On Compliance
Author(s): Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes
Source: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 175-205
Published by: The MIT Press
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On compliance
AbramChayesand
AntoniaHandlerChayes
complexand interdependentworld,negotiation,adoption,
In an increasingly
of internationalagreementsis a majorcomponentof the
and implementation
foreignpolicy activityof everystate.1Internationalagreementscome in a
varietyof shapes and sizes-formal and informal,bilateral and multiparty,
universaland regional. Our concern is with contemporaryagreementsof
relativelyhigh political salience in fields such as security,economics,and
where the treatyis a centralstructuralelement in a broader
environment,
internationalregulatoryregime.2Some of these agreementsare littlemore
treaty
chapterto a moreextendedstudyofcompliancewithinternational
This is an introductory
obligations.The researchhas been supportedby grantsfromthe Pew CharitableTrust and the
CarnegieCorporationof New York,forwhichwe wishto expressour gratitude.Earlierversionsof
HarvardUniversity,
thisarticlewerepresentedat seminarsat theKennedySchool of Government,
and at the Universityof Chicago Law School. Robert Keohane has been particularlyhelpfulin
on the earlierefforts.
Our thanksare also due to our manystudentresearchassistants
commenting
and especiallyto Sean Cote, Fred Jacobs,and JanMartinez,who laboredon thereferences.
1. BarryE. Carterand PhillipR. Trimble,IntemationalLaw (Boston: Little,Brown,1991), pp.
133-252,cite a statisticalstudyshowingthatof 10,189U.S. treatiesand internationalagreements
made between1789 and 1979, 8,955were concludedbetween1933 and 1979 (see p. 169). In the
agreementsratifiedwiththeadviceand
U.S. lexicon,theterm"treaty"is reservedforinternational
consentof the Senate in accordancewithArticle2, cl. 2 of the Constitution.Other international
agreementsare concludedbythe President,in thegreatmajorityof cases withtheauthorizationof
All ofthese are "treaties"according
on his or herown responsibility.
Congressand less frequently
to internationalusage,whichdefinesa treatyas "an internationalagreement,concludedbetween
statesin writtenformand governedbyinternationallaw." See Vienna Conventionon the Law of
Treaties (enteredintoforceon 27 January1980) Article2(1)(a), in IntemationalLegal Materials,
vol. 8 (Washington,D.C.: The AmericanSocietyof InternationalLaw, July1969), pp. 679-735
(hereaftercited as Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties). The quotationis foundon p. 701.
The computerbank of the United Nations (UN) TreatyOfficeshows treatygrowth,including
multilateraland bilateral treatiesand amendments,as follows:373 treatieswere entered into
duringthe ten-yearperiod endingin 1955; 498 in the period endingin 1965; 808 in the period
endingin 1975;461 in theperiodendingin 1985; and 915 in theperiodendingin 1991.
a contracor explicitly,
practice,adopts,implicitly
2. Treatylaw, based on nineteenth-century
tualmodelofbilateralrelationships(or, at most,agreementsamonga fewparties),and a good deal
Althoughnineteenthrelationsreflectsthissame framework.
workin international
ofcontemporary
centurylegal thoughtwas hospitableto conceptionsbased on contract,theydo notfitcomfortably
lawmaking.
withregulatory
47, 2, Spring1993
Organization
International
?3 1993 bytheWorldPeace Foundationand theMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
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176 InternationalOrganization
than statementsof general principle,while otherscontaindetailed prescriptionsfora definedfieldof interaction.Stillothersmaybe umbrellaagreements
forconsensusbuildingin preparationformorespecificregulation.Most ofthe
agreementsof concernare multilateral,except in the fieldof nuclear arms
control,in whichthe cold war generateda seriesof bilateralnegotiationsand
agreementsbetweenthe UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion.
We believe thatwhen nationsenterintoan internationalagreementof this
and theirexpectationsofone
kind,theyaltertheirbehavior,theirrelationships,
That
in
accordance
with
its
terms.
anotherovertime
is,theywillto some extent
complywith the undertakingsthey have made.3 How or why this should
be so is the subject of a burgeoningliteratureand debate in which,forthe
firsttime in half a century,the possibilityof fruitfuldialogue between
internationallawyersand studentsof internationalrelationshas emerged.
This article explores some basic propositionswe thinkshould frame this
discussion.
First,the generallevel of compliancewithinternationalagreementscannot
be empirically
verified.That nationsgenerallycomplywiththeirinternational
on theone hand,and thattheyviolatethemwheneveritis "in their
agreements,
intereststo do so" are not statementsof factor even hypothesesto be tested,
but assumptions.We give some reasons why we think the background
to complyis plausibleand useful.
assumptionof a propensity
Second, complianceproblemsoftendo not reflecta deliberatedecisionto
violate an internationalundertakingon the basis of a calculationof interests.
We propose a varietyof other(and in ourviewmoreusual) reasonswhystates
these
maydeviatefromtreatyobligationsand why,in particularcircumstances,
suchdepartures.
reasonsare acceptedbythepartiesas justifying
Third,the treatyregimeas a whole need not and should not be held to a
standard of strictcompliance but to a level of overall compliance that is
"acceptable" in the lightof the interestsand concernsthe treatyis designed
to safeguard.We consider how the "acceptable level" is determinedand
adjusted.
3. We are mindfulof the distinctionbetweentreatycomplianceand regimeeffectiveness.
See
Hard Cases and CriticalVariables,"
of InternationalInstitutions:
Oran Young,"The Effectiveness
Orderand
Government:
in JamesN. Rosenau and Ernst-OttoCzempiel,eds., GovemanceWithout
Changein WorldPolitics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1992), pp. 160-92; and Jesse
Ausubel and David Victor,"Verificationof InternationalEnvironmentalAgreements,"Annual
vol. 17, 1992,pp. 1-43. The partiesto theInternationalWhaling
ReviewofEnergyand Environment,
Convention,for example,complied fullywiththe quotas set by its commission,but the whale
populationcrashedbecause the quotas were too high.Nevertheless,we thinkthe observance(or
not) of treatycommitments
bythe partiesis a subjectworthstudyingin its own right.Moreover,
treatiesare ordinarilyintendedto induce behaviorthatis expectedto amelioratethe problemto
whichtheyare directed,so that,ifYoung's warningis keptin mind,compliancemaybe a fairfirst
approximation
surrogateforeffectiveness.
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On compliance 177
Backgroundassumption
Accordingto Louis Henkin,"almostall nationsobservealmostall principlesof
almostall ofthetime."4 The
international
law and almostall of theirobligations
observationis frequentlyrepeated without anyone, so far as we know,
supplyingany empiricalevidence to supportit. A moment'sreflectionshows
thatit would not be easy to devise a statisticalprotocolthatwould generate
such evidence. For example, how would Iraq's unbrokenrespect for the
bordersofTurkey,Jordan,and Saudi Arabia countin thereckoningagainstthe
invasionsof Iran and Kuwait?
Equally, and for much the same reasons, there is no way to validate
empiricallythe positionof mainstreamrealistinternationalrelationstheory
goingback to Machiavelli,that "a prudentrulercannot keep his word,nor
would damage him,and when the reasons that
should he, wheresuch fidelity
realistsaccept that
made himpromiseare no longerrelevant."5Contemporary
theinterestin reciprocalobservationoftreatynormsbyotherpartiesor a more
general interestin the state's reputationas a reliable contractualpartner
of costsand benefitson whicha decisionis
shouldbe countedin the trade-off
based (an extensionthatdetractsconsiderablyfromthepowerand eleganceof
therealistformula).6No calculus,however,willsupplya rigorous,nontautological answer to the question whethera state observed a particulartreaty
obligation,much less its treatyobligationsgenerally,onlywhen it was in its
interestto do so. Anecdotal evidenceabounds forboththe normativeand the
realistpropositions,but neitherof them,in theirgeneral form,is subject to
betweenthetwoschoolsis notone
statisticalor empiricalproof.The difference
of factbut of the backgroundassumptionthatinformstheirapproach to the
subject.
A criticalquestionforany studyof compliance,then,is whichbackground
assumptionto adopt, and that questionis to be resolvednot on the basis of
whetherthe assumptionis "true" or "false" butwhetheror notit is helpfulfor
the particularinquiry.Thus, forgame-theoretic
approachesthatfocuson the
oftherelationshipbetweenstates,therealistassumptionofa
abstractstructure
unitaryrationalactoroptimizingutilitiesdistributedalong smoothpreference
curvesmayhavevalue. As Thomas Schellingsaid at thebeginningofhis classic
Press,1979),
4. See Louis Henkin,How NationsBehave,2d ed. (New York: ColumbiaUniversity
p. 47; and p. 69 of Louis Henkin,"InternationalLaw: Politics,Values, and Functions:General
Course on Public InternationalLaw," Recueil Des Cours,vol. 216, 1989, pp. 1-416, emphasis
original.
5. Niccol6 Machiavelli, The Prince, eds. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988), pp. 61-62. For a moderninstance,see Hans J. Morgenthau,
forPowerand Peace, 5th ed. (New York: AlfredA. Knopf,
PoliticsAmongNations: The Struggle
1978),p. 560: "In myexperience[states]willkeep theirbargainsas longas it is in theirinterest."
6. See, forexample,JamesA. Caporaso, "InternationalRelationsTheoryand Multilateralism:
46 (Summer1992),pp. 599-632.
The Search forFoundations,"IntemationalOrganization
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178 InternationalOrganization
work,"The premiseof 'rationalbehavior'is a potentone fortheproductionof
theory.Whetherthe resultingtheoryprovidesgood or poor insightintoactual
behavioris ... a matterforsubsequentjudgment."7
Our interestin thisworkis in improvingthe prospectsforcompliancewith
treaties,both at the draftingstage and later as the partieslive and operate
therealistanalysis,focusingon a narrowset
underthem.Fromthisperspective,
of externallydefined "interests"-primarily,in the classical version, the
maintenanceor enhancementof state militaryand economic power-is not
veryhelpful.Improvingcompliancebecomes a matterof the manipulationof
burdensand benefitsdefinedin termsof those interests,whichtranslatesinto
the applicationof militaryor economic sanctions.Because these are costly,
difficult
to mobilize,and of doubtfulefficacy,
theyare infrequently
used in
practice. Meanwhile, analytic attentionis divertedfrom a wide range of
institutionaland political mechanismsthat in practice bear the burden of
efforts
to enhancetreatycompliance.
For a studyof the methods by which compliance can be improved,the
backgroundassumptionof a general propensityof states to complywith
internationalobligations,whichis the basis on whichmostpractitioners
carry
out theirwork,seems more illuminating.8
We note here some of the chief
to such an assumption.We do not suggest
considerationsthatlend plausibility
thatthese factors,singlyor in combination,will lead to compliancein every
case or even in any particular instance. Our claim is only that these
for
considerationssupportthebackgroundassumptionof a generalpropensity
statesto complywiththeirtreatyobligations.
Efficiency
Decisions are not a freegood. Governmentalresourcesforpolicyanalysis
and decisionmakingare costlyand in shortsupply.Individualsand organizations seek to conserve those resources for the most urgent and pressing
matters.9In these circumstances,standardeconomic analysisargues against
the continuousrecalculationof costsand benefitsin the absence of convincing
evidence that circumstanceshave changed since the originaldecision. EffiIn areas of activitycoveredby
ciencydictatesconsiderablepolicycontinuity.
7. Thomas C. Schelling,The Strategy
of Conflict(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,
1980), p. 4.
8. Oran R. Young, Complianceand PublicAuthority:
A TheorywithIntemationalApplications
(Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Press,1979),pp. 31-34.
9. See George Stigler,"The Economicsof Information,"
JoumalofPoliticalEconomy69 (June
1961), pp. 213-25; G. J. Stiglerand G. S. Becker,"De Gustibusnon Est Disputandum"(There is
no disputingtaste),in Karen S. Cook and MargaretLevi, eds., TheLimitsofRationality
(Chicago:
of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 191-216; Charles E. Lindblom,ThePolicyMakingProcess
University
(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1968), p. 14; and Young, Complianceand PublicAuthority,
pp. 16-17.
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On compliance 179
treatyobligations,the alternativeto recalculationis to followthe established
rule.
