Used or abused?:
Armed Non-state Actors as Proxies
JMR Woudenberg
6352138
June 2011
Supervisor: dr. S. Khan
Second Reader: dr. C. Hille
Master Politicologie: Internationale Betrekkingen
International Military Security
‐ 1 ‐ 1.
Introduction.................................................................................................................... - 4 -
2.
Literature Review........................................................................................................... - 8 Realism .......................................................................................................................... - 8 Principal-agent theory.................................................................................................. - 11 Existing literature......................................................................................................... - 15 -
3.
Theory chapter ............................................................................................................. - 21 Nuclear weapons.......................................................................................................... - 26 Protraction of conflict .................................................................................................. - 28 Regime type ................................................................................................................. - 29 Conventional weaker state ........................................................................................... - 31 Foreign aid ................................................................................................................... - 33 Methodology ................................................................................................................ - 34 -
4.
Case Study: India-Pakistan .......................................................................................... - 35 The 1999 Kargil War ................................................................................................... - 38 Usage of armed non-state actors .................................................................................. - 38 A nuclear dimension .................................................................................................... - 40 A protracted conflict .................................................................................................... - 41 The regimes of India and Pakistan............................................................................... - 42 Strength and weakness................................................................................................. - 43 Scrutiny of aid.............................................................................................................. - 45 -
5.
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... - 46 Nuclear weapons.......................................................................................................... - 47 Protraction of conflict .................................................................................................. - 47 Regime type ................................................................................................................. - 48 Conventional weaker state ........................................................................................... - 48 Foreign aid ................................................................................................................... - 49 -
‐ 2 ‐ Theoretical implications............................................................................................... - 50 Policy recommendations.............................................................................................. - 51 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ - 52 - 6.
‐ 3 ‐ 1. Introduction
The phenomenon of delegating violence has been seen throughout history. It has always
been used by policy makers, and if one would project it on the field of International Relations
one will discover that throughout history there are many accounts of quarrels where
responsibility for actions was transferred to, say, another state. Several conflicts during the
Cold War are a case in point for this kind of behavior. With the creation of nuclear weapons
and hence the risk of nuclear winter, the superpowers were more than ever inclined not to let
conflicts escalate into a direct (nuclear) confrontation.1 With the strategy of Mutually Assured
Destruction, a direct confrontation would bring about complete annihilation. The United
States and the Soviet Union therefore fought each other in numerous small scale conflicts
through third parties.2 Usually these parties were states too, but occasionally they were
guerilla groups. One could argue that it was during the Cold War that using third parties as a
substitute for responsibility of actions got institutionalized. In popular language these types of
conflict are called proxy wars.
Proxy wars and the use of proxies has been justified through the masks of foreign policy
doctrines that the two ideological blocs exhibited. In the West it was the Truman Doctrine
partly inspired by the famous article The Sources of Soviet Conduct that George Kennan
wrote in 1947. In the Soviet Union there was an anti-imperialist doctrine that shaped Soviet
foreign policy. In the light of these ideological doctrines many proxy wars found their origin.
During the Cold War there was the support that East-Germany gave to the Rote Armee
Fraktion (RAF) to wreak havoc in West-Germany. China backed the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia against the Vietnamese in the late 1970s when Vietnamese forces attacked
Cambodia to bring about a regime change.3 Another, rather remarkable, example of proxy
warfare during the Cold War is the Libyan support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA). Under Qaddafi Libya provided the PIRA with an extraordinary amount of advanced
weaponry, as long as it would be used against Thatcher’s England. Both the PIRA and
Qaddafi were very hostile towards the UK and hence supplying arms to the PIRA was a good
way for Qaddafi to harm the UK.4 some scholars argue that way that when the Berlin Wall
came down and the Soviet Union imploded, ending the bipolar system, that the need for proxy
1
Jayne Mooney and Jock Young, “Imaging Terrorism: Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Terrorism, Two Ways of
Doing Evil,” Social Justice 32 (2005): 115. 2
Bertil Dunér, “Proxy Intervention in Civil Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 18 (1981): 354. 3
Chris Loveman, “Assessing the phenomenon of proxy intervention,” Conflict, Security & Development (2002):
33. 4
Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004), 249. ‐ 4 ‐ wars would evaporate. There were no spheres of influence to protect and the Soviet led bloc
was no more.5
Still, the phenomenon of proxy wars remained. The Cold War was not the only theatre
where proxy warfare existed since the phenomenon also occurred at the regional level and
without superpower rivalry fueling these. One can look up many examples of proxy wars in
the post Cold War era. A landmark example is the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This
war eventually involved eight African nations that were supporting pro and contra factions
that attacked and supported the Kabila regime. Apparently with the goal of regime change and
regime support it is said that many countries were after diamond mines, the prize of the
Congo.6 In this conflict the most notable users of proxies were Uganda and Rwanda, both
supporting the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD).7 The devastation of this
war in particular is reason enough to continue to research this phenomenon, the war is the
deadliest the world has witnessed since 1945.8 So the usage of proxies, intertwined with the
Cold War as it may be, remained after the Soviet Union imploded. Without the explanatory
variable that the Cold War provided, there is need to explore more explanations for the
existence of proxy wars nowadays.
With the rise of global terrorism and their equipment these actors prove a useful means for
some, and a grave danger for others. More insight in proxy wars, and the role of armed nonstate actors in these proxy wars will prove useful for states battling with the consequences of a
globalizing security threat. Especially policymakers pursuing the higher cause of eliminating
terrorism will need to know why the international community on the one hand wrestles with
armed non-state actors and on the other hand gladly use their services. Conflicts where armed
non-state actors are employed by either one of the warring factions cannot be solved if one
does not grasp the dynamics and origins of a proxy war. This leads to the central question in
this thesis: ‘Why do some states use armed non-state actors as proxies?’
There has been some scholarly work on proxy wars and the delegation of war making to
rebel movements (see, e.g., Abbink, Byman, Swami, Prunier, Loveman, Dunér and Salehyan).
5
Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg, and Jonathan Hall, “Are ‘New Wars’ More Atrocious? Battle Severity,
Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the End of the Cold War,” European Journal of
International Relations 15 (2009): 508. 6
Daniel Byman et al., Trends in outside support for insurgent movements (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 19,
accessed March 19, 2011,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf. 7
Byman, Trends in outside support, 12. 8
Joe Bavier, “Congo war-driven crisis kills 45,000 a month: study,” Reuters, January 22, 2008, accessed April
19, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/22/us-congo-democratic-deathidUSL2280201220080122?pageNumber=1
‐ 5 ‐ These authors provide an overview of the phenomenon and some basic hypotheses and
propositions. Some of these are not tested against cases properly, making them not as valuable
as tested propositions. On the whole, the propositions that try to explain proxy warfare build
on a very basic logic: a state resorts to proxy warfare because it does not want to risk
retaliation is a very basic proposition. The propositions in the literature create a framework for
explaining proxy warfare, but due to the basic logic of this framework, it only provides the
obvious explanations for proxy warfare. This thesis argues that causes for proxy warfare are
to be found in the presence of nuclear weapons, the protraction of the conflict, regime type of
states involved in proxy warfare, the conventional strength and the amount of aid provided to
a country.
Several possible explanations have been explored in this thesis. In the current nuclear era
it is important to discover the dynamics of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the dynamics and causes
of modern conflict. Nuclear weapons have proven to be of a whole new level of influence on
theories of International Relations. These weapons have such devastating power that a small
state in possession of this capability can at once be catapulted in global power play, meaning
they can stand up to other (more powerful) states.9 In the Cold War the superpowers fought
proxy wars, both being nuclear weapons states. Proxy warfare with armed non-state actors is
still present nowadays. Since nuclear weapons are only employed by states, and proxies
nowadays mostly consist out of armed non-state actors, it can be said that the relationship
between the two is rather asymmetric. Here lies both the scientific and societal justification of
this research. The link that the Cold War provided between proxy warfare and nuclear
weapons evaporated when the Soviet Union collapsed. One has to wonder if there still is a
relationship between nuclear weapons and the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies, and
if so, how this relationship is constituted.
Another conflict dynamic that has a potential effect on proxy warfare is the protraction of
a conflict. If a conflict is protracted it will prove difficult to resolve. States that are involved in
such a conflict are more likely to explore every option possible to use against the other state in
their conflict dyad. The scientific justification here is found in the attempt to explain an
important explanation for proxy warfare and the societal justification lies in the fact that the
more there will be known on both proxy warfare and protracted conflicts, then one will be
more able to solve these conflicts and bring about peace in places where it is needed most.
9
Barry O’Neill, “Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers no. 1560
(2006): 1-2. ‐ 6 ‐ What may be another explanation for proxy warfare is the regime type of the state that
actually uses armed non-state actors as proxies. This hypothesis can be justified because
proxy warfare is a very covert foreign policy option. Because it is largely covert, one can
argue that this option is an interesting one for states that have certain regime types, especially
democracies. The Democratic Peace Theory, a theory that is the closest to a law in
International Relations there is, suggests that democracies are not likely to go to war with
each other. Covert support of an armed non-state actor could be an option for democracies
thereby getting around the fact that democracies do not fight each other. Nondemocratic
regime types are not very strained in their behavior like democracies. It will be interesting to
investigate if the lack of limitations these regimes have, have an impact on the usage of armed
non-state actors as proxies.
Another independent variable that this thesis has focused on is an old proposition turned
around. Contrary to the belief that it is the stronger state that is more likely to resort to the
usage of armed non-state actors as proxies, this thesis poses that it is the other way around and
that it is the weaker state that is more likely to resort to the usage of armed non-state actors as
proxies. Blaming the stronger state for a conflict is not always the right thing to do, and this
thesis clarifies this.
Many states in the world receive aid from richer states. The recipient states depend on this
steady flow of money from donor states. Donor states, by aiding poorer countries, try to attain
foreign policy goals of their own. Recipient states therefore are under constant scrutiny by
their donors. For a recipient state to exercise a security related foreign policy of its own, it
means to use more covert means than necessary. Proxy warfare might be a viable option for
these states. This thesis establishes that link between the flow of aid and the usage of armed
non-state actors as proxies.
In chapter two I will provide an overview on the current scholarly work that has been
done on proxy warfare in general. This will include the principal-agent theory and one of the
paradigms of International Relations, Realism. Chapter three contains a fresh look on the
usage of armed non-state actors as proxies and will provide definitions of the variables that
this thesis has focused on. The hypotheses will be introduced and thoroughly explained here
as well as the methodology used. Chapter four will contain a single case study to test the
hypotheses and chapter five will contain some concluding remarks and implications for
policymakers and future research. The case on which the theory will be tested is the conflict
between India and Pakistan, and more specifically the part during the 1990s, with special
attention to the 1999 Kargil War between them.
‐ 7 ‐ 2. Literature Review
Proxy warfare is intrinsically linked to Cold War dynamics. Early explanations for proxy
warfare were to be found in the foreign policy doctrines of the two superpowers. President
Harry Truman proclaimed the so-called Truman Doctrine which became a United States
foreign policy tool for justifying (military) assistance to states that were threatened by
communist rule.10 Inspired by the alarming article by George Kennan on the origin of Soviet
policy and the consequences it would bring about to United States interests, the Truman
Doctrine focused on containment as the only answer to Soviet foreign policy. Proxy war
scholars emphasize that the phenomenon of proxy warfare was extensively used by the Cold
War superpowers11 and as such local quarrels were transformed to international conflicts.12
During the Cold War the explanations for proxy warfare were to be found in the ideological
struggle between two blocks, indicating cluster bipolarity.13 This chapter will focus on giving
an overview of possible explanations for using armed non-state actors as proxies. This
overview will be used to assess the quality of the propositions in the works of proxy war
scholars such as Idean Salehyan and Daniel Byman. The principal-agent theory will be
reviewed so the underlying dynamics of using armed non-state actors as proxies can be
explained.
Before any of this can be done one needs to start with one of the paradigms in
International Relations, Realism. This one is chosen instead of Liberalism or Marxism
because Realism is all about security related matters. Proxy warfare, being a security related
phenomenon, should be explained by Realism.
