THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATIONAND UN
RESOLUTION 242
DONALD NEFF
The Clintonteamhas turnedoutto be morehospitable
to Israel'sbasic
policiesthananyadministration
before
it. In lessthana yearin office,
ithas
already
significantly
changed,
diluted,
orsignaleditswillingness
tomodify
at
leastfourimportant
U.S.policieson theMiddleEast. First,
itopenlyallowed
theuseofU.S.fundstofinance
thegrowth
ofJewish
settlements
inArabEast
Jerusalem
and the otheroccupiedterritories.'
Second,it acquiescedin
Israel'scontention
thatIsraeliruleoverArabJerusalem
is non-negotiable.2
Third,it effectively
endorsedIsrael'srightto deportPalestinians.3
And
it has seemedto acceptIsrael'scontention
fourth,
thattheArabterritories
captured
byIsraelin 1967are "disputed"
rather
than"occupied."4
Nowthereareindications
thattheadministration
is considering
deserting
whathasbeentheverycornerstone
ofU.S.policyon theArab-Israeli
conflict
forthepast quartercentury-United
CouncilResolution
NationsSecurity
242. As theworldcommunity's
overarching
summation
of the land-fortheresolution
thelegitimacy
andtheframework
peaceformula,
hasprovided
forall attempts
at finding
peacesinceitspassagein 1967.
It is theerosionoftheClintonadministration's
on thespecific
positions
issuesmentioned
above-positionsthatmoreover
werederivedfromthe
DonaldNeffis author
ofhow
oftheWariorstrilogy
(AmanaBooks),a study
U.S.policyrelated
toIsraelandtheArabsduring
thewarsof1956,1967,and
EastHandbook,
on whichthis
1973,andoftheunpublished
database,Middle
articleis based.
Journal
StudiesXXIII,no. 2 (Winter1994),pp. 20-30.
ofPalestine
RESOLUTION 242
21
broadpreceptsof Resolution242-that givesriseto concernthattheresolution as a whole is about to be jettisoned.The resolutiondirectlyrefersto
occupiedterritories,
Israeliwithdrawaltherefrom,
and the inadmissibility
of
the acquisitionof territory
by force. Over the years,the UnitedStateshad
made clearthatitbelievedthecapturedterritories
wereindeedundermilitary
occupationand thatIsrael'swithdrawalshouldbe totalexceptforminorand
reciprocalborderadjustments.Yetin itstwodraftpaperson an Israeli-Palestiniandeclarationof principles,submittedduringthepeace talkson 14 May
and 30 June 1993-before the September1993 Israeli-PLO accord-the
UnitedStatesconsistently
failedto describethe territories
as "occupied." It
madeno mention,in fact,oftheoccupation.Nor did it mentionIsraeliwithdrawal,redeployment,
or an exchangeof land forpeace.5
Most chillingwas an indicationin the 30 Junedraftthatthe Clintonadministration
had completelyabandoned any commitmentto honor the
UnitedStates'originalconceptof 242. In theJunedraft,the UnitedStates
wrote: "The two sides concurthatthe agreementreachedbetweenthemon
permanentstatuswill constitute
the implementation
of Resolutions242 and
338 in all theiraspects." While thelanguageis so legalistically
ambiguousas
to defyclearinterpretation,
certainly
one readingofitis thattheUnitedStates
has no positionat all on themeaningof242. DesertionofResolution242 by
theClintonadministration
would be a portentous
eventforthecurrent
peace
efforts
betweenIsrael and the Palestinians.As theweakerparty,the Palestiniansneed an "honestbroker"to assurethattheygetas faira deal as possible. Withoutjustice,the Palestinianswill not be able to agree to a final
settlement.There are too manyrejectionists
among them(and among the
Arabstates)forthemto be able to accepta settlement
thatis patentlyunfair.
Yet iftheUnitedStatesno longersupportsthemajortenetsoftheresolution,
the prospectsforresolvingthe conflictare dim indeed.
Administration
Supporters
ofIsrael
The Clintonadministration
has outdistancedall its predecessorsin terms
of strongIsrael supportersat the highestlevels. These include President
Clintonhimselfand Vice PresidentAl Gore.