Organizationtheorywould reach the same resultas economicanalysis,but
by a differentroute. In place of the continuouslycalculating,maximizing
rationalactor,it substitutesa "satisficing"model of bounded rationalitythat
reactsto problemsas theyarise and searchesforsolutionswithina familiarand
In thisanalysis,bureaucraticorganizationsare viewed
accustomedrepertoire.10
accordingto routinesand standardoperatingprocedures,often
as functioning
rules and regulations.For Max Weber,thiswas the
specifiedby authoritative
definingcharacteristicof bureaucracy.1"The adoption of a treaty,like the
rule system.Complienactmentof anyotherlaw, establishesan authoritative
ance is thenormalorganizationalpresumption.
The bureaucracyis not monolithic,of course, and it will likelycontain
opponents of the treatyregime as well as supporters.When there is an
applicable rule in a treatyor otherwise,oppositionordinarilysurfacesin the
and takestheformofargumentoverinterpretacourseofruleimplementation
tion of language and definitionof the exact contentof the obligation.Such
controversies
are settledin accordancewithnormalbureaucraticproceduresin
which,again, the presumptionis in favorof "following"the rule. Casuistryis
admissible,thoughsometimessuspect.An advocateofoutrightviolationbears
a heavyburdenofpersuasion.
Interests
onlywhenitis in their
The assertionthatstatescarryout treatycommitments
are somehowunrelatedto
interestto do so seems to implythatcommitments
interests.In fact,theoppositeis true.The mostbasic principleof international
law is thatstatescannotbe legallybound exceptwiththeirown consent.So, in
thefirstinstance,thestateneed notenterintoa treatythatdoes notconformto
itsinterests.12
10. Herbert Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational-MathematicalEssays on Rational
Human Behaviorin a Social Setting(New York: JohnWiley& Sons, 1957), pp. 200-204. See also
(New York: JohnWiley& Sons, 1958), p.
JamesG. March and HerbertA. Simon,Organizations
169. For an example of this model of organizationalbehavior applied to the analysis of
see GrahamT. Allison,TheEssenceofDecision:ExplainingtheCuban Missile
internationalaffairs,
Crisis(Glenview,Ill.: Scott,Foresman,1971),chaps. 3 and 4.
11. M. Rheinstein,ed., Max Weberon Law in Economyand Society(New York: Simon and
Schuster,1954), p. 350: "For modernbureaucracy,the elementof 'calculabilityof its rules' has
reallybeen of decisivesignificance."
12. Even in the case of peace treaties,thevictorseems to attachimportanceto the signatureof
the vanquished on the document.Afterthe Persian Gulf War, for example, the UN Security
Council insistedthatIraq accept the termsof Resolution687 establishinga cease-fire.See Sean
of Section C of UN SecurityCouncil Resolution687,
Cote, A Narrativeof the Implementation
Cambridge,
Occasional Paper, CenterforScience and InternationalAffairs,HarvardUniversity,
and Morgenthau,PoliticsAmong
Nations,p. 282.
Mass., forthcoming;
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180 InternationalOrganization
More important,a treatydoes not presentthe state witha simple binary
are
alternative,to signor not to sign.Treaties,like otherlegal arrangements,
artifactsof politicalchoice and social existence.The processbywhichtheyare
formulatedand concluded is designed to ensure that the final result will
represent,to some degree,an accommodationof the interestsof the negotiating states. Of course, if state interestsare taken to be fixedand given,the
assertionthat states do not conclude treatiesexcept as theyembodythose
interestswouldadd littleto therealistposition.But moderntreatymaking,like
legislationin a democraticpolity,can be seen as a creativeenterprisethrough
but
whichthe partiesnot onlyweighthe benefitsand burdensof commitment
explore,redefine,and sometimesdiscovertheirinterests.It is at its best a
learningprocess in whichnot onlynationalpositionsbut also conceptionsof
nationalinterestevolve.
level. In
This processgoes on bothwithineach stateand at theinternational
national
positions
a statewitha well-developedbureaucracy,theelaborationof
vetting.
in preparationfortreatynegotiationsrequiresextensiveinteragency
in what
and
engage
objectives
withdifferent
responsibilities
Differentofficials
the
Trimble's
list
of
U.S.
a
internal
Phillip
amountsto sustained
negotiation.
groupsnormallyinvolvedin arms controlnegotiationsincludes the national
securitystaff,the Departmentsof State and Defense, the Arms Controland
Disarmament Agency,the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the Central Intelligence
Agency,and sometimestheDepartmentofEnergyor theNationalAeronautics
and Space Administration
(NASA).13 These organizationsthemselvesare not
unitaryactors. Numeroussubordinateunits of the major departmentshave
quasi-independentpositionsat the table. Much of the extensiveliteratureon
U.S.-Soviet arms controlnegotiationsis devoted to analysisof the almost
of theseinternalinteractions.14
byzantinecomplexity
The processis not confinedto armscontrolbut can be seen in everymajor
U.S. internationalnegotiation.For example,at the end of what Ambassador
minuet"in preparationfortheVienna
RichardBenedickcalls "the interagency
Conventionforthe Protectionof the Ozone Layer,thefinalU.S. position"was
clearedbytheDepartments
draftedbytheState Departmentand was formally
of Commerce and Energy,The Council on EnvironmentalQuality, EPA
Joumal
13. PhillipR. Trimble,"ArmsControland InternationalNegotiationTheory,"Stanford
ofIntemational
Law 25 (Spring1989),pp. 543-74, especiallyp. 549.
14. See John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Storyof SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Press
Winston,1973); GerardC. Smith,Doubletalk:TheStoryofSALTI (Lanham, Md.: University
of America,1985); StrobeTalbott,Endgame: The Inside Storyof SALT II (New York: Harper &
and the Stalematein
Row, 1979); Strobe Talbott,Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration
Detenteand Confrontation:
NuclearArmsControl(New York: Knopf,1984); RaymondL. Garthoff,
1985);
American-Soviet
RelationsfromNixonto Reagan (Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,
and J. McNeill, "U.S.-U.S.S.R. Arms Negotiations:The Process and the Lawyer,"American
JoumalofIntemationalLaw 79 (January1985), pp. 52-67. Althoughknowledgeof the processin
the formerSoviet Union is less detailed, the sources cited above, among others,suggestthat
bureaucraticstructure)the process was not
(makingallowances fora more compartmentalized
dissimilar.
fundamentally
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On compliance 181
ProtectionAgency],NASA, NOAA [NationalOceanographic
[Environmental
and AtmosphericAdministration],
OMB [Officeof Managementand Budget],
USTR [U.S. Trade Representative],and the Domestic PolicyCouncil (representing all other interestedagencies)."'15In addition to this formidable
alphabetsoup, WhiteHouse units,like the Officeof Science and Technology
Policy, the Office of Policy Development, and the Council of Economic
Advisers,also got into the act. Accordingto Trimble,"each agencyhas a
distinctive
perspectivefromwhichitviewstheprocessand whichinfluencesthe
positionit advocates.... All these interestsmustbe accommodated,compromisedor overridenbythe Presidentbeforea positioncan even be put on the
table."16
In the United States in recentyears,increasinginvolvement
of Congressand withit nongovernmental
organizations(NGOs) and the broaderpublichas introduceda new rangeof intereststhatmustultimately
be reflectedin the
national position.17Similar developmentsseem to be occurringin other
democraticcountries.
In contrastto day-to-dayforeignpolicy decision makingthat is oriented
toward currentpolitical exigenciesand imminentdeadlines and is focused
heavilyon short-term
costsand benefits,themoredeliberateprocessemployed
in treatymakingmayserveto identify
and reinforcelongerrangeinterestsand
values. Officialsengaged in developingthe negotiatingpositionoftenhave an
additionalreason to take a long-rangeview,since theymayhave operational
responsibility
under any agreementthatis reached.18What theysay and how
theyconductthemselvesat the negotiatingtable may returnto haunt them
15. Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directionsin Safeguardingthe Planet
(Cambridge,Mass: Harvard UniversityPress, 1991), pp. 51-53. The Domestic Policy Council,
whichestablisheda special senior-levelworkinggroupto rideherdon theprocess,consistsof nine
Cabinet secretaries,the directorfor the OMB, and the USTR. At the time of the ozone
negotiations,the councilwas chairedbyAttorneyGeneral Edwin Meese. Other states,at least in
advancedindustrialized
societies,exhibitsimilar,ifperhapsnotquite as baroque,internalpractices
in preparation for negotiations.Developing countries,with small resources to commit to
bureaucraticcoordination,mayrelymore on the judgmentand inspirationof representatives
on
thescene.
16. Trimble,"ArmsControland InternationalNegotiationTheory,"p. 550.
17. See Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy,p. 57, for a descriptionof the emphasis on Congress,
industry,
and environmental
groupsin thedevelopmentoftheU.S. strategy
to buildsupportforthe
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. For a discussionof how governments
"organizethemselvesto cope withtheflowofbusinessgeneratedbyinternational
organizations"in
an internationalpolitical systemof "complex interdependence,"see Robert 0. Keohane and
2d ed. (Glenview,Ill.: Scott,Foresman,1989),p. 35.
JosephS. Nye,Powerand Interdependence,
18. Hudec uses the examplesof the General Agreementon Tariffsand Trade (GATT) and the
InternationalTrade Organization(ITO): "For thebetterpartof thefirstdecade, GATT meetings
resembleda reunionof the GATT/ITO draftsmenthemselves.Failure of the code would have
meanta personalfailureto manyof theseofficials,
and violationof rulestheyhad helped to write
could not help being personallyembarrassing."See p. 1365 of Robert E. Hudec, "GATT or
GABB? The FutureDesign of theGeneral AgreementofTariffsand Trade," Yale Law Joumal80
(June 1971), pp. 1299-386.See also RobertE. Hudec, The GATT Legal Systemand WorldTrade
Diplomacy,2d ed. (Salem, N. H.: Butterworth
Legal Publishers,1990),p. 54.
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182 InternationalOrganization
Moreover,they are likelyto attach
once the treatyhas gone into effect.19
considerable importanceto the developmentof governingnorms that will
operate predictablywhen applied to the behaviorof the partiesovertime.All
theseconvergentelementstendto influencenationalpositionsin the direction
ofbroad-basedconceptionsofthenationalinterestthat,ifadequatelyreflected
in thetreaty,
willhelp to inducecompliance.
The internalanalysis,negotiation,and calculationof the benefits,burdens,
and impacts are repeated, for contemporaryregulatorytreaties, at the
level.20In anticipationof negotiations,the issues are reviewedin
international
internationalforumslong before formalnegotiationbegins. The negotiating
debate oftenlasting
involvesintergovernmental
processitselfcharacteristically
but also international
not onlyothernationalgovernments
yearsand involving
bureaucraciesand NGOs. The mostnotablecase is theUN Conferenceon the
Law of the Sea, in whichthatprocesslasted formorethantenyears,spawning
innumerablecommittees,subcommittees,and workinggroups, only to be
torpedoed in the end by the United States, which had sponsored the
negotiationsin thefirstplace.21Bilateralarmscontrolnegotiationsbetweenthe
extended,and althoughonly
UnitedStatesand theSovietUnionweresimilarly
thetwosuperpowerswere directlyinvolved,each felta measureof responsibility to bring along the members of its alliance. Current environmental
negotiationson ozone and on globalwarmingfollowverymuchthe Law of the
ozone was convokedbythe
Sea pattern.The firstconferenceon stratospheric
UN Environment
Program(UNEP) in 1977,eightyearsbeforethe adoptionof
the Vienna Conventionon the Protectionof the Ozone Layer.22The formal
beginningoftheclimatechangenegotiationsin February1991was precededby
Panel on Climate Change,
two years of work by the Intergovernmental
and the UNEP to
the
World
Organization
convened by
Meteorological
considerscientific,
technological,and policyresponsequestions.23
19. The Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treatiespermitslimitedrecourseto the negotiating
historywhen the treatytextis ambiguous,thoughthe emphasisgivento such historydiffersin
varioustribunalsand nationalcourts.See Vienna Conventionon theLaw ofTreaties,Article32. In
the United States,resortto the negotiatinghistoryis muchfreer.See UnitedStatesv. Stuart,489
U.S. 353-377 (1989); and Detlev F. Vagts "Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation:Some
Research Hintsforthe SupremeCourt,"AmericanJoumalofIntemationalLaw 83 (July1989),pp.
546-50.