Realism
Realism has been one of the grand theories, or paradigms, in the International Relations
realm and has been accredited by many scholars as a good and parsimonious theory for its
explanatory power. There are of course many strands of Realism and it would be beyond the
scope of this thesis to provide a thorough account of all of these strands, but a short discussion
on the more general features of Realism is necessary.14 Realism is a state centered paradigm
10
Donald M. Snow, United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water’s Edge (Belmont: Thomson
Wadsworth, 2005), 39. 11
Jon Abbink, “Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects of Peace in the Horn of Africa,” Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 21 (2003): 407. 12
Byman, Trends in outside support, xiii. 13
David Garnham, “The Causes of War: Systemic Findings”, in Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of
International Conflict, ed. Alan N. Sabrosky (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 7-23. 14
For a more extensive discussion of the different strands of Realism see Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt in
Baylis et al. ‐ 8 ‐ that focuses on the state as the principal agent in the international system. That system is
anarchic by nature which means that states recognize themselves as the highest authority
possible and do not accept a higher authority above them. The world without any higher
authority is a dangerous one according to Thomas Hobbes.15 In this anarchic international
system all Realist scholars identify three core elements. Statism means that the state is the
principal unit of analysis, as abovementioned. Survival is the raison d’être of the state in that
anarchic system. State security is something that is not assured in the international system and
therefore survival is coined by Waltz as the ground of action for every state.16 But with
respect to the research on proxy warfare the third core element is of most interest. This is the
self-help element. To continue with Waltz, he furthermore identifies that whereas survival is
the ground of action for states, self-help is to be regarded as “[N]ecessarily the principle of
action in an anarchic order.”17
If Realism is placed in the modern security agenda there are some implications. Due to
technological progress, institutional change and globalization the potential actions of states
are constrained, but the key problems remain, as Realists predict, primarily on security and
survival.18 Interstate problems remain key in the post Cold War world, but there are many
contemporary security problems that have their roots within states making conflicts
potentially less interstate and more intrastate. However this is not a dichotomy, there are some
interstate conflicts with an intrastate edge to it and vice versa.19 Armed non-state actors play a
key role in this shift being regional and transnational players that break through state borders
as known today.20 States officially have a monopoly on violence but these actors increasingly
challenge that monopoly in their sphere of influence. So the nature of the contemporary
security agenda is changing in terms of parameters and priorities. Realists can only answer
questions related to security problems in narrow terms with states using military means in an
interstate analysis. Brown argues that the critics of Realism are right in a way when they
argue that intrastate, nonmilitary and transnational factors or agents need to be part of the
security agenda.21
15
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Dover Publications, 2006), 70. 16
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 93. 17
Waltz, Theory, 111. 18
Loveman, “Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention,” 42. 19
Michael E. Brown, “New Global Dangers,” in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided
World, ed. Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 42. 20
Ulrich Scheckener, “Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance,” in Private Actors
and Security Governance, ed. Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini. (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, 2006), 28, accessed April 28, 2011, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/PublicationDetail?lng=en&id=25736 21
Brown, “New Global Dangers,” 45. ‐ 9 ‐ Important to understand is that the logic of self-help implies that the survival of the state
cannot be delegated to any entity whatsoever since a state’s survival is the single most
important goal of the state. If one assumes that policy that is related to security matters are
considered part of the survival of a state, indeed a state would probably resort to military
means if its very own existence would be threatened. At that point the phenomenon of proxy
warfare by a state can too be considered part of the policies that are linked with a state’s quest
for survival. But in the first place, with Realism regarding the state as the primary unit of
analysis, one would encounter a problem in explaining proxy warfare. This is due to the fact
that the proxy in question would in most of the cases, especially after the end of the Cold
War, consist of non-state actors. Second, a state would, according to Realists, never put its
own survival in the hands of any entity whatsoever. A good example is the military of the
United States, that is capable to conduct operations around the globe. The combined militaries
of the member states of the European Union exceed the United States military in numbers.
But the European Union does not have the same global capabilities that the United States
posses. The individual member states want to have their own fully fledged military. Working
together and specializing tasks is out of the question. These countries still refuse to put their
survival in the hands of other states, and desperately cling to their own military.
To explain delegation to proxies one encounters in Realism the contradictory elements of
self-help on the one hand and survival on the other. Using armed non-state actors for security
purposes is not in accordance with the principle of self-help. At the point where a state’s
existence is in danger it might resort to armed non-state actors as proxies. Hence Realism
cannot give a one sided explanation for the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies by
states.
This can be explained if one looks at the levels of analysis that Kenneth Waltz introduced
in his book Man, the State, and War. Waltz discusses his three images of causation for war:
the individual level, the level of the state and the level of the international system. Greg
Cashman adds two more levels of analysis to those of Waltz: the small group level and the
interaction between two states, or the dyadic level of analysis. The latter being how states
interact with each other which will determine the likelihood of war.22 The dyadic level of
analysis and the state level of analysis are the best levels to examine proxy warfare in.
Delegating towards armed non-state actors by states is state behavior, since it is about why
22
Greg Cashman, What Causes War: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict (Lanham: Lexington
Books, 2000), 13. ‐ 10 ‐ states choose this option out of many foreign policy options. This phenomenon is best looked
at using the state level of analysis. The reason why states resort to this policy option vis-à-vis
specific other states can be best viewed at the dyadic level of analysis. To explore in depth the
dynamics of using armed non-state actors as proxies, the principal-agent theory is needed.
This theory is about why actors choose to delegate certain behavior to third parties. Using
armed non-state actors as proxies fits in this relationship.
Principal-agent theory
Salehyan argues that the support that states give to rebel organizations, or armed non-state
actors for that matter, is a good example of a kind of delegation in international politics and
that this strategy is hence a good example of a principal-agent relationship.23 This theory is
well known in the social sciences where it has been applied primarily and successfully within
political science on the delegation of tasks to bureaucracies and in the legislative realm (see,
e.g. Kiewiet and McCubbins). It has also been applied in the realm of International Relations
on international organizations (see Hawkins et al.).
Principal-agent theory focuses on the delegation from principal actors to agents. In this
kind of relationship delegation is meant as a cost-saving endeavor for the principal actor. It is
a “[…] conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to
act on behalf of the former.”24 Besides the argument that it can provide lower costs for the
principal compared to the principal having to perform the delegated task on its own,
delegation can provide the principal with a specialized agent that can provide efficiency to the
principal when delegating instead of performing the task on its own.25 So there is a cost
saving edge to it as well as an efficiency edge. An important matter with delegation to rebel
movements according to Salehyan is that there must be a very clear understanding of what
delegation exactly constitutes.
There is the danger that scholars do not make a clear divide between delegation and
conflict intervention. The logic with conflict intervention is that the external actor is interested
in influencing the outcome of the conflict but has little control over the actual war strategies
and goals of the agent that is aided. Delegation, however, indicates that there is a (high)
23
Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2010):
495. 24
Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, Delegation and agency in international
organizations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6. 25
Hawkins et al., Delegation and agency, 14. ‐ 11 ‐ degree of control by the aiding state.26 This may result over time in a greater dependency of
the rebel group to aid, giving the patron-state more room for asserting control over the rebel
movement.27 But it can also result in a loss of control by the principal over the agent. In a
relationship between a principal and an agent there is distinct possibility that eventually a
divergence of interests will occur. When the goals of the principal change it might be that the
agent is opposed to the new goals. The other way around is more problematic for the
principal. If the agent decides to change its goals and strategies without discussing this with
the principal it might be that the latter will be embarrassed by the agent’s action. In the realm
of foreign policy this is potentially harmful for a state (principal).
If one looks at principal-agent theory with regard to the delegation to armed non-state
actors, thereby creating a proxy for the principal, one has to look at the role of information.
Inadequate information within a principal-agent relationship can lead to two possibilities
where the agent chosen in the first place proves to be unreliable at best, and hostile against the
principal at worst. When the principal is in the phase prior to the establishment of a
(contractual) relationship with the agent there is no complete information about the agent, so
the principal is not fully aware of traits as reliability and competence of the agent. This
information inadequacy poses the risk to the principal that it chooses an inferior agent.28 This
is the process that is called adverse selection. When a principal has chosen its agent, it starts
to gain more knowledge about the agent. And after a certain amount of time after the
relationship has been in effect, the agent has gathered more information on the principal and
its goals and strategies. An agent might no longer be interested or inclined to perform the
tasks it has been delegated to by the principal. This can because of numerous reasons. The
options that the agent has are not dichotomous in that it can choose to devote just slightly less
effort to the principal’s cause. It can also decide to do next to nothing on the delegated task.
These forms of agent slacking are called shirking.29 Things get worse for the principal when
the agent decides to use the capabilities entrusted to it by the principal and direct these at the
principal itself. In this extreme case the principal is targeted by the very agent it supported in
the first place.30 This is an extreme example of what is called slippage, another form of agent
26
Saleyhan, “Delegation,” 501. 27
A good example of far-reaching (political) control of a principal over its agent can be the fact that Hezbollah
leadership and the Iranian government keep close contact on the policies of Hezbollah. For a further discussion
on this link see Magnus Ranstorp (1994). 28
Saleyhan, “Delegation,” 495, 502. 29
Hawkins et al., Delegation and agency, 7. 30
Salehyan, “Delegation,” 495, 502. ‐ 12 ‐ slacking. This happens when an agent is slipping from the principal’s to its own preferences.31
For agent slacking to occur there has to be uncertainty. Hypothetically, if there is perfect
certainty, the principal will be able to control the agent perfectly, rendering the option of
slacking for the agent useless. Uncertainty, though, is always present. If one looks at the
delegation to armed non-state actors which operate in a conflict setting there is usually a huge
amount of uncertainty making the option of slacking for an agent quite interesting. Therefore
the principal cannot tell whether the outcome of a certain action is because of the agent’s
actions or because of an exogenous shock.32 The second factor that has to be present before
agent slacking can occur is related with the specialization of the agent. If the principal
requires to know all what the agent knows and does, the initial reason for delegation, namely
specialization of the agent, evaporates. On the other hand the agent can, under the umbrella of
specialization, refuse to disclose information and knowledge making the opportunity for
slacking a more attractive one.33 These agent problems are central to principal-agent theory, it
assumes that agents are opportunistic actors that pursue their own interests and are subject to
constraints of the principal.34
Principal-agent theory offers several mechanisms to tackle the problems that can arise out
of delegation.35 To prevent agency slacking from happening the principal has a total of five
options. This list is not exhaustive as the principal cannot account for every possible incident.
Despite the broad application of principal-agent theory on both domestic and international
issues there has been no significant differences in the mechanisms of control on the domestic
level and international level.36 The delegation of tasks to an agent by the principal is governed
by a contract. With every form of delegation there is some contractual form of communicating
goals of the agent and the rewards it gets for completing these goals. This contract is the first
control mechanism the principal has. A contract is usually described using the rules-discretion
dimension. A contract can primarily consist out of rules, making it quite easy for the principal
to limit the agent’s action in these sets of rules. On the other hand, a contract based on
discretion gives the agent lots of freedom, as long as the goals are met. This kind of contract
makes it very difficult for the principal to assert control over the agent. Uncertainty and agent
specialization however forces more discretion instead of rules. This is mostly the case if one
looks at delegation to armed non-state actors in a military conflict setting. There is uncertainty
31
Hawkins et al., Delegation and agency, 7. 32
Hawkins et al., Delegation and agency, 27-8. 33
Hawkins et al., Delegation and agency, 28. 34
Hawkins et al., Delegation and agency, 27. 35
For a more extensive explanation on these five mechanisms see Hawkins et al., Delegation and agency, 31-6. 36
Hawkins et al., Delegations and agency, 29. ‐ 13 ‐ and the information available might be very unreliable. Carl von Clausewitz dubbed this
problem the fog of war.37
A second mechanism are monitoring and reporting requirements. Essentially this means
that principals use two kinds of methods to have insight in the progress and the
(mal)functioning of the agent. Police patrols are used to ‘police’ the agents progress and
actions looking for potential agency slacking. The other method is the fire alarm where the
principal waits for signals of malfunctioning, or to continue the analogy, the principal waits
for the fire alarm to ring when there is enough malfunctioning, or smoke. In a situation of a
proxy war policing might be very troublesome due to the nature of the delegation. The
principal is more likely to monitor closely if the agent is behaving as expected by watching
the outcome. Pakistan allegedly trained and facilitated the people responsible for the 2008
Mumbai attacks,38 and if one assumes that this connection is correct then Pakistan could
assess whether the agent fulfilled their tasks by researching the results of the Mumbai attacks.
The third control mechanism is one that is employed in choosing the agent instead of
during the contract between the principal and the agent. Using selection and screening
procedures the principal can choose in partnering with an existing agent or create an agent to
its own preferences. When it chooses to partner with an existing agent the principal can
reduce agency slack by choosing an agent with preferences similar to those of the principal.
That way the principal can grant greater degrees of discretion to the agent making it less
costly to monitor the agent and creating less incentive for the agent to double cross the
principal. Obviously within the realm of International Relations and specifically on proxy
warfare the principal has less choice with existing agents, and creating a resistance cell in
enemy territory is not without risk as it may backfire on the principal. Like the monster
Frankenstein created, and which turned against its master and creator.
Another mechanism is created in institutional checks and balances. Within broader
principal-agent theory this is a mechanism that is quite useful if there are agents that have a
solid institutional structure of their own and if the delegation happens in a broader
institutionalized context. This mechanism is all about creating a system of checks and
balances that governs the delegation of the agent in a way that the principal has no trouble in
restraining possible opportunistic behavior. This mechanism is not so useful if applied to the
37
Clausewitz. On War, 140. 38
Eric Schmitt, and Somini Sengupta. “Ex-U.S. Official Cites Pakistani Training for India Attackers,” The New
York Times, December 3, 2008, accessed April 21, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/world/asia/04india.html?hp
‐ 14 ‐ realm of conflict and proxy warfare. Rebel groups or insurgency movements usually do not
have an extensive institutionalized structure or cannot be brought into existing institutions.
This makes it quite difficult for the principal to employ this mechanism in controlling their
agent. The fifth, and last control mechanism is to employ sanctions. This mechanism is all
about punishing the agent in case of malfunction or possible agent slacking and rewarding the
agent if it is behaving according to the goals set by the principal.
This theory helps to understand how uncertain the relationship between the principal and
its agent can be. It shows what the dynamics are in the process of delegation to an agent. A
state never fully controls the actions and strategies of a non-state actor that it has employed to
perform tasks. Especially in the (international) security realm this can possibly lead to
dangerous consequences in the case of agency slack. What if the rebel group that has just been
armed by a state, uses those weapons against the very same state that armed them in the first
place? One has to look to the case of the Taliban. They were armed by the United States to
attack the Soviet Union when they invaded Afghanistan, but those very same weapons they
use against the United States in the current Afghanistan war.
