THEORIES OF POLITICAL DECISION - MAKING
IN FOREIGN POLICY
Hasan KÖNİ **
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson once scornfully
observed that decision..making analyses were nothing more than,
«political science's latestmost fashionable, and most boring
study ... » 1 Acheson's most striking criticism, that decision-making
studies are boring, undoubtedly reflects more on the literaI}'
shortcomings of various authors than it does on the subject
material and the latterl s relevanee to political science. PoHtical
scientists quite properly should be engaged in probing the proces­
ses whieh generate the policy that underlies the behavior of states
in the international system.2 The charges of fashion and curreney
in themselves are not particularly serious: who, for example, would
disıniss the value of quantum mechanics to the study of physics
simply because it is current or fashionable? İt is true that since
the 1960' s studies of the decision-making process have comprised
an important part of political science Hterature. But as this reflects
a trend toward the diversification of political inquiry sİnce conclu­
tian of the Second World War, such studies probably constitute a
positive addition to rather a negative detraction from the general
knowledge of political practice. İf, however, it is the qua1ity of
this contribution ,vhich Acheson doubts, then perhaps he is on
firmer ground. For li!ke any exploratory effort, the studies of
.~ ;'-k
ı
2
Dr. Hasan Köni is the author of the book entitled: «Declsion-M.akinı in
International Organizations: A System Approach», Ankara, 1981.
'
Assoc. Prof. Dr. at Gazi University in Ankara.
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creatlon: My Years in the State Department,
New York, 1%9, pp. 478479.
Comments by James N. Rosenau's «Introductory Note»in his edited
work, International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York, The Free
Press, 1%9, p.167.
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political decision-making have differed in character and exhibited
an uneven quality.
Studies of decision-making, like those of organization, have
not been restricted to a single approach but have employed variaus
methods and techniques to probe the processes by which policy is
made. The various approaches to decision-making analysis may be
grouped in a number of ways.3 Ho"\vever, we are going to place
them into three broad categories according to the principal forms
of the study. Studies which direct attention to individual decision­
makers may be labeled psychoanalyticaljperceptual; those which
deal with the process and effects of smaH group interaction ,maybe
termed sociological; and those which examine the policy process
in terms of a diffision of power among institutions and individual
may be described as political.
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC j PERCEPTUAL APPROACH
Studies falling İn the first category general1y focus on a specific
individual policy-maker and attempt to explain in psycholögical
terms why he behaved as he did. Familiar examples of this approach
are the so-caned psychobiographies of prominent individuals, such
as those of Woodrow Wilson, Kurt Schumacher, James Forresta},
Charles de Gaulle, Atatürk.4 While the actual analytical techniques
used in this approach vary depending on the knowledge and
purposes of the authors, the basic thought remains the same: to
gain an understanding of the policy-makers behavior in terms (Jf
his unique psychological characteristics. As Maurice Farber has
explained:
3
4
Wilfrid L. KohI, for example, identifies six model s or conceptual frame­
works used to explain foreign policy decisions or actions İn «The Nixon­
Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S. - European Relations: Patterns
of Policy - Maıking», World Politics, XXVII, October 1975, pp. 1-3. RecentIy
decision-ma!king analyses are' based mostly on mathematical modeıs~
See Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel1
House, New York, John Day, 1956; Lewis Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A
Study in Personanty and Pontteal Behavior, Stanford, California, Stanford
University Press, 1965; Arnold Rogow, James Forrestal: A Study of Per­
sonaIlty, Politics and Policy, New Yoıık, Macmillan, 1%3; Andre Malraux,
Les Chines qu'on ahat, Paris, Gal1imard 1971; Lord B.P. Kinross, Atatürk,
The Reblrth of aNation, 2 ed. Nicosia, Rüstem and Brother, 1981.
THEORIES OF POLlTICAL DECISION MAKING
157
.«the psyohoanalytical approaoh... is, in İts orientation, con­
cerned with the individual and his motiv1es, particular1y those
pervasive ones developed early in life of which we are bardıy
aware.»:>
One fairIy recent study on foreign policy which empIoys tbe
psychoanalytic approach on a mor.e theoretical level, is J oseph de
Rivera's book.6 In this .study, de Rivera examines the decision­
ınaker as a psychological phenomenon; the pollcymakers stands
not as the independent but dependent variable, subject to his per­
sonality and the impact of his past experiences. The variables, or
perhaps more appropriately sub-variables, ·which de Rivera iden­
tifies . as contributing to the decision choices of a policy-maker
inclU'de perceptions, stimuli, selectiye biases, pressures of dr·
drcumstance andmomentum, conceptual failures, and personality,
including aberations.7 All of these, he feels, contribute to and
therefore help explain the behavioral patterns of individual decision­
makers' as they partidpate in the policy process. FOr example, de
Rivera suggests thatmuch of President Truman'·s behavior in office
reHected his youthfuldeveloprrient under thehand of a strong,
authoritarian father. In support of this argument, de Rivera cites
an instanee .from Truman's youth when the future President fell
from a horse, andhis father-whö was an authority figure-foreed
the boy to walk home. Years later, de Rivera contends, Truman's
perception of his relations with General MacArthur-who was also
an authority figure-was shaped by the Presidenl's past experiences
with authority.8 Another comprehensive study in this field İs Irving
J anis and Leon Mann's book on decision-making.9 As J anisand
ı'J{annnot(;!, most previous books on decision-making have con·
centrated on how decisions. «ought» to be made. Af.ter reviewing
s Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Study of Wıar, eJoUı1"11al of Social İssues,
VoL XI, 1955, p.35. Perhaps the classic study in this area is Sigmımd
Freud's OWn work, Civi.lization and Us Discontents, New York, Jonathan
.Cape and .Harrison Smith, 1930.
