Vietnam

Contesting the Past
The volumes in this series select some of the most controversial episodes in
history and consider their divergent, even starkly incompatible representations. The aim is not merely to demonstrate that history is ‘argument without end’, but to show that study even of contradictory conceptions can be
fruitful: that the jettisoning of one thesis or presentation leaves behind
something of value.
Published
Contesting the Crusades
Norman Housley
Contesting the German Empire 1871–1918
Matthew Jefferies
Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, Second Edition
Gary R. Hess
Contesting the French Revolution
Paul Hanson
The Israel‐Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories
Neil Caplan
Contesting the Renaissance
William Caferro
Contesting the Reformation
C. Scott Dixon
Vietnam
Explaining America’s
Lost War
Second Edition
Gary R. Hess
This edition first published 2015
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc
Edition History: Blackwell Publishing Ltd (1e, 2009)
Registered Office
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK
Editorial Offices
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148‐5020, USA
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK
The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK
For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about
how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website
at www.wiley.com/wiley‐blackwell.
The right of Gary R. Hess to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in
accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in
print may not be available in electronic books.
Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as
trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service
marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not
associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their
best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect
to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any
implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on
the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services
and neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom.
If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent
professional should be sought.
Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data applied for.
Paperback ISBN: 978-1-118-94899-6
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Cover image: Vietnamese woman and child under sniper fire as U.S. Marines storm the village
of My Son, near Da Nang, searching for Viet Cong insurgents in April 1964. © Eddie Adams/
AP/Press Association
Set in 10/12.5pt Photina by SPi Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India
2 2015
For Madeline and Grayson
Contents
Preface
1 From the Streets to the Books: The Origins of an Enduring Debate
viii
1
2 A Necessary War or a Mistaken War?
23
3 “Kennedy Exceptionalism,” “Missed Opportunity for Peace,”
or “Lost Victory?”: The Movement toward War, 1961–1965
49
4 The Revisionist Critique of the “Strategy for Defeat”:
The Clausewitzian Alternative
84
5 The Revisionist Critique of the “Other War”:
The “Hearts‐and‐Minds” Prescription for Victory
111
6 The Media and the War: Irresponsible or Balanced Journalism?
133
7 The Tet Offensive: Decisive American Victory or Devastating
Loss? 155
8 Nixon–Kissinger and the Ending of the War: A “Lost Victory”
or “Neither Peace nor Honor?”
179
9 Conclusion: The War’s “Lessons”
209
Bibliography
Index
218
221
Preface
The year 2015 marks the 50th anniversary of the Americanization of the
war in Vietnam. President Lyndon Johnson’s announcement in July 1965
of an open‐ended military commitment ended uncertainty about whether
measures taken earlier that year – the bombing of North Vietnam, the
introduction of the first American ground forces and their expanding military mission – would be sufficient to save South Vietnam from coming under
communist control. By the time of Johnson’s decision for war, the escalating
American role in Vietnam was already dividing the country. In late March
1965, the first Vietnam “teach‐in” took place at the University of Michigan.
At other campuses around the country, students and faculty soon followed
by holding similar forums that debated the issues confronting the United
States in Vietnam. Most participants questioned, if they were not outright
opposed to, the escalating US involvement. Bowling Green State University,
where I was in my first year of teaching, was the scene of a modest teach‐in
in May 1965. Although I knew little about Vietnam, I agreed to participate
and tried to present a balanced appraisal of how America had become
involved there.
Few of us at that time conceived of the momentous events that were to
follow: that within three years more than 500,000 American troops would
be stationed in Vietnam fighting an indecisive war that would divide
Americans more deeply than any event of the twentieth century. That early
uneasiness, however, foreshadowed the turbulent times that lay ahead. For
two decades Americans had uncritically supported the nation’s Cold War
policy of “containment” of the Soviet Union. From the beginning, Vietnam
was a different kind of problem: a war against ruthless insurgents in the jungles of Asia to salvage a politically and militarily unstable ally. The challenge
of securing a non‐communist South Vietnam was far more foreboding
than earlier Cold War crises. The ensuing war, which cost 58,000 American
and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese lives and which ended in humiliating defeat, underlined the appropriateness of pausing in 1965 to think
through where the nation was heading.