20. Robert D. Putnam,"Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:The Logic of Two-Level Games,"
42 (Summer1988),pp. 427-60.
IntemationalOrganization
21. See James K. Sebenius, Negotiatingthe Law of the Sea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University
Press,1984); and WilliamWertenbaker,"The Law of the Sea," parts1 and 2, TheNew
Yorker,1 August1983,pp. 38-65, and 8 August1983,pp. 56-83, respectively.
22. As earlyas 1975,theUNEP fundeda WorldMeteorologicalOrganization(WMO) technical
conferenceon implicationsof U.S. ozone layer research.But the immediateprecursorof the
negotiatingconferencein Vienna came in March 1977, when the UNEP sponsored a policy
meetingof governmentsand internationalagencies in Washington,D.C., thatdrafteda "World
Plan ofActionon the Ozone Layer." See Benedick,OzoneDiplomacy,p. 40.
Panel of ClimateChange was set up bythe UNEP and WMO after
23. The Intergovernmental
the passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53, A/RES/43/53, 27 January1989,
"Resolutionon theProtectionof the Global Climate."
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On compliance 183
Much of this negotiatingactivityis open to some formof public scrutiny,
repeated roundsof nationalbureaucraticand politicalreviewand
triggering
revisionof tentativeaccommodationsamong affectedinterests.The treatyas
is thereforelikelyto be based on
finallysignedand presentedforratification
considered and well-developedconceptionsof national interestthat have
themselvesbeen shaped to some extentby the preparatoryand negotiating
process.
Treatymakingis not purelyconsensual,of course. Negotiationsare heavily
affectedbythe structureof the internationalsystem,in whichsome statesare
muchmorepowerfulthanothers.As noted,the Conventionof the Law of the
Sea, the productof more than a decade of internationalnegotiations,was
foundit unacceptable.
derailedwhena new U.S. administration
ultimately
On the otherhand, a multilateralnegotiatingforumprovidesopportunities
forweakerstatesto formcoalitionsand exploitblockingpositions.In thesame
UN Conferenceon the Law of the Sea, the caucus of what were knownas
"land-lockedand geographicallydisadvantagedstates,"whichincluded such
unlikelycolleagues as Hungary,Switzerland,Austria, Uganda, Nepal, and
Bolivia,had a crucialstrategicposition.The AssociationofSmall Island States,
chaired by Vanuatu, played a similarrole in the global climatenegotiations.
process leaves a
Like domesticlegislation,the internationaltreaty-making
interests.In sucha setting,not
good deal ofroomforaccommodatingdivergent
even the strongeststatewill be able to achieve all of its objectives,and some
participantsmay have to settle for much less. The treatyis necessarilya
compromise,"a bargainthat[has] been made."24Fromthepointofviewofthe
particularinterestsof anystate,the outcomemayfallshortof the ideal. But if
and witha practical
theagreementis well-designed-sensible,comprehensible,
eye to probable patternsof conduct and interaction-complianceproblems
and enforcement
issuesare likelyto be manageable.Ifissuesofnoncompliance
and enforcement
are endemic,the real problemis likelyto be thattheoriginal
bargaindid not adequatelyreflectthe interestsof those thatwould be living
underit,ratherthanmeredisobedience.25
stage may be
It is true that a state's incentivesat the treaty-negotiating
fromthoseitfaceswhenthetimeforcompliancerollsaround.Parties
different
on the givingend of the compromise,especially,mighthave reason to seek to
escape the obligationstheyhave undertaken.Nevertheless,the veryact of
makingcommitmentsembodied in an internationalagreementchanges the
24. Susan Strange,"Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,"in Stephen D.
Press,1983), pp. 337-54; the
Regimes(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Krasner,ed., International
quotationis on p. 353.
25. Systemsin whichcompliancecan onlybe achieved throughextensiveuse of coercion are
Sanctions:Orderin
and unjust.See Michael Barkun,Law Without
regardedas authoritarian
rightly
Press, 1968), p.
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Societiesand theWorldCommunity
Primitive
62.
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184 InternationalOrganization
calculus at the compliancestage,if onlybecause it generatesexpectationsof
compliancein othersthatmustenterintotheequation.
Moreover,althoughstatesmayknowtheycan violate theirtreatycommitmentsin a crunch,theydo notnegotiateagreementswiththeidea thattheycan
bargainwillitself
do so in routinesituations.Thus,theshape ofthesubstantive
be affectedby the parties' estimatesof the costs and risks of their own
complianceand expectationsabout thecomplianceof others.Essentialparties
regulationsifthe prospectsfor
maybe unwillingto accept or impose stringent
complianceare doubtful.The negotiationwillnot necessarilycollapse on that
account,however.The resultmaybe a looser,moregeneralengagement.Such
outcome,
an outcome is oftendeprecated as a lowest-common-denominator
withwhatis reallyimportantlefton the cuttingroomfloor.But it maybe the
seriousand concertedattentionto theproblem.
beginningofincreasingly
Finally, the treatythat comes into force does not remain static and
Treatiesthatlastmustbe able to adapt to inevitablechangesin the
unchanging.
economic,technological,social, and politicalsetting.Treatiesmaybe formally
amended, of course, or modifiedby the addition of a protocol,but these
methods are slow and cumbersome.Since they are subject to the same
ratification
process as the originaltreaty,theycan be blocked or avoided by a
dissatisfiedparty.As a result,treatylawyershave deviseda numberofwaysto
deal withthe problemof adaptationwithoutseekingformalamendment.The
simplestis thedeviceofvestingthepowerto "interpret"theagreementin some
organ establishedby the treaty.The U.S. Constitution,afterall, has kept up
with the times not primarilyby the amendingprocess but by the Supreme
of its broad clauses. The InternationalMonetaryFund
Court'sinterpretation
(IMF) Agreementgivessuchpowerto theGoverningBoard,and numerouskey
whetherdrawings
questions-includingthe crucial issue of "conditionality,"
againstthefund'sresourcesmaybe conditionedon theeconomicperformance
ofthedrawingmember-have been resolvedbythismeans.26
A numberof treatiesestablishauthorityto make regulationson technical
mattersbyvote of the parties(usuallyby a special majority),whichare then
bindingon all, thoughoftenwiththe rightto opt out. The InternationalCivil
Aeronautics Organizationhas such power with respect to operational and
In many regulatorytreaties,
safetymattersin internationalair transport.27
"technical"mattersmaybe relegatedto an annexthatcan be alteredbyvoteof
mechathe parties.28In sum,treatiescharacteristically
containself-adjusting
26. Articlesof Agreementof the IMF, 27 December 1945, as amended, Article8, sec. 5, in
Series(UNTS), vol. 2, Treatyno. 20 (New York: UnitedNations,1947),p. 39.
UnitedNationsTreaty
decision,see decisionno. 102-(52/11)13 February1952,"Selected Decisions
For theconditionality
oftheExecutiveDirectorsand Selected Documents,"p. 16.
27. Conventionon InternationalCivilAviation,7 December 1944,Article90, in UNTS, vol. 15,
Treatyno. 102,1948,p. 295.
Legal
28. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, in International
Materials,vol. 26, 1987,p. 1541,Article2(9) (signed 16 September1987 and enteredintoforce1
January1989; hereaftercited as Montreal Protocol) as amended, London Adjustmentand
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On compliance 185
nisms by which,over a significantrange, they can be and in practice are
interestsoftheparties.
commonlyadapted to respondto shifting
Norms
Treaties are acknowledgedto be legallybindingon the states that ratify
In commonexperience,people, whetheras a resultof socializationor
them.29
otherwise,acceptthattheyare obligatedto obeythelaw.30So itis withstates.It
is oftensaid that the fundamentalnorm31of internationallaw is pacta sunt
servanda(treatiesare to be obeyed).32In the United States and manyother
countries,they become a part of the law of the land. Thus, a provision
assentedentailsa legal
containedin an agreementto whicha statehas formally
a guideto action.
obligationto obeyand is presumptively
fora proposiIt seems almostsuperfluousto adduce evidenceor authority
tion that is so deeply ingrainedin common understandingand so often
reflectedin the speech of national leaders. Yet the realist argumentthat
nationalactionsare governedentirelybycalculationofinterests(includingthe
servedbya systemofrules)is essentiallya
and predictability
interestin stability
denial of the operationof normativeobligationin internationalaffairs.This
relations
positionhas held thefieldforsome timein mainstreaminternational
theory(as have closely related postulates in other positivistsocial science
Amendmentsto the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, in
Legal Materials,vol. 30, 1991,p. 537 (signed 29 June 1990 and enteredinto force7
International
March 1991;hereaftercitedas London Amendments).
29. The Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties,signed23 May 1969 (enteredintoforceon
27 January1980), Article 2(1)(a), states that "'treaty' means an internationalagreement
law,whetherembodiedin
concludedbetweenStatesinwrittenformand governedbyinternational
and whateveritsparticulardesignation."
or in twoor morerelatedinstruments
a singleinstrument
See UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/27.
30. According to Young, "'obligation' encompasses incentivesto comply with behavioral
whichstemfroma generalsense ofdutyand whichdo notreston explicitcalculations
prescriptions
role in compliancechoices."
ofcostsand benefits.... Feelingsofobligationoftenplaya significant
Moreover,"rules constitutean essentialfeatureof bureaucraciesand ... routinizedcompliance
withrules is a deeply ingrainednormamong bureaucrats."See Young, Complianceand Public
pp. 23 and 39. See also R. H. Fallon, "Reflectionson Dworkinand the Two Faces of
Authority,
Law," NotreDame Law Review,vol. 67, no. 3, 1992, pp. 553-85, summarizingH. L. A. Hart's
concept of a law as a social rule: "From an internalpoint of view-that of an unalienated
participantofthesocial lifeofthecommunity-asocial ruleis a standardthatis acceptedas a guide
(p. 556); Rheinstein,Max Weberon
to conductand a basis forcriticism,includingself-criticism"
Rules,Norms,and Decisions:
Law inEconomyand Society,pp. 349-56; and FriedrichV. Kratochwil,
Relationsand DomesticAffairs
On theConditionsofPracticaland Legal Reasoningin International
Press,1989),pp. 15 and 95-129.
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
31. We use "norm" as a generictermincludingprinciples,precepts,standards,rules,and the
like.For presentpurposes,it is adequate to thinkof legal normsas normsgeneratedbyprocesses
bya legal system.CompareH. L. A. Hart,TheConceptofLaw (Oxford:
recognizedas authoritative
OxfordUniversity
Press,1961).
32. The Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties,Article26, specifiesthat"everytreatyin
forceis bindingupon the partiesto it and mustbe performedin good faith."See also chap. 30 of
ArnoldDuncan McNair,TheLaw of Treaties(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1961),pp. 493-505.
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186 InternationalOrganization
disciplines).33But it is increasinglybeing challenged by a growingbody of
empiricalstudyand academicanalysis.
Such scholarsas Elinor Ostromand Robert Ellicksonshow how relatively
in containedcircumstances
generateand securecompliance
smallcommunities
of a superveningsovereignauthoriwithnorms,evenwithoutthe intervention
ty.34Others,like FrederickSchauer and FriedrichKratochwil,analyze how
processes,whetheras "reasons foraction"
normsoperate in decision-making
JonElster,oftenregarded
or in definingthemethodsand termsof discourse.35
as one of the mostpowerfulscholarsof the "rationalactor" school,saysin his
most recent book, "I have come to believe that social norms provide an
importantkind of motivationfor action that is irreducibleto rationalityor
indeed to anyotherformofoptimizingmechanism."36
As applied to treatyobligations,thispropositionseems almostself-evident.
For example: in the absence of the antiballisticmissile (ABM) treaty,the
Soviet Union would have been legallyfree to build an ABM system.The
exerciseof thisfreedomwould surelyhave posed seriousmilitaryand political
In due course,the
issuesforU.S. analysts,diplomats,and intelligenceofficers.
UnitedStateswould have responded,witheitheritsownABM systemor some
of an
or politicalmove.The same act, the construction
othersuitablemilitary
ABM system,would be qualitativelydifferent,
however,if it were done in
violationofthespecificstipulationsoftheABM treaty.Transgressionofsucha
fundamentalengagementwould triggernot a limitedresponse,but a hostile
reactionacrossthe board,jeopardizingthe possibilityof cooperativerelations
betweenthe partiesfora long timeto come. Outrage when solemncommitIt is unlikely
mentsare treatedas "scraps of paper" is rootedin U.S. history.37
thatthiskindofreactionis unique to theUnitedStates.