6 Joseph de Rivera, TIıe Pschological Diınension of Foreign Policy, Colwnbus,
Ohio, .Charles E. Merrill Company, 1965.
1
tbid., pp. 193-206.
pp. 245·297
h;ving L. Janis andLeon Mann, Declsioıı-Maldng; A Psyclıological Analysts
of Conflict, Cholce and Commitment, New York, The Free Press, 1m.
4 . ·İbid.,
9
r
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this dreary literature they manage to arriye to a single generaiiza­
tion-namely, that deci:sion makers ought to engage in what they
call «vigilant information processing» They then like the others
realize that decision-makers habitually fail to reach this ideaL.
That's why another author points out that decision-making is
nothing but/muddling through process. lO Rudolph Binion has the
same conclusions with de Rivera. In his book he argues that
Hitler's mother had been treated by a jewish doctor \vho was in·
capable to cure her breast caneer. Psychohistorian explains that
Hitler's mother medical fail also clarifies his anti-semitism,u
While the psychoanalytie approach to human behavior may
offer a rich field of inquiry, it nonetheless suffers from certaİn
deficiencies as an adequate model of decis ion-making. From the
simple perspectiye of feasibility, the psychoanalytic approach
requires large amounts of raıther specific biographic and documen­
tary material which often prove unobtainable. But more basically
the psychoanalytic approach is of dubious value to the construction
of a general theory of decision-making. Because it rests on the
subjectiye interpretation of another's personaUty the influence of
a myriad of past experiences on that personaHty, the psychoanalytic
approach becoınes exceedingly cuınbersome as an explanatory too1.
The problems of elegance and exclusion become unmanageable;
for as Sidney Verba notes, «to include all the variables that have
some effect ... would be to create a model so complex as to be
uselessP it is best used to explain the behavior of particular indivi­
duals rather than governments, but even at this level the psy­
hoana1ytic approach is limited by its subjectivity.
i
Sufficiently similar to the psychoanalytic approach so that
they may be included in the same category are those studies \vhich
examine the elements of perception and cognition as factors deter­
mining decision-making behavior. One suggestive work in this area
is that of Robert Jervis whodevelops specific hypotheses on h01v
lü
Charles E. Lindblom, «The Science of Muddling Through», Publk
Review, No. 19, Spring 1959, pp. 85-88.
Rudolph Binion, Introduction il la Psycbobistoire, Paris, Presses Univer­
sitaire de France, 1982, p.17.
Sidney Verba, «Assumptions of Rationa1ity and Non-Rationality in Models
of the International System», İn Rosenau, ed., İnternattonal PoUdcs,
19'69, p.220.
Admbıtıstration
tl
12 THEORIES OF POLITICAL DECISION· :VV\KING
159
perception of the decision-maker and his learning ability may
influence the resulting response. B Also included in perceptual
analysis are such factors as societal norms and moresı govern­
mental structures, and the particular historical circumstances sur­
rounding a given decision. On ıthe other hand, shaping of misper­
ceptions are explained by such factors as Centralization of percep­
tion, overestimation one's importance, the influence of desires and
fears, cognitive dissonance. Aıı these factors, it is felt, help create
the «perceptional lenses» through which officials interpret and
respond to events. As Henry Kissinger has noted:
«The definition of what constitutes a problem and what
criteria are re1evant in «solving» it reflects to a considerable
extent the domestic notions of what is just, the pressures
produced by the decision-making process, and the experience
which forms the leaders in their rise to eminence.»14
Or in other words, systemic factors help shape the inner deter·
minent9 of outcomes. No douht perceptual factors influence
dec!sions. But criticisms leveled at the psychoanalytic approach
also apply here. It is difficuIt to generalize about the effect of per­
sonar factors on decisions because theyare best applied to specific
individuals and even then, «it is diffficult to explain why one
decision and another was taken by particular individual in a
particular situation» .15
At this point it should beadded that decision-making studies
on psychoanalytical level are stilI developing ones but this does not
diminish their importance.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH
The approaches grouped under the sociological label take as
their primary concem the effects of smaIl group interaction on
decision-making. Irving L. Janis, for example, has recently argued
that a smail decision-making group can build up its own nomıs
13
14
15
Robert Jervis, Perceptlon and Misperception tn International PoRttes,
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976.
