The Institute for Domestic and International Affairs, Inc.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Reform of Peacekeeping Operations
Director: Jess Falk
© 2009 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA)
This document is solely for use in preparation for Rutgers Model
United Nations 2009. Use for other purposes is not permitted
without the express written consent of IDIA. For more
information, please write us at [email protected]
Policy Dilemma ______________________________________________________________ 1
Chronology __________________________________________________________________ 2
10 November 1956: United Nations Emergency Force for the Suez Canal Crisis _____________ 2
14 July 1960: UN Operation in the Congo _____________________________________________ 3
April 1989: UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia ________________________________ 5
24 April 1992: UN Operation in Somalia I and UN Operation in Somalia II _____________ 5
December 1994: Establishment of United Nations Standby Arrangement System ____________ 7
22 October 1999: UN Mission in Sierra Leone__________________________________________ 8
February 2000: UN Transitional Administration in East Timor ___________________________ 9
September 2005: UN World Summit _________________________________________________ 9
31 July 2007: Establishment of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 10
Causes of Problems with UN Peacekeeping Operations _____________________________ 11
Mismanagement of Funds and Corruption ___________________________________________ 11
UN Security Council Creates Too Many Mandates ____________________________________ 13
Sexual Misconduct and Lack of Punishment __________________________________________ 13
Limited Training, Supplies, and Personnel ___________________________________________ 14
Actors and Interests __________________________________________________________ 16
Permanent Members of the Security Council _________________________________________ 16
States that Contribute Troops ______________________________________________________ 17
Projections and Implications___________________________________________________ 18
Discussion Questions _________________________________________________________ 21
Works Cited ____________________________________________________________________ 23
Works Consulted ________________________________________________________________ 25
Rutgers Model United Nations
1
Policy Dilemma
The United Nations (UN) was created by the global community as an institution to
keep peace throughout the world. UN led peacekeeping missions have been an integral
part in achieving the goals set out when the UN was established. The UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for the organization of the peacekeeping
missions. The DPKO must “evaluate the requirements of peace operations under
consideration, provide recommendations to the Security Council through the SecretaryGeneral, plan the mission, recruit troops and other necessary personnel from contributing
countries, determine equipment and logistical requirements, coordinate pre-deployment
training, match mission requirements to the budget, and finally deploy the forces and
implement the mission.”1 All of these elements are necessary for a peacekeeping mission,
and the DPKO must determine the course of action to take when creating a peacekeeping
operation.
The first peacekeeping mission was in 1948, established with the purpose to
observe the Armistice Agreement between Israel and surrounding states. 2
In its
subsequent sixty three missions, UN peacekeeping operations have evolved and come
across successes and failures. Originally, the role of UN peacekeepers was simply to
maintain ceasefires and stabilize the situation on ground, so that an agreement could be
made on the political level. Chapter VI mandates which includes the Pacific Settlement
of Disputes, were imposed in early peacekeeping operations. This was to “facilitate the
deployment of military observer missions of monitoring groups.”
This type of
peacekeeping was seen in the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan that was
established in the late 1940s.3 Since the Cold War the scope of peacekeeping missions
has expanded. UN peacekeeping operations and now responsible for “helping to build
sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector
1
Brett Schaefer, “Time for a New United Nations Peacekeeping Organization,” February 13, 2007,
http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizations/bg2006.cfm#_ftn30
2
“United Nations Peacekeeping,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
3
Rachel Utley, ed. “Major Power and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military
Intervention,” Burlington: Ashgate Publsihing Company, 2006. 3
Rutgers Model United Nations
2
reform, to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants” as
well as overseeing and assisted in elections.4 This is referred to as second or third
generation peacekeeping.
While it is promising that the role of UN peacekeepers has been expanded,
reform must be made for UN peacekeeping to function smoothly. The matter of force has
been a controversial subject for UN peacekeeping missions. A Security Council Chapter
VII mandate allows for the use of force in self defense and to protect civilians. However,
there is enough ambiguity to leave room for differing interpretations as to when force
should be used and for what purpose. This has been a controversial subject because some
states are against the use of force completely.
The year 2009 will continue to test the strength and capacity of UN
peacekeeping. There are currently 115,000 personnel from 118 countries serving in the
16 current UN peace operations. This number included troops, military observers, police,
UN volunteers and other international and local civilians.5 The UN has become the
second largest mover of military in the world, after the United States, and with these
large numbers, strain in being put on the organization.6 For all of these missions to be
successful, peacekeeping operations must be reformed.
Chronology
10 November 1956: United Nations Emergency Force
for the Suez Canal Crisis
In July 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company against the wishes of
France and the United Kingdom. Then, on October 29, 1956, Israel with the support of
the United Kingdom and France attacked Egypt and occupied Sinai and the Gaza Strip,
because of the blockade of the Suez Canal.7 When the General Assembly convened, they
4
Ibid.