This book is an effort to come to terms with a substantial portion of the
literature on the Vietnam War. The differences between “hawks” and
“doves” of the war years have continued in the contentious debate among
scholars, journalists, and participants over the war’s retrospective
“meaning” and its “lessons.” At the heart of the 50 years’ debate has been
the issue of explaining failure. Wartime hawks feared that limitations on
military operations and domestic opposition were undermining a war that
had to be waged in the name of anti‐communism: if America failed, they
were convinced, it would be a self‐inflicted defeat. On the other side, the
doves believed that failure was inherent in a misguided intervention on
behalf of a weak government against a communist movement that enjoyed
nationalist legitimacy: US power could not change the political situation in
Vietnam, a country, moreover, of marginal significance in terms of
American security. Those contemporary debates have essentially continued
in the retrospective writing, with revisionists carrying forward the hawkish
“winnable” war argument and orthodox writers following in the dovish
“unwinnable” war tradition.
To help make sense of this debate, I have divided it into seven topics:
1. The basic question – was Vietnam a “necessary” or “mistaken” war?
2. The decisions for war from 1961 to 1965 – could war have been avoided
(did Kennedy plan to withdraw from Vietnam and did Johnson miss
opportunities for a peaceful settlement?) or did policymakers subvert a
“lost victory?”
3. Military strategy – was the United States engaged in a conventional
war, not a guerrilla war, and victory achievable by all‐out use of US
power?
4. As an alternative to reliance on military power – would pacification and
an emphasis on winning “hearts‐and‐minds” have brought victory?
5. The media – was coverage of the war irresponsible or balanced?
6. The Tet Offensive – was the outcome of the battles of 1968 a decisive
American victory or devastating loss?
7. The Nixon–Kissinger policy – did Vietnamization bring a “lost victory”
or “neither peace nor honor?”
My objective is to provide a guide to a debate of scholarly as well as contemporary importance, for the “lessons” of Vietnam continue to inform
public discourse on foreign policy questions. The identification of the
p r e fa c e
ix
p r e fa c e
x
principal issues reflects, in my judgment, the points where the debate is
now focused. I have sought to present both sides of the debates on these
issues in a comprehensive and even‐handed manner. In assessing the
merits of the points of contention, I have endeavored to draw principally
on scholarly works, although some memoirs and partisan histories contribute significantly to the debate. Since the issues follow both chronological and topical lines and since I endeavor to make each chapter stand on
its own, there is some overlap; in particular, the history of Vietnamese
nationalism and political developments in South Vietnam have to be
­discussed in the context of the necessity of war, the decisions for war, and
the hearts‐and‐minds alternative. Also, I have had to make some
arbitrary decisions on where to deal with some topics and where to “fit”
certain books. For instance, the chapter on the media and the war does
not include the controversy about coverage of the Tet Offensive; instead
that issue is incorporated into the chapter on Tet itself, since the media’s
role is fundamental to assessing the debate on which side “won” that
battle. Likewise, the chapter on the hearts‐and‐minds alternative strategy
covers the full course of the war, since the issues involved in pacification
were persistent, regardless of the extent to which it was prioritized. The
danger in this approach is that it might detract from a full evaluation of
the Nixon administration’s emphasis on pacification as part of
Vietnamization.
My views were shaped during the early months of the war when I
became convinced that the US had become involved in a hopeless
enterprise. From what I read at the time especially on the history of
Vietnamese nationalism, it seemed to me that America was defying the
forces of Vietnamese history; having lived in India and having traveled
through other parts of Asia (not including Indochina) shortly before the
war was Americanized, I had been impressed by the strength of nationalism
everywhere and the determination of Asians to free themselves from
anything resembling Western ­domination. Later research on US policy in
Southeast Asia confirmed my early reactions to the war, although I came to
appreciate the complexities of Vietnamese politics and the interests of the
major powers in Indochina.