Henry Kissinger, «Dornestle Stmeture and Foreign Policy», Daedalus, V.,
Sp ring 1966, p.505.
Verba) op.Cıt., p.219.
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and consensus at the expense of clear and critical thought. The
resuIt is an incomplete search for 'alternatives and a subsequent
policy based onpoor judgemerit. J anis suggests that:
.
"
...
«The more amihili ty and ~spirit de corps ;among the members
of a policy-makip.g in"group, the greater İs .the da~lger that
independ~nt critical thi~i~g will ~ !,eplaced by groupthink,
which likely to result in irrational or dehunazipg, acti()ns
directed against outgroups.16 '
Not all decision groups,' of course,' become victiin of group
thiIlık, but the:çe exists a persisıtent danger that group dynamics will
produce 'the almast irresistlble pr.essureş forconformity that
ulfi.rİultely l~ad to groupthink Janis feels that a' number of foreign
policy misadventures, jncluding the invasion of North Korea, the
Bay of Pigs and the escahttion' of ,the . Vietnam War reflect the
effeet of groupthink..
Other investigators, .departing frQID a more experiment al basis,
have sought to develop theories of, smail group interactionP By
emphasizing' small . groups, ,esPecially ,triads, as miniature social
systems, they have ,explored, oftem with th~ use of gaming teclmi­
ques, the effects of the distribution of power and the processçs ~f
coalition formation within the groups. The rationale for this
approach İs' that because policy-maker.~ 'operate from an unequal
distribution of power, policy decisiOIls require the formation of a
coalition with enough collective power to win over opposing coa1i­
tions. eoaUtions form and reform depending on the İssües, the
relative power of the coalition's mernbers; and the rewardsto be
distributed. The process of coalition formation is most obvious in
legislative bodies, but also occur.s ,in more ·subtle forms within, the
Executive branch.
Irving L., Janis, Victims of Grouptlıink, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1972, p.13.
,
17 These wor.ks include Theodore Caplow, Two Against One: CoaıUtions tn
Triads, New Jersey, Englewood ellffs, 1968; William A. Gamson, «A
Theory of C6alition Fonnation», American Soclolog1.cal Review, No. 11>,
June 1961, pp. 373~82; Bernhaııd Ueberman,' «A Notion of Trust in Three~
"Person G ames ,and International Affairs», Journal'of COnfUCt Resolution,
No. 8, September 1964, pp.271-80; William Riıker, The'Thoory of PoUıtical
eOaUHOllS. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961.
16. THEORIES OF l'QLITICll DECISION - MAKING
161
An approach like that adopted by Janisı while high!y suggesti"e
is only useful when there exists the partieular set of
eonditİons which he describes. While final decisİons may be taken
by sn1all groupsı the process of policy formulation is a more extcn­
ted process, often reaching across agencies and spanning the divi­
sion bctween the Legislative and Executive branches. Because of
the diffusion of power within government, the p!uralist nature of
the system usuaııy finds expression in the policy process. There is
thus a richness and depth to policy process which J anİs1ike ,models
faH to take into account. The White House is not always isolated
summit it hecame during the height of the Watergate siege.
at
timesı
Similarlyı the game-theoretic approaches to smaIl group İn­
teraction often simpHfyl for the sake of control, to the pOİnt where
they too lose sİght of the İnherent complexity of the policy process.
it İs. in fact, this political and complex nature of the policy process
which serves as the point of departure for those investigators whose
works are collected under the third or political approach.
THE POLITICAL APPROACH
i t is true, of course, that single individuals can and sometimes
do dominate a nation's foreign policy. One has only to thİnk of
such figures as Cardinal Richelieu ı Metternich, Bismark, Taııeyrand,
Atatürk and İnönü. In the United States, too, the President wilJ
on occasion personally assume command of foreign policy,13 Fre­
quentlyı however, such cases of command occur in crisis situatİon
where time for reflection and consultation is compressed and the
nced for an authoritative action immediate. More generaııy, the
process of policy formulation reflects the competition among values
and interest inherent in any political system. Broad policy objectives
do not always flow down from the top but are but together from
bits and pieces that filter up from below and seep in lateraııy.
Policy decisions are not necessarily rational selections between well
reasoned alternatives but reflect instead a victory or compromise
among competing groups and individuals with different values and
objectives. In apıuralist system, policy making becomes politics.