The principal-agent theory gave a abstract, yet thorough overview on the dynamics of the
relationship between a state and the armed non-state actors it uses as proxies. Now for more
specific propositions on why states exactly use armed non-state actors as proxies, this thesis
has turned to the scholarly work on this subject and give an overview of existing propositions.
Existing literature
There has been extensive scholarly research on the broader phenomenon of delegation to
non-state actors. Using these for proxy warfare is one of the possible manifestations.
However, many of this work has been case specific, or specifically aimed at researching a
special kind of armed non-state actor such as rebel movements or insurgencies. One can argue
that there are major differences between those groups, yet they all have some elementary traits
in common. They are all non-state actors, they all display some kind of armed struggle in
pursuit of particular, actor specific, (political) goals. A more extensive exploration on armed
groups will be given in the theory section. A short overview on some scholarly work will
reveal that there is no clear unity on the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies.
Byman et al. have examined in their research paper the trends in support for insurgencies.
They differ between state support, diaspora support and support by other non-state actors.
With regard to state support they find some remarkable conclusions. States are mainly
motivated by geopolitical reasons when supporting an insurgency, even the more common
‐ 15 ‐ motivations thought of, such as ethnicity and kinship are “[O]ften mere window dressing.”39
In the post Cold War era the support by states remains a very important source from where
rebel groups and insurgencies get their strength. To name a few examples of the support states
can provide non-state actors with, are assistance with improving military capacities, a
recruiting base, or some diplomatic leverage in the international arena40. This support greatly
enhances the life cycle of these groups, making them dependent on the supporting state over
time, as principal-agent theory predicts.
In the report Byman et al. designate a list of twelve possible motivations41 by states to
support insurgencies. With regard to these motivations ‘insurgency support’ will be used
interchangeably with ‘using armed non-state actors’ since the former is a manifestation of the
latter.
The first motivation is regional influence. States use proxies to ensure some level of
control in the near abroad or to use popular language, a country’s own backyard. The foreign
policy of states that focus on the region is very important since regional unrest can affect a
state directly if the unrest escalates into crisis or even conflict. To deploy one’s armed forces
directly can escalate a tangible situation, hence states will want to use more covert means of
managing the near abroad. Examples are Iran’s support of the Supreme Assembly for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) and Iraq’s support of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran
(MEK).
A second motivation is to support armed non-state actors with the purpose to destabilize
neighboring states. A neighboring state can be a potential adversary. Again this has to do with
foreign policies regarding the near abroad and hence a state will want to use the covertness of
proxy warfare. This is essentially what is happening in the disputed territory of Kashmir
where India has to deploy large amounts of resources toward battling Pakistani backed
Kashmiri insurgents. Another example is the proxy wars that Ethiopia and Eritrea fought in
Somalia, keeping that state destabilized.
A third motivation is trying to bring about regime change in the targeted state. If state A is
not happy with the regime that holds sway over state B then supporting insurgents or other
armed groups in state B can be an effective way to topple an unfriendly regime and support a
potentially friendly regime. This way state A will be less worried about state B’s behavior.
Byman et al. indicate that ousting a government using proxies is a rather difficult job and may
39
Byman, Trends in outside support, 23. 40
Byman, Trends in outside support, 2. 41
For a more extensive explanation on these twelve motivations see Byman, Trends in outside support, 23-10. ‐ 16 ‐ not bring the wanted success. A clear example is Rwanda and Uganda trying to oust Kabila
from power during the second Congo war, that lasted from 1998 till 2003. Also the United
States’ support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan is a case in point of fighting a proxy war to
topple a hostile regime.
Fourth, a state may resort to proxies because of payback. Supporting armed groups may
trigger a chain reaction where groups in one’s own state are supported by the state you
targeted in the first place. This may also lead to some restraint by governments. If there is
plenty opportunity for one’s adversary to back armed groups in one’s own state, it might be
wise not to utilize every possibility of supporting proxies in an adversary’s state.
Fifth, supporting an armed group may be done to ensure that the group in question does
not develop goals that are targeted to one’s own state. Thus ensuring more support from
oppositional groups can be a very good motivation for supporting those (oppositional) armed
groups.
The sixth motivation shows that supporting armed non-state actors does not solely arise
out of foreign policy goals. When a state suffers from internal instability it might prove very
helpful to support armed groups in a neighboring state and use that proxy to battle one’s own
unrest. This motivation is only viable if the proximity and geography allow armed groups to
maneuver freely enough so that they can attack dissident armed groups in one’s own state. An
example is the support Lebanon gave to the PLO in the 1970s to prevent a large and armed
Palestinian community against the weak and fragile Lebanese regime.
The seventh motivation for supporting armed groups can also be a matter of prestige.
Supporting an insurgency that is viewed as the good side in a conflict is a prestigious act. One
of the many examples of prestige driven support is the French support for the Libyan National
Council or the widespread Arab support for the Palestinian cause.
Religious kinship can be another motivation. In regions where religion plays a key role in
society, conducting foreign policy with religion as a reference framework can be very
effective. Iran, for example, supported many Shi’a movements throughout the Middle East,
and Balkans because exporting militant Islam was a cornerstone of its foreign policy.
Ninth, next to religious kinship as a motivation stands ethnic kinship. Ethnic conflicts
“exploded” when the Cold War ended, but the origins can be traced back to the 1950s.42 A
modern day example is the Russian support for Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist under the
42
Tedd Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 11. ‐ 17 ‐ pretext of ethnicity. Russia supports and protects Russian citizens and found in this reasoning
a justification for military actions that lead to the 2008 war with Georgia.
The tenth motivation is to be found in irredentism. This is a rare one since it covers
territorial expansionism along homo-ethnic lines. In the 1990s there was irredentism
motivated support for armed groups in the former Yugoslavia when Serbia and Croatia
supported groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the goal of adding territory where the majority
was Serb and Croat respectively.
Byman et al. indicate leftist ideology to be the eleventh motivation. Ideology was an
important motivation for the support of proxies during the Cold War since the United States
supported anti-communist groups where they could and the Soviet Union did the same with
leftist, Marxist movements. With the Cold War ending the ideology based support declined as
well and nowadays rebel groups take their chances playing the ethnic card.
The twelfth and the last of this list of motivations is plunder. Supporting an insurgency in
an area that is rich in resources can bring great benefits to the supporting state. The
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone provided Charles Taylor’s Liberia with
blood diamonds in exchange for the support that Liberia gave to the RUF.
These twelve motivations have been developed to try and explain state support for
insurgency movements. In this thesis the focus is on the usage of armed non-state actors as
proxies. Insurgent movements are a manifestation of armed non-state actors and hence these
twelve motivations are useful to explore. Motivations such as plunder and prestige are
perhaps very applicable to insurgent movements, but one can doubt that these very specific
motivations are of any influence in explaining the usage of armed non-state actors as a whole.
However, the overall worth of this report by Byman et al. exceeds the negative aspects, since
it provides a good starting point in researching why states resort to using armed non-state
actors as proxies.
If one moves from the supporting of insurgencies to the delegation to rebel movements
one comes across a rather small framework that Salehyan introduced. He distilled a total of
eight conjectures about why states want to delegate to rebel movements.43 Delegation to rebel
movements is, just like supporting an insurgency, to be considered as a manifestation of using
armed non-state actors as proxies. Salehyans framework has eight conjectures but the last two
however, are from the perspective of the proxy and not of the state so these will be left out. To
43
Salehyan, “Delegation,” 508-9. ‐ 18 ‐ explore the relationship of a proxy vis-à-vis its patron state goes beyond the scope of this
thesis.
The first is closely linked to the utilitarian approach of a cost benefit analysis. Salehyan
states that delegation will be more likely when there is a high expectance of war casualties
and costs in resources. Simultaneously there is a low tolerance for casualties and costs at
home. Using proxies instead eliminates the risk of casualties of one’s own and is potentially
cost reducing. Almost every case of a proxy fighting for a state this cost benefit argument can
be applied. States, as well as the decision makers of states, are considered rational and
calculating actors. Since every action is being calculated one can argue that the
abovementioned proposition is at the core of every principal-agent relationship. This makes
this proposition so universal that it provides too little explanatory power to explain why states
use armed non-state actors properly, and more important, specifically.
Second, a state is more likely to consider the covertness of using proxies if there is a great
risk of international scrutiny. This can come from the international arena or from the domestic
arena. Internationally this could result in for example United Nations sanctions and protests
from the government’s constituents at the domestic level. No government would risk military
action if the reputational costs are too high, hence the use of proxies will help them to avoid
the blame for a conflict. A good example here is the alleged support of Venezuela and
Ecuador for the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Columbia accused
these countries from secretly supporting. Which these countries, out of fear of (international)
scrutiny denied.
A third situation in which a state is more likely to resort to using proxies is when the need
for military action is not dire. If a state needs to interfere right away it will be more probable
that the own military is deployed whereas if the foreign policy goals of the state are more
long-term, proxies might be the best instruments available. If vital interests of a state are
under attack than it might not be wise to direct a rebel group to solve this problem. Instead it
is more likely the armed forces of that state will be used to protect its interests. A good
example of a situation like this is the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006 when the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) threatened the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The
United States backed intervention of Ethiopian forces came at the invitation of the TFG.
Ethiopia could have used its proxies in the region but the situation was too dire. Other
countries in the region such as Egypt, allegedly supported the ICU through Eritrea.44
44
International Crisis Group, “Somalia Confict Risk Alert,” accessed May 22,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2006/somalia-conflict-risk-alert.aspx. ‐ 19 ‐ 2011,
Fourth, Salehyan argues that it is the stronger state that will be more likely to use proxies
against a weaker state because the threat of a counter attack by the weaker state is not very
likely and the stronger state will have more resources to control the proxy. This proposition
works the other way around as well because a weaker state will fear retaliation by the stronger
state if the latter finds out that the former supported a particular armed group. Many examples
exist the prove this conjecture true, yet there are situations where this conjecture is proven to
be false. This weakens this argument to a great extent.
The fifth conjecture has to do with the occupation of enemy territory. If a state has little
intelligence on the territory that is to be occupied or has not enough resources to manage the
occupation than that state will be more likely to delegate these tasks to a proxy. Local proxies
possess specific intelligence on the captured territory and local armed groups are more likely
to have some degree of legitimacy by the populace in the occupied territory.
The sixth proposition has considerable overlap with the ninth motivation of Byman et al.
When there is ethnic kin in the target state and they have organized themselves in armed
groups, than the threshold for a state to support these armed groups greatly diminishes. It is
easier to delegate to proxies with the same ethnicity than it is with proxies that have a
different ethnic background. This makes it more likely for a state to delegate to armed groups
of the same ethnicity. This proposition seems solid at a first glance, yet Byman et al.
discovered in their survey of insurgent movements during the 1990s found that the ethnic card
is “[O]ften mere window dressing.”45
These motivations by Byman et al. and the conjectures and propositions of Salehyan on
why states would resort to the use of armed non-state actors as proxies fail to lift the
explanations from the level of the obvious. This means that the explanation is found in factors
that seem quite logical, but deny the diversity in conflict dimensions. This does not mean that
these are of no good, but there is more to explore than just the obvious. This thesis aimed to
do just that, go more in depth on possible propositions on why states resort to armed non-state
actors as proxies.
Regarding the reviewed literature, many of these propositions are very state-centered or
very leadership-centered and therefore they fail to grasp more of the possible explanations for
proxy warfare. This thesis explored the dynamics of nuclear weapons and its impact on proxy
warfare. It furthermore will look for possible explanations in the regime type of the states
involved and the impact of the amount of aid on proxy warfare. Another explanation will be
45
Byman, Trends in outside support, 23. ‐ 20 ‐ looked for in the protraction of the conflict and last, the proposition by Salehyan on
conventional strength will be reversed. If guerilla tactics are the weaker man’s weapon of
choice, indeed proxy warfare will likely be the weaker state’s weapon of choice.
This chapter revolved around scholarly work on proxy warfare and the possible
motivations. Next chapter contains the hypotheses and definitions of key concepts as well as
the methodology that will be used.
3. Theory chapter
As introduced earlier in the introduction the central question in this thesis is:
Why do some states use armed non-state actors as proxies?
Carl von Clausewitz in his landmark philosophical study of war makes the famous statement
that “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”46 Where others paraphrase
this original statement into “Guerilla war is the extension of politics by means of armed
conflict.”47 These two statements have in common that there is always a political notion to
warfare, that war is always a policy of some sort. To continue this line of reasoning one
comes to a point where the questions regarding the delegation of war as a policy option come
up.48 That line of reasoning brought about the central question in this paper. It is a remarkable
and new subject of study within international relations, and one that does not fear to
acknowledge that there are more actors than just states in the security realm.
To answer this question properly a careful demarcation of the dependent variable is
necessary. The dependent variable is:
The usage of armed non-state actors by states as proxies
The dependent variable has multiple concepts that need clarification. ‘Proxies’ relate to proxy
war so this is a worthwhile definition to shed light on. The same goes for ‘usage’, though this
seems an easy one, it needs proper clarification before it can be utilized in this thesis. The last
concept to be defined properly is that of non-state actors. Central to this definition is the
question of what exactly is a non-state actor? And most importantly, since there are so many
different kinds of actors, a typology will provide a structured view on these actors.
