Enlightenment Document-Based Question (DBQ)
Complete the following prompt in a 3-page minimum essay.
Thomas Hobbes defended Absolutism in his book Leviathan. Using the samples provided from
Leviathan, explain the rationale behind his defense of the absolutist system.
In the century following Hobbes’ writings, many Enlightenment thinkers began to question
man’s relationship with government. Using the information from class and the primary sources
provided, develop a thesis that argues how these thinkers challenged traditional views of
government, opposed the ideas of Hobbes, and ultimately changed man’s relationship with
government.
To prove and support your thesis, cite examples from the provided works of Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. Good essays will analyze the main theories of these three writers by citing and
explaining portions of their writings. Be sure to prove your thesis through this analysis.
Prompt for Thesis
How did Enlightenment ideas of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau differ from the
theories of Thomas Hobbes?
Excerpts from Thomas Hobbes’s
Leviathan
(1651)
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body and mind, as that though there be found
one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is
reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable, as that one man
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For
as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself . . .
And as to the faculties of the mind . . . men are . . . [more] equal than unequal . . .
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore
if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become
enemies, and in the way to their End, . . . endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another . . . If one
plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come
prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but
also of his life, or liberty . . .
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition;
Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, Reputation. The first
use Violence to make themselves Masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the
second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other
sign of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends,
their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in
awe, they are in that condition which is called War; and such a war, as is of every man, against
every man . . . state of nature will return.
***
Hobbes describes "the state of nature," a theoretical model of life prior to the formation of the
state.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of War, where every man is Enemy to every man;
the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security, than what their own
strength and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place
for Industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea, no commodious Building,
no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force, no Knowledge of
the face of the Earth, no account of Time, no Arts, no Letters, no Society, and which is worst of
all, continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short . . .
The Passions that incline men to Peace, are Fear of Death, Desire of such things as are necessary
to commodious living, and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth
convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement . . .
And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a
condition of Warre of everyone against everyone; in which case everyone is governed by his
own Reason, and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in
preserving his life against his enemies; It followeth that, in such a condition, every man has a
Right to every thing--even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural Right of
every man to everything endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise
soever he be) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live . . .
. . . If there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may
lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men . . .
The only way to erect . . . a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of
[foreigners] and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by
their own industry, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of
men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will . . . and therein to
submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than
Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all, in one and the same Person, made by
Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every
man, I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing myself to this Man, or to this Assembly of
men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like
manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMONWEALTH . . .
For by this Authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use
of so much Power and Strength ... conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form
the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutual [aid] against their enemies abroad. And in
him consisteth the Essence of the Commonwealth; which (to define it) is One Person, of whose
Acts a great Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with another, have made themselves everyone
the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient,
for their Peace and Common Defense.
And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have Sovereign Power; and
everyone besides, his SUBJECT . . .
. . . They that have already Instituted a Commonwealth, being thereby bound by Covenant . . .
cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in
anything whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch
cannot, without his leave, cast off Monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited
Multitude; nor transfer their Person from him that beareth it to another Man, or other Assembly
of men for they . . . are bound, every man to every man, to [acknowledge] . . . that he that already
is their Sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done, so that [those who do not obey] break their
Covenant made to that man, which is injustice; and they have also every man given the
Sovereignty to him that beareth their Person, and therefore if they depose him, they take from
him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice . . . And whereas some men have pretended
for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God,
this also is unjust. For there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that
representeth God's Person, which none doth but God's Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty
under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God is so evident a [lie], even in the pretenders
own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition
...
. . . Consequently none of [the sovereign's] Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed
from his Subjection.
Excerpts from John Locke’s
Second Treatise on Government
(1690)
Chapter II.
Of the State of Nature.
Sec. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider,
what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions,
and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more
than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties,
should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord
and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and
confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and
sovereignty.
Sec. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to
one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all
mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby
every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its
violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in
vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and
thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may
punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality,
where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in
prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sec. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no
absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the
passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far
as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so
much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man
may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of
nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common
equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so
he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence,
being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the
peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the
right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy
things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law,
as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from
doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT
TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
CHAP. VII.
Of Political or Civil Society.
Sec. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or
number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his
life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish
the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself,
in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political
society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in
order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is political
society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the
hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the
law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded,
the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all
parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules,
decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any
matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the
society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are,
and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a
common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies
between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no
such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is
no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect
state of nature.
Sec. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only
government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civilgovernment at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies
of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by
setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury
received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the* society ought to obey;
where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any
difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every
absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.
CHAP. XIX.
Of the Dissolution of Government.