13 After Watergate affair, American Congress became more energetic on
Foreign Policy issues.
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TL'RKISH pUBLle ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL
The authors who focus on the poHtical nature of policy malcing
may be divi,ded in two groups. On one side are those who have
contributed to what may be called the political process model and
on the other those who favor bureaucraıtic politics concept. Included
in the first group are such famous names as Roger Hilsman, Samuel
Huntington, Richard Neustadt and Warner Schilling. 19 These in­
vestigators link foreign policy to the broader arena of domestic
politics. They view the foreign policy process as involving the entire
spectrum of political participants: the President, his secretaries
and their departments, the Congress, interest groups and other
attentive publics.2\) The foreign policy process parallels the political
patterns of the federal government. The primary task of the policy­
ma'ker, therefore, is to achieve a widespread consensus, often based
on compromise; his chief tool is thatof persuasion.
The poHtical nature of the foreign policy process, these authors
argue, ·may be explained by four characterestics of the governmen·
tal system. The first two of these factors focus on the diffusion of
power and the multiplicity of actors in the system. The federal
system, as Neustadt has pointed out, rests not on a separation of
powers but on a separation of institutions which share powers.
Neither the President nor the Congress, therefore, is fully authorita­
tive in foreign affairs. Eaoh has a constitutional grant of power
which is jealously guarded. Traditon and practice have also
served to erect spheres of activity and certain perogatives. But
the essential poinıt is that there is no .fully authoritative foreign
policyorgan: power is held jointly.
Yet power is not divided between the Execuüve and Legislative
branches only. The power of the Executive is diffused within that
i,:)
211
Roger Hilsınan, To Move ANation: nıe Politics of Foreign Policy in
the Administration of John F. Keımedy, New York, Doubleday and Co.
1%7; Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strateglc programs
in National Politics, New Yonk, Columbia University Press, 1%1; Riohard
Neustadt, Presidendal Power; Warner R. Sehilling, «The Politics of
National Defense: Fiscal 1950» Warner Schilling et aL., Strategy, Politics
and Defense Budgets, New Yorrk, Columbia University Press, 1962.
This approach ınostly true İn the case of T.urJdsh embargo. American
Congress implernented an arms ernbargo upon their NATO ally, Turkey,
ınost1y influenced. pressure coming from interest groups such as G:reeıks
and Armenians.
THEORIES OF POLITICAL DECISION· MAKING
163
braneh 21 This diffusion of power in turn produces a multiplicity of
actors whose responsihilities and jurisdictional interes1ts must be
satisfied before a policy consensus can be reaehed. This diffusion
of power and the multipIicity of aetors are largely unavoidable,
and in this sen se political deeision-making is inherent İn the system.
As Charles Frankel explains :
The simple arithmetic of the American governmeni' s opera­
tions makes it hard to achieve consisteney or order within
it. In the eourse of a single day the important decisions made
by the government are too large in number and varied in
content to be made by any smaIl group of men, or any ten
small groups. So power spreads out. And as it spreads, more
andmore attention has to be given to keeping the different
centers of power in touch with one another. Thus forward
motion is blocked because time andenergy have to be spent
on lateral eommunication.ıı
A third element which adds to the difficulty of reaching a
policy consensus stems from the fact that each of the actors in the
system participates on the basis of his policy eonvictions which
are ofien at variance with those of his eolleagues. Thus the
proble.m of consensus becomes not merely one of contaet, but of
difficult persuasion. For these beliefs which animate policy-makers
represent not pecuniary interests but deeply hel d eonvictions as
to the eontent and direction of American foreign policy. It is in
faet the genuineness of these convictions rather than self - interest
which makes the resolution of differenees so difficult.23
And finaIly, policy-maık!ers are hampered by inadequate
knowledge about the problem at hand. This inadequaey operates
on two Ievels. on a general plane, policy mak!ers Iaek the analytical
tools necessary to lay bare all the underlying elements of any
major decision. This inadequaey of analysis permits major and
therefore serious differences of apinon to arise as to the best way
to proceed. Because they eannot peer eollectively into the future,
21
11
23
Andre Kaspi, La Vie PoHtlque Aux Etats - URis, Paris, Armand Collin,
1977, p.145.
Charles Frankel, IDgh on Foggy Bottom, New York, 1969, p.171.
Hilsman, op.clt., p. 10.
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T'C'RKISH pUBLle ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL
pülicy-makers develop their personal - and often unique· versions
of füresight which ünly reinfürce the divevgence of pülicy opinion.