Clintonhas repeatedlyshown himselfsensitiveto a faultto theIsraelipartoftheconflict. Clintonhas shownhimself
He seldom seems to miss a chance to retell sensitiveto a faultto the
the anecdoteabouthis old preacherwho, on Israelipartof the conflict.
his death bed, warned the futurepresident
thatif he ever "let Israel down, God would neverforgiveme," as Clinton
describesit,adding,"I'll neverlet Israeldown."'6 Gore has describedIsrael
as America's"strongest
allyand bestfriend,notonlyin theMiddleEast,but
anywhere
else in theworld." He takespridein thefactthaton mattersofthe
MiddleEasthe is theprotegeofMartinPeretz,themanwho becameeditorof
22
JOURNALOF PALESTI
STUDIES
theNewRepublicafterhis wifeboughtit and managedto transform
it intoan
apologistorganforIsrael.7
As antithetical
to achievingan evenhandedpolicyas thepresidenthimself
is the dedicationto Israel's interestsof manyof the highestofficialsin his
administration.Under Clinton,the bureaucracy'smost influentialofficials
includeMartinIndyk,head of the MiddleEast desk at the NationalSecurity
Council; Samuel W. Lewis,head of the StateDepartment'spolicyplanning
staff;and Dennis B. Ross, thechiefU.S. negotiator
in theArab-Israelipeace
talks. These threemen have prominentrolesin themostsensitiveU.S. policy-making
on the Middle East.
An Australiannationalwho beganworkingfortheAmericanIsraelPublic
Affairs
Committee(AIPAC), Israel'sAmericanlobby,in theearly1980s, Indykis widelyknownas a supporterof IsraeliLikudleaderssuch as Yitzhak
Shamir. In 1985 he cofoundedan AIPAC spin-off,
theWashingtonInstitute
forNear East Policy,of whichhe was executivedirectoruntilhis appointmentby Clinton. He is reportedto have said thatthepurposeoftheinstitute
was to "counterArabistviews."8 He has been astonishingly
successful.
Everystudyand activity
undertaken
by theinstitute
has advancedthatstated
ambition.
Lewis was ambassadorto Israel foreightyears,wherehis sympathiesto
theIsraelicause wererewardedby lavishhonorsand lucrativeappointments
upon his retirement
in 1985. He was namedthefirstInternational
Fellow at
theDayan Centerat Tel AvivUniversity,
appointedto theboard of overseers
oftheTrumanInstitute
forInternational
in JeruPeace at HebrewUniversity
salem,and made a board memberof the New Yorkbranchof Bank Leumi,
Israel's largestbank. At the time,Lewis said he so admiredIsrael thathe
planned to spend about half his time livingthereand helpingin Israel's
fund-raising
drives.9
Ross keeps a low profileas a behind-the-scenes
playerwho has been activein bothRepublicanand Democraticadministrations.
Butwhilehe has a
less-publicimagethanLewis or Indyk,his sympathies
are no secret:according to the Washington
Post,he has "strongpro-Israelconvictions."'0Or, as
authorRobertKaplan reported,Ross "traveledin pro-Israel,Neo-Conservativecircles."" He has been activeforyearsin promoting
pro-Israelpositions
in variousstudiesand forums,in whichhe has had no kindwordsforwhat
he called back in 1985 "traditionalArabistsand theirmedia supporters,"a
quaint-sounding
phrasethesedays.'2 Ross' pro-Israelcredentialsweresufficientlyimpressivethatthe patronsof the WashingtonInstitutefoundhim
morethanacceptableas one oftheirown. He was slatedto replaceIndykas
the directorof the institutebeforehe was givenhis job by Clintonas the
directorof the peace talks.'3
ofStateWarrenChristopher
has remainedsomethingof a cipher
Secretary
in termsoftheMiddleEast. Buthis personalviewsbarelymatter,
sincehe is
boxed in betweena chiefexecutiveand a bureaucracythatshare the same
biases favoring
Israel. He can hardlyretainhis post withoutfollowingtheir
RESOLUTION 242
23
lead. WhateverChristopher's
personaloutlook,a numberof thehighestnational-security
officialsof the Clintonadministration
are more thanusually
sympathetic
to Israel. This is thecase ofa groupwho servedas membersofa
commissionthatwrotea highlypro-Israelreportcallingfora "U.S.-Israel
in thepost-coldwar era. The report,
partnership"
Enduring
was
Partnership,
commissionedand guidedby theWashingtonInstitute
in 1992, while Indyk
was itshead.'4 It was supportedby a grantfromEdgarM. Bronfman,
chairman of the Seagramliquorgiantand activein Zionistcauses.
