Reconsidering
the
Roots
of
Crude
Coercion:
a
Policymaking
Analysis
of
'the
Oil
Weapon'
Clay
Ramel
21
May
2012
CISAC
Honors
Program
Advisor:
Professor
Coit
Blacker
Ramel
2
Table
of
Contents
I. Abstract
–
3
II. Acknowledgements
–
4
III. List
of
Abbreviations
and
Acronyms
–
5
IV. Chapter
I:
Introduction
–
6
V. Chapter
II:
Literature
Review
and
Hypothetical
Framework
–
10
VI. Chapter
III:
Priming
‘the
Oil
Weapon’:
1945‐1973
–
33
VII. Chapter
IV:
Testing
and
Firing
‘the
Oil
Weapon’:
1967
and
1973‐1974
–
43
VIII. Chapter
V:
A
Mothballed
Weapon:
1974‐2003
–
57
IX.
Chapter
VI:
Rising
Prices,
Resurgent
Rhetoric,
and
a
Return
to
the
World
Stage:
2003‐2008
–
72
a. Venezuela
–
72
b. Iran
–
79
c. Russia
–
84
X.
Chapter
VII:
Conclusion:
2009‐Present
–
91
XI.
Bibliography
–
99
XII.
Appendices
–
110
a. Appendix
A:
‘Oil
Weapon’
Use
and
Rhetoric:
2003‐2008
–
110
b. Appendix
B:
Google
News
Hits
for
‘Oil
Weapon’:
1972‐2011
–
111
Ramel
3
Abstract
In
1973‐1974,
several
Arab
oil‐producing
countries
embargoed
oil
shipments
to
the
United
States
while
cutting
oil
production,
in
order
to
pressure
the
US
to
diminish
its
support
of
Israel.
Despite
expectations
at
the
time,
such
large‐scale
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
has
not
become
a
commonplace
policy.
This
thesis
explores
potential
explanations
for
these
changing
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
drawing
on
policymaking,
neo‐realist,
and
offensive
realist
frameworks,
then
employing
various
case
studies
to
evaluate
the
explanatory
power
of
such
frameworks.
This
thesis
finds
that
whereas
a
punctuated
equilibrium
model
best
explains
the
buildup
to
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974,
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model
best
explains
the
deployment
patterns
for
this
policy
from
1973‐2003.
In
case
studies
of
Venezuela,
Iran,
and
Russia’s
“oil
weapon”
use
and
rhetoric
during
the
2003‐2008
period
of
heightened
oil
prices,
Kingdon’s
model
best
explains
Venezuela
case,
an
offensive
realist
framework
best
explains
Russia’s,
and
a
hybrid
of
the
two
models,
Iran’s.
The
conclusion
addresses
the
current
EU‐Iran
oil
embargo
to
gauge
how
“the
oil
weapon”
might
develop
in
the
future.
This
thesis’
findings
will
help
inform
oil‐importing
countries’
calibrations
of
their
policies
for
addressing
oil‐producing
countries’
potentially
hostile
export
policies.
Ramel
4
Acknowledgements
I
would
like
to
take
the
chance
here
to
thank
all
of
the
people
that
helped
me
during
the
eight‐month
process
of
realizing
my
honors
thesis.
First
of
all,
thanks
to
my
thesis
adviser,
Professor
Coit
Blacker,
whose
vast
depth
of
knowledge
and
stalwart
dedication
to
my
thesis
were
integral
to
its
successful
completion.
Second,
I
would
like
to
thank
the
Center
for
International
Security
and
Cooperation
(CISAC)
and
the
professors
and
staff
there
that
always
pushed
me
to
re‐examine
and
hone
my
thesis
–
especially
Professor
Martha
Crenshaw
and
the
honors
seminar
TA,
David
Blum.
Third,
I
would
like
to
thank
my
fellow
honors
students
for
their
perspectives,
support,
and
friendship
throughout
the
year
–
from
our
truly
memorable
times
together
in
DC
all
the
way
through
to
the
finish
line.
Personally,
I
would
like
to
thank
my
girlfriend,
Katie
Fite,
without
whose
constant
encouragement
and
care
I
could
not
have
completed
this
undertaking,
my
family,
my
roommate
Julio
Alvarado,
and
my
many
other
friends
who
helped
me
get
through
countless
late
nights
of
research
and
writing
along
the
way.
And
finally,
thanks
to
Bodum,
for
making
the
best
French
press
in
existence,
and
Green
Library,
for
always
having
a
perfect
desk
ready
for
me.
Ramel
5
List
of
Abbreviations
and
Acronyms
AIOC
–
Anglo‐Iranian
Oil
Company
Bpd
–
Barrels
per
Day
EU
–
European
Union
IEA
–
International
Energy
Agency
IEF
–
International
Energy
Forum
JODI
–
Joint
Oil
Data
Initiative
NATO
–
North
Atlantic
Treaty
Organization
NIOC
–
National
Iranian
Oil
Company
NYMEX
–
New
York
Mercantile
Exchange
OAPEC
–
Organization
of
Arab
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries
OPEC
–
Organization
of
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries
SPR
–
Strategic
Petroleum
Reserve
UN
–
United
Nations
UNSC
–
United
Nations
Security
Council
WTI
–
West
Texas
Intermediate
Ramel
6
Chapter
I:
Introduction
Out
of
the
History
Books
and
Into
the
Headlines:
On
January
23,
2012
the
European
Union
(EU)
officially
initiated
a
bloc‐wide
embargo
of
Iranian
oil
imports.
The
Europeans
cited
their
actions
as
an
attempt
to
pressure
Iran’s
nuclear
program,
which
many
in
the
West
have
accused
of
being
a
front
for
the
development
of
nuclear
weapons.
All
existing
bilateral
deals
with
Iran
were
given
an
end
date
of
early
July,
and
the
EU
required
its
members
not
to
strike
further
oil
contracts
for
any
Iranian
oil.1
It
had
been
more
than
38
years
since
a
group
of
countries
had
coordinated
to
use
oil
as
a
tool
of
explicit
political
coercion
against
a
targeted
state.
In
that
case,
it
was
1973‐1974,
and
the
executors
of
the
embargo
were
not
the
oil
importing
countries,
but
instead
the
oil
exporting
countries
under
the
banner
of
the
Organization
of
Arab
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries.
A
familiar
political
tango
was
re‐emerging
on
the
world
stage,
but
the
sides
had
switched
positions.
Historically,
this
use
of
oil
supply
disruption
as
a
tool
of
political
coercion
explicitly
went
in
one
direction
–
the
suppliers
cut
shipments
to
the
consumers.
Such
a
full‐scale
oil
embargo
was
not
initiated
with
the
push
of
a
button.
It
was
a
staggeringly
complex
operation,
requiring
either
inter‐
or
intra‐governmental
negotiation,
persuasion,
and
agreement,
communication
from
the
capital
to
every
refinery,
pipeline
station,
and
terminal,
and
coordination
between
the
exporting
country
or
countries’
shipping
agencies
and
those
countries
that
would
still
be
1
Traynor,
Ian.
"EU
Agrees
Iranian
Oil
Embargo."
The
Guardian.
Guardian
News
and
Media,
23
Jan.
2012.
Web.
29
Jan.
2012.
Ramel
7
permitted
to
receive
delivery
of
oil.
All
of
this
was
before
the
energy
intensive
diplomatic
engagement
with
the
embargoed
parties.
In
other
words,
‘the
oil
weapon’
was
not
a
policy
used
lightly.
In
light
of
this
reality,
any
attempt
to
understand
‘the
oil
weapon’
and
its
historical
patterns
of
use
requires
a
holistic
approach.
One
must
examine
the
multitude
of
contributory
factors
to
tease
out
what
undergirds
a
country
or
countries’
decision
to
deploy
“the
oil
weapon.”
Past
analyses
leaned
heavily
on
evaluation
of
the
historical
success
or
failure
of
such
a
policy
tool,
or
concluded
that
structural
changes
in
world
oil
markets
since
the
last
big
“oil
weapon”
event
in
1973‐1974
forever
blunted
any
future
attempts
to
use
it.
There
was
an
air
of
conclusion
in
the
existing
literature,
that
the
issue
of
“the
oil
weapon”
was
settled
and
figured
out.
The
ongoing
developments
this
year
between
the
EU
and
Iran
put
that
notion
soundly
to
rest.
Even
before
the
explosive
headlines
in
early
2012,
fears
regarding
the
revitalization
of
“the
oil
weapon”
had
rekindled
in
press
accounts
leading
up
to
this
year.
A
Google
News
search
for
“oil
weapon”
returns
1,260
and
1,020
headlines
for
1973
and
1974,
respectively.
When
oil
prices
started
skyrocketing
in
the
early
2000s,
the
term
came
in
vogue
once
again,
with
mentions
up
from
just
341
in
2001
to
1,870
in
2003
to
an
astonishing
3,300
in
2006.2
Given
both
the
EU‐Iranian
events
of
this
year
as
well
as
the
preceding
more‐than‐passing
resurgence
in
discussion
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
I
believe
that
the
time
is
ripe
for
a
more
thorough
analysis
of
its
historical
patterns
of
use
than
the
current
literature
provides.
2
See
Appendix
B.
Ramel
8
The
question,
then,
is
what
factors
undergird
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
as
a
foreign
policy?
Clearly,
oil
prices,
leaders,
domestic
political
concerns,
international
institutions,
and
the
structure
of
world
oil
markets
all
play
a
part
in
country’s
or
groups
of
countries’
decision
making
processes
around
“the
oil
weapon.”
Sorting
through
this
complex
stew
of
inputs
without
short‐changing
the
importance
of
any
one
of
them
requires
careful
analysis
of
the
lead
up
to
country’s
or
countries’
ultimate
decision
to
use
“the
oil
weapon.”
As
noted
earlier,
the
advent
of
the
EU‐Iranian
oil
standoff
makes
this
research
not
only
timely,
but
also
important.
Knowing
how
and
when
countries
might
decide
to
use
their
all‐important
oil
resources
as
tools
of
political
coercion
will
help
policymakers
to
allocate
diplomatic
resources
and
shape
energy
security
policy
in
a
way
that
minimizes
the
threat
of
such
oil
supply
disruptions
to
the
overall
health
of
the
world
economy.
Thesis
Overview:
Chapter
II
will
begin
with
a
review
of
the
existing
literature
on
“the
oil
weapon”,
followed
by
the
development
of
a
hypothetical
framework
with
which
to
evaluate
the
policymaking
processes
behind
historical
instances
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
In
particular,
this
hypothetical
framework
proposes
the
evaluation
of
the
explanatory
power
of
Baumgartner
and
Jones’
punctuated
equilibrium
model
and
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model
in
understanding
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Chapter
III
will
trace
the
changes
in
the
world’s
oil
industry
from
1945
to
1973
that
set
the
stage
for
“the
oil
weapon’s”
largest‐scale
uses
in
1967
and
Ramel
9
1973‐1974.
Chapter
IV
will
examine
the
major
multilateral
exercises
of
“the
oil
weapon”
that
occurred
in
1967
and
1973‐1974.
Chapter
V
will
detail
the
period
with
the
lowest
amount
of
“oil
weapon”
activity,
which
ranges
from
1974
to
2003.
Chapter
VI
will
engage
with
the
oil
price
boom
period
from
2003
to
2008,
in
which
“the
oil
weapon”
re‐emerged
on
the
world
stage.
In
this
period,
I
will
not
only
investigate
actual
uses
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
as
in
the
case
of
Russia,
but
also
cases
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric,
in
which
countries
such
as
Venezuela
and
Iran
threaten
to
use
“the
oil
weapon”,
but
then
do
not.
The
final
chapter,
Chapter
VII,
will
conclude
with
an
analysis
of
the
most
recent
EU‐Iran
“oil
weapon”
developments,
an
assessment
of
potential
future
trends
in
“oil
weapon”
use
and
rhetoric,
and
a
brief
discussion
of
policy
relevance.
Ramel
10
Chapter
II:
Literature
Review
and
Hypothetical
Framework
Introduction:
Despite
the
clear
importance
of
understanding
how,
why,
and
when
countries
elect
to
utilize
their
oil
as
a
tool
of
political
coercion,
either
unilaterally
or
cooperatively,
the
literature
on
the
subject
has
been
somewhat
lacking.
Ultimately,
most
of
the
currently
articulated
argumentative
strains
regarding
“the
oil
weapon”
are
either
overly
deterministic,
or
descriptive
instead
of
explanatory.
This
existing
literature
on
“the
oil
weapon”3
generally
falls
into
three
categories.
The
first
is
literature
debating
the
tactic
of
“the
oil
weapon”
on
the
basis
of
its
historical
track
record
of
efficacy,
with
a
particular
bias
towards
exploring
the
events
of
1973‐1974.
This
outcome‐based
line
of
thought
operates
on
the
assumption
that
an
initial
success
in
using
“the
oil
weapon”
would
be
sufficient
motivation
for
its
future
use,
and
thereby
attempts
to
establish
the
efficacy
of
past
displays
of
“the
oil
weapon”
to
explain
trends
in
its
use.
The
second
portion
of
the
literature
consists
of
accounts
of
the
ensuing
major
structural
changes
in
world
oil
markets
since
1974
that
scholars
believe
have
3
Drawing
on
Hanns
Maull’s
definition,
I
will
use
the
term
“oil
weapon”
to
refer
to
“any
manipulation
of
the
supply
and/or
price
of
oil
by
exporting
nations
with
the
intention
of
changing
the
political
behavior
of
the
consumer
nations,”
(emphasis
added).
The
explicit
politically
minded
intention
is
important,
as
it
excludes
events
in
which
an
oil
exporting
country
purposely
raises
price
primarily
for
financial
gain
instead
of
for
political
coercion.
See
Maull,
Hanns.
Oil
and
Influence:
The
Oil
Weapon
Examined.
London:
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies,
1975.
Print.
1‐2.
Another
oft
cited
definition
is
found
in
Paust,
et.
al
1977
(“the
deliberate
employment
of
an
economic
instrument
of
coercion
[oil]…against
other
states
and
people
in
order
to
place
intense
pressure
upon
their
freedom
of
choice,”);
see
Paust,
Jordan
J.,
Albert
P.
Blaustein,
and
Adele
Higgins.
The
Arab
Oil
Weapon.
Dobbs
Ferry,
NY:
Oceana
Publications,
1977.
Print.
Ramel
11
rendered
“the
oil
weapon”
operationally
infeasible.
This
area
of
the
scholarship
treats
the
non‐use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
since
1974
as
confirmatory
evidence
that
such
structural
changes
have
undercut
“the
oil
weapon.”
The
third
category
of
literature
puts
forth
the
idea
that
changes
in
the
international
system
of
institutions
can
best
explain
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
It
emphasizes
the
role
that
the
International
Energy
Agency
(IEA)
and
accompanying
Strategic
Petroleum
Reserve
(SPR),
as
well
producer‐consumer
dialogues
such
as
the
International
Energy
Forum
(IEF)
and
its
Joint
Oil
Data
Initiative
(JODI)
have
played
in
discouraging
the
use
of
the
“oil
weapon”
since
1973‐
1974.
In
the
following
sections,
I
will
explore
the
literature
that
addresses
these
discussions,
with
a
particular
eye
for
identifying
the
weaknesses
in
the
existing
treatment
of
“the
oil
weapon’s”
patterns
of
use
as
a
foreign
policy
tactic.
Debating
the
Success
of
‘the
Oil
Weapon’
–
Competing
Accounts
or
Oversimplification?
The
most
well
established
debate
in
the
literature
on
the
1973‐1974
embargo
is
whether
this
particular
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
can
be
considered
successful
or
not.
Scholars
have
entered
into
this
debate
because
establishing
that
the
oil
embargo
was
ineffective
in
achieving
its
stated
goals
might
help
to
explain
the
decline
in
the
use
of
such
a
maneuver
in
the
ensuing
period
since
1974.
One
of
the
most
serious
obstacles
to
such
objective
scholarship
on
“the
oil
weapon’s”
effectiveness
is
the
symbolic
strength
that
memories
of
the
oil
embargo
Ramel
12
of
1973‐1974
still
carry.4
Even
today,
those
alive
in
the
United
States
during
the
oil
embargo
recall
the
widespread
anxiety
and
panic
over
gasoline
availability
and
price,
memorably
manifested
as
long
lines
at
gas
stations
all
across
the
United
States.5
In
the
face
of
such
experiences,
it
can
seem
intuitive
to
conclude
that
“the
oil
weapon”
was
successful.
However,
a
deeper
investigation
of
the
literature
demonstrates
that
this
scarcity
was
not
solely
due
to
the
effect
of
the
supply
disruptions
coming
from
the
oil
embargo.
Numerous
scholars
have
argued
that
the
Nixon
administration’s
price
controls
and
import
restrictions
on
oil
were
also
to
blame.
Taylor
and
van
Doren
have
emphasized
that
these
market
interventions
created
perverse
incentives
for
companies
importing
oil
into
the
United
States,
as
due
to
price
controls
on
the
legal
amount
that
they
could
receive
for
a
given
amount
of
imported
oil,
it
was
more
lucrative
for
them
to
only
supply
gas
stations
that
they
owned
directly.6
Others,
such
as
Walter
J.
Mead,
note
that
these
price
ceilings
promoted
consumer
demand
in
excess
of
supply,
the
result
of
which
was
an
acute
shortage
as
buyers
jumped
on
every
opportunity
to
purchase
gas
at
the
artificially
low
price.7
Given
that
such
artificial
distortions
make
murky
the
layman’s
opinion
on
the
success
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
a
more
rigorous
comparison
of
the
oil
embargo’s
stated
4
As
an
example
of
the
hyperbolic
stance
that
some
well‐respected
academics
take
regarding
the
danger
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
see
Morse,
Edward
L.,
and
James
Richard.
“The
Battle
for
Energy
Dominance.”
Foreign
Affairs
81.2
(2002):
16‐31.
Web.
7
Feb.
2012,
in
which
the
authors
call
oil
reserves
in
the
Middle
East
“the
energy
equivalent
of
nuclear
weapons,”
(20).
5
"25th
Anniversary
of
the
1973
Oil
Embargo."
U.S.
Energy
Information
Administration
(EIA).
7
Mar.
2000.
Web.
07
Feb.
2012.
6
Taylor,
Jerry,
and
Peter
Van
Doren.
"Economic
Amnesia:
The
Case
against
Oil
Price
Controls
and
Windfall
Profit
Taxes."
The
Cato
Institute,
2005.
Web.
5
Feb.
2012.
7
Mead,
Walter
J.
"The
Performance
of
Government
in
Energy
Regulations."
The
American
Economic
Review
69.2
(1979):
352‐56.
JSTOR.
Web.
5
Dec.
2011.
Ramel
13
political
goals
and
achieved
outcomes
is
necessary
in
order
to
firmly
establish
the
success
or
failure
of
the
endeavor.
At
its
heart,
“the
oil
weapon”
is
a
tool
for
political
coercion
–
the
supplier
country
or
countries
make
a
concerted
effort
to
utilize
the
embargoing
of
oil
to
affect
the
foreign
policy
of
the
target
country
or
countries.
As
such,
“the
oil
weapon”
can
be
considered
a
form
of
economic
sanction,
and
drawing
on
the
literature
of
economic
sanctions
proves
helpful
in
framing
the
discourse
over
the
success
or
failure
of
the
1973‐1974
embargo.
In
their
work
Economic
Sanctions
Reconsidered,
Hufbauer,
et
al.
examine
past
cases
of
international
economic
sanctions
to
determine
the
criteria
that
affect
whether
and
when
such
sanctions
are
successful.8
Throughout
their
work,
the
authors
utilize
an
explicit
target‐sender
model
for
talking
about
sanctions
and
their
success
and
failure:
the
sender
wants
to
change
specific
behaviors
or
policies
of
the
target,
and
as
such
the
sanctions
are
deemed
successful
if
they
result
in
a
substantial
alteration
in
the
target’s
behavior
or
policy
consistent
with
those
initially
stated
goals.9
By
these
specific
guidelines,
sanctions
have
been
largely
ineffective
as
a
policy.
Drawing
on
analysis
of
204
historical
cases
of
economic
sanctions,
the
authors
found
that
sanctions
only
succeeded
at
impairing
the
target’s
military
potential
21%
of
the
time
and
at
instigating
other
major
policy
changes
in
30%
of
cases.10
8
Hufbauer,
Gary
Clyde.,
Jeffrey
J.
Schott,
and
Kimberley
Elliott.
Economic
Sanctions
Reconsidered.
3rd
ed.
Washington,
DC:
Peterson
Institute
for
International
Economics,
2007.
Print.
9
Ibid.
47.
10
Ibid.
159.
–
Numerous
other
highly
cited
works
have
found
economic
sanctions
to
be
ineffective
at
achieving
their
stated
goals.
See
also
Pape,
Robert
A.
“Why
Economic
Sanctions
Do
Not
Work.”
International
Security
22.2
(1997):
90‐136.
Web.
5
Feb.
2012;
or
Morgan,
T.
Clifton,
and
Valerie
L
Schwebach.
“Fools
Suffer
Gladly:
The
Use
of
Economic
Sanctions
in
International
Crises.”
International
Studies
Quarterly
41.1
(1997):
27‐50.
Web.
5
Feb.
2012.
Ramel
14
Drawing
on
the
literature
of
economic
sanctions
in
his
investigation
of
early
uses
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
Roger
Stern
argues
that
attempts
to
utilize
this
tactic
in
the
first
half
of
the
20th
century
yielded
a
mostly
ineffective
track
record
of
success
at
influencing
the
foreign
policy
of
the
targeted
country.11
According
to
Stern,
the
concept
of
“the
oil
weapon”
as
a
tool
for
altering
the
foreign
policy
of
a
targeted
nation
emerged
in
earnest
during
discussions
among
members
of
the
League
of
Nations
over
possibly
embargoing
oil
shipments
to
Italy
in
1935‐1936.
However,
these
deliberations
ultimately
amounted
to
nothing,
as
the
members
judged
that
such
a
policy
would
be
infeasible
without
mobilizing
an
outright
blockade
of
Italy.
As
a
second
early
example
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
Stern
points
to
the
United
States’
decision
in
July
of
1941
to
freeze
Japanese
assets
held
in
the
United
States,
an
attempt
to
influence
Japan
to
withdraw
from
their
occupation
of
China.
President
Roosevelt
purposely
did
not
authorize
an
embargo
of
oil
shipments,
as
he
feared
that
such
an
action
would
trigger
a
Japanese
attack
of
the
East
Indies
to
seize
additional
oil
reserves.
However,
bureaucratic
biases
within
the
Roosevelt
administration
resulted
in
an
unintended
de
facto
embargo
on
oil
shipments
to
Japan.12
Due
to
the
fact
that
80%
of
Japan’s
oil
at
the
time
came
from
the
United
11
Stern,
Roger.
"Oil
Market
Power
and
United
States
National
Security."
Proceedings
of
the
National
Academy
of
Sciences
103.5
(2006):
1650‐655.
31
Jan.
2006.
Web.
02
Dec.
2011.
12
For
a
discussion
of
the
bureaucratic
politics
that
transmuted
President
Roosevelt’s
asset
freeze
into
an
oil
embargo
that
he
did
not
originally
intend,
see
Anderson
Jr.,
Irvine
H.
"The
1941
De
Facto
Embargo
on
Oil
to
Japan:
A
Bureaucratic
Reflex."
