Safety Nets in Somalia on 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
Introduction
Adeso and Save the Children are jointly implementing a 30-month pilot safety net project in the
Sanaag and Karkaar regions of Somalia, which provides cash grants and skills
training for 2,200 households.
As the project nears completion, Save the Children and Adeso convened a
workshop in Nairobi to engage some of the key stakeholders (donors, other
NGOs, UN agencies) in a discussion about lessons learnt from the programme
about the feasibility of implementing safety nets in Somalia. Forty people participated in the
workshop, including donor representatives from USAID, DFID, the EC, ECHO, Swedish Government,
AusAid, and Embassy of the Netherlands, other international NGOs, UNICEF, World Bank and FAO (list
of participants in Annex 1). This report summarises the issues presented and discussed at the
workshop.
Expectations
Participants wrote the key issues they’d like to see addressed on cards. The following categories
emerged:
Scale: how to scale up safety net provision from a small-scale pilot to reach larger numbers of
households.
Government: to what extent is it possible for safety net approaches to link with different levels of
government that are emerging in different parts of Somalia?
Where: Is it feasible for a safety net approach to be implemented in south-central Somalia even in
areas controlled by Al-Shabaab?
Sustainability / Graduation: How can the concept of sustainability be addressed in Somalia, given low
levels of governance capacity and how can future projects encourage households receiving support to
‘graduate’ to more resilient livelihoods so support is no longer needed?
Linking Relief and Development: What scope exists to move from the current large-scale emergency
cash relief in south-central Somalia to longer-term approaches incorporating safety net dimensions?
Complementary Interventions: What types of interventions are most effective and needed to
complement safety net provision?
Targeting: How can targeting work when it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the most
vulnerable and the slightly less vulnerable and when constraints to access and insecurity make
intensive engagement with communities in participatory approaches to targeting difficult?
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
2: Social protection in fragile states
The workshop began with a presentation and discussion of the broader international debate around
the feasibility of expanding social protection provision in fragile states. Social protection is increasingly
seen as a crucial component of development strategies to tackle poverty. As a Chronic Poverty Report
argues, ‘there is now a wealth of evidence that social protection is a cost-effective means of reducing
poverty and chronic poverty; that it is affordable and that it can be scaled up even in relatively poor
countries’.
The growing interest in social protection has stemmed in part from the positive experience with
conditional cash transfers in Latin America which has resulted in increased children’s enrolment in
education, improved health and a reduction in the poverty gap for participating households. There has
also been renewed interest in the positive impacts of pensions in South Africa and Namibia which have
played an important role in poverty reduction and enabling old people to bear some of the burden of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Developments in Africa have included the introduction of universal pensions in
Lesotho, pilot cash transfer social assistance in Zambia, Kenya and Malawi, the Productive Safety Net
Programme in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net in Kenya. In Asia, India has introduced the National
Rural Employment Guarantee and there are long running social assistance programmes such as
Samurdhi in Sri Lanka and the IGVGD programme in Bangladesh.
Social protection has been presented as an agenda that can strengthen the legitimacy of the state by
allowing it to re-shoulder responsibilities for ensuring the basic survival of its citizens. Social protection
instruments implemented by the state, such as pensions, can be seen as a central part of the political
contract between a state and its citizens. Experience with social protection in conflict and post-conflict
contexts, however, remains thin on the ground, with humanitarian aid often continuing to act as an
inadequate instrument of last resort even in protracted crises.
Conflict and post conflict affected fragile states are by definition contexts where delivering any
services is difficult; ‘where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of
its people.’ Social protection is often one of a list of basic services that are largely absent along with
access to basic health care and education. Often social protection is largely absent from the agenda
because it is seen as just too difficult to deliver and the aim of government owned and delivered social
assistance as just too distant a long-term prospect.
The ways in which state fragility make social protection more difficult in conflict and post-conflict
contexts can be grouped as follows:
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Ongoing conflict, the risk of a return to conflict and high levels of insecurity make
implementation of social protection programmes more difficult and achieving predictable and
regular transfers particularly problematic.
Weak state capacity – meaning that the ability of governments to develop policy and plan and
implement programmes is limited
In some contexts governments’ may themselves be abusive and predatory making it difficult
for international actors to work with them.
Donors may have restrictions on working directly with governments with which they have
political differences.
Low revenues – fragile governments may have a particularly low revenue base making the
affordability of social protection especially challenging
Delivering social assistance in fragile states is always going to be difficult but that is too often serving
as an excuse for inaction. The admirable focus on the ideal of government owned and financed social
protection also seems to be inhibiting a focus on what is possible in fragile states. Recognition of the
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
ideal shouldn’t prevent engagement in the messy and difficult reality of trying to improve people’s
access to some form of social assistance in fragile states.