The Clintonofficialsassociatedwiththisstudyinclude such administrationluminariesas Secretary
ofDefenseLes Aspin,DirectorofCentralIntelligenceR. JamesWoolsey,U.S. Ambassadorto theUnitedNationsMadeleine
Albright,
and the head of the NationalSecurityCouncil W. AnthonyLake
and his chiefdeputy,Samuel "Sandy"Berger.Othersare Leon Fuerth,assistantto Vice PresidentGore on securityaffairs;Clark Murdock,assistantto
thesecretary
of defense;and WalterSlocombe,principaldeputyundersecretaryof defense. Lewis, Indyk,and Ross also participatedin one formor
another.15 Most of the commission'swork had been completedby early
1993, but the workactuallycame out afterClintonappointedhis team. A
footnoteon the participants
explainsthatthosewho joined the Clintonadministration
terminated
theirmembership"and do not, therefore,
endorse
the report."
The studycalled fordeeperand closertiesbetweenIsrael and the United
Statesin the post-coldwar period. It supportedthe continuationof aid to
Israel at the current(huge) levels,urgedthe United Statesto share more
satellitereconnaissancedata with Israel, and endorsedthe kind of "quiet
on the deportationof
diplomacyfromwhichthe U.S.-Israelunderstandings
PalestinianIslamic activistsemergedin February1993." (This last was a
referenceto the deal workedout by Secretaryof State Christopherwhich
ignoredtheU.S. votein theUN Security
CouncildemandingIsrael'simmediate returnof 413 Palestiniansdeportedin December 1992 in orderto privatelyagree Israel could deport them for a limitedperiod-as already
mentioned,a significant
policychangeon U.S. oppositionto deportations.)
The studywent so faras to make a special plea forIsrael to maintainits
nuclearmonopolyin the region: "Ideally,Israelwould like to retainits exclusivenucleardeterrent
whileproliferation
is prevented-eitherthroughdiplomacyorjointmilitary
actionor,ifnecessaryas in 1981, actionby Israel's
military
forces."
TheOniginal
MeaningofResolution
242
Withsuch a networkof Israelsupporters
muchof theClinton
throughout
administration's
national-security
apparatus,it is importantto examinethe
of Resolution242. The resolution,unanilong-heldU.S. interpretation
mouslypassed by the United Nations SecurityCouncil on 22 November
1967, was deceptivelysimple.'6 If one moreword had been added to the
24
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
292 ofthebriefresolution,
muchofthequarrelingstillgoingon aboutits meaningwould
have been avoided. That one word is either
"the" or "all." Withouteitherof theseclarifyingwords, the resolutioncalls simplyfor
"withdrawalof Israeliarmedforcesfromterritoriesoccupied."
Failureto call forIsraeliwithdrawalfrom"the" or "all" territories
occupied was consideredat the timeto be an exercisein creativeambiguity,
a
hedgeaimed at givingbothpartiesa chanceto straighten
out awkwardfrontiersleftby thearmistices
of 1949. Althoughmostcouncilmemberswanted
to demand Israel's totalwithdrawal,the UnitedStateshad boughtinto the
idea encouragedby Israelthatthepostwarperiodwas a timewhen thefrontierscould be rationalizedto bothsides' advantagewithminorand reciprocal
changes.
The land capturedby Israel in 1967-the territories
fromwhich Resolution242 soughtIsrael'swithdrawal-was of significant
extent:theOld City
of Jerusalem(1 /2square miles),the Golan Heights(500 square miles),the
Sinai Peninsula(18,100 squaremiles,including135 squaremilesoftheGaza
Strip),and theWest Bank(2,270 squaremiles). To putthesefiguresin perspective,Israel'ssize as envisionedby the 1947 UN partition
plan was 5,900
square miles; in the 1948-49 fighting
Israel expandedits area of controlto
8,000 square miles.
The Johnsonadministration
had been the majorplayerin sellingto the
Arabs the idea of usingindefinite
languagein the withdrawalclause. As a
StateDepartmentstudyof the issue completedin 1978 reported:"Support
forthe conceptof totalwithdrawalwas widespreadin the SecurityCouncil,
and it was only throughintensiveAmericanefforts
thata resolutionwas
adoptedwhich employedindefinitelanguagein the withdrawalclause. In
theprocessof obtainingthisresult,theUnitedStatesmade clearto theArab
statesand severalothermembersof the SecurityCouncil thatthe United
Statesenvisionedonly insubstantialrevisionsof the 1949 armisticelines.
