A Theory of Neutrality Rights in War
Scott Wolford
Department of Government
University of Texas at Austin
11 October 2014
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
1 / 13
Question
How (if at all) can the laws of war affect state behavior?
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
2 / 13
Motivation
Laws of war govern behavior between
Co-belligerents (POWs, civilians, violence)
I
I
Threats of reciprocity
(Morrow 2002, 2007; Wallace 2012; Valentino et al. 2006)
Belligerents and third parties (neutrality)
I
I
Threats of intervention
Where this paper comes in
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
3 / 13
Motivation
Laws of war govern behavior between
Co-belligerents (POWs, civilians, violence)
I
I
Threats of reciprocity
(Morrow 2002, 2007; Wallace 2012; Valentino et al. 2006)
Belligerents and third parties (neutrality)
I
I
Threats of intervention
Where this paper comes in
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
3 / 13
Motivation
Laws of war govern behavior between
Co-belligerents (POWs, civilians, violence)
I
I
Threats of reciprocity
(Morrow 2002, 2007; Wallace 2012; Valentino et al. 2006)
Belligerents and third parties (neutrality)
I
I
Threats of intervention
Where this paper comes in
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
3 / 13
Theory
Theory of international law
I
I
Coordinates expectations on unacceptable behavior and
response (Morrow 2002, 2014)
May also reduce costs of intervention (cf. Voeten 2005)
Theory of war expansion
I
I
Intervention desirable against “expansionist” states
But belligerent’s type isn’t known ex ante
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
4 / 13
Theory
Theory of international law
I
I
Coordinates expectations on unacceptable behavior and
response (Morrow 2002, 2014)
May also reduce costs of intervention (cf. Voeten 2005)
Theory of war expansion
I
I
Intervention desirable against “expansionist” states
But belligerent’s type isn’t known ex ante
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
4 / 13
Theory
Theory of international law
I
I
Coordinates expectations on unacceptable behavior and
response (Morrow 2002, 2014)
May also reduce costs of intervention (cf. Voeten 2005)
Theory of war expansion
I
I
Intervention desirable against “expansionist” states
But belligerent’s type isn’t known ex ante
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
4 / 13
The Model
Players: belligerent (B), third party (A)
Belligerent honors or violates neutrality
I
I
I
military boost at some cost cB
expansionist β values victory more than satiable type β
β<β
Third party joins war or not
I
I
I
would like to fight expansionist but not satiable type
uncertain over belligerent’s type
expansionist w/ probability φ
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
5 / 13
The Model
Players: belligerent (B), third party (A)
Belligerent honors or violates neutrality
I
I
I
military boost at some cost cB
expansionist β values victory more than satiable type β
β<β
Third party joins war or not
I
I
I
would like to fight expansionist but not satiable type
uncertain over belligerent’s type
expansionist w/ probability φ
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
5 / 13
The Model
Players: belligerent (B), third party (A)
Belligerent honors or violates neutrality
I
I
I
military boost at some cost cB
expansionist β values victory more than satiable type β
β<β
Third party joins war or not
I
I
I
would like to fight expansionist but not satiable type
uncertain over belligerent’s type
expansionist w/ probability φ
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
5 / 13
The Model
for generic β,

(ρ + b) β



(ρ + b − a) β
uB =
(ρλ + b) β − cB



(ρλ + b − a) β − cB
if h, ¬j
if h, j
if v , ¬j
if v , j,

(ρ + b) uA (β)



(ρ + b − a) u (β) − c
A
A
uA =

(ρλ + b) uA (β)



(ρλ + b − a) uA (β) − dcA
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
if h, ¬j
if h, j
if v , ¬j
if v , j
Peace Science 2014
6 / 13
The Model
for generic β,

(ρ + b) β



(ρ + b − a) β
uB =
(ρλ + b) β − cB



(ρλ + b − a) β − cB
if h, ¬j
if h, j
if v , ¬j
if v , j,

(ρ + b) uA (β)



(ρ + b − a) u (β) − c
A
A
uA =

(ρλ + b) uA (β)