And on a müre specific level, üfficials often lack infürmation
essential to the intelligent resolutiün of a particular problem or
they cannot cope with too much information coming früm different
agencies. This laek may be due tü an absence of direct cüntact,
faulty reporting procedures, büttlenecks in the com.munication
system. On the üther side tüo muoh informatiün is not so handy
and sametime unnecessary. But whatev1er the cause, the resuIt is
thaıt officials mustmake their own assesments of a situation and
act accoIidingly. Or worseyet, officials may be .the victims of
misinfürmation. Tü borrow anüther of Charles Frankers pungent
observatiüns :
«i used tü imagine, when government took actions i found
inexplica:ble , that it had information i dind't have. But after
i served in the government for süme months, i füund that
the issue was more complex: often the government does
know something that people on the outside dün't, but it's
something that isn't so,24
Suah misinfürmation may arise from deficiencies in the com­
munications system or from deliberate attempts at misdirectiün.
But in any event the effect is to impair ıthe response üf policy­
makers.
The other hranch üf the political approach, which has gained
considerable fashiün, has been identified by its proponents as the
bureaucratic pülitics paradigm.2S The distinction between the püli­
tical process model and the bureaucratic politics paradigm is a
rather fine one. Büth have thesame intellectual roots, and in many
ways share the same conceptual view of güvern·ment. However,
2~ 25 Charles Frankel, op.clt., p. 78.
see Graham T. Allison, «Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis»,
Amerlcan Pd1itical Science Review, No. 58, September 1969, pp. 689-718;
Graham T. Allison, Esseıx:e of Decision ı : Explain the Cuban Missile Crlsis,
Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1971, Graham T. Allison and Morton H.
Halpedn, «Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy İmplica­
tions», World PoRtles, XXIV, Spring 1972, pp.40-79; Morton H. Halperin,
Bureaucratic Pdlities and Foreign PoRcy, Washington, D.C.: Broo.k:ings
İnstitution, 1974.
THEORIES OF POLITICAL DECISION· MAKING
165
there some differences which should be no.red. First, rather than
linking the foreign policy process to domestic politics, the
adherents of bureaucratic politics restrich their focus primarily to
the Executive branch. Here again they ıencounter the diffusion of
power among individuals positioned differential1y in the organiza­
tional structure. But rather than view the policy process as a
difficuIt struggle to overcome deep policy convictions and build a
consensus, they tend to view the formulation of policy as aresnIt
of a combination of two factors. First, they note that the existence
of various power centers necessitates a bargaining process, the
aggregated resuIt of which İs policy.
As Allison and Halperin expressed it:
«What a government does in any particular instance can be
understood largelyas a result of bargaining among players
positioned hierarchically in the government.»26
Second, the bureaucratic politics paradigm suggests that the
policy positions held by the «players» do not necessarily reflect
genuine convictions; instead theyare shaped by the participants'
positions within the government. This İs summed up in the now
familiar maxi,m: «Where you stand depends on where you sit».
Thus the players in this political game are essentiallya combination
of the pure poli tİcian and a power 'broker in that they seek first
to protect their OWn position and then to promote a particular
interest which they feel advantageous to .them. Policy, then, is not
generated at high levels but is reached at lower levels through a
series of individual and interagency compromises. Allison sum­
marizes the bureaucratic politics process as foI1ows:
«The
organizing concepts of this paradi·gm can be arranged
as elements of three central questions: 1 - Who play? 2 ­
What determines each p],ayer's stand? 3 - How are players'
stands aggregated to yiel,d governmental decisions and
actions ?»'Z7
2f
'l7
Allison and Halperin, İbid., p.43.
Allison. op.clt. (Essence), p.I64.
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Tl'RKISH PVaLlC ADMINISTRATION ANNVAL
The bureaucratic politics paradigm, like other models of
decision-making has been criticized on a number of points. One
central issue involves the description of the policy process as t\
game. This characterization is unfortunate in the sense that it
implies a lack of seriousness on the part of the participants.While
political competition may qualify as a game in Anatol Rapoport's
terminology, it is a contest of ten played in earnest and for keeps.
A specialized use of the wOlid ga,me, coupled with Allison and
Halperin's assertion that participants in the policy process act
more to protect and enhance a narrower self than to promote a
larger national self gives the impression that policy results more
from purdy politicalmaneuver than from a serious attenıpt to
build a consensus bridging the gaps between genuine policy alter­
natives. This impression is not conveyed by the broader political
process model which asserts to the contrary that one of the prime
difficulties in obtaining a policy consensus stems from a situation
where «the states are high and the issues fundamental» and where
passions run strong and full. 28
Further, this negative characterization is doubly unfortunate
for not only is it dubious e,mprical1y -and certainly unf!attering - but
unnecessary to the bureaucratic politics paradigm. it is not neces­
sary to assume that policy-makers are seIf serving or committed
to their particular ageney at the expense of national policy. While
such may sometimes- be the case, it is only necessary to understand
that political bargaining described by the bureaucratic politics
paradigm is inherent İn the system.
