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Article Title: Reassessing China's Democratic
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Vol. 40, No.5
ments." Singapore
ll Development in
Asian Profile
October, 2012
Reassessing China's Democratic Potential:
Emerging Middle Class, Political Consciousness and
Social Unrest
FRANCIS SCHORTGEN
Assistant Professor
Political Science and International Studies
University of Mount Union
Alliance, Ohio
USA
I have said on many occasions and I will say again the Arab Spring is coming to China as well.
-Sen. John McCain (4 February 2012)
I have so far found no evidence to support the multiple analyses over several decades now that China
was on the verge of breaking up, or its rising middle class was about to bring about a Chinese version
of the Arab Spring and with it the collapse of Communist Party rule.
-Kevin Rudd, Australian Foreign Affairs Minister (January 15, 2012)
Introduction
Against the backdrop of three decades of sustained economic growth, the prospects of the
political logic of economic reform (Shirk, 1993) (centered around the four modernizations)
gradually paving the way for a socia1logic of a.fifth modernization (i.e. political reform) have been
the subject of enduring scholarly controversy. On one end of the debate are "democracy optimists"
who, in the spirit of Seymour Martin Lipset (1960), advocate the inevitability of democratization.
Sustained economic development will inevitably produce an emerging middle class with rising
social aspirations, a gradual shift in political value changes, and growing rights consciousness.
The combined effect of these evolving trends will be a gradual re-pressurization of the political
sphere. Further underscoring the apparent prospects of sweeping political liberalization in China is
the speed and scope of the mass extinction of Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe in the aftermath
of a crisis of Marxist-Leninist ideology (Chriot, 1991; Jowitt, 1992). For their part, "democracy
450
Asian Profile
pessimists" seek to confound predictions of China's democratic future by pointing to the perceived
intransigence on the part of leading officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In a speech
to the National People's Congress (NPC), Wu Bangguo, Chairman and Party Secretary of the NPC
Standing Committee, declared that "China's system of political parties is a system of multiparty
cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, not
a Western-style multiparty system ... we will never simply copy the system of Western countries
or introduce a system of multiple parties holding office in rotation, a system with the separation
of the three powers or a bicameral system." 1 In their eyes, expectations of substantive political
reform and liberalization merely perpetuate a naive "China Fantasy" (Mann, 2007) and appear to
purposely dismiss the effect of authoritarian upgrading and official powers of repression. Moreover,
the view of global resurgence of democracy is no longer an unquestionable fact. As Larry Diamond
acknowledges, " ... celebrations of democracy's triumph are premature. In a few short years, the
democratic wave has been slowed by a powerful authoritarian undertow, and the world has slipped
into a democratic recession" (Diamond, 2008, p. 36). Ultimately, both the optimistic and pessimistic
perspectives on China's democratic future entail a high degree of analytical and ideological rigidity.
Neither is engaged in a substantive effort at disaggregating Chinese society to the point where
detailed contextual analysis would inform their views on the likely prospects of democratization.
A third group, which I call "democracy pragmatists", are much more reserved, cautious and
careful in examining the contemporary evidence. Where "democracy pessimists" do not see any
overt inklings of democracy, they note that "endogenous and incremental changes in the political
institutions of the authoritarian regime are gradually forming subtle but important checks and
balances against the ruling party's monopoly of power, strengthening the rule of law, and cultivating
self-government at the grassroots level" (Pei, 1995, p. 66). Furthermore, more predictable policymaking, evolving strategies of governance, gradual establishment of legal structures and rule of
law (though still open to substantive charges of inconsistent and arbitrary application), may merely
suggest a directional trend towards greater social (and to a lesser extent, political) liberalization,
rather than a wholesale and irresistible democratization of the Chinese polity. Some even counsel
against unconstrained pressure and/or desire for rapid and irresponsible push for democracy. In
their view, too rapid an approach to democratization could lead to "societal disintegration and the
collapse of Chinese Communist Party rule and even to the fragmentation of China into several
competing polities" (Ogden, 2002, p. 7).
The forces of globalization have undoubtedly acted as a fundamental catalyst for state
transformation in China (Zheng, 2004). Notwithstanding the positive effects on China's economic
development and growth rates, globalization also poses significant challenges to the Leninist PartyState structure in China. It is the globalization challenge that has seen many pundits jump rather
expeditiously on the democratization bandwagon, armed first and foremost with the argument that
democratization is a byproduct of modernization and economic development, which in turn are
heavily influenced and defined by globalization. The revolutionary fervor of the Arab Spring that
has been spreading in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region since December 2010 has
breathed new life into the prospects of China's authoritarian regime also succumbing to the forces
that ousted Arab regimes whose authoritarian upgrading eventually proved unable to stand the test
of time in the face of comprehensive popular demands for political change (Heydemann, 2007).
