INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Mali Risk Assessment 2014
INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Mali—a landlock West African country,
bordering Mauritania, Algeria, Burkina Faso,
Guinea, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire, and Senegal—
attracted attention in 2012 when a group of
military officers overthrew the government
due to increased unhappiness with the way
the Tuareg Rebellion in the north was being
managed.
The coup was a surprise because for 20 years
Mali was touted as a model of democratic
progress in Sub-Saharan Africa. Soon after
the coup, a United Nations-backed French
military force landed in the country to
respond to an Islamist force that was heading
from northern Mali to the south. The
FIGURE 1: Map of Mali (Wikimedia Commons).
Islamists were routed, and soon after civilian
rule was restored, although a UN peacekeeping
force—the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)—remains in the
country.1
Consequently, Mali can be said to face a number of challenges. First, the country remains vulnerable to
external pressures, caused mainly by the presence of Islamic forces. Their origins and links remain unclear,
although they seem to feed on the pervasive sense of insecurity in the Sahel region, which exists on multiple
levels, including inter-state tensions2 and human insecurity.3 Second, the Malian security services are unable
to address the Islamist and Tuareg–based threats because the Malian military is small and poorly equipped
and trained. Third, its economic prospects remain tenuous. Its economy is linked closely to its topography
and its ability to extract natural resources (gold, phosphates, kaolin, salt, limestone, uranium, gypsum, granite,
and hydropower, although reportedly the nation also has bauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin, and copper
deposits).4
1
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts.shtml
Laurence Aïda Ammour, “Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s Pivotal Ambivalence,” Africa Security Brief, No. 18,
February 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556855.pdf
3 In a January 2014 plan, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) declared that the Sahel region is on the
brink of a humanitarian disaster with more than 20 million people requiring life-saving humanitarian interventions, with the number of those in need
of food rising from 11.3 million in 2013 to 20 million in 2014. Accordingly, 117 humanitarian organizations are seeking $2.025 billion for the
512 projects that they manage across the nine Sahel countries. “2014-2016 Strategic Response Plan Sahel Region,” United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2014. https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/SRP_2014-2016_Sahel.pdf
4 Information extracted from CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html
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OVERVIEW
Mali became independent from France in 1960. Initially the country was governed by a dictatorship
interrupted every so often by military coups. In 1991, President Alpha Konare won Mali's first democratic
presidential elections in 1992. Konare stepped down in 2002 after completing a second term, thus underlining
a commitment to respect the constitution, which only allows for two successive terms. His replacement
Amadou Toumani Toure, who was re-elected to a second term in 2007 elections, which were largely deemed
fair and just. The failure of the Toure government to deal with returning Malians from Libya, coupled with
growing disillusionment by low- and mid-level soldiers with the way the government was handling of the
Tuareg Rebellion—headed by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)—led to Toure’s
ouster in March 2012.
Mediation efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led to a restoration of a
civilian government, although the security situation in Mali’s three northern regions remains precarious.
Islamic militants of indefinite origins established strongholds causing massive displacement when northern
Malians fled the ensuing violence. This displacement caused both internal and regional instability because the
countries of the Sahara and Sahel are ill-equipped to deal with refugees and humanitarian crises. The Security
Council authorized5 a French-AU intervention, which successfully defeated the Islamists, who seem to have
dispersed throughout the region. In July and August 2013, Malians went to vote, and Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
was elected president in the second round.
Mali has a particularly undiversified economy,
making it highly fragile to natural and man-made
disasters. Notably, only 10% of the population lives in
the three northern regions—Gao, Kidal, and
Timbuktu—even though those regions represent twothirds of the entire territory and contributed 9.5% of
the country’s GDP before the crisis. Mali’s poverty
rate, which was heading down between 2001 and 2010
from 55.6% to 43% seems to be increasing again (from
43.6% in 2010 to 46.1% of the population by the end
of 2012, or 7.2 million poor).6 What adds to Mali’s
woes is that its security is heavily dependent on its
neighbors, as seen when Cote d'Ivoire experienced a
political crisis and the cost of transportation rose,
placing pressure on the Malian economy.