The strongestcircumstantialevidence for the sense of an obligationto
complywithtreatiesis thecare thatstatestakein negotiatingand enteringinto
them. It is not conceivable that foreignministriesand governmentleaders
could devote time and energyon the scale theydo to preparing,drafting,
33. WilliamEskridge,Jr.,and G. Peller, "The New Public Law: Moderationas a Postmodern
CulturalForm,"MichiganLaw Review89 (February1991),pp. 707-91.
forCollectiveAction
theCommons:TheEvolutionofInstitutions
34. See ElinorOstrom,Governing
Law: How
Press,1990); and RobertC. Ellickson,OrderWithout
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1991).
Neighbors
SettleDisputes(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
35. See FrederickF. Schauer,PlayingbytheRules:A PhilosophicalExaminationof Rule-based
in Law and Life (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1991); Kratochwil,Rules,Normsand
Decision-making
Decisions;and SallyFalk Moore,Law as Process(London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1978).
36. JonElster,TheCementofSociety:A StudyofSocial Order(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1989), p. 15. See also MargaretLevi, Karen S. Cook, JodiA. O'Brien, and Howard Fay,
pp. 1-16.
"Introduction:The Limitsof Rationality,"in Cook and Levi, TheLimitsofRationality,
37. The quotationis fromGermanChancellorTheobald von Bethman-Hollweg'sremarkto the
when Germanyinvaded in
Britishambassadorabout the treatyguaranteeingBelgian neutrality
Theobald von. For an example
1914.See EncyclopediaBritannica,14thed., s.v.Bethman-Hollweg,
of the U.S. response, see the letter of ex-PresidentTheodore Roosevelt to BritishForeign
SecretarySir Edward Greydated 22 January1915,quoted in Hans J.Morgenthau,PoliticsAmong
Nations:TheStruggle
forPowerand Peace, 4thed. (New York: Knopf,1967).
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On compliance 187
negotiating,and monitoringtreatyobligationsunless there is an assumption
oughtto and does constrainthe state's
thatenteringintoa treatycommitment
own freedomof action and an expectationthat the other parties to the
agreementwill feel similarlyconstrained.The care devoted to fashioninga
treatyprovisionno doubt reflectsthe desire to limitthe state's own commitIn eithercase, the
mentas muchas to make evasionby othersmore difficult.
enterprisemakes sense onlyon the assumptionthat,as a generalrule,states
acknowledgean obligationto complywithagreementstheyhave signed.
These attitudesare not confinedto foreignoffices.U.S. Departmentof
Defense testimonyduringthe cold war repeatedlysounded the theme that
armscontroltreatieswiththe Soviet Union were importantin providingthe
the Pentagon needed for sound
stabilityof expectationsand predictability
States
and
other Westerncountries,the
In
the
United
strategicplanning.38
powerin generalis subjectto law
principlethatthe exerciseof governmental
lends additionalforceto an ethos of national compliancewithinternational
And, of course, appeals to legal obligationsare a staple of
undertakings.39
foreignpolicydebate and of the continuouscritiqueand defense of foreign
policy actions that account for so much of diplomatic interchangeand
politicalcommentary.
international
All thisarguesthatstates,like othersubjectsof legal rules,operateundera
sense ofobligationto conformtheirconductto governingnorms.
behavior
Varietiesofnoncomplying
If the state's decisionwhetheror not to complywitha treatyis the resultof a
calculationof costs and benefits,as the realistsassert,the implicationis that
noncompliance is the premeditatedand deliberate violation of a treaty
obligation.Our backgroundassumptiondoes not exclude thatsuch decisions
the
underlying
mayoccurfromtimeto time,especiallywhenthecircumstances
Or, as in the area ofinternational
originalbargainhave changedsignificantly.40
human rights,it may happen that a state will enter into an international
but have little
agreementto appease a domesticor internationalconstituency
of General David C. Jones,chairmanof theJointChiefsof
38. See, forexample,the testimony
Staff,beforethe U.S. Senate Committeeon ForeignRelationson the StrategicArmsLimitation
Service,S381-2479, 9 July1979.
Talks (SALT) II treaty,CongressionalInformation
39. It is notclear,however,thatdemocraciesare morelaw-abiding.See Diggsv. Shultz,470 F. 2d
scheme,Congresscan denouncetreatiesifit sees
461 (D.C. Cir. 1972): "Under our constitutional
can do about it.We consider
fitto do so, and thereis nothingtheotherbranchesofthegovernment
thatis preciselywhatCongresshas done in thiscase" (pp. 466-67).
40. Internationallaw recognizesa limitedscope forabrogationof an agreementin such a case.
See the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties,Article62. Generally,however,the possibility
or even
of change is accommodatedby provisionsfor amendment,authoritativeinterpretation,
withdrawalfromthe agreement.See, forexample,the withdrawalprovisionof the ABM Treaty,
Article25(2), or the LimitedTest Ban Treaty,Article4. None of these actionsposes an issue of
violationof legal obligations,thoughtheymayweakenthe regimeofwhichthetreatyis a part.
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188 InternationalOrganization
however,
withforeignaffairs,
it out. A passingfamiliarity
intentionof carrying
does a treatyviolationfallintothecategoryofa
suggeststhatonlyinfrequently
oflegal obligation.4'
willfulflouting
At thesame time,generalobservationas well as detailedstudiesoftenreveal
departuresfromestablishedtreaty
whatappear or are alleged to be significant
norms.If these are not deliberateviolations,whatexplainsthisbehavior?We
infrequently
recognizedin discussionsof complidiscussthreecircumstances,
ance, thatin our view oftenlie at the root of behaviorthatmay seem prima
and indeterminacy
of treaty
facieto violatetreatyrequirements:(1) ambiguity
language,(2) limitationson thecapacityofpartiesto carryout theirundertakings, and (3) the temporaldimensionof the social and economic changes
treaties.
contemplatedbyregulatory
These factorsmightbe considered"causes" of noncompliance.But froma
to thinkofthemas "defenses"-matters
lawyer'sperspective,it is illuminating
a prima facie case of breach. A
or
or
extenuate
put forthto excuse justify
is subject to the overriding
all
other
issues
of
compliance,
defense, like
in
If theplea is
faith
the
of
of
performance treatyobligations.42
obligation good
accepted, the conductis not a violation,strictlyspeaking.Of course, in the
internationalsphere,these charges and defenses are rarelymade or determinedin a judicial tribunal.However,diplomaticpracticein otherforumscan
perhaps,the
be understoodin termsof the same basic structure,reflecting,
legal framework.
pervasivenessoftheunderlying
Ambiguity
Treaties,like other canonical statementsof legal rules,frequentlydo not
providedeterminateanswersto specificdisputedquestions.43Language often
is unable to capture meaningwithprecision.Treatydraftersdo not foresee
manyof the possible applications-let alone theircontextualsettings.Issues
thatare foreseenoftencannotbe resolvedat thetimeoftreatynegotiationand
are sweptundertherugwitha formulathatcan mean whateach partywantsit
41. Keohane surveyedtwo hundredyearsof U.S. foreignrelationshistoryand identifiedonly
inwhichtherewas a serious
cases of "inconvenient"commitments
interesting"
forty
"theoretically
issue of whetheror not to comply.See the chapterentitled"Commitmentsand Compromise,"in
Robert 0. Keohane, "The Impact of Commitmentson AmericanForeignPolicy,"manuscript,
1993,pp. 1-49.
42. See Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties,Article26; Lassa Oppenheim,International
Law: A Treatise,8thed., ed. H. Lauterpacht(London: Longmans,1955), p. 956; and McNair, The
Law of Treaties,
p. 465.
43. See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "Living Under a Treaty Regime:
and Adaptation,"in Antonia Handler Chayes and Paul Doty, eds.,
Compliance,Interpretation,
ManagingtheABM TreatyRegimeintothe21st Century(Washington,D.C.:
DefendingDeterrence:
Pergamon-Brassey's
InternationalDefense Publishers,1989), chap. 11. See also Young, Compliin the contextof
pp. 106-8, whichdiscusses issues of interpretation
ance and PublicAuthority,
are
deliberate attemptsat "evasion" of obligation.We argue that alternativeinterpretations
frequently
invokedin good faith.No doubtin practicethereis oftensome ofboth.
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On compliance 189
to mean. Economic,technological,scientific,
and even politicalcircumstances
change. All these inescapable incidentsof the effortto formulaterules to
withinwhichitis
governfutureconductfrequently
producea zone ofambiguity
difficult
to saywithprecisionwhatis permittedand whatis forbidden.
Of course, treatylanguage, like other legal language, comes in varying
degreesof specificity.44
The broaderand moregeneralthe language,thewider
the ambitof permissibleinterpretations
to whichit givesrise. Yet thereare
frequently
reasonsforchoosinga more generalformulation
of the obligation:
the political consensus may not supportmore precision,or, as withcertain
provisionsof the U.S. Constitution,it may be wiser to define a general
direction,to tryto informa process,ratherthan seek to foreseein detail the
circumstancesin whichthe words will be broughtto bear. If there is some
the
confidencein thosewho are to applythe rules,a broaderstandarddefining
in realizingitthana series
generalpolicybehindthelaw maybe moreeffective
of detailed regulations.The North AtlanticTreaty has proved remarkably
durable,thoughitslanguageis remarkably
general:"In ordermoreeffectively
to achieve the objectivesof thisTreaty,the Parties,separatelyand jointly,by
means of continuousand effective
self-helpand mutualaid, willmaintainand
developtheirindividualand collectivecapacityto resistarmedattack."45
In the arms controlfield, the United States has opted for increasingly
detailed agreementson the groundthat theyreduce interpretative
leeways.
The 1963 LimitedTest Ban Treaty(LTBT), the firstbilateral arms control
agreementbetweenthe United States and the SovietUnion, consistedof five
articlescoveringtwo or three pages. The StrategicArms Reduction Treaty
(START) signedin 1989is thesize of a telephonebook.
Detail also has itsdifficulties.
It is vulnerableto themaximexpressio
uniusest
exclusioalterius (to expressone thingis to exclude the other). As in the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code, precisiongenerates loopholes, necessitatingsome
The corpus
procedureforcontinuousrevisionand authoritative
interpretation.
of thelaw maybecome so complexand unwieldyas to be understandable(and
manipulable)by onlya small coterieof experts.The complexitiesof the rule
when thingsare
systemmay give rise to shortcutsthat reduce inefficiencies
whenthepoliticalatmospheredarkens.
goingwell butmaylead to friction
In short,moreoftenthannottherewillbe a considerablerangewithinwhich
parties may reasonablyadopt differing
positionsas to the meaning of the
institutions
obligation.In domesticlegal systems,courtsor otherauthoritative
are empoweredto resolvesuchdisputesabout meaningas betweenpartiesin a
44. See Duncan Kennedy,"Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication,"HarvardLaw
Review89 (June 1976), pp. 1685-788; Ronald Dworkin,"The Model of Rules," University
of
Chicago Law Review35 (Autumn 1967), pp. 14-16; Louis Kaplow, Rules VersusStandards:An
Economic Analysis,Discussion Paper no. 108, Programin Law and Economics, Harvard Law
School,April1992.
45. NorthAtlanticTreaty,Article3, 63 stat.2241 (signed4 April1949and enteredintoforce24
August1949), in UNTS, vol. 34, no. 541, 1949,p. 243.
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190 InternationalOrganization
particularcase. The internationallegal systemcan providetribunalsto settle
such questionsif the partiesconsent.But compulsorymeans of authoritative
disputeresolution-by adjudicationor otherwise-are not generallyavailable
maynotarise
level.46Moreover,theissue ofinterpretation
at theinternational
dispute. In such cases, it remains
in the contextof an adversarialtwo-party
open to a state,in the absence of bad faith,to maintainitspositionand tryto
convincetheothers.