The majority of people in need of basic assistance to maintain lives and livelihoods in fragile states
don’t receive much. Humanitarian aid is too unreliably funded and delivered to achieve adequate
coverage and long term social assistance is even thinner on the ground. There is therefore much to be
done and a humanitarian imperative, a rights based argument and a development priority to do
better. The ultimate goal, as in other contexts, is widely agreed upon and consists of a responsive state
able to provide long-term, reliably delivered and tax financed social assistance to its most vulnerable
citizens as part of broader social protection and development strategies. Fragile states have even
further to go in moving towards this goal than in other contexts but that doesn’t mean that the need
for social assistance in these contexts should be ignored or that incremental improvements can’t be
made.
3: The pilot safety net project in Puntland, Somalia
The next session of the workshop focused on Adeso and Save the Children pilot safety net project. The
project was described, initial monitoring results on impact were presented and the main challenges
faced in implementation discussed.
The Social Safety Nets (SSN) Project is being led by Adeso in consortium with Save the Children in
Sanaag and Karkaar regions of Somalia. The project is supported by the European Commission and the
Government of Sweden with funds of €3.7 million Euros provided over a 30 month period (June 2010
to November 2012).Adeso and Save the Children have coordinated the project with the government in
Puntland including the Ministries of the Environment, Agriculture and Planning and International
Cooperation.
There are 2,240 beneficiaries households. They have received the following forms of support:
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1,200 households have received Cash Relief--with over 84% of the direct recipients being
women. The Cash Relief component provides grants of USD $85 per month. This was planned
to cover the full minimum expenditure basket (MEB) but increases in the cost of living mean
that it now covers slightly less than 50% of the MEB.
1,000 households have received skills training in alternative livelihoods, improving pastoral
livelihoods and basic literacy and numeracy.
40 community members have been trained in Disaster Risk Reduction and contingency
planning.
There are four expected results of the project:
Result 1: Targeted households are able to meet their basic needs throughout the year.
Result 2: Households’ access to livelihood opportunities within their own community has increased.
Result 3: Community capacity and resilience to livelihood related shocks have improved.
Result 4: Project is monitored effectively & learning is documented & shared with other actors.
Impact Results
Data indicates that since the baseline, the average household monthly income has increased from
US$50 to an average of $91. This is mainly due to the cash transfer provided by the Social Safety Net
project, which provides a monthly transfer of US$85.
At the time of the baseline, households reported debts of more than US$250 – a figure more than five
times their reported monthly income. Many households had used their maximum allowable credit and
were in a weak buying-position. Buying on credit is an important coping strategy for poor households,
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
as it allows them to purchase food even when income is scarce. Over the course of the project,
households have managed to pay down much of this debt, which would allow them to extend or reopen credit lines in future. The most recent project data indicates that the average household debt
now stands at US$73.
Figure 1: Household income and debt
In addition to paying down their debts, more than 20% of households have taken the opportunity of
regular income to start new income generating activities – including teashops, petty trading and other
small businesses. Some households are now able to give Zakat or Sadaaqa (community support)
instead of receiving it, and therefore have increased their social standing (capital) within the
community.
Figure 2: Coping strategies employed
At baseline, among other coping strategies used, high proportions of households were buying food on
credit, asking family members for money, selling productive assets or migrating in search of work. The
household employing these more severe coping strategies has decreased over time, highlighted on the
figure above, indicating that food security has improved.
Another food security indicator that has improved over time is the percentage of households reporting
food shortage in the last three months. The project baseline was conducted in July, during the Gu
season, which is usually the best season of the year. Even so, 25% of households at baseline reported
that they had faced food shortage in the previous three months. This has decreased to less than ten
percent of households by February 2012 even during the Jilaal season, which is typically the harshest
season for pastoralist communities.
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
Figure 3: Household reporting food shortage in the last 3 months
Households were asked to give an estimate of how much food they have available in their home. This
is a proxy indicator for household food security status, with those having more food being more food
secure.
Figure 4: Household food availability
At baseline, most households had enough for 2 days – 1 week (46.7%) or less than 1 day (34.1%). Over
the course of the project, the proportion of households having only “enough food for less than one day
has decreased. A greater percentage of households now report having more food in the home
indicating an improvement in food security.
The improvement in food security seen above by the change in household food availability is
confirmed by a reported improvement in the number of meals consumed each day. At baseline, adults
were eating two meals a day and children slightly more. This improved to three meals a day by May
2011 and has stayed around that level since. Even during the Jilaal season (January-March), the
harshest season for pastoralists, households have been able to consume three meals a day.