Since proxy warfare has been mentioned a lot in the past chapters it is good to start with
this phenomenon. Cecily Brewer has researched negotiation in proxy wars in East Africa.
According to her proxy wars are conflicts that are not to be classified in the more traditional
46
Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87. 47
Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice (London: Paladin, 1972), 26. 48
Abbink, “Ethiopia-Eritrea,” 420. ‐ 21 ‐ distinctions of war that are used, those being interstate wars and intrastate wars. She defines
interstate wars as the classic wars between two states and intrastate wars as civil wars, wars of
independence and so on. According to Brewer “Proxy wars are interstate conflicts fought via
intrastate means.”49 This essentially means that the conflicts that start as classic conflicts
between states transform into not so transparent conflicts with opaque actors as substitutes for
the initiating states. If one would look up the definition of proxy in a dictionary and would
apply this to the international phenomenon of conflict and warfare, one would logically see
that “[…] a proxy war is a war waged by one party on behalf of another”50
Jon Abbink in his case study of the proxy war in the Horn of Africa makes the analogy of
proxy wars being a chess game where the rules change constantly to illustrate the complexity
of proxy warfare and its characteristics.51 Abbink, like Brewer, sees proxy wars as happening
in the realm between the interstate – intrastate dichotomy. He adds more characteristics in his
definition than Brewer does though, defining proxy wars as “[…]secondary, often 'low
intensity' armed conflicts, pursued in the context of a major geopolitical power struggle or an
outright war between states, carried out by subsidiary or co-opted insurgent movements,
usually of an ethno-regional nature.”52 Several elements of this definition stand out. First there
is the notion of low intensity conflict that clearly indicates guerilla wars, wars of
independence and the like, that are being fought with primarily low tech arms.53 The second
element that stands out is the focus on insurgent movements which is a rather specific type of
armed non-state actors. A last element is the ethnic card that Abbink plays, which is a highly
contested one in current literature. Of course, these remarks should be seen in the light of the
scope of his research, which is the Horn of Africa.
An author that has done research on proxies in the midst of the Cold War is Bertil Dunént,
and his thoughts and definitions are an important addition to this small anthology of
definitions. He defines three elements of what a proxy should have vis-à-vis its patron-state.54
There should be a compatibility of interests between the two parties. Besides the connection
of interests there should also be a material connection between the two parties in which party
A will send material support to party B, the proxy. In some sense this could mean, according
to Dunént, that party B will get dependent on this support, and hence will be unable to operate
49
Cecily Brewer, “Peril by Proxy: Negotiating Conflicts in East Africa,” International Negotiation 16 (2011):
138. 50
Brewer, “Peril by Proxy,” 140. 51
Abbink, “Ethiopia-Eritrea,” 407. 52
Abbink, “Ethiopia-Eritrea,” 409. 53
With this notion I mean that they usually do not operate armored vehicles, warplanes and other sophisticated
weaponry. 54
Dunént, “Proxy Intervention,” 356-7. ‐ 22 ‐ in the first place without it. But by far the most important characteristic is the asymmetric
power relation between the two parties.
To summarize a bit of the general remarks made on proxies; there should be an
asymmetric relation between the patron state and the target actor in the first place. Second, the
actor must have somewhat the same interests in the bigger power game played at the interstate
level. It should be able to accommodate itself in the foreign policy goals of the patron state.
Third, there should be a degree of support from the patron state. Fourth, the proxy itself is an
actor that operates in between the interstate and intrastate level, on a more transnational,
regional scale. The proxies Dunént talks about are primarily states, but because of the time in
which he wrote his article one could argue that that line of reasoning is too focused on Cold
War dynamics.
These dynamics of proxy war are to be included in the broader definition of using armed
non-state actors as proxies. A proxy war can be defined as a war fought between states using
third parties as a tool.
The next concept of my dependent variable that needs to be clarified is ‘usage’. To many
this noun speaks for itself, but it both deserves and needs a scientific look at it. For the noun
usage the Cambridge dictionary gives “the way something is treated or used”55, and looking
further it gives for the verb ‘to use’ the definition “to put something such as a tool, skill or
building to a particular purpose”56 When one combines these two one gets a proper definition
for ‘usage’: “the way something is put to a particular purpose”.
The last component to be defined is ‘armed non-state actors’. Before I go into defining
this component it is very helpful to construct a small typology of what actors exactly fit into
the concept of armed non-state actors. Put simply, there is need to know more about these
armed groups. As said, armed non-state actors may be supported by states.
Uri Scheckener has put effort in defining armed non-state actors and creating a rather
extensive typology. According to him armed non-state actors have two essential
characteristics. They “[A]re 1) willing and able to use violence for pursuing their objectives;
and 2) not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential
guards, police or special forces.”57 Furthermore, most of the armed non-state actors share the
feature that they do not attach importance to the distinction between combatants and non-
55
Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “usage”. 56
Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “use”. 57
Scheckener, “Armed Non-State Actors,” 25. ‐ 23 ‐ combatants.58 Claude Bruderlein thinks that making a common definition on armed non-state
actors is rather difficult because armed groups differ to a great extent, but he does create three
characteristics. First there should be an apparent organizational structure with a command
level at the top of the organization. Second, the armed group is engaged in some kind of
political struggle meaning that they try to redefine a political and legal basis of some sort
through acts of violence.59 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) defines armed nonstate actors as entities that contest the state’s monopoly on the use of violence within a
specified geographical territory.60
Some characteristics of armed non-state actors have been explained, but what kind of
groups are to be classified as armed non-state actors? Scheckener makes a rather exhaustive
attempt61. The first kind are rebels and guerilla fighters. These kind of groups generally
pursue the liberation of a social class or nation and hence pursue a political agenda. They
draw their support from foreign governments, making them excellent proxies. The second
kind are militias and paramilitaries. These usually act on behalf of a regime or are tolerated by
the regime. Often they are created, trained and equipped by state authorities and can be used
to perform actions for the state that a state cannot do for itself, dirty business like kidnapping,
killing and ethnic cleansing. Third there are the clan chiefs and big men. These actors are
legitimate representatives of local clans, tribes etcetera. They attained their positions through
tradition of local people and their kingdoms or chiefdoms can be formalized in structure, but
also can be informal when these lines cut across the administrative borders of a state. A fourth
kind Scheckener discusses are warlords. These are local potentates who control particular
territory with their own private armies where the government does not hold sway anymore.
They benefit greatly from the post-war economies by exploiting resources in the controlled
territory. Warlords are a typical byproduct of a long civil war. The fifth kind are terrorists.
Terrorists are a kind of armed non-state actors that have been subject of endless discussion as
to what they constitute exactly. Spreading panic and fear are their instruments to achieve
political goals based on their ideology. They are often organized in cells or small groups.
Militarily they are a rather weak group and they use their attacks to focus attention on their
grievances and cause. The sixth kind of armed non-state actors is a kind that greatly benefits
from globalization. Criminals organize themselves in syndicates and Mafia type structures.
58
Scheckener, “Armed Non-State Actors,” 28. 59
Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority,”
INSS Occasional Paper 57 (2004): 15, accessed April 29, 2011. http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435193&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 60
Shultz, “Armed Groups”, 16. 61
Scheckener, “Armed Non-State Actors,” 25-8. ‐ 24 ‐ They seek political influence to safeguard their profitable endeavors that increasingly go
across borders. A seventh kind are the mercenaries and the more modern private security
corporations. These usually consist out of volunteers recruited from third states. Because they
essentially fight for their reward they can be found at any side in a conflict, which depends on
which master pays best. The eight and last kind that Scheckener distinguishes are the
marauders. These groups are demobilized and scattered former combatants that roam the
spoils of war after the conflict ended. They are extremely useful for other actors such as the
state. They then are deployed to do a government’s dirty work like killing and cleansing.
Schneckener’s typology of armed non-state actors is made across four criteria which he
uses to distinguish among the large variety of these groups.62 Armed non-state actors can be
focused on changing the status quo such as rebels, guerillas and terrorists, but can also have
their aims in maintaining the status quo. Examples of the latter are militias, paramilitaries and
warlords. Second, there is a territorial edge to the goals of armed non-state actors, whether
they have territorial aspirations or not. Rebels and warlords are a good example for the former
whereas terrorists, criminals and marauders are a typical example of having no territorial
aspirations. Third, there is the kind of violence a group employs. A terrorist’s main weapon is
fear and hence this kind of violence is psychological in character. But also marauders and
criminals use this kind of violence. Physical violence is used, according to Scheckener, by
groups like rebels, paramilitaries, warlords and mercenaries. A last characteristic is that of
whether the motivation is political or economic which Scheckener dubs greed versus
grievance. Some groups, such as rebels and paramilitaries, have a socio-political agenda and
are thus in need of resources and political power. Others such as marauders and mercenaries
pursue only economic gains.
The problem with this typology is that there are armed non-state actors that are not easily
categorized. For instance, organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah or the PIRA do have a
political branch, but are terrorist organizations according to the West. If these organizations
are used by a nation-state for that states security ends, they tend to become more or less
private security companies but then with a political edge to it. Nevertheless this typology has
proven to be of great use in distinguishing what constitutes an armed non-state actor and what
characteristics do they have in common. To summarize some remarks made on armed nonstate actors; they possess a degree of structure in their organization, they are both willing and
capable of using violence and they are not integrated in formalized state institutions. They are
62
Scheckener, “Armed Non-State Actors,” 28-30. ‐ 25 ‐ primarily independent and have their own agenda but they can be employed by a state. Their
agenda ranges from territorial ambitions to economic gains.
Now all the components of the dependent variable are analyzed, a definition can be
constructed. The usage of armed non-state actors as proxies, will be defined as:
The way an organized armed group of people is put to the purpose of fulfilling a state’s
policy goals using violent means in exchange for economic, political and/or material support.
The next section contains the elaboration of this thesis’ central addition to the literature on
proxy wars and the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies by states. The independent
variables that might have impact on the usage of armed non-state actors will be further
introduced and explained. These are the presence of nuclear weapons, the protraction of the
conflict, regime type, conventional strength and the amount of aid received. These will then
be tested on the case of Pakistan and India.
Nuclear weapons
There are five independent variables that this thesis focuses on. The first is the nuclear
weapons capability of at least one state in the conflict dyad. One can define this as the
capability by a state of using a nuclear weapon. This means that in this case one or two states
in the conflict dyad are capable of targeting the other state, and have the autonomous control
of those nuclear weapons. This variable will be measured by assessing the moment when at
least one state in the conflict dyad has got the capacity to develop its nuclear capability into a
nuclear weapons capability, if needed.
The theoretic backbone of this hypothesis is the stability/instability paradox that Glen
Snyder introduced in his 1965 article The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror. He
developed the stability-instability paradox, a construct which was to explain the relation
between the stability of nuclear deterrence on the strategic level of conflict and the instability
on the conventional level of conflict. His central point is “[T]hat conventional and nuclear
balances interact in a variety of ways, and sometimes to contradictory effects.”63 One would
expect that the argument of avoiding direct confrontation would count, but nuclear weapons
and conventional weapons interact in a different way. He starts to doubt the notion that
nuclear weapons, or the so-called balance of terror, negate the more traditional concept of
balance of power which is primarily based on conventional strength. He was specifically
interested in the effects of United States nuclear deterrence on the conventional theatres of
63
Rajesh Rajagopalan, “What Stability-Instability Paradox? Subnational Conflicts and the Nuclear Risk in South
Asia,” South Asian Strategic Stability Unit Research Paper no.4 (2006): 5. ‐ 26 ‐ Europe and South Asia. Rajesh Rajagopalan uses this to argue that the stability/instability
paradox has been misinterpreted by many scholars: “He is clearly not referring to the equation
between the nuclear balance and alleged foreign assistance for sub-conventional conflicts,
insurgencies, proxy wars and the like”.64 However, this reasoning was made with the Cold
War in mind, and several scholars have used the stability-instability paradox on the state or
dyadic level of analysis. Scholars such as Sumit Ganguly apply a different line of reasoning,
namely that conventional conflict has a risk of escalation and that both sides are therefore
trying to exploit internal conflicts.65 But what exactly constitutes this paradox? In a nutshell it
revolves around the stability at the nuclear level versus conflict at the conventional level. A
great level of stability at the nuclear level, or the low probability that conventional war will
escalate in nuclear war,66 will decrease stability at the conventional level. If neither side has
the capability to completely annihilate its adversary, and they both know this, they will be
experiencing less inhibitions concerning the initiation of a conventional war.67 These limited
conventional adventures, as some scholars dub them, should not be targeted at a states core
interests to prevent escalation from happening. Or to speak in other terms, one should not
cross the nuclear threshold.68 In the light of this mechanism one can legitimately ask oneself,
with interstate war becoming less likely but medium to low level conflict more likely, what is
peace?69 There are also pessimists that reason in the other direction. They state that the
possibility of conventional war can lead to an inadvertent escalation that eventually results in
using one’s nuclear weapons.70
But does the stability-instability paradox explain proxy warfare? If there is stability at the
nuclear level in the conflict dyad then, according to this mechanism, there will be a greater
risk of conventional warfare which comes with the risk of escalating. The nuclear threshold
can be reached with military operations hence it could be a wise choice for decision makers to
delegate these somewhat risky operations and use other crisis management techniques.71 To
64
Rajagopalan, “What Stability-Instability Paradox?” 5. 65
Sumit Ganguly, “India-Pakistan Nuclear Issues and the Stability-Instability Paradox”, Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 18 (1995): 326. 66
P.R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia”,
(Washington D.C.: Stimson, N.D.), 20, accessed May 5, 2011, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/researchpdfs/NRRMChari.pdf 67
Glenn Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury
(San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 199. 68
Feroz Hassan Khan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review (2003): 64. 69
Saira Khan, “A Nuclear South Asia: Resolving or Protracting the Protracted Conflict,” International Relations
61 (2001): 66. 70
Sumit Ganguly and Harrison R. Wagner, “India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 27 (2004): 480. 71
Khan, “A Nuclear South Asia,” 65. ‐ 27 ‐ use armed non-state actors would even mean a lower method of fighting a conflict since
regular conventional units will not be deployed and thus the risk of reaching a nuclear
threshold will be null.
