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VOL.
LXXVIII.
FEBRUARY,
No. 2.
1942.
Authors are alone responsible for the statements
mad. ODd ... opinioruo ........... in
_'
("...8<:8. 0 4~~
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Journal
.~ • ~~40~ ~
of the
~~'
O~ _
Royal Army Medic~orps.
Original Communications.
" BLITZKRIEG."
AN APPRECIATION.
By BRI(!ADIER
E. M. COWELL, C.B., CB.E., D.S.a., T.D.
THIS is the title of a small book written by F. O. Miksche and recently
published by Faber and Faber Ltd., London. The author, an officer of
the Regular Army :of the Czechoslovak Republic for twelve years, served
with distinction with the Republican forces in the late War in Spain. The
book is described by Tom Wintringham in his introduction as "a Continental, a European\ essay on Tactics."
LieutenantMiksche writes with a sound knowledge of Germal1 tactics and
a practical experience of Total War. He is in a position to be able to
describe' tJ.()t only the plans for attack' on the new lines exploited by the
Germans with their ,armoured and motorized forces but also the methods
to be adopted in defence in depth, as employed so brilliantly by our gallant
Russian allies to-day.
'
All medical officers in a Field Force will perform their duties with success
'proportional to their knowl~dge'oftactics. Whether it be the Regimental
Medical Officer or the Director of Medical Services, m~dical arral~gements
wiIH,,\iluilless'the tictical situation be studied, understood and appreciated
a ptactical angle.
1'ri war many'of us have found that the medi~al services function at their
b~~t when they cease to be ". A" and become" G."
',
In" Blitzkrieg " the teaching is sound, practical and so important that
',all Medical Officers in the Field are advised to read, absorb and apply the
lessons without delay.
'
tram
5
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« Blitzkrieg"
In Chapter I a study is made of the reasons which led to the downfall
of France and of the methods of Total War adopted and practised by the
Germans in the Battle of Flanders, 1940. '
"Infiltration, both tactical, economic and political, is described and the
Maginot psychosis is suitably d~alt with.
The old' doctrines of Clausewitz have been revived and brought up to
date. Attack is superior to defence because it forces the defence to opel:ate
under unfavourable conditions.
The basal factors of the German Blitzkrieg are surprise, speed and
superiority in material and fire power.
- The German doctrine teaches the value of local superiority. Hecon"
naissance by contact units having revealed a weak spot, troops are conceni
trated on a narrow front arid an intense attack delivered. This becomes
possible by improved transport methods, superiority in fire power and perfected communications including the use of wireless. The fighting force
hits hard and swiftly by means of its tanks., lorried infantry aild air arm.
These methods were worked out by Germans fighting with Franco's
Army in Spain.
In Chapter II a study is made of Spanish fighting, commencing with the
Battle of Guadalajara, March 8, 1937.
Here 150 Italian tanks achieved a
of six battalions each and on
local
success but two motorized
.
. . .
. divisions
.
separate roads failed to advance with sufficient speed. Bad weather conditions bogged the vehicles so that a surprise Republican air attack on the
12th createq pa11ic and a complete rout of the Italians. Next day, supported
'by forty heavy Russian tanks, the Republicans successfully continued the
attack.
At Brunette in July, 1937, tanks again failed because they operated on a
wide front in accordance with the French theories and did not form a spear
-head, 'tactical- thrust-point or " Schwerpunkt," supported by guns and aeroplanes, according to the German plan.
"
At Bilbao, in the same year, a break through was secured on a narrow
front hardly a thousand yards wide. This gap was enlarged by the direction
of the attack- b,eing switched laterally to cut communications, shooting up_
the defence from the rear.
, Another important lesson from Spain is the value of .fortified villages
and towns as islands of resistance Jor all-rO\lild defence; this will be referred
to later and is of interest f~om the medi~al ,point of v,iew.
Chapter IlI.'-At the end of the Spanish War new methods of attack
were worked out and used for the first time by the Fascists. In Aragon
motorized columns 'pushed forward at the rate of twenty-five miles a day
while in Catalonia the pace was doubled, largely owing to concomitailt air
,attack.
In Poland .in J939 the tempo was again increased, largely by means of
overwhelming air superiority, Fifth Column activities and destruction of
all Polish intercommunications.
,
C
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E.M. Cowell
55
Tank units broke through the wide Polish front, a pinning attack was
made on every position the Poles 'took up and resistance was finally crushed
by further attack from the rear.