Sec. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the
end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as
guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and
moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never be
supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that
which every one designs to secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted
themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take away,
and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they
put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther
obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against
force and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of
society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put
into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people;
by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary
ends, and it devolves to the people, who. have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the
establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and
security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said here, concerning the
legislative in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double
trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts
against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society. He
acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the
society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the
electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or
otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have promised beforehand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new-model
the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very
fountain of public security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their
representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might
always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require.
This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all
sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the
declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers
of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to
subvert the government, as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add rewards and
punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts of perverted law made use of, to
take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent
to betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought
to have in the society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its first
institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any
such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted.
Excerpts from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
On the Social Contract
(1762)
The Source of Power
MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and
still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What
can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.
If I took into account only force, and the effects derived from it, I should say: "As long as a
people is compelled to obey, and obeys, it does well; as soon as it can shake off the yoke, and
shakes it off, it does still better; for, regaining its liberty by the same right as took it away, either
it is justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for those who took it away." But the
social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does
not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions.
THE strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into
right, and obedience into duty. Hence the right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming
meant ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental principle. But are we never to have an
explanation of this phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can
have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will — at the most, an act of prudence. In
what sense can it be a duty?
Suppose for a moment that this so-called "right" exists. I maintain that the sole result is a mass of
inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates right, the effect changes with the cause: every force
that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with
impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being always in the right, the only thing
that matters is to act so as to become the strongest. But what kind of right is that which perishes
when force fails? If we must obey per force, there is no need to obey because we ought; and if
we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly, the word "right" adds
nothing to force: in this connection, it means absolutely nothing.
Obey the powers that be. If this means yield to force, it is a good precept, but superfluous: I can
answer for its never being violated. All power comes from God, I admit; but so does all sickness:
does that mean that we are forbidden to call in the doctor? A brigand surprises me at the edge of
a wood: must I not merely surrender my purse on compulsion; but, even if I could withhold it,
am I in conscience bound to give it up? For certainly the pistol he holds is also a power.
Let us then admit that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate
powers. In that case, my original question recurs.
Individual Wills and the General Will
In reality, each individual may have one particular will as a man that is different from-or
contrary to-the general will which he has as a citizen. His own particular interest may suggest
other things to him than the common interest does. His separate, naturally independent existence
may make him imagine that what he owes to the common cause is an incidental contribution - a
contribution which will cost him more to give than their failure to receive it would harm the
others. He may also regard the moral person of the State as an imaginary being since it is not a
man, and wish to enjoy the rights of a citizen without performing the duties of a subject. This
unjust attitude could cause the ruin of the body politic if it became widespread enough.
So that the social contract will not become meaningless words, it tacitly includes this
commitment, which alone gives power to the others: Whoever refuses to obey the general will
shall be forced to obey it by the whole body politic, which means nothing else but that he will be
forced to be free. This condition is indeed the one which by dedicating each citizen to the
fatherland gives him a guarantee against being personally dependent on other individuals. It is
the condition which all political machinery depends on and which alone makes political
undertakings legitimate. Without it, political actions become absurd, tyrannical, and subject to
the most outrageous abuses.
The Social Contract
I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in
the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal
of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no
longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence.
But, as men cannot create for themselves new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones,
they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum
of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. For man is inherently evil and will seek to
rob, steal and relieve his fellow by any means necessary.
"The problem is to find a form of government which will defend and protect all persons and
goods from mans evils, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself
alone, and remain as free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the Social
Contract provides the solution.
These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one — the total relief of each citizen,
together with all his rights, to the whole community. The community then has the responsibility
to protect the individual.
Moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no
associate has anything more to demand. If then we discard from the social contract what is not of
its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the
general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive protection from the whole.”
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association
creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains
votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. Those who
are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as
sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State.
As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one of the
members without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body without the
members resenting it. Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to
give each other help; and the same men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the
advantages dependent upon that capacity.
Again, the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor
can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the sovereign power need give no
guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members. We
shall also see later on that it cannot hurt any in particular. The Sovereign, merely by virtue of
what it is, is always what it should be.
Whatever benefits he had in the state of nature but lost in the civil state, a man gains more than
enough new ones to make up for them. His capabilities are put to good use and developed; his
ideas are enriched, his sentiments made more noble, and his soul elevated to the extent that-if the
abuses in this new condition did not often degrade him to a condition lower than the one he left
behind-he would have to keep blessing this happy moment which snatched him away from his
previous state and which made an intelligent being and a man out of a stupid and very limited
animal....
In order then that the social contract may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the
undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will
shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be
forced to be free.