Israel did not protestthisapproach."''7
One example of how the UnitedStatessold the resolutionto the Arabs
involvedtheLatrunSalient,a smallprotrusion
of land held byJordanin the
LatrunPlain thatblockeddirectroad travelbetweenTel Avivand Jerusalem
throughtheWadi al-Bab. On 6 November,less thanthreeweeksbeforethe
passageof 242, Secretary
of StateDean Ruskprivately
assuredKingHussein
ofJordanin a WashingtonmeetingthatifJordangave up theLatrunSalient,
"the UnitedStateswould thenuse its diplomaticand politicalinfluenceto
obtainin compensationaccess forJordanto a Mediterranean
portin Israel."
Arthur
J. Goldberg,America'sambassadorto theUnitedNations,gave Hussein similarassurancesat the same time,also citingLatrunas the kind of
minorchangecontemplated.'8
If one morewordhad been
addedto 242, muchof the
quarrelingaboutits
meaningwould have been
avoided.
RESOLUTION 242
25
When Husseinmeton 8 NovemberwithLyndonJohnson,who had been
briefedbyRuskon theU.S. interpretation,
theJordanianmonarchaskedhow
soon Israelitroopswould withdrawfrommostof the occupied lands. The
presidentreplied: "In six months."'9 Afterthese assurancesfromthe top
echelonsof the government,
King Hussein pronouncedhimself"extremely
satisfied"withthe U.S. interpretation
of withdrawalby Israeliforces.20
Israelgaveeveryindicationat thetimeofthevoteon Resolution242 thatit
agreedwith the U.S. interpretation.
The 1978 StateDepartmentstudyreported: "There was no overtconflictbetweenthe UnitedStatesand Israel
overthe U.S. viewson withdrawal,
and in severalrespectsthe U.S. position
coincidedwiththatof Israel.... At no timeduringthisperioddid Israel
in
arguethatit would withdrawonly on selectedfronts.To the contrary,
withAmericanofficialsthe Israelisconsistently
conversations
discussedthe
'21
conceptsof withdrawaland securebordersin termsof threefronts.'
Israel'sOpposition
to242
The resolutionhad barelybeen passed beforeIsraelbegan challengingits
generallyacceptedmeaning,sometimesin quiteextraordinary
terms.Foreign
MinisterAbba Eban, forexample,arguedthatthe"centraland primary"concernoftheresolution
was notreallywithdrawalat all, buttheneed fora "just
and lastingpeace." (He did notexplainhow a "justand lastingpeace" could
be attainedwith a continuingmilitaryoccupation.) At anothertime Eban
and otherIsraeliofficialsarguedthattheprincipleof the "inadmissibility
of
theacquisitionofterritory
bywar" was notrelevantto Israelsincethephrase
because it apappearedonlyin the preambularparagraphor, alternatively,
plied onlyto warsofaggression.The factthatitwas Israelthathad launched
the 1967 war was ignored.22
withat leasttheappearanceofseriousnesswas that
Amongthearguments
maintainedby Eban and succeedingIsraeliofficialsto theeffectthattheextentof Israel'swithdrawalwas vagueand undetermined
since theresolution
allowedfor"territorial
revision."This argumentwas carriedto thepointof
inassertingthat withdrawalwas not "applicable to all the territories
volved."23In fact,Eban had been directly
involvedin theUN discussionsin
New Yorkpriorto passage oftheresolutionand was notonlyperfectly
aware
of the U.S. interpretation,
but indicatedthatIsrael agreedwithit. Nonetheless,theallegedvaguenessoftheresolutionremainsto thisday Israel'smajor
argumentforretainingoccupiedterritory.
were
Anotherargument
used by Israelis thatsome or all of theterritories
notactuallyoccupiedbecause theybelongedto Israelby right.The assertion
was consistently
appliedto ArabEast Jerusalemfromtheoutset,causingthe
beforethe Security
UnitedStatesfinallyto protestin 1969. In a statement
Councilon 1 July,U.S. AmbassadorCharlesW. YostdefinedArabEastJerusalem as "occupied territory
[similar]to otherareas occupiedby Israel."24
26
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
SincethattimeIsrael'sclaimthatArabJerusalem
is notoccupiedhas been
extendedbyinference
to embraceall of theterritories,
now generallycharacterizedas "disputed"and therefore
subjectto negotiations.This imaginative
interpretation
was reachedby maintainingthatJordan'sannexationof the
West Bank in 1950 had been recognizedby onlytwo countries,Britainand
Pakistan,leavingthe implicationthatArabs rulingArabs underJordanwas
no morelegitimate
thanIsrael'smilitary
occupation.Althoughthisinterpretationhad been rebuffed
by all previousadministrations,
theClintonadministrationappears to acceptthe Israeliposition.