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
Figure 5: Number of meals consumed per day
4: Critical debates
Throughout the workshop participants engaged in vigorous discussion around various critical issues.
This section summarises the key themes that emerged from these debates.
Relief and Development: The current cash relief in Somalia has demonstrated the feasibility of
implementing large-scale cash transfers. Cash Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG) partners have
reached 136,673 households with over $50 million worth of cash and vouchers between September
2011 and April 2012. This was seen as presenting opportunities to explore links between emergency
cash grants and longer term approaches. As the second phase of the emergency relief programme
starts to reach completion there is an urgent need for discussions about what, if anything, will replace
it. Will all assistance be abruptly cut off only to be restarted when another crisis develops or is there
scope to put in place a longer term approach to assisting the most vulnerable which could be
expanded in times of crisis?
Scale, coverage and location: The challenges of moving from a small-scale pilot to a larger scale were a
recurrent theme. What is meant by ‘large-scale’ also needs further debate. Would an expansion from
the current 1,200 households to 10,000 households be enough of a scale-up or is there a need for both
donors and implementing agencies to be more ambitious? The current pilot has focussed on districts in
Puntland and there was also debate around the feasibility of safety net approaches in South-Central
Somalia. Should safety net approaches focus on areas where it is possible for agencies to work with
local level governments and security is relatively good or is there a need to tackle the difficult
challenges of south-central Somalia?
Governance: There was general agreement that it would be desirable to build more of a governance
dimension into future programmes but how this would be done, at what levels and what sort of role
government and local authorities could play all needs further thinking. On the one hand agencies are
understandably careful about limiting the ability of local authorities to influence how is targeted and
sensitive to risks of diversion of taxation of social assistance benefits. On the other hand, if safety net
approaches are to fulfil their hoped for role of strengthening the social contract between a state and
its citizens then there is a need to start thinking about ways in which it might be possible to involve
local authorities in positive ways.
Targeting: In contexts where the majority of the population lives below the poverty line, is chronically
food insecure and prone to periodic shocks then it is always extremely difficult to choose who receives
support and who does not. Somalia is no exception to this rule and distinguishing between the more or
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
less vulnerable is clearly extremely difficult. These difficulties are compounded by insecurity and
restrictions to access which make intensive engagement with communities in participatory approaches
to targeting problematic. Scaling up safety net approaches will also make intensive community based
approaches more difficult. The workshop didn’t come up with any brilliant new ideas to solve these
dilemmas which are perennial but future programme design will need to give them careful attention.
Grant Size: There are also dilemmas around the question of how much money to provide to people.
The current project set out to provide the full minimum expenditure basket to the most vulnerable
households ($85 per month). In the event the rise of the MEB to over $180 per month meant that the
grant covered less than 50% of the MEB so was more of a top-up to households existing livelihood and
coping strategies. Nevertheless the current grant size is relatively generous compared to for instance
the roughly $240 per year provided in the Hunger Safety Net programme in Kenya. Given limited
budgets there is a choice to be made between supporting larger numbers of people with smaller
grants or smaller numbers of people with larger amounts. For example, you could provide 10,000
households with $1000 a year or 50,000 households with $200 per year given the same budget. More
debate and analysis is needed to decide on the appropriate grant size in future programmes.
Gender, rights and downwards accountability: Various participants highlighted the need to ensure
continuing and perhaps expanded attention to issues of gender, rights and downwards accountability
in future programmes.
5: Moving forward
A final session considered the way forward for safety nets in Somalia. A presentation from Adeso and
Save the Children noted that the pilot project has helped 2,200 households to improve their
livelihoods, demonstrated the feasibility of safety provision and suggested some principles for
expanding safety net provision.
Adeso and Save the Children noted the following challenges in taking this agenda forward:
 Scaling up: how to move beyond small pilot projects.
 Targeting: the current method is good, but how to do it at scale in an area with great needs
and limited resources
 Engagement with government: what could be possible in these areas knowing that capacity
and revenue are limited
 Downwards accountability: the complaints mechanism is a start, but how could SSN be more
pro-actively accountable?
 Integration with other social services / complementary activities: this has been the biggest
gap mainly due to funding constraints; is it possible to make connection to other initiatives
(e.g. other NGO supported programmes in the area?)
 Strengthening traditional safety nets: what traditional safety nets can be revived or
strengthened through the intervention?
There is a need to shift the dialogue on safety nets in Somalia from a short term, humanitarian focus to
that of a predictable safety net more in line with the objectives of social protection. The former only
addresses immediate suffering and is short term and direct. The latter takes on a boarder, longer term
view with a focus on national ownership and political and development processes.