The prospect of the Chinese polity transforming into a liberal democratic system on the heels of
sustained economic modernization and growth is by no means a foregone conclusion. Studying the
nature of the relationship between economic reform and democratization, Valerie Bunce concludes
that it is shaped significantly by the timing of democratization, the agenda of transformation,
1.
The full text of Wu Banggu's remarks to the 2009 annual session of the National People's Congress is available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Speeches/2009-03/ 16/content_l493447_5 .htm (Accessed 3 March 20 12).
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Asian Profile
451
and variations in governing mandates (Bunce, 2001). If the search for value changes that may
mobilize the reformist elements of the CCP and the citizenry to take the path towards democracy
is conducted exclusively through the lens of modernization theory, predictions of a successful
transition to, and eventually consolidation of, democracy may prove rather untenable. Rather, the
formulation of "a full explanatory account of the steady growth of democratic orientation" (Chu,
Chang, & Huang, 2004) in China will prove more compelling if it combines modernization theory,
institutionalism, rationality, and political culture.
In this paper, I attempt to provide a contextual analysis of the prospects and progress of political
reform in China that bridges the gap between "democracy optimists" and "democracy pessimists".
First, I contend that the relationship between economic development and democratization has
been overemphasized in China, and is likely to play out in a very different way, shape, form and
timing than many proponents of Chinese democratization would have it. While I do not dismiss
outright the likelihood of deepening political liberalization in China in the future, I do contend
that talk of an impending Chinese democratic future, hastened by the Arab Spring demonstration
effect is premature at best, and at worst fails to take into account the historical, social, economic
and political realities and changes in post-Mao China. Secondly, the highly pragmatic Chinese
leadership has (thus far) managed to avoid a characteristic trend of authoritarian regimes, in times
of acute crisis, devolving into entropy and obsolescence due to the rigidities of their founding
ideologies and purposes. Deliberate yet cautious pragmatism that has come to be seen as a hallmark
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the course of three decades of economic reform
and restructuring is also reflected to a significant degree in the CCP's efforts to build "political
democracy" (State Council, 2005). Thirdly, the historical legacies of the Maoist era and the 1989
Tiananmen Square Incident have channeled the energies and commitments of both the political
elite and the population at large to enhancing and expanding marketization in China. The result has
been a genuine depoliticization of social life, depressurization of the political sphere, and general
marginalization of political mobilization (Gore, 2000). Thus, "building socialism with Chinese
characteristics" Uianshe you zhongguo teshe de shehui zhuyi) may in the context of democratization
transpire into "building democracy with Chinese characteristics" Uianshe you zhongguo teshe de
minzhu).
Prior to substantiating the arguments outlined above, I deem it important to briefly comment on
the dominant theoretical approaches to democratization, and to an all-too-pervasive deterministic
motivation transcending both its process and overall advocacy. Next, I will contextualize my
discussion of China through a comparative note on reform efforts in Marxist-Leninist systems. In
addition to offering a brief comparison of reform efforts in China and the former Soviet Union, I
will also point to the flawed analytical logic of using the Arab Spring as a predictive indicator of
a "Beijing Spring". The remainder of the paper will assess and evaluate the pressures for political
reform and the democratic potential in China. Finally, I will offer some concluding remarks on the
probability and nature of a democratic future in China.
Democratization, Determinism, and Processes
A whole range of contemporary views, analyses by democracy pundits, and yes, even a
significant bookshelf space in the academic literature have, for whatever reason- be it ignorance of
facts and/or context; strongly-held idealistic or ideological views, etc.- fallen into the analysis trap
that Ogden has so aptly and succinctly outlined. In assessing the potential for democracy in China,
the starting point and analytical processes used ought to be as value-free as possible and certainly
not limited to one theoretical approach alone.
In fact, democratization literature encompasses three main theoretical approaches. The
"modernization approach" advocates economic determinism, while dismissing the importance
452
Asian Profile
of historical contextualization. The reductionist analytical leanings and causal simplicity of
this approach are counterbalanced by the "historical sociology" approach, which emphasizes
historical processes. The primary utility of such a structural approach lies in facilitating a wellgrounded and highly explanatory and meaningful comparison. Finally, the "transition studies" (or
agency) approach stresses the presence of committed actors, translating into a political process of
democratization.