Ibid.
6
Ian Johnstone, ed, 1.
7
“Middle East; UNEF,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unef1backgr1.html
5
Rutgers Model United Nations
3
called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from occupied territories.8
It also established the United Nations Emergency Fund (UNEF) to secure and supervise
the end of aggression. After the UNEF was deployed to the area, the French and British
left the Suez Canal by December 1956, and Israeli forces were gone by March 1957.
UNEF was the first UN peacekeeping operation. It was carried out with the
approval and the cooperation of the parties in the conflict. Peacekeepers were armed, but
they were only supposed to use their weapons in self defense and even then with
restraint.9 The main function of this mission was to oversee the withdrawal of Israel,
France, and the United Kingdom, to act as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces,
and to be an impartial party supervising the ceasefire. While stationed in Egypt UNEF
patrolled the Egypt-Israel armistice separation line. The UNEF created what became the
basic principles of traditional peacekeeping. The basic principles included, that UN
peacekeepers should be deployed in a buffer zone to enforce a ceasefire, they should be
impartial, not empowered to use force except in self defense, and the force should
exclude major powers if possible.10 These principles were use in following missions until
after the Cold War.
14 July 1960: UN Operation in the Congo
The first of twenty UN peacekeeping missions in Africa was in the Congo in 1960.
When the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was deployed it was a mandate under
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A Chapter VI mandate means that the parties in dispute
are to seek a solution through “negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice.”11 Under a Chapter VI mandate, UN peacekeepers are not allowed
to use force to stabilize the situation. The original mandate for ONUC stated that the
8
Ibid.
Ibid.
10
Rachel Utley 3.
11
“Chapter VI: Pacific Settlements of Disputes,” http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml
9
Rutgers Model United Nations
4
Security Council authorized the ONUC “to take necessary steps, in consultation with the
Government of the Republic of Congo, to provide the Government with such military
assistance as might be necessary until, through that Government’s efforts with United
Nations technical assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of
the Government, to meet fully their tasks.”12 Originally, the responsibility of ONUC was
to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo, and to aid the
government in “maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance.” 13
However, the mandate was soon changed in February 1961 as a result of the ongoing
civil war.
Resolution 161 stated that ONUC should take immediate action and
“appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of a civil was in the Congo, including
arrangements for ceasefire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes,
and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.”14 Changes were again made in
November 1961, with Resolution 169 which authorized, “vigorous action, including the
use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension,
detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary
personnel and political advisers not under UN Command.”15
Lessons were learned by the UN through the upheavals during the mission in the
Congo. It became apparent that UN peacekeeping forces should not be deployed in
intrastate conflict with the “absence of peace to keep, a ceasefire to monitor, or a
legitimate authority to grant consent for the mission.”16 In a complex situation peace
enforcement is needed in the form of humanitarian intervention and the maintenance of
international peace and security.17 This was the first of many times that the UN will
encounter a mission that needs to be altered as a result of the changing action on ground.
12
“Republic of Congo: ONUC Mandate,” http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucM.htm
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Rachel Utley, ed. “Major Power and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military
Intervention,” Burlington: Ashgate Publsihing Company, 2006. 103
17
Ibid. 103
13
Rutgers Model United Nations
5
April 1989: UN Transition Assistance Group in
Namibia
The UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) was different from
traditional peacekeeping operations, it was the UN’s first multifunctional peace operation.
The mandate for UNTAG was very specific, the purpose of the operation was to assist in
the implementation of the peace agreement between the South West African People’s
Organization and South Africa.18 The UNTAG force included soldiers, civilians, police
and electoral observers. The UN operation succeeded in monitoring the withdrawal of
South African forces from Namibia, the disbarment of the South West African People’s
Organization and the return of refugees, making it one of the UN’s most successful
peacekeeping missions. Part of the reason for the ease of the mission was because there
were only two protagonists in the conflict.19 Both parties agreed to a cease fire and peace
accord and complied with all of the agreements, making UNTAG a successful
peacekeeping operation. This again proved how important it is for there to be peace to
keep and willing parties when a UN peacekeeping operation is established
24 April 1992: UN Operation in Somalia I and UN Operation in
Somalia II
The UN Operation in Somali marks the greatest disaster in UN peacekeeping
history. After the downfall of President Siad Barre of Somalia in 1991, a civil war broke
out between two factions. One group supported Interim President Mahdi Mohamed and
one in support of Gerneral Mohamed Farah Aidid. The civil war resulted in one million
refugees and five million people suffering from hunger and disease.20 In 1991, the
Secretary General dispatched and envoy with support from both faction leaders. The UN
also began to take part in humanitarian efforts along with relief organizations. To further
their efforts in creating peace in Somalia, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo
18
Ibid. 103
Ibid. 103
20
“Somalia- UNOSOM II,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2backgr1.html
19
Rutgers Model United Nations
6
against Somalia and arranged for peace talks between the two parties, who agreed to a
ceasefire to be monitored by UN observers.