Hence this hypothesis will be: ‘When at least one state of the conflict dyad has nuclear
weapons capability, the other state will be more likely to use armed non-state actors as
proxies against that state.’
Protraction of conflict
The second independent variable is the protraction of the conflict dyad. Defining this
variable is rather difficult due to the many scholarly definitions out there and the lack of a
common definition of protracted conflict. A leading scholar in the field of protracted conflict
is Edward Azar. He introduced a definition that found widespread use. According to Azar et
al. protracted conflicts are:
“[H]ostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open
warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are
very high […], they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination. […] they
will end by cooling off.”72
Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfield adapt the abovementioned definition slightly by
removing the ‘violence’ component but also operationalize it to a measurable variable. They
state that before a conflict can be qualified as a protracted conflict there should have occurred
at least three international crisis between the two states in the conflict dyad in a time frame of
at least five years. The issue(s) over which there is conflict should be recurring throughout the
time frame of the conflict.73 The time frame will be measured in terms of years. To measure
the number of international crisis I will follow Brecher in his remark that “[I]nternational
crisis denotes disruptive interaction between states whether or not accompanied by
violence.”74 Assuming that the behavior of states towards each other, when not in conflict, is
quite peaceful, any disruption in this pattern can indicate a crisis. One has to measure by
looking at skirmishes, politicians’ statements and so on. Now one has to look more into the
rationale behind this hypothesis.
One has to assume that some conflicts get protracted and this thesis looked at this fact for
a possible explanation for the proxy war phenomenon. So the starting point is the point where
72
Edward E. Azar, Paul Jureidini and Ronald McLaurin, “Protracted Social Confict: Theory and Practice in the
Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies (1978): 50. 73
Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press:
1997): 6. 74
Michael Brecher, Crisis in World Politics, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993): 6. ‐ 28 ‐ there is a conflicting relationship between two states about an indivisible issue, and this
conflict stretches on without being ended. When a state finds itself in a protracted conflict
with another state, any behavior that could lead to a relative gain vis-à-vis its adversary will
be scrutinized by that adversary. Any attempts of resolving the conflict via military means
will be answered accordingly. Probably any behavior will be under constant suspicion by a
state’s adversary, making the situation tense at least.
An example of the tensions is the escalation of the Indo-Pakistani conflict when the latter
overreacted to a military operation of the former, Operation Brasstacks. To shift from overt
means of ending the conflict to more covert means can have multiple advantages to a state.
Covert policy means are not likely to get noticed instantly, creating a momentum in the
conflict. However, the main rationale for employing armed non-state actors is to ensure
oneself that everything possible is done to win the conflict. A state will have its own military
devoted to the cause, its own intelligence services and on top of that it has ensured itself of the
help of proxies in the adversary’s territory. For example, these can consist out of terrorist
groups plotting attacks against its adversary. These will help weaken the opponent so when
momentum is gained there might be a bigger window of opportunity to end the conflict. With
a positive ending as the main goal.
But does the measure of protraction explain proxy warfare? If there is a protracted conflict
a state would want to use every means possible to end the conflict. To use armed non-state
actors is to broaden a state’s means for ending the conflict. And an end to a lasting conflict
will be a state’s primary secondary objective, winning the conflict will be the primary
objective.
The hypothesis will be: ‘A state will be more likely to use armed non-state actors as
proxies against the other state when a conflict is protracted.’
Regime type
The third independent variable is the regime type of the patron-state. Regime type
concerns what type of political system there is in a state. This can range from authoritarian to
democratic. The patron-state is the state that is supporting armed non-state actors, so the
causal relationship that is being researched is whether the regime type is of any influence on
the choice for using a proxy. To measure regime type there are multiple options from which
one can choose. The index that has been used in this thesis is the Polity IV index developed
by Ted Robert Gurr. The Polity IV index is preferred over the Freedomhouse index due to the
fact that the former scores better overall in a comparative study of multiple democracy and
‐ 29 ‐ regime type indices. Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen assess these indices on
conceptualization, measurement and aggregation of data, and the Polity IV index scores better
than Freedomhouse on at least the measurement75 and aggregation of data76.
Now for the theory behind this hypothesis one has to start with the fact that authoritarian
states tend to be war-prone. One of the leading scholars on the democratic peace theory,
Michael Doyle, states that democratic representation, the ideological commitment to
fundamental human rights and transnational interdependence account for the peace-proneness
that (liberal) democracies display.77 These kind of restraints come from the norms that exist
within democracies. Therefore democracies are more inclined to resolve international issues
through compromise or third party mediation. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett dubbed this the
normative model of democratic peace.78 This line of reasoning can be applied the other way
around as well. In nondemocratic, or authoritarian regimes the political competition resembles
a zero-sum game where the winner takes all and the stability of the regime flows from the
absence of an effective opposition. In the foreign policy realm of these more autocratic states,
conflicts with other states, be it democracies or nondemocracies, will be dominated by force
and the quest for a decisive victory.79 So in these cases “[T]he logic of power replaced the
liberal logic of accommodation.”80
The structural model concerns the internal structure of the political system. Democracies
have a system of checks and balances which makes it difficult to rally support for war, hence
making war not very likely because in the time that a democracy is mobilized for war, the
issue is most likely resolved through peaceful means. Nondemocracies do not experience
these structural restraints and hence are more likely to use war as a conflict resolution tool. A
conflict between states with this kind of regime is most likely to escalate into a war.81 But
democracies are just as war-prone as other states.82 Their war-prone behavior comes from a
trait that democracies inhibit: their international ‘imprudence’ vis-à-vis nondemocracies. The
restraint therefore only seems to work vis-à-vis other democracies.83 This imprudent behavior
can be explained in terms of the normative and structural models for democratic peace. When
75
Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative
Indices,” Comparative Political Studies 35 (2002): 21. 76
Munck and Verkuilen, “Measuring Democracy,” 25-6. 77
Michael W. Doyle, “On the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19 (1995): 180. 78
Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,” The American
Political Science Review 87 (1993): 625. 79
Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 625. 80
Doyle, “Democratic Peace,” 181. 81
Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 626. 82
Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 48. 83
Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80 (1986): 1156. ‐ 30 ‐ there is a conflict dyad that consists out of a democracy and a nondemocracy the former will,
in case of the normative model, take over the norms of the nondemocracy when attacked and
hence respond with force if necessary. In the case of the structural model the former will, if
attacked, find itself in an emergency which gives legitimacy to respond with force if
necessary.
A case in point for the argument that the regime type does not matter is Pakistan. It had
many political upheavals throughout its history. This is a state that saw periods of democracy
being interspersed with periods of (military) dictatorship. However, ever since the conflict
began there are traces of links between Pakistan and Kashmir insurgent groups.
The structural model prevents a democracy from pursuing an aggressive foreign policy
since the constituents of the incumbent government will probably not support an aggressive
foreign policy. Key here is domestic accountability. When there is no clear link established
between an armed non-state actor and a democracy, then the constituents cannot keep their
government responsible or accountable for the actions performed by the armed non-state
actor. Using proxies, then, generates the possibility for a democracy to pursue an aggressive
foreign policy if that is in its interests. It even: “[A]llows a state to distance itself from being
directly or indirectly responsible for war crimes up to and including genocide.”84
Authoritarian states are, as abovementioned, more war-prone and hence one can assume that
they will use armed non-state actors where they can if possible and if it serves the war effort.
Since both democracies and nondemocracies have an incentive to use armed non-state
actors there is no direction of hypothesizing. Since both regime types are more likely to resort
to the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies one can distill the following, more general,
hypothesis. “The regime type of the state does not have an impact on the positive likelihood
of states using armed non-state actors as proxies against other states.”
Conventional weaker state
The fourth independent variable is derived from the research conducted by Salehyan, this
is “Conventional disadvantage of the weaker state of the dyad”. The key component in this
variable that needs definition is conventional disadvantage. The weaker state of the dyad will
be the state in the conflict dyad that is militarily weaker than the other state in the dyad, on a
conventional level. Conventional “describes weapons which are not nuclear, or methods of
fighting a war that do not involve nuclear weapons.”85 Essentially this means that
84
Loveman, “Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention,” 46. 85
Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “conventional”. ‐ 31 ‐ conventional forces encompass normal military forces a state has to its disposition. A
disadvantage therein means that a state has a weaker army than its adversary, in this variable
the other state in the conflict dyad. To measure this, this thesis used the total number of troops
in the army. This includes reserves and paramilitary units. Data from the National Material
Capabilities (NMC) data set will be used. This data set contains annual values that include
military personnel, iron and steel production and so on. The value for military personnel will
be used to assess the conventional strength.
Salehyan poses, as explained in the literature review chapter, that due to the fear of
retaliation for using a proxy in the first place, it is the weaker state that is not likely at all to
resort to using proxies. Strong states are more likely to use proxies against predominantly
weaker targets because there is virtually no threat of retaliation and the stronger state has
more means to keep the proxy under control and prevent agent slacking from happening.86
The causal relationship that this thesis poses is the contrary, that the weaker state leads to the
usage of armed non-state actors as proxies. When there is asymmetry in the conflict dyad it
can still be rational for the weaker state in that dyad to initiate a war according to T. V. Paul.
To explain asymmetric war initiation he introduces four variables, being the politico-military
strategy, the possession of offensive weapon systems, great power defensive support, and
fourth, a changing domestic power structure.87 In the cases Paul examined the stronger states
were convinced, however, that their power preponderance would deter the weaker states.88 So
despite the weakness of the weaker state, it can seek a direct confrontation with the other
(stronger) state. This thesis argues that weaker states can seek a confrontation, but they will
not want to prefer a direct one. Instead, it will want to use armed non-state actors as proxies
because the connection between the patron state and the proxy can be kept unclear enough to
prevent it from becoming a casus belli for the stronger state, yet the patron-state (weaker
state) can still pursue important foreign policy goals vis-à-vis the stronger state in the conflict
dyad. Those goals can be, as Paul mentioned, to alter the status quo or to keep it from
deteriorating further.89
There are some examples to be found where weaker states use proxies against a stronger
state. One of history’s primary examples is the support by various Arab states of Hamas and
Hezbollah. Hamas being predominantly supported by Iran and Hezbollah begin supported by
86
Saleyhan, “Delegation,” 508. 87
Thazha Varkey Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (New York: Cambridge
University Press,1994), 20. 88
Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, 174. 89
Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, 16. ‐ 32 ‐ both Iran and Syria. The military balance in the Middle East is in favor of Israel. That is, the
balance in technology instead of sheer numbers. It is considered to be the strongest military
power in the region, but nevertheless Arab states such as Iran and Syria continue to support
Hamas and Hezbollah. Another less known example is that of Malay support to Pattani United
Liberation Organisation (PULO) that fights for the independence of the Malay Muslim south
of Thailand.90 Thailand’s military is almost three times the size of the Malay military.91
Salehyans proposition was that stronger states were more inclined to use armed non-state
actors as proxies, this thesis tests the hypothesis that: “The conventionally weaker state will
be more likely to use armed non-state actors as proxies against other states.”
Typically, as Loveman argues, every state in the post Cold War era has the potential to be
the principal or the agent in a proxy war.92
Foreign aid
The last independent variable is related to the flow of aid or the amount of aid received.
This is a more theoretically straightforward variable. Many states receive foreign aid from the
industrialized, predominantly Western, states. This thesis follows the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in defining what exactly constitutes aid.
The OECD defines aid as Official Development Assistance (ODA) as “flows of official
financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of
developing countries as the main objective which are concessional in character with a grant
element of at least 25 percent.”93 To measure the flow of aid in the case studies, ODA data of
the OECD will be used.
In the literature review a proposition that concerns international scrutiny was assessed.
Salehyan states that due to reputational cost a state might be more inclined to use proxies. The
same proposition also concerns the reputational costs vis-à-vis the domestic level of the state
in question.94 This thesis poses a hypothesis that roughly resembles Salehyans proposition,
however, this hypothesis will be narrowed down to the specific relationship of ODA with
proxy warfare. Reputational costs can be operationalized in many ways and aid is related to
this, thus reputational costs cannot be measured with ODA due to the fact that aid is regarded
90
Byman, Trends in outside support, 16. 91
Correlates of War Project, “Composite Index of National Capabilities,” accessed May 17, 2011,
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 92
Loveman, “Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention,” 39. 93
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Glossary of Statistical Terms,” accessed May 11,
2011, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043. 94
Salehyan, “Delegation,” 508. ‐ 33 ‐ as a foreign policy tool by the donors, and hence the aid comes with an agenda. That agenda
is not related to the reputation of a receiving state, perhaps for geopolitical reasons. An
example is the Western support to Myanmar. According to OECD data there is a considerable
flow of ODA to Myanmar. Myanmar is one of the most authoritarian states in the world and it
violates human rights on a large scale, but the Western powers continue to aid Myanmar. The
bad reputation of Myanmar is, at least not entirely, linked to the flow of foreign aid to the
country. Apparently other factors are taken into consideration when giving aid.