As the abundance of scholarly literature on democratization suggests, it is rather easy to
become wrapped up in a desire to make new, arguably ground-breaking contributions to an already
complex volume of competing theories and causal arguments, types of determinism, and paths of
democratization (Larsen, 2000). A "modified crises and sequences model" of political transition,
holds significant promise to explain China's democratization potential (or the lack thereof) (Wu,
1994). According to Wu, traditional modernization theories have limited utility in that they do not
account for timing, process, or the complex roots of revolutionary changes. In a similar vein, the
political transition literature's near-exclusive process orientation leaves comparatively little room
for substantive integration of relevant wider contextual variables.
To date, much of the democracy-centered aspect of the China discourse represents an idealisminfused misinterpretation and ill-informed analysis of the prospects for democratization in China,
fueled to some extent by "inapt comparisons between the fate of socialist regimes in Europe and
China" (Young, 1995, p. 652), and glaring unawareness of the scope and implications of economic
and social changes that have come to and continue to define post-Tiananmen China.
From Arab Spring to Beijing Spring?
It is certainly no exaggeration to claim that the spotlight of the democratization debate has been
pointed at China in recent years. Considering that the student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square
in June 1989, and the repressive reaction of the CCP thereto, symbolized the first mass pressures
for political change in the socialist bloc (even preceding the tumultuous events that would mark
the beginning of the end of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe a few months later), the fact
that China's socialist state structure has thus far proved immune to the Eastern European contagion
effect makes exploring the reasons behind this outcome especially worthwhile from a comparative
political perspective. Indeed, it begets a range of provocative and intellectually stimulating
questions and research avenues, including: Is post-Mao China a possible viable alternative to
Western liberal capitalism? Could it be that democracy is merely delayed in China?
With the adoption of a substantive Reform and Open Door policy, beginning in the late 1970s,
China's political leadership de-emphasized the Maoist-era "politics in command" approach in favor
of an "economics in command" commitment. With this policy shift, the government appeared to
signal its commitment to addressing people's physiological and safety needs in the wake of the
widespread political, economic and social upheaval resulting from the Cultural Revolution. In the
near- to medium-term, self-actualization would not appear synonymous with clamoring for political
freedom and democracy but rather in sowing the seeds of economic well-being and reaping the
benefits of modernization and industrialization.
A sustained post-Mao economic boom has allowed China to emerge as the world's secondlargest economy by 2011 and paved the way for a burgeoning middle class that has come to
represent a powerful economic constituency. Beyond that, the revolutionary fervor spreading
through much of the MENA region appears to have rekindled hopes that China's emerging middle
class could in due course draw inspiration and hope from the relative success of the Arab Spring
in mounting a credible challenge to the political legitimacy of longstanding regional autocrats
and transform itself into a credible sociopolitical force advocating for a heretofore elusive fifth
modernization in China- extensive political modernization and democratization (Li, 2010).
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Despite the intensifying assertiveness of China's working classes, as evinced by an emerging
rights consciousness and a spectacular uptake in "mass incidents" - they have increased
roughly ten-fold since 1993 to reach 87,000 in 2005 - it would be misguided to interpret these
dynamics as evidence of an emerging legitimacy crisis that will pose an existential challenge to a
"decentralized predatory state" (Pei, 2008, p. 138) and will pave the way to political liberalization
and democratization. Rather, they reflect a general sense of frustration over unfulfilled or delayed
economic gratification and/or anger against widespread corruption, lack of accountability and
usurpation of power by local and regional government officials. As Elizabeth Perry has aptly
remarked, the temptation to depict the rising incidence of popular protests as "indicative of an
emergent 'civil society' posing a growing challenge to the authority of the Chinese Communist
state should probably be resisted" (Perry, 2010, p. 16). Framing these "mass incidents" as catalysts
of an eventual "Beijing Spring" is a conceptually and contextually flawed comparative logic.
Using the Arab Spring as a predictive indicator of the likelihood for political change in China
raises a methodological concern about equivalence and the importance of "contextualized analysis"
in comparative politics. Specifically, it is important to recognize that there is a clear distinction
between cross-national comparative analysis and longitudinal analysis. When engaging in the
former, it is imperative to ensure issue or process equivalence. Even so, to avoid issue or process
equivalence being arbitrarily assigned, the strategy of "contextualized comparison", including
emphasis on starting and sticking points should be adopted. In assessing the prospects of a popular
uprising weakening, if not eradicating the state's political legitimacy and opening the door to
political democratization, the adoption of a contextualized comparative approach would alert the
analyst to the fact that seemingly common trends in MENA and China- that is, political legitimacy
concerns - "have been refracted into very different conflicts, centering on divergent substantive
issues in alternative national contexts" (Locke & Thelen, 1998, p. 11). Adopting a longitudinal
perspective, it also becomes clear that whereas, despite similar efforts at authoritarian upgrading,
the Chinese leadership has not suffered from autocratic myopia of the sort that has doomed nondemocratic regimes in MENA in recent months. In fact, the CCP has committed itself to a political
adaptation strategy over time to retain political legitimacy without paying more than lip-service to
the notion of political democracy.