Then in April, the Security Council
established the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I).21
Fighting continued in Somalia despite UNOSOM efforts and in August, 3,000
additional troops were deployed to the area. The United States offered to help this dire
situation by organizing and leading an operation to ensure delivery of humanitarian
assistance. The Security Council accepted the offer and authorized the United States to
“use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for the relief effort.” The
Unified Task Force was created, made up of contingents from 24 countries and was
successful in securing relief centers, and had humanitarian aid flowing again by the end
of the year. UNOSOM was still a presence in the region, protecting the delivery of all
assistance and helping to end the war through political means.22
A meeting was held by the Secretary General in 1993, in which 13 Somali
political movements agreed on a ceasefire and promised to hand over all weapons to
UNITAF and UNOSOM. In March of 1993, there was a transition from UNITAF to a
new peacekeeping operation UN Operation in Somalia II. UNOSOM II was authorized
to use force if necessary to carry out the mandate of “securing a stable environment for
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as assist in economic reconstruction and
rebuilding of social and political life. This transition caused problems for Somalia. The
UNITAF was comprised of 37,000 troops to patrol less than half of the country, and the
new UNOSOM II consisted of 22,000 UN peacekeepers to cover all of Somalia. This was
clearly not enough personnel to make a peacekeeping operation successful. After the
transition was complete, warring factions did not observe the ceasefire, and 24 UNOSOM
II soldiers from Pakistan were killed in Mogadishu. Following this episode, fighting
ensued between UNOSOM II and Somali militiamen in Mogadishu resulting in the
deaths of civilians and UNOSOM II members. In October, 18 US soldiers lost their lives
in a clash in Mogadishu. After this event, the US announced they would withdraw from
21
22
Ibid.
Ibid.
Rutgers Model United Nations
7
Somalia in early 1994. Belgium, France and Sweden also decided to withdraw from the
mission. Before the mission ended in March 1995, 157 UN personnel had been killed.23
The problems with the peacekeeping operation in Somalia started with an
impossible mandate and a rocky transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.
The
American contingent refused to be under the control of UNOSOM which resulted in
disagreement between troops. Also, the Italians rejected the use of force in self defense
that was in the mandate.24 Division within peacekeepers made a dangerous and difficult
situation even more complicated. Just as in Congo, the UN learned that it is difficult to
“carry out a peace enforcement in a civil war situation where there is no cease-fire to
monitor, no peace to keep and the peacekeepers cannot function as neutral interpositionary forces.”25 The devastating results in Somalia gave the UN an aversion to
peace enforcement missions.
December 1994: Establishment of United Nations
Standby Arrangement System
A core problem with UN peacekeeping missions is the time that elapses between a
formal request from a Member State and the time when resources are deployed. In an
attempt to decrease response time the UN created a Standby Arrangement System, which
is a commitment for Member States to “contribute specified resources within agreed
response time for United Nations peacekeeping operations.”26 The agreed upon resources
are kept on standby in the home country. These resources include fully trained military
units, specialized personnel, trained civilians and equipment. When requested by the
Secretary General, these resources are to be deployed immediately. A time table was set
out for Member States to follow regarding the response time of resources. Member
States are given seven days for individual personnel to be deployed, fifteen day for
“units/sub-units/elements involved in the reception phase and thirty days for other unit
23
Ibid.
Rachel Utley 105.
25
Ibid.
26
“UN Standby Arrangements System Description,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/rapid/body_sys.htm
24
Rutgers Model United Nations
8
elements.27 It is the responsibility of the state to train peacekeepers according to UN
guidelines in order for them to be ready for deployment as well as financing all of their
contributions. The implementation of the Standby Arrangement System represents an
important change in peacekeeping, because it begins to address the issue of deployment
time and the importance of having resources ready.
22 October 1999: UN Mission in Sierra Leone
The UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was a Chapter VII
mandate, meaning the use of force was allowed to protect civilians and provide security
for designated areas. This marked one of the first times force was allowed by UN
peacekeepers, and they were tested quickly by the Revolutionary United Front. 28
Peacekeepers were at first denied freedom and movement and then hostages were taken.
In response to these actions, the Secretary General called for the expansion of UNAMSIL
and utilized rapid reaction forces. Help from the United Kingdom as well as government
counterattacks prevented further assault, and bought time until well trained troops from
Jordan and India could arrive.29 In order to free the hostages, a unit of 222 from India
plus other members of UNAMSIL successfully launched a forceful military operation to
attain the freedom of the hostages. In August of 2000, the Security Council increased the
pressure on the RUF by authorizing UNAMSIL “to deter and, where necessary,
decisively counter the threat of the RUF by responding robustly to any hostile actions or
threat of imminent and direct use of force.” This was a controversially decision that
resulted in countries withdrawing troops because they disagreed with the mandate.