These lessons were not· appreciated by the French. In 1940 General
Gamelin expected a repetition of the German move of 1914 and disposed his
strongest force in front of Brussels, leaving two weak armies to defend a
front of ninety miles .. It was here that three German columns crossed the
Meuse on narrow fronts, May 12-13. This took the French by surprise,
because. the Ardennes were thought to be .impassable owing to lack of railways and roads. But there were enough roads for armoured and motorized "
formations. This" irruption," which was an advance on -narrow fronts,
took place at such" speed that Abbeville was reached ten days later, May 24.
In the second phase of the fighting after the evacuation of the B.-E.F'.
the FreiIch waited on the" Weygand Line," and did not attempt any counter, manceuvre or counter-infiltration. On June 8 three narrow breaches were
made through which seven Panzer Divisions were poured and which continued to advance some thirty miles a day. This ended the French resistance .
. This success resulted from the new conception of warfare. The Germans
attack the enemy flanks or rear and achieve this by searching for and
piercing the defence on narrow fronts.
This narrow gap is not wide enough for slow-moving masses but will
permit fast-moving vehicles to pass through.
On a. twelve mile front intensive attack may be concentrated on two or
three points, each headed in a divergent direction so that Panzer Divisions,
having broken through, can attack the defence zones from the flanks and
rear.
This method is described by the two German words "Schwerpunkt"
and" Aufrollen."
A " Schwerpunkt" or thrust-point implies the continual seeking for
the weakest points of resistance, the application of a locally superior force
and the constant maintenance of initiative and surprise.
The" Aufrollen," which alternates with the movement of the Schwerpunkt, is the immediate and methodical exploiting of each local success by
side, thrusts which protect the flanks of the advancing units.
.
A modern battle is no longer fought along a wide front but over' wide
areas. The line has given place to the column and operations are conducted
in great depth.
Chapter IV.-'-In this chapter the basic factors for success, initiative,
surprise and speed, as outlined by Clausewitz, are again emphasized.
Whereas troops used to move on the approach march at 15 to 25 miles
a day, they now advance at 100 to 150 miles a day_ It is estimated that with
motorization the pace of development of any tactical situation is six or seven
times faster than previously. Main forces can be moved rapidly from their
concentration areas in any direction required, using roads and not railways.
These areas may be 100 to 150 miles away from the foremost enemy forces"
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56
«
Blitzkrieg"
so. far away that the massed attacking force thl"eatens not one but many
[sectors of the enemy front.
Actual physical concentration is no longer necessary. All that is needed
'is an elastic grouping which allows of rapid movement.
The factors determining the choice of the strategical thrust~point are: .
(i) The road system centring on the attack sector.
(ii) Roads on the enemy side with diverging routes,
(iii) The position of the enemy's strategical reserves .
. (iv) The presence of lateral roads to allow of rapid transfer to a new
sector if the first attack fails.
Plans for the first phase in the m~ve up from the elastic concentration
to the r'egrouping zone include mo.vement of units in the order in ~hich they
will go. into action.
The second phase of the approach march is from the regrouping zone to
the point of contact.
The normal order of march will be:
(i) Armoured (Panzer) Divisions.
(ii) Shock Divisions (specially trained, provided with extra weapons).
(iii) Motorized Divisions.
(iv) Normal Infantry Di~isions .
. Advanced echelons may travel 12 to 24 hours. ahead and will consist;of :
(i) Reconnaissance troops working with air co~operation and including staff and commanders, who travel in plain battle-dress in lorr1('s
on trucks and not staff cars.
.
.
. (ii) Traffic control, including A.A. units and ai1ti-paratroop personnei.
(iii) Supply parties, organizing petrol, food and water.
(iv) Repair units, including workshops and L.A.D.s.
(v) Engineers, responsible for bridges., by-passing- obstacles, etc.
Immediately behind these advance echelons come the assault troops whose
task it is to' make the gap. When this has been made further troops are
brought up and poured through to consolidate the position and widen the
breach.
',"
The 'supPly 'problem is met by motorized divisions themselves carrying
double loads and including motorized sUpply columns in their formation ..
Petiol l'e'q'uires a special organization which is as follows In the German
:Arrrty!- (i) Tanks are fitted to provide a range of 180 miles.