Alberto Alesina and David Dollar find for the three biggest donors that the United States
gives much aid to Israel and Egypt, France gives overwhelmingly to its former colonies and
Japan gives aid to the countries that vote with Japan in the United Nations.95 This clearly
supports that “[T]he pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic
considerations.”96 A recipient state that receives ODA from donor states would not want to
jeopardize that flow of income. So if a state’s foreign policy agenda needs more violent
means for it to be attained, the state cannot start open war with the risk of losing the foreign
aid. A state would want to be able to employ more covert means of attaining its foreign policy
goals. Using armed non-state actors as proxies is a viable option at that point. If there are high
amounts of aid to be potentially lost, a state would be even more inclined to use proxies.
An example is to be found in the Sudan case. The government in Khartoum receives aid
from the United States, but is also pursuing a foreign policy that the United States does not
like.97 This policy is reflected in the support for the Janjaweed militia´s that were active in the
border region with Chad and in Darfur.98
Now to formulate the hypothesis that sharpens Salehyans proposition on fear of
reputational costs: “A high amount of ODA received by a state makes it more likely to use
armed non-state actors as proxies against other states.”
Methodology
In this thesis the method of a single N study is used. This is a method to perform an in
depth analysis of one case. There have been many criticisms on the value of a single case
study. Most common heard critiques are the danger of a researcher’s bias or incorrect
95
Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic
Growth 5 (2000): 55. 96
Alesina and Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid,” 33. 97
Séverine Autesserre, “United States ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ in South Sudan,” Journal of Humanitarian
Assistance (2002), accessed May 25, 2011, http://www.jha.ac/articles/a085.htm. 98
Jérôme Tubiana, “The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Myths and Reality,” HSBC
Working Paper 12 (2008): 11. ‐ 34 ‐ inferences. However, no-variance research designs can be useful according to Alexander
George and Andrew Bennett. The particular designs that can be useful are that of a deviant
case, a crucial case, a most-likely case or a least-likely design. Tests of necessity and
sufficiency in a single case study are useful as well.99 What is imperative in theory testing
with a single case is that the method of process-tracing is used.100 This method “[A]ttempts to
trace the link between possible causes and observed outcomes.”101 This is essentially the case
with an in depth single case study.
The hypotheses that are tested in the case study have been the result of a study of literature
on the dependent variable, and the gaps in this literature. They will be tested in a very
structured way using the method of process-tracing. The case will be the conflict between
India and Pakistan during the 1990s, with an emphasis on the 1999 Kargil War. The Kargil
War is chosen because of its importance. It was the first standoff between India and Pakistan
since they both tested their nuclear weapons. It was initiated by Pakistan using several
proxies. The war ended well before the military coup brought an end to democratic reign in
Pakistan. The Kargil War therefore makes a good case to test several independent variables.
The data will be collected at each year from the period after the Cold War until the year
2000. The case study in this thesis draws on these 11 measure points. These measure points
are necessary to establish clear causal links between the variables, and to prevent from
focusing on just a few points in time. This way, if one measure point proves to be an outlier,
the other 10 measure points can compensate for that and still provide evidence for the
hypotheses tested. The data collected will be assessed qualitatively so any anomalies can be
filtered out and the scientific quality of this thesis can be safeguarded.
4. Case Study: India-Pakistan
The conflict between India and Pakistan began as soon as the countries became
independent in 1947. Scholars even argue that due to the diametrical positions of the Muslim
League and the Indian National Congress (INC), achieving independence as one country was
an insurmountable task.102 The last viceroy of British India, Lord Mountbatten, signed an
edict that the predominantly Muslim states and regions should form Pakistan and the
predominantly Hindu states should form India. The exception was for the principalities. These
99
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 32-3. 100
George and Bennett, Case Studies, 80-1. 101
George and Bennett, Case Studies, 6. 102
Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2001), 10. ‐ 35 ‐ would have the choice what country they would join.103 Only the Maharaja of Kashmir
refused to make a decision, so the state of Kashmir joined neither Pakistan nor India. The first
skirmishes broke out in the South West of Kashmir, and the Pakistani army responded by
immediately aiding the rebels with arms, men and transportation.104 India deployed regulars in
Kashmir to battle the Pakistani backed insurgents. The insurgency quickly became what is
now known as the First Kashmir War. The Indian leadership realized that this conflict had the
potential to drag on indefinitely if Pakistan would not refuse to support the Kashmiri
insurgents.105 The war ended with a division in Kashmir. The people of Kashmir, however,
continued to see themselves as one people.106 The Kashmir issue was then transferred to the
United Nations Security Council but in the end neither India nor Pakistan proved able to move
their standpoint in the negotiations. According to Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai the
intractability of the positions both countries held in the negotiations was because of the
function that Kashmir held to both countries. Besides the fact that it held some strategic value
it had become a symbol of statehood for both countries. To the Indians Kashmir was proof
that secularism proved successful, and hence India could be successful. Pakistan viewed
Kashmir as a part of its Islamic state. It saw the Muslim majority of Kashmir as vital for its
own raison d’être, an Islamic state in the region.107
From 1963 onwards India had been stripping Kashmir of some constitutional provisions.
This way the territory was more easily incorporated into the Indian Union. This generated
more animosity across the border in Pakistan. Another key event in the early years of the
1960s is the routing of the Indian army by the Chinese during the 1962 Sino-Indian border
war. This showed the weakness of the Indian army and instigated a huge reform in the Indian
military. Pakistani military planners soon realized that with the Indian army modernizing,
their window of opportunity grew thin. With a ‘now or never’ mentality they launched
Operation Gibraltar. This plan envisaged in the infiltration of 5.000 men in Kashmir where
they would start an insurgency against Indian troops. The Pakistani army would then take key
positions and thereby force India to give up, even before they could mobilize its own military.
The insurgency would be presented as the fait accompli for Pakistan’s military operations in
Kashmir.108 Operation Gibraltar failed and India responded with force, sparking the Second
103
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 15. 104
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 16. 105
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 18. 106
Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, “India and the Crisis in Kashmir,” Asian Survey 34 (1994): 402. 107
Ganguly and Bajpai, “India and the Crisis,” 405. 108
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 40. ‐ 36 ‐ Kashmir War of 1965. The subsequent ceasefire was negotiated by the Soviet Union and
signed in Tashkent. The ceasefire remained in effect until 1971.
In 1970 democratic elections were held in Pakistan, after which the call for greater
autonomy came from East Pakistan. When demands for greater autonomy were not met an
insurgency broke out. The Pakistani army reacted with force and a short war broke out
between the Pakistani army and Bangladeshi rebels. Suspicious of Indian intervention the
Pakistani air force launched a pre-emptive attack on Indian airfields which failed. India now
entered the conflict by supporting the Bangladeshi rebels. They invaded under the cover of
humanitarian intervention, with the aim of stopping the genocide that was supposedly
perpetrated by the Pakistani army.109
The 1980s saw the Sikh revolting against India in the Indian Punjab. Their goal was to
establish Khalistan, a Sikh theocratic state. Pakistan decided to support these rebels.110 After
the Khalistan rebels took control over a temple complex the Indian military launched a big
offensive, Operation Blue Star, to remove them. This led to a exodus of rebels to training
facilities in Pakistan, some located only 75 meters across the border.111 The violence
intensified and by 1984 the Indian government began to publicly accuse Pakistan of fueling
the Khalistan rebellion. India military leaders designed a plan with which the full prowess and
capability could be shown to Pakistan. This message would indicate that India was ready for
war if Pakistan drove the conflict in that direction. So in 1986 India ordered Operation
Brasstacks. Thirteen divisions were deployed and threatened vital Pakistani communications.
Pakistan responded by mobilizing its own forces and by the end of 1986 observers around the
world were genuinely concerned that war was highly probable.112
The crisis that came with Operation Brasstacks is considered to be the first real nuclear
crisis in the region. India had conducted its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974,113 while
Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold in the mid 1980s. Both tested their nuclear weapons
capabilities in May 1998.114
109
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 62. 110
Praveen Swami, “Failed Threats and Flawed Fences: India’s Military Response to Pakistan’s Proxy War,”
India Review 3 (2004):149. 111
Swami, “Failed Threats,” 150, 156. 112
Swami, “Failed Threats,” 154. 113
Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons
Progam,” International Security 23 (1999): 160. 114
Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Woflsthal and Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Threats (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 240. ‐ 37 ‐ The 1999 Kargil War
During the 1990s tensions between Pakistan and India rose again due to insurgent activity
in Kashmir and the testing of the nuclear weapons in 1998. These tensions found their
apotheosis in the 1999 Kargil War. Pakistan had attempted to infiltrate and support insurgents
in the Kargil region of Kashmir.115 The insurgency in Kashmir was on its way back, Indian
security forces had the insurgents on the run. The years 1997 and 1998 had a sense of
normalcy to them.116 Pakistan feared that this relative rest in the region would diminish the
chances for a successful insurgency in the future. This explains the timing of the operations
along the Line of Control (LoC).117 In April they succeeded in bringing men and material
across the LoC. Several key positions high in the mountains surrounding Kargil were taken.
India responded with mobilizing 200.000 troops, but suffered high casualties in the
mountainous terrain. The Indian military had to deploy the air force to defeat the rebels. The
Kargil War ended with a Pakistani retreat and a status quo ante bellum.
The dynamics of this particular crisis are to be found in Pakistani optimism on the one
hand and Indian complacency on the other.118 An important facet of this war is that it is the
first war India and Pakistan fought after they both tested their nuclear weapons.
Usage of armed non-state actors
The Kashmir insurgency proves to be a constant factor in the conflict between India and
Pakistan. The alleged support that Pakistan provides to the Kashmiri insurgents proves to be a
constant factor as well. The experience with proxy warfare in the Punjab in the 1980s would
be a blueprint for further proxy warfare by Pakistan, most notably for the Jihad in Kashmir.119
Praveen Swami gives a pattern of terrorist violence in Kashmir from 1988 to 2002. From this
article it can be drawn that throughout the 1990s Pakistan supported the Khalistan rebellion in
Punjab.120 In the Kashmiri region there are the Pakistan based organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Harakat al-Ansar, Harkat–al-Jihad-i-Islami and al-Badr which they supported. These groups
have a Pakistani cadre and leadership, which links them to Pakistan. Hizb-al-Mujahideen and
Jamaat-al-Mujahideen are Pakistan based groups with a more predominant Kashmiri cadre
and leadership. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) is Kashmiri based and has a
115
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 114. 116
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 121-2. 117
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 115. 118
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 115. 119
Swami, “Failed Threats,” 149. 120
Byman, Trends in outside support, 12. ‐ 38 ‐ leadership and cadre from Kashmir.121 They, too, are supported by Pakistan.122 The armed
non-state actors presented here were active during the 1990s and it could be argued that they
are still active. Pakistan’s support here is indisputable. The many examples given, and the
short abovementioned overview, provides ample evidence that Pakistan has been dedicated to
proxy warfare since they supported the insurgency in Kashmir in 1947.
Swami gives an overview of the attacks on security personnel by the Kashmiri insurgents.
The pattern in these figures suggests an intense and bloody 1992, with as many attacks as
3.413. The figures slowly decrease to 1.116 in 1997, with a small increase to 1.994 in 2001.123
To what extent is Pakistan visibly involved in these attacks? Swami gives figures to make this
connection clear as well. He draws from figures provided by the Indian government on the
number of terrorists killed, and the number of Pakistani and other foreign terrorists killed.
These figures show a steady rise in the number of terrorists killed from 991 in 1992, to
numbers hovering around the 1.500s in 1995, 1996, 1997. The amount of terrorists being
killed reaches its record in 2000 with 1.808 deaths. The interesting part in these figures is that
there is a steady rise of Pakistani/foreign terrorists being killed. In 1992 only 19 of the 991
terrorists killed were of Pakistani/foreign origin, while in 1998 394 of the 1.111 terrorists
killed were of Pakistani/foreign origin. For 1999 this was 348, and for 2000 the number rose
to 403 Pakistani/foreign terrorists killed.124
These figures show two patterns with regard to the 1990s. First, the amount of attacks
increase in the early years of the decade, than the amount decreases to increase again by the
end of the 1990s. This pattern has an s-curve. The second pattern is that of Pakistani/foreign
involvement. This pattern shows a steady rise in the number of killed terrorists. More
concretely these patterns tell that there has been a proxy war between India and Pakistan
during the 1990s, and that Pakistan has been actively involved. The Kargil War provides
some explanations of the upsurge of the number of attacks and the number of killings at the
end of the 1990s.
The conflict between India and Pakistan that is fought through armed non-state actors has
one predominant direction. Pakistan draws heavily on this strategy whereas the Indians can
only be linked to one Pakistani opposition group, the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM).