In manysuch disputes,a consensusmayexistor emergeamongknowledgeIn manyothers,however,
able professionalsaboutthelegal rightsand wrongs.47
theissue willremaincontestable.Althoughone partymaychargeanotherwith
violationand deploylegionsof internationallawyersin itssupport,a detached
observer often cannot readily conclude that there is indeed a case of
noncompliance,at least in the absence of "bad faith."The numerousalleged
violationsof armscontroltreatieswithwhichthe Soviet Union was annually
charged were, with the exception of the radar at Krasnoyarskin Siberia,
contestable in that sense.48In fact, it can be argued that if there is no
arbiter(and even sometimeswhenthereis), discourseamongthe
authoritative
wayof
parties,oftenin the hearingof a widerpublicaudience,is an important
themeaningoftherules.
clarifying
overa considerablerange,
In theface oftreatynormsthatare indeterminate
even conscientiouslegal advice may not avoid issues of compliance.At the
extreme,a statemayconsciouslyseek to discoverthe limitsof itsobligationby
testingitstreatypartners'responses.Therewas speculationthatthepatternof
Soviet deploymentof Pechora-typeradars prior to the constructionof the
was an attemptto testthelimitsoftheradar
phased arrayradarat Krasnoyarsk
provisionoftheABM treaty.The Pechora siteswerelocated as far
deployment
as fourhundredkilometersfromtheborder,arguably"on theperipheryof the
national territory,"
as required by the treaty-but also arguablynot.49The
to
failureoftheUnitedStatesto reactwas thoughtbysome to have contributed
the decisionto site Krasnoyarskeven furtherfromthe nearestborder-some
sevenhundredkilometers.
46. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "Compliance WithoutEnforcement:State
Journal7 (July1991),pp. 311-31. See also Louis
BehaviorUnder RegulatoryTreaties,"Negotiation
B. Sohn,"Peaceful SettlementofDisputes in Ocean Conflicts:Does UN Clause 3 PointtheWay?"
examines
Problems46 (Spring 1983), pp. 195-200. Our work-in-progress
Law and Contemporary
signsofa recenttrendtowardmoreformaldisputeresolutionproceduresin suchareas as trade,the
law of the sea, and others.The currentemphasis in the United States on alternativedispute
judicial settlementmaynotbe an entirelyunmixedblessing,
resolutionsuggeststhatinternational
however.
University
47. Oscar Schachter,"The InvisibleCollege of InternationalLawyers,"Northwestern
Law Review,vol. 72, no. 2, 1977,pp. 217-26.
48. Gloria Duffy,Complianceand theFutureofArmsControl:Reportofa ProjectSponsoredbythe
andArmsControl(Cambridge,Mass: Ballinger,1988),pp. 31-60.
Security
International
Centerfor
49. See Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, "From Law Enforcementto Dispute
Settlement:A New Approach to Arms Control Verificationand Compliance," International
14 (Spring1990),pp. 147-64;and Duffy,Complianceand theFutureofArmsControl,p. 107.
Security
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On compliance 191
JusticeOliverWendellHolmes said, "The verymeaningofa linein thelaw is
maycome as close to it as youcan ifyou do notpass it."50
thatyouintentionally
Nevertheless,deliberatetestingof the kinddescribedabove mightin ordinary
withgood faithobservationof the
circumstances
be thoughtto be inconsistent
treatyobligation. On the other hand, in the early years of the Interim
Agreementon LimitationofStrategicArms(SALT I) theUnitedStatesplayed
a similargame by erectingopaque environmentalsheltersover missilesilos
"notto use deliberate
work,despitethetreatyundertaking
duringmodification
bynationaltechnicalmeans."'51
concealmentmeasureswhichimpedeverification
betweenthe United States
In the contextof the long cold war confrontation
and the Soviet Union, a certainamountof such probingseems to have been
withintheexpectationsoftheparties.52
is to design
Perhaps a moreusual wayof operatingin the zone of ambiguity
others
to argue
the
obligation,leaving
the activity
to complywiththe letterof
about the spirit.The General Agreementon Tarrifsand Trade (GATT)
prohibitsa partyfromimposingquotas on imports.When Japaneseexportsof
steel to the United States generatedpressuresfromU.S. domesticproducers
that the Nixon administrationcould no longer contain,U.S. trade lawyers
inventedthe "voluntaryrestraintagreement,"under whichprivateJapanese
producersagreed to limittheirU.S. sales.53The United States imposed no
officialquota, althoughthe Japanese producersmightwell have anticipated
some such action had theynot "volunteered."Did the arrangementviolate
GATT obligations?
ariseas an adjunct
Questionsofcompliancewithtreatyobligationsordinarily
to activitydesigned to achieve an objectivethat the actor regardsas important.54Lawyersmaybe consultedor mayintervene.Decisions about how the
oflegal
desiredprogramis to be carriedout emergefroma complexinteraction
and policyanalysisthatgeneratesitsownsubrulesand precedents.The process
of thatin a classicU.S. bureaucracyor corporation.
is reminiscent
280 U.S. 390 (1920), p. 395.
50. SuperiorOil Co. v. Mississippi,
51. InterimAgreementof Limitationof StrategicArms (SALT I), Article 5(3). See also
Special Report no. 55, Bureau of Public Affairs,U.S.
CompliancewithSALT I Agreements,
DepartmentofState,July1979,p. 4. The issue was finallyresolvedbyArticle15(3) of theSALT II
ballisticmissilesilo launchersof sheltersthat
treaty,prohibitingthe use over intercontinental
bynationaltechnicalmeans.
impedeverification
law.
52. Unilateralassertionis a traditionalwayofvindicatingclaimed"rights"in international
In the springof 1986,U.S. forcesengagedin twosuch exercises,one offthe SovietBlack Sea coast
in the"exerciseofthe rightof innocentpassage" (The New YorkTimes,19 March 1986,p. Al) and
watersand the
theotherin the airspaceovertheGulfofSidra,whichLibyaconsidersitsterritorial
United States does not. The Black Sea maneuverwas concluded withnothingmore than some
bumpingbetweenU.S. and Soviet ships,but in the Gulf of Sidra, U.S. aircraftsank two Libyan
missiles.See ChicagoTribune,19 March 1986,sec. 1,p. 10;
patrolvesselsthathad firedantiaircraft
LosAngelesTimes,26 March 1986,p. I1; and LosAngelesTimes,27 March 1986,p. I1.
506 F2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
53. ConsumersUnionv. Kissinger,
54. Chayesand Chayes,"LivingUnder a TreatyRegime,"pp. 197 and 200.
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192 InternationalOrganization
was bent on developinga spaceFor example,the Reagan administration
based ABM system.Congressinsistedthatresearchand testingshouldconform
of the ABM treaty,whichprohibitedthe
to the "traditional"interpretation
testingof ABM "components," rather than the administration's"broad
whichwould have permittedfulldevelopmentand testingof a
interpretation,"
space-based ABM system.To ensure that it remained withinthe treaty
establisheda special legal unit in the Defense
constraint,the administration
Department,nominallyindependentof the StrategicDefense Initiative(SDI)
organization,to revieweach proposed testagainstan intricateset of internal
rules.The unitsatisfieditselfthatthe itemsas testedwould not be capable of
as ABM "components,"usuallybecause of power limitationsor
performing
knownto thetestersbutnotnecessarilyobservable
otherdesigncharacteristics
applied to the testingprogram,
byoutsiders.These ruleswere conscientiously
maintained
thatit had stayedwithinthe
and on thatbasis the administration
No Soviet lawyerhad
of the treaty.55
bounds of the traditionalinterpretation
were
classified),and it is not
seen or approvedtherules,however(indeed,they
Soviet
testsas compliantif
have
accepted
States
would
likelythatthe United
not
observable.
were
externally
thelimiting
designelements
Even in thestark,highpoliticsoftheCuban MissileCrisis,StateDepartment
lawyersargued that the United States could not lawfullyreact unilaterally,
sincetheSovietemplacementofmissilesin Cuba did notamountto an "armed
to triggerthe rightof self-defensein Article51 of the UN
attack" sufficient
Charter. Use of force in response to the missileswould only be lawfulif
approvedbythe Organizationof AmericanStates (OAS). Thoughit wouldbe
foolishto contendthatthelegal positiondeterminedPresidentJohnKennedy's
decision, there is little doubt that the asserted need for advance OAS
authorizationforanyuse of forcecontributedto the mosaic of argumentation
thatled to the decisionto respondinitiallybymeans of the quarantinerather
than an air strike. Robert Kennedy said later, "It was the vote of the
Organizationof AmericanStates thatgave a legal basis forthe quarantine...
and changed our position from that of an outlaw acting in violation of
internationallaw intoa countryactingin accordancewithtwentyallies legally
This was the advicehe had heardfromhislawyers,
theirposition."56
protecting
and it was a thoroughly
defensibleposition.Nevertheless,manyinternational
lawyersin theUnitedStatesand elsewheredisagreedbecause theythoughtthe
withtheUN Charter.57
actionwas inconsistent
55. For example,the so-called Foster box rules serveto distinguishbetween strategicmissile
reentryvehicles,whichare prohibitedby the ABM treaty,and tacticalmissilereentryvehicles,
such as velocityand reentryangle not
whichare not,on the basis of performancecharacteristics
mentionedanywherein the ABM treaty.See AshtonB. Carter,"Limitationsand Allowancesfor
Deterrence,
pp. 132-37.
Space Based Weapons," in Chayesand Doty,Defending
Days (New York: W. M. Norton,1971),p. 99.
56. RobertKennedy,Thirteen
57. See, forexample,QuincyWright,"The Cuban Quarantine,"AmericanJoumalof IntemationalLaw 57 (July1963),pp. 546-65; JamesS. Campbell,"The Cuban Crisisand theUN Charter:
Law Review16 (December 1963), pp. 160-76;
An Analysisof the UnitedStates Position"Stanford
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On compliance 193
Capability
Accordingto classical internationallaw, legal rightsand obligationsrun
betweenstates.A treatyis an agreementamongstates58and is an undertaking
bythemas to theirfutureconduct.The objectoftheagreementis to affectstate
behavior.This simplerelationshipbetweenagreementand relevantbehavior
continuesto existformanytreaties.The LTBT is such a treaty.It prohibits
nucleartestingin the atmosphere,in outer space, or underwater.Only states
conduct nuclear weapons tests,so only state behavior is implicatedin the
itsown actions,withoutmore,determines
The state,bygoverning
undertaking.
or not.Moreover,thereis no doubt
whetheritwillcomplywiththeundertaking
about the state'scapacityto do whatit has undertaken.Everystate,no matter
or limiteditsresources,can refrainfromconducting
howprimitive
itsstructure
atmosphericnucleartests.
Even when onlystate behavioris at stake,the issue of capacitymay arise
obligation.In the 1980s it may have
when the treatyinvolvesan affirmative
been a fairassumptionthatthe SovietUnion had thecapabilityto carryout its
undertakingto destroycertainnuclear weapons as requiredby the START
agreement.In the 1990s,thatassumptionwas threatenedbytheemergenceofa
congeriesof successorstatesin place of the SovietUnion,manyof whichmay
not have the necessarytechnicalknowledgeor materialresourcesto do the
job.59
regulatorytreaties.Much of the
The problemis pervasivein contemporary
workof the InternationalLabor Organization(ILO) fromthe beginninghas
been devoted to improvingits members' domestic labor legislation and
enforcement.The currentspate of environmentalagreementsposes the
in acute form.Such treaties formallyare among states, and the
difficulty
obligationsare cast as stateobligations-forexample,to reduce sulfurdioxide
(SO2) emissionsby 30 percentagainsta certainbaseline. Here, however,the
real object of the treatyis not to affectstate behaviorbut to regulatethe
behavior of nonstate actors carryingout activitiesthat produce SO2generatingpower,drivingautomobiles,and the like. The ultimateimpacton
the relevantprivatebehaviordepends on a complex series of intermediate
decree or legislationfollowed
steps.It will normallyrequirean implementing
In
the state will have to
essence,
administrative
detailed
regulations.
by
establishand enforcea full-blowndomesticregimedesigned to secure the
necessaryreductionin emissions.
and WilliamL. Standard,"The UnitedStatesQuarantineofCuba and theRule ofLaw,"American
BarAssociationJoumal49 (August1963),pp. 744-48.
58. Vienna Conventionon theLaw ofTreaties,Article2(1)(a).
59. Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Charles A. Zraket, Soviet
SovietUnion,CSIA Studies in
NuclearFission: Controlof theNuclearArsenalin a Disintegrating
Cambridge,Mass., November1991,pp. 24, 25,
InternationalSecurity,no. 1, HarvardUniversity,
and 108.