Israel has been able to performtheseverbalacrobaticsin largepartbecause of Washington'srefusalin recentyearsto takea publicpositionon its
own interpretation
of Resolution242. Indeed,thefirst-and last-time the
U.S. interpretation
has receiveddetailed,official,and public airingwas late
in 1969. On 9 Decemberof thatyear,Secretaryof StateWilliam Rogers,
notablyevenhandedon theArab-Israeliconflict,
remarkedin an addressthat
Resolution242 "calls forwithdrawalfromoccupied territories,
the nonacquisitionof territory
by war, and recognizedboundaries. We believe that
whilerecognizedpoliticalboundariesmustbe established,and agreedupon
by the parties,any changesin the preexistinglines should be confinedto
insubstantialalternations
requiredformutualsecurity.We do not support
expansionism."25For his fairefforts
at fairness,Rogerswas ridiculedout of
officeby HenryKissingerand a presidentweakened by a scandal called
Watergate.
Otherofficialsbecame candid and outspokenonlyaftertheywere out of
office.For instance,Dean Rusk,thesecretary
ofstatewho personallynegotiated with King Hussein concerning242 and approvedits passage, later
wrote: "Resolution242 nevercontemplated
themovementof anysignificant
territories
to Israel."26 In his memoirs,Rusk repeatedthatformulation,
explainingthat"we thought. . . certainanomaliescould easilybe straightened
out withsome exchangesof territory,
makinga moresensibleborderforall
parties."27
LordCaradon,authoroftheresolution,
wrotein 1981,longafter
Similarly,
his retirement:"It was fromthe occupied territories
that the Resolution
called forwithdrawal.The testwas which territories
were occupied. That
was a testnotpossiblysubjectto doubt. As a matterofplain factEast Jerusalem, the West Bank,Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were occupiedin the 1967
thatthe Resolution
conflict;it was on withdrawalfromoccupied territories
insisted."28
Even HenryKissingertoldessentiallythe same story.In his memoirs,he
wrote: "Jordan'sacquiescencein Resolution242 had been obtainedin 1967
by the promiseof our United Nations AmbassadorArthurGoldbergthat
underits termswe would workforthe returnof the West Bank to Jordan
withminorboundaryrectifications
and thatwe were preparedto use our
"29
influenceto obtaina role forJordanin Jerusalem.
RESOLUTION 242
27
Despite such authoritative
statementsand
thepersuasiveevidenceof the 1978 StateDeIsrael and its supporters
partment
studyon themeaningof Resolution
have maintainedthatthe
242, Israel and its supportershave mainresolutiondoes not say,or
tainedforwell overa quartercentury
thatthe
does not mean,whatis
resolutiondoes not say, or does not mean,
clearlywritten.
whatis clearlywritten.ArthurGoldberg,an
avowed Zionist,laterwentso faras to claim thathe and otherofficialshad
neversupportedthe idea of minorand reciprocalchanges.30
Clearlysuch statements
are nottheresultofa misunderstanding.
Theyare
a deliberatemisrepresentation
by Israeland itssupporters
oftherecordin an
effort
to justifyIsrael's continuedoccupation. Lucius D. Battle,the assistant
secretary
of stateforthe Middle East at the timeand intimately
involvedin
passage of 242, reaffirmed
in an interview
in 1993 theoriginalU.S. interpretation.He added thatGoldberghad provenovertheyearsto be, on theissue
of 242, "a slipperycharacter.",31
Carter'sCatastrophic
Mistake
As alreadymentioned,it is the White House's refusalto set the record
straight
thathas enabled Israeland itssupporters
to succeedin such deliberate obfuscation.The faultforthismustbe placed largelywithJimmy
Carter
and thetimorousness
of succeedingpresidents.Thereis a deep ironyin this
outcome,because Cartercame to officein 1977 talkingpubliclyand loudly
aboutResolution242. In his firstmonthsin office,he referred
to minorand
reciprocalborderchanges,32
theonlypresidentto do so, as faras I can determine. A positionpaper revealingCarter'sMiddleEast viewsreleasedon 27
June1977 endorsed242 in thefollowingterms:"We considerthatthisresolutionmeans withdrawalon all threefronts-thatis, Sinai, Golan, West
Bank-Gaza. . . . no territories,
includingthe West Bank, are automatically
excludedfromthe itemsto be negotiated."33
ButthenCartermade a catastrophic
new in
miscalculation.Stillrelatively
office,naive in foreignaffairs,
overlytrusting,
and alreadydesperatelyconcernedabout reelection,he soughtto win the confidenceof Israel's new
leader,MenachemBegin,in theirfirstmeetingin 1977. In a privateupstairs
sessionat theWhiteHouse on 19 July,CarterpleadedwithBeginto haltthe
establishment
ofsettlements
in theoccupiedterritories
whileBeginasked the
presidentto stop talkingin public about Resolution242 meaningminoradjustmentsto thefrontiers.In a noteon themeeting,CarterwrotethatBegin
"asks thatwe not use phrase 'minoradjustments'withoutpriornotice to
him-I agreed. He will tryto accommodateus on settlements."34
Begin's"accommodation,"
itturnedout,was an emptypromise.Less than
a weeklaterBegin'sgovernment
conferred
legal statuson threeJewishsettleon his wayestablishingmore
ments,and in theyearsahead he wentmerrily
and moresettlements
frustrated
despiteCarter'sincreasingly
complaintsthat
28
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
theywereillegal. (In anotherexampleof U.S. backtracking,
theword "illegal" to describethesettlements
is no longeruttered.)Astonishingly,
despite
Begin'sfailureto honorhis commitment,
Carterdid not respondin kind.