Pacific
Historical
Review
44.2
(1975):
201‐31.
JSTOR.
University
of
California
Press.
Web.
5
Feb.
2012.
Ramel
15
States,
this
particular
instance
of
“the
oil
weapon”
was
very
well
positioned
to
place
leverage
on
the
target
nation’s
foreign
policy.13
In
the
cases
that
Stern
presents,
“the
oil
weapon”
motivated
a
change
in
the
targeted
nation’s
foreign
policy
when
only
one
country
was
necessary
to
embargo
the
target
country.
This
falls
in
line
with
Hufbauer
et,
al,
who
demonstrate
that
the
more
countries
that
are
required
to
actualize
and
maintain
a
sanction,
the
lower
the
likelihood
of
success
for
that
sanction
–
as
seen
in
the
League
of
Nations’
aforementioned
attempt
to
utilize
“the
oil
weapon.”14
It
is
informative
to
note,
though,
that
in
the
United
States‐Japan
case
the
foreign
policy
change
that
occurred
(Japan
strikes
out
to
try
to
maintain
energy
security)
was
not
the
one
that
the
United
States
initially
had
set
as
the
goal
of
the
asset
freeze
(Japan
leaving
China),
demonstrating
that
“the
oil
weapon”
is
not
a
surgical
foreign
policy
tool.
Continuing
toward
the
embargo
of
1973‐1974,
Roy
Licklider
examines
the
effect
that
this
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
had
on
the
foreign
policies
of
five
different
countries
–
the
United
States,
the
Netherlands,
Britain,
Japan,
and
Canada
–
ultimately
concluding
that
“the
short‐term
impact
of
the
oil
weapon
on
the
foreign
policies
of
the
target
countries
toward
the
Arab‐Israeli
dispute
was
small
or
negligible,”
and
that
“it
is
not
at
all
clear
that
the
[long‐term]
shift
[in
Arab‐Israeli
policy]
was
due
to
the
oil
weapon.”15
His
starting
point
is
defining
the
foreign
policy
13
There
is
an
ongoing
debate
over
how
much
of
a
role
the
pinching
off
of
Japan’s
oil
supplies
had
in
aggravating
Japan
to
attack
the
United
States
preemptively
at
Pearl
Harbor
on
December
7,
1941.
For
arguments
in
addition
to
Stern’s,
see
Agawa,
Hiroyuki.
The
Reluctant
Admiral:
Yamamoto
and
the
Imperial
Navy.
Tokyo:
Kodansha
International,
1979.
Print.
14
See
page
173
of
Hufbauer,
et
al.
2007.
15
Licklider,
Roy.
"The
Power
of
Oil:
The
Arab
Oil
Weapon
and
the
Netherlands,
the
United
Kingdom,
Canada,
Japan,
and
the
United
States."
International
Studies
Quarterly
32.2
(1988):
205‐26.
JSTOR.
Web.
21
Nov.
2011.
Ramel
16
changes
that
OAPEC
hoped
to
achieve
by
way
of
their
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
so
as
to
establish
a
benchmark
for
the
potential
success
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
He
states
that
OAPEC
sought
to
influence
the
embargoed
countries’
positions
on
the
Arab‐Israeli
conflict
such
that
they
would
result
in
a
return
of
Israeli
territories
captured
in
the
1967
war,
a
recognition
of
the
“legitimate
rights”
of
the
Palestinians,
and
a
ceding
of
portions
of
Jerusalem.
Through
case‐study
analysis
of
each
of
the
five
selected
countries,
Licklider
arrives
at
the
conclusion
that
although
several
of
these
countries
undertook
actions
in
response
to
“the
oil
weapon”
that
generally
appeared
to
favor
the
Arab
side
of
the
Arab‐Israeli
conflict,16
“the
oil
weapon”
was
not
ultimately
the
key
determinant
behind
any
larger
shifts
in
those
countries’
foreign
policies
in
the
region.
Licklider
draws
heavily
on
the
literature
on
economic
sanctions
to
explain
his
findings,
postulating
that
“the
oil
weapon”
ultimately
failed
to
have
an
impact
because
it
failed
to
indirectly
create
adequate
political
pressure
on
key
decision‐
makers
in
the
targeted
countries.
Whereas
Licklider
saw
“the
oil
weapon”
as
ultimately
lacking
influence
on
the
foreign
policies
of
the
embargoed
nations,
other
scholars
have
argued
that
the
1973‐1974
oil
embargo
was
at
least
somewhat
successful
in
achieving
its
initiators’
outcomes.
Dankwart
Rustow
appraises
the
shifting
US
position
towards
Israel
following
the
1973‐1974
embargo,
noting
that
“within
days
after
the
announcement
of
the
16
Licklider
points
out
that
some
of
these
actions
were
largely
symbolic
–
such
as
the
Netherlands’
decision
to
sign
on
with
a
European
Community
statement
calling
for
Israel
to
“’end
the
territorial
occupation’
resulting
from
the
1967
war”
(p210),
and
the
Japanese
threatening
to
“reconsider
policy”
toward
Israel
(p216).
Others,
such
as
the
EC’s
decision
to
not
allow
the
US
to
use
their
bases
as
jumping
points
for
rearming
Israel
(p216)
and
Britain’s
decision
not
to
explicitly
help
the
Netherlands
make
up
their
embargoed
oil
deficit,
were
clearly
important
during
the
crisis.
Ramel
17
Arab
embargo
and
production
cutback,
the
United
States,
by
threatening
the
suspension
of
military
deliveries,
forced
the
Israelis
to
accept
a
cease‐fire
in
place…in
the
next
two
years,
US
diplomacy…shifted
to
a
demonstratively
“even‐
handed”
attitude
in
bringing
about
successive
disengagements
on
the
Sinai
and
Golan
fronts.”17
By
this
assessment,
Rustow
considers
the
embargo
to
have
been
successful
at
achieving
its
goals.
Hanns
Maull
argues
that
despite
the
fact
that
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974
was
“not
a
totally
successful
exercise,”
due
to
the
international
oil
companies’
trans‐shipment
efforts
and
the
embargo’s
overall
short
duration,
it
was
a
success
because
it
ushered
a
new
group
of
political
actors
onto
the
international
scene,
elevating
them
into
positions
of
prominent
influence
based
on
the
power
contained
in
their
oil.
The
inference
here
is
that
the
conditions
that
OAPEC
originally
stated
as
the
intended
goals
for
this
utilization
of
“the
oil
weapon”
were
politically
expedient
ones
that
masked
their
true
intention
of
leveraging
“the
oil
weapon”
simply
to
command
respect
for
themselves
as
important
participants
in
international
politics.18
17
Rustow,
Dankwart.
"U.S.
–
Saudi
Relations
and
the
Oil
Crises
of
the
1980s."
Foreign
Affairs
55
(1977):
494‐516.
PAIS.
Web.
1
Dec.
2011.
It
is
interesting
to
note
that
in
an
earlier
piece,
Rustow
came
to
the
conclusion
that
the
overall
“winner”
of
the
events
of
1973‐1974
was
the
United
States;
further
time
and
analysis
shifted
his
opinion
towards
the
one
stated
above.
See:
Rustow,
Dankwart.
"Who
Won
the
Yom
Kippur
and
Oil
Wars?"
Foreign
Affairs
17
(1974):
166‐75.
JSTOR.
Web.
24
Nov.
2011.
18
Maull,
Hanns.
Oil
and
Influence:
The
Oil
Weapon
Examined.
London:
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies,
1975.
Print.
Daoudi
and
Dajani
also
argued
that
the
success
or
failure
of
the
embargo
should
not
be
measured
solely
on
the
basis
of
the
originally
stated
goals,
which
hewed
closely
to
the
tenants
put
forth
in
UN
Resolution
242.
They
argued
that
the
embargo
achieved
other
goals,
including
a
bolstering
of
collective
Arab
confidence,
a
rapid
settlement
to
the
actual
Arab‐
Israeli
hostilities,
and
an
increased
attitude
of
respect
toward
the
Arab
countries
on
the
part
of
the
Western
world.
See
Daoudi,
M.
S.,
and
M.
S.
Dajani.
Economic
Sanctions,
Ideals
and
Experience.
London:
Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul,
1983.
Print.
Ramel
18
Ruediger
Graf
builds
on
Maull’s
argument
about
the
oil
producing
countries’
desire
to
be
respected,
while
simultaneously
rejecting
both
the
success‐failure
dichotomy
that
Maull
and
most
other
scholars
have
adopted
and
the
sender‐target
model
proposed
by
Hufbauer,
et
al:
“to
confine
the
idea
of
a
successfully
functioning
embargo
to
the
initial
declaration
or
even
motivation
of
the
embargoer
[sic]
neglects
the
multiple
ways
in
which
the
embargo
works
and
can
be
used
by
both
the
embargoer
[sic]
and
the
embargoed
in
order
to
achieve
various
goals.”19
As
illustrated
in
the
preceding
quotation,
Graf
prefers
to
discuss
the
1973‐1974
embargo
as
a
reciprocal,
alternating
communicative
process
between
the
oil
exporting
countries
and
the
oil
importing
ones,
which
inherently
places
more
emphasis
on
the
symbolic
dimensions
of
the
embargo
than
on
its
material
ones.
Under
such
a
nuanced
framework,
neither
side
can
be
seen
admitting
that
they
have
failed
at
achieving
their
aims,
so
each
continually
reframes
the
issue
in
an
effort
to
appear
to
have
achieved
their
desired
ends.20
Taken
all
together,
the
literature
debating
the
success
of
“the
oil
weapon”
hews
towards
the
“failure”
camp,
but
nonetheless
paints
a
mixed
portrait
of
the
actual
efficacy
of
such
a
policy
tactic.
Additionally,
such
a
reading
of
“the
oil
weapon’s”
utilization
is
excessively
deterministic
–
the
failure
of
a
policy
in
the
past
19
Graf,
Ruediger.
"Making
Use
of
the
‘Oil
Weapon’:
Western
Industrialized
Countries
and
Arab
Petropolitics
in
1973–1974."
Diplomatic
History
36
(2012):
185‐208.
Wiley
Online
Library.
Jan.
2012.
Web.
23
Jan.
2012.
20
“In
general,
most
Arab
official
changed
the
primary
objective
of
the
embargo
from
the
implementation
of
UN
Resolution
242
toward
the
creation
of
a
pro‐Arab
atmosphere
in
the
Western
world.
Moreover,
they
defined
the
purpose
as
contributing
to
a
fundamental
transformation
of
the
relationship
between
oil
producing
and
consuming
countries.
In
an
interview
on
CBS,
the
Saudi
Arabian
Foreign
Minister
[Umar
al‐]
Saqqaf
described
the
embargo
in
February
1974
as
a
means
to
make
‘banker,
the
media
people
and
others’
aware
of
the
‘reality
of
our
problem’
and
expressed
his
satisfaction
with
the
results
of
these
attempts
to
change
public
opinion.”
–
Ibid
197.
Ramel
19
does
not
per
se
guarantee
its
disappearance
from
the
policy
world
in
the
future.
As
such,
it
is
clear
that
other
factors
besides
the
historical
effectiveness
of
“the
oil
weapon”
have
affected
its
pattern
of
use
since
1973‐1974.
Structural
Changes
in
World
Oil
Markets
–
Globalization,
Competition,
and
Futures
Trading
Blunt
‘the
Oil
Weapon’:
Despite
the
historical
record
of
selective
embargoes
of
oil,
many
scholars
have
argued
that
in
today’s
world,
such
a
policy
is
infeasible
to
carry
out
for
an
extended
period.21
According
to
this
school
of
thought,
oil
is
a
perfectly
fungible
commodity
with
prices
established
by
a
unified
global
market.
Millions
of
barrels
per
day
are
bought
and
sold
in
hundreds
of
countries,
and
prices
today
are
generally
reflective
of
global
demand
versus
global
supply.
As
a
result,
such
scholars
postulate
that
it
is
not
possible
for
a
given
country
to
both
unilaterally
and
selectively
embargo
certain
markets
in
order
to
deny
supply
to
and
drive
up
prices
in
only
those
markets,
as
transfers
of
oil
from
third
party
sellers
to
the
embargoed
country
would
circumvent
the
intention
of
the
embargo,
and
most
decreases
in
output
of
oil
by
the
producing
country
could
be
met
by
either
increases
in
production
by
other
producers
or
the
release
of
stockpiled
oil.
21
A
wide
variety
of
scholars
and
institutions
with
vastly
different
backgrounds
defend
this
theory.
From
renowned
periodicals
("Still
Holding
Customers
Over
A
Barrel."
Economist
369.8347
(2003):
61‐63.
Academic
Search
Premier.
Web.
26
Jan.
2012)
to
oil
historians
(Parra,
Francisco
R.
Oil
politics:
a
modern
history
of
petroleum.
I.B.Tauris,
2004.
Print)
to
libertarian
think
tanks
(Taylor,
Jerry,
and
Peter
Van
Doren.
"An
Oil
Embargo
Won't
Work."
The
Cato
Institute.
10
Apr.
2002.
Web.
17
Jan.
2012)
to
U.S.
Army
officers
(Kraemer,
Thomas
D.
"Addicted
to
Oil:
Strategic
Implications
of
American
Oil
Policy."Strategic
Studies
Institute.
U.S.
Army,
May
2006.
Web.
12
Nov.
2011).
Ramel
20
While
this
approach
offers
a
theoretical
conception
of
the
impossibility
of
maintaining
an
oil
embargo,
it
is
excessively
deterministic.
It
does
not
take
into
account
several
possibilities
that
either
alone
or
in
concert
might
strengthen
“the
oil
weapon.”
First,
if
several
countries
with
a
sufficient
combined
share
of
the
world’s
oil
market
were
to
collaborate
to
mutually
enforce
a
given
embargo,
it
would
have
a
greater
chance
to
last
long
enough
to
influence
the
targeted
country
or
countries
to
take
a
desired
political
action.
Second,
such
an
approach
ignores
the
myriad
systemic
inefficiencies
built
into
world
oil
markets,
including
the
need
to
turn
to
the
spot
market
in
the
case
of
the
loss
of
previously
contractually
guaranteed
supply
and
the
lag
inherent
in
re‐routing
tanker
shipments
to
embargoed
markets.
Third,
unexpected
natural
or
man‐caused
disasters,
such
as
hurricanes
or
terrorist
attacks,
that
damaged
key
oil
infrastructure
and
took
a
significant
volume
of
oil
off
of
the
world
market
might
make
the
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon”
more
powerful.22
Finally,
an
individual
country
may
use
“the
oil
weapon”,
despite
the
predicted
lack
of
success
of
such
a
policy,
in
an
effort
to
unilaterally
sway
a
target
country
or
countries.
Admittedly,
such
caveats
do
not
completely
offset
the
difficulty
of
successfully
utilizing
“the
oil
weapon.”
However,
they
do
offer
qualifications
to
the
idea
that
such
a
policy
is
impossible
to
initiate
and
sustain
for
any
appreciable
time.
In
the
same
vein
of
economic
structural
changes
in
world
oil
markets
that
have
blunted
“the
oil
weapon”,
Andres
Goldthau
and
Jan
Martin
Witte
draw
attention
to
the
fact
that
the
nationalizations
of
oil
concessions
in
many
oil‐
22
Verrastro,
Frank
A.,
Sara
O.
Ladislow,
Matthew
Frank,
and
Lisa
A.
Hyland.
"The
Geopolitics
of
Energy:
Emerging
Trends,
Changing
Landscapes,
Uncertain
Times."
Center
for
Strategic
and
International
Studies
Energy
and
National
Security
Program
(2010).
Web.
22
Sept.
2011.
Ramel
21
producing
countries
throughout
the
1960s
and
1970s
led
to
a
breakdown
in
the
vertical
integration
of
the
oil
industry
that
had
prevailed
since
the
original
development
of
those
oil
resources.
This
dis‐integration
of
the
industry,
in
turn,
resulted
in
the
separation
of
the
upstream
operations,
such
as
exploration
and
drilling,
from
the
downstream
operations,
such
as
refining
and
retailing.
Refineries
and
retailers
still
held
by
major
international
oil
companies,
but
on
the
margin
in
terms
of
internal
allocation
of
upstream
supply,
were
now
in
the
market
for
whatever
crude
oil
they
could
get
at
the
lowest
price
possible,
leading
to
competition
with
other
buyers
and
an
overall
more
open
spot
market
for
oil.23
Vaunted
oil
historian
Daniel
Yergin
builds
on
Goldthau
and
Witte’s
narrative
of
a
liberalizing
trend
towards
a
truly
international
oil
market
by
highlighting
the
importance
of
the
emergence
of
a
futures
trading
market
for
oil.24
Starting
on
March
30,
1983,
the
New
York
Mercantile
Exchange
(NYMEX)
began
offering
future
contracts
for
light,
sweet
West
Texas
Intermediate
oil
out
of
Cushing,
Oklahoma.
According
to
Yergin,
this
development
assured
that
now
a
diffuse
network
of
buyers
and
sellers
would
set
international
oil
prices,
furthering
the
transition
of
oil
from
a
politically‐controlled
good
to
a
more
freely
circulated
economic
one.
A
1999
study
by
professors
at
the
Rice
University
Graduate
School
of
Management
lent
empirical
backing
to
Yergin’s
claims.
In
an
event‐based
study
of
the
effects
of
the
advent
of
oil
futures
at
the
NYMEX
in
1983,
the
authors
concluded
23
Goldthau,
Andreas,
and
Jan
Martin
Witte.
"Back
to
the
Future
or
Forward
to
the
Past?
Strengthening
Markets
and
Rules
for
Effective
Global
Energy
Governance."International
Affairs
85.2
(2009):
373‐90.
JSTOR.
Web.
25
Nov.
2011.
24
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Quest:
Energy,
Security,
and
the
Remaking
of
the
Modern
World.
Penguin,
2011.
Print.
165‐167.
Ramel
22
that
“deep
and
liquid
futures
markets
have
a
mitigating
effect
on
volatility
in
the
underlying
market…these
findings
suggest
that
future
trading
improves
depth
and
liquidity
in
the
underlying
market.”25
From
this
follows
Yergin’s
belief
that
improved
volume
of
futures
trading
and
the
accompanying
increase
in
liquidity
are
indicative
of
a
more
liberal,
free
oil
market,
subsequently
less
susceptible
to
political
manipulation.
While
both
the
dis‐integration‐backed
competition
and
futures
market
liberalization
of
oil
pricing
arguments
have
strong
theoretical
and
empirical
underpinnings,
they
are
both
still
more
descriptive
than
explanatory
in
their
addressing
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
They
outline
how
certain
structural
changes
in
world
oil
markets
have
created
a
climate
less
hospitable
for
the
exercise
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
but
offer
no
deeper
insight
as
to
the
actual
decision‐making
process
informing
the
use
or
non‐use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
historically.
As
such,
one
must
consider
additional
interpretations
in
an
attempt
to
arrive
at
a
more
robust
explanation
of
the
pattern
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
since
1973‐1974.
An
Institutional
Explanation
–
International
Energy
Regime
Theory
Institutionalism
in
international
relations
refers
to
a
group
of
theories
that
focus
their
study
on
the
importance
of
the
structures
of
the
international
system,
25
Fleming,
Jeff,
and
Barbara
Ostdiek.
"The
Impact
of
Energy
Derivatives
on
the
Crude
Oil
Market."
Energy
Economics
21.2
(1999):
135‐67.
Rice.edu.
Web.
2
Feb.
2012.
This
paper
also
gives
an
ideal
of
the
scale
of
the
paper
trading
future
market
for
oil:
by
1990,
just
seven
years
after
the
introduction
of
oil
futures
to
the
NYMEX,
the
barrels
of
oil
represented
by
futures
trades
outpaced
that
year’s
world
production
of
oil.
Ramel
23
particularly
its
organizations
and
the
evolution
and
fluctuations
of
such
organizations’
capabilities
over
time.26
Those
advocating
for
an
institutional
explanation
of
“the
oil
weapon’s”
pattern
of
use
argue
that
it
is
changes
in
the
international
system
of
oil‐related
organizations
that
account
for
the
non‐use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
since
1973‐1974.
The
oil
consuming
countries’
first
coordinated
reaction
following
the
1973‐
1974
embargo
was
establishing
the
International
Energy
Agency
as
a
hedge
against
future
similar
actions
by
OPEC.27
The
core
aspect
of
the
IEA’s
cooperative
capabilities
is
its
coordination
of
its
member‐countries’
strategic
oil
stockpiles,
to
be
used
in
the
event
of
a
sudden
supply
disruption.28
For
a
frame
of
reference,
the
magnitude
of
such
stockpiles
today
is
such
that,
were
Iranian
oil
completely
taken
off
of
the
world
market,
the
1.5
billion
barrels
of
stockpiled
oil
would
be
adequate
to
offset
the
shortfall
for
two
years.29
Accordingly,
advocates
of
the
importance
of
the
IEA’s
SPR
argue
that
the
presence
of
such
stockpiles
is
a
distinct
retarding
factor
on
the
potential
feasibility
of
“the
oil
weapon”
today.30
In
addition
to
the
role
of
enhanced
inter‐oil‐consumer
coordination
in
blunting
“the
oil
weapon”,
the
literature
also
focuses
on
the
importance
of
more
robust
cooperative
engagement
between
oil
producers
and
consumers,
specifically
26
Hall,
Peter
A.,
and
Rosemary
C.
R.
Taylor.
"Political
Science
and
the
Three
New
Institutionalisms."
Political
Studies
44.5
(1996):
936‐57.
Wiley
Online
Library.
22
Dec.
2006.
Web.
6
Dec.
2011.
27
See
page
270‐271
in
Yergin
2011.
28
Since
the
IEA’s
inception,
member‐countries
have
only
initiated
a
drawdown
of
strategic
stockpiles
in
response
to
three
events:
the
Gulf
crisis
of
1990‐1991,
Hurricanes
Katrina
and
Rita
in
2005,
and
the
Libyan
civil
war
in
2011;
see
page
273
of
Yergin
2011.
29
See
page
271
of
Yergin,
2011.
30
See
page
382
of
Goldthau
and
Witte,
2009.
Ramel
24
the
International
Energy
Forum,
an
institution
created
to
foster
producer‐consumer
dialogue
on
oil
and
other
energy
issues.31
The
recognition
of
mutual
interdependence
between
the
countries
comprising
both
the
IEA
and
OPEC
has
yielded
some
concrete
results,
most
notably
the
Joint
Oil
Data
Initiative
(JODI).
This
database
combines
figures
from
not
only
the
IEA
and
OPEC,
but
also
from
a
wide
variety
of
third
party
sources
in
order
to
give
policymakers
and
oil
market
participants
the
best
possible
information
regarding
oil
inventories,
supply,
and
demand.
IEF
officials
note
that
such
transparency
enables
better
investment
projections
and
reduced
potential
instability
in
oil
markets
that
might
result
from
a
lack
of
vital
information.32
While
such
an
institutional
perspective
is
useful
in
noting
how
changes
in
the
international
energy
regime
complex
have
helped
to
diminish
the
possibility
of
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
it
still
deals
fundamentally
with
how
external
factors
shape
the
environment
in
which
countries
or
collections
of
countries
have
considered
“the
oil
weapon”
as
a
tactic.
Even
though
this
reading
fails
to
prove
satisfactorily
explanatory
alone,
it
is
helpful
in
rendering
useful
context
for
more
robust
explanatory
models
for
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
developed
later
in
this
thesis.