Even so, the Chinese Party-State is manifestly in the midst of a transition period, in which the
CCP is actively searching for a new formula to guarantee its hold on power. The apparent futility
of more or less maintaining current levels of monopolistic political control lies in the fundamental
incompatibility, as some scholars see it, "between the CCP's goal of perpetuating its political
monopoly and its means of doing so through market-oriented economic reform ... " (Pei, 2002, p. 1).
The countervailing forces and stabilizing trends that usually offset pressures exerted on social and
political fabrics are gradually emerging in China, though they are still rather weak and tentative at
present (Pei, 2000). Given the right catalyst, the current weak basis of these countervailing forces
may well crumble and let loose a new torrent of popular dissent. Some scholars have for years
pointed to three main trends that could be potential triggers of increasing levels of socio-political
instability, and could potentially even condemn the Chinese Party-State, in its traditional Leninist
structure, to the dustbin of history. These trends include a visible rise of independent social forces;
rising levels of inequality, corruption, and inflation; and the clear loosening of political control over
the population, and of the subordination oflocal governments to the center (Walder, 1997).
Is the CCP well positioned to insist on preserving a socialist "superstructure" on top of a
capitalistic "infrastructure"? China's capitalist market reforms have raised the specter of a postcommunist personality following the demise of the Communist moral order of the Maoist era, and
the overall ideological bankruptcy of the Party. If "the post-communist personality is not part of
the Communist Party's design" and the moral and ideological disjunction in post-Mao China has
all the imprints of the confusion and chaos that define the contradictions within the CCP's "protocapitalist reform program" (Wang, 2002), it becomes easily apparent that the question of continued
454
Asian Profile
legitimacy and maintenance of power has assumed a new level of urgency among the Party elite.
Will the Party-State, as Suzanne Ogden argues, "continue to act in a very pragmatic, rational,
cost-benefit way that is neither threatening to social order nor threatening to the CCP staying in
power" (Ogden, 2004)? Or is Ross Terrill on target with his observation that "Beijing's unfailing
instinct to put the maintenance of Communist autocratic power at the center of its calculations will
eventually be its undoing" (Terrill, 2003)?
Pressures for Political Reform
Present-day legitimacy of the CCP may rest on two crucial pillars - economic growth and
national greatness - but the core base of Chinese Communist legitimacy is to be found in the
Party's revolutionary tradition. The organizational features that proved instrumental to the CCP
as a revolutionary organization - (I) revolutionary ideology (the CCP as a "vanguard party"); (2)
democratic centralism; and (3) mobilization and mass campaigns - have gradually lost relevance
in the changing political context of post-1949 China. As China made the transition from waging
revolution to building a state, the CCP was forced to acknowledge an inevitable shift from
legitimacy based on revolutionary tradition to legitimacy based on policy performance (Deng &
Guo, 2011; Guo, 2010; Sandby-Thomas, 2011; Zhu, 2011).
In recent years, the Chinese Party-State has exhibited numerous structural and institutional
weaknesses. Though not necessarily commensurate with exaggerated pessimistic predictions
about the coming political collapse of Communist Party rule (Goldstone, 1995), these purported
weaknesses have immeasurably contributed to a growing sense of unease in top political circles
about potentially significant Party vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include (1) a shrinking, and
increasingly volatile social support base; (2) declining credibility of official organizations; (3) lack
of credible institutions that can serve as mediums for interest articulation and state-society conflict
resolution; and (4) lack of functioning institutional channels for resolution of intra-state conflicts.
However, partially offsetting these structural and institutional Party-State weaknesses, Pei argues,
is the small relative comfort zone still offered by ( 1) prevailing weakness and lack of organization
of opposition movements, and (2) continued unity and cohesion of elite circles. In other words, the
CCP still has more than adequate breathing space to restructure and reposition itself, with a focus
on pre-empting the emergence of movements and factions that may take aim at party pragmatism
and hope to shake the very foundations of party legitimacy with the aim of making political
democratization a necessity rather than a calculated, progressive and structured choice that may
unfold gradually and in ever-so-carefully measured doses (Pei, 1999).
Moreover, as a result of China's gradual economic transformation, a moral gap has emerged
with the demise of the Communist moral order of the Maoist era. A fundamental challenge
to the Party lies in developing a political formula that allows for a successful combination of
Leninist Party structure and capitalist market economy fundamentals. Accentuating the inherent
contradictions in such a formula, the Party's call in late 2004 for political reform, based increasingly
on rule oflaw seems rather incompatible with the insistence on continued one-party dominance.