Thus,as a resultof thiswillingnessto keep one side of a brokenbargain,
Carterwas thelastpresidentto voicein publictheprovocative
phrase"minor
and reciprocalborderchanges"withregardto theU.S. interpretation
ofResolution242. When Arab and otherinterlocutors
have questionedvarious
administrations
overtheyearssince 1977 about U.S. policyon withdrawal,
theyhave been soothingly
assuredthat"thereis no changein policy." Reagan, Bush, and Clintonare on recordas assertingthatthe United States
standsfirmly
behind Resolution242. Even Reagan characterized
it "as the
foundationstoneof America'sMiddle East peace effort."35
The presidents,at least throughReagan and Bush,have been vocal in assertingthatwithdrawalmustcome on "all threefronts"and thatpeace must
come in exchangeforland. Buttheresponsewas silencewhen theyor their
officials
werepressedon whethertheUnitedStatesstillbelievedwithdrawal
shouldincludeonlyminorand reciprocaladjustments.
While such tactics may salve the guilty
conscience, it clearly is an abdication of
SinceCarter,theUnited
America'slong-heldposition. Since Carter,
Stateshas indicated,in
the UnitedStateshas indicatedin public,in
thatit has no
effect,
effect,
thatithas no positionon whatResolupositionon whatResolution tion 242's withdrawalclause means. The
242's withdrawalclause
endless reiterationof the litany that the
means.
UnitedStatesstandssolidlybehindthe resolutionis all but meaninglesswithoutWashingtonsayingpreciselywhat it
meansbythatcommitment.
Butstillthereremainedtheslenderassuranceto
the UnitedStatescontinuedto supportits original
the Arabs thatprivately
interpretation.
hintingthatit is readyto abandon
Now, withthe Clintonadministration
ofits
of 242, thedetermination
eventhepretenseof a separateinterpretation
who are so unequal in
meaningwould be leftup to the partiesthemselves,
fortheunorganized
frompolicywould be catastrophic
strength.This retreat
and weak Palestinians.Yet it would not be the onlyretreaton policycomin less thana yearin power. It is thus
mittedby theClintonadministration
no surprisethatthePalestiniansin 1993 had to fleetheembraceofClinton's
administration
to findan accommodationwithIsrael-not throughWashit had turnedout,was
ingtonbut via Norway. The Clintonadministration,
morehard-linethanthe IsraeliLabor government.
NOTES
1. AssistantSecretary
of StateforNear Easternand
SouthAsianAffairs
EdwardP. Djerejiantestified
before
apCongresson 9 March1993 thattheadministration
provedofIsrael'suse ofthe$10 billionin loan guaran-
RESOLUTION 242
teesgranted
in 1992tofinancethe"naturalgrowth
and
basic,immediate
needs"of existingsettlements
in the
occupiedterritories,
including
ArabEastJerusalem;
see
excerpts
ofthehearings
in "Documentsand SourceMaJoumnal
ofPalestine
Studies,22, no. 4 (Summer
terial,"
1993),pp. 157-58.