31
Colgan,
Jeff
D.,
Robert
O.
Keohane,
and
Thijs
Van
De
Graaf.
"Punctuated
Equilibrium
in
the
Energy
Regime
Complex."
The
Review
of
International
Organizations
(2011).
Web.
27
Nov.
2011.
12.
32
Fattouh,
Bassam,
and
Coby
Van
Der
Linde.
"The
International
Energy
Forum:
Twenty
Years
of
Producer‐consumer
Dialogue
in
a
Changing
World."
International
Energy
Foundation,
2011.
Web.
29
Nov.
2011.
Ramel
25
Hypothetical
Frameworks
for
Analysis:
The
weakness
in
the
existing
literature
on
“the
oil
weapon”
is
mostly
the
result
of
two
failures:
(1)
inadequate
historical
contextualization
of
the
uses
of
“the
oil
weapon”
and
(2)
an
overly
deterministic
understanding
of
the
decision‐making
process
regarding
“the
oil
weapon”
that
ignores
the
fact
that
the
decision
to
use
“the
oil
weapon”
is
the
result
of
a
larger
policy‐making
process
that
includes
leaders,
domestic
political
and
economic
questions,
and
OPEC
dynamics.
In
an
effort
to
render
a
more
robust
treatment
of
the
decision‐making
process
behind
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
it
is
helpful
to
turn
to
existing
frameworks
for
understanding
policymaking.
As
discussed
earlier
in
the
chapter,
“the
oil
weapon”
is
a
form
of
economic
sanction,
which
in
turn
is
an
example
of
a
specific
foreign
policy.
Therefore,
investigating
models
for
policymaking
is
a
logical
next
step.
The
most
reductionist,
deterministic
understanding
of
policymaking
would
assume
that
completely
rational
actors
systematically
evaluate
all
potential
options,
weigh
their
costs
and
benefits
perfectly
and
impartially,
and
then
choose
the
objectively
best
option.
Such
an
approach
is
obviously
not
reflective
of
the
reality
of
the
process
–
human
beings
are
not
completely
rational
actors,
policy‐makers
do
not
have
unlimited
time
and
resources
to
compare
all
possible
options,
and
myriad
complicating
factors
including
personal
experience,
political
lobbying,
and
bureaucratic
biases
all
come
into
play.33Any
model
attempting
to
explain
33
The
idea
of
bounded
rationality,
first
proposed
by
Herbert
Simon
in
1957
and
cited
in
thousands
of
papers
and
books
since
then,
outlines
how
human
decision‐making
is
inherently
limited
by
the
information
they
have
access
to,
their
cognitive
ability,
and
the
finite
amount
of
time
that
they
have
Ramel
26
policymaking,
then,
must
take
into
account
a
multitude
of
interacting
factors
that
color
and
complicate
the
policymaking
process.
One
such
model
is
John
Kingdon’s
policy
streams
model.
It
proposes
that
policies
are
ultimately
enacted
when
a
given
problem,
a
feasible
policy,
and
a
fortuitous
political
atmosphere
all
align
to
yield
a
policy
window,
at
which
point
a
policy
entrepreneur
willfully
expends
energy
and
political
capital
in
order
to
capitalize
upon
the
opportunity
and
push
through
the
policy.34
Although
this
model
was
originally
developed
in
reference
to
policymaking
in
the
United
States,
it
is
readily
adaptable
to
policymaking
in
other
venues,
such
as
OAPEC
or
OPEC,
for
two
reasons.
First,
it
accounts
for
the
important
role
of
leaders
in
capitalizing
on
opportunities
to
realize
a
given
policy.
The
policy
entrepreneur
could
just
as
easily
be
the
President
of
Egypt
as
the
President
of
the
United
States.
Second,
it
takes
into
account
the
importance
of
both
domestic
political
and
economic
concerns
in
generating
an
atmosphere
in
which
a
given
policy
is
more
likely
to
be
paired
with
a
given
problem.
Just
as
a
situation
in
the
United
States
where
an
economic
downturn
and
the
rise
of
a
highly
conservative
domestic
political
movement
might
increase
the
likelihood
of
certain
solutions
to
budgetary
problems,
fluctuations
in
oil
prices
and
popular
sentiment
in
the
Arab
world
might
embolden
Arab
oil‐exporting
states
to
consider
“the
oil
weapon”
more
readily.
Ergo,
Kingdon’s
model
has
the
benefit
of
allowing
simultaneous
consideration
of
issues
that
fall
under
traditionally
distinct
leadership‐based,
domestic
political,
and
to
actually
make
a
decision.
See
Simon,
Herbert
A.
"A
Behavioral
Model
of
Rational
Choice."
Models
of
Man:
Social
and
Rational:
Mathematical
Essays
on
Rational
Human
Behavior
in
a
Social
Setting.New
York:
John
Wiley
&
Sons,
1957.
Print.
34
Kingdon,
John
W.
Agendas,
Alternatives,
and
Public
Policies.
Boston:
Little,
Brown,
1984.
Print.
Ramel
27
rational
economic
explanations
of
events.
Altogether,
Kingdon’s
model
provides
a
more
robust
portrayal
of
the
decision‐making
processes
undergirding
the
policymaking
process,
and
lends
itself
nicely
to
narrative
reconstruction
of
the
various
subjective
details
that
have
informed
particular
instances
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
An
alternative
understanding
of
policymaking
that
examines
the
historical
conditions
that
lead
to
disruption
of
the
status
quo
is
the
punctuated
equilibrium
model,
in
which
sudden
flurries
of
innovation
interrupt
otherwise
long
periods
of
inactivity
and
stagnation.
Stephen
Krasner
was
the
first
to
adapt
the
evolutionary
biological
theory
of
punctuated
equilibrium,
as
originally
conceptualized
by
Stephen
Jay
Gould
and
Niles
Eldridge,
to
questions
of
political
science.35
Krasner
put
forth
a
model
of
punctuated
equilibrium
in
politics
in
which
“institutional
stasis”
sets
in,
and
the
static
regime’s
continued
unwillingness
to
innovate
or
address
an
issue
eventually
sparks
other
participants
to
take
action,
resulting
in
a
period
of
substantial
churn
and
the
realization
of
a
new
regime
or
policy.
Later,
Frank
Baumgartner
and
Bryan
Jones
offered
a
slightly
more
developed
assessment
of
what
undergirded
the
concept
of
punctuated
equilibrium
in
policymaking.
They
emphasized
the
importance
of
“policy
monopolies”,
which
are
similar
in
function
to
Krasner’s
static
regimes,
but
they
also
expounded
that
rather
than
merely
passively
blocking
change,
such
policy
monopolies
actively
attempt
to
35
See
Krasner,
Stephen.
(1984).
Approaches
to
the
State:
Alternative
Conceptions
and
Historical
Dynamics.
Comparative
Politics,
16(2),
240‐244.
JSTOR.
Web.
10
Nov.
2011;
and
Gould,
Stephen
J.,
and
Niles
Eldridge.
"Punctuated
Equilibria:
An
Alternative
to
Phyletic
Gradualism."
Models
in
Paleobiology.
By
Thomas
J.
M.
Schopf.
San
Francisco:
Freeman
and
Cooper,
1972.
82‐115.
Ramel
28
maintain
control
by
managing
the
agenda
of
issues
of
discussion
to
exclude
reform.36
Building
on
this
thread
in
Baumgartner
and
Jones’s
work,
Thomas
Birkland
proposes
a
model
by
which
such
a
policy
monopoly
might
be
disrupted:
“Policy
communities
use
agreed‐upon
symbols
to
construct
their
visions
of
problem,
causation,
and
solution.
As
long
as
these
images
and
symbols
are
maintained
throughout
society,
or
remain
largely
invisible
and
unquestioned,
agenda
access
for
groups
that
do
not
share
these
images
is
likely
to
be
difficult;
change
is
less
likely
until
the
less
powerful
group‘s
construction
of
the
problem
becomes
more
prevalent.”37
Only
by
gaining
control
over
such
symbols
and
providing
an
alternative
conception
of
the
problem
can
disgruntled
actors
destabilize
the
existing
policy
monopoly
and
become
the
officiators
of
a
new
one.
Past
these
policymaking
frameworks,
there
are
also
traditional
theories
of
international
relations
that
attempt
to
explain
states’
behavior,
of
which
“the
oil
weapon”
would
be
a
manifestation.
The
class
of
theories
most
readily
applicable
to
this
type
of
investigation
is
the
positivist
set
of
theories,
which
focus
on
state
level
analysis.
Its
dominant
strains
are
classical
realism,
which
focuses
on
competition
among
states
within
the
structure
of
the
international
system,
and
liberalism,
which
deals
with
achieving
peaceful
cooperation
between
states
in
the
international
36
Baumgartner,
Frank
R.,
and
Bryan
D.
Jones.
Agendas
and
Instability
in
American
Politics.
Vol.
2.
Chicago:
University
of
Chicago,
2009.
Print.
37
Birkland,
Thomas
A.
An
Introduction
to
the
Policy
Process:
Theories,
Concepts,
and
Models
of
Public
Policy
Makin.
3rd
ed.
Armonk:
M.E.
Sharpe,
2010.
177.
Google
Books.
Web.
10
Feb.
2012.
I
am
indebted
to
Varun
Sivaram
for
noticing
the
link
between
Baumgartner
and
Jones
work
and
Birkland’s.
See
Sivaram,
Varun.
"Sunny
Side
Up:
Characterizing
the
US
Military's
Approach
to
Solar
Power."
Center
for
International
Security
and
Cooperation
(2011):
14.
Coursework.
Stanford
University,
May
2011.
Web.
22
Sept.
2011.
Ramel
29
system
through
shared
norms
and
institutions.38
Newer
strains
of
each
of
these
two
schools
of
thought
have
emerged
in
the
last
half‐century,
aptly
named
neo‐realism
and
neo‐liberalism.
Given
that
“the
oil
weapon”
is
a
coercive
policy,
meant
to
apply
a
competitive
disadvantage
to
the
targeted
state
by
way
of
its
economy,
analysis
of
such
a
policy
decision
through
an
international
relations
framework
would
favor
the
realist/neorealist
branch
of
analysis
over
the
liberal/neoliberal
one.
Neo‐realism
rejects
classical
realism’s
essentialist
claims
about
human
nature
as
the
root
of
state
conflict
in
favor
of
the
belief
that
it
is
the
lack
of
overseeing
authority
in
the
international
system
that
leads
to
anarchy
among
states,
and
thus,
competition.39
In
such
a
system,
states
have
unequal
capabilities,
which
limit
cooperation
further
and
push
states
to
attempt
to
realize
gains
relative
to
other
states
within
the
international
system.
States’
competing
actions
ultimately
yield
a
balance
of
power,
in
which
states
do
not
necessarily
need
to
achieve
regional
hegemony
to
achieve
a
measure
of
security.
Supporters
of
the
offensive
realist
strain
of
the
realist
school
react
to
what
they
perceive
as
a
status
quo
bias
in
neorealist
thought.
Instead,
offensive
realists
such
as
John
Mearsheimer
propose
that
states
“look
for
opportunities
to
alter
the
balance
of
power
by
acquiring
additional
increments
of
power
at
the
expense
of
38
For
a
good
general
discussion
of
the
major
school
of
thought
in
international
relations
theory,
see
Walt,
Stephen
M.
"International
Relations:
One
World,
Many
Theories."
Foreign
Policy110
(1998):
29+.
JSTOR.
Web.
14
Apr.
2012.
39
The
foundational
text
of
neo‐realism
in
international
relations
is
Kenneth
Waltz’s
Theory
of
International
Politics.
See
Waltz,
Kenneth
Neal.
Theory
of
International
Politics.
Reading,
MA:
Addison‐
Wesley
Publishers,
1979.
Print.
Ramel
30
potential
rivals.”40
According
to
this
school
of
thought,
states
are
not
happy
with
just
enough
power
to
balance
other
states’
intentions;
instead,
they
seek
at
the
very
least
to
achieve,
through
military
might,
a
measure
of
hegemony
over
neighboring
states
in
their
respective
regions.41
These
theoretical
frameworks
in
mind,
this
thesis
will
explore
the
principal
puzzle
of
explaining
“the
oil
weapon’s”
historical
patterns
of
use
via
two
larger
questions:
Question
1:
How
might
larger
systemic
developments
that
helped
pave
the
way
for
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967
and
1973‐1974
best
be
understood,
particularly
the
overarching
transition
in
control
of
the
international
oil
market
from
the
international
oil
companies
to
the
oil‐producing
countries?
Hypothesis
1A:
Krasner’s
punctuated
equilibrium
framework
has
substantial
explanatory
power
in
understanding
this
initial
transition
in
power.
Hypothesis
1B:
Baumgartner
and
Jones’
punctuated
equilibrium
framework
has
substantial
explanatory
power
in
understanding
this
initial
transition
in
power.
Question
2:
How
can
the
historical
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
and
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
as
policy
tactics
best
be
explained?
40
Mearsheimer,
John
J.
The
Tragedy
of
Great
Power
Politics.
New
York:
Norton,
2001.
Print.
34.
41
Ibid.
141.
Ramel
31
Hypothesis
2A:
A
punctuated
equilibrium
approach
is
adequate
to
set
the
stage
for
the
consideration
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
but
inadequate
to
fully
account
for
its
ultimate
deployment
or
non‐deployment.
Hypothesis
2B:
Kingdon’s
multiple
streams
model
offers
a
strong
explanation
for
the
rhetoric
or
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
for
the
case
in
question.
Hypothesis
2C:
Neo‐realism
offers
a
strong
explanation
for
the
rhetoric
or
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
for
the
case
in
question.
Hypothesis
2D:
Offensive
realism
offers
a
strong
explanation
for
the
rhetoric
or
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
for
the
case
in
question.
Hypothesis
2E:
Economic
structural
changes
in
world
oil
markets
offer
a
strong
explanation
for
the
rhetoric
or
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
for
the
case
in
question.
Conclusion:
The
existing
literature
on
“the
oil
weapon”
focuses
disproportionately
on
deterministic
explanations
for
why
“the
oil
weapon”
has
not
been
used
since
1973‐
1974.
Missing
from
this
literature
is
a
robust
treatment
of
the
myriad
factors
that
affect
the
policymaking
process
undergirding
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
In
the
ensuing
chapters,
I
will
develop
such
a
treatment
via
analyses
of
the
historical
development
in
the
international
oil
industry
from
1945
to
the
present.
In
my
next
chapter,
I
will
test
my
hypothesis
that
a
punctuated
equilibrium
approach
best
Ramel
32
explains
the
developments
in
the
1945‐1973
period
that
set
the
table
for
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Ramel
33
Chapter
III:
Priming
‘the
Oil
Weapon’
–
1945­1973
Introduction:
Starting
in
the
post‐World
War
II
period,
many
of
the
developing,
oil‐
producing
countries
exerted
increasingly
stronger
influence
over
their
own
reserves
and
production,
eventually
wresting
control
from
the
major
international
oil
companies
and
using
this
newfound
position
of
power
as
leverage
in
foreign
policy.
The
following
account
helps
frame
both
the
Arab
oil
producing
countries
and
the
Organization
of
Arab
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries’
(OAPEC)
ultimate
decisions
to
bring
“the
oil
weapon”
into
play
in
1967
and
1973‐1974,
respectively.
This
chapter
does
so
by
providing
the
historical
background
of
the
relevant
events
in
world
oil
politics
leading
up
to
OAPEC’s
utilization
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974,
evaluating
two
prominent
punctuated
equilibrium
models
as
a
potential
explanation
for
the
political
developments
that
occurred
during
this
period.
From
‘Well­Paid
Eunuchs’
to
a
Position
of
Control:
In
the
post‐World
War
II
period,
the
so‐called
“Seven
Sisters”
dominated
the
world’s
oil
industry.
An
unofficial
quasi‐cartel
composed
of
the
Anglo‐Persian
Oil
Company
(AIOC),
Gulf
Oil,
Royal
Dutch
Shell,
Standard
Oil
of
California,
Standard
Oil
of
New
Jersey,
Standard
Oil
of
New
York,
and
Texaco,
controlled
a
vast
majority
of
the
world’s
oil
via
predatory
“concessions
agreements”
with
the
governments
of
the
world’s
oil
producing
countries.
However,
flurries
of
disruptive
activity
in
the
international
oil
company
/
oil
producing
country
power
dynamic
in
1956,
1960,
Ramel
34
and
1971
set
the
table
for
the
final
destruction
of
this
long‐standing
economic
order
as
manifested
in
OAPEC’s
1973‐1974
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
For
a
punctuated
equilibrium
interpretation
of
the
occurrence
of
“the
oil
weapon”
to
have
explanatory
power,
it
must
be
demonstrated
that
certain
actors
in
a
political
arena
successfully
mobilize
in
new
venues
and
expand
the
scope
of
the
central
conflict
in
an
attempt
to
rectify
perceived
inequities
in
the
long
standing,
existing
policy
monopoly
or
regime.
If
the
arrangement
of
the
international
oil
industry
at
the
beginning
of
this
period
is
to
be
interpreted
as
an
equilibrium
period
in
a
punctuated
equilibrium
explanation,
an
observable
status
quo
must
first
be
in
place
either
due
to
(1)
a
policy
monopoly
enforcing
stability
through
the
control
of
the
material
and
symbolic
infrastructure
of
the
industry,
a
la
Baumgartner
and
Jones42;
or
(2)
a
static
regime
arrangement
in
which
existing
regimes
and
their
constituent
members
are
not
innovating,
a
la
Krasner.43
The
equilibrium
status
was
one
in
which
the
international
oil
companies’
maintained
a
dominant,
controlling
position
over
the
world
oil
economy
by
way
of
explicit
physical
control
of
infrastructure
such
as
drilling
rigs,
refineries,
shipping
ways
and
implicit
symbolic
control
of
production
schedules
and
producing‐country
revenue
takes.
Therefore,
in
this
case,
Baumgartner
and
Jones’
42
Baumgartner,
Frank
R.,
and
Bryan
D.
Jones.
Agendas
and
Instability
in
American
Politics.
Chicago:
University
of
Chicago,
1993.
Print.
43
Krasner,
Stephen.
(1984).
Approaches
to
the
State:
Alternative
Conceptions
and
Historical
Dynamics.
Comparative
Politics,
16(2),
240‐244.
JSTOR.
Web.
10
Nov.
2011.
Krasner
had
first
articulated
his
understanding
of
regimes
and
their
dynamics
in
“Structural
Causes
and
Regime
Consequences:
Regimes
as
Intervening
Variables."
International
Organization
36.02
(1982):
185.
JSTOR.
Web.
08
Feb.
2012.
Krasner
drew
this
model
from
the
biological
theory
of
punctuated
equilibrium
as
explicated
by
Stephen
Jay
Gould
and
Niles
Eldridge.
See
Gould,
Stephen
J.,
and
Niles
Eldridge.
"Punctuated
Equilibria:
An
Alternative
to
Phyletic
Gradualism."
Models
in
Paleobiology.
By
Thomas
J.
M.
Schopf.
San
Francisco:
Freeman
and
Cooper,
1972.
82‐115.
Ramel
35
equilibrium
state
of
the
policy
monopoly
hews
more
closely
to
reality
than
Krasner’s
conception
of
a
stable
regime.
Under
this
relatively
stable
policy
monopoly,
the
local
governments
of
the
oil
producing
countries
usually
received
almost
no
information
regarding
production
figures
for
their
own
oil
reserves,
and
were
routinely
paid
a
modest
percentage
of
the
royalty
payments
resulting
from
the
sale
of
their
countries’
crude.
Even
as
the
high
volume
of
production
ensured
a
steady
flow
of
money
into
the
oil
producing
countries,
they
suffered
the
indignity
of
a
lack
of
control
over
their
own
natural
resources,
compounded
by
a
deficit
in
the
human
capital,
the
infrastructure,
and
the
market
access
that
would
even
have
allowed
them
to
consider
successfully
managing
their
own
oil
reserves.
They
were,
as
the
oil
historian
Francisco
Parra
so
concisely
put
it,
“well‐paid
eunuchs.”44
The
first
rumblings
foreshadowing
an
end
to
the
current
equilibrium
state
and
a
transition
to
a
greater
degree
of
producer
country
control
over
domestic
oil
reserves
were
Venezuela
and
Saudi
Arabia’s
calls,
in
1943
and
1950,
respectively,
for
a
larger,
more
equitable
slice
of
the
revenues
coming
from
the
production
of
their
oil.
The
oil
producing
countries
negotiated
“50/50”
profit
sharing
agreements
as
an
early,
pragmatic
maneuver
to
assert
a
measure
of
sovereignty
over
their
oil
reserves
without
sparking
severe
reprisals
from
the
home
countries
of
the
international
oil
companies.45
44
Parra,
Francisco
R.
Oil
politics:
a
modern
history
of
petroleum.
I.B.Tauris,
2004.
Print.
31.
45
Yergin,
Daniel.
"Fifty‐Fifty:
The
New
Deal
in
Oil."
The
Prize:
The
Epic
Quest
for
Oil,
Money,
and
Power.
New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1991.
431‐48.
Print.
Ramel
36
Iran
soon
learned
of
the
danger
of
such
reprisals,
and
the
resistance
of
dominant,
stable
policy
monopolies
to
change.
In
April
of
1951,
the
democratically
appointed
Prime
Minister
of
Iran,
Mohammed
Mossadegh,
capitalized
on
discontent
among
the
Iranian
public
and
support
within
Iran’s
parliament
to
bring
about
the
nationalization
of
Iran’s
oil
reserves
from
the
despised
AIOC.
The
United
Kingdom
did
not
suffer
such
an
indignity
quietly.
Under
the
Attlee
government,
it
instigated
a
worldwide
boycott
of
Iranian
oil
to
place
economic
pressure
on
Iran,
and
following
the
transition
to
the
Churchill
administration
it
aided
the
CIA
in
orchestrating
a
coup
deposing
Mossadegh.
This
incident
remained
the
elephant
in
the
room
for
other
countries
considering
taking
on
a
greater
position
of
control
over
their
own
oil
reserves.46
Despite
the
fact
that
Iran’s
first
attempt
had
failed,
however,
the
writing
was
on
the
wall.
In
the
ongoing
struggle
of
former
colonies
and
protectorates
to
assert
full
independence
from
their
previous
occupiers
and
exploiters,
domestic
control
of
natural
resources
was
to
become
an
absolutely
non‐negotiable
principle.
One
of
the
most
strongly
symbolic
vestiges
of
both
the
old
colonial
system
of
control
and
the
international
oil
companies’
policy
monopoly
was
British
occupation
and
administration
of
the
Suez
Canal,
which
acted
as
a
vital
transit
point
for
the
movement
of
oil
and
other
goods
from
the
Middle
East
to
Europe.
By
1954,
Gamal
Abdel
Nasser
had
assumed
dictatorial
power
in
Egypt.
He
brought
with
him
a
strong
brand
of
nationalism
ensconced
in
a
larger
united
vision
of
the
Arab
world
known
as
“pan‐Arabism”,
and
he
broadcasted
these
ideas
expansively
by
way
of
regular
radio
46
Heiss,
Mary
Ann.
"The
International
Boycott
of
Iranian
Oil
and
the
Anti‐Mossaddeq
Coup
of
1953."
Mohammad
Mosaddeq
and
the
1953
Coup
in
Iran.