As L M. Destler has written;
Bureaucratic politics is the process by which people inside
gov:ernment bargain with ope another on complex policy
questions. Its e:xistence does not connote impropriety, though
such may be present. .. Rather, hureaucratic politics arises
from two inescapable conditions. One is that no single official
possesses either the power or .the wisdom or the time to
decide all important ,executive branch policy issues himself.
z8
Hilsman, op.clt. (To move), p.l0.
THEORIES OF POLITICAL DECISION· MAKING
167
The second is that officials who have influence inevitably
differ in how they would like these issues to be resolved.N
Two other criticisms of the bureaucratic politics view may be
disarmed by incorporating it within the broader political process
modeL. The first is that the bureaucratic politics approach fails to
account for presidential initiatives 30 and the second is that by
restrkting its focus to the executive branch, bureaucratic politics
fails to account for other factors, especially congressional desire
and pressures.3I The broader political process model accounts
for both of these limitations. Regarding the former, it recognizes
that the U .S. President disposes of an awesome array of powers
which he mayernploy to assert his leadership. He may issue policy
directives, and in such cases the process of policy persuasion
moves downward. He mayaıso command and if the orders are self­
executing they wiU in aıı probabiHty be carried out. But this does
not mask the fact that formal powers rarely suffice for effeetive
Icadership; po!itical persuasion remains the President's primary
tooı' Concerning the latter criticism, it may be helpful to view
bureaucratic politics as a subject of the political process model:
it does not disavow the impact of the poHtical system on the foreign
policy process, restricts its focus to one primary field.
A final criticism which may be leveled at the political approach
general derives from the fact that it fails to a~count for the high
degrec of continuHy manifested by states' goals and actions over
time. John Marsanyi, for example, notes that:
İn
if ,ve observe a country's foreign policyover lang periods,
we can-usually discern some fairly stable and consistent
bask policy goals pursued by that countryı subJect to minor
deviations. These basic policy goals seem to undergo only
very slow and gradual changes.32
~')
~
SI
~L
Yozık, 1972, p.52. See, Stephen D. Krasner, «Are Buıreaucracies Important? or Allison Wonderland», Foreign Policy, Summer 1972, pp. 159-179.
Destler, op.cit., pp. 65-66.
John Harsanyi, «Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflkt»
İn Rosenau, ed. International Politlcs, pp. 37~7ı.
i. M. Destler, Presidents, New
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While this is indeed alimitation, it İs not necessarily a serious
one. The political approach endeavors to account for policy on a
realistic day-today basis. It seeks to explain the formulation of a
particular policyand why one decision was taken and not _nother.
One potential explanation of the contifiuity phenomenon is that
consistency of goals represents the expressian of societal values so
basic that theyare not really challenged by policy-makers. For
example, in deciding to İntervene in Vietnam, Americans' basic
opposition to 'authoritarian systems, which dates back to the Revolu~
tionary War, was not called into question. Rather, the questions
which seem to have been asked were; a) Does this particular
conflict threaten us sufficiently to merit intervention? And given
an affirmative answer, b) What form of intervention is therefore
best? The ensuingf battles over U.S., involvement in the war were
fought largeıyon these grounds. Another possibility is that policy
contuinity reflects a political or miHtary fact obvious in its impli­
cations that all regimes would react similarly to it. A good example
can be seen in Britains efforts to dominate the sea until the First
\Vor1d War when this goal became impossible. Or it may be a com­
binatiün of both. But essential point is that the reason for policy
continuity lies beyond the explanatory bounds which political
approach set s for itsel f.
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE
The political process model of decision-making, as presented
here; offers several advantages to an analysis of the relationship
between strueture and process in the formulation of policy. This
model adrnİ ts and takes as its basis the fact that policy making
İs politics, and as such recognizes that organizations aet as ehannels
for the flow of information and authority and that organizational
stmetures and routines carry implieations für policy ehoices. This
also explains fall backs of the foreign policies of the developing
eountries. With a lack of adequate information flow, they always
follow foreign events from behind. And 'most importantly in the
present eontext, the political process frarnework leaves room for
an exploration and analysis of the ways in which organization Dıay
be adapted to correspond rnore closely to the demands of politics
THEORIES OF POLITICAL DECISION· MAKING
169
and thcreby improve the quality of the policy process, and its
product.