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194 InternationalOrganization
The state maybe "in compliance"when it has taken the formallegislative
and administrative
steps,and, despitethe vagariesof legislativeand domestic
politics,it is perhaps appropriateto hold it accountableforfailureto do so.
Quite apart frompolitical will, however,the constructionof an effective
domesticregulatoryapparatus is not a simple or mechanicaltask. It entails
and technicaljudgment,bureaucraticcapability,
choicesand requiresscientific
and fiscalresources.Even developed Westernstates have not been able to
constructsuch systemswith confidencethat theywill achieve the desired
objective.60
The deficitin domesticregulatorycapacityis not limitedto environmental
agreements.The nonproliferationtreaty (NPT) is supported by a sideagreementamongnuclear-capablestatesnot to exportsensitivetechnologyto
The agreementis implementedbynationalexportcontrol
nonweaponsstates.61
regulations.The UN-InternationalAtomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) inspectionsin Iraq, however,revealed thatthe Iraqi nuclearweapons programwas
able to draw on suppliersin the United States and West Germany,among
others, where governmentalwill and abilityto control such exports are
presumablyat theirhighest.
Althoughthere are surely differencesamong developing countries,the
characteristic
situationis a severe dearthof the requisitescientific,
technical,
bureaucratic,and financialwherewithalto build effectivedomesticenforcementsystems.Four yearsafterthe MontrealProtocolwas signed,onlyabout
halfthe memberstateshad compliedfullywiththe requirementof the treaty
The Conferthattheyreportannualchlorofluorocarbon
(CFC) consumption.62
ence of the Parties promptlyestablishedan Ad Hoc Group of Expertson
states
Reporting,whichrecognizedthatthe greatmajorityof the nonreporting
were developingcountriesthatforthemostpartwere simplyunable to comply
withouttechnicalassistancefromthetreatyorganization.63
The MontrealProtocolis the firsttreatyunderwhichthe partiesundertake
financialassistance to defraythe incrementalcosts of
to providesignificant
compliancefordevelopingcountries.The same issue figuredon a muchlarger
LinkingNationaland Interna60. KennethHanf,"DomesticatingInternationalCommitments:
tionalDecision-making,"preparedfora meetingentitledManagingForeignPolicyIssues Under
ConditionsofChange,Helsinki,July1992.
of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483 (1970) (signed 1 July
61. Treatyon the Non-proliferation
Legal Materials,vol. 7, 1968,p. 809.
1968 and enteredintoforce5 March 1970), inIntemational
62. See Reportof the Secretariaton the Reportingof Data bythe Partiesin Accordancewith
Article7 of the MontrealProtocol,UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/5, 23 May 1991,pp. 6-12 and 22-24; and
Addendum,UNEP/OzL.Pro3/5/Add.1,19 June1991.
oftheAd Hoc Group ofExperts,see ReportoftheSecond Meetingof
63. For theestablishment
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/
OzL.Pro.2/3,Decision 2/9,29 June1990,p. 15. At itsfirstmeetingin December 1990,theAd Hoc
Group of Expertsconcludedthatcountries"lack knowledgeand technicalexpertisenecessaryto
foraddressing
provideor collect"therelevantdata and made a detailedseriesofrecommendations
theproblem.See ReportoftheFirstMeetingoftheAd Hoc Group ofExpertson theReportingof
Data, UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.2/1/4,7 December 1990.
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On compliance 195
scale in the negotiationsfora global climatechangeconventionand in theUN
Conferenceon Environmentand Development,held in Brazil in June 1992.
The last wordhas surelynot been spokenin theseforums,and the problemis
agreements.
notconfinedto environmental
The temporal dimension
The regulatorytreatiesthat are our major concernare, characteristically,
problemarea
of a regimeformanaginga majorinternational
legal instruments
over time.64Significantchanges in social or economic systemsmandated by
regulatorytreaties take time to accomplish.Thus, a cross section at any
particularmomentin time may give a misleadingpicture of the state of
compliance.Wise treatydraftersrecognizeat the negotiatingstage thatthere
willbe a considerabletimelag afterthe treatyis concludedbeforesome or all
of the parties can bringthemselvesinto compliance.Thus moderntreaties,
fromthe IMF Agreementin 1945 to the Montreal Protocol in 1987, have
provided for transitionalarrangementsand made allowances for special
Nevertheless,whetheror not the treatyprovidesfor it, a
circumstances.65
willbe necessary.
periodof transition
Similarly,if the regime is to persist over time, adaptation to changing
mixof regulawill requirea shifting
circumstances
conditionsand underlying
to whichstateand individualbehaviorcannotinstantaneously
toryinstruments
respond. Often the originaltreatyis onlythe firstin a series of agreements
addressed to the issue-area.Even the START agreementto reduce nuclear
arsenalscontemplatesa processextendingoversevenyears,bywhichtimeit is
reductionswillhave been mandated.66
expectedthatnew and further
Activistsin all fieldslament that the treatyprocess tends to settle on a
(or universal
basis. But the driveforuniversality
least-common-denominator
membershipin the particularregionof concern)maynecessitateaccommodationto theresponsecapabilityofstateswithlargedeficitsinfinancial,technical,
or bureaucraticresources.A commonsolutionis to startwitha lowobligational
ante and increasethe level of regulationas experiencewiththe regimegrows.
64. The now-classicaldefinitionof an internationalregime appears in Krasner,"Structural
Causes and Regime Consequences," p. 2: "Regimes are sets of implicitor explicitprinciples,
proceduresaround whichactors' expectationsconvergein a
norms,rules,and decision-making
given area of internationalrelations." Regime theoristsfindit hard to say the "L-word" but
law is all about,
procedures"are whatinternational
"principles,norms,rules,and decision-making
and it is apparentfromtheirworkthatformallegal norms,mostoftenembodiedin treaties,are an
elementin mostofthephenomenaofinterestto them.
important
structural
65. See ArticlesofAgreementof the InternationalMonetaryFund,Article14,in UNTS, vol. 2,
1945,p. 1501; and MontrealProtocol,Article5.
66. Under START, the agreed reductionsin strategicnuclearweapons are to take place overa
seven-yearperiod divided into three phases of three,two, and two years. See U.S. Congress,
BetweentheUnitedStatesand theUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicson theReduction
Senate, Treaty
102dCong.,1stsess., 1991,S. TreatyDoc. 102-20,Article
OffensiveArms,
ofStrategic
and Limitation
2.
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196 InternationalOrganization
strategyadopted in a number of contemporary
The convention-protocol
thisconception.
regimesexemplifies
environmental
The Vienna Conventionon the Protectionof the Ozone Layer, signed in
1985, containedno substantiveobligationsbut requiredonlythatthe parties
"in accordance with the means at their disposal and their capabilities"
exchangeand in harmonizingdomestic
cooperatein researchand information
Two
policieson activitieslikelyto have an adverseeffecton the ozone layer.67
of
on
on
the
destructive
effect
CFCs
yearslater,as scientificconsensusjelled
a
was
for
50
Montreal
Protocol
providing
negotiated,
the ozone layer,the
percentreductionfrom1986 levelsof CFC consumptionbytheyear2000.68By
June1990,the partiesagreedto a completephaseoutbythe above date and to
chemicalcompounds.69
regulatea numberofotherozone-destroying
A similarsequence marksthe Conventionon Long-RangeTransboundary
Air Pollution (LRTAP).70 It began with a general agreementto cooperate
signedin 1979,was followedbya protocolimposinglimitson SO2 emissionsin
1985,71and then by anotherimposinglimitson nitrogenoxides, whichwas
signedat Sofia in October 1988.72The patternhas a long pedigree,extending
back to the ILO, the firstof the modern internationalregulatoryagencies,
or draft
whose membersagreed in 1921 onlyto "bringthe recommendation[s]
67. Vienna Conventionfor the Protectionof the Ozone Layer (signed 22 March 1985 and
enteredintoforce22 September1988; hereaftercitedas Vienna Ozone Convention),Article2(2),
Legal Materials,vol. 26, 1986,p. 1529.
inIntemational
68. MontrealProtocol,Article2(4).
Annex1,Articles2A(5) and 2B(3).
69. London Amendments,
70. Conventionon Long-RangeTransboundaryAir Pollution(signed 13 November1979 and
enteredintoforce16 March 1983),inIntemationalLegal Materials,vol. 18, 1979,p. 1442.
71. Protocol to the 1979 Conventionon Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution on the
Reductionof SulphurEmissionsor Their TransboundaryFluxes by at Least 30 Percent(signed8
July1985), UN Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/12, reproducedin IntemationalLegal Materials,vol. 27, May
1988,pp. 698-714; see especiallyp. 707.
72. Protocolto the 1979 Conventionon Long-RangeTransboundaryAir PollutionConcerning
the Controlof Emissionsof NitrogenOxides or Their TransboundaryFluxes (signed 31 October
1988 and enteredintoforce14 February1991), UNEP/GC.16/Inf.4,p. 169. Additionalprotocols
to theoriginalconventionare theProtocolto the 1979Conventionon Long-RangeTransboundary
Air Pollution on Long-Term Financing of the Co-operative Program for Monitoringand
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmissionof Air Pollutantsin Europe (signed 28 September
Legal Materials,vol. 27, March 1988,
1984),UN Doc. EB.AIR/AC.1/4, reproducedinIntemational
pp. 698-714 (see especiallyp. 701); and the Protocol Concerningthe Controlof Emissionsof
Volatile Organic Compounds or Their TransboundaryFluxes (signed November1991), reproduced in IntemationalLegal Materials,vol. 31, May 1992, pp. 568-611. See also the Barcelona
Conventionforthe Protectionof the MediterraneanSea AgainstPollution,in IntemationalLegal
Materials,vol. 15, 1976, p. 290, whichwas accompanied by the Protocol for the Preventionof
Pollutionof the MediterraneanSea byDumpingfromShips and Aircraft,UNEP/GC.16.Inf.4,p.
130,and the ProtocolConcerningCo-operationin CombatingPollutionof the MediterraneanSea
by Oil and Other HarmfulSubstancesin Cases of Emergency,UNEP/GC.16/Inf.4,p. 132. The
Protocolforthe Protectionof the MediterraneanSea AgainstPollutionforLand-based Sources,
UNEP/GC.16/Inf.4,p. 134,followedin 1980; the land-basedsourcesprotocolcontemplatesthat
pollutionwillbe eliminatedin accordancewith"standardsand timetables"to be agreed to bythe
parties in the future (see Article 5[2]). The Protocol ConcerningMediterraneanSpecially
ProtectedAreas (UNEP/GC.16/Inf.4,p. 136) was signedat Geneva in 1982.
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On compliance 197
or authoriconvention[s][preparedby the organization]beforethe authority
of
legislation
for
the
enactment
tieswithinwhose competencethe matterlies,
and
for
forum
drafting
then
became
the
or other action."73The ILO
on therights
propagatinga seriesofspecificconventionsand recommendations
foradoptionbytheparties.
oflabor and conditionsof employment
The effortto protecthumanrightsbyinternationalagreementmaybe seen
as an extreme case of time lag between undertakingand performance.
Although the major human rightsconventionshave been widely ratified,
complianceleaves muchto be desired.It is apparentthatsome statesadhered
withoutanyseriousintentionof abidingby them.But it is also truethateven
expectationsabout compliance
partiescommittedto the treatieshad different
than with most other regulatorytreaties. Indeed, the Helsinki Final Act,
containingimportanthumanrightsprovisionsapplicableto EasternEurope, is
byitstermsnotlegallybinding.74
Even so, it is a mistake to call these treaties merely"aspirational" or
system,but
To be sure,theyembody"ideals" of the international
"hortatory."
treaties,theywere designedto initiatea processthatover
likeotherregulatory
time,perhapsa long time,would bringbehaviorintogreatercongruencewith
those ideals. These expectationshave not been whollydisappointed.The vast
amountof public and privateeffortdevotedto enforcingthese agreementsnotalwaysinvain-evinces theirobligationalcontent.Moreover,thelegitimatwas an importantcatalystof the revolutions
of these instruments
ingauthority
of the 1980s against authoritarianregimes in Latin America and Eastern
Europe and continuesto sparkdemandsfordemocraticpoliticselsewherein
theworld.