India, though, has used armed non-state actors in the past. A clear example is the arming and
training of Tamil rebels in the 1970s and 1980s. New Delhi played a key role in supporting
121
Praveen Swami, `Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, in Theory and Practice,” India Review 2 (2003): 58-9. 122
Ganguly and Bajpai, “India and the Crisis,” 405 123
Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 60. 124
Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 61. ‐ 39 ‐ these Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).125 However, in the case of the MQM the
links to the Indian government are a lot harder to find. India has been indicated to be a minor
supporter of this group, but not to the extent of the support it provided the LTTE with in the
1970s and 1980s.126 Pakistan’s use of proxies is not exclusively connected to the conflict with
India. It supported the Taliban in Afghanistan against the communist government, and it
allegedly supports the Taliban now against the regime of Hamid Karzai. Pakistan is more
inclined in using proxies than India is in the conflict that exists between them. India has used
proxies in the past, but rather selectively. Pakistan used them against India and against
Afghanistan.
A nuclear dimension
The hypothesis was: ‘When at least one state of the conflict dyad has nuclear weapons
capability, the other state will be more likely to use armed non-state actors as proxies against
that state.’
India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, and its first weapons capability in 1998.
After the devastating Sino-Indian War of 1962 the Indians felt the urge to develop a nuclear
capability to prevent potential blackmail from the Chinese.127 First there was the ill-exercised
quest for a nuclear guarantee by one of the superpowers to deter Chinese aggression and
nuclear weapons. When that seemed fruitless India began to pursue its own nuclear weapon
more vigorously.128 By the early 1970s India had both the political will and the capability to
conduct its own nuclear test, it only waited for the right moment to show the world. Pakistan’s
attitude towards a nuclear weapon of its own began to change in the 1960s when the relations
with India began to deteriorate. The war of 1965 showed the disparity in conventional power
and Pakistan realized it needed a nuclear capability to compensate.129 The defeat in the 1971
war, and most certainly the nuclear test India conducted, gave Pakistan more incentives to
pursue a weapon of its own.130 Pakistan reached the nuclear threshold somewhere in the mid
1980s, well before the crisis surrounding the Punjab began.
India and Pakistan became nuclear weapons states in 1998, but since the late 1980s they
both possessed the capability. Both countries entered the 1990s knowing that the other
125
Byman, Trends in outside support, 117. 126
Byman, Trends in outside support, 14. 127
Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II,” 152. 128
Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II,” 153. 129
Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International
Security 23 (1999): 182. 130
Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 183. ‐ 40 ‐ possessed the nuclear capability. In the early 1990s the proxy war in Kashmir intensified if
one looks at the number of attacks on Indian security personnel. Also, Pakistan’s involvement
in the Kashmir insurgency also began to intensify, looking at the share of Pakistani nationals
among the killed terrorists. When India and Pakistan went nuclear in 1998 this immediately
altered the relation between them, as tensions increased. The false optimism that Pakistan had
in the run up to the Kargil War in 1999 is partly due to its overt nuclearization in 1998.131 In
1998 the number of attacks on Indian security personnel reached 1.211 and this number rose
to 1.390 in 1999 and to 1.560 in 2000; with Pakistani/foreign deaths reaching 394 in 1998,
348 in 1999 and 403 in 2000.132 There is a clear rise in the intensity of Pakistan’s proxy war
and its involvement after both India and Pakistan reached the status of nuclear weapons state
in 1998. Before that moment, however, Pakistan used armed non-state actors against Indian
presence in Kashmir. Examples are found during the First Kashmir War of 1947 and in
Operation Gibraltar that lead to the Second Kashmir War in 1965.
A protracted conflict
The hypothesis was: ‘A state will be more likely to use armed non-state actors as proxies
against the other state when a conflict is protracted.’
The conflict between Pakistan and India started with the refusal of the principality of
Kashmir to choose sides. What followed were numerous crises of which a few resulted in full
scale war between the two states. The issue at stake remains the control over Kashmir, to both
countries of paramount importance. This makes the issue indivisible to say the least. Because
of the nature of the issue at stake, and the number of crises and wars fought over it, this
conflict dyad can be most certainly classified as a protracted. To some scholars this dyad is
essentially a case in point of a protracted conflict.133 Since Kashmir is still artificially divided
by the LoC, and there is no end of the conflict in sight, the conflict remains protracted
throughout the 1990s. Brecher and Wilkenfeld stated that before a conflict is protracted there
should have occurred at least three international crises in a time frame of at least five years.134
The testing of the nuclear weapons, the Kargil War and the failing of high-level talks in 1997
can all be denoted as disruptive behavior between the states.135 Hence these are crises and
with at least three within a time frame of five years, one can assume that the conflict is
131
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 122. 132
Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 60-1. 133
Peter Coleman, “Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a
Metaframework,” Journal of Peace Psychology 9 (2003): 3. 134
Brecher and Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisi, 6. 135
Michael Brecher, Crisis in World Politics, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993): 6. ‐ 41 ‐ protracted, throughout the 1990s. Swami’s figures show that there has been a constant proxy
war going on against India. Pakistan utilized numerous armed non-state actors and was
increasingly directly involved in the insurgency’s efforts.
Operation Brasstacks showed that the actions of both states are under constant scrutiny
and Operation Gibraltar showed that Pakistan is constantly on the lookout for a window of
opportunity to launch an offensive; in the case of Operation Gibraltar, with proxy warfare in
advance. Some 5.000 men would infiltrate in Kashmir to start an insurgency against Indian
security forces. Pakistan would then take key positions and finalize the operation before India
could mobilize. This operation resulted in the 1965 Second Kargil War.136 Armed non-state
actors had already been utilized in the 1947 Kashmir War, and they stood at the offset of the
1999 Kargil War. In all cases India responded by deploying its own military, from flooding
Kashmir with regulars and paramilitaries137 to deploying the Indian air force to solve the
Kargil War.
These examples prove that the window of opportunity politics are a constant factor in
Pakistan’s military assessments of the situation in Kashmir. Pakistan’s military planners draw
significantly on armed non-state actors in the conflict in Kashmir. This makes proxy warfare a
constant in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.
The regimes of India and Pakistan
The hypothesis was: ‘The regime type of the state does not have an impact on the positive
likelihood of states using armed non-state actors as proxies against other states.’
In 1947 the two countries emerged from independence, India being a secular republic and
Pakistan an Islamic republic. India’s republic evolved into what today is known as the world’s
largest democracy. The trend of democratization in India has continued in the 1990s
according to the Polity IV dataset. This dataset constructs a 21 point scale where 10 is a
consolidated democracy and -10 is a hereditary monarchy. From 1990 onward India scored an
8 and that score got better from 1997 onward, the country scored a 9.138 Thus, India scores
well in the top regions of the data set meaning that it has been a very stable democracy
throughout the 1990s. With regard to the support of proxies during the 1990s, there is only the
case of India allegedly supporting one minor opposition group in Pakistan, the MQM.
136
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 40. 137
Coleman, “Characteristics of Protracted Conflict,” 3. 138
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions,
1800-2009,” accessed May 17, 2011, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. ‐ 42 ‐ Furthermore in the conflicts with Pakistan during the 1990s India had a more reactionary
position in the dyad, mostly responding to Pakistani military maneuvers.
Pakistan has a history marked by many political upheavals. Several coup d’états by the
military mark a large portion of its political history. Scholars argue that these large periods of
authoritarian rule in Pakistan aided the conflict with India. The anti-Indian and chauvinistic
ideology of the authoritarian Pakistani state has been a contributing factor to the many flawed
assessments of India’s military capability and willingness to deploy this capability.139
If one looks at the measure points in the 1990s, Pakistan scores an 8 from 1990 to 1997,
going to 7 in 1998 and 1999, then plummeting to a -6 in 2000 on the Polity IV data set.140 The
figure for 1997 comes with a note though. The year 1997 is denoted with an X which stands
for a special polity event. In this case that is the 1997 elections. After the dismissal of the
government in 1996 by President Leghari on charges of corruption and abuse of power, new
elections were held. Two years later followed a coup d’état by General Pervez Musharraf to
end the instability in the country. These events explain the low score in 2000. In the early
years of the 1990s Pakistan was viewed as a democracy while later it became a military
dictatorship. The commitment of Pakistan to the uprising in Kashmir remained throughout the
1990s as the figures by Swami show. The Pakistani effort in the Kashmir insurgency rose
steadily, with higher numbers at the end of the 1990s with the Kargil War taking place.
Interesting to note here is that the Kargil War took place between April and June 1999 and the
military coup d’état took place in October of that year. This means that the democratically
elected government of Nawaz Sharif instigated a conflict in Kashmir. Earlier governments led
by Nawaz Sharif are too involved with supporting the Kashmir insurgency when the military
planned a military operation to revive the Kashmir issue and jump-start the insurgency again.
This was done by military planners, but with the acquiescence of Nawaz Sharif.141
Strength and weakness
The hypothesis was: ‘The conventionally weaker state will be more likely to use armed
non-state actors as proxies against other states.’
Ganguly mentions in his book that Pakistani leaders frequently failed in assessing the
strength of the Indian army.142 The Indian army suffered a shameful defeat at the hands of the
Chinese in 1962, generating momentum for military reform. Throughout its history, Pakistan
139
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 7. 140
Marshall and Jaggers, “Polity IV Project.” 141
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 115. 142
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 7. ‐ 43 ‐ received military aid from the United States. This was earmarked and meant to counter the
Indo-Soviet axis in the region during the Cold War. Especially when the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the military aid to Pakistan grew with more, and more modern
weapons. Despite the military aid given the Pakistani army remains the weaker party if
compared with the Indian military.
The Pakistani military throughout the 1990s hovered around 580.000 troops. In 1990 it
had a total of 565.000 troops. The years 1992 through 1996 saw an increase to 580.000
troops. This amount grew to 610.000 in 1997, shrunk to 590.000 in 1998 and 1999; and
stabilized at 612.000 troops in 2000.143 The strength of the Indian army throughout the 1990s
is a constant one with 1.260.000 troops in 1990 well through until 1998. In 1998 there is a
build-up to 1.300.000 troops, with 1999 showing 1.300.00 as well. In 2000 there is a very
small increase in troops, up to 1.303.000.144 India clearly has a bigger conventional force than
Pakistan has. This is because under the terms of the transfer of power all the movable military
infrastructure was divided between Pakistan and India under a 30:70 ratio. Second, the
majority of the army bases, ordnance factories and training facilities were situated within the
states that became part of India.145 According to the National Material Capabilities (NMC)
data set the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) for India and Pakistan show that
Pakistan will never be able to reach conventional strengths similar to India.146
Pakistan responded to this conventional weakness by aiding several insurgencies and rebel
groups in Kashmir throughout the 20st century. They incorporate these groups in their own
military strategy, Operation Gibraltar is a clear example. This operation saw some 5.000
Pakistani regulars mixing with the insurgency movements in Kashmir to jump start a new
insurgency aimed at Indian security personnel and key positions. The Pakistani army would
then take these and other key positions from the Indians before they could mobilize. Here
proxy war tactics are neatly fit in a Blitzkrieg strategy. A case in point during the 1990s is the
the 1999 Kargil War. Here active involvement of Pakistani regulars next to insurgents was
seen in their bid to consolidate defense positions in the mountains around the town of Kargil.
The amount of attacks on Indian security personnel in Kashmir sees an increase in the
second half of the 1990s. In 1999 the increase was 14,7 percent and the increase in 2000 was
12,2 percent. Also the number of Pakistani/foreign deaths among the terrorists rose in the
143
Correlates of War Project, “Composite Index of National Capabilities,” accessed May 17, 2011,
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 144
Correlates of War Project, “CINC.” 145
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 19. 146
Correlates of War Project, “CINC.” ‐ 44 ‐ latter half of the 1990s. In 1999 they accounted for 27,2 percent of the total terrorist deaths.147
There is an increase to be seen in the number of attacks and in Pakistani involvement. The
strength of the army was 590.000 in 1999 and rose to 2000 in the aftermath of the Kargil War.
India developed a sophisticated military strategy to counter Pakistan’s proxy wars. India
used an “[A]malgam of defence and deterrence through punishment and retaliation.”148 India
relied on its military for its operations in Kashmir and it communicated its willingness to
defend Kashmir to the Pakistan military leadership often. This strategy of on the one hand
threatening with full-scale war, and on the other hand trying to seal the frontiers is India’s
answer to Pakistan’s proxy war strategy.149 This strategy is consistent with not using armed
non-state actors as proxies against Pakistan. There is only the weak link with the MQM, and
this weak link prevents from drawing solid conclusions.
Scrutiny of aid
The hypothesis was: ‘A high amount of ODA received by a state makes it more likely to
use armed non-state actors as proxies against other states.’
Both India and Pakistan are recipient states of Official Development Assistance. They
receive certain amounts of aid from donor countries or institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
Pakistan receives ODA. In 1990 the country received a total of 653,75 million USD. In
1991 471,72 million USD; in 1992 470,42 million USD; then in 1993 there was a slight
increase to 490,39 million USD. In 1994 the amount of aid reached 508,99 million USD while
1995 saw a sharp decline to 360,38 million USD. This decline continued well into 1996 with
338,93 million USD with a record low of the 1990s in 1997 with only 78,77 million USD.