2. The StateDepartment's
annual reporton Israel's
settlements
notedthatIsrael has "made no commitmentto haltor reduceconstruction
in East Jerusalem
[and]has affirmed
its intention
to continuesettlement
construction
in a 100 square mile surrounding
area
" Nonetheless,
termed'Greater
Jerusalem.'
theadministration's
responsehas been silence;see U.S. StateDepartment,
Settlement
Report,quotedin Foundationfor
MiddleEastPeace,Report
onIsraeliSettlement
intheOccupiedTerritories,
July1993.
3. On 1 February,1993, Secretary
of StateWarren
Christopher
hailedan Israeliofferto takeback 100 of
the413 Palestinians
deported17 December1992 as a
"breakthrough,"
adding: "As a consequenceof the
stepsthatIsraelwilltake,we believethatfurther
action
by theSecurity
Councilis unnecessary
and couldeven
undercut
theprocesswhichis underway;"see textof
Christopher's
in "Documentsand SourceMaremarks
terial,"Journalof PalestineStudies,22, no. 3 (Spring
1993),p. 159.
4. See belowin reference
to twoU.S. paperson an Israeli-Palestinian
Declarationof Principles,submitted
duringthepeace talkson 14 Mayand 30 June1993.
5. Textsofthepapersare in "Documentation,"
Middle
EastPolicy,2, no. 2 (1993), pp. 155-56,158-60.
6. Fromhis speechto theJewishLeadershipCouncil
in Washington,
DC, 30 June1993.
7. LloydGrove,Washington
Post,20 January
1993.
8. JohnLaw,"MartinIndykLaysOut theClintonAp11 June1993,p. 3.
proach,"MiddleEastItnternational,
9. "WashingtonTalk,"New YorkTimes,5 September
1985.
10. DavidHoffman,
Washington
Post,28 October1991.
11. RobertD. Kaplan,TheArabists.TheRomance
ofan
American
Elite(New York: FreePress,1993),p. 287.
12. See, for instance,his studyActingwithCaution.
MiddleEastPolicy
theSecondReaganAdminPlatnningfor
istration
for
(Washington,DC: WashingtonInstitute
NearEast Policy,1985).
13. FrankJ.Murray,
Washington
Times,19 June1993;
ThomasW. Lippman,Washington
Post,19 June1993.
14. Commissionon U.S.-Israel Relations,Enduring
Partnership
DC: Washington
for
(Washington,
Institute
NearEast Policy,1993).
15. Othermembers
ofthecommission
wereofficials
in
previousadministrations
or membersof Congressand
academicand mediapersonalities.
TheyincludedWilliamBrown,a former
ambassadorto Israelnowon the
board of the TrumanInstitute
at HebrewUniversity;
former
ofStateAlexanderHaig;CharlesHill,
Secretary
former
executiveassistantto Secretary
of StateGeorge
Shultz;columnistCharles Krauthammer;
Republican
SenatorJohnMcCainofArizona;former
Vice President
WalterMondale,former
ofStateJoseph
Undersecretary
Sisco;and Mortimer
ownerofUS. News&
Zuckerman,
Wot-ld
Report.Sisco,incidentally,
is theofficial
widely
blamedforbeginningtheprocessof dilutingtheconcentration
of Arabistsin the StateDepartment's
Near
EastAffairs
bureaustarting
as farback as 1971.
16. The textof Resolution242 in full:
The SecurityCoutncil,
29
Expressing
itscontinuing
concernwiththegravesituationin theMiddleEast,
Emphasizing
theinadmissibility
of theacquisitionof
territory
by war and the need to workfora just and
lastingpeacein whicheveryStatein theareacan livein
security,
thatall MemberStatesin theiracEmphasizzngfurther
oftheUnitedNationshaveunceptanceoftheCharter
dertakena commitment
to act in accordancewith
Article2 of theCharter,
1. Affirns
of Charterprinciples
thatthefulfillment
requirestheestablishment
ofa justand lastingpeace in
the MiddleEast whichshouldincludetheapplication
ofboththefollowing
principles:
ofIsraeliarmedforcesfromterrito(i) Withdrawal
ries*occupiedin therecentconflict;
(ii) Termination
of all claimsor statesof belligerofthesovencyand respectforand acknowledgement
and politicalindependence
ereignty,
territorial
integrity
ofeveryStatein theareaand theirrightto livein peace
withinsecure and recognizedboundariesfreefrom
threats
or actsof force;
2. Affirns
further
thenecessity
ofnavigation
(a) Forguaranteeing
freedom
through
international
waterways
in thearea;
of the refugee
(b) For achievinga just settlement
problem;
theterritorial
and
(c) Forguaranteeing
inviolability
political independenceof everyState in the area,
through
measuresincluding
theestablishment
ofdemilitarizedzones;
3. Requeststhe Secretary-General
to designatea
to proceedto theMiddleEastto
SpecialRepresentative
establishand maintaincontactswiththe Statesconcernedin orderto promoteagreement
and assistefforts
to achievea peacefuland acceptedsettlement
in accordancewiththe provisionsand principlesin this
resolution;
4. Requeststhe Secretary-General
to reportto the
Security
Councilon the progressof the efforts
of the
SpecialRepresentative
as soon as possible.
occup6s."]