SECURITY
FIGURE 2: Conflict in Northern Mali as of January 2013
(Wikimedia Commons).
Mali’s security situation is tenuous. The nature of its
topography, geography, and history means that the country faces traditional security concerns: inter-state
rivalry and tensions, coupled with human insecurity steaming from periodic droughts and poor to non5
6
Security Council Resolution 2085, Dec. 20, 2012.
“Mali Overview,” The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mali/overview
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existent state services. When analyzing the security situation, it is useful to begin with a review of topography.
At about 1.2 million square kilometers, Mali is comparable in size to South Africa. It has three natural zones:
the southern, cultivated “Sudanese Zone” that is primarily savanna; the central semiarid “Sahelian Zone;” and
a northern arid “Saharan Zone,” with some rolling plains and high plateaus. More than 60% of the country is
either desert or semi-desert.7
The Tuareg Rebellion, located in northern Mali and which served as a key factor in the 2012 military coup—
coupled with the growing presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—are central concerns, as
they not only impact Mali directly but heighten tensions among its neighbors. One explanation for the interstate tensions is a Malian claim that the rebellion and AQIM’s presence is a product of the insecurity,
corruption, and policies of neighboring governments.8 The Tuareg are a nomadic people inhabiting most of
the Sahara Desert where it crosses Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya. Over the years, the Tuareg
people have fought several rebellions, bemoaning the fact that the Malian government in Bamako constantly
ignores them and their needs (and allows the Malian
military to commit violations against them).9
AQIM has its roots in the Algerian civil war of the
1990s and is expanding across the Saharan and
Sahelian areas, although it appears that the majority
of its membership is Algerian and Mauritanian, with
a large number of Libyans also represented. The
concern that these groups cause is that, beyond their
radical agenda and commitment to Islamism, they
are heavily involved with crime. Accordingly, much
of Mali’s northern economy is smuggling-based, with
traders from northern Mali and Niger using
divergent economic policies to smuggle food and
cigarettes, both of which have become big business in
the region.10
FIGURE 3: Tourist attractions—such as the Festival au Désert
(above, the 2012 edition)—are important to Mali’s economy, but
susceptible to terrorist threats (NPR).
ECONOMY
Mali has large rural population, and its economy relies heavily on subsistence farming. In 2012, mainly
because of the coup, the country went through a recession, with growth of -1.5%, compared to the initial
forecast of +5.6%. In 2013, the country rebounded mainly because of the vigor of the agriculture and gold
sectors, plus the resumption of international aid. Mali's great potential wealth lies in mining and the
production of agricultural commodities, livestock, and fish. The most productive agricultural area lies along
7
Information extracted from CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html
Wolfram Lacher, “The Malian Crisis and the Challenge of Regional Cooperation,” International Journal Stability of Security & Development, Vol. 2,
No. 2 (2013), pp. 1-5; Ronald Marchal, “Mali Vision of War,” International Journal Stability of Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2013), pp.
17-25.
9 Thomas Fessy, “Mali Tuareg rebels declare independence in the north,” BBC News Online, April 6, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-17635437
10 Wolfram Lacher, “The Malian Crisis and the Challenge of Regional Cooperation,” International Journal Stability of Security & Development, Vol.
2, No. 2 (2013), pp. 1-5.
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the banks of the Niger River, the Inner Niger Delta, and the southwestern region around Sikasso.11 Tourism is
Mali’s third-largest export, comprising 2.4% of GDP, with national parks, ancient cities, archeological sites,
Niger River cruises, cultural and music festivals (including the famed Festival au Désert), and desert
landscapes serving as key attractions. However, tourism is highly susceptible to security threats, especially
terrorism.