However, other states listened to the plea from the Secretary General for “a very strong
military presence with the necessary force multipliers,” and by March 2001, UNAMSIL
was the largest peacekeeping operation at that time.30 Strong UN presence, as well as the
27
Ibid.
Ian Johnstone, ed, 2.
29
Ibid. 3
30
Ibid. 3
28
Rutgers Model United Nations
9
presence of British marines and political engagement with the RUF led to a voluntary
disarmament by the RUF and a successful election in April 2002.
The UNAMSIL proved to be a learning opportunity for the DPKO. This mission
marked a shift to a more robust approach to peacekeeping, something that the UN has
been hesitant to take part in. Also, it illustrated problems that can arise when the mandate
is augmented and communication between troop contributors and the Security Council
was not consistent.31
February 2000: UN Transitional Administration in East
Timor
The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was also given a
Chapter VII mandate to manage the territory.
Peacekeeping forces were given the
authority to use “all necessary means” to fulfill its mandate, however the 8,000 forces
operated under restrictive rules of engagement. The mission was soon tested when a large
militia ambushed a New Zealand contingent on July 24th resulting in the death of one
solider. By September three more UN personnel had been killed in well planned attacks.
After these attacks, a revision was made to the rules of engagement when the DPKO
approved an “amplified concept of self defense, which became the basis for coercive
action without warning if necessary.”32 The UNTAET illustrated that changes may need
to take place once a peacekeeping is already deployed, to adapt to current conditions.
September 2005: UN World Summit
The 2005 UN World Summit addressed issues regarding the effectiveness of
peacekeeping and adopted recommendations made by the Secretary General’s High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. The Summit recognized the need for support
from the European Union and regional bodies to develop capacities for rapid deployment
31
32
Ibid. 3
Ibid.
Rutgers Model United Nations
10
and standby arrangements. Support was also given to a ten year plan to for capacity
building for the African Union. Regional organizations that have the ability to prevent
armed conflict or peacekeeping were encouraged to place these capacities in the
framework of the UN Standby Arrangement System.33
31 July 2007: Establishment of the African
Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1769 and created a joint AU-UN
peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan. This decision was made despite the
fact that the conflict was ongoing and neither side of the conflict showed any sign of
coming to a peace agreement.
When the operation started, Sudan ordered that the
peacekeepers be mostly from African states.
This resulted in a limited number of
available troops who were trained and qualified the mission.34 The Sudanese government
has also been hindering the success of the operation by denying peacekeepers and
humanitarian workers the “freedom of movement and access, refusing entry visas for
desperately needed personnel, blocking the delivery of critical logistics support, and
even… expelling thirteen international non-governmental organizations.”35 UNAMID is
currently operating with only 69 per cent of the authorized 19,500 troops and only 45 per
cent of its authorized police strength of 6,400.36 UNAMID demonstrates how much more
difficult a peacekeeping operation can be without the support for the state government. It
is also one of the first joint UN peacekeeping mission with the African Union, and will
not be the last. The UN High-level Panel, noted that the best way to met the demand for
33
Ibid. 6
“United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities,” Testimony before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs by Brett D. Schaefer, July 29, 2009,
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/sch072909.pdf, 11.
35
“House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing- New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations, Address
by Ambassador Susan Rice” Access World News, July 30, 2009.
36
Ibid.
34
Rutgers Model United Nations
11
peacekeeping was to create partnerships between the UN and regional organizations such
as the African Union, European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization.37
Causes of Problems with UN Peacekeeping Operations
Mismanagement of Funds and Corruption
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has the largest budget in the UN
Secretariat, and investigations have found that some of the money is not used properly.
In the year 2005, an Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit of $1 billion in
DPKO procurement contracts found that at least $265 million was “subject to waste,
fraud, or abuse.”38 In response to these findings, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office concluded that the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations “lacks the
expertise and capacities needed to manage field procurement activities.39 Former US
Ambassador John Bolton, evaluated the situation, stating that “without accountable, cost
effective, efficient and transparent U.N. procurement practices, the U.N. will not have its
essential goods and services, billions of dollars of contributions might be ill spend or not
properly accounted and the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations would be
jeopardized.”40 In 2007, a OIOS report examined $1.4 billion of peacekeeping contracts
found “significant corruption schemes that tainted contracts involving more than $619
million of the total value of the contracts.41 Investigations in to 250 instances of
wrongdoing were revealed in 2008, leading the head of the OIOS, Inga – Britt Ahlenius
to exclaim, “We can say that we found mismanagement and fraud and corruption to an
37
38
Ian Johnstone, ed, “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006,” Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.