(ii) Pettol lorries are attached to furnish another 100 miles.
(ili) Independ.ent petrol columns are convoyed forward to re-fuelling
'points.
(iv) Roadside du~psare established to refuel lorries moving to the
teat.
To el'lsui'e~ucce~s a highly trained staff is necessary to prepare staff tables
,and to co"ordinate movement. The latter is done through traffic control
units and air reconnaissance by wireless.
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E. NI. Cowell
'57
Air superiority is vital for this operation.'
Chapter V.-In this chapter the Air Arm is considered. A third dimension is added to warfare and modern battle is' the fight for cubic space.
In addition to fire superiority, air superiority is of vital importance to-day.
The attacking side chooses its air thrust-points, "Luftschwerpunkt"
in addition to the ground Schwerpunkt. Modern air tactics were worked
out by the Germans operating with the Fa.scists in Spain. All forms ot
attack were practised, from dive bombing to fj.ring woods by incendiary
bombs and 'so driving out the defending troops.
Ori the EbrQ in the Autumn of 1938, high"altitude bombing, low flying
attacks and dive bombipg were all employed.
The air arm is used in battle for the following purposes: Air Reconnaissance, Protection, Liaison, Supply and Support.
Air reconnaissance is only possible in the presence of air superiority and
involves continuous observation of both our own and the enemy's'troop
positions with perfect communications to signal and report centres. ,Pro~
tection is afforded by a fighter screen over the enemy rear and an "umbrella"
overhead, together with bombers which attack roads and communications in
addition to bombing aerodromes. These bombers may afford' flank support
to advancing for'mations.
,
When the air arm is used' as artillery, areas can be 'neutralized by
variOUS types of bombs or covered by machine-gun or' cannon fire.
The German organization for air co-operation includes the following
methods:
'
(i) Long-range combat, where fighters accompany bombers 20 to 40
miles in enemy territory.
(ii) Long-range reconnaissance, fiying, at 9,000 to 15,000 feet, using
photography.
.
(iii) Tactical reconnaissance, at 5,000 to 9,,000 feet, reporting troop
positions of both sides, giving positions and, observing for the
artillery.
(iv) Fighter reconnaissance, to down enemy machines, to lead friendly
bombers and to do bombing themselves.
(v) Counter-battery and main bombardment, carried out by bombers
who attack enemy artillery during the approach march of the
forward attacking units. They then switch to bombing the
enemy's chief zone of reststance and' finally drop a curtain of
metal behind the enemy's main positions cutting them off.
(vi) Close support, where machines,' chiefly of the 'dive-bomber fype,
. accompany the ground "assault groups" (Angriffsgruppen)
bombing targets whiCh are their immediate objectives and neutralizing enemy gJlns.
(vii) Reserves;
An ,.Air Army Corps of the German Air Force consists of one
Fighter and three Bomber Div'isions with a total of 1,656 machines.
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\,
58
(( Blitzkrieg"
The Air Arm may develop a useful function in: dropping supplies;
one machine can carry petrol for 20 tanks for {OO kilometres or
rations for 400 men for one day.
Some of these machines may be sent to reinforce the' squadron~
of the Panzer Divisions in a " blitz."
Chapter V I.-The merit of the tank as a weapon lies in its capacity for
rapid manceuvre. To achieve StlCCess theatta<;k must be on a narrow front
and must be accompanied by close support from the air.
Battle success depends on mobility and not on fire power. Tank's push
through a defensive, position, help their own Infantry through and then
appear in the rear of the defenders. When bunched and concentrated they
are less vulnerable to anti-t~nk weapons. A light Panzer battalion attacking in "block" formation covers 30 to 40 acres and is more easily controlled thana wave attack over 'a: wide front.
A Pari~er Division consists of two armoured brigades each of over 200
tanks and a Jaeger brigade of three battalions, with Sappers, Artillery,
Signals and other Divisional units. Accompanying the armoured division
may be one or more motorized divisions, consisting of three lorry-carried
infantry brigades with two artillery brigades attached, an air reconnaissance squadron of nine machines, a light batta:Iion of armoured cars and cal'riers, divisional artillery, engineer arid other services.
" Shock" Divisions also exist, consisting of highly trained mobile
troops, moved as required in lorries especially detailed.
These three formations complete the "Panzer team."
Chapter VII.-The Panzer team is used to form the thrust point. Coming up against a defence position with no weaknesses' and no flil11ks, it
smashes .its way through by sheer force.