1998 saw a return to normalcy with 537,49 million USD. In 1999 and 2000 this number
dropped to 435,68 and 475,48 million USD respectively.150
The number of attacks on Indian security personnel reaches a high in 1992 and the number
of attacks remain quite high throughout the early 1990s. The amount of ODA received is
somewhat steady, hovering around 500 million USD. The relationship however starts to
change from 1995 onward. The amount of attacks is decreasing rapidly and the Pakistani
involvement is getting bigger. The amount of ODA drops. In 1997 the number of attacks are
147
Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 60-1. 148
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 38. 149
Swami, “Failed Threats,” 148. 150
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “ODA by recipient,” accessed May 17, 2011,
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?datasetcode=ODA_DONOR. ‐ 45 ‐ at the lowest point since 1990 and the ODA is at a record low of 78,77 million USD. When
the amount of ODA recovers to levels that resemble the first half of the 1990s, the number of
attacks on Indian security personnel and the direct involvement of Pakistan start to rise as
well. The amount of ODA starts to hover around 500 million USD again while there is a
steady increase in the number of attacks on Indian security personnel during 1998, 1999 and
2000.
India received more aid than Pakistan did in the 1990s. In 1990 it received 751,86 million
USD, rising to 1.769,85 million USD in 1991. The figure then fell to 1.197,73 million USD in
1992 and to 811,44 million USD in 1993. The ODA rose again in 1994 to 1.377,66 million
USD. After this record high of the decade the number of ODA began to decrease steadily to
1.060,83 million USD in 1995; 1.025,90 million USD in 1996; 929,12 million USD in 1997;
915,19 million USD in 1998; 838,43 million USD in 1999 and the amount of ODA reached
650,48 million USD in the year 2000.151
The pattern here is that India receives a certain amount of aid in the early 1990s, but
eventually these figures decreased. India being one of the promising economies at the moment
is bound to receive less aid as the country gets richer. This could explain the decrease in the
1990s. As to the relation with proxy warfare; India did not rely on proxies during the 1990s. It
responded primarily with its own military to security problems vis-à-vis Pakistan.
The next chapter will see further analysis of the patterns uncovered in this case study. It
will furthermore contain both theoretical and policy implications as well as come concluding
remarks.
5. Conclusion
Proxy warfare was (re)invented during the Cold War to escape the conflict dynamics of a
bipolar international system. The United States and the Soviet Union fought each other on
distant battlefields, with foreign armies and other non-state actors. This system collapsed
when the Berlin Wall crumbled down and the United States remained as the sole superpower.
How intertwined proxy warfare was with the Cold War, the phenomenon survived well into
the 1990s and beyond. The goal of this thesis was to find an explanation for the phenomenon
of using armed non-state actors as proxies. More specifically to search for explanations that
go beyond the obvious reasoning of the utilitarian approach. This fifth and final chapter will
show to what extent this effort was successful.
151
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “ODA by recipient.” ‐ 46 ‐ First the hypotheses will be tested. Next the implications this thesis has for policy and
decision makers will be discussed, as well as the theoretical implications. New gaps will be
identified and ideas for future research will also be provided. The testing will be done per
hypothesis. These hypotheses have been the backbone in trying to find an explanation as to
why states resort to using armed non-state actors as proxies. They will be tested to what extent
they prove a necessary or sufficient precondition vis-à-vis the dependent variable.
Nuclear weapons
The hypothesis was: ‘When at least one state of the conflict dyad has nuclear weapons
capability, the other state will be more likely to use armed non-state actors as proxies against
that state.’
Pakistan and India had the capacity to detonate a nuclear weapon by the end of the 1980s,
they tested this capability in 1998. During the 1990s there had been proxy activity in Kashmir,
fueled by Pakistan. By the end of the 1990s Pakistan was more and more actively involved in
the Kashmir insurgency. By the end of the decade the slumbering tensions escalated in the
Kargil War. This war saw the Pakistani army battling Indian regulars next to Kashmiri
insurgents. Two nuclear weapons states engaged each other violently while knowing that both
possessed nuclear weapons. Pakistan actively used armed non-state actors as proxies in that
war. In essence they behaved accordingly with regard to the stability-instability paradox.152
The nuclear deterrent did not make a difference since there was both classic interstate
violence and intrastate, proxy violence.
Well before at least one of the two states in the conflict dyad acquired the capacity to
develop a nuclear weapons capability, by the end of the 1980s, armed non-state actors were
used by Pakistan. Operation Gibraltar and the 1947 Kashmir War are cases in point. India did
not use proxies, regardless of nuclear weapons. The hypothesis on nuclear weapons therefore
has to be rejected. The nuclear weapons capability of at least one state in the dyad proves to
be a sufficient precondition for the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies, but not a
necessary one.
Protraction of conflict
The hypothesis was: ‘A state will be more likely to use armed non-state actors as proxies
against the other state when a conflict is protracted.’
152
Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 122. ‐ 47 ‐ Pakistan and India have been engaged in a protracted conflict ever since they became
independent in 1947. It was that year when Pakistan started using armed non-state actors as
proxies. In the 1990s there was an active support of Pakistan for Kashmir rebels and
eventually direct involvement with Pakistani regulars being killed by Indian security forces in
Kashmir. The conflict can be labeled as protracted throughout the 1990s.
India, however, did not actively use armed non-state actors as proxies against Pakistan.
Instead it relied more on its own regular military capacities. The hypothesis holds for
Pakistan, yet it must be rejected for India. As such, protraction of the conflict proves to be a
sufficient but not a necessary precondition for the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies.
Regime type
The hypothesis was: ‘The regime type of the state does not have an impact on the positive
likelihood of states using armed non-state actors as proxies against other states.’
India became what it wanted to become from the beginning, a democratic republic. The
country succeeded largely and scores on the Poltiy IV data set show that it is a very stable
democracy throughout the 1990s. There is no trace of India using armed non-state actors
against Pakistan.
Pakistan underwent a regime change in October 1999 when a military coup d’état
installed Musharraf in power. Before this event the country was ranked a democracy
according the Polity IV data. Pakistan used armed non-state actors throughout the 1990s
whether it had a democratic leadership or an autocratic leadership. The peak of attacks on
Indian security personnel in 1992 was under a democratically elected government. The 1999
Kargil War was initiated by a democratic government. After Musharraf took power, the
amount of attacks on Indian security personnel increased only further.
This hypothesis holds. India did not use armed non-state actors as proxies being a
democracy, but Pakistan did, being a democracy. Pakistan continued this being a military
dictatorship. One cannot state that a certain kind of regime type is a sufficient or necessary
precondition for using armed non-state actors as proxies.
Conventional weaker state
The hypothesis was: ‘The conventionally weaker state will be more likely to use armed
non-state actors as proxies against other states.’
Ever since independence Pakistan has been the weaker party of the conflict dyad. India
had more resources to its disposition, more military hardware and other movable military
‐ 48 ‐ materials were divided between Pakistan and India on a basis that favored India. Well
throughout the 1990s Pakistan remained the weaker country and India the stronger country.
The latter did not employ armed non-state actors while the former did.
This hypothesis holds. Being the conventional weaker state is both a sufficient and a
necessary precondition for using armed non-state actors as proxies.
Foreign aid
The hypothesis was: ‘A high amount of ODA received by a state makes it more likely to
use armed non-state actors as proxies against other states.’
Both Pakistan and India received ODA, the latter more than the former. India received
large amounts of ODA yet it did not use armed non-state actors as proxies. Pakistan, however,
received somewhat lesser amounts of aid but it actively used armed non-state actors as
proxies. The usage of armed non-state actors as proxies and the amount of ODA received by
Pakistan move in the same manner. When the amount of ODA received was around 500
million USD there were significant attacks reported. When the amount of ODA dropped,
dramatically the number of attacks on Indian security personnel dropped as well. When the
amount of ODA reached normal levels again, hovering around 500 million USD, the number
of attacks rose again.
The hypothesis holds for Pakistan, but has to be rejected for India. The amount of ODA
received is a sufficient precondition for the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies, but not
a necessary one.
To return to the central question in this thesis: ‘Why do some states use armed non-state
actors as proxies?’
There is no single and complete answer to this question. This thesis sought explanations in
a number of variables. The presence of nuclear weapons is of no significant influence to
explain the why some countries use armed non-state actors as proxies and others do not. The
fact that a conflict is protracted gives some leads but since only one country in the protracted
conflict dyad uses proxies there is an intervening variable that explains why India does not
use them and why Pakistan uses them. The conventional weakness of Pakistan is explaining
why it is using armed non-state actors as proxies. Democracies and authoritarian states can
have incentives to resort to armed non-state actors as proxies, since Pakistan used them when
governed by both regime types. But because India did not one might need to look for a
possible intervening variable. This leaves the amount of ODA. Again this explains why
Pakistan has been using armed non-state actors as proxies, but not why India has not been
‐ 49 ‐ using them. A possible explanation of why India is not using proxies can be given if one
focuses solely on the conventional strength as both an independent variable and as an
intervening variable for the other independent variables. It does not matter whether a country
receives large amounts of aid, or if a country is in a protracted conflict or not, what matters is
whether a country is weak vis-à-vis its adversary. So introducing conventional strength as an
intervening variable one finds that India, not being the weaker state, does not have to resort to
armed non-state actors due to its conventional superiority. And similarly, Pakistan needs to
resort to proxies because of its conventional weakness. The actions of both states can be
explained if conventional strength is introduced. This can be a variable on its own, but also a
variable that makes connections between other independent variables and dependent variables
more definite.
Pakistan, then, uses armed non-state actors because it is the conventional weaker state.
The fact that both countries behave accordingly under the stability-instability paradox
explains the intensity of the conflict and the outburst of the Kargil War, but it does not
provide explanation on why states use armed non-state actors. Again, conventional strength is
intervening here.
On protraction, the nature of the issue in the conflict and the fact that the conflict is
protracted provide a sufficient explanation for the usage of armed non-state actors as proxies,
not a necessary one. If the state was conventionally stronger it does not need armed non-state
actors since it can rely on its own military for ending the conflict.
If conventional strength is the intervening variable regarding the amount of ODA one
finds that a state resorts to armed non-state actors as proxies because it is the conventionally
weaker state in the conflict dyad. Or that it does not use proxies, because it is the
conventionally stronger state in the dyad. The variation in the actual use of armed non-state
actors can be explained by the amount of ODA received. The amount of ODA is a sufficient,
but not necessary precondition for using armed non-state actors as proxies.
Why do some states use armed non-state actors as proxies? Because they are
conventionally weaker than their adversary. Hence the conventionally weaker states are less
likely and able to deploy its armies. Instead they will want to choose to deploy combatants
from the ranks of rebels, insurgents and terrorists, to name but a few.
Theoretical implications
This thesis adds to the larger theoretical framework in several ways. First, Realism as
explanatory paradigm is affirmed. Due to the conventional strength as main reason why states
‐ 50 ‐ use armed non-state actors, the imperatives behind this use come from classic interstate
security problems. Mobilizing armed non-state actors can be seen as a tool in balancing the
conventional imbalance that exists between two states.
Another confirmation is that of the stability-instability paradox. Rajagopalan argued that
the stability-instability paradox was not intended to be applied to sub-conventional warfare.153
Proxy warfare is considered to be a manifestation of sub-conventional warfare, and this thesis
shows that the stability-instability paradox explains certain behavior regarding the usage of
armed non-state actors as proxies. The theory of nuclear peace or other theories that predict
stability due to the fact that more states possess nuclear weapons, can be rejected using this
thesis.
The argument posed by Salehyan that only conventionally strong states were more likely
to use armed non-state actors can be rejected. The case of Pakistan is a clear example of a
conventional weaker state using armed non-state actors as proxies. Future research should
focus more on posing conventional strength as an intervening variable. Alternative cases do
exist where conventionally weaker states do not resort to proxy violence such as South Korea
and Israel. Interesting for future research will be the role of superpower support in these cases.
This might shed more light on the proxy war dynamics and as such might strengthen this
thesis’ argument further.
A last implication is that for the Democratic Peace theory. This thesis can be used by both
protagonists and antagonists. India, being a stable democracy, is not using armed non-state
actors as proxies. This is in line of accordance with the Democratic Peace Theory. But on the
other hand it can be argued that Pakistan, in the periods that it was governed by a democratic
regime, used armed non-state proxies nonetheless. However, the argument by antagonists
using this thesis is stronger. Pakistan was rated a democracy on the Polity IV data set, and it
was using armed non-state actors as proxies, and using them against a democracy as well.
Policy recommendations
For decision makers that are faced with the perils of modern security threats or for conflict
resolution scholars and specialists, this thesis has some recommendations to offer. To resolve
a conflict is to know its dynamics. If armed non-state actors are part of the conflict dynamics
this thesis provides a starting point for tracking down where these armed groups get their
153
Rajagopalan, “What Stability-Instability Paradox?” 5. ‐ 51 ‐ support from, or who is their principal state. Knowing this greatly reduces the time needed to
bring a conflict to a good end.
Eradicating terrorism and other insurgencies and rebellions can be done more effectively
knowing that the conventionally weaker state in that conflict has incentives to use armed nonstate actors. Counterinsurgency activities can be targeted more effectively if there can be
established links to the conventionally weaker state that is allegedly supporting armed nonstate actors.
For policymakers who struggle with the allocation of aid on behalf of a donor country,
this thesis proves helpful in doing so. ODA does not really influence a state´s foreign policy
and hence ODA should not be treated as a foreign policy tool by donor countries to force a
recipient from refraining certain policies.
Despite research in this field one can doubt whether states using armed non-state actors
will ever quit doing so. There is only more insight in these dynamics to be gathered. And
maybe, eventually, this phenomenon will cease to exist. Just as predicted when the Cold War
ended.
6. Bibliography
Books

Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics: An
introduction to international relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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