Mali’s earnings from gold production represent about 25% of its GDP and 75% of export revenue, with the
country producing around 45,000 ounces (4,000 ounces through lone or “artisan” miners) of gold annually,
making it Africa’s third largest exporter of gold. Nevertheless, despite the importance of gold to the Malian
economy—which officially employs 10,000 Malians, although there are countless artisan miners, many of
them children—there has been no endogenous creation of added value through beneficiation. A key issue
increasingly affecting the gold mining sector in Mali is the decline in the price of gold over the last few years
($1,920.30/oz in 2011 to about $1,337.30/oz today), leading mining firms to either suspend or halt projects,
especially in the case of mature mines with already declining output (the IMF projects a 2% output decline in
2015).12 The Malian government has noted this decline, with industrial production forecasting to fall to 46
tonnes this year from 47 tonnes in 2013. Artisanal miners will produce an additional four tonnes, bringing
total production to 50 tonnes, down from 51
tonnes last year.13
The country has two main gold fields (with
nine mines), both in western Mali. One is the
Sadiola Gold Mine, which is an open-cast mine
owned by South Africa's Anglogold Ashanti
and Canada's IAMGOLD (a combined share of
41%), as well as the Malian government.14 The
other is the Loulo-Gounkoto Complex. La
Société des Mines de Loulo SA owns the Loulo
mines and La Société des Mines de Gounkoto
owns the Gounkoto mines. Randgold owns
80% of the Loulo-Gounkoto Complex; the Mali
government owns 20%.15
FIGURE 4: Children working in a makeshift (“artisan”) gold mine (Human
An emerging economic sector in Mali is hydroRights Watch).
electric power. Five dams (Markala, Sotuba,
Selingue, Felou, and Manantali) have been constructed with the aim of increasing supplies of renewable
electricity, reducing Mali’s requirement for imported oil. Notably, electricity accounts for approximately 1%
of the national consumption of energy, with the majority coming from biomass (wood for heating, charcoal,
11
“Mali Economic Outlook,” African Development Bank, http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/mali/mali-economic-outlook/
Reuters, “Mine workers postpone strike at AngloGold's Mali mines,” Mining Weekly, March 10, 2014.
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/mine-workers-postpone-strike-at-anglogolds-mali-mines-2014-03-10
13 “Mali sees gold output dipping this year on mine closure,” Reuters, Feb. 12, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/12/mali-goldproduction-idUSL5N0LH4QH20140212
14 In February 2013 Anglogold announced it was postponing a $500 million expansion and underground development of the mine due to security
concerns.
15 “Randgold sees prosperous future ahead with Mali” Randgold Resources, Aug. 1, 2013.
http://www.randgoldresources.com/randgold/content/en/randgold/randgold-news?oid=86750&sn=Detail&pid=27138
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and residues from agricultural and agro-industrial products) and imported oil. The hydroelectric potential of
the country, based on the Senegal and Niger Rivers, is estimated at 1,000 MW and is able to produce 5,000
GWh during a one-year average. Despite this potential, only 50 MW (approximately 220 GWh) are exploited
at present, owing to the Sélingué and Sotuba Dams on the Niger River. Mali is using a $40 million grant,
which is part of $215 million investment program, from the Climate Investment Fund—Scaling-Up
Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries Program (SREP)—to develop Mali’s renewable energy sector.16
DEFENSE
The Malian military, which is relatively small, comprises an Army, Air Force, Gendarmerie, Republican
Guard, National Guard, and National Police. The Army is incredibly limited in what it can provide the Malian
State, and it was left to French and Chadian troops to
defeat Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
when it took over three Malian cities. The current
Chief of the General Staff is Gen. Mahamane Toure,
who replaced Brig. Gen. Ibrahima Dahirou Dembele
in 2013.
Following the French-led intervention in January
2013, the international community—mainly
European states—has taken on the responsibility of
rebuilding Mali’s weak military. In February 2013
the European Union, authorized the dispatch of an
FIGURE 5: Malian military leaders stand with a French-supplied
EU Training Mission to Mali (EUTM) aimed at
armored vehicle (Reuters).
training and re-equipping the military’s disorganized
units. Four battalions of 700 soldiers each are being trained, using enlisted men and new recruits, with the
training mission to wrap up in May 2014.