Acceptablelevelsofcompliance
The foregoingsectionidentifiedand advanceda rangeofmattersthatmightbe
putforwardbytheindividualactorin defenseor excuseofa particularinstance
ofdeviantconduct.Fromtheperspectiveofthesystemas a whole,however,the
normlike a highwayspeed
For a simpleprohibitory
centralissue is different.
limit,it is in principlea simple matterto determinewhetherany particular
organizadriveris in compliance.Yet mostcommunitiesand law enforcement
comfortablewitha situationin
tionsin the United States seem to be perfectly
whichthe average speed on interstatehighwaysis perhaps ten miles above
the limit.Even in individualcases, the enforcingofficeris not likelyto pursue
a driver operating within that zone. The fundamentalproblem for the
73. Constitutionof the InternationalLabor Organization,11 April 1919,Article405, 49 stat.
2722.
74. Conferenceon Securityand Cooperationin Europe, Final Act (1 August1975), Article10,
Legal Materials,vol. 14, 1975,p. 1292.
inIntemational
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198 InternationalOrganization
systemis not how to induce all driversto obey the speed limitbut how to
treaty
containdeviancewithinacceptablelevels.75So, too,itis forinternational
obligations.
"An acceptablelevelofcompliance"is notan invariantstandard.The matter
is furthercomplicatedbecause manylegal normsare not like the speed limit
thatpermitsan on-offjudgmentas to whetheran actoris in compliance.As
noted above, questions of compliance are often contestable and call for
subjectiveevaluation.What is an acceptable
complex,subtle,and frequently
level of compliancewill shiftaccordingto the typeof treaty,the context,the
exactbehaviorinvolved,and overtime.
It would seem, forexample,thatthe acceptable level of compliancewould
varywiththe significanceand cost of the reliance that parties place on the
others' performance.76
On this basis, treaties implicatingnational security
would demand strictcompliancebecause the stakesare so high,and to some
extentthatpredictionis borne out by experience.Yet even in thisarea, some
departuresseem to be tolerable.
In thecase of the NPT, indicationsof deviantbehaviorbypartieshave been
of
dealt withseverely.In the 1970s,U.S. pressuresresultedin the termination
programsto constructreprocessingfacilitiesin South Korea and Taiwan.77
pressureswas mountedagainstNorth
Recently,a menuof evenmorestringent
Korea, whichultimatelysignedan IAEA safeguardagreementand submitted
to inspection.78
The inspectionand destructionrequirementsplaced on Iraq
underUN SecurityCouncilresolution687 are,in one sense,an extremecase of
thisseverity
towarddeviationbyNPT parties.
Althoughover 130 statesare partiesto the NPT, the treatyis not universal,
and some nonpartieshave acquired or are seekingnuclearweapons capabiliholdouts,compliancewiththeNPT bytheparties
ty.79
Despite theseimportant
remainshigh.In fact,in recentyearsprominentnonparties-includingArgentina,Brazil,and SouthAfrica-have eitheradheredto thetreatyor announced
Even therecalcitrant
nonpartieshave not
thattheywillcomplywithitsnorms.80
p. 109.
75. Young,Complianceand PublicAuthority,
76. Charles Lipson, "Why Are Some InternationalAgreements Informal,"International
45 (Autumn1991),pp. 495-538.
Organization
77. See JosephA. Yager, "The Republic of Korea," and "Taiwan," in JosephA. Yager, ed.,
1980),pp. 44-65
Nonproliferation
and U.S. ForeignPolicy(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,
and 66-81, respectively.
78. See David Sanger,"NorthKorea AssemblyBacks AtomPact," TheNewYorkTimes,10 April
1992,p. A3; and David Sanger,"NorthKorea Reveals Nuclear Sites to AtomicAgency,TheNew
diplomatic
YorkTimes,7 May 1992,p. A4. The initialU.S. responseincludedbehind-the-scenes
pressureand encouragingsupportivestatementsby concernedstates at IAEA meetings.See L.
TheSpreadofNuclearWeapons,1989-1990(Boulder,Colo.: Westview
Spector,NuclearAmbitions:
Press, 1990), pp. 127-30. Japan apparentlyhas refused to consider economic assistance or
in NorthKorea untilthenuclearissue is cleared up.
investment
79. Countriesthathave not ratifiedthe NPT includeArgentina,Brazil, China, France, India,
p. 430.
Israel,and Pakistan.See Spector,NuclearAmbitions,
80. ReutersNews Service,"Argentinaand BrazilSignNuclearAccord,"TheNewYorkTimes,14
December 1991,p. 7; "Brazil and Argentina:IAEA SafeguardAccord,"U.S. Departmentof State
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On compliance 199
openly tested or acknowledgedthe possession of nuclear weapons. Thus,
despitesome significant
departurefromitsnorms,the NPT and thenonproliferationregimebuiltaroundithave survived.
The U.S. emphasis on the importanceof verificationof arms control
agreementsseemsto portendthe applicationof a strictcompliancestandard.81
However, at least since the Reagan administration,
presidentialreportsto
Congress,mandatedby theArmsControland DisarmamentAct, listeda long
seriesofallegedSovietviolationswithoutigniting
anyseriousmoveto withdraw
fromtheapplicabletreaties.82
One of theseviolations,the phased arrayradarconstructedat Krasnoyarsk,
was widelyregardedas a deliberateand egregiousbreach of the ABM treaty.
radars be sited "along the peripheryof
Article6 requiresthatearly-warning
and orientedoutward."Krasnoyarsk
was sevenhundred
[the]nationalterritory
kilometersfromtheMongolianborderand pointednortheastoverSiberia.The
overa period
issue was repeatedlythrashedout betweenthe twogovernments
of years, sometimes at the highest levels. The United States linked its
resolution to progress on future arms control agreements.The Soviets
radarsystemand thusnot
maintainedthattheinstallationwas a space-tracking
subjectto the prohibition,but ultimatelytheyacknowledgedthe breach and
agreed to eliminatethe offendinginstallation.Nevertheless,throughoutthis
and the
entireperiodtheABM treatyregimecontinuedin fullforceand effect,
U.S. administrationnever seriouslypursued the option of withdrawalor
Even in connectionwithits cherishedSDI, the Reagan adminisabrogation.83
trationpreferredto attemptto "reinterpret"the treatyratherthanaccept the
moreseriousdomesticpoliticalcostsof abrogation.
Dispatch,23 December 1991,p. 907; ReutersNews Service,"South AfricaSignsa TreatyAllowing
Nuclear Inspection," The New York Times, 9 July 1991, p. All; and "Fact Sheet: Nuclear
Non-proliferation
Treaty,"U.S. Departmentof State Dispatch,8 July1991,p. 491.
81. The 1977 Congress enacted a requirementfor "adequate verification"of arms control
agreements.This was describedbyCarteradministration
officialsas a "practicalstandard"under
whichtheUnitedStateswouldbe able to identify
significant
attemptedevasionsin timeto respond
effectively.
See Chayesand Chayes,"From Law Enforcementto Dispute Settlement,"pp. 147-48.
It should be noted thatwhen the Soviet Union in 1987 finallyagreed to substantially
unlimited
on-siteinspection,theUnitedStatesdrewback fromitsearlierinsistenceon thatrequirement,
as it
has in chemicalwarfarenegotiations.
82. Withdrawalfromall U.S.-Soviet arms controlagreementsis permittedon shortnotice if
"extraordinary
eventsrelatedto the subjectmatterof thetreatyjeopardize the supremeinterests"
ofthewithdrawing
party.See, forexample,TreatyBetweentheUnitedStatesand theSovietUnion
on the Limitationof AntiballisticMissile Systems,26 May 1972, Article 15(2), 23 U.S.T. 3435
(1972). The law of treatiesalso permitsthe suspensionof a treatyin whole or in partifthe other
partyhas committeda materialbreach.See theVienna Conventionon theLaw ofTreaties,Article
60(1),(2).
83. The closestapproachto such an initiative
was themildlycomicbureaucraticsquabble in the
closing years of the Reagan administrationabout whetherthe Krasnoyarskradar should be
denominateda materialbreach of the ABM treaty.See Paul Lewis, "SovietsWarn U.S. Against
AbandoningABM Pact," TheNew YorkTimes,2 September1988,p. A9; and Michael R. Gordon,
"MinorViolationsofArmsPact Seen," TheNew YorkTimes,3 December 1988,p. 5.
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200 InternationalOrganization
In thelast analysis,the longlistof asserted"violations"presentedno threat
eitherto theU.S. securityintereststhatthetreatiesweredesignedto safeguard
or to thebasic bargainthatneitherside would deployABM systems.American
political and militaryleaders were more than willingto toleratenonperformance at the marginas the price of continuingconstrainton a meaningful
Sovietattemptto shiftthestrategicbalance.
If national securityregimeshave not collapsed in the face of significant
perceivedviolation,it shouldbe no surprisethateconomicand environmental
treatiescan toleratea good deal of noncompliance.Such regimesare in fact
relativelyforgivingof violations plausiblyjustifiedby extenuatingcircumstances in the foreignor domesticlife of the offendingstate, providedthe
action does not threatenthe survivalof the regime. As noted above, a
considerableamountof deviancefromstricttreatynormsmaybe anticipated
fromthe beginningand accepted,whetherin the formof transitionalperiods,
special exemptions,limitedsubstantiveobligations,or informalexpectationsof
theparties.
reporting
The generallydisappointingperformanceof states in fulfilling
It is widelyacceptedthatfailure
is consistentwiththisanalysis.84
requirements
or deficientbureaucraticcapacity
to filereportsreflectsa low domesticpriority
in the reportingstate.Since the reportingis not centralto the treatybargain,
the lapse can be viewed as "technical."When, as in the MontrealProtocol,
of the regime,the parties
accuratereportingwas essentialto the functioning
and with
to overcomethedeficiency,
and thesecretariatmade strenuousefforts
some success.85
The Conventionon InternationalTrade in Endangered Species (CITES)
ordinarilydisplayssome tolerancefor noncompliance,but the alarmingand
widelypublicizeddeclinein theelephantpopulationin East Africanhabitatsin
the 1980s galvanizedthe treatyregime.The partiestook a decisionto listthe
itfromAppendixB, whereithad
elephantin AppendixA ofthetreaty(shifting
been listed),withtheeffectofbanningall commercialtradein ivory.
previously
The treatypermitsanypartyto entera reservationto such an action,in which
case the reservingpartyis not bound by it. Nevertheless,througha varietyof
pressures,the United States togetherwith a group of European countries
insistedon universaladherence to the ban, bringingsuch major tradersas
Japan and Hong Kong to heel.86The head of the Japanese Environment
Not
Environment:
InternationalAgreementsAre
84. U.S. GeneralAccountingOffice,International
GAO, RCED-92-43, January1992.
Well-Monitored,
85. See Reportof the Secretariaton the Reportingof Data bythe Partiesin Accordancewith
Article7 of the MontrealProtocol,UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/5, 23 May 1991, pp. 6-12 and 22-24; and
Addendum,UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/5/Add.1,19 June1991.
86. For a reportof Japan'sannouncementof itsintentionnotto entera reservationon the last
dayof the conference,see United Press International,"TokyoAgrees to JoinIvoryImportBan,"
Boston Globe, 21 October 1989, p. 6. Japan stated that it was "respectingthe overwhelming
As to Hong Kong,see JanePerlez,"IvoryBan Said to
community."
sentimentof the international
was
Force FactoriesShut,"TheNew YorkTimes,22 May 1990,p. A14. The Hong Kong reservation
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On compliance 201
Agency supported the Japanese move in order "to avoid isolation in the
internationalcommunity."87
It was freelysuggestedthatJapan's offerto host
the nextmeetingof the conferenceof parties,whichwas accepted on the last
dayof theconferenceafterJapanannounceditschangedposition,would have
been rejectedhad itreservedon theivoryban.
The meaningof the backgroundassumptionof general complianceis that
moststateswill continueto comply,even in the face of considerabledeviant
behaviorby other parties. In otherwords,the free-riderproblemhas been
overestimated.
The treatywillnotnecessarilyunravelin theface of defections.
As Mancur Olson recognized,ifthe benefitsof the collectivegood to one or a
group of partiesoutweighthe costs to themof providingthe good, theywill
continueto bear thecostsregardlessofthedefectionsofothers.88
It seems plausible thattreatyregimesare subjectto a kindof critical-mass
phenomenon,so thatonce defectionreaches a certainlevel,or in the face of
particularly
egregiousviolationbya majorplayer,the regimemightcollapse.89
Thus,eithertheparticularcharacterofa violationor theidentity
oftheviolator
maypose a threatto the regimeand evoke a higherdemand forcompliance.