Brett Schaefer, “Time for a New United Nations Peacekeeping Organization,” February 13, 2007,
http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizations/bg2006.cfm#_ftn30
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
“United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities,” Testimony before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs by Brett D. Schaefer, July 29, 2009,
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/sch072909.pdf
Rutgers Model United Nations
12
extent we didn’t really expect.”42 The budget for the DPKO from July 1, 2009 to June 20,
2010 is $7.75 billion. This is a threefold increase in budget and personnel since 2003.43
The size and expense of peacekeeping operations have increased dramatically, and for
future missions to run smoothly, changes need to be made in the financial handling of
peacekeeping missions.
Recent events have proven that the OIOS is not immune to improper influence. In
2006 allegations were made that UN peacekeepers were involved in gold smuggling,
arms trafficking and other illegal dealings with Congolese militias. 44
The OIOS
investigator responsible for investigating the peacekeepers in Congo found the allegations
credible, however the investigation was given to another team after the lead investigator,
Matthias Basanisi resisted attempts to influence the outcome of the report. Reports
submitted to the OIOS senior management included information from witnesses
confirming illegal deals between Pakistani peacekeepers and warlords from the Front for
National Integration and well as information that “senior officers of the Pakistani
contingent secretly returned seized weapons to two warlords in exchange for gold, and
that the Pakistani peacekeepers tipped off two war lords about plans by the UN
peacekeeping force and the Congolese Army to arrest them.45 The final report for the
OIOS was “little short of a whitewash,” and evidence from the BBC and Human Rights
Watch showed that the UN covered evidence that proved the wrongdoings of the
peacekeepers in Congo.46 Basanisi believes that one of the reasons for the one of reasons
for the watered down report is because Pakistan is one of the largest contributors of
troops to UN peacekeeping missions. The absence of a completely independent inspector
at the UN is a problem that the organization has faced since its beginning.
42
Ibid. 6
Ibid.
44
Ibid. 7
45
Matthias Basanisi, “Who Will Watch the Peacekeepers?” May 23, 2008, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/23/opinion/23basanisi.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Who%20Will%20Watch%20the%
20Peacekeepers?&st=cse
46
Ibid.
43
Rutgers Model United Nations
13
UN Security Council Creates Too Many Mandates
In an attempt to seem active and effective, the Security Council has approved
missions in some cases in which “there is no peace to keep.” For a peacekeeping
operation to be set up, it must be clear that UN intervention will help stabilize the
situation and not cause further harm. Clear and reachable objectives must be set before a
mandate is made, because the need to “do something attitude” has resulted in decisions
being made without careful planning.47 There must also be a guarantee of enough troops
and supplies before a mission is authorized, as well as an exit strategy to prevent
situations such as in Cyprus, where the UN has been since 1964, but are doing little to
help the state of affairs.
The UN has also become involved in states where the conflict is ongoing there is
“little genuine commitment to a political process by the parties to work toward peace,”
and there is no support for peacekeepers in surrounding states.48 Missions such as these
include the UN Mission in Sudan and UN Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. These missions require large amounts of personnel, equipment and
resources and consume some 50 per cent of the UN peacekeeping budget and account for
about 50 per cent of uniformed personnel involved in peacekeeping.49 More planning
needs to be made before a peacekeeping mission is established and the UN must ensure
that there are enough supplies and personnel on hand.
Sexual Misconduct and Lack of Punishment
Reports of sexual misconduct including rape and forced prostitution of women and
young girls by peacekeepers have plagued the UN for years. Allegations and confirmed
incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel have occurred in the
47
“United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities,” Testimony before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs by Brett D. Schaefer, July 29, 2009,
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/sch072909.pdf 10
48
Ibid. 9
49
Ibid.
Rutgers Model United Nations
14
Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Guinea, Kosovo, Haiti,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.50 The victims of these crimes are often refugees who
view UN peacekeepers as a source of security, not terror. Suggestions have been made
on how best to address the problems including, “imposing a uniform standard of conduct,
conducting professional investigations, and holding troop contributing countries
accountable for the actions of their soldiers and for enforcing proper disciplinary action.
Also, any person who will be a member of a UN peacekeeping mission must undergo
training on behavior and conduct. Since these recommendations were implanted in 2005
reports of sexual misconduct still exist. Save the Children, an international nonprofit
organization accused peacekeeper in Ivory Coast, southern Sudan and Haiti of sexually
abusing children and going unpunished. A report issued by the organization states,
“Children as young as six are trading sex with aid workers and peacekeepers in exchange
for food, money, soap, and, in very few cases, luxury items such as mobile phones.”51
Statistics show that peacekeepers are more likely to be perpetrators then other UN
agencies. According to the UN report on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, of the 67 allegations of sex with minors reported, 60
were from DKPO, four from UN Volunteers, two from the UN High Commission on
Refugees, and one from the World Food Program. 52
The reasons behind the
disproportionate number of peacekeepers are believed to be that peacekeepers exert more
power over the communities where they are stationed because they are armed and
provide physical security in a dangerous environment.