(ρλ + b − a) uA (β) − dcA
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
if h, ¬j
if h, j
if v , ¬j
if v , j
Peace Science 2014
6 / 13
The Model
ui h, ¬j|β
neutral
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
honor
join
B
violate
ui v , ¬j|β
A
join
β φ
ui v , j|β
N
ui h, ¬j|β
β 1−φ
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
honor
B
violate
join
neutral
A
join
Neutrality and War
ui h, ¬j|β
ui h, j|β
Peace Science 2014
7 / 13
The Model
ui h, ¬j|β
neutral
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
honor
join
B
violate
ui v , ¬j|β
A
join
β φ
ui v , j|β
N
ui h, ¬j|β
β 1−φ
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
honor
B
violate
join
neutral
A
join
Neutrality and War
ui h, ¬j|β
ui h, j|β
Peace Science 2014
7 / 13
The Model
ui h, ¬j|β
neutral
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
honor
join
B
violate
ui v , ¬j|β
A
join
β φ
ui v , j|β
N
ui h, ¬j|β
β 1−φ
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
honor
B
violate
join
neutral
A
join
Neutrality and War
ui h, ¬j|β
ui h, j|β
Peace Science 2014
7 / 13
The Model
ui h, ¬j|β
neutral
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
honor
join
B
violate
ui v , ¬j|β
A
join
β φ
ui v , j|β
N
ui h, ¬j|β
β 1−φ
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
honor
B
violate
join
neutral
A
join
Neutrality and War
ui h, ¬j|β
ui h, j|β
Peace Science 2014
7 / 13
The Model
ui h, ¬j|β
neutral
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
honor
join
B
violate
ui v , ¬j|β
A
join
β φ
ui v , j|β
N
ui h, ¬j|β
β 1−φ
neutral
A
ui h, j|β
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
honor
B
violate
join
neutral
A
join
Neutrality and War
ui h, ¬j|β
ui h, j|β
Peace Science 2014
7 / 13
Analysis
Three types of equilibrium
No law / opportunistic violation → both types violate*
Full compliance / pooling → no type violates
Separating → only expansionist violates
Two types of effect
Equilibrium selection
Equilibrium replacement
. . . but both depend on opportunistic defection existing as well
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
8 / 13
Analysis
Three types of equilibrium
No law / opportunistic violation → both types violate*
Full compliance / pooling → no type violates
Separating → only expansionist violates
Two types of effect
Equilibrium selection
Equilibrium replacement
. . . but both depend on opportunistic defection existing as well
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
8 / 13
Analysis
Three types of equilibrium
No law / opportunistic violation → both types violate*
Full compliance / pooling → no type violates
Separating → only expansionist violates
Two types of effect
Equilibrium selection
Equilibrium replacement
. . . but both depend on opportunistic defection existing as well
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
8 / 13
Analysis
Three types of equilibrium
No law / opportunistic violation → both types violate*
Full compliance / pooling → no type violates
Separating → only expansionist violates
Two types of effect
Equilibrium selection
Equilibrium replacement
. . . but both depend on opportunistic defection existing as well
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
8 / 13
Analysis
Three types of equilibrium
No law / opportunistic violation → both types violate*
Full compliance / pooling → no type violates
Separating → only expansionist violates
Two types of effect
Equilibrium selection
Equilibrium replacement
. . . but both depend on opportunistic defection existing as well
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
8 / 13
Equilibrium Selection
probability B is expansionist (φ)
1
partial compliance
separating
full compliance
separating
opportunistic violation
opportunistic violation
φ
0
β=
cB
ρ(λ−1)
cB
ρ(λ−1)−a
expansionist type’s valuation of victory β
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
9 / 13
Equilibrium Selection
probability B is expansionist (φ)
1
partial compliance
separating
full compliance
separating
opportunistic violation
opportunistic violation
φ
0
β=
cB
ρ(λ−1)
cB
ρ(λ−1)−a
expansionist type’s valuation of victory β
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
9 / 13
Equilibrium Replacement
probability B is expansionist (φ)
1
partial compliance
separating
φ
full compliance
φ
0
β=
full compliance
separating
opportunistic violation
opportunistic violation
cB
ρ(λ−1)
cB
ρ(λ−1)−a
expansionist type’s valuation of victory β
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
10 / 13
Implications
1. Effect greatest when expansionism believed rare.
2. Violations facilitate desirable interventions b/c only
expansionists violate.
- “punishment” spurious to desirable intervention
- compliance the right standard?
3. More powerful 3rd parties more prone to regretted
non-intervention.
4. Violations independently increase chances of war expansion.
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
11 / 13
Implications
1. Effect greatest when expansionism believed rare.
2. Violations facilitate desirable interventions b/c only
expansionists violate.
- “punishment” spurious to desirable intervention
- compliance the right standard?
3. More powerful 3rd parties more prone to regretted
non-intervention.
4. Violations independently increase chances of war expansion.
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
11 / 13
Implications
1. Effect greatest when expansionism believed rare.
2. Violations facilitate desirable interventions b/c only
expansionists violate.
- “punishment” spurious to desirable intervention
- compliance the right standard?
3. More powerful 3rd parties more prone to regretted
non-intervention.
4. Violations independently increase chances of war expansion.
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
11 / 13
Implications
1. Effect greatest when expansionism believed rare.
2. Violations facilitate desirable interventions b/c only
expansionists violate.
- “punishment” spurious to desirable intervention
- compliance the right standard?
3. More powerful 3rd parties more prone to regretted
non-intervention.
4. Violations independently increase chances of war expansion.
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
11 / 13
Implications
1. Effect greatest when expansionism believed rare.
2. Violations facilitate desirable interventions b/c only
expansionists violate.
- “punishment” spurious to desirable intervention
- compliance the right standard?
3. More powerful 3rd parties more prone to regretted
non-intervention.
4. Violations independently increase chances of war expansion.
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
11 / 13
Conclusion
Laws of neutrality are unique
I
govern behavior b/w belligerents and non-belligerents
Integrated theories of law and war expansion
Deterrence vs. solving information problems
Implications for
I
I
I
Judging effectiveness
Spuriousness of “punishment”
Effects on compliance and war expansion
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
12 / 13
Conclusion
Laws of neutrality are unique
I
govern behavior b/w belligerents and non-belligerents
Integrated theories of law and war expansion
Deterrence vs. solving information problems
Implications for
I
I
I
Judging effectiveness
Spuriousness of “punishment”
Effects on compliance and war expansion
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
12 / 13
Conclusion
Laws of neutrality are unique
I
govern behavior b/w belligerents and non-belligerents
Integrated theories of law and war expansion
Deterrence vs. solving information problems
Implications for
I
I
I
Judging effectiveness
Spuriousness of “punishment”
Effects on compliance and war expansion
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
12 / 13
Conclusion
Laws of neutrality are unique
I
govern behavior b/w belligerents and non-belligerents
Integrated theories of law and war expansion
Deterrence vs. solving information problems
Implications for
I
I
I
Judging effectiveness
Spuriousness of “punishment”
Effects on compliance and war expansion
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
12 / 13
Conclusion
Questions? Comments?
Scott Wolford
[email protected]
http://www.scott-wolford.com/
Scott Wolford (UT Austin)
Neutrality and War
Peace Science 2014
13 / 13