[* The Frenchversionsaid "des territoires
17. Quotedfroma StateDepartment
studyof theU.S.
of Resolution242 by Nina J. Noringof
interpretation
theOfficeof theHistorianand WalterB. Smith11,directorof theOfficeof Israeliand Arab-Israeli
Affairs,
of State,The Withdrawal
Department
Clausein UN SeCouncil
Resoluition
242 of1967,February
curity
1978;Secret/Nodis, 24. The study was based on
secretU.S. reportsfrom1967 and
contemporaneous
was undertaken
at therequestoftheCarteradministrationto determine
iftherewas anyjusticeto theIsraeli
didnotincludeall theoccupositionthattheresolution
it concludedtherewas not. Also see
pied territories;
Donald Neff,WaiiorsAgainst
JerusalenrTheSix Days
that Chanigedthe MiddleEast (New York: Linden
VT:
Press/Simon
& Schuster,1984, and Brattleboro,
Amana Books, 1988), whichdiscussesin detail U.S.
tacticsused in gainingpassageof theresolution.
18. Noringand Smith,TheWithdrawal
inUNSeClaluse
Resoluitioni
242 of1967,pp. 12-13.
Counicil
cufity
inUNSeClaluse
19. Noringand Smith,TheWithdrawal
CouncilResolutioni
242 (q 1967,p. 13; also author
curity
withKingHussein,Amman,Jordan,
interview
7 August
1983.
inUNSe20. Noringand Smith,TheWithdrawal
Claulse
Resoluitioni
242 (q 1967,p. 14.
Counicil
cuirity
30
21. Noringand Smith,TheWithdrawal
ClauseinUNSecuriny
CouncilResolution
242 of1967,p. 23.
22. NormanG. Finkelstein,
"To Liveor Perish:Abba
Eban 'Reconstructs'
theJune1967 War,"unpublished
manuscript,
1993,p. 19.
23. Finkelstein,
"To Liveor Perish,"p. 19.
24. The textis in JodyBoudreault
and YasserSalaam,
US. Official
TheStatusofJerusalem
Statements.
(WashforPalestineStudies,1992), pp.
ington,DC: Institute
3 1-33.
25. JodyBoudrealt
et al., US. Official
Statements.
UN.
Security
Council
Resolution
242, (Washington,
DC: InstituteforPalestineStudies,1992),p. 123.
26. Letterto theauthor,23 August1983.
27. Dean Rusk,As I SawIt (New York: W.W. Norton
and Company,1990), p. 389.
28. LordCaradonet. al., UN. Securiny
CouncilResolution242, (Washington,DC: Georgetown
University,
1981), p. 9.
JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES
White
HouseYears(New York,
29. HenryA. Kissinger,
Boston:Little,Brownand Company,1979), p. 345.
30. See, forinstance,his article"Hussein'sMisreading
of History,"JerusalemPost, 28 May 1983.
DC, 7 July
withtheauthor,Washington,
31. Interview
1993.
camein Carter's9 March1977
32. One suchreference
thetextis in MeronMedzini,Israel's
pressconference;
Selected
Documents,
1974-1977(vol.3)
Foreign
Relations.
of ForeignAffairs,
1982),p. 543.
(Jerusalem:Ministry
American
Foreign
33. The textis in StateDepartment,
Policy1977-1980,pp. 617-18;NewYorkTimes,28 June
1977.
34. WilliamQuandt,CampDavid (Washington,DC:
1986), p. 81. Also see
The BrookingsInstitution,
PowerandPrinciple:
Memoirs
ofthe
ZbigniewBrzezinski,
GiAdviser
Strauss,
National
Securiny
(New York: Farrar,
roux,1983) p. 100,who reportsthesame account.
UN. SecurStatements:
etal., US. Official
35. Boudrealt
242, p. 133.
ityCouncilResolution