Limited Training, Supplies, and Personnel
50
“United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities,” Testimony before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs by Brett D. Schaefer, July 29, 2009,
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/sch072909.pdf 7.
51
Ibid. 8
52
“No One to Turn To: The Under Reporting of Child Sexual Exploitation and abuse by aid workers and
peacekeepers,” Save the Children, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_05_08_savethechildren.pdf,
8.
Rutgers Model United Nations
15
In December 2008, 150 people were killed in 24 hours in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, with 100 peacekeepers less than one mile away.53 The peacekeepers did not
know what was occurring because “they had no intelligence capabilities or even an
interpreter who could speak the necessary languages. Also, they were short of equipment
and men, and their priority was to evacuate aid workers and journalists. 54
The
commander of the Indian peacekeepers based in Kiwanja, the place of attack stated that
they this situation was a result of “poor communication and staffing, inadequate
equipment, intelligence breakdown and spectacularly bad luck.”
The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, along with
other peacekeeping missions, suffers from problems that can be reformed.
UN
peacekeepers rarely speak the native language and do not know the local communities or
their customs. In the DRC, peacekeepers have rarely used force to protect the civilian
population, which is a key part of their mandate.55 Without a real military threat, attacks
on villages will not stop. When the UNAMID took over for the AU led peacekeeping
mission, it too faced issues that should have been addressed.
It lacked essential
equipment to carry out the basics of peacekeeping, such as, armored personnel carriers
and helicopters. Some African peacekeepers had to buy their own paint to turn their
green helmets blue.56 US Ambassador Susan E. Rice mentions key elements missing
from peacekeeping missions including, “robust command-and-control arrangements;
adequate training and equipment for the troops; the capacity to rapidly deploy and move
forces in theater; readily available medical, engineering, intelligence, and aviation -particularly helicopter -- units; and perhaps most importantly, the peacekeepers’ capacity
53
Lydia Polgreen, “A Massacre in Congo, Despite Nearby Support,” December 11, 2008, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/world/africa/11congo.html?scp=11&sq=problems%20with%20un%20peaceke
eping&st=cse
54
Ibid.
55
Linda Mason, “The UN needs to get tough,” February 8, 2009, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/opinion/28ihtedmason.3.19745708.html?scp=5&sq=un%20peacekeeping%20and%20supplies&st=cse
56
Lydia Polgreen, “Peacekeeping in Darfur Hits More Obstacles,” The New York Times, March 24, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/world/africa/24darfur.html?pagewanted=1
Rutgers Model United Nations
16
and determination to defend themselves and their mission mandate.”57 All of these are
aspects that could be change if reform is made in peacekeeping operations.
Actors and Interests
Permanent Members of the Security Council
The five permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, the
United Kingdom, China, France, and Russia, are an integral part of peacekeeping
missions because they are the body that approves mandates for the formation of
peacekeeping missions. Each state has its own agenda when evaluating a peacekeeping
situation. France has been an important contributor to peacekeeping operations, but
“only on French terms,” and “in the pursuit of France national interests.”58 This was seen
in France’s involvement in the conflict on the Ivory Coast in which, “France’s wider
continuing interests in Africa, resulted in increasing French commitments as the crisis
unfolded.”59
The United States has continued to provide monetary support for UN
peacekeeping missions, but contributed limited number of troops. Part of the reason for
their hesitancy is they do not want their troops under the control foreign command.60 To
protect their soldiers from being prosecuted by the International Criminal Court,
Congress passed the American Servicemember’s Protect Act in 2002 that “prohibited US
military participation in UN peace operation unless the President certified that US
personnel could serve without the risk of criminal prosecution by the ICC.”61
China’s view on UN peacekeeping operations has caused them to abstain from
most resolutions that would authorize peacekeeping.
China feels that UN lead
peacekeeping was “tantamount to external interference in the internal affairs of sovereign
57
“House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing- New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations, Address
by Ambassador Susan Rice” July 30, 2009, Access World News.
58
Rachel Utley 70.
59
Ibid.
60
Rahcel Utley 19.
61
Ibid.
Rutgers Model United Nations
17
states.”62 Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated, “It is our consistent view
that peacekeeping operations should strictly conform to the principles of the UN Charter
and the norms of international relations. Such operations should be undertaken only with
the consent and cooperation of the parties concerned, and an impartial and unbiased
attitude must be maintained.
No peacekeeping operations or humanitarian aid
programmes should be permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of any country, still
less to use force and get embroiled in a conflict between parties.”63 China is however
involved in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti where 125 personnel are there to train local
police to restore order to the country that was hit by a devastating flood. Some suggest
that China’s main reason for being in Haiti is because Haiti maintains formal relations
with Taiwan, and China is hoping to lure Haiti away from Taiwan by being active in their
mission. Since China is invested in Darfur and the DRC, they also seek a peaceful
resolution to those conflicts because it will help their political agenda. China is also
using UN peacekeeping operations as a chance to train their forces, and provides them
with important on the ground experience.