Ed.
Mark
J.
Gasiorowski
and
Malcolm
Byrne.
Syracuse:
Syracuse
UP,
2004.
178‐200.
Print.
Ramel
37
addresses
to
listeners
across
the
Arab
World.
In
a
1956
visit
to
Nasser,
British
Foreign
Secretary
Selwyn
Lloyd
articulated
that
the
Suez
Canal
was
“an
integral
part
of
the
Middle
East
oil
complex,
which
was
vital
to
Britain,”
to
which
Nasser
responded
that
if
it
was
so
vital,
then
Egypt
should
be
entitled
to
the
same
“50/50”
profit
sharing
agreements
that
Venezuela
and
others
had
negotiated.47
In
a
clear
articulation
of
the
seriousness
of
his
convictions,
on
July
26,
1956,
Nasser
simultaneously
ordered
the
Egyptian
military
to
seize
and
block
the
Suez
Canal
and
allied
Syrian
engineers
to
sabotage
several
important
oil
pipelines,
thereby
interrupting
the
transport
of
three
fourths
of
Western
Europe’s
oil.48
In
the
ensuing
months,
the
British,
French,
and
Israeli
invaded
portions
of
Egypt
in
an
attempt
to
clear
the
Suez
Canal
and
wrest
control
back
from
Nasser,
and,
after
tortured
negotiations
and
frenzied
logistical
planning,
the
United
States
mobilized
its
shut‐in
surplus
oil
production
capacity
to
help
Western
Europe
make
up
its
deficit.
The
entire
affair
was
a
clear
harbinger
of
things
to
come
in
three
respects.
First,
Nasser
had
ultimately
succeeded
in
his
initial
objective
of
gaining
operational
control
of
the
Suez
Canal,
a
result
that
only
further
emboldened
other
countries
to
take
aggressive
steps
to
expand
the
venues
of
contention
in
increasing
domestic
control
over
oil
infrastructure
previously
held
by
the
international
oil
companies
or
their
home
countries.
Second,
in
response
to
both
the
choking
off
of
the
Suez
Canal
and
the
sabotage
of
oil
pipelines,
the
international
oil
companies
placed
a
newfound
emphasis
on
operational
flexibility
in
oil
transport,
something
that
would
prove
47
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Prize:
The
Epic
Quest
for
Oil,
Money,
and
Power.
New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1991.
482.
Print.
48
Ibid.
490.
Ramel
38
invaluable
in
addressing
future
crises.
They
did
this
by
investing
heavily
in
increasing
the
average
size
of
the
oil
tankers
in
their
fleets.
Such
“supertankers”
not
only
increased
their
ability
to
economically
shuffle
oil
in
the
event
of
blockades
and
embargoes,
but
also
remained
highly
symbolic
of
the
international
oil
companies’
ability
to
outmaneuver
the
oil
producing
countries
in
the
struggle
to
either
maintain
or
destroy
the
existing
policy
monopoly.
Finally,
under
Nasser’s
leadership,
portions
of
the
Arab
world
had
mobilized
to
deny
the
delivery
of
oil
for
political
purposes,
a
clear
expansion
in
the
scope
of
conflict
from
solely
financial
negotiation
to
politically
coercive
action.
This
intensification
would
prefigure
the
more
involved
iterations
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967
and
1973‐1974.49
Nasser
would
carry
this
momentum
into
a
series
of
unofficial
meetings
in
the
late‐1950s
of
a
group
of
Arab
heads
of
state
and
oil
ministers
who
called
themselves
the
“Arab
Oil
Experts”,
where
he
used
his
position
as
the
chief
interlocutor
of
Arab
nationalism
to
persuade
other
Arab
leaders
of
the
central
importance
of
using
their
oil
wealth
in
the
struggle
against
the
former
colonial
powers.
Through
Nasser’s
repeated
incitement,
the
consensus
emerged
that
the
Arab
world
should
form
a
united
consortium
to
balance
against
the
combined
power
of
the
international
oil
companies
and
their
governments.50
That
hypothetical
international
body
for
managing
production,
increasing
revenues,
and
exerting
Arab
oil
power
would
later
become
manifest
as
OPEC.
49
Author’s
Note:
I
will
eschew
from
discussing
the
1967
and
1973‐1974
incidents
in
this
particular
section,
instead
dedicating
separate
sections
later
in
this
chapter
to
examining
them
in
depth.
50
Ibid.
509.
Ramel
39
Through
all
of
the
jolting
political
developments
in
the
region,
the
economic
issues
associated
with
the
international
oil
companies’
concessions
still
remained
at
the
forefront
of
the
oil
producing
countries’
grievances.
In
1959,
an
oil
glut
had
developed
as
the
various
Arab
producers
and
the
newly
ascendant
Soviet
oil‐
exporting
sector
sought
to
increase
their
revenues
by
racking
up
enormous
volumes
of
sales
in
international
markets.
The
issue
was
that
the
royalties
that
the
international
oil
companies
paid
to
the
oil
producers
was
based
on
a
posted
price,
which
was
now
far
higher
than
the
actual
price
that
the
oil
was
fetching
in
a
saturated
global
market.
British
Petroleum,
AIOC’s
successor,
led
the
international
oil
companies
in
deciding
to
cut
the
posted
prices
by
10percent
to
make
up
the
differences,
which
resulted
overnight
in
huge
reductions
in
the
oil
producing
countries’
revenues.
Later,
in
the
summer
of
1960,
Standard
Oil
of
New
Jersey
would
initiate
a
further
price
cut
of
7
percent.
Once
again,
the
other
major
international
oil
companies
followed
suit,
either
oblivious
to
or
ignoring
the
explosive
force
of
Arab
nationalism
in
the
oil
arena.
51
These
incidents
would
prove
to
be
galvanizing
ones
for
the
leaders
and
oil
ministers
of
the
oil
producing
countries,
who
saw
them
as
indicative
examples
of
the
unacceptable
power
that
the
international
oil
companies
had
over
them.
Only
through
domestic
control
of
their
natural
resources
did
the
oil
producers
believe
that
they
could
escape
the
insecurity
that
came
from
relying
on
the
historically
powerful
international
oil
companies.
51
Ibid.
515‐516
and
520‐521.
John
Loudon,
an
executive
with
Royal
Dutch
Shell,
made
the
prescient
observation
at
the
time
that
the
price
cuts
were
“the
fatal
move.
You
can’t
just
be
guided
by
market
forces
in
an
industry
so
essential
to
various
governments.
You
had
to
take
these
other
things
into
consideration.
You
had
to
be
so
terribly
careful.”
Ramel
40
United
by
a
shared
collective
sense
of
victimization
at
the
hands
of
the
international
oil
companies,
ministers
from
Venezuela,
Saudi
Arabia,
Kuwait,
Iran,
and
Iraq
composed
a
gentleman’s
agreement
at
the
1959
Arab
Oil
Congress
pledging
to
enact
a
range
of
nationalistic
measures
in
the
oil
sphere,
including
increased
revenue
takes,
the
creation
of
vertically
integrated
national
oil
companies,
and
increased
integration
and
cooperation
to
ensure
stable
markets
for
themselves.
By
September
14,
1960,
these
countries,
representing
80
percent
of
the
world’s
oil
exports
at
the
time,
had
established
OPEC.
Though
this
new
venue
and
policy
forum
would
play
a
minimal
role
in
the
events
in
the
oil
industry
throughout
the
1960s
due
to
intra‐organizational
differences
in
policy
goals,
increasing
volumes
of
Russian
oil
exports,
and
US
import
quotas,
it
would
come
to
be
monumentally
important
in
the
period
from
the
1970s
onward.52
Perhaps
the
most
disruptive
changes
in
the
balance
of
power
in
the
oil
industry
were
the
Tehran
and
Tripoli
agreements
of
1971,
in
which
the
oil
producing
countries
of
the
world
were
able
to
negotiate
increased
revenue
takes
across
the
board
from
the
international
oil
companies,
using
the
threat
of
embargo
to
force
acquiescence
to
the
terms
of
the
agreements.
Fear
of
oil
scarcity
had
taken
root
amongst
both
industry
and
governments
in
the
period
from
1969
to
1971,
as
estimate
after
estimate
from
esteemed
oil
experts
pointed
to
a
meteoric
demand
increases
in
the
ensuing
years,
with
no
potential
for
addressing
them
without
Middle
Eastern
oil
reserves.53
This
trend
had
heavily
strengthened
the
oil
producers’
hands
going
into
negotiations.
Being
able
to
push
the
international
oil
companies
52
Ibid.
523.
53
Parra,
Francisco
R.
Oil
politics:
a
modern
history
of
petroleum.
I.B.Tauris,
2004.
114.
Print.
Ramel
41
and
their
host
countries
around
so
easily
in
issues
of
power
over
oil
only
emboldened
the
producer
countries
in
future
negotiations.
James
Placke,
the
head
petroleum
officer
stationed
at
the
American
embassy
in
Libya
at
the
time,
articulated
the
momentousness
of
these
new
negotiations:
“the
practicality
of
controlling
supply
as
means
of
exerting
pressure
for
raising
the
price
of
oil
has
been
dramatically
demonstrated…control
of
the
flow
of
resources
has
been
of
strategic
concern
throughout
history.
Asserting
control
over
a
vital
source
of
energy
would
permit
Middle
Eastern
states
to
regain
the
power
position
vis‐à‐vis
the
West,
which
this
area
lost
long
ago.”54
Placke
correctly
predicted
that
as
the
oil
producing
countries
grew
more
confident
in
asserting
their
dominion
over
their
oil
reserves,
discussions
of
control
over
price
would
continue
to
lead
to
discussion
of
control
over
supply.
The
foundations
were
set
for
a
final
serious
clash
between
the
oil
producing
countries
and
the
oil‐importing
countries
and
oil
companies
of
the
West,
one
in
which
the
previously
existing
policy
monopoly
would
be
irrecoverably
shattered.
Amidst
this
ongoing
trend
of
nationalization
of
oil
resources,
country
after
country
followed
the
examples
set
via
the
Tehran
and
Tripoli
agreements,
undertaking
a
wide
range
of
contract
re‐negotiations,
establishing
controlling
equity
stakes
in
certain
oil
concessions,
and
vertically
expanding
the
reach
of
their
national
oil
companies’
operations.
As
an
illustrative
figure,
as
late
as
1966,
less
than
1
percent
of
oil
was
directly
marketed
by
producing
countries,
whereas
by
1979
that
54
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Prize:
The
Epic
Quest
for
Oil,
Money,
and
Power.
New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1991.
587.
Print.
Ramel
42
figure
had
climbed
to
42.2
percent,
a
staggering
increase
reflecting
the
profound
change
in
power
dynamics
in
the
world’s
oil
industry
during
the
ensuing
period.55
Conclusion:
The
overall
trend
from
the
end
of
World
War
II
to
the
early
1970s
was
a
shift
away
from
the
major
international
oil
companies
in
favor
of
the
oil
producing
countries
assuming
greater
control
of
their
oil
and
the
economic
power
that
such
control
entailed.
The
events
therein
hew
closely
to
the
punctuated
equilibrium
interpretation
of
historical
proceedings,
specifically
Baumgartner
and
Jones’
model,
thereby
validating
the
hypothesis
that
the
world
oil
economy’s
transformation
writ
large
in
the
post‐World
War
II,
pre‐1973
period
can
best
be
explained
through
such
a
lens.
Additionally,
these
developments
presaged
the
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967
and
1973‐1974,
and
are
thus
crucial
in
understanding
the
causes
and
interpreting
the
outcomes
of
those
events.
55
Levy,
Brian.
"World
Oil
Marketing
in
Transition."
International
Organization
36.01
(1982):
113‐
133.
JSTOR.
Web.
12
Feb.
2012.
Ramel
43
Chapter
IV:
Testing
and
Firing
‘the
Oil
Weapon’
–
1967
and
1973­1974
Introduction:
While
the
punctuated
equilibrium
model
examined
in
the
previous
chapter
is
helpful
in
explaining
the
changes
that
paved
the
way
for
the
eventual
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
I
propose
here
that
such
a
model
cannot
fully
account
for
the
policymaking
process
undergirding
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Accordingly,
in
this
chapter
I
will
evaluate
the
instances
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967
and
1973‐1974
according
to
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model,
neo‐realism,
offensive
realism,
and
economic
structural
change
analysis
in
an
attempt
to
find
which
has
the
most
explanatory
power
for
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
this
period.
This
portion
of
the
thesis
is
divided
up
into
two
parts.
The
first
details
several
Arab
countries’
abortive
1967
attempt
to
exhibit
oil
power
through
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
The
second
puts
forth
an
account
of
the
period
in
1973‐1974
during
which
OAPEC
unleashed
“the
oil
weapon”,
focusing
on
the
role
that
certain
factors
such
as
leadership,
oil
producer
country
domestic
politics,
and
economic
changes
had
on
their
ultimate
decision
to
deploy
“the
oil
weapon.”
Ramel
44
1967
–
Test­Firing
‘the
Oil
Weapon’:
In
many
ways,
1967
was
a
precursor
to
OAPEC’s
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974,
and
as
such,
the
two
events
bear
much
in
common.
In
both
cases,
Arab
nations
spurred
on
by
Egypt
embargoed
their
collective
oil
reserves
in
an
attempt
to
punish
certain
Western
nations
for
supporting
Israel
in
its
conflict
with
a
consortium
of
Arab
nations.
However,
a
lack
of
support
amongst
participants
in
the
embargo
made
it
a
short‐term
endeavor
without
real
teeth.
In
this
section,
I
will
detail
the
causes,
proceedings,
and
outcomes
of
the
1967
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
with
particular
emphasis
on
identifying
the
ways
in
which
it
set
the
stage
for
the
more
ambitious
and
better‐coordinated
utilization
of
the
same
tactic
in
1973‐1974.
I
argue
that
the
appearance
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967
can
best
be
explained
through
the
lens
of
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
approach.
For
this
model
to
have
explanatory
power,
a
policy
entrepreneur
must
take
advantage
of
a
conflation
of
problems,
politics,
and
policies
in
the
form
of
a
policy
window
in
order
to
enact
a
specific
political
change.56
One
key
difference
between
the
usual
subjects
of
multiple
policy
streams
analysis
and
the
Arab
oil
producers’
coalition
is
the
scope
of
problem
and
policies
that
each
is
exposed
to.
By
design,
the
Arab
oil
producers’
coalition’s
mission
relates
specifically
to
the
utilization
of
member
countries’
oil
reserves
for
achieving
political
goals,
a
much
narrower
purview
than
that
of
the
United
States
Senate,
for
example.
Though
Kingdon
originally
developed
his
models
to
examine
policymaking
in
the
56
Kingdon,
John
W.
Agendas,
Alternatives,
and
Public
Policies.
Boston:
Little,
Brown,
1984.
Print.
Ramel
45
United
States’
Legislative
and
Executive
branches,
I
believe
that
its
tenets
can
be
expanded
to
help
explain
a
much
wider
variety
of
policy
outcomes.
Despite
the
diminished
latitude
of
potential
problems
to
address
and
policies
to
consider,
the
Arab
oil
producers’
coalition’s
collective
policies
ultimately
only
come
to
fruition
via
the
actions
of
a
dedicated
policy
entrepreneur
seizing
on
expedient
political
circumstances.
In
the
summer
of
1967,
as
in
that
of
1956,
Nasser
would
be
at
the
vanguard
of
the
Arab
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Eager
to
shore
up
his
personal
prestige
by
reclaiming
lands
lost
to
the
Israelis
in
the
1956
conflict
and
afraid
of
being
perceived
as
insufficiently
militant
among
the
Arab
public,
he
began
coordination
with
Syria
and
Jordan
to
blockade
and
surround
Israel.
In
a
surprise
response,
the
Israelis
launched
a
blindingly
fast
preemptive
campaign
against
the
massed
Arab
armies,
catching
them
unaware,
utterly
destroying
their
air
and
ground
defenses,
and
leaving
Sinai,
all
of
Jerusalem,
the
West
Bank,
and
the
Golan
Heights
under
direct
Israeli
control.57
Taken
aback
and
incensed,
Nasser
claimed
that
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom
must
have
helped
the
Israelis
by
flying
bombing
sorties
on
Arab
targets.
Presenting
this
case
before
a
meeting
of
Arab
oil
ministers
on
June
5th,
he
called
for
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
against
the
United
States
and
Great
Britain
to
punish
them
for
their
military
support
of
Israel.
His
specific
policy
proposal
to
address
the
clear
and
present
problem
of
Israeli
control
over
Arab
territory
was
set
against
an
incredibly
supportive
political
backdrop.
Domestic
constituencies
across
the
Arab
world
were
clamoring
for
57
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Prize:
The
Epic
Quest
for
Oil,
Money,
and
Power.
New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1991.
554‐556.
Print.
Ramel
46
retribution
against
Israel
and
its
backers,
with
anti‐Western
riots
cropping
up
across
Saudi
Arabia,
Kuwait,
and
Libya
and
the
International
Confederation
of
Arab
Trade
Unions
calling
for
workers
to
blow
up
and
otherwise
sabotage
the
oil
infrastructure
of
any
Arab
oil
producing
country
that
did
not
support
the
oil
embargo.58
Given
the
vast
oil
reserves
that
the
Arab
countries
collectively
controlled,
“the
oil
weapon”
seemed
the
strongest
leverage
point
they
had
in
punishing
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom
for
their
support
of
Israel.
In
the
face
of
Nasser’s
policy
entrepreneurship
and
the
policy
window
opened
by
such
vehement
unrest,
on
June
7th,
Saudi
Arabia,
Kuwait,
Libya,
Syria,
Algeria,
Iraq
all
elected
to
enact
an
embargo
prohibiting
the
shipment
of
any
of
their
oil
to
the
United
States
or
the
United
Kingdom,
bolstered
by
a
closure
of
the
Suez
Canal
and
the
region’s
oil
pipelines.59
At
first
look,
the
embargo
appeared
to
be
succeeding:
by
the
following
day
Arab
exports
of
oil
had
diminished
some
60
percent.60
However,
this
episode
of
“the
oil
weapon”
was
already
in
trouble,
as
intra‐coalition
disagreements
among
the
Arab
countries,
alternative
sources
of
oil,
and
international
oil
companies’
logistical
maneuvering
combined
to
neutralize
the
embargo
almost
immediately.
58
Daoudi,
M.
S.,
and
M.
S.
Dajani.
"The
1967
Oil
Embargo
Revisited."
Journal
of
Palestine
Studies
13.2
(1984):
69.
JSTOR.
Web.
12
Jan.
2012.
59
The
resolution
that
they
would
officially
adopt
in
the
Oil
Ministers’
Conference
in
Baghdad
soon
after
is
notable
for
explicitly
holding
the
international
oil
companies
responsible
for
the
political
actions
of
their
home
countries,
stating
that
“the
involvement
of
any
country,
directly
or
indirectly
in
armed
aggression
against
Arab
states
will
make
assets
of
its
companies
and
nationals
inside
territories
of
Arab
countries
subject
to
laws
war.
This
includes
assets
of
oil
companies."
See
The
United
States.
Department
of
State.
National
Archives
and
Records
Administration.
Telegram
From
the
Embassy
in
Iraq
to
the
Department
of
State
­
Baghdad,
June
6,
1967,
2140Z.
Office
of
the
Historian's
Bureau
of
Public
Affairs,
1999.
Web.
23
Jan.
2012.
<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxxiv/x.html>.
60
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Prize:
The
Epic
Quest
for
Oil,
Money,
and
Power.
New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1991.
555.
Print.
Ramel
47
The
Saudis,
the
largest
oil
exporter
in
the
coalition
as
well
as
in
the
world
at
that
time,
had
initially
agreed
to
vocally
and
substantially
back
“the
oil
weapon”
in
order
to
diffuse
domestic
political
pressure.
Had
they
not
offered
such
a
show
of
solidarity
with
the
Arab
countries
in
their
struggle
against
Israel,
public
anger
might
have
erupted
and
destroyed
portions
of
the
country’s
crucial
oil
infrastructure.
However,
by
the
end
of
June,
Saudi
policy
had
changed,
and
with
it,
the
policy
options
available
to
the
entire
coalition
diminished.
Sheikh
Yamani,
Saudi
Arabia’s
Minister
of
Oil
and
Mineral
Resources,
had
embarked
on
an
extensive
media
blitz
in
which
he
publically
questioned
the
value
of
the
embargo
and
claimed
that
it
was
hurting
the
Arab
oil
producers
more
than
the
targeted
states.
King
Hussein
of
Jordan’s
public
claim
on
July
7th
that
there
was
no
real
evidence
that
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom
had
actually
participated
in
bombing
sorties
alongside
Israel
only
buoyed
the
Saudi
position.61
Though
public
backlash
among
Arab
leaders
and
the
Arab
public
forced
the
Saudis
to
publically
retract
these
statements,
Saudi
Arabia
nevertheless
reopened
their
spigots
and
began
quietly
permitting
the
United
States’
international
oil
companies
to
resume
exports.
Despite
radical
countries
such
as
Iraq
advocating
for
an
escalation
to
a
three‐
month
full
shutdown
of
Arab
oil
exports
paired
with
a
selective
embargo,
this
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon”
had
already
been
neutered.
Given
the
volume
of
its
oil
production
relative
to
the
other
members
of
the
coalition
of
embargoing
countries,
Saudi
Arabia’s
decision
to
no
longer
support
the
embargo
rendered
it
all
but
meaningless.
Without
the
all‐important
enabling
Saudi
support,
the
policy
61
Daoudi,
M.
S.,
and
M.
S.
Dajani.
"The
1967
Oil
Embargo
Revisited."
Journal
of
Palestine
Studies
13.2
(1984):
71‐72.
JSTOR.
Web.
12
Jan.
2012.
Ramel
48
window
was
closed
before
the
policy
of
“the
oil
weapon”
could
have
any
significant
effect.
At
this
point,
Nasser,
the
policy’s
original
entrepreneur,
could
no
longer
muster
the
political
capital
to
support
“the
oil
weapon.”
He
had
just
put
down
a
coup
at
home,
and
he
admitted
to
the
rest
of
the
Arab
embargoing
countries
that
Egypt
was
broke.62
In
a
meeting
of
the
Arab
coalition
in
Khartoum
in
late
August,
Nasser
and
King
Faisal
of
Saudi
Arabia
orchestrated
a
save‐face
agreement
for
Egypt
by
which
the
embargo
would
be
lifted
and
a
portion
of
the
revenues
resulting
from
the
oil
sales
would
be
paid
back
to
the
Arab
states
that
had
sustained
damage
at
the
hands
of
Israel
during
the
war.
The
Arab
countries
lifted
the
embargo
and
resumed
exports
by
September.
Even
during
the
peak
of
the
embargo’s
enforcement,
the
embargoed
countries
maintained
access
to
oil
because
of
three
economic
factors.
First,
the
international
oil
companies
had
fleets
of
supertankers,
which
they
had
built
following
the
1956
Suez
Canal
crisis.
Second,
the
embargoed
countries
at
the
time
had
ample
domestic
oil
reserves
to
supply
at
least
four
months
of
consumption.
Third,
non‐Arab
producers,
notably
the
United
States,
had
sufficient
swing
capacity
to
help
stave
off
the
oil
shortfall.
