Nuclear Deterrence in Practice
The vulnerability of cities, bombers &
missiles during the 1950s was a point of
major concern
• If bombers could be
caught on the ground…
• If cities could be wiped out
• If missiles could be
targeted…
• Both retaliation & will
would be insufficient
• Nuclear deterrence would
not “work”
• But this problem was never
really solved—if it was a
real problem…
Moreover, was “massive retaliation” a
credible threat?
• With the “New Look,” the
Eisenhower Administration
threatened to launch full-scale
war against Communist actions
• Some thought it not credible to
make such a threat in response
to minor provocations
• Thus was born “Flexible
Response,” which envisioned
escalatory tactics prior to the
full thing
By the early 1960s, U.S.
missiles were becoming
more accurate and could,
perhaps, hit missile silos
McNamara proposed a “no cities strategy”—
counterforce attacks only—which raised a political
firestorm in 1962
"To Have the Only
Option That of
Killing 80 Million
People is the Height
of Immorality"
Henry Kissinger,
1973
But the Nixon Administration struggled, once again,
with “limited nuclear options” even as it negotiated arms
control treaties with the USSR (SALT I & ABM Treaty)
Nixon also launched a new ballistic missile program,
first called “Sentinel,” then “Safeguard,” directed
against China. Only one site was completed.
After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, U.S.Soviet relations began to decline, once again. By
the end of the decade, a new missile race had begun
Soviet missiles were bigger & heavier
Conservatives worried that Soviet missiles
could knock out the American arsenal
They lobbied for a new, heavier, multi-warhead
missile, the “Missile Experimental” or MX,
which would be moved around on trains
They also organized the “Committee on the Present
Danger” and a “Team B” review of the CIA’s analysis
of Soviet strength and intentions
Around 1976, the USSR began to put
IRBMs (SS-20s) in Eastern Europe
It was feared this opened a “gap” in the ladder of
extended deterrence, which had to be filled by
NATO IRBMs: nuclear –armed Pershing II and
cruise missiles
During early 1980s, there was renewed
talk about nuclear war, which led to
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Revival of anti-nuclear movements
“Nuclear Freeze”
Films such as “The Day After” & “Red Dawn”
Catholic Bishop’s letter critical of MAD
Backpedaling by Reagan Administration
Strategic Defense Initiative
U.S.-Soviet negotiations: INF, Reykjavik
summit, START I
• And then 1989 and all that...
“Through the SDI research program, I have called upon the great
scientific talents of our country to turn to the cause of strengthening
world peace by rendering ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete.” Ronald
Reagan, 1984
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) dates back to
the early days of the Cold War
• BMD was never designed or
intended to destroy all incoming
missiles—since missing even as few
as 10% would still result in
enormous destruction
• But the possibility that some
fraction of an attack could be
prevented might give an attacker
pause
• And, if missile silos could be
defended, they would survive an
attack and could be fired in
retaliation
• Thus, BMD becomes one more
element in the uncertainty
surrounding deterrence
Is there a nuclear strategy today?
• Little expectation of a
massive nuclear threat
• Limited expectation of largescale conventional war to be
deterred
• Asymmetric warfare and
insurgencies not amenable to
nuclear threats
• Nuclear strikes against rogue
facilities unlikely to succeed
• And there are serious doubts
that deterrence will continue
to “work” as in the past