The permanent members of the Security Council are the deciding factor in the
establishment of a peacekeeping mission, but none of them place supply the forces that
go to the conflict zone. France, US, UK, and China all provide significant monetary
support, but they do not support the mission on ground.
When deciding on the
establishment of a mission, each state has their best interest in mind, and creates missions
that put other countries troops at risk.
States that Contribute Troops
Pakistan contributes 10,584 troops to UN peacekeeping missions, making it the
largest contributor. Reasons behind their contributions are also for personally gain.
Pakistan believes that it “provides valuable military training, burnishes the country’s
62
63
Ibid. 85
Ibid. 85.
Rutgers Model United Nations
18
image, and raises morale among troops who are paid higher salaries than at home.”64
Similarly, Bangladesh, which contributes 9,549 troops use peacekeeping to earn a “good
name and fame for the army, air force and navy as well as contributing to our
economy.”65 Peacekeeping earns the country approximately $200 million a year.66 Also,
Bangladesh has few enemies, and their troops are readily accepted by the local people.
Nigeria is the number four contributor in troops and have received special
recognition for their work. In 2006, Nigerian police and corrections officers serving in
the United Nations Mission in Liberia received awards for their work. India has also
been a main contributor of both troops and supplies. In 2004, when the mission in the
DRC needed extra support, India sent over thousands of extra soldiers as well as fourteen
helicopters.67 All of these countries are crucial for the success of peacekeeping missions,
and just like the members of the Security Council, each provides troops for their own
benefit.
Projections and Implications
The evolution and expansion of peacekeeping does not seem to be coming to an
end, and changes need to be made. The change in the UN mandates clearly illustrates an
underlying problem of peacekeeping missions. In 1974, the mandate that established the
UN force on the Syria – Israel border was just a few sentences long, and basically states
that troops are meant to monitor a cease fire.68 The mandate establishing the UN
peacekeeping mission in Darfur is more than two pages long, and details tasks such as
protecting civilians, political processes, economic development, human rights monitoring,
and border control.69 The objectives of each mission remain unclear and are a main
64
Colum Lynch, “Providing UN’s Peacekeeping,” November 15, 2000, Global Policy Forum,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199-peacekeeping/40922.html
65
Rolan Buerk, “The Cream of UN Peacekeepers,” January 18, 2006, BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3763640.stm
66
Ibid.
67
“Additional troops from India, Pakistan to bolster UN peacekeeping force in DR of Congo,” November 29, 2004,
UN News, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12661&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo
68
Neil MacFarquhar, “In Peacekeeping, a Muddling of the Mission,” February 10, 2009, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/world/11peacekeeping.html
69
Ibid.
Rutgers Model United Nations
19
reason missions experience trouble, and are also why reform is needed. If the Security
Council continues to create mandates without clear objectives, and create missions
without knowing if there is enough money, personnel, and supplies, the effectiveness of
peacekeeping missions will continue to decline.
The DPKO released “Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” in July 2009,
and make recommendations about how to address these issues. The DPKO suggested the
Security Council “consider crafting mission mandates to reflect clearly achievable
objectives and to specify those activities for which the mission is responsible.”70 In order
to strengthen the confidence of Member States, the DPKO proposed to, “consult
systematically with Member States in advance of a technical assessment mission on its
objectives and broad parameters and debrief Member States on its main findings.”71 To
increase the accountability in the command and control chain, DPKO “will develop mire
robust accountability frameworks between headquarters and senior mission leaders.”72
While these suggestions are a start, it is yet to be seen if they will be implemented, and
more issues exist that need to be addressed.
70
“Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,” July 2009, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and
Department of Field Support, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/newhorizon.pdf
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
Rutgers Model United Nations
20
Conclusion
Peacekeeping operations have the potential to have an everlasting impact for the
world if they are implemented and carried out in a proper fashion.
In the past
peacekeeping missions have been met with both successes and failures. Peacekeepers
have a record of sexual assault of girls in the villages they are stationed, as well as
corruption within the peacekeeping structure.
Mission also have a history of slow
deployment, and not have enough personnel and equipment to be successful. With 16
current peacekeeping missions reform must be made for current and future missions to be
successful.
Rutgers Model United Nations
21
Discussion Questions
• Are there any common threads between UN peacekeeping missions?
• What are the main problem areas of UN peacekeeping missions?
• What can be done to address these issues?
• Under what circumstances should the Security Council create a mandate for a
peacekeeping operation?
• How can you get states to contribute money/troops/supplies?
• Should incentives exist? What kind?