The political processmodel, however describes a conditiof!
wherein the division of labor also creates a division of power. This
division of power, in ıturn, undermines the authority of the
executiye. Within the Executive branch, therefore, authoritative
deciston5 can be made at the top only rarely; in more usual cir­
cumstances the authority of a decision derives from consensus
reached among the various interested partidpants. Thus, policy
tends to flow up rather than down. Additionally, there İs litde
homogenity of oıııtlook as the division of labor also creates a
particularization of interest. And beyond this, individuals act from
deeply held values as much or mor.e than they do from a sense of
loyalty or responsibility to the organization per se. In government,
it is not unusual for individuals to be loyal to the nation and give
evidence of this loyalty by working strenuousıy against a policy
which they view as inimical to the best interests of ·the country,
whatever the official position may be. Thus, competition unavoida­
bly springs up between various sectors and between various levels
of government. On the other hand in order to produce effective
decisions, policy-makers must be supplied with information about
particular question, be aware of possible options, and have assess­
ments of the probable ontcomes of alternatives. Decisions made on
the basis of insufficient information and analysis can, at least İn
the long run, only be insuffident. And the conclution, therefore, is
that it is necessary to create mechanisms to provide these servıces
to decision-makers.
The counter argument, as ably argued by Braybrooke and
is that the competition in the political arena between
individuals and groups representing disparate value s does, in fact,
serve to provide information al ternatives and assessments. And
they further contend that this pragmatic combination of evaluation,
competition and capahility results İn a most effective fotrn of
policy a,dvancement.
Lindbloın,
Intel'estingly, however, the incremental model has come ;under
attack as an inadequate means of policy formulation. For example,
Alexander George has aUacked the political-incrernental model as
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Tl'RKISH PUSLlE ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL
having several dysfunctional aspects which are the result of im­
perfect competition in a pluralist system.33 His contention İs that
political competition, Ieft to İts OWn devices, does not adequately
provide possihle policy a1ternatives and evaluatİons of those alter­
natives. The tendeney, he says, is for the s'trong to out-muscle and
out-shout the weak, with the result that policy is made on the
basİs of strength rather then merlt. George's solution to this inade­
quacy of the system is to create bodies whose specific purpose is
to generate alternatiye solutions and then argue them vigorously
İn appropriate councils. In other words, He seeks, through organiza­
tional modifications, to improve existing poUtkal process of policy
formu1ation. His aim is not to supress the politics of the system,
but rather :to capitalize on the exİsting plurali.ty of the system and
thereby to widen the scope of investİgation and analysis. George
argues that :
more openly competitive system... is more likely to secure
a critical e:x:amination and weighing of policy considerations,
outside of as well as inside the executiye branch.34
Similarly, Robert Rothst,e,in has inveighed what he considers
the deficiencies of an incremental system based on a mistaken faith
in muddling through to success. Rothstein's recommendation is
for the creation of a newand more effective planning process as
a way to improve policy-making. His contentian is that policy­
makers must have knowledge of Iong range trends and developments
if theyare to produce adequate and coherent policy.3s
Best explanation to incremental model is given by Herbert Simon. Simon
suggests that do not go about maximiring their goals, but-given the
great difficulty of making decisions - merely «satisficing them, a term
he uses to deseribe the process of considering alternatives sequentially,
or incrementally, until one 'Comes along that seems to meet certain
requirements See.: Herbert A Simon, Models of .Man: soclal and Rat1onaI,
New Yorık, Wiley, 1957. Charles Lindblom model is called «sucressive
limited comparison» modeL. Lindblom, idem.
w Alexander L. George, «The case for Multiple Advocacy in Maıking Foreign
Policy», American PollticaI Science Review, LXVI, September 1972, p.751.
3S Robert Rothstein, Planning, Prediction and Policymaking in Foreign
Affairs, Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1972.
!3
THBORIBS OF POLITICAL DECISION· MAKING
171
A third and highly suggestive approach:1o the rationalization
of the policy-making process has heen suggested by Yehezekel
Dror.36 Dror suggests that scientific approach to policy-maJdng
should be developed which would improve the quality of decision­
making through the application of systematically acquired «policy­
making knowledge». This knowledge, which deals with the problem
of how to make policy about policy or metapolicy as Dror refers
to it can then be applied to improve the design and operations of
policymaking s)'istems.37
An ,impartant aspect of these proposals is ıthat each empIoys
an organizational device to improve the policy-making process and
hence upgrade the quality of policy. UnderIying each, therefore, is
the idea that organizational reform can improve the quality of
foreign policy, not radically, not dramatically, but at the margin
and through gradual improvement. As a counter argurnent, I.M.
Destler contends that governments as institutions are not as
maneabIe as many would !ike to think, and that in anY event, there
is no way for reason to overcome the diversi:ty of güals and means
that are inevitable among participants in foreign policymaking., ,38
Destler is undoubtly correct: organizational devices cannot be
cxpected to suppress politics. But Destler argument misses the
point in that it is not a question .of overcoming or suppressing,
supplanting politics with organizational manipulations, but it is
a problem of accommodating political pressures within organiza­
tional channels and rationalizing themso that policy not only
reflects a consensus, but to ensure that the consensus is an İD­
teligent one. George, for example, does not seek itO overcome
mulıtiple demands; if anything he seeks to institutionalize diversity
and thereby make it work for rather than again coherent policy.