The Adeso and Save the Children vision is that vulnerable households are able to provide for their basic
needs throughout the year. To reach this vision we would require a programme that is multi-year,
multi-donor and multi-sector. Key elements of SSN moving forward would include:
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Seasonality: support to communities needs to be better connected to the seasonal needs and
gaps.
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
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Flexibility: the activities and budget should not be static, but rather be flexible to account for
changes that may occur due to shocks; this could include a “crisis modifier” funding element.
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Resilience: the area of intervention is chronically food insecure with periodic acute food
insecurity; trends show that livelihoods are changing and programming should help
communities to be better prepared for those changes.
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Range of actors: safety nets in Somalia are not just about Adeso and SC; other actors and
stakeholders can play a role in the project.
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Continued evidence building: there is still a lot of be learned especially if the project is able to
be more robust.
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Capacity building: though government has a very limited capacity to date there has been
good support. Moving forward a more meaningful engagement of the government within its
limitations needs to be explored.
Save the Children and Adeso are in the process of planning a second phase of the social safety net
project and will design this based on further rigorous analysis of the lessons learned from the pilot
phase. This will include:
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Rigorous analysis of all data sets: there is a massive amount of data collected under SSN and
analysis against seasonality and other sources needs to be done to clarify trends and impact.
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Collecting missing livelihood zone information: data for part of Sanaag do not exist; Adeso is
discussing with FSNAU to complete these.
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Outcome analysis: with the livelihood zone information modeling will be done to see the
effects of different types of transfers on different wealth groups; this will help to understand
the seasonal needs as well as the budgetary implications of different interventions.
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End of project evaluation: this is expected to be completed in the next three months
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Discussions with stakeholders: this will include the communities, regional, district and local
governments, beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, IOs, UN agencies and donors.
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Lessons & project monitoring of at-scale cash response in Somalia: the upcoming report on
cash and vouchers project implementation in Somalia may give some insight on how a scale up
of SSN could be possible.
Adeso and Save the Children propose to target approximately 10,000HH in the next phase of SSN. The
annual budget for this target would range from US$6 to 20 million depending on the size of grants and
the complementary services. We see the need to have these entitlements be as flexible as possible;
they should account for economic and natural shocks that may occur during the project period.
“Graduation” is an area that will need further consideration. We know that if “graduation” is possible
it will only be achieved with a greater focus on complementary activities such as income generation.
Lastly, greater political buy in and accountability will be essential to achieve these project aspirations.
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
6. Conclusions
This workshop provided a useful starting point for discussion of the possible role of safety nets in
Somalia but there is a clear need for further debate and for this to include more Somali stakeholders
as well as international aid actors. Some concrete next steps will include:
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Adeso and Save the Children are commissioning an evaluation of the pilot safety net project in
August 2012 and will share results of this with the workshop participants.
Based on this evaluation, further rigorous analysis of the monitoring results and further
discussions with key stakeholders, Adeso, Save and possibly other aid actors will present a
second phase of the social safety nets programme to donors for support towards the end of
2012.
There is a clear need for greater discussion within the Cash Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG)
and other coordination forums about possible transitions from emergency cash relief in south
central Somalia to longer term social assistance. Adeso and Save the Children will push for this
to take place.
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report
Annex 1 – List of participants
Agency
AUSaid
AUSaid
EC
EC
EC
EC
SIDA
SIDA
SIDA
ECHO
ECHO
ECHO
USAID
USAID
USAID
DFID
DFID
DANIDA
Dutch Embassy
World Bank
World Bank
FAO
UNICEF
DRC
DRC
NRC
Oxfam
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Kenyan Red Cross
SATG
Save the Children
Adeso
Name
Shannon Ryan
Solomon Ngari
Mohamed Sabul
Ernesto Njoroge
Felix Rembold
Isabel Faria de Almeida
Mathias Kruger
Erik Petterson
Lilian Kilwake
Aldo Biondi
Morten R. Petersen
Sapenzie Ojiambo
Pete Mohan
Sureka Khandagle
Mark Wilt
Chris Porter
Chris Price
Betina Gollander Jensen
Rogier Nouwen
Endeshaw Tadesse
Sarah Coll-Black
Julie Lawson McDowall
Claire Mariani
Betty Kweyu
Kate Ashton
Opio Peter Patrick
Imeje Zacharia Elung'at
Sophie Dunn
Jane MacAskill
Glenn Hughson
Paul Harvey
leila Chepkemboi
Aurs Scek
Ben Foot; Holly Radice; Suleiman Ahmed; Rosie Jackson; Marion McKeone, Brian Kiswii
Degan Ali; Gurudatta Shirodkar; Helen Haltshul; Jean-Christophe Saint-Esteben; Agnes
Shihemi; Mercy Chahilu
Safety Nets in Somalia – 22nd May 2012 - Workshop Report