In
concert,
the
United
States
government
and
the
international
oil
companies
marshaled
a
large‐scale
oil
redistribution
campaign
to
ensure
that
Western
Europe’s
markets,
including
the
United
Kingdom’s,
received
62
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Prize:
The
Epic
Quest
for
Oil,
Money,
and
Power.
New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1991.
557.
Print.
Ramel
49
adequate
amounts
of
oil.63
These
factors
demonstrate
the
important
constraining
power
that
economic
realities
have
on
the
political
viability
of
enacting
and
maintaining
a
given
policy.
Ultimately,
it
was
the
influence
of
a
specific
policy
entrepreneur
(Nasser)
and
domestic
political
constituencies
that
resulted
in
the
initiation
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967,
and
it
was
internal
dissension,
United
States
spare
production
capacity,
and
international
oil
market
flexibility
that
doomed
the
exercise
to
failure
and
early
termination.
Throughout,
a
multiple
policy
streams
reading
of
the
events
holds
up
as
explanatory
in
nature.
Overall,
1967
was
a
proof
of
concept
for
coalitional
exercise
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
The
failure
was
not
necessarily
due
to
an
inherent
flaw
in
the
policy,
but
rather
due
to
practical
political
variables
that
might
better
align
to
yield
success
in
future
attempts.
OAPEC
would
build
on
the
lessons
of
1967
in
the
ensuing
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974.
Realist
and
Economic
Structural
Change
Frameworks
Fail
to
Fully
Explain
the
Decision
to
Use
‘the
Oil
Weapon’
in
1967:
An
attempted
realist
reading
of
the
events
of
1967
has
some
limited
explanatory
power,
as
the
coalition
of
Arab
states
used
“the
oil
weapon”
as
an
attempt
to
indirectly
balance
against
Israel’s
superior
military
capabilities
by
way
of
pressuring
the
United
States,
Israel’s
ally.
However,
this
reading
does
not
account
63
Daoudi,
M.
S.,
and
M.
S.
Dajani.
"The
1967
Oil
Embargo
Revisited."
Journal
of
Palestine
Studies
13.2
(1984):
83.
JSTOR.
Web.
12
Jan.
2012.
Ramel
50
for
the
important
intra‐state
dynamics
at
play,
particularly
the
role
that
domestic
unrest
had
in
influencing
certain
policy
makers.
While
Egypt’s
early
decision
to
aggressively
and
preemptively
surround
Israel
along
with
Jordan
and
Syria
hews
closely
to
an
offensive
realist
lens,
the
coalition
of
Arab
States’
actual
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
was
motivated
less
at
further
offensive
territorial
moves,
but
rather
at
simply
trying
to
pressure
Israel
to
withdraw
from
its
captured
territories
through
pressure
on
the
United
States.
Finally,
the
economic
structural
changes
analytical
approach
fails
to
adequately
address
the
manifold
important
political
dynamics
of
the
situation.
As
evidenced
by
the
fact
that
the
United
States
still
maintained
spare
capacity
sufficient
to
blunt
this
abortive
embargo,
the
world’s
oil
economy
had
not
yet
changed
in
an
appreciable
enough
manner
to
give
such
changes
real
leverage
in
the
overall
policy
equation.64
Given
the
failure
of
these
three
frameworks
to
fully
explain
the
many
and
varied
dynamics
and
circumstances
undergirding
“the
oil
weapon’s”
use
in
1967,
only
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
analysis
holds
as
having
robust
explanatory
power.
Here
We
Go
–
‘the
Oil
Weapon’
in
Action
in
1973­1974:
Under
Anwar
Sadat’s
direction,
Egyptian
and
Syrian
troops
launched
a
surprise
attack
on
Israel
on
the
morning
of
October
6,
1973,
purposely
coinciding
with
Yom
Kippur,
the
most
sacred
of
Jewish
holidays,
in
order
to
maximally
catch
64
Ibid.
Ramel
51
the
Israeli
armed
forces
off‐guard.
After
discovering
that
the
United
States
was
resupplying
the
Israelis
quickly
exhausted
materiel,
the
countries
of
OAPEC
initiated
a
three‐pronged
reprisal
consisting
of
a
unilateral
70
percent
increase
in
the
posted
price
of
oil,
tiered,
successive
production
cuts,
and
an
embargo
of
the
United
States
and
the
Netherlands.65
I
argue
here
that
the
appearance
of
“the
oil
weapon”
again
under
the
auspices
of
OAPEC
in
1973‐1974
can
best
be
explained
via
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
approach,
bolstered
by
several
key
economic
structural
changes.
As
stated
in
the
previous
iteration
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967,
for
this
model
to
have
explanatory
power,
a
policy
entrepreneur
must
take
advantage
of
a
conflation
of
problems,
politics,
and
policies
in
the
form
of
a
policy
window
in
order
to
enact
a
specific
political
change.66
As
mentioned
in
the
opening
paragraph
of
this
section,
President
Sadat
of
Egypt
was
the
clear
driver
of
the
initial
aggression
against
Israel;
however,
he
also
played
a
key
role
as
the
policy
entrepreneur
advocating
successfully
for
the
use
“the
oil
weapon.”
The
problem
for
OAPEC
in
1973
was
the
same
one
the
Arab
consortium
of
embargoing
countries
had
had
in
1967:
Israeli
troops
were
(still)
occupying
Arab
territories
in
Egypt,
Syria,
and
Jordan,
and
the
policy
options
available
to
OAPEC
were
once
again
limited
to
strategic
application
of
member
countries’
oil
reserves.
Several
exogenous
economic
factors,
however,
helped
to
intensify
the
potential
viability
of
the
policy
of
using
“the
oil
weapon.”
Together,
these
factors
65
Ibid.
602‐614.
66
Kingdon,
John
W.
Agendas,
Alternatives,
and
Public
Policies.
Boston:
Little,
Brown,
1984.
Print.
Ramel
52
support
the
complementary
explanatory
power
of
the
economic
structural
change
approach
to
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
First
of
all,
a
crucial
piece
for
OAPEC
and
its
member
countries
in
their
quest
to
assume
a
dominant
position
in
world
oil
markets
fell
into
place
in
1970,
when
the
United
States
became
a
net
importer
of
oil
for
the
first
time
in
history.
Previously,
the
United
States’
had
functioned
as
a
key
swing
producer
of
oil
in
world
markets.
As
mentioned
in
the
previous
section,
this
capability
had
proven
to
be
a
blunting
influence
on
oil
producing
countries’
past
efforts
to
exert
power
by
way
of
oil
supply
interruption,
most
notably
during
the
1956
Suez
Canal
crisis
and
1967
Arab
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”67
No
longer
would
this
previously
complicating
economic
structural
factor
have
the
potential
to
mediate
future
Arab
attempts
to
utilize
“the
oil
weapon.”
Secondly,
world
oil
markets
were
much
tighter
in
1973
than
in
1967
–
surging
demand
had
outpaced
supply,
leaving
those
OAPEC
member
states
with
swing
capacity,
such
as
Saudi
Arabia,
as
the
sole
option
for
countries
seeking
additional
oil
imports.
Under
such
tight
market
conditions,
spare
capacity
takes
on
a
much
more
important
role
than
in
over‐supplied
markets.68
67
Yergin
pointed
out
the
criticality
of
this
shift
in
affording
the
Arab
oil
producers
a
greater
degree
of
leverage
in
using
“the
oil
weapon”:
“Since
the
1950s,
members
of
the
Arab
world
had
been
talking
about
using
the
hazily
defined
‘oil
weapon’
to
achieve
their
various
objectives
regarding
Israel…yet
the
weapon
had
always
been
deflected
by
the
fact
that
Arab
oil…was
not
the
supply
of
last
resort…but
once
the
United
States
hit
100%
in
terms
of
production
rates,
that
old
warrior,
American
production,
could
not
rise
up
again
to
defend
against
the
oil
weapon.”
See
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Prize:
The
Epic
Quest
for
Oil,
Money,
and
Power.
New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1991.
557.
Print.
68
Verrastro,
Frank
A.,
Sara
O.
Ladislow,
Matthew
Frank,
and
Lisa
A.
Hyland.
"The
Geopolitics
of
Energy:
Emerging
Trends,
Changing
Landscapes,
Uncertain
Times."
Center
for
Strategic
and
International
Studies
Energy
and
National
Security
Program
(2010).
Web.
22
Sept.
2011.
Ramel
53
The
politics
stream
of
a
Kingdonian
reading
was
not
as
clear‐cut,
though.
As
late
as
the
end
of
1972,
King
Faisal
of
Saudi
Arabia,
a
staunch
ally
of
the
United
States,
had
famously
stated
the
belief
that
“oil
and
politics
do
not
mix,”
even
going
so
far
as
to
publically
repudiate
Sadat
when
he
called
for
the
manipulation
of
oil
supplies
for
political
purposes.
Without
the
support
of
such
a
key
producer,
OAPEC’s
embargo
would
fail
as
it
had
previously
in
1967.
However,
the
aforementioned
exogenous
economic
changes
had
strengthened
the
Saudis
relative
position
in
the
world
oil
economy.
Additionally,
Faisal
had
grown
closer
with
Sadat
in
the
intervening
period,
and
believed
that
supporting
Sadat’s
policy
agenda
of
using
“the
oil
weapon”
would
both
help
supplant
Soviet
influence
in
the
region
and
help
alleviate
domestic
anti‐Israeli,
pro‐Arab
pressures
that
threatened
to
damage
the
country’s
oil
infrastructure.69
Once
Faisal
was
onboard,
a
policy
window
opened
for
“the
oil
weapon”
due
to
the
simultaneous
flaring
up
of
an
enduring
problem
(the
Israeli
occupation
of
Arab
territory
and
the
United
States
materiel
support
of
Israel),
domestic
political
situations
throughout
the
oil
producing
countries’
that
gave
their
leaders
an
incentive
to
address
that
problem,
and
a
combination
of
economic
structural
changes
in
world
oil
markets
that
empowered
the
policy
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Sadat
capitalized
on
the
policy
window,
and
the
price
raises,
embargo
and
production
cuts
went
into
effect
by
OAPEC
agreement.
69
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Prize:
The
Epic
Quest
for
Oil,
Money,
and
Power.
New
York:
Simon
&
Schuster,
1991.
594‐595.
Print.
Ramel
54
Debates
over
the
efficacy
of
this
episode
of
“the
oil
weapon”
fill
the
literature.70
Regardless,
1973‐1974
still
remains
the
single
most
intensive
and
large‐
scale
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
history,
and
represented
the
oil
producing
countries
realizing
the
full
range
of
the
abilities
derived
from
their
oil
reserves.71
Realist
Frameworks
Fail
to
Fully
Explain
the
Decision
to
Use
‘the
Oil
Weapon’
in
1973­1974:
An
attempted
neo‐realist
reading
of
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974
has
some
limited
explanatory
power
due
to
two
facts:
(1)
the
coalition
of
Arab
states
used
“the
oil
weapon”
as
an
attempt
to
indirectly
balance
against
Israel,
which
was
being
supplied
by
the
United
States
at
the
time;
and
(2)
Saudi
Arabia
believed
that
supporting
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
would
help
check
Soviet
influence
in
the
region.
However,
this
reading
falls
flat
due
to
the
key
importance
of
the
international
institution
of
OAPEC
in
ultimately
providing
the
arena
for
the
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Neo‐realism
places
states
as
the
sole
important
70
See
Chapter
II:
Literature
Review
and
Hypothetical
Framework
71
To
properly
understand
why
“the
oil
weapon”
has
remained
part
of
the
public
discourse
of
energy
politics
for
so
long,
it
is
important
to
establish
in
a
brief
aside
the
intense
fear
and
uncertainty
associated
with
its
most
prominent
exercise
in
1973‐1974.
The
most
searing
memory
for
many
is
the
gas
lines.
50
cars,
bumper
to
bumper,
filled
with
angry,
tired
drivers
who
just
wanted
to
fill
up
and
get
on
with
their
lives.
With
the
OAPEC
oil
embargo
and
production
cuts
in
full
swing
in
late
1973
and
early
1974,
many
Americans
associated
the
daily
trials
at
the
gas
station
with
such
developments.
But
such
a
conception
is
largely
incorrect.
Even
at
the
height
of
the
OAPEC
embargo,
oil
supply
contraction
in
the
United
States
was
by
some
experts’
calculations
only
4%.
Most
economists
instead
blame
the
Nixon
administration’s
import
and
price
controls
for
driving
the
artificial
shortages
that
manifest
as
gas
lines.
As
I
mentioned
earlier,
most
scholars
have
panned
“the
oil
weapon”
of
1973‐1974
as
a
material
failure
in
accomplishing
its
goals.
Hindsight,
though,
is
20/20,
and
at
the
time,
“the
oil
weapon”
shook
both
civilian
and
politician
alike,
all
the
way
up
to
Secretary
of
State
Henry
Kissinger.
It
is
against
this
historical‐psychological
backdrop
that
this
thesis’
analysis
stands.
See
Isidore,
Chris.
"A
Return
to
Gas
Lines
and
Rationing?"
CNNMoney.
CNN,
13
Oct.
2004.
Web.
10
Oct.
2011;
and
Adelman,
Morris
Albert.
The
Genie
out
of
the
Bottle:
World
Oil
since
1970.
Cambridge,
MA:
MIT,
1995.
Print.
85‐87,
105,
and
136‐137.
Ramel
55
arbiters
in
the
international
system,
yet
in
this
case
it
was
an
international
institution,
OAPEC,
that
was
integral
to
the
exercise
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
An
offensive
realist
lens,
meanwhile,
gains
credibility
due
to
the
fact
that
Egypt
and
a
coalition
of
Arab
States
were
using
“the
oil
weapon”
in
order
to
indirectly
pressure
Israel
via
the
United
States
to
withdraw
from
the
territories
that
it
had
occupied
since
1967,
upon
which
point
they
would
then
be
able
to
retake
those
territories.
Even
though
this
is
true,
an
offensive
realist
framework
fails
in
this
case
because
states
were
cooperating
outright
via
OAPEC
in
the
exercise
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Additionally,
such
a
framework
does
not
accurately
account
for
the
importance
of
domestic
political
pressures
internal
to
Egypt
and
Saudi
Arabia
for
the
ultimate
realization
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
In
the
end,
only
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model,
complemented
by
the
important
economic
structural
change
in
world
oil
markets,
can
fully
account
for
OAPEC’s
decision
to
deploy
“the
oil
weapon.”
Conclusion:
The
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974
was
the
final
disruptive
event
marking
the
end
of
the
international
oil
companies’
control
of
the
world
oil
economy.
Examination
of
both
the
1967
and
1973‐1974
uses
of
“the
oil
weapon”
suggests
that
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
analysis,
accompanied
by
an
understanding
of
the
economic
structural
changes
that
had
occurred
in
world
oil
markets,
has
robust
explanatory
process
in
explaining
this
policy’s
patterns
of
use.
Ramel
56
In
the
next
chapter,
I
will
undertake
a
narrative
examination
of
the
years
from
1974
to
2003,
including
the
Iranian
oil
crisis
and
the
collapse
of
oil
prices
in
the
1980s,
in
an
attempt
to
ascertain
whether
the
policy
streams
model
that
is
so
useful
in
charting
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967
and
1973‐1974
is
equally
so
in
the
period
ranging
from
1974
to
2003.
Ramel
57
Chapter
V:
A
Mothballed
Weapon
­
1974­2003
Introduction:
In
the
months
following
OAPEC’s
1973‐1974
deployment
of
the
oil
weapon,
a
common
fear
articulated
in
various
journals
and
press
accounts
was
that
“the
oil
weapon”
still
held
dangerous
potential.72
The
worry
was
that
now
that
the
oil‐
producing
countries
had
united
in
their
use
of
oil
as
a
tool
of
political
coercion,
there
was
no
telling
how
often
they
would
advance
such
a
policy.
If
a
punctuated
equilibrium
approach
were
to
have
explanatory
power
in
understanding
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
the
period
following
1974
would
have
seen
constant
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon”
as
the
de
rigueur
policy
of
the
new
policy
monopoly
that
OPEC
represented.
This
did
not
occur,
which
further
supports
the
notion
developed
earlier
in
Chapter
IV
of
this
thesis
that
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model
is
most
useful
in
characterizing
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”73
Neo‐realist
and
offensive
realist
frameworks
also
prove
not
to
have
as
much
explanatory
power
for
the
“oil
weapon”‐related
developments
that
72
Legendary
oil
industry
historian
Daniel
Yergin
notes
that
at
the
time
“so
dominant
did
OPEC
appear
to
be
in
the
mid
1970s
that
some
spoke
about
an
OPEC
imperium.”
See
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
Quest:
Energy,
Security,
and
the
Remaking
of
the
Modern
World.
Penguin,
2011.
Print.
270.
Additionally,
the
author
of
one
oft‐cited
book
on
“the
oil
weapon”
notes
apprehensive
and
pessimistic
articles
to
this
effect
appearing
in
Foreign
Affairs,
International
Affairs,
and
The
Economist
in
1974.
See
Venn,
Fiona.
The
Oil
Crisis.
London:
Longman,
2002.
21+.
Print.
Similar
articles
from
The
Associated
Press
and
The
Washington
Post
were
circulated
in
daily
newspapers
across
the
United
States
as
several
points
in
1974.
See
Associated
Press.
"Arabs
Again
Threaten
to
Use
Oil
Weapon."
Eugene
Register­Guard
28
Oct.
1974:
2.
Google
News.
Web.
27
Feb.
2012;
Associated
Press.
"Oil
Weapon
Threat
Raised
Once
Again."
The
Press­Courier
[Oxnard]
2
Nov.
1974:
1.
Google
News.
Web.
27
Feb.
2012;
and
Rowen,
Hobart.
"Oil
Embargo
Is
Gone,
but
Arabs
Retain
Threat."
St.
Petersburg
Times
­
Washington
Post
Service
22
Mar.
1974:
20.
Google
News.
Web.
27
Feb.
2012.
73
Kingdon,
John
W.
Agendas,
Alternatives,
and
Public
Policies.
Boston:
Little,
Brown,
1984.
Print.
Ramel
58
occurred
during
this
period,
with
neither
of
the
two
instances
of
“the
oil
weapon”
during
this
period
having
to
do
with
interstate
tensions
or
coercion.74
Instead,
the
period
from
1974
to
2003
in
the
international
oil
market
was
largely
characterized
by
a
transition
from
oil‐producing
countries
using
oil’s
economic
power
as
an
explicit
political
tool
to
instead
using
their
political
power
to
better
take
advantage
of
oil’s
economic
value.
This
transition
took
place
amid
serious
economic
structural
changes
in
world
oil
markets.
The
overall
trend
in
the
period
was
a
de‐politicization
of
oil
in
favor
of
a
more
rational,
revenue‐minded
approach.
In
the
ensuing
chapter,
I
will
develop
these
arguments
via
analysis
of
select
historical
developments
during
the
period,
including
the
1979
Oil
Crisis,
the
collapse
of
OPEC’s
pricing
power
in
the
early
1980s,
the
Iran‐Iraq
War
from
1980
to
1988,
the
Gulf
War
of
1990‐1991,
and
Iraq’s
two
abortive,
unilateral
attempts
in
2001
and
2002
to
wield
their
oil
in
the
political
realm.
Punctuated
Equilibrium
Framework
Proves
Lacking
in
Explaining
Patterns
of
Use
of
‘the
Oil
Weapon’:
Following
the
end
of
the
1973‐1974
embargo,
the
oil‐importing
countries
that
had
been
embargoed
worked
feverishly
to
try
to
put
in
place
measures
that
might
hedge
against
future
uses
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Their
first
coordinated
reaction
74
As
detailed
later
in
this
chapter,
Iraq’s
first
attempt
was
an
economically
minded
cash
grab,
and
its
second
was
only
a
brief
show
of
solidarity
with
the
Palestinian
people.
Due
to
these
facts,
my
analysis
in
this
chapter
will
focus
on
the
declining
utility
of
the
punctuated
equilibrium
model
and
the
staying
explanatory
power
of
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model,
set
against
the
general
trend
of
de‐
politicization
of
oil
during
the
period.
In
Chapter
VI,
which
follows,
realist/offensive
realist
approaches
once
again
enter
the
discussion
in
a
more
serious
way.
Ramel
59
was
establishing
the
International
Energy
Agency.
Drawing
on
the
concepts
of
punctuated
equilibrium
in
politics
and
international
regime
theory,
Jeff
Colgan,
Robert
Keohane,
and
Thijs
Van
de
Graaf
explain
the
emergence
of
this
new
institution
as
an
expected
result
of
the
consuming
countries’
dissatisfaction
with
world
oil
politics
as
controlled
by
OAPEC
during
the
1973‐1974
embargo.
75
Given
scholarship
that
uses
the
theory
of
punctuated
equilibrium
to
explain
developments
in
the
international
institutions
associated
with
oil,
it
is
tempting
to
expand
the
argument
to
state
that
a
punctuated
equilibrium
framework
can
be
used
more
narrowly
to
explain
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
this
period.
However,
while
changes
in
the
larger
energy
regime
complex
hew
closely
to
such
an
interpretation,
the
same
is
not
true
for
the
use
and
non‐use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”76
For
such
a
model
to
have
explanatory
power,
the
policy
of
“the
oil
weapon”
would
have
to
have
been
incorporated
explicitly
into
the
standard
operating
procedure
of
OPEC,
the
newly
powerful
policy
monopoly.
Such
an
understanding
deeply
mischaracterizes
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
by
ignoring
the
many
complicated
interactions
that
had
been
required
for
all
past
deployments
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
The
weakness
of
this
competing
explanation
lends
only
strengthens
the
argument
that
Kingdon’s
multiple
streams
model
best
characterizes
the
processes
undergirding
discrete
instances
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
75
Colgan,
Jeff
D.,
Robert
O.
Keohane,
and
Thijs
Van
De
Graaf.
"Punctuated
Equilibrium
in
the
Energy
Regime
Complex."
The
Review
of
International
Organizations
(2011).
Web.
27
Nov.
2011.
76
Compare
Chapter
III
of
this
thesis,
in
which
I
argued
that
the
punctuated
equilibrium
model
best
characterized
larger
shifts
in
the
industry
that
paved
the
way
for
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
to
Chapter
IV,
in
which
I
argued
that
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model
best
explains
the
actual
policymaking
process
undergirding
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”.
Ramel
60
Despite
Crises,
Inflated
Political
Fears
Give
Way
to
Less­Politicized
Oil:
The
period
from
1974
to
2003
in
the
international
oil
industry
was
characterized
by
two
interacting
trends:
(1)
a
gradual
decline
in
OPEC’s
ability
to
control
and
influence
oil
prices,
and
(2)
numerous
crises
that
disrupted
flows
of
oil
into
international
markets.
The
end
result,
leading
into
the
commodities
boom
in
2003,
was
an
overall
trend
towards
the
de‐politicization
of
oil.
As
the
dust
settled
following
the
cessation
of
the
1973‐1974
embargo
and
production
cuts,
OPEC
had
successfully
installed
itself
as
the
mediator
of
world
oil
prices.
Prices
were
up
more
than
70
percent
from
mid‐1973
levels,
and
for
the
next
five
years,
OPEC
managed
to
keep
prices
at
that
level.77
In
late
1978,
strikes
in
the
Iranian
oil
industry
reduced
Iranian
oil
production
from
5.5
million
barrels
per
day
to
a
low
of
only
500,000
barrels
per
day
on
December
27,
1978.78
This
massive
decline
in
the
amount
of
Iranian
oil
that
flowed
into
international
markets
coincided
with
two
other
major
events:
(1)
the
rise
of
revolutionary
religious
clerics
under
Ayatollah
Khamanei,
who
toppled
the
Shah
of
Iran
to
assume
power
in
the
spring
of
1979,
and
(2)
OPEC’s
decision
to
raise
oil
prices
by
14.5
percent.