In asimilar manner, Rothsıein argues for creation of bodies which
WiII provide information to po li cy-m akers that transcends the
confines of the immediate batılıe and thereby improve their
pe:rıspective in making policy choices. Neiıther of these proposals
36
37
.;8
Y.ehezekel Dror, Publtc Pol.icymaking Reexamined, San Fransisco, Chandler,
1968. Ibid., p. 8, Destler, op.clt., p. 56. Tl"RKISH PUBLlC ADMINISTRA1'ION ANNlJAL
172
attempts to supplant politics with reason; their contention, rather,
is that reason and politics are not wholly incompatible and that,
indeed, certain organizational reforıns can be undertaken to
rationalize the policy process.
CONCLUSION
In every nation some bodies are established to restructure the
Executive branch in oı:der to ohtain a more effective policy process.
National Security Councils, for example, were designed to
coordinate the activities of the civiHan and ,military components
of the national security system at the highest levels of government.
it was also intended to provide the President with a broad range
of a1ternatives and evaluations to enable him to make intelligent
choices. And third, the staff of the National Securi ty Council, in
any case, was to function as a source of independent studyand
analysis of particular problems in relative freedom from the
pressures of day-to-day political battles. This latter function in
some countries was also assigned to other departments of the State
in an effort to improve State's analytical capacity and capabilities.
Let's ask to ourselves, did these restructuring effoııts provide means
to accomodate and incorporate political pressures so as to improve
the quaHty and timeliness of foreign policy decisions? Arthur
Macmahon in his well-known book describes three requisites of
organizational performance in the decision-making process:
In an argument similar to Roth­
stein'g Macmahon suggests that for a government to be effective
it must possess a planning capability. Because many aspects of
foreign affairs cannot be controBed, the need for planning is
essential in order to recognize possible alternatives and assess their
long-range impHcations. Without this ahilHy, policy becomes
chaotic, the nation becomes an ineffective international actor,
and its safety is endangered. Govern,ments, therefore must plan.
But planning must not be conducted in a haphazard fashion;
otherwise it cannot provide a meaningful assessment of the myriad
of faots which innuendo dejartments and agencies. Planıning, ıf
i t is to be effective, must be conducted in a systematic maınner,
-
A need for foresight:
THEORIES OF POLITICAL DECISION - MAKING
173
and the results Df analysis must be available tO' those whDse
responsibiHty it is to make the critical chDices.39
- Maintenance of the prerogatives of the top: Because Df
their pDlitical nature, and sheer number, most decisions are not
made at the tDP levels of goveınment but «arise by consensus» as
the product of analysis and pDlitical competition frDm various
activities at lower levels. This process has a par.ticular soundness;
fur to burden the highest officers with a stream of unremittant
decisions would be premature, unecessary and potentially dangerous:
premature in that decisiDns not suppoııted by CDnsensus are Hkely
to be ineffective; unnecessary in that consensus in ,many cases
obviates the need fDr choice at high levels; aııd dangerous in that
burdening tDP officials with lesser CDncerns necessarily detracts
from the quality of their consideratiDn of Dther, more vital matters.
But while an upward flow decision by consensus may be necessary,
the prerogatives of the tDP ınust be maintained. As Macmahon
expresses, it, «the pDtential of drastic choice must exist ... and be
eonstantly felt in all parts». Decisions which entail great responsa­
bility-to use the atomic weapon, to intervene with armed force,
to committhe state to the defense of anather nation-must be
made by those Dn whDm that responsability ultimately falıs. Thus
the system must be eapable Df plaeing the huck on the President's
or Prime Minister's desk.
- Systems of conınıunicatİon and enforcement: To be
effctive, decisiDns must be executed. This in turn requires a system
of communication so that decisions made at the center can be
madeknDwn throughout the vast complex Df governmental
stmeture. And in additiDn tO' mere communication, the authoritiy
of decisiDns must be conveyed and respected at lower levels;
Dtherwise theyare hollow.
As l\1ichael Sullivan suggested: «the entire picture of a decision
can never be made; any desription n1ust exclude same infDrmation...
there is no way knawing for sure what effect that organizational
''I Arthur W. Macmahon, Administration in Foreign Affalrs, University of
Allabaıma Press, 1953, pp. 3-5.
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ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL
quirk had.»40 Decision-maıking studies are a very difficuIt enterprise
and thoory~building process has not been spectacular ei,ther.
Anyhow, they form a useful and a new approach to the study of
foreign policy.
40
Michael P. SulHvan, International Relatlons: Theorles and Evidence, The
University of Arizona, Prentice Hall of New Jersey, 1976, p.93.