This ,process is termed
" irruption."
Following irruption, the shock divisions enter the gap," infiltrate " and,
dive,rging laterally; immediately proceed to "roll up" the defence positions
from the flanks and rear. While this is going on the motorized divisions
'press on through the gaps 'in the defence zone, driving the main thrust deep
into the enemy territory.
,
,
The normal infantrydivision~, which form the main body of the German,
Army, continue the process" exploit the situation and secure a' decisive
'success.
Such an attack may be expected to be launched on a twenty kilometre
front with three main thrust points each two kilometres wide. The edges "
of the breach are kept open by air bombardment and widening is immediately secured by attack from both flank ana rear. The motorized and other
units only enter when the breach is five or six kilometres wide.
To achieve such a break through on an enemy divisional front the Germans use a team of six or eight divisions.A Blitz attack may be mounted in four echelons:
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E. M. Cowell
·59
(i) The reconnaissance echelon consists of one tank battalion which
carries out its duties by fighting. It attacks on a 300 to 500 y;u:d
front and goes {or guns, dumps and command posts, spreading
panic as it advances. This dash is supported by dive bomber<;,
and the tanks protect their flanks by an all round field o(fire. '.
(ii) The combat echelon is the main body. Advancing on a-slightly
wider front it extends the breach, sideways fbr the following
echelon.
(in) The third echelon, that of infiltration, 'consists of light tanks and
motorized infantry in cross country lorries. Once through they
debus, hold thepositi<;>ns gained, spi·ead out over the enemy lines
of communication and occupy key positions.
'
(iv) The mopping-up echelon, composed of assault groups,. either
battalions or brigades with supporting arms, is thrown into the
breach' with orders to wipe out all traces of resistance, to widen
the breach and to establish and hold the bridge~head.
Through this bridge-head pass the motorized divisions, whose task it is
to exploit the success of the operation. Behind them again follow the normal
divisions.
The initiative must be maintained _by the attacker and the pursuit COlltinued relentlessly.
Units leap-frog through each other alternating the
processes of advance and consolidation.
'
The pursuit must be co-ordinated; it is not necessary to establish a continuous front. The motorized units leading us~ the smaller roads, by-pass
areas of resistance, occupy points of strategic 'value and hold theg-round
gained until relieved by larger formations. Motor-cycle battfllions play
a large part in the advance and during the whole time the air arm continues t<>, function.
During this advance the armoured formations move forward in reserve,
relying on air reconnaissance for information of an enemy counter"attack.
Chapter VIII. The Combat Teams.-Jhis is a fascinating chapter in~
which the author descends from the height of tactics of high formations to
,the all-important level of unit and sub-uriit fighting.
Miksche, haying described the methods of Blitzkrieg, points out that the
Infantry are still required in these decisive battles. Not the in"fantry of
W14-19l8 but an infantry incorporated in -" combat teams" or perhaps
better described as " assault groups," working in teams of combi~1ed arms
. organized and trained to 'fight together.
The normal infantry division may, move at three miles' an hour and coordinating orders take a very longtime. The motorized modern divisions
move at fifteen miles an hour and with modern arms and equipment possess
dynamic power. Because of this power battle, to-day c0115istsof a gr~at
number of small actions fought by assault groups which may be companies,
battalions or brigades.
Here is, the picture of a Blitz against the old infantry division.
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60
· "Blitzkrieg"
The approach march on one or two roads provides a target which invites
air attack. Where the division is deployed on' a, 4 or 5 mile front, only a
portion of its guns and anti-tank weapons can come into action at any given
time. Enemy tanks appear, dive bombing takes place and the enemy breaks
through to the rear, attacking command posts and crushing resistance.
The secret of the success of Blitzkrieg' does not lie in German material
superiority hut in the Allies' tactical inferiority.
When infantry are opposed to mechanized forces they can only contribute
towards a decision by adopting a method of " filtration"; that is, they find
out strong positions by fighting reconnaissance, avoid them, and filter
through until they encounter the rear infantry divisions and supply columns
which are following ~hese mechanized forces.
This manceuvre of bringing infantry through to the rear of a meclIanized enemy is called "counter-filtration." The German terminology for
this .method is significant, "die Liicken und Flachentaktik " (the tactics of
the space and the gap), in distinction to the old tactics of an advance in line
on a continuous front.