The
combined
result
was
panic
in
international
oil
markets,
which
in
turn
fueled
rampant
speculations
and
spot
market
purchasing,
which
resulted
in
prices
spiraling
up
149
percent
from
$15.85
per
barrel
to
a
high
of
$39.50
per
barrel.79
77
Yergin,
Daniel.
The
prize:
the
epic
quest
for
oil,
money,
&
power.
Simon
and
Schuster,
1991.
Print.
606‐652.
78
"Iran."
EIA.gov.
U.S.
Energy
Information
Administration
(EIA),
14
July
2010.
Web.
12
Feb.
2012.
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/country‐data.cfm?fips=IR>.
79
For
an
exhaustive
account
of
the
sequence
of
events
that
resulted
in
panicked
speculative
purchasing
on
the
spot
market,
and
for
the
effect
that
this
had
on
oil
prices,
see
Parra,
Francisco
R.
Oil
Ramel
61
OPEC
would
ultimately
lose
the
ability
to
exert
control
over
oil
prices.
The
historically
unprecedented
height
of
oil
prices
drove
both
investment
in
oil
exploration
and
production
elsewhere
in
the
world,
especially
in
the
North
Sea,
and
conservation
and
efficiency
efforts
amongst
the
oil‐consuming
countries.
From
1973
to
1981,
world
investment
in
the
petroleum
industry
grew
at
an
astonishing
average
pace
of
20
percent
annually,
with
oil
production
from
non‐OPEC
sources
surpassing
that
from
OPEC
members
by
1981.80
Regarding
conservation
and
efficiency,
the
data
paint
a
clear
picture:
the
overall
energy
intensity
of
IEA
economies
dropped
20
percent
from
1973
to
1985,
and
gasoline
consumption
decreased
22
percent.81
The
result
was
an
oversupply
of
oil
in
international
markets,
combined
with
declining
demand.
Despite
Saudi
Arabia’s
efforts
to
stem
the
drop
in
prices
by
unilaterally
cutting
its
production
from
10.3
million
barrels
per
day
in
1981
to
2
million
barrels
per
day
in
June
of
1985,
other
members
of
OPEC
continued
to
flout
their
agreed‐
upon
production
quotas.
The
end
result
was
prices
dropping
72
percent
from
1981,
bottoming
out
in
1986
below
$10
per
barrel.82
As
mentioned
in
the
literature
review
in
Chapter
II,
liberalizing
trends
in
world
oil
markets
such
as
oil
futures
trading
and
expanding
non‐OPEC
oil
exports
generally
diminished
the
amount
of
political
sway
that
the
governments
of
OPEC
could
generate
using
their
oil
resources.
Even
as
conflicts
like
the
Iran‐Iraq
War
(1980‐1988)
and
the
first
Gulf
War
(1991)
periodically
impinged
upon
the
free
flow
politics:
a
modern
history
of
petroleum.
I.B.Tauris,
2004.
Print.
215‐229.
Data
on
oil
prices
is
taken
from
Mouawad,
Jad.
"Oil
Prices
Pass
Record
Set
in
80s,
but
Then
Recede."
The
New
York
Times,
3
Mar.
2008.
Web.
12
Mar.
2012.
80
Ibid.
149.
81
Ibid
248.
82
"Cheap
Oil!"
Time
Magazine
14
Apr.
1986.
Time
Magazine
Online.
Web.
17
Jan.
2012.
Ramel
62
of
oil
supplies
from
the
Middle
East,
during
this
period
no
country
or
coalition
of
countries
specifically
mobilized
to
leverage
their
oil
exports
as
a
tool
of
political
coercion.
Additionally,
the
free
flow
of
oil
revenues
in
the
post‐1974
period
led
to
the
development
of
extensive
social
service
and
welfare
programs
in
the
oil‐producing
countries.
For
the
ruler
of
one
of
these
countries
to
consider
cutting
off
its
oil
exports
was
to
consider
cutting
off
the
steady
stream
of
revenue
required
to
finance
such
highly
popular
domestic
programs.83
The
overall
result
in
the
period
was
a
loss
of
OPEC
control
over
pricing,
and
a
gradual
shift
away
from
envisioning
oil
resources
as
political
tools
to
instead
considering
mostly
their
economic
importance.
Combined,
these
manifold
changes
in
the
structures
of
the
world’s
oil
economy
set
the
stage
for
the
two
exceptions
to
the
trend
towards
de‐politicization
in
the
oil
space
–
both
abortive
attempts
by
Iraq
to
utilize
“the
oil
weapon.”
Going
It
Alone
–
the
Case
of
Iraq
in
2001:
It
was
not
until
2001
that
an
oil‐exporting
country
would
mobilize
its
oil
resources
in
an
explicit
attempt
to
influence
the
political
behavior
of
oil‐importing
countries.
That
country
was
Iraq
under
Saddam
Hussein.
Thus
far
in
this
thesis,
I
have
attempted
to
explain
policymaker’s
decisions
to
deploy
“the
oil
weapon”
using
Kingdon’s
multiple
streams
model.
As
I
have
83
This
domestic
political‐economic
disincentive
against
“the
oil
weapon”
only
increases
in
salience
as
oil
prices
rise.
I
will
return
to
this
idea
of
the
entrenchment
of
domestic
social
programs
and
welfare
infrastructure
in
oil‐producing
countries
in
the
following
chapter,
noting
how
the
stratospheric
oil
prices
from
2003
to
2011
only
increased
policymakers’
inertia
vis‐à‐vis
“the
oil
weapon”.
Ramel
63
transposed
this
model
from
its
origins
in
multi‐actor
American
policymaking
onto
multilateral
efforts
to
leverage
oil
resources
for
political
purposes,
I
have
assumed
the
participation
of
multiple
countries
as
a
precondition
for
analysis
with
Kingdon’s
framework.84
This
particular
instance,
then,
is
an
outlier
in
the
sense
that
only
one
oil‐
exporting
country
is
involved
in
attempting
to
use
its
oil
resources
as
a
tool
of
political
coercion.
Therefore,
comparisons
with
other
instances
in
this
thesis
are
likely
to
be
imperfect
because
the
international
dynamics
of
political
institutions
such
as
OAPEC
or
OPEC
are
not
especially
comparable
to
the
intra‐national
ones
within
Iraq,
particularly
because
Saddam
ruled
Iraq
as
a
dictator
with
ultimate
control
over
the
country’s
foreign
policy.
That
in
mind,
a
more
limited
reading
a
la
Kingdon
is
still
possible
for
these
proceedings.
It
is
helpful
here
to
provide
some
historical
context
for
this
situation.
After
Saddam
ordered
Iraqi
forces
to
occupy
Kuwait
in
1990,
the
United
Nations
Security
Council
(UNSC)
responded
with
a
wide‐ranging
package
of
sanctions
under
the
auspices
of
UNSC
Resolution
661,
and
the
international
community
banded
together
to
remove
Iraq
from
Kuwaiti
territory.85
The
UNSC
modified
its
existing
sanctions
in
1995,
when
it
enacted
UNSC
Resolution
986.
Under
the
new
sanctions
regime’s
“Oil
for
Food
Program”,
the
government
of
Iraq
would
now
be
permitted
to
sell
its
oil
to
help
finance
the
purchase
of
humanitarian
goods
for
its
people.86
However,
under
84
See
Chapter
IV:
in
1967,
a
loose
coalition
of
Arab
countries
banded
together
to
use
“the
oil
weapon”,
while
in
1973‐1974,
it
was
the
Organization
of
Arab
Petroleum
Exporting
Countries
that
did
so.
85
"Oil
for
Food:
About
the
Program."
United
Nations
News
Center.
United
Nations
Office
of
the
Iraq
Program,
21
Nov.
2003.
Web.
10
Mar.
2012.
86
Ibid.
Ramel
64
this
program
the
Iraqi
government
only
actually
received
credit
for
a
value
equivalent
to
half
of
the
revenues
from
its
oil
sales,
with
the
remaining
funds
going
to
Gulf
War
reparations
(33
percent),
compensation
to
Kurdish
minorities
within
Iraq
(13
percent),
and
UN
administration
costs
(1‐5
percent).87
In
January
of
2001,
the
international
community
discovered
that
Iraq
had
been
illegally
smuggling
oil
to
the
Mediterranean
Sea
by
way
of
Syrian
rail
lines.88
This
method
of
transportation
for
Iraqi
oil
had
been
blocked
since
1982,
when
Syria
had
decided
to
side
with
Iran
in
the
Iran‐Iraq
War.
These
exports,
which
were
outside
of
the
auspices
of
the
“Oil
for
Food
Program”,
were
permitting
the
Iraqi
government
to
accrue
revenues
from
oil
sales,
the
full
amount
of
which
they
could
then
use
for
any
purpose
they
liked.
Concurrently,
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom
had
grown
more
leery
of
Iraq
both
for
its
build‐up
in
air
defense
systems,
which
they
claimed
were
inhibiting
their
ability
to
enforce
the
no‐fly‐zones
stipulated
as
a
part
of
the
settlement
of
the
hostilities
of
the
Gulf
War,
and
for
its
continued
refusal
to
allow
UN
inspectors
full
access
to
any
suspected
nuclear,
biological,
or
chemical
weapons
facilities.
This
suspicion
culminated
in
joint
US‐UK
air
strikes
on
various
air
defense
targets
around
Baghdad.89
With
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom
accelerating
their
push
to
put
in
place
a
new
system
of
“smart
sanctions”
aimed
at
pressuring
Saddam
to
allow
full
87
Whitaker,
Brian.
"Saddam
Oils
the
Wheels
of
Fuel
Chaos."
The
Guardian.
Guardian
News
and
Media,
18
Sept.
2000.
Web.
10
Mar.
2012.
88
Berry,
Jessica,
Phillip
Sherwell,
and
Mary
Fagan.
"Iraqi
Oil
Smuggled
on
Train
via
Syria."
Telegraph.co.uk.
The
Telegraph,
14
Jan.
2001.
Web.
10
Feb.
2012.
89
Fenton,
Ben,
and
Michael
Smith.
"US
Launches
Air
Strikes
on
Baghdad."Telegraph.co.uk.
The
Telegraph,
17
Feb.
2001.
Web.
15
Feb.
2012.
Ramel
65
access
for
the
aforementioned
UN
weapons
inspectors,
Saddam
responded
by
halting
Iraq’s
official
crude
exports
on
June
5,
2001.90
Iraq’s
stated
intention
in
doing
so
was
to
discourage
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom
from
continuing
this
increased
pressure.91
The
entire
exercise
was
ultimately
a
complete
operational
and
political
failure.
The
United
States’
imports
from
Iraqi
were
only
down
22
percent
from
May
to
June,
and
by
September
they
had
already
surpassed
the
May
import
levels.92
Additionally,
the
Saudi
Arabian
government
only
had
to
insinuate
that
it
had
adequate
spare
capacity
to
cover
the
deficit
to
result
in
oil
analysts
and
government
scoffing
at
Iraq’s
actions.
The
halt
in
exports
withered
in
several
weeks
without
exerting
any
political
pressure
on
its
intended
targets,
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom.
Both
countries
would
only
continue
their
push
to
further
isolate
Saddam’s
regime.
Examining
contemporary
press
accounts
permits
the
identification
of
the
state
of
the
three
policy
streams
in
this
case.
The
rapid
failure
of
the
policy
either
indicates
that
at
least
one
of
these
streams
was
not
sufficiently
robust
to
present
a
true
policy
window
or
that
the
policy’s
stated
goals
were
not
aligned
with
its
actual
goals.
Starting
with
the
political
stream
helps
contextualize
the
other
streams
in
this
case.
Brian
Whitaker,
a
journalist
with
extensive
experience
covering
Middle
90
Laguardia,
Anton.
"Iraq
Halts
Official
Exports
of
Crude."
Telegraph.co.uk.
The
Telegraph,
5
June
2001.
Web.
5
Jan.
2012.
91
Ibid.
92
“Petroleum
and
Other
Liquids
‐
Monthly
U.S.
Imports
from
Iraq
of
Crude
Oil
and
Petroleum
Products."
Energy
Information
Administration,
28
Feb.
2012.
Web.
9
Mar.
2012.
Ramel
66
Eastern
politics,
had
noted
in
late
2000
that
given
the
recently
high
oil
prices,
Iraq
likely
had
enough
cash
reserves
built
up
that
it
could
withstand
several
months
with
no
additional
oil
revenues
without
cutting
programs
that
were
popular
among
the
Iraqi
public.
Such
a
situation
would
create
favorable
circumstances
for
launching
“the
oil
weapon.”93
On
a
more
obvious
note,
Iraq
had
no
backing
from
other
oil‐
exporting
countries,
as
the
problem
in
question
was
considered
solely
an
Iraqi
concern.
In
terms
of
the
policy
stream,
Saddam
was
certainly
familiar
with,
even
predisposed
towards,
“the
oil
weapon”
as
a
policy
approach.
As
the
then
second
in
command
in
the
Baath
Party,
Saddam
had
been
the
officiator
of
Iraq’s
nationalization
of
its
oil
resources
on
July
1,
1972,
and
was
still
in
power
when
Iraq
participated
in
OAPEC’s
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974.94
Saddam
had
learned
the
folly
of
foreign
military
excursions
against
the
United
States
and
its
allies
in
1990‐1991,
so
military
measures
would
not
have
been
an
attractive
alternative
option.
The
problem
stream
is
murkily
defined.
Saddam
officially
stated
that
this
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon”
was
meant
to
force
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom
to
reconsider
their
increased
pressure
on
his
regime.
However,
Whitaker
also
pointed
out
that
Iraq
might
have
sought
to
create
an
artificial
crisis
via
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
an
attempt
to
spook
world
oil
markets
and
drive
oil
prices
up.
It
could
then
sell
oil
at
market
price
to
friendly
countries
without
incurring
the
tax
of
93
See
Whitaker
2000.
94
"The
Blundering
Dictator."
The
Economist.
The
Economist
Newspaper,
04
Jan.
2007.
Web.
12
Mar.
2012.
Ramel
67
the
“Oil
for
Food
Program”.95
Sure
enough,
despite
its
ultimate
decision
to
halt
its
official
oil
exports,
Iraq
still
exported
oil
to
Turkey
and
Jordan
during
this
period.96
This
exception,
combined
with
the
fact
that
oil
prices
were
up
7
percent
over
the
monthly
average
from
six
months
previous,
meant
that
Iraq
still
garnered
significant
oil
revenues.97
Therefore,
electing
to
use
“the
oil
weapon”
permitted
Saddam
to
take
a
seemingly
defiant
policy
stand
that
would
appear
strong
to
domestic
audiences,
but
without
having
to
take
on
the
risk
that
other
such
seemingly
tough
policies,
such
as
military
measures,
might
have
carried.
It
also
was
ultimately
the
result
of
economic
calculus,
lending
further
support
to
the
idea
of
international
oil
markets
as
becoming
less
political
since
1974.
Overall,
this
example
suggests
the
importance
of
the
coincidence
of
all
of
the
three
policy
streams
in
presenting
a
truly
viable
policy
window
upon
which
a
policy
entrepreneur
might
capitalize.
The
fact
that
Iraq
never
even
had
the
possibility
of
building
a
coalition
in
launching
“the
oil
weapon”,
combined
with
the
high
degree
of
oil‐producing
country
participation
required
to
buoy
an
instance
of
“the
oil
weapon”
against
the
reality
of
fungible
international
oil
markets,
suggests
that
Iraq’s
primary
concern
was
not
truly
a
political
goal,
but
rather,
an
economic
one.
The
policy
initiative
was
an
attempt
to
manipulate
prices
and
increase
revenues,
masquerading
as
the
more
politically
popular
“oil
weapon”.
While
the
explanatory
power
of
Kingdon’s
multiple
streams
model
is
stronger
in
analyses
of
multiple
actors’
95
Ibid.
96
See
Laguardia
2012.
97
West
Texas
Intermediate,
one
of
the
two
most
important
marker
barrels
for
global
oil
prices,
was
priced
at
$27.84
when
Saddam
decided
to
cut
off
its
oil
imports,
whereas
it
was
at
$26.10
just
six
months
previous.
See
"Petroleum
and
Other
Liquids
‐
Monthly
Cushing,
OK
WTI
Spot
Price
FOB."
Energy
Information
Administration,
7
Mar.
2012.
Web.
9
Mar.
2012.
Ramel
68
attempts
to
collaborate
in
the
utilization
of
oil
resources
as
a
tool
for
generating
coercive
political
leverage,
it
can
still
hold
in
cases
of
individual
countries
deciding
whether
or
not
to
use
“the
oil
weapon.”
Failure
Once
More
–
the
Case
of
Iraq
in
2002:
As
in
1967
and
1973‐1974,
conflict
between
Arabs
and
Israelis
spurred
this
attempt
to
deploy
“the
oil
weapon.”
Amidst
the
Second
Intifada,
a
period
of
renewed
Palestinian‐Israeli
violence
lasting
from
2000
to
2005,
Israel
launched
Operation
Defensive
Shield
in
March
of
2002.98
This
operation,
a
response
to
Palestinian
suicide
bombings
that
had
killed
130
Israelis
in
March
alone,
resulted
in
Israeli
occupation
of
several
Palestinian
cities
in
the
West
Bank.99
In
response
to
this
development,
Saddam
announced
on
April
7,
2002
that
Iraq
would
embargo
all
of
its
oil
exports
for
a
month,
or
until
Israel
left
their
newly
occupied
Palestinian
positions.
Iraqi
exports
had
totaled
about
1.5
million
barrels
per
day
before
the
export
halt,
almost
a
million
of
which
had
previously
gone
to
the
United
States
each
day.100
Iraq’s
attempt
to
use
“the
oil
weapon”
in
2002
differed
from
the
previous
one
in
2001
in
that
the
problem
to
which
this
policy
was
attached
was
not
one
that
only
affected
Iraq.
Rather,
the
problem
was
a
flare‐up
of
the
larger
Arab‐Israeli
conflict,
which
resonated
with
other
OPEC
countries
as
relevant
and
acquiring
attention.
98
""Report
of
Secretary
General
on
Recent
Events
in
Jenin,
Other
Palestinian
Cities."
UN
News
Center.
UN,
1
Aug.
2002.
Web.
12
Mar.
2012.
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SG2077.doc.htm>.
99
Ibid.
100
"Iraq's
Saddam
Suspends
Oil
Exports;
Crude
Prices
Climb."
CNNMoney.
CNN,
8
Apr.
2002.
Web.
12
Jan.
2012.
Ramel
69
Several
of
these
countries
considered
coordinating
with
Iraq
to
pressure
the
West
to
take
a
tougher
line
against
the
Israeli
occupation
of
Palestinian
territories.
Iran’s
Supreme
Leader
Khamenei
called
on
Arab
oil‐exporting
countries
to
band
together
in
launching
a
“symbolic”
one‐month
embargo
with
this
same
specific
goal
in
mind.
Libya
also
backed
this
position.101
However,
neither
Iran
nor
Libya
ultimately
cut
off
their
exports,
leaving
Iraq
alone
once
again
in
its
wielding
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
For
a
time,
the
United
States
had
also
feared
that
Saudi
Arabia
might
join
in
with
the
embargo,
as
Saudi
Crown
Prince
Abdullah
had
ominously
warned
that
America
risked
grave
consequences
to
its
interests
in
the
Middle
East
if
it
did
not
moderate
its
support
for
Israel.102
However,
Saudi
representatives
soon
clarified
that
Saudi
Arabia
would
not
join
Iraq
in
withholding
oil
supplies.103
In
past
cooperative
deployments
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
the
policy
entrepreneur
ultimately
required
buy‐in
from
other
members
of
the
Arab
oil‐producing
community
to
give
the
policy
any
real
strength
–
during
the
abortive
attempt
of
1967,
Saudi
Oil
Minister
Yamani
orchestrated
the
unofficial
sabotage
of
Egyptian
President
Nasser’s
“oil
weapon”
campaign,
whereas
the
more
substantial,
long‐
lasting
instance
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1973‐1974
benefitted
from
Egyptian
President
Sadat
persuading
the
Saudi
King
Faisal
to
help
enforce
“the
oil
weapon.”104
Here
in
2002,
no
other
OPEC
country
actually
decided
to
join
with
Iraq
in
using
“the
oil
weapon”
to
pressure
the
West
to
diminish
its
support
of
Israel.
In
101
Ibid.
102
Aizhu,
Chen.
"Oil
Prices
Dip
as
Saudi
Oil
Weapon
Fear
Eases."
Timesofmalta.com.
Times
of
Malta,
27
Apr.
2002.
Web.
12
Feb.
2012.
103
Ibid.
104
See
Chapter
IV
of
this
thesis.
Ramel
70
their
estimates,
the
lost
revenue
associated
with
backing
“the
oil
weapon”
outweighed
the
benefits
of
joining
the
Iraqis.
This
suggests
that
an
unfavorable
political
stream
led
to
the
Iraq’s
weak,
unilateral
attempt
to
use
“the
oil
weapon.”
Conclusion:
Despite
fears
to
the
contrary,
the
period
from
1974
to
2003
was
not
one
in
which
“the
oil
weapon”
was
often
used.
The
overall
trend
moved
in
the
other
direction,
with
a
gradual
de‐politicization
of
oil
resources.
The
exceptions
were
Iraq’s
two
attempted
uses
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
June
of
2001
and
April
of
2002.
Despite
the
seeming
applicability
of
the
punctuated
equilibrium
model
to
the
question
of
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
the
post‐1974
period,
it
ultimately
lacks
explanatory
power
because
it
forces
a
comingled
understanding
of
the
regime
(OPEC)
and
the
policy
(“the
oil
weapon”),
at
the
expense
of
paying
attention
to
various
important
details
informing
the
regime’s
decision‐making
process
regarding
“the
oil
weapon.”
Analyzing
Iraq’s
attempts
to
use
“the
oil
weapon”
helps
to
flesh
out
certain
aspects
of
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model
as
applied
to
explaining
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
As
mentioned
earlier,
the
translation
of
Kingdon’s
model,
from
an
American
domestic
political
context
with
checks
and
balances
to
one
in
which
dictators
can
push
forward
“the
oil
weapon”
without
a
true
policy
window,
complicates
analysis.
The
model
has
greater
explanatory
power
for
the
consideration
of
“the
oil
weapon”
within
OPEC
and
similar
cooperative
decision‐
making
forums,
where
even
dictators
must
engage
with
competing
forces
if
they
Ramel
71
wish
to
achieve
cooperative
deployment
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Additionally,
it
prefigured
the
importance
that
rising
oil
prices
would
have
on
oil‐producing
countries’
propensity
to
engage
in
the
rhetoric
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
As
a
final
note,
during
this
period,
structural
changes
in
the
world’s
oil
economy
helped
create
a
backdrop
against
which
certain
states
elected
to
use
the
“oil
weapon”.
However,
it
is
important
to
note
that
these
economic
structural
changes
did
not
themselves
play
a
direct
role
in
the
ultimate
decision
to
use
“the
oil
weapon.”