In their analysis of the evolution and eventual disintegration of Communist Party-States,
Maria Csamidi and Lai Hairong advance the concept of the Interactive Party-State (IPS) model
(Csamidi & Lai, 2003). They suggest that the demise of Party-States is not simply associated with
the breakdown of the party but with the gradual erosion of "linkage principles" that had sustained
the Party-State structure for a long time. The transformation of the Chinese Party-State appears
to be following a so-called self-withdrawing transformation and reproduction pattern (Csamidi
& Lai, 2003). In support of their proposition, the authors point to (a) the fast growing share in
employment, and production contribution of non-state enterprises; (b) the large amount of foreign
and domestic private capital infiltrating the Party-State network and increasing the market field
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outside the network; (c) the growing budgetary deficits; (d) the decline in the number of economic
units attached to the network; and (e) the increasing number of village, township and county level
free-and semi-free elections for redistribution of responsibilities and enhancing willingness for
collaboration and resource contribution.
The CCP may well come to the realization that preservation of a socialist superstructure on
top of a capitalistic infrastructure is an attempt at reconciling irreconcilable differences. Only time
will tell how effective and successful the Party will be in regaining lost social support and political
legitimacy without resorting to traditional Leninist Party approaches. The death of ideology leaves
the Party with nothing but economic deliverables as the basis of legitimacy. All the while, an
inevitable side-effect of ideological bankruptcy - opportunism and corruption - is further chipping
away at even this last layer of legitimacy. Thus, the only way to stave off loss of legitimacy is a
more comprehensive opening up of the political process and expansion of the social support base.
Steps that ought to be considered include legislative and legal reforms, expansion of elections
and empowerment of civil society. Viewed from the traditional Leninist Party structure, the embrace
of such bottom-up measures is tantamount to intentional undermining of political legitimacy.
Ironically though, it is just such a drastic measure that may prove crucial in extending the CCP's
political legitimacy in the absence of core ideological values. Better to embrace such measures at
a time when organized political opposition is still largely non-existent and when surviving of the
political transition process is still, comparatively speaking, easier to ensure in China at present,
provided that a certain weakening of power and control will become an acceptable proposition to
the ruling elite.
China's Democratic Potential
China has not yet been confronted by nationally-coordinated mass pressures and grassroots
democracy movements as emerged during the period of decline of Communism in Eastern Europe.
This lack of overt challenge to the CCP legitimacy has at least partially been attributed to the rather
more sophisticated control and coercion mechanisms at the disposal of the Chinese government.
An alternative, and more commonly accepted explanation, stresses the social effect of sustained
economic growth, reform and transformation since 1979. In fact, it is tempting to argue that China's
democratic future has been - at least temporarily - "Guangdonged" 2 or rendered unattractive by
virtue of being eclipsed by economic decentralization and a gradual increase in local autonomy.
Democracy, as Shaohua Hu puts it, "has not been a necessity, but a luxury to the Chinese" (Hu,
2000, p. 149). It might well remain so for the foreseeable future, as the youth of 21st century China,
in contrast to MENA countries that have or are currently experiencing revolutionary movements,
is not giving any indication that it is tempted to embrace the role of democracy agitators. Not only
are they too focused in their pursuit of consumerism, but they "are also less inclined to place the
blame for everything with the communist government" (Chang, 1998, p. 85). For the majority of
Chinese, democratic aspirations are not an end in itself. Considering China's quest for national
wealth, power and recognition, it does not matter to them whether the political system is pluralistic
2.
In coining this term, I owe my inspiration to Lucian Pye who, in the context of nationalism, talked about Chinese
nationalism being "Shanghaied". His depiction of Chinese nationalism as essentially con tentless in the modem era rests
on the recognition that the people toiling in the treaty ports and coastal enclaves under foreign control during much
of the 19th and early 201h centuries adopted a conspicuous apolitical mentality in their dedication to the development
of private enterprises (p. 121). In using the term "Guangdonged" I refer to China's southern province of Guangdong,
adjacent to Hong Kong, where much of the early experimentation with economic reforms, special economic zones,
and administrative decentralization took place before it began to spread throughout the coastal regions in a wave of
economic decentralization.
456
Asian Profile
or neo-authoritarian, so long as it delivers unity, stability, national wealth and continues to improve
its responsiveness to people's demands and concerns.