This analysiswould accountforboth the similaritiesand differences
between
the Krasnoyarskand CITES cases. In the firstcase, althoughcore security
values were at stake and the violationwas egregious,it did not threatenthe
basic treatybargain.The United States respondedwitha significant
enforcementeffort
but did notitselfdestroythebasic bargainbyabrogatingthetreaty.
In the second case, involvingrelativelyperipheralnationalinterestsfromthe
realistperspective,a reservationpermittedunder the treatythreatenedthe
collapse oftheregime.A concertedand energeticdefenseresulted.
Determiningtheacceptablecompliancelevel
If,as we argue above,the "acceptable level of compliance"is subjectto broad
varianceacrossregimes,times,and occasions,howis whatis "acceptable" to be
determinedin anyparticularinstance?The economistshave a straightforward
answer: invest additional resources in enforcement(or other measures to
not renewed after the initial six-monthperiod. Five African producer states with effective
managementprogramsdid enterreservationsbut agreed not to engage in trade untilat least the
next conferenceof the parties. See Michael J. Glennon, "Has InternationalLaw Failed the
Elephant,"AmericanJournalofInternational
Law 84 (January1990), pp. 1-43, especiallyp. 17. At
the 1992 meetingtheyended theiropposition.See "Five AfricanNations Abandon Effortto
Daily,electronic
Resume ElephantTrade in CITES Talks,"BureauofNationalAffairs
Environment
newsservice,12 March 1992.
87. United Press International,"Tokyo Agrees to JoinIvoryImportBan," Boston Globe, 21
October1989.
Action(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
88. MancurOlson, TheLogic of Collective
Press,
1971),pp. 33-36.
and
89. For a discussionof critical-mass
behaviormodels,see Thomas Schelling,Micromotives
Macrobehavior
(New York: Norton,1978),pp. 91-110.
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202 InternationalOrganization
induce compliance) up to the point at which the value of the incremental
benefitfroman additionalunitofcomplianceexactlyequals thecostofthelast
the usefulnessof
unit of additionalenforcementresources.90Unfortunately,
or even approximatof quantifying
thisapproachis limitedbytheimpossibility
ing, let alone monetizing,any of the relevantfactorsin the equation-and
marketsare notnormallyavailableto help.
as CharlesLindblomhas toldus, theprocessbywhich
In suchcircumstances,
preferencesare aggregatedis necessarilya politicalone.91It followsthatthe
effort
is
enforcement
(or slacken)theinternational
choicewhetherto intensify
necessarilya politicaldecision.It implicatesall the same interestspro and con
of the treatynorm,as modifiedby
thatwere involvedin the initialformulation
the balance will to some
Although
interveningchanges of circumstances.
the partiesentertainedat
that
of
compliance
degree reflectthe expectations
as
in
domesticpolitics,to find
in
international
means
it
is
no
rare,
by
thattime,
in
the
form
of
substantive
regulationis taken
the
lawmaker
has
given
thatwhat
in
terms
of compliancewill
is
"acceptable"
What
in
implementation.
the
away
reflectthe perspectivesand interestsof participantsin the ongoingpolitical
standard.
or market-validated
processratherthansome externalscientific
Ifthetreatyestablishesa formalorganization,thatbodymayserveas a focus
formobilizingthe politicalimpetusfora higherlevel of compliance.A strong
secretariatcan sometimesexertcompliancepressure,as in the IMF or ILO.
The organizationmayserveas a forumforcontinuingnegotiationamongthe
partiesabout the level of compliance.An exampleof these possibilitiesis the
of the InternationalMaritimeConsultativeOrganization(IMCO)-and
effort
after1982 its successor,the InternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)-to
controlpollutionof the sea by tankerdischargesof oil mixed with ballast
water.92IMCO's regulatoryapproach was to impose performancestandards
limitingthe amountof oil thatcould be dischargedon anyvoyage.From 1954,
whenthefirstoil pollutiontreatywas signed,untilthe 1978revisions,therewas
withthe level of compliance.IMCO respondedby
continuousdissatisfaction
imposingincreasinglystrictlimits,but these produced only modest results
of monitoringand verifyingthe amount of oil
because of the difficulty
dischargedby tankercaptains at sea. Finally,in 1978 IMO adopted a new
regulatorystrategyand imposed an equipment standard requiringall new
90. See Gary Becker,"Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach,"Journalof Political
ofLaws," p.
Economy76 (March/April1968),pp. 169-217;and Stigler,"The OptimumEnforcement
pp. 7-8 and 111-27.
526. Also see Young,Complianceand PublicAuthority,
91. CharlesE. Lindblom,Politicsand Markets(New York:Basic Books,1977),pp. 254-55. At the
enforcementof the treatyimplicatesa similar
domesticlevel, the decisionwhetherto intensify
testify.
politicalprocess,as the continuousdebates in the United Statesover GATT enforcement
includesa considerationof second-levelenforcement.
Our work-in-progress
92. Ronald Mitchell,"IntentionalOil Pollutionof the Oceans: Crises, Public Pressure,and
EquipmentStandards,"in PeterM. Haas, Robert0. Keohane, and MarkA. Levy,eds.,Institutions
Protection(Cafibridge,Mass.: MIT
International
Environmental
fortheEarth:SourcesofEffective
Press,forthcoming).
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On compliance 203
preventthe intermixture
tankersto have separateballast tanksthatphysically
of oil withthe dischargedballast water. The new requirementwas costlyto
tankeroperatorsbuteasilymonitoredbyshippingauthorities.Compliancewith
the equipmentstandardhas been close to 100 percent,and dischargeof oil
fromthe new ships is substantiallynil. The sequence reflectsthe changing
and shipof politicalstrengthbetweendomesticenvironmental
configuration
originally
which
was
IMCO)
IMO
(and
members
of
pingconstituenciesin the
referredto as a "shippingindustryclub." At the same time,the major oil
companies,whichin the earlier period were shippingindustryallies, shifted
pressures.
politicalallegianceunderenvironmentalist
Since the internationalsystemis horizontalratherthan hierarchical,if one
resources,it maybe
stateor a groupof statesis willingto commitenforcement
able to short-circuitcumbersome organizational procedures and pursue
improvedlevels of complianceby its own decision. The U.S. deploymentof
tradesanctionsunderSection301 of the TariffAct againstviolatorsof GATT
obligationsreflectsa unilateralpolitical decision (1) that existinglevels of
compliance were not acceptable and (2) to pay the costs of additional
In that case, however,gains in compliancewith substantive
enforcement.93
obligationsmustbe weighed againstlosses attendanton departurefromthe
proceduralnormsmandatingmultilateraldisputesettlement.94
Again, aftera considerableperiod of fruitlessexhortationin the InternationalWhalingCommission,Japanfinallyagreedto participatein a temporary
moratorium
on whalingthathad been proclaimedbytheorganizationwhenthe
United States threatenedtrade sanctionsunder the Marine Mammal ProtectionAct.95The Japaneseban on ivoryimportsshowsa mixtureofeconomicand
reputationalthreats.The United States hinted at trade sanctions,and the
conferenceofthepartiesof CITES threatenednotto scheduleitsnextmeeting
in KyotoifJapanremainedout ofcompliance.
Ifthereare no objectivestandardsbywhichto recognizean "acceptablelevel
of compliance,"it maybe possible at least to identifysome generaltypesof
situationsthatmightactuatethe deploymentof politicalpowerin the interest
of greatercompliance.First,statescommittedto the treatyregimemaysense
thata tippingpointis close, so thatenhancedcompliancewould be necessary
As notedabove,the actionsagainstJapanon theivory
forregimepreservation.
93. UnitedStatesCode,Title 19,Section2411. Section301,however,has been widelycriticizedas
itselfa violationof GATT. See A. 0. Sykes,"ConstructiveUnilateralThreats in International
Business
CommercialRelations:The LimitedCase forSection301," Law and PolicyinInternational
23 (Spring 1992), pp. 263-330; and Thomas 0. Bayard and KimberlyA. Elliott,"Aggressive
Unilateralismand Section 301: Market Opening or Market Closing," The WorldEconomy 15
(November1992),pp. 685-706.
94. GATT, Articles22 and 23, 30 October 1947, as amended. See "GATT Basic Instruments
and Selected Documents,"in UNTS, vol. 55, no. 814, 1950,p. 194.
95. See SteinarAndresen,"Science and Politicsin the InternationalManagementof Whales,"
Regulationof Whaling
MarinePolicy,vol. 13, no. 2, 1989, p. 99; and PatriciaBirnie,International
(New York: Oceana, 1985).
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204 InternationalOrganization
givento the
importban mayhavebeen ofthischaracter.Afterthehighvisibility
CITES movesto ban the ivorytrade,therewould not have been muchleftof
theregimeifJapanhad been permittedto importwithimpunity.
Second, states committedto a level of compliance higher than that
acceptableto thegeneralityof thepartiesmayseek to ratchetup thestandard.
The Netherlandsoften seems to play the role of "leader" in European
environmentalaffairsboth in the NorthSea and Baltic Sea regimesand in
LRTAP.96 Similarly,the United States may be a "leader" for improving
compliancewiththe NPT, where its positionis far strongerthan that of its
allies.
Finally,campaigningto improvea compliancelevel that states concerned
forNGOs, especiallyin
activity
wouldjustas soon leave alone is a characteristic
have
NGOs
increasingly
and
of
human
rights.
the fieldsof the environment
in
and
the
both
within
organizations
treaty
the
politicalprocess
directaccess to
and
organizational,
a
Their
technical,
are
part.
they
the societies of which
lobbyingskillsare an independentresourceforenhanced complianceat both
levelsofthetwo-levelgame.
Conclusion
The foregoingdiscussionreflectsa viewof noncomplianceas a deviantrather
thanan expectedbehavior,and as endemicratherthandeliberate.This in turn
measuresand even,to a degree,of
leads to de-emphasisofformalenforcement
in
cases. It shiftsattentionto
egregious
informal
except
sanctions,
coercive
sources of noncompliancethat can be managed by routine international
of disputeresolutionprocedures
politicalprocesses. Thus, the improvement
technicaland financialassistancemayhelp
goes to the problemof ambiguity;
willmake it likelierthat,overtime,
cure the capacitydeficit;and transparency
national policy decisions are brought increasinglyinto line with agreed
standards.
international
to persuade
These approachesmergein theprocessofjawboning-an effort
the miscreantto change its ways-that is the characteristicformof internaThis processexploitsthepracticalnecessityforthe
tionalenforcement
activity.
forsuspectconduct.These
putativeoffenderto givereasons and justifications
reasons and justificationsare reviewedand critiquedin a varietyof venues,
public and private,formaland informal.The tendencyis to winnow out
commitments-thosethat
reasonablyjustifiableor unintendedfailuresto fulfill
comportwitha good-faithcompliancestandard-and to identifyand isolate
addressing
the fewcases of egregiousand willfulviolation.By systematically
circumstancesthatmightpossiblybe advanced,
and eliminatingall mitigating
96. See Peter M. Haas, "Protectingthe Baltic and NorthSeas," in Haas, Keohane, and Levy,
Institutions
fortheEarth.
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On compliance 205
thisprocesscan ultimately
demonstratethatwhatmayat firsthave seemed like
ambiguous conduct is a black-and-whitecase of deliberate violation. The
to the rule as
offending
state is leftwitha starkchoice betweenconforming
definedand applied in the particularcircumstancesor openly floutingits
obligation.This turnsout to be a veryuncomfortableposition for even a
powerfulstate.The Krasnoyarskstoryrepresentsan exampleofthisprocessin
action. Perhaps anotheris the repeated Iraqi retreatin showdownswiththe
UN-IAEA inspectionteams.97
measuresof assistanceand persuaEnforcementthroughthese interacting
sion is less costlyand intrusiveand is certainlyless dramaticthan coercive
sanctions,theeasy and usual policyelixirfornoncompliance.It has thefurther
virtuethat it is adapted to the needs and capacities of the contemporary
international
system.
97. For an accountof the Iraqi response,see Sean Cote, A Narrativeof theImplementation
of
SectionC of UN Security
CouncilResolution687.
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