon, Francis (1995) Le reÂfeÂrendum. Etude comparative. Paris: Librairie geÂneÂrale de droit et de
jurisprudence.
Hug, Simon (1999) `Occurrence and Policy Consequences of Referendums. A Theoretical Model
and Empirical Evidence', Typescript. La Jolla: Department of Political Science, University of
California, San Diego.
KirchgaÈssner, Gebhard, Lars P. Feld and Marcel R. Savioz (1999) Die direkte Demokratie der
Schweiz: Modern, erfolgreich, entwicklungs- und exportfaÈhig. Basel: Helbing und Lichtenhahn.
Koehler, David H. (1990) The Size of the Yolk: Computations for Odd and Even-numbered
Committees', Social Choice and Welfare 7: 231±45.
KoÈnig, Thomas and Simon Hug (2000) `Ratifying Maastricht. Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts', European Union Politics 1(1): 89±122.
Kurian, George Thomas (1998) World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 513
Lacy, Dean and Emerson M. S. Niou (2000) `A Problem with Referendums', Journal of Theoretical Politics 12(1): 5±32.
Lascher, Edward L., Michael G. Hagen and Steven A. Rochlin (1996) Gun Behind the Door ±
Ballot Initiatives, State Policies and Public Opinion', Journal of Politics 58(3): 760±75.
Lesage, Michel (1995) Constitutions d'Europe centrale, orientale et balte. Paris: La documentation francËaise.
Lupia, Arthur (1992) `Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information', American
Political Science Review 86(2): 390±404.
Lupia, Arthur (1994) `Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in
California Insurance Reform Elections', American Political Science Review 88(1): 63±76.
Magleby, David E. (1984) Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Matsusaka, John G. (1995) `Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last
30 Years', Journal of Political Economy 103(3): 587±623.
Matsusaka, John G. (2001) `Problems with a Methodology Used to Test Whether Policy Is More
or Less Responsive to Public Opinion in States with Voter Initiatives', Journal of Politics 63(4):
1250±6.
Matsusaka, John G. and Nolan M. McCarty (2001 `Political Resource Allocation: The Bene®ts
and Costs of Voter Initiatives', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17(2): 413±48.
McKelvey, Richard D. (1976) `Intransitivities in Multi-dimensional Voting Models and Some
Implications for Agenda Control', Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472±82.
Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld (1989) The Geometry of Majority Rule',
Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(4): 379±406.
MoÈckli, Silvano (1994) Direkte Demokratie. Ein internationaler Vergleich. Bern: Haupt.
Moser, Peter (1996) `Why is Swiss Politics so Stable?', Zeitschrift fuÈr Volkswirtschaft und
Statistik 132(1): 31±60.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1979) Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1996) Constitutional Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Neidhart, Leonard (1970) Plebiszit und pluralitaÈre Demokratie. Bern: Francke.
Newell, James L. and Martin J. Bull (1993) `The Italian Referenda of April 1993: Real Change at
Last?', West European Politics 16(4): 607±15.
Nurmi, Hannu (1997a) `Referendum Design: An Exercise in Applied Social Choice Theory',
Scandinavian Political Studies 20(1): 33±52.
Nurmi, Hannu (1997b) `Compound Majority Paradoxes and Proportional Representation',
European Journal of Political Economy 13(3): 443±54.
Nurmi, Hannu (1998) `Voting Paradoxes and Referenda', Social Choice and Welfare 15(3): 333±
50.
Ranney, Austin (1978) `United States of America', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds)
Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, pp. 67±86. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Riker, William H. (1982) Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal (1978) `Political Resource Allocation, Controlled
Agendas, and the Status Quo', Public Choice 33(4): 27±43.
Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal (1979) `Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political
Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy', Quarterly Journal of Economics
93(4): 561±87.
Rousseau, J.J. (1947) The Social Contract. New York: Hafner Publishing Co.
Saari, Donald G. and Katri K. Sieberg (2001) `The Sum of the Parts Can Violate the Whole,
American Political Science Review 95(2): 415.
Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
514
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
Schmitter, Philippe C. (2000) How to Democratize the Euro-Polity and Why Bother? New York:
Rowman and Little®eld.
Scho®eld, Norman (1978) `Instability of Simple Dynamic Games', Review of Economic Studies
45: 575±94.
SetaÈlaÈ, Maija (1999) Referendums and Democratic Government. London: Macmillan.
Smith, Gordon (1976) `The Functional Properties of the Referendum', European Journal of
Political Research 4(1): 1±23.
Steunenberg, Bernard (1992) `Referendum, Initiative, and Veto Power', Kyklos 45(4): 501±29.
Stone, Christine, ed. (1997) Pariah or Victim? A Reappraisal of Human Right and Democracy in
Belarus. Oxford: The British Helsinki Human Rights Group.
Suksi, Markku (1993) Bringing in the People: A Comparison of Constitutional Forms and Practices of the Referendum. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Thibaut, Bernard (2000) `Referendums: Latin America', in Richard Rose (ed.) The International
Encyclopedia of Elections, pp. 267±8. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.
Trechsel, Alexander H. (2000) `Initiative: Europe', in Richard Rose (ed.) The International
Encyclopedia of Elections, pp. 151±3. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
Tsebelis, George (1995a) `Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarism, Multicamerialism and Multipartyism', British Journal of Political Science
25: 289±325.
Tsebelis, George (1995b) `Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies', in
H. Doering (ed.) Parliaments in Western Europe: Majority Rule and Minority Rights, pp. 83±
111. New York: St Martin's Press.
Tsebelis, George (1999) `Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An
Empirical Analysis', American Political Science Review 93 (Sept.): 591±608.
Tsebelis, George (2000) `Veto Players and Institutional Analysis', Governance 13(4): 441±74.
Tsebelis, George (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (1996) `Introduction', in Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds)
The Referendum Experience in Europe, pp. 1±19. London: Macmillan.
ZuÈrn, Michael (1996) UÈber den Staat und die Demokratie im europaÈischen Mehrebenensystem',
Politische Vierteljahresschrift 37(1): 27±55.
SIMON HUG is a Professor of Political Science at the University of St Gallen
(Switzerland). His research interests include the formation of new political
parties, the effect of institutions and, more particularly, referendums and
federalism on decision-making and con¯ict resolution, formal theory and
research methods. He is the author of Altering Party Systems (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2001), Voices of Europe. Citizens, Referendums
and European Integration (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little®eld, 2002), coauthor with Stefano Bartolini and Daniele Caramani of Political Parties and
Party Systems. A Bibliographic Guide to the Literature on Parties and Party
Systems in Europe since 1945 (London: Sage, 1998) and co-editor with Pascal
Sciarini of Nouvelles valeurs et nouveaux clivages en Suisse (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002). ADDRESS: Institut fuÈr Politikwissenschaft, Dufourstrasse 45,
9000 St Gallen, Switzerland [email: [email protected]].
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 515
GEORGE TSEBELIS is Professor of Political Science at University of California, Los Angeles. His work focuses on political institutions and parties of
advanced industrialized countries in general and the European Union in
particular. He is the author of Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative
Politics (University of California Press, 1990; translated into Portuguese), and
Veto players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton University Press,
2002; translated into Italian), and co-author of Bicameralism (Cambridge University Press, 1997). His articles have been published in numerous professional
journals and translated in French, German, Greek, Japanese and Spanish.
ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, 405 Hilgard Avenue, University
of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA. [email: [email protected]]
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010
Downloaded from jtp.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 30, 2010