A third, and least commonly articulated, explanation emphasizes the importance of incorporating
"eventful temporalities" for generating meaningful analysis. As Detlef Pollack states in his study of
the structural transition of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), transition "is a result
of a unique historical constellation of events and factors ... " (Pollack, 2002, p. 306). It could well
be argued that the bitter and painful legacies of the Cultural Revolution ( 1966-1976) and the CCP's
reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations may be real enough to have contributed
to a subdued enthusiasm, aversion, and non-commitment to political pluralism, as the resulting
social chaos would unduly put at risk the economic gains that China's population has been able to
accumulate over three decades of economic reform.
The CCP has also proactive steps to coopt societal elements that (at least theoretically) could
emerge as likely advocates of far-reaching democratization and effectively tum them into allies of
the state by crafting a symbiotic relationship between the economic and political elites in China
(Chen & Dickson, 2010; Dickson, 2003, 2008; Tsai, 2007). This was accomplished with the
adoption of san ge dai biao ("Three Represents") theory at the 16th Party Congress in November
2002, and its subsequent incorporation into the People's Republic of China (PRC) Constitution,
was a major attempt on the part of the CCP to project itself as "a faithful representative of the
requirements in the development of advanced productive forces in China, the orientation of the
advanced culture in China, and the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the people in
China." 3 The controversial invitation extended to "advanced productive forces in China" (private
entrepreneurs and capitalists) to join the Party is a shrewd attempt on behalf of the Party to ease
into political liberalization "under conditions that would maximize their chances for exercising
close and enduring control over the transition" (O'Donnell et al., 1986).
The prospects of China's democratic future will remain a source of vigorous debate, not least
because of the range of divergent opinions as to the potential, the speed, and scope of such a
transition. However, the question of democracy in China should not simply be reduced to "Is China
Ready for Democracy?" or to unrestrained optimism that the Arab Spring will be coming to China
as well. The more important question concerns the definition of democracy in the Chinese context.
A black and white stereotyping of the democracy debate - either democracy or no democracy
- is counterproductive. In order to assess the current conditions and potential for democracy in
China, the first casualty ought to be the Western ideological understanding of the term. In fact, the
orthodox Chinese understanding of democracy differs in fundamental ways from the conventional
definition that prevails in the West (Ding, 2001, pp. 4-9). As such, the prospects for democracy in
China center on very different conceptions of what democratization is or ought to be.
Judging from recent government pronouncements, China is certainly adopting the rhetoric
of democracy. In a government white paper published in 2005, the Chinese leadership stated its
commitment to building political democracy in China. But it is a political democracy with Chinese
characteristics, shaped ever so gradually through a careful process of incremental institutional
changes. The CCP is extremely mindful to shield this process from exogenous pressures. Lest these
forces be selectively allowed to affect the transition, instability could well jeopardize the entire
democratization process and undermine the legitimacy of the CCP.
A country's socio-political fabric is invariably exposed to significant levels of strain during
transition periods. China is certainly no exception. Just as political and social cohesiveness appear
to be declining, however, exogenous pressures calling for an acceleration of democratization have
handed the Chinese government credible tools to generate countervailing forces that may not only
3.
Jiang, Zemin. Report to the 161h National Congress of the Communist Party of China (2002). Available at http://www.
china.org.cn/english/features/49007 .htm#l (Accessed 7 March 2012).
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prevent a slipping into disorganization and chaos, but actually contribute to new social and political
cohesiveness. In other words, consistent and unrelenting external pressure has the perverse effect
of strengthening the basis of the very political forces it aims to undermine. The result may well be
a transition from Leninist Party-State structure to authoritarian pluralism rather than democracy
(Scalapino, 1998).
Where Bruce Gilley sees the signs for China's democratic future, other scholars have concluded
that an overall lack of institutionalization and the reality of a monistic political culture have thus
far deprived China from essential elements and conditions that may spur efforts at democratization.
China, they argue, is lacking a political structure of networks and factions that would be crucial
for the quest of democratization. Additionally, significant obstacles and sources of resistance to
imminent democratization in China include powerful vested interests, a stability of the inhibited
center, limited potential at the present time for both social and intellectual mobilization, and a
glaring absence of the requisite conditions that facilitated democratization in Taiwan (Metzger,
1998).
On the whole, the case of China's democratic future is premised on several main propositions
that, upon closer scrutiny, suggest a rather myopic analytical perspective. Attributing the lack
of democracy to nothing more than apparent bad choices by political elites amounts to reducing
comparative analysis to the lowest possible common denominator for the sole purpose of offering
compelling arguments for the Chinese context. The problem with such reductionist logic is that it
ignores significant progress in China's political reform effort (Harding, 1998).