This
point
emphasizes
an
underlying
theme
throughout
the
thesis:
structural
changes
in
the
world’s
oil
economy
can
certainly
affect
decision
makers
involved
in
making
decision
about
“the
oil
weapon”,
but
they
do
not
themselves
lead
to
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Thus,
the
only
explanatory
power
of
economic
structural
factors,
as
laid
out
in
Hypothesis
2E,
is
in
a
complementary
role
to
another
more
comprehensive
theory
–
in
this
case,
Kingdon’s
multiple
streams
model.
Building
on
this
chapter’s
lessons,
in
the
following
section
of
this
thesis
I
will
examine
international
oil
politics
from
2003‐2008,
with
an
eye
towards
investigating
the
role
that
skyrocketing
oil
prices
had
on
the
patterns
of
rhetoric
and
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Against
this
context,
I
will
test
the
viability
of
the
Kingdonian
framework,
neo‐realism,
and
offensive
realism
in
explaining
such
patterns
of
use.
Ramel
72
Chapter
VI:
Rising
Prices,
Resurgent
Rhetoric,
and
a
Return
to
the
World
Stage
–
2003­2008
Introduction:
From
January
2003
to
its
peak
in
July
2008,
the
price
of
a
barrel
of
crude
oil
trading
on
the
NYMEX
rose
over
390
percent
from
around
$30
to
$147.28.105
These
newly
elevated
oil
prices
coincided
with
an
escalation
in
the
frequency
and
severity
of
oil
producing
countries’
rhetoric
surrounding
the
use
of
their
oil
resources
in
a
coercive
manner.
Countries
such
as
Venezuela,
Russia,
and
Iran
were
all
particularly
keen
to
adopt
an
aggressive
posture
regarding
“the
oil
weapon.”
In
response
to
these
developments,
Senator
Richard
Lugar
(R‐IN),
the
ranking
Republican
on
the
United
States
Senate
Committee
on
Foreign
Relations,
noted,
“oil
is
the
new
currency
of
foreign
policy.”106
Over
this
period,
there
were
14
distinct
events
in
which
an
oil
exporting
country
explicitly
called
for
the
use
of
a
selective
embargo
of
oil
reserves
for
political
purposes,
or
for
the
use
of
oil
as
a
weapon
more
generally.107
Of
these
14,
four
resulted
in
actual
embargoes.108
Perhaps
most
notable
is
that
in
13
out
of
14
of
these
cases,
spot
oil
prices
on
the
day
of
the
announcement
were
at
least
8
percent
105
See
"Petroleum
and
Other
Liquids
‐
Monthly
Cushing,
OK
WTI
Spot
Price
FOB."
Energy
Information
Administration,
18
Apr.
2012.
Web.
18
Apr.
2012.
As
a
basis
for
comparison,
the
1973‐
1974
Oil
Embargo
resulted
in
“only”
a
300%
price
increase
from
around
$3
to
around
$12.
106
United
States.
Cong.
Senate.
Committee
on
Foreign
Relations.
High
Costs
of
Crude:
The
New
Currency
of
Foreign
Policy.
By
Richard
G.
Lugar,
R.
James
Woolsey,
and
James
R.
Schlesinger.
109th
Cong.,
1st
sess.
S.
Doc.
Washington,
DC:
United
States
Government
Printing
Office,
2005.
Google
Books.
1
Jan.
2006.
Web.
3
May
2012.
107
See
Appendix
A.
108
Tellingly,
all
of
these
events
involved
Russia,
a
fact
expounded
upon
later
in
this
section.
Ramel
73
higher
than
the
monthly
average
for
oil
prices
from
six
months
previous,
in
ten
out
of
14
cases,
at
least
20
percent
higher,
and
in
eight
out
of
14
cases,
at
least
30
percent
higher.109
Clearly,
the
rise
in
oil
prices
contributed
in
some
measure
to
the
invocation
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
The
question,
then,
is
what
contributory
role
rising
oil
prices
played
in
oil
exporting
countries’
decision
to
use
the
rhetoric
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
or
to
ultimately
back
that
rhetoric
up
with
actions.
As
described
earlier
in
this
thesis,
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
analysis
takes
stock
of
the
problem
at
hand,
the
policy
alternatives
available
to
policymakers,
and
the
current
political
atmosphere
in
which
deliberations
regarding
action
are
taking
place.
In
mini‐case
studies
of
Venezuela,
Iran,
and
Russia,
three
oil
exporting
countries
that
repeatedly
resorted
to
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
during
this
period,
I
will
bring
this
analytical
framework
to
bear
with
a
specific
eye
for
examining
how
escalations
in
oil
price
affected
the
decision
making
processes
undergirding
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
and
practice.
Additionally,
I
will
bring
both
realist
and
offensive
realist
frameworks
to
bear
in
each
of
the
case
studies
to
see
if
they
offer
stronger
explanatory
power
for
any
particular
country’s
pattern
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
and
use.
Venezuela:
“Oil
Weapon”
Rhetoric
Helps
Chavez
Satisfy
His
Bases
Venezuelan
President
Hugo
Chavez
is
mostly
known
as
a
political
orator
prone
to
fiery
rhetoric,
especially
in
his
verbal
attacks
on
the
United
States
and
its
leadership.
In
these
speeches,
he
has
not
shied
away
from
the
rhetoric
of
“the
oil
109
See
Appendix
A.
Ramel
74
weapon.”
In
the
period
from
2003
to
2008,
Chavez
four
times
threatened
to
cut
oil
exports
to
various
countries,
mostly
the
United
States,
in
response
to
real
or
perceived
antagonistic
policies
on
the
part
of
those
countries.
I
argue
that
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model
has
the
most
explanatory
power
in
dissecting
the
processes
undergirding
Chavez’s
use
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric,
as
it
allows
for
the
important
roles
of
higher
oil
prices,
Chavez’s
personal
political
goals,
and
Venezuelan
domestic
politics
in
influencing
the
ultimate
Venezuelan
policy
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
Chavez’s
exercises
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
have
been
only
that
–
rhetoric.
Venezuela
has
never
followed
up
any
of
these
threats
with
corresponding
actions.
In
both
March
of
2004110
and
August
of
2005111,
Chavez
threatened
to
cut
off
oil
supplies
to
the
United
States
if
alleged
attacks
against
Venezuela
materialized.112
Next,
Chavez
said
that
he
would
cut
off
oil
exports
to
the
US
if
American
arbitrators
ruled
in
favor
of
Exxon
Mobil
in
its
expropriation
dispute
with
the
Venezuelan
government.113 Later,
in
June
of
2008,
Chavez
threatened
to
cut
all
oil
exports
to
the
countries
of
the
European
Union
if
they
passed
controversial
legislation
that
would
110
"Venezuelan
President
Threatens
US
with
Oil
Weapon."
Venezuelan
President
Threatens
US
with
Oil
Weapon.
1
Mar.
2004.
Web.
09
Mar.
2012.
111
"Iran,
Venezuela
Discuss
Oil
Embargo."
Free
Republic.
Vermont
Times,
17
Aug.
2005.
Web.
23
Feb.
2012.
112
Much
of
Chavez’s
animosity
towards
the
United
States
and
suspicion
that
Washington
is
attempting
to
attack
him
stem
from
the
United
States’
support
of
a
failed
coup
attempt
against
Chavez
in
2002.
See
Beehner,
Lionel,
and
Toni
Johnson.
Global
Oil
Trends.
Issue
brief.
Council
on
Foreign
Relations,
18
Oct.
2007.
Web.
30
Jan.
2012.
113
Wilson,
Peter.
"Chavez's
Big
Oil
Bluff."
Businessweek,
11
Feb.
2008.
Web.
14
Oct.
2011.
Also
of
note
during
this
period
was
Venezuela’s
extremely
nationalist
approach
to
control
over
oil
resources.
As
tends
to
be
the
case
when
prices
are
high,
Venezuela’s
government
either
increased
royalty
takes
from
international
oil
companies
such
as
Exxon
Mobil
that
were
drilling
in
Venezuela,
or
it
outright
nationalized
certain
oil
concessions.
Nationalization
in
the
oil
space
has
a
vast
field
of
relevant
literature.
For
example,
see
Nolan,
Peter
A.,
and
Mark
C.
Thurber.
On
the
State's
Choice
of
Oil
Company:
Risk
Management
and
the
Frontier
of
the
Petroleum
Industry.
Program
on
Energy
and
Sustainable
Development,
2010.
PAIS.
Web.
15
Oct.
2011.
Ramel
75
have
lead
to
the
deportation
of
more
immigrants.114
However,
at
that
time,
no
European
Union
country
imported
any
oil
from
Venezuela,
leaving
this
puzzling
threat
entirely
baseless
and
empty.
If
Chavez’s
rhetoric
appears
to
yield
no
real
effect
or
influence
over
other
countries
foreign
policies,
why
then
does
he
engage
in
it?
Assessment
of
the
multiple
policy
streams
involved
in
Chavez’s
policy
decision
to
use
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
proves
useful
in
explaining
this
seemingly
nonsensical
policy
thrust.
Chavez
had
a
predisposed
affinity
for
the
use
of
oil
as
a
tool
of
political
coercion.
Before
ascending
to
the
presidency,
he
wrote,
“Oil
is
a
geopolitical
weapon…and
these
imbeciles
who
govern
us
don’t
realize
the
power
they
have,
as
an
oil‐producing
country.”115
With
this
philosophical
background,
the
policy
part
of
the
Kingdonian
equation
becomes
clearer.
But
why
has
Chavez
only
gone
so
far
as
to
use
the
rhetoric
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
instead
of
actually
following
through
on
the
policy
with
action?
Understanding
this
question
requires
an
understanding
of
both
the
political
atmosphere
in
Venezuela
and
the
problems
that
Chavez
faced
during
this
period.
Having
dealt
with
huge
waves
of
internal
protest
and
strikes
in
2002,
Chavez
was
eager
to
consolidate
political
support
within
his
country.
Luckily
for
him,
it
was
right
at
that
point
that
oil
prices
started
their
meteoric
ascent.
Flush
with
newfound
wealth,
Chavez
could
then
afford
to
promote
development
projects
and
social
114
"Chavez
Protests
EU
with
Oil
Threat."
CNN.
19
June
2008.
Web.
11
Mar.
2012.
115
Kozloff,
Nikolas.
Hugo
Chavez:
Oil,
Politics,
and
the
Challenge
to
the
U.S.
New
York,
NY:
Palgrave
Macmillan,
2006.
Print.
7.
Ramel
76
programs
preferentially
aimed
at
shoring
up
support
from
impoverished
domestic
political
constituencies.
In
tandem
with
his
expansion
of
programs
within
Venezuela,
Chavez
had
also
embarked
on
a
regional
political
tour
and
spending
extravaganza
in
an
attempt
to
shore
up
support
in
other
Latin
American
countries
for
policies
that
fell
in
line
with
his
conception
of
a
Bolivarian
regional
political
system,
including
the
formation
of
trade
agreements
and
financial
institutions
squarely
outside
of
Washington’s
control.116 This
policy
push
was
explicitly
“anti‐imperialist”,
aimed
at
combating
historical
US
influence
in
the
region
and
replacing
it
with
Chavez’s.
It
is
here
where
neo‐realist
and
offensive
realist
explanations
would
have
the
most
potential
footing
in
explaining
Venezuela’s
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
Chavez’s
regional
political
aspirations
channeled
through
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
align
somewhat
with
offensive
realism’s
emphasis
on
regional
hegemony,
but
the
similarities
stop
there.
Venezuela
has
no
ambitions
for
regional
conquest,
only
for
establishing
a
counterpoint
to
the
values
that
he
perceives
Washington
as
spreading
through
Latin
America.117
Thus,
the
offensive
realist
model
fails
to
explain
Chavez
and
Venezuela’s
use
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
The
neo‐realist
model
perhaps
gains
credibility
here,
as
such
actions
on
Chavez’s
part
could
be
interpreted
as
balancing
actions
against
the
largest
power
in
the
international
system,
the
United
States.
However,
while
a
neo‐realist
framework
can
provide
some
measure
of
justification
for
Chavez’s
Venezuela’s
larger
foreign
policy
contours,
it
does
not
account
for
116
DeFeo,
Christina.
"ALBA:
How
Much
of
a
Turn
to
the
Left
in
Latin
American
Governance
and
Economic
Policy?"
Council
on
Hemispheric
Affairs.
1
July
2010.
Web.
02
May
2012.
117
Ibid.
Ramel
77
Chavez’s
predilection
for
“the
oil
weapon”
and
the
domestic
political
dynamics
within
Venezuela
–
in
other
words,
neo‐realism’s
state
level
analysis
leaves
it
blind
to
the
important
internal
workings
of
this
case.
As
demonstrated
earlier
in
this
case
study,
further
analysis
with
the
Kingdonian
model
does
include
these
important
details.
As
time
pressed
on,
Chavez’s
larger
regional
ambitions
invited
domestic
criticism
from
Venezuelans
who
wanted
Chavez
to
spend
domestically
the
money
that
he
was
spending
internationally.
Crime,
food
shortages,
and
soaring
inflation
all
ravished
poor
Venezuelans.
A
septuagenarian
Venezuelan
retiree
articulated
a
common
grievance
in
an
interview
with
the
New
York
Times:
“[Chavez]
should
take
care
of
his
own
house
before
taking
care
of
others.
I
think
Chavez
does
it
so
he
seems
bigger.
He
wants
to
be
seen
as
an
international
leader.
There
are
many
things
about
him
I
support.
Giving
away
money
for
exactly
nothing,
I
don’t
like
that.”118
Chavez,
then,
found
himself
in
the
position
of
needing
a
policy
that
would
allow
him
to
continue
to
burnish
his
regional
standing
as
an
important
anti‐
imperialist,
anti‐US
political
leader,
but
that
would
not
be
extraordinarily
expensive,
as
his
past
spending
spree
had
been.
The
policy
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
fit
the
bill
perfectly.
It
was
anti‐
imperialist
rhetoric,
sure
to
unite
domestic
audiences
around
nationalist
sentiment,
while
simultaneously
further
endearing
him
to
the
international
leftist
audiences
in
Ecuador,
Nicaragua,
Bolivia,
and
Cuba
that
he
had
been
in
the
process
of
118
Forero,
Juan.
"Chávez,
Seeking
Foreign
Allies,
Spends
Billions."
The
New
York
Times.
The
New
York
Times,
4
Apr.
2006.
Web.
7
Apr.
2012.
Ramel
78
engaging.119
Importantly,
this
policy
was
cheap
–
thus
further
diffusing
internal
criticism
from
domestic
audiences.
Actually
going
forward
with
cutting
oil
exports
to
the
United
States
would
have
been
financially
ruinous
for
the
Venezuelan
state’s
coffers
–
and
thus,
for
Chavez’s
political
career.120
Engaging
in
the
rhetoric
of
“the
oil
weapon”
without
actually
following
through
on
it
conferred
all
of
the
benefits
with
none
of
the
costs.
Given
this
narrative,
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
analysis
proves
to
have
definite
explanatory
power
in
the
case
of
Venezuela’s
use
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
in
the
period
from
2003
to
2008.
The
initial
enabling
political
conditions
were
the
fortuitous
rise
in
oil
prices
that
had
allowed
Chavez
to
support
domestic
social
programs
for
key
political
audiences.
In
the
years
that
followed,
Chavez,
the
policy
entrepreneur,
utilized
the
policy
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
to
address
his
problem
of
finding
a
cheap
policy
measure
that
would
support
his
foreign
policy
agenda
without
alienating
domestic
audiences
concerned
with
that
agenda’s
costs.
Throughout
the
rest
of
the
commodity
boom,
Chavez
repeatedly
supported
this
policy
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
as
a
cheap,
but
effective,
political
measure
for
balancing
his
regional
aspirations
with
domestic
political
constraints.
Javier
Corrales,
a
scholar
of
Venezuelan
politics,
succinctly
summarized
the
lessons
learned
from
Chavez’s
policy
strategy
around
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric:
119
Corrales,
Javier.
"Hugo
Boss."
Foreign
Policy.
4
Jan.
2006.
Web.
19
Mar.
2012.
120
In
2008,
oil
accounted
for
93%
of
all
of
Venezuela’s
export
revenues,
up
from
69%
in
1998.
See
Romero,
Simon.
"Chávez
Lets
West
Make
Oil
Bids
as
Prices
Plunge."
New
York
Times.
New
York
Times,
15
Jan.
2009.
Web.
18
Nov.
2011.
Ramel
79
“Aspiring
autocrats,
take
note:
trashing
the
United
States
is
a
low‐risk,
high‐return
policy
for
gaining
support.”121
Iran:
“Oil
Weapon”
Rhetoric
Buys
its
Nuclear
Program
Time
The
period
from
2003
to
2008
saw
Iran
subject
to
increasingly
restrictive
economic
and
political
sanctions
at
the
hands
of
the
United
Nations’
Security
Council
due
to
widespread
claims
from
various
intelligence
agencies
and
governments
that
Iran’s
self‐proclaimed
“peaceful”
nuclear
program
was
in
fact
cover
for
the
development
of
the
fuel
required
to
build
nuclear
weapons.
However,
unprecedentedly
high
oil
prices
during
the
period
helped
keep
Iran
running
even
in
the
face
of
such
sanctions,
and
also
emboldened
it
to
frequently
use
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
as
part
of
its
foreign
policy.
Karim
Sadjadpour,
a
researcher
with
the
Carnegie
Endowment
for
International
Peace,
confirmed
this
notion,
noting
that
during
the
period
from
2003
to
2008,
“soaring
oil
prices…have
given
the
Islamic
Republic
unprecedented
power
vis‐à‐vis
the
United
States,
offering
Khamenei
and
Iran’s
hardliners
a
newfound
confidence.”122
I
argue
that,
once
again,
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
analysis
proves
to
have
the
greatest
explanatory
power
in
understanding
Iran’s
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
but
that
realist
and
offensive
realist
frameworks
also
address
certain
important
aspects
of
the
Iranian
case.
121
Ibid.
122
Sadjadpour,
Karim.
Reading
Khamenei:
The
World
View
of
Iran’s
Most
Powerful
Leader.
Rep.
Washington,
DC:
Carnegie
Endowment
for
International
Peace,
2009.
Carnegie
Endowment
for
International
Peace,
2009.
Web.
30
Mar.
2012.
Ramel
80
Iran’s
use
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
in
late
January
of
2006
came
after
a
40
percent
run
up
in
price
in
just
six
months.
Following
threats
that
Iran
might
consider
cutting
of
its
oil
exports
in
response
to
further
Western
pressure
on
its
nuclear
program,
the
price
of
oil
rose
an
additional
17
percent
from
March
to
May
of
that
year.123
According
to
industry
analysts,
much
of
that
rise
in
price
was
directly
priced‐in
risk
associated
with
potential
disruptions
in
the
world
oil
market.
Rising
oil
prices
had
given
Iran
the
confidence
and
funding
to
engage
in
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
This
brash
language
then
caused
market
jitters
that
contributed
to
further
oil
price
rises.124
These
developments
helped
demonstrate
that
oil
prices
can
have
a
positive
feedback
relationship
with
the
use
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
In
this
case,
Iran’s
decision
to
use
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
helped
create
market
conditions
that
increased
revenue
flow
into
state
coffers,
thereby
augmenting
the
Iranian
regime’s
ability
to
weather
out
the
UNSC’s
manifold
sanctions.
Additionally,
such
cash
inflows
permitted
the
Iranian
government
to
continue
to
fund
domestic
social
programs,
thereby
diminishing
the
potential
for
social
unrest.
The
net
financial
benefit
was
clear,
and
so
too
was
the
accompanying
political
benefit.
Assessing
the
explanatory
power
of
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
framework
in
the
case
of
Iran
during
this
time
period
requires
understanding
the
problem,
the
politics,
the
policy,
and
the
policy
entrepreneurs.
The
problem
is
the
most
clear
in
this
case
–
Iran
needed
to
find
a
way
to
stave
off
UNSC
economic
sanctions
in
order
to
buy
time
and
money
for
the
furtherance
of
123
Capaccio,
Tony.
"Iran
Might
Try
to
Disrupt
Hormuz
Oil
Flow
If
Attacked
by
U.S."Bloomberg.
5
May
2006.
Web.
8
Feb.
2012.
124
Isidore,
Chris.
"Shutting
off
Iran's
Oil
Could
Double
the
Price."
CNNMoney.
CNN,
07
Feb.
2006.
Web.
11
Apr.
2012.
Ramel
81
their
nuclear
program.
In
fact,
each
of
the
five
reported
uses
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
that
Iran’s
leaders
made
during
this
period
explicitly
referenced
that
Iran’s
oil
could
either
help
protect
its
nuclear
program
from
attack
or
punish
those
that
would
try
to
interfere
with
it.125
The
policy
stream
requires
just
a
bit
more
examination.
Why
did
Iran’s
leaders
elect
to
merely
use
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric,
instead
of
actually
deploying
“the
oil
weapon”?
The
alternative
policies
were
either
military
action
against
those
countries
sanctioning
it,
or
actually
following
up
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
with
action.
The
former
would
be
suicide
–
a
preemptive
military
strike
of
any
kind
by
Iran
would
be
met
with
a
devastating
and
overwhelming
response
similar
to
that
that
the
Taliban
experienced
in
Afghanistan
in
2001.
Initiating
“the
oil
weapon”
also
had
significant
and
difficult
associated
logistical
issues.
Unlike
in
the
case
of
Russia,
which
can
easily
cut
off
oil
exports
to
Eastern
Europe
and
the
Baltic
because
it
is
connected
directly
over
land
by
oil
pipeline,
87
percent
of
Iran’s
oil
is
shipped
by
tanker
to
its
destination.126
This
decreases
Iran’s
ability
to
use
the
“oil
weapon”
as
often
as
Russia
is
able
to
do.
Any
unsheathing
of
its
own
“oil
weapon”
would
necessitate
either
blocking
the
Strait
of
Hormuz
or
engaging
in
negotiations
for
a
whole
array
of
bilateral
contracts
aimed
at
preventing
their
oil
from
reaching
certain
targeted
countries.
The
first
path
would
provoke
a
similar
reaction
as
an
outright
military
strike
would,
and
the
second
would
require
serious,
lengthy
negotiations
with
no
guarantee
of
success.
Given
the
negatives
of
these
alternative
125
See
Appendix
A
for
a
table
detailing
each
incident
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
during
this
period.
126
"Russia
‐
Country
Energy
Brief."
Energy
Information
Administration,
2010.
Web.
08
May
2012.
<http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Full.html>.
Ramel
82
policies,
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
emerged
as
the
Iranian
leadership’s
policy
of
choice
–
it
addressed
the
problem
of
buying
additional
time
and
money
to
support
Iran’s
nuclear
aspirations
while
simultaneously
avoiding
the
more
dangerous
entanglements
associated
with
the
alternative
policies.
The
political
stream
during
this
period
was
also
conducive
to
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
Two
scholars
examining
Iranian
populism
at
the
time
noted,
“[Ahmadinejad’s]
public
attacks
on
the
US
and
its
unfair
economic
strategies
play
well
to
a
nationalist
sentiment
that
is
widespread
and
felt
with
special
intensity
by
[his]
base.”127
The
extremely
high
oil
price
during
this
time
period
only
further
tilted
the
political
atmosphere
in
favor
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric,
with
Ahmad
Zeidabadi,
an
Iranian
opposition
political
analyst,
stating
that
increased
oil
revenue
had,
“given
the
government
lots
of
self‐confidence
in
many
fields.”128
With
all
the
other
streams
in
place
to
create
a
policy
window,
all
that
was
necessary
was
for
a
policy
entrepreneur
to
step
in
and
be
willing
to
political
capital
to
realize
the
opportunity.