This identity with the dovish‐orthodox tradition does not, I hope, preclude me from giving a fair assessment of the debate. I have learned a great
deal from the revisionists, and have come to respect much of their work,
especially as it has become more scholarly. I have also come to appreciate
the determination of participants in the war to see a purpose in their effort
and sacrifice and to suggest ways that the war might have been more successful. While I am not a convert to revisionism, I have made every effort to
give its arguments a complete and fair hearing.
Since the publication of the first edition of this book in 2008, much
scholarship has incorporated Vietnamese sources and has drawn greater
attention to international aspects of the war, cultural influences, and the
politics within both North Vietnam and South Vietnam. My definition of
the issues remains American‐centered, which continues to represent the
preponderance of the writing on the war, as is appropriate for it was US
intervention that initiated the Vietnam War, or, as it often labeled, the
Second Indochina War. Recent scholarship on the political struggles in
southern Vietnam during the French period, the complex interplay of
nationalism and colonialism in Indochina during the 1940s and 1950s,
the response of allies to US intervention, and North Vietnamese decision‐
making and strategy has greatly enhanced our understanding of the complexities and dynamics of the war.
I continue to benefit from those who have guided my thinking since I
began working on the first edition of the book. Three reviewers of the preliminary proposal stressed the need for a broader focus than I had initially
envisioned. Later, four reviewers’ instructive criticism strengthened my
draft manuscript.
Recently, in preparing for the revised edition, I was helped immensely by
the comments of 19 instructors of Vietnam War courses who commented
on the first edition. While their suggestions influenced the rewriting of several chapters, they are most fully represented in the entirely rewritten
conclusion, which now focuses on the “lessons” of the war.
For this extensive guidance from colleagues on both the 2008 and 2015
editions, I am indebted to Peter Coveney, Wiley Blackwell’s Senior
Commissioning Editor. Peter is a superb editor in every respect. It has been
a privilege to work with him. I owe gratitude as well to his first‐rate staff –
including Purushothaman Saravanan, Project Manager; Georgina Coleby,
former Project Editor; Ashley McPhee, former Editorial Assistant in US
and Latin American History; as well as to Lynette Woodward, Freelance
Copyeditor.
My wife, Rose, as always, has been a sympathetic and sturdy supporter
of my writing. Previous books have been dedicated to my parents John and
Dorothy Hess, to Rose, and to our son Ryan. This book is dedicated to the
next generation: our grandchildren Madeline and Grayson Hess.
Gary R. Hess
p r e fa c e
xi
1
From the Streets to the Books:
The Origins of an Enduring
Debate
From its beginning, the Vietnam War divided Americans. In the summer of
1965, President Lyndon Johnson made an open‐ended military commitment to the defense of South Vietnam. It came after several months of a
mounting crisis that left the beleaguered South Vietnamese government
and its army on the verge of collapse in the face of a communist insurgency.
Limited application of American military power had failed to halt the
political‐military deterioration. Earlier in 1965, Johnson had launched a
bombing campaign against North Vietnam, which supported the Viet Cong
insurgents and had sent American combat troops, beginning with some
3,500 marines. Despite the acceleration of the bombing and an increase of
troops to 40,000 men, American officials recognized by July, 1965 that a
much larger military commitment was the only means of saving South
Vietnam from a communist takeover. Despite Johnson’s effort to downplay
the magnitude of his decision, Americans recognized that it meant that tens
of thousands of additional troops soon would be sent to Vietnam and that
indeed the nation was at war.
While most Americans supported Johnson’s decision, going to war in
Vietnam was met with less enthusiasm than other wars. About 60 percent
of the public thought the military commitment was correct, but one‐fourth
of them thought it was a “mistake,” while the remainder of people were
uncertain. In another opinion poll in which Americans were asked which
course of action should be followed – hold the line, negotiate and get out,
carry the war to North Vietnam – not even a majority, only 48 percent,
favored the first alternative that reflected the position of Johnson, while 31
percent supported “negotiations and get out” (barely 17 percent favored the
Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, Second Edition. Gary R. Hess.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.