Political reform in the Chinese context differs markedly from the Western understanding
of the term. Failure to make this crucial differentiation is at the heart of much of contemporary
misrepresentation of the Chinese polity, indeed of the very demonizing of the regime from
ardent proponents of democracy in China. Political reform in China is not so much aimed at
democratization of the polity than at raising the level of efficiency and accountability of the CCP
and strengthening its legal base (Zhao, 2003, p. 334). Western democratic idealism has similarly
thwarted a sense of appreciation for the progress made by China in recent years on the political
reform front. Not only did the official statement following the conclusion of Fifth Plenum of the
CCP 151h Central Committee in October 2000 call for "continuing promoting political system
reform, strengthening democratic legal construction, promoting scientific and democratic decisionmaking, and expanding citizens' orderly political participation (youxu zhengzhi canyu)" (Zhao,
2003, p. 333) but local elections have increasingly been introduced in rural China. They may not
meet the strict criteria of democratic elections in the Western sense, but they nonetheless suggest
a substantive progress towards political reform. These incremental steps towards political reform,
of which the Chinese government has indeed taken quite a few - the most notable one being the
1987 adoption of the Organic Law of Village Committees, which contrary to initial predictions that
it would remain contained to "experimental villages" has in fact expanded significantly in recent
years - should not be dismissed as insignificant. Rural elections may thus far well have taken place
in the context of "three disconnects" - disconnect between economic development and democratic
elections, the disconnect between democratic elections and democratic consciousness, and the
disconnect between direct local elections in the rural areas and the higher level elections in urban
regions (Hong, 2006)- but it has in no way diminished its reformist potential.
The need for the maintenance of domestic order, stability and national unity have relegated
the issue of political democracy to a level of secondary importance for the foreseeable future. To
critics positing political freedom and democracy as important prerequisites for peace and stability,
Beijing's answer is simply to point at the situation of many of the former Soviet republics, notably
Russia, to highlight the need for effective, forceful and CCP-centered state guidance. Having said
that, it is of course undeniable that the CCP is engaged in a very delicate balancing act. Finding a
level playing field for continued one-party rule and increased socioeconomic pluralism would be no
mean feat indeed. Yet, even if divergences and discontinuities from the current situation materialize
458
Asian Profile
(and to some extent they inevitably will), the ramifications thereof, as Brzezinski has so eloquently
captured are "likely to be dulled by relatively successful and continuing economic progress"
(Brzezinski, 1998, p. 4). In comparative terms, China's strategic decision to opt for a phased,
incremental process of policy implementation (Shi, 2006) rather than to advocate fair and free
elections in the Western sense at the outset, has allowed the CCP to maneuver the stormy waters of
reforms much more skillfully than the Soviet Union ever did.
Conclusion
Milton Friedman and others are certainly right in asserting that political freedom cannot
remained bottled up forever. Despite significant short-term successes by China's vaunted Internet
police, even the Chinese leadership is resigned to the fact (albeit not necessarily publicly) that
efforts at censoring Internet content and restricting access to information will ultimately be futile. 4
Yet, the observation that China "is headed for a series of Tiananmen Squares" (Friedman, 2006, p.
40) is more indicative of a fatalistic resignation to the fact that, unless China democratizes along
Western ideals and expectations, the authoritarian regime's lease on life will expire in the shortterm. At the most basic level, it assumes an ideological conviction of democracy's universal appeal
that may never come to fruition.
Even so, a substantial increase in popular protests in recent years raises the question of
evolutionary change in the political sphere. The government has grown keenly aware of the urgent
need to address rising social imbalances and regional wealth disparities that have emerged as
unwelcome byproducts of economic growth and which, if left unaddressed, would carry sweeping
socio-political repercussions, not least pointing to the insufficiency of relying on economic
"performance legitimacy" alone. Beijing may find short-term comfort in the fact that these popular
protests are by and large expressions of popular anger and frustration over abuses of power
and corruption by local-level officials rather than overt challenges of the central government.
A prominent slogan displayed during a wave of massive popular protests in the small fishing
village of Wukan in Guangdong province, which helped to renew international speculation about
impending democratic prospects in China, was reminder that protesters have in the past and will
likely continue to "demonstrate their loyalty to central policies and leaders" (Perry, 2010, p. 13).
Its message- "Without the central government, we cannot solve anything!" (meiyou zhongyang,
women jiejue buliao renhe shi!) - was telling in that regard.
