WP-13850-2014
(GAYA PRASAD MISHRA Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH)
22-04-2015
Petitioner has filed this petition challenging the order dated 4.7.2014
passed by the SDO/competent authority, Rewa exercising jurisdiction
under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 with regard to the
land in question which is being acquired under the National Highways
Act, 1956. There is a serious dispute between the petitioner and the
respondents No.6 and 7 with regard to the right and title of the
property. The competent authority exercising the statutory power has
gone into the question based on certain partition which had taken place
earlier between the brothers and the entries in the revenue entries and
directed for distribution of the compensation apportionment between
the two brothers.
2. From the record, we find that acquisition for the land in question
pertains to four Khasra numbers namely Khasra Nos.773, 775, 776 and
777. As far as Khasra Nos.776 and 777 are concerned, it the case of the
petitioner that these are his self earned property which were purchased
through the registered sale-deed and did not fall part of the partition. As
far as Khasra Nos.773 and 775 are concerned, it is the case of the
petitioner that he has received some part of the said property in the
partition. The learned competent authority has gone into the question in
detail and found that the petitioner having accepted the partition cannot
blow hot and cold at the same time, the petitioner on one side accepts
the partition and at the same time, he says that he has acquired the
land in question by purchasing the same through a registered sale-deed
and based on these findings the impugned order is passed. Be that it
may, learned counsel for the petitioner invites attention of this Court to
the provision of Section 3H sub-section (4) of the National Highways Act,
1956 and contends that when there is a dispute with regard to the title
of the property, the competent authority exercising jurisdiction under
Section 3G of the Act cannot go into the said question, he had to refer
the dispute to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the
limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated to cause an enquiry with
regard to the right of the parties. Accordingly, it is argued by Shri
Ghildiyal that instead of refering the matter to the principal Civil Court
as contemplated in section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act, 1956,
the competent authority usurped jurisdiction and has gone into the
question of title which is not permissible in law.
3. Shri Manoj Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.6
and 7 has contended that with regard to the same dispute, the
petitioner has also raised a claim by way of an appeal before the
Commissioner under section 3G(5) and therefore this petition is not
maintainable. He further pointed out that there is a partition between
the parties and as the competent authority has determined the question
based on the partition, in fact there is no dispute which is to be referred
under Section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act, 1956.
4. We have considered the rival contentions. As far as the question of
appeal filed by the petitioner under section 3G(5) of the National
Highways Act, 1956 before the Commissioner is concerned, we find that
under Section 3G(5), the Commissioner is only empowered to go into
the question of quantification of compensation. If there is a dispute with
regard to the title and ownership of the property, the same is beyond
the jurisdiction of the appellate authority as provided under Section
3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. To that effect, the preliminary
objection raised by the respondents cannot be sustained for the simple
reason that in this proceeding, the question is with regard to the right,
title and ownership of the parties to the property based on the partition
or otherwise. That apart, this is a case where both parties are claiming
their right on the property and the order is based on certain partition.
5. The next question is as to whether the competent authority has
usurped jurisdiction by going into the question himself and not referring
the dispute to principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in view of the
provision of Section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act, 1956. Section
3H(4) National Highways Act, 1956 reads as under:3H. Deposit and payment of amount..
4.
If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or
any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any
part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the
dispute to the decision of the principal civil court of original
jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is
situated.
6. A perusal of aforesaid provision shows that if there is dispute with
regard to apportionment of the amount or part thereof, or the person to
whom it is payable, then the competent authority shall refer the dispute
for decision to the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. This means
that when there is a dispute with regard to the title of the property or
ownership i.e., as to who is the person entitled to receive the
compensation based on which apportionment of compensation has to be
done between the parties then this has to be done as per the decision of
the principal civil court of original jurisdiction and the competent
authority under section 3G has to refer the matter to the principal civil
Court of original jurisdiction and it is the principal civil court which can
decide the matter. A perusal of record shows that the competent
authority went into the question of ownership or title based on the
partition said to have been effected between the parties and the entries
in the revenue record, has determined the question of apportionment of
compensation. In our view, this could not be done. The questions as to
whether any partition took place between the parties by consent,
whether partition was proper or not or the petitioner acquired right by
purchase etc. were disputed. All these questions are required to be
referred to the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction who would be
the appropriate authority to adjudicate the same and then direct for
apportionment of the compensation.
7. That apart, as far as the objection raised by the learned counsel for
respondent to show that the competent authority has conducted the
enquiry in view of the directions issued by this Court in Writ Petitions
No.20438/2013 and 20436/2013 on 13.3.2014 is concerned, we are of
the considered view that the writ Court had only directed the competent
authority to consider the objection and proceed further in accordance
with law. That does not mean that the competent authority is also
authorised to consider and proceed in the matter even if it had no
jurisdiction. As the competent authority has acted in excess of the
jurisdiction vested in him, as the matter pertains to title and ownership
of property, it should have been referred to the principal civil Court of
original jurisdiction as contemplated in section 3H(4) of the National
Highways Act, 1956. In view of the aforesaid, we have no option but to
remand the matter to the competent authority.
8. Accordingly, we allow this petition and the impugned order passed by
the competent authority/SDO is quashed. The matter is remanded back
to the competent authority, who is directed to refer the matter to the
principal civil Court of original jurisdiction as contemplated under
section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act, 1956 within 15 days from
the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
9. That apart, all parties who have received the compensation are
directed to deposit the amount so received within a period of 30 days
with the competent authority and on being deposit of the same, the
competent authority shall deposit the entire amount in fixed deposit in
the nationalised bank and thereafter shall disburse the same to the
parties after a decision is taken by the principal civil Court of original
jurisdiction to whom the reference is to be made under section 3H(4) of
the National Highways Act, 1956.
10. With the aforesaid, the petition stands allowed and disposed of.
(RAJENDRA MENON)
JUDGE
(MOOL CHAND GARG)
JUDGE