CONCLUSION
Insecurity is pervasive in Malian society. Much of it stems from the geography and history of the country,
coupled with the fact that that Malian society is divided along ethnic lines and social status. One explanation
for the growing allure of radical Islamic groups is their ability to cross ethnic and social lines in this and
neighboring countries.17 The two most pertinent threats likely to affect Mali in the near-term are the presence
of AQIM and the decline in the price of gold. The Malian military, at this stage of its development, is largely
unable to counter the threat of AQIM and the various Tuareg movements, necessitating substantial external
intervention, especially from former colonial power France.
16
“Mali” Climate Investment Fund, https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cifnet/?q=country/mali; “SREP Mali - Investment Plan Scaling Up
Renewable Energy,” Republic of Mali, Ministry of Energy and Water. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-andOperations/SREP-Mali_IP_Volume1_EN_21Sept%20(2).pdf
17 Ronald Marchal, “Mali Vision of War,” International Journal Stability of Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2013), pp. 17-25.
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Another key challenge being faced by the Keïta government is the state of the economy, which contracted
because of the 2011-2012 crises. However, the ability of the government to engage in development programs
has been undermined by the decline in the price of gold over the last few years. Additionally, there is an
appreciation—thanks to work by non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch—that 20,000
children are believed to be working in Malian artisanal gold mines.18 The 2011 National Action Plan for the
Elimination of Child Labor in Mali was a good start in terms of cleaning up this industry, but one has to
recognize the limitation faced by the government in imposing its will, especially when human insecurity
remains so pervasive.
18
“A Poisonous Mix Child Labor, Mercury, and Artisanal Gold Mining in Mali,” Human Rights Watch, 2011.
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mali1211_forinsertWebUpload_0_0.pdf
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ADDENDUM
Executive Leadership
President: Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta
Prime Minister: Oumar Tatam Ly
Communication & Information Technology: Jean Marie
Sangaré
Defence & Veterans' Affairs: Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga
Economy & Finance: Bouaré Fily Sissoko
Energy & Water: Mamadou Frankaly Keïta
Environment: Ousmane Ag Rhissa
FIGURE 6: Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (Agence
France Presse)
Foreign Affairs & International Co-Operation: Zahabi Ould
Sidi Mohamed
Industry & Mines: Boubou Cissé
National Reconciliation & Relations with the North: Cheick Oumar Darrah
Public Service: Bocar Moussa Diarra
Regional Administration: Col. Moussa Sinko Coulibaly
Rural Development: Bokary Tereta
Trade: Abdel Karim Konaté
Director General of the National Directorate of Geology & Mines: Lassana Guindo
Chief of the General Staff: Gen. Mahamane Toure
Governor of the Regional Central Bank (BCEAO): Koné Tiémoko Meyliet
Key Companies
Energie du Mali (EDM)
http://www.edm-sa.com.ml/default.asp
Eskom Enterprises http://www.eskom.co.za
Orange Mali (formerly Ikatel)
http://www.orangemali.com
Sotelma http://www.sotelma.ml
Anglogold http://www.anglogold.com
Randgold http://www.randgoldresources.com
IAMGOLD http://www.iamgold.com
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CONTRIBUTOR: Isaac Kfir, Visiting Professor of
International Relations and Law, Syracuse University.
A multidisciplinary, university-based center for the study
of national and international security and terrorism,
the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism
(INSCT) offers law and graduate studies and conducts
incisive research and timely policy analysis. Part of both
Syracuse University’s College of Law and Maxwell School
of Citizenship and Public Affairs, INSCT’s collaborative
projects and initiatives have shaped law and policy
dialogues for more than 10 years. insct.syr.edu
Suite 402, MacNaughton Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244-1030
P: 315.443.2284
F: 315.443.9643
E: [email protected]
W: insct.syr.edu