For the success of this manceuvre "a psychological re-orientation" of
the troops is necessary. They must learn to fight with full confidence even
when surrounded.
The solution of the problem lies in the fOl:mation and employment of the
assault groups already referred to, " la tactique des groupements combines." The basic elements of such groups are:
(i) Close support weapons to form a fire base, its main protection.
(ii) Covering units to pr;oteCt these close support weapons.
(iii) Shock troops to advance forward or to a flank.
(iv) A reserve in the case of the larger team formations.
Whilst small teams of 16 men may be used, the average size is that of an '
infil.11try company or battalion with sufficient equipment for independent
fighting-including anti-tank guns.
'
The, next groups are:
(i) The brigade, which is an infantry-artillery group,and
(ii) The division, an infantry-artillery-air group.
Of the. divisional troops which assume a leading role in modern fighting
the Germans attach great importance to a motorized battalion of engineers,
whose tas'ks include the laying of mine-fields and the making of anti-tank
obstacles.
'
The methods of attack follow the plan already described for larger for- .
mations, i.e. the Schwerpunkt and the Aufrollen, and may include a simultane'ous attack on both flanks iof the objective by two groups, the pincer
movement.
'
Assault ,groups are organized in depth with reserves which can be
flung into action where resistance is weak and so attack the main'resi~tance
from the flank or rear.
The Staff and Commands work from within rese,rve groups, companies,
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E. M. Cowell
61"
battalions and brigades in the case of battalions, brigades and divisions:
respectively. Continual reconnaissance by air and other means is essential
and wireless welds the groups into co-ordinated manceuvre.
The author concludes this chapter by drawing attention to the vast
importance of the fighting qualities and morale of the individual members"
of all groups. d, Morale is decisive."
" We are entering a period when only armies that are inspired by an
ideology can fight well." Leadership, man management, initiative and again
morale are vital factors.
And an essential factor in this sort of morale to-day is a political ideal,
some aim connected with making and remaking the World, that.is suitable
to the epoch in which we are living.
,Chapter IX.-This is a chapter on the artillery and describes the methods
of employment of the ·normal divisional gunner units.
With the normal metho,ds of co-ordination between infantry and artillery
a very considerable time lag exists between the receiving of a request for
and the opening of fire. This allows fast moving targets to escape.
In warfare of to-day, with the need for more rapid action, a satisfactory
result can only be obtained where" a large part of the artillery is integrated
into the actual frame'workof infantry units." The gunners must advance
with the infantry, partly for their own protection but mainly to secure the
most intimate co-operation.
Part of the work of the artillery has been' taken over by the air arm,
chiefly in " preparatory" and" close-support" fire. ,Protective, long range
and counter-battery work is' now almost entirely the, work of the air,. force'.
Counter-preparation will be carried out by the air force if ·it possesses
superiority.
In defence the task of the artillery assumes greater importance, including
putting down protective barrages, fire against tanks and support for short
counter attacks.
The main function of the artillery to-day is to neutralize targets difficult
to locate from the air and to deal with small and moving targets, i.e. destructive fire.
In attack, prolonged fire can be put down by the heavy artillery on roads,
road junctions, bridges and villages deep in the enemy positions, i.e. harassing fire. This can be carried out at night.
Another function is to protect or "wall in" the flanks of, an assault
group, "box barrage." This may be shared with the air arm.
To destroy tanks, fire must be directed against the tanks themselves, by
direct laying and firing over open sights. It is not sufficient to put down
a barrage over the area through which the tanks are travelling.
When the artillery is decentralized, its' fire can cover a larger area" it
gains greater flexibility, observation is facilitated and initiative encouraged.
With this system it is more difficult to s,ecure large concentrations of
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62
«
Blitzkrieg"
fire on the same target but dispersal ~improves protection since concealment
from the air is easier for small groups than large masses of guns.
The assault group system, 'with guns as part of the infantry network,
affords protection to the gunners who otherwise are open to surprise attack
by air-borne troops or paratroops.
These.same remarks apply also to decentralizations of both anti-tank
and light A.A. guns to infantry battalions.
The divisional artillery is so decentralized that the C.R.A. has but little
left for him to control.
(To be continued).
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''Blitzkrieg'': An
Appreciation
E. M. Cowell
J R Army Med Corps 1942 78: 53-62
doi: 10.1136/jramc-78-02-01
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