The Chinese government is well aware the need to adapt to the changing economic and
social environment that has emerged as a result of nearly three decades of reforms. Is the current
challenge stretching the pragmatism of the CCP to its limits? Bruce Dickson points to the emerging
trends of cooptation and corporatism as indicators that could possibly be a harbinger of hope that
"economic reform will eventually lead to gradual political change, allowing China's transition from
communism to be more like Hungary or Poland (or even Taiwan) and thereby avoid the turmoil that
accompanied political change in the rest of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union" (Dickson,
2000, p. 517).
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References
4.
On this debate, an argument that ought not to be dismissed off-hand, however, is that advances in modem technologies
have actually handed the leadership an array of tools to disrupt critics. In the words of one expert, China has used
technology to "create both low-tech Leninism - seizures, arrests, informers - and an environment of self-censorship and
self-deterrence so they don't have to actively enforce." See "A Safety Net for China's Rulers," Washington Post, April
16, 2006, B03 for elaboration of that argument. For an analysis of political use of the Internet by Chinese dissidents,
see Michael S. Chase and James C. Mulvenon, You've Got Dissent! Chinese dissident use of the Internet and Beijing s
counter-strategies (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).
Brzezinski, Z., 1998
Bunce, V., 200 l. "D
Chang, M.H., 1998.
83-100.
Chase, M.S. and J.C
Strategies. Sant
Asian Profile
so eloquently
lie progress"
for a phased,
fair and free
my waters of
~dom cannot
mted Internet
mblicly) that
ely be futile. 4
nan, 2006, p.
:ratizes along
in the short[versal appeal
~
question of
of the urgent
~emerged as
ll1)' sweeping
on economic
these popular
ses of power
government.
small fishing
:ulation about
past and will
2010, p. 13).
u zhongyang,
conomic and
Is the current
the emerging
r of hope that
·ansition from
1e turmoil that
Jn" (Dickson,
lem technologies
, China has used
If-censorship and
ngton Post, April
1inese dissidents,
·net and Beijing s
459
When asked about the possibility of restrictions on freedom of speech and political expressions
fueling the fires of unrest and the potentially negative impact on economic growth during an
appearance at Yale University in April 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao did not dismiss the notion
of democracy outright. Yet, his eloquent reply ought well be noticed by democracy ideologues that
relish every opportunity to project their Western idealism as democratic values that ought to have
universal appeal without qualification. He said: "On one hand, we are ready and willing to draw on
the useful experience of foreign countries into political involvement. .. On the other hand, we will
not simply copy the political models of other countries."
Recognizing that greater political pluralization is inevitable, the Chinese leadership remains
determined to implement this political change in characteristically pragmatic and incremental
fashion. It is not unfeasible that in the long-term relative democratization at the local level will be
allowed to extend to higher levels and thus gradually usher political change at the national level.
At the same time, Beijing's political elite is concerned that political reform, if unrestrained and
unchecked, could adversely affect domestic stability and likely put at risk much of the substantive
economic development and growth that China has been able to nurture over the past three decades.
Once unleashed, it will be difficult to put the genie of political democracy back into the bottle.
Even if feasible, any attempt to do so would not only result in international condemnation but
also meet determined resistance domestically. For the moment, the Chinese government may take
consolation in the fact that its citizens are more occupied with the idea of how to take advantage of
mass consumerism and the improved lifestyle than on challenging the Party's legitimacy. Indeed,
China's new authoritarianism is less likely to be questioned by contemporary youth. Not only do
the current youth have different priorities than those of the 1980s that helped trigger Tiananmen
Square (Chang, 1998, p. 85) but the newly emerging "special case of authoritarianism" has
introduced a governance structure with "an outstanding historical record for stability and popular
acceptance" (Metzger & Myers, 1998, p. 23).
In light of the obvious potential challenges of a Chinese economy that is showing increasing
evidence of being "unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable," it would
be naive to dismiss outright the prospects of some aspect of political reform in the years ahead.
The Chinese government will undoubtedly continue to steer a very gradual and pragmatic course
aimed at ongoing depressurization of the political sphere through continued economic and political
reforms as well as improvements in social justice. Along the way, the West will be well served to
resist the temptation of framing any debate about the prospects of political reform along Western
perceptions of democracy, as that invariably "creates expectation of a fundamental transformation
in Chinese state-society relations that appears unwarranted" (Perry, 2010, p. 12). Judging by
Premier Wen Jiabao's exhortation in a closing speech to the National People's Congress on March
12 to proceed with economic and political reform so as to jeopardize the economic gains and
progress of the past few decades, we have to acknowledge that the speed and scope of political
reform and democratization in China will be on Beijing's terms. Given China's relative success
at authoritarian upgrading, combined with a new emphasis on "social management" (Fewsmith,
20 12) to mitigate social tensions, sweeping political reform, while not inevitable, might yet prove
improbable in the very near future.
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