• What can be done to improve communication between the DPKO and Security
and the peacekeeping mission on ground?
• What needs to be done to create a sufficient stand by force and supplies?
• What consequences should exist for sexual misconduct and corruption in UN
peacekeepers?
• How can you get the support of the host country?
• What improvements can be made to the training of UN peacekeepers?
• What should be done if a peacekeeping mission is not going smoothly?
• How do we create more specific objectives?
• How do we deal with the expanding roles of UN peacekeepers?
Rutgers Model United Nations
22
Further Readings
Hillen, John. “Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations.” Brassey’s:
Washington DB, 2000.
John Hillen’s book provides a look at how peacekeeping operations have
changed over the pass three decades. It shows the transition from
observation missions, to traditional peacekeeping and finally second
generation peacekeeping missions. It will be useful to see how the
responsibilities have increased over time.
Utley, Rachel, ed. “Major Power and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges
of Military Intervention.” Burlington: Ashgate Publsihing Company, 2006.
This book highlights the influence major countries have on peacekeeping
operations. It also looks at peacekeeping in different regions, and the
differences to how they are approached.
Johnstone, Ian ed. “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006.” Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2006.
The “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006” provides in depth
descriptions of current peacekeeping missions, as well as background of
the conflict. It is useful to compare the approach the UN takes to each
peacekeeping mission.
Rutgers Model United Nations
23
Works Cited
“Additional troops from India, Pakistan to bolster UN peacekeeping force in DR of
Congo.” November 29, 2004, UN News,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12661&Cr=democratic&Cr1=co
ngo
Basanisi, Matthias. “Who Will Watch the Peacekeepers?” May 23, 2008, New York
Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/23/opinion/23basanisi.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=
Who%20Will%20Watch%20the%20Peacekeepers?&st=cse
Buerk, Rolan. “The Cream of UN Peacekeepers.” January 18, 2006, BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3763640.stm
“Chapter VI: Pacific Settlements of Disputes,”
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml
“Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.” July 2009, Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/newhorizon.pdf
Hillen, John. “Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations.” Brassey’s:
Washington DB, 2000.
“House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing- New Challenges for International
Peacekeeping Operations, Address by Ambassador Susan Rice.” July 20, 2009,
Access World News.
Lynch, Colum. “Providing UN’s Peacekeeping.” November 15, 2000, Global Policy
Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199peacekeeping/40922.html
Johnstone, Ian ed. “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006.” Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2006.
MacFarquhar , Neil. “In Peacekeeping, a Muddling of the Mission.” February 10, 2009,
The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/world/11peacekeeping.html
Rutgers Model United Nations
24
Mason, Linda. “The UN needs to get tough.” February 8, 2009, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/opinion/28ihtedmason.3.19745708.html?scp=5&sq=un%20peacekeeping%20and%20supplies&
st=cse
“Middle East; UNEF.”
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unef1backgr1.html
“No One to Turn To: The Under Reporting of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by
aid workers and Peacekeepers.” Save the Children, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_05_08_savethechildren.pdf.
Polgreen, Lydia. “A Massacre in Congo, Despite Nearby Support” December 11, 2008,
The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/world/ frica/11congo.html?scp=11&sq=pro
blems%20with%20un%20peacekeeping&st=cse
“Republic of Congo: ONUC Mandate.”
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucM.htm
Schaefer,Brett. “Time for a New United Nations Peacekeeping Organization.” February
13, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizations
bg2006.cfm#_ftn30
“Somalia- UNOSOM II.” http://www.un.org/Depts /dpko/dpko/co_mission
/unosom2backgr1.html
“United Nations Peacekeeping,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
“United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities,” Testimony before the United
States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs by Brett D. Schaefer, July
29, 2009, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/sch072909.pdf
“UN Standby Arrangements System Description,”
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/rapid/body_sys.htm
Utley, Rachel, ed. “Major Power and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges
of Military Intervention.” Burlington: Ashgate Publsihing Company, 2006.
Rutgers Model United Nations
25
Works Consulted
MacFarquhar , Neil. “New Demands Overwhelm UN Peacekeeping Missions.” February
11, 2009, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/world/africa/11ihtpeace.1.20103863.html?scp=4&sq=un%20peacekeeping&st=cse
Mason, Linda. “The UN Needs to get Tough.” February 8, 2009. The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/opinion/28ihtedmason.3.19745708.html?scp=19&sq=un%20peacekeeping&st=cse
Polgreen, Lydia. “Executions in Congo Underscore Failure of UN Peacekeeping Force,”
November 11, 2008, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/world/africa/11ihtcongo.1.18585026.html?scp=5&sq=un%20peacekeeping&st=cse
Sobjerg, Lene. “The UN’s New Peacebuilding Commission.” December 2006, Global
Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/226initiatives/48077-the-uns-new-peacebuilding-commission.html.