In
the
Iranian
case,
the
analysis
is
a
bit
more
complicated,
as
many
actors
within
the
Iranian
political
system
have
publicly
called
for
the
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
from
President
Ahmadinejad
to
Supreme
Leader
Khamenei
to
the
Iranian
OPEC
representative
to
the
Iranian
oil
minister
to
the
editorial
board
of
the
Tehran
Times.
Given
this
multitude
of
actors,
it
is
important
in
this
case
to
establish
127
Dodson,
Michael,
and
Manochehr
Darraj.
"Populism
and
Foreign
Policy
in
Venezuela
and
Iran."
The
Whitehead
Journal
of
Diplomacy
and
International
Relations
(2008):
71‐88.
Hein
Online.
2008.
Web.
14
Apr.
2012.
128
Erdbrink,
Thomas.
"Oil
Cash
May
Prove
A
Shaky
Crutch
for
Iran's
Ahmadinejad."WashingtonPost.com.
The
Washington
Post,
30
June
2008.
Web.
10
Nov.
2011.
Ramel
83
who
within
the
Iranian
political
elite
expended
political
influence
directly
in
order
to
ensure
that
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
was
part
of
Iran’s
foreign
policy.
This
question
automatically
ends
with
Supreme
Leader
Khamanei.
As
the
final
arbiter
in
all
decisions
related
to
the
National
Iranian
Oil
Company
(NIOC),
Iran’s
oil
policy
must
first
pass
his
inspection
and
gain
his
approval.129
Though
the
Iranian
policy
apparatus
is
somewhat
opaque,
it
is
clear
that
no
matter
which
political
actor
mustered
their
internal
political
capital
each
time
in
favor
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
had
to
be
sure
to
run
it
by
Khamanei.
Given
the
useful,
but
partially
incomplete
picture
that
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model
provides
for
the
undergirding
factors
for
Iran’s
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
during
the
period,
it
is
helpful
here
to
examine
two
alternative
frameworks,
offensive
realism
and
neo‐realism,
to
see
if
the
patterns
of
use
for
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
hew
to
their
tenets
in
this
case.
Immediately,
offensive
realism
jumps
to
attention
as
potentially
holding
good
explanatory
power
for
the
Iranian
use
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
One
tenet
of
offensive
realism
is
that
states
seek
superior
military
material
or
force
to
be
able
to
exercise
power
within
their
particular
region.130
Though
Iran
has
long
officially
denied
that
its
nuclear
program
is
pursuing
nuclear
weapons,
most
Western
governments,
intelligence
agencies,
and
inspections
bodies
have
either
remained
129
Brumberg,
Dan,
and
Ariel
I.
Ahram.
"The
Internal
Politics
of
Iranian
Oil:
Between
Market
and
Politics."
BakerInstitute.org.
Proc.
of
Baker
Institute
Energy
Forum,
Rice
University,
Houston.
The
Baker
Institute,
2
Mar.
2007.
Web.
14
Apr.
2012.
130
Mearsheimer,
John
J.
The
Tragedy
of
Great
Power
Politics.
New
York:
Norton,
2001.
Print.
141.
Ramel
84
skeptical
of
the
claim
or
out‐right
certain
that
Iran
has
been
lying.131
Assuming
that
Iran
was
indeed
pursuing
nuclear
armaments
during
the
period
from
2003
to
2008,
and
noting
that
Iran
used
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
in
an
attempt
to
further
fund
and
buy
time
for
its
nuclear
program,
then
offensive
realism
appears
to
offer
solid
explanatory
power
for
Iran’s
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
By
contrast,
neo‐realism
offers
only
some
explanatory
power
in
Iran’s
case.
Iran’s
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
was
phrased
in
terms
of
retaliation
against
the
West
for
any
potential
preemptive
strikes
against
Iran.
However,
these
threats
did
not
balance
against
increased
Western
influence
in
Iran
–
in
fact,
they
only
served
to
invite
further
sanctions
from
the
UN
and
state
governments.
Having
considered
the
contributory
factors
to
Iran’s
decision
to
utilize
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
during
the
period
from
2003
to
2008,
Kingdon’s
model
still
emerges
as
having
the
most
explanatory
power
in
understanding
what
undergirded
the
policymaking
process.
However,
offensive
realism
also
offers
a
useful
bit
of
framing
for
this
case,
as
Iran’s
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
fits
neatly
within
a
larger
conception
of
Iran’s
desire
for
regional
hegemony.
Russia:
‘the
Oil
Weapon’
as
Regional
Hegemony
As
the
largest
net
exporter
of
oil
in
the
world
as
well
as
the
direct
supplier
of
32.6
percent
of
all
of
Europe’s
oil,
Russia
is
ideally
suited
to
use
its
energy
resources
131
"Iran's
Nuclear
Program."
New
York
Times.
New
York
Times,
11
May
2012.
Web.
11
May
2012.
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program
/index.html>.
Ramel
85
as
potential
political
leverage.132
It
has
not
hesitated
to
demonstrate
this
power:
in
the
course
of
four
separate
disagreements
taking
place
between
2003
and
2008,
Russia
cut
off
oil
pipeline
shipments
to
various
Baltic
and
Eastern
European
countries.133
These
actions
were
all
consistent
with
an
exercise
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
Interestingly,
Russia
denied
explicit
political
motivations
for
these
cutoffs,
but,
nevertheless,
the
oil
stopped
flowing
immediately
following
regional
political
developments
that
irked
Moscow.
In
light
of
these
cases,
I
argue
that
Russia’s
approach
to
“the
oil
weapon”
has
been
to
utilize
it
in
the
furtherance
of
its
goal
of
reasserting
regional
dominance
in
the
former
Soviet
sphere.
This
approach
fits
well
within
a
regional
hegemony
explanation
of
“oil
weapon”
use,
with
the
economic
coercive
power
of
oil
standing
in
for
more
explicit
military
power.
The
first
incident
occurred
in
January
of
2003.
Russia’s
state‐owned
pipeline
monopoly,
Transneft,
abruptly
stopped
shipping
oil
through
to
Ventspils
Nafta,
a
Latvian
company
that
runs
a
major
oil
terminal
on
the
Baltic
Sea.
Previously,
the
Latvian
government
had
backed
Ventspils
in
resisting
a
buyout
from
Transneft.
132
For
largest
exporter
data,
see:
"Russia
‐
Country
Energy
Brief."
Energy
Information
Administration,
2010.
Web.
08
May
2012.
<http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Full.html>.
For
European
import
percentage,
see
Piebalgs,
Andris,
and
Sergey
Shmatko.
Energy
Dialogue
EU‐Russia:
The
Tenth
Report.
Rep.
European
Commission,
Nov.
2009.
Web.
8
May
2012.
133
It
is
important
to
note,
too,
that
Russia
has
also
cut
pipeline
export
of
its
natural
gas
to
Europe
via
the
Ukraine.
In
both
2006
and
2009,
Russia
cited
pricing
disagreements
with
the
Ukrainian
government,
which
resulted
in
Russia
temporarily
turning
off
the
taps.
The
results
were
felt
throughout
European
gas
markets,
which
depend
heavily
on
Russian
gas,
especially
during
the
winter.
Despite
the
fact
that
there
was
no
explicit
political
motive
credited
in
press
accounts,
these
events
underscored
the
serious
power
that
Russia
held
over
Eastern
Europe
due
to
its
control
of
the
latter’s
energy
supply.
See
Stone,
Sam.
"Gas
and
Geopolitics:
The
Foreign
Policy
Implications
of
Energy
Import
Dependency."
Center
for
International
Security
and
Cooperation
(2010).Coursework.
14
May
2010.
Web.
9
Sept.
2011.
Ramel
86
Venspils
loudly
clamored
that
this
export
halt
was
Russia’s
way
of
punishing
this
resistance.
134
Officially,
though,
Transneft
denied
any
political
rationale
for
the
export
stop,
claiming
that
it
was
part
of
a
smart
economic
strategy
for
consolidating
Russian
oil
export
operations.
However,
Latvian
officials
were
skeptical,
claiming
that
by
weakening
Ventspils
Nafta,
Russia
would
be
able
to
“replace
its
lost
military
control
over
Latvia
with
a
new
energy‐based
economic
control.”135
Ainars
Slesers,
a
Latvian
deputy
prime
minister
for
economic
affairs,
affirmed
this:
“Russia
has
started
to
understand
that
they
can
influence
many
things
in
business
life,
and
one
of
those
things
is
the
oil
business.
They
are
willing
to
accept
losses
just
to
show
who
the
real
decision
maker
is.''136
Additionally,
the
export
halt
took
place
mere
months
before
Latvia
was
set
to
join
NATO,
prompting
other
Latvian
politicians,
such
as
Guntars
Krasts,
a
former
prime
minister,
to
propose
that
Russia
was
establishing
influence
within
NATO’s
sphere
before
the
official
transition
in
order
to
have
a
stronger
bargaining
position
in
future
negotiations
with
NATO.137
The
second
incident
occurred
in
October
of
2006.
A
Polish
company,
PKN
Orlen,
beat
out
two
Russian
oil
companies,
Lukoil
and
TNK‐BP,
with
the
winning
bid
for
Lithuania’s
sole
oil
refinery.
In
the
aftermath
of
this
process,
Russian
oil
stopped
134
Tavernise,
Sabrina.
"Latvia's
Oil
Routes
Dry
Up
as
Russia
Alters
Flow."
The
New
York
Times.
The
New
York
Times,
21
Jan.
2003.
Web.
09
May
2012.
135
Ibid.
136
Ibid.
137
Ibid.
Ramel
87
flowing
to
Lithuania.138
Moscow
responded
that
the
pipeline
had
begun
to
leak
in
the
days
following
the
deal,
and
thus,
had
to
be
shut
down
for
repairs.
Tomas
Janeliunas,
deputy
director
of
the
Center
for
Strategic
Studies,
offered
a
different
read
on
the
situation:
“The
goal
was
to
force
Lithuania
to
reconsider
the
sale.
They
wanted
a
Russian
company
to
buy
the
refinery,
but
for
cheaper
than
a
market
price.
Then
American
Vice
President
Dick
Cheney
framed
this
incident
with
more
charged
language,
citing
it
as
another
iteration
in
Moscow’s
strategy
of
using
energy
exports
as
“tools
of
intimidation
or
blackmail”
in
relations
with
its
neighbors.139
Mere
months
later,
in
May
of
2007,
the
Russian
“oil
weapon”
struck
once
again.
Amid
a
diplomatic
row
between
Estonia
and
Russia
over
the
former’s
decision
to
move
a
Soviet‐era
monument
out
of
a
prominent
plaza
in
Tallinn,
the
Estonian
capital,
Russia
responded
by
announcing
that
it
would
be
beginning
repair
work
on
all
of
its
rail
linkages
into
Estonia,
effectively
halting
all
of
its
oil
shipments
to
Estonia’s
Baltic
Sea
ports.140
The
final
Russian
invocation
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
this
period
occurred
in
July
of
2008,
when
oil
prices
were
at
their
absolute
peak.
As
the
New
York
Times
reports,
“Transneft
cut
supplies
[to
the
Czech
Republic]
in
early
July,
a
day
after
[United
States]
Secretary
of
State
Condoleezza
Rice
signed
an
accord
with
her
Czech
138
Kramer,
Andrew
E.
"Lithuanians
Are
Given
a
Taste
of
How
Russia
Plays
the
Oil
Game."The
New
York
Times.
The
New
York
Times,
28
Oct.
2006.
Web.
09
May
2012.
139
Ibid.
140
Meyers,
Steven
L.
"Tensions
Worsen
between
Russia
and
Estonia."
The
New
York
Times.
The
New
York
Times,
2
May
2012.
Web.
09
Jan.
2012.
Ramel
88
counterpart
to
deploy
part
of
the
Pentagon’s
antiballistic
missile
shield
on
Czech
territory.”141
When
confronted
with
this
temporal
coincidence,
Transneft’s
vice
president
Mikhail
Barkov
explicitly
denied
that
the
decision
to
cut
the
volume
of
oil
supplied
to
the
Czech
Republic
in
July
by
50
percent
had
been
in
retaliation
for
the
signing
of
the
agreement,
instead
citing
“technical
and
commercial”
reasons
as
undergirding
the
decision.142
Taken
together,
these
four
cases
provide
strong
evidence
for
the
explanatory
power
of
a
regional
hegemony
model
for
Russia’s
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
By
cutting
off
oil
exports
to
Latvia,
Lithuania,
Estonia,
and
the
Czech
Republic,
Russia
repeatedly
demonstrated
its
willingness
to
use
oil’s
economic
power
as
political
leverage
meant
to
express
and
expand
its
dominance
in
its
region.
Columbia
Professor
F.
Stephen
Larrabee
characterized
the
thrust
of
this
Russian’s
strategy
as
“embarking
on
a
systematic
effort
to
restore
Russian
influence
in
Eastern
Europe
and
along
Moscow’s
Western
periphery…rather
than
relying
on
military
power,
as
the
Soviet
leadership
did,
the
current
Russian
leadership
has
sought
to
use
economic
instruments–above
all,
Russia’s
energy
exports–to
expand
Russia’s
power
and
influence.”143
The
other
two
potential
models,
neo‐realism
and
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
model,
do
not
offer
as
much
explanatory
power
in
the
Russian
case
as
they
141
Dempsey,
Judy.
"Russia
Further
Cuts
It
Oil
Deliveries
to
the
Czech
Republic."
The
New
York
Times.
The
New
York
Times,
30
July
2008.
Web.
09
Jan.
2012.
142
Ibid.
143
Larrabee,
F.
Stephen.
"Rethinking
Russia:
Russia,
Ukraine,
and
Central
Europe:
The
Return
of
Geopolitics."
Columbia
Journal
of
International
Affairs
63.2
(2010):
33‐52.
Columbia
School
of
International
and
Public
Affairs,
2012.
Web.
4
May
2012.
Ramel
89
did
in
the
Venezuelan
or
Iranian
case.
While
a
neo‐realist
approach
has
some
merit
in
that
the
Russian
exercise
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
July
2008
was
a
balancing
action
against
the
United
States,
this
framework
cannot
explain
why
Russia,
despite
being
the
clear
military
superpower
in
the
region,
has
continued
to
take
predatory
moves
against
its
Baltic
neighbors
in
the
oil
sphere.
Neo‐realism
would
predict
that
security
there
is
enough,
whereas
offensive
realism
predicts
the
reality
–
that
Russia
seeks
additional
power
in
its
region
to
unabashedly
establish
a
larger
sphere
of
regional
hegemony.
As
to
Kingdon’s
model,
it
suffers
from
the
fact
that
Russia
unsheathed
“the
oil
weapon”
in
so
many
varied
cases
for
so
many
different
reasons.
The
only
united
thread
among
the
four
incidents
was
a
cutoff
in
oil
exports
to
a
targeted
country.
The
lack
of
official
acknowledgement
from
Moscow
also
decreases
the
possibility
of
analyzing
the
policy
stream
and
policy
entrepreneur
portions
of
Kingdon’s
approach.
This
segues
into
one
final
point
about
Russia’
patterns
of
use
for
“the
oil
weapon”
during
this
period.
Of
the
three
cases
analyzed,
Russia
was
the
only
one
that
actually
pulled
the
trigger
on
the
“oil
weapon.”
Puzzlingly,
though,
they
never
publicly
owned
up
to
having
done
so,
instead
blaming
leaks,
timely
repairs,
or
malfunctions.
This
approach
stands
in
sharp
contrast
to
Venezuela
and
Iran’s
brash
applications
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
This
difference
may
reflect
that
Russia’s
physical
control
of
pipelines
to
its
chosen
“oil
weapon”
targets
allowed
it
to
avoid
having
to
engage
in
rhetoric
to
achieve
its
policy
goals.
It
needed
only,
and
material
circumstances
empowered
it
to,
act
–
something
that
Venezuela
and
Iran
would
Ramel
90
have
had
much
more
trouble
doing
given
that
most
of
their
oil
leaves
by
tanker
at
sea.
Conclusion:
As
Thomas
Friedman
notes,
“because
the
rising
price
of
crude
is
certain
to
be
a
major
factor
shaping
international
relations
for
the
near
future,
we
must
try
to
understand
any
connections
it
has
with
the
character
and
direction
of
global
politics.”144
With
this
in
mind,
I
analyzed
the
cases
of
Venezuela,
Iran,
and
Russia
in
the
oil
price
boom
period
from
2003
to
2008.
While
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
approach
offered
very
strong
explanatory
power
for
Venezuela’s
use
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric,
and
strong
explanatory
power
for
Iran’s,
it
did
not
hold
any
explanatory
power
for
Russia’s
actual
use
of
“the
oil
weapon.”
To
a
lesser
extent
in
Iran’s
case,
but
to
a
total
extent
in
Russia’s,
the
regional
hegemony
approach
from
offensive
realism
offers
explanatory
power
for
the
patterns
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
and
use
during
this
period.
Throughout,
the
importance
of
high
oil
prices
proved
to
be
repeatedly
important.
144
Friedman,
Thomas
L.
"The
First
Law
of
Petropolitics."
Foreign
Policy
124
(2006):
28‐36.
JSTOR.
Web.
5
Apr.
2012.
Ramel
91
Chapter
VII:
Conclusion
–
2009­Present
The
Financial
Crisis
Grant
a
Brief
Respite:
In
late
2008,
the
world
financial
system
went
into
a
meltdown.
Major
investment
firms
collapsed,
the
housing
market
crumbled,
and,
most
relevant
to
this
thesis,
oil
prices
tumbled,
with
NYMEX
futures
contracts
for
WTI
crude
bottoming
out
at
$35.35
on
Christmas
Eve.
Prices
remained
in
the
$30s
as
late
as
February
of
2009,
and
it
was
not
until
the
first
week
of
June
2009
that
prices
approached
even
half
of
their
pre‐crisis
peak.145
These
tumbling
oil
prices
greatly
decreased
the
economic
leverage
that
oil‐
exporting
countries
had
in
world
politics.
A
front‐page
New
York
Times
headline
from
October
21,
2008,
proclaimed,
“3
Oil‐Rich
Countries
Face
a
Reckoning”.146
The
accompanying
article
detailed
how
Venezuela,
Iran,
and
Russia
had
“muscled
their
way
onto
the
world
stage
using
checkbook
diplomacy
and,
on
occasion,
intimidation,”
but
that
now
“plummeting
oil
prices
are
raising
questions
about
whether
the
countries
can
sustain
their
spending
–
and
their
bids
to
challenge
United
States
hegemony…such
ambitions
are
harder
to
finance
when
oil
is
at
$74.25
a
barrel…than
when
it
is
at
$147,
its
price
as
recently
as
three
months
ago.”147
Chastened
by
these
new
economic
circumstances,
these
three
states’
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
and
use
cooled
substantially
–
in
all
of
2009
and
2010,
there
was
only
one
instance
of
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric,
and
it
was
a
half‐hearted
one
from
145
See
"Petroleum
and
Other
Liquids
‐
Monthly
Cushing,
OK
WTI
Spot
Price
FOB."
Energy
Information
Administration,
11
May
2012.
Web.
11
May
2012.
146
Romero,
Simon,
Michael
Slackman,
Clifford
J.
Levy,
Maria
Eugenia
Diaz,
and
Nazila
Fathi.
"3
Oil
Countries
Face
a
Reckoning."
The
New
York
Times.
The
New
York
Times,
21
Oct.
2008.
Web.
02
May
2012.
147
Ibid.
Ramel
92
President
Ahmadinejad
that
only
noted
that
“the
oil
weapon”
was
“a
good
proposal”
for
supporting
the
Palestinian
cause,
but
that
it
was
not
on
Iran’s
agenda
at
the
time.148
Iran
and
‘the
Oil
Weapon’,
Back
Again
on
the
World
Stage:
In
time,
though,
oil
prices
rose
again,
cracking
the
$100
mark
in
early
March
of
2011.149
In
parallel,
political
developments
between
the
European
Union
and
Iran
brought
“the
oil
weapon”
issue
roaring
back
onto
the
world
stage
at
a
tenor
unheard
of
since
the
1973‐1974
OAPEC
embargo
and
production
cuts.
Following
months
of
increased
pressure
from
the
United
States
and
the
EU
over
its
nuclear
program,
Iran
finally
responded
with
a
return
to
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
Oil
Minister
Rostam
Qasemi
stated
that
any
attempt
to
disrupt
Iran’s
oil
exports
would
cause
“severe
problems”
for
the
interfering
parties
and
the
global
oil
market.150 This
was
a
telling
incident,
as
Iran’s
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
had
assumed
a
reactive
posture
–
the
warning
was
in
case
another
party
disrupted
Iranian
oil
shipments,
instead
of
the
traditional
warning
that
Iran
would
disrupt
oil
exports
to
the
targeted
party.
This
inversion
played
out
starting
in
on
January
23,
2012,
when
the
EU
approved
and
put
in
place
an
oil
embargo
of
Iran.
Two
and
a
half
months
later,
Iran
responded
with
a
counter‐embargo
in
an
attempt
to
pre‐empt
European
countries
148
Blair,
Edmund,
and
Fredrik
Dahl.
"Iran
Says
Oil
Embargo
over
Gaza
Is
Good
Idea."Reuters.
15
Jan.
2009.
Web.
11
Dec.
2011.
149
See
"Petroleum
and
Other
Liquids
‐
Monthly
Cushing,
OK
WTI
Spot
Price
FOB."
Energy
Information
Administration,
11
May
2012.
Web.
11
May
2012.
150
DePaola,
Anthony.
"Iran
Says
Oil
Market
to
Suffer
If
Its
Exports
Affected,
Seeks
'Fair'
Price."
Bloomberg.
20
Nov.
2011.
Web.
13
Jan.
2012.
Ramel
93
before
they
could
establish
bilateral
oil
contracts
to
compensate
for
lost
Iranian
imports.151
This
step
was
the
first
time
since
1974
that
Iran
had
involved
itself
in
an
actual
exercise
of
“the
oil
weapon”
instead
of
merely
its
rhetoric.
Both
sides
have
struggled
to
gain
the
upper
hand
in
the
proceedings.
The
EU,
which
previously
imported
450,000
bpd
from
Iran,
or
roughly
a
quarter
of
Iran’s
exports,
has
worked
to
help
its
members
diversify
away
from
Iranian
sources.
Concurrently,
the
US
has
negotiated
with
Japan,
India,
Korea,
and
China,
which
together
account
for
more
than
half
of
Iranian
exports,
to
try
to
get
them
to
consider
alternate
bilateral
contracts
with
countries
such
as
Saudi
Arabia.152
In
response
to
Saudi
Arabia’s
decision
to
supply
the
Europeans’
shortfalls,
Iran
urged
Saudi
Arabia
to
reconsider,
and
not
interfere
in
Iran’s
counter‐embargo
against
the
EU.153
In
an
attempt
to
find
a
badly
needed
market
for
its
oil,
Iran
has
turned
to
China
as
a
potential
market
partner
for
buying
up
its
destination‐less
oil.
Unfortunately
for
Iran,
the
combined
US
sanctions
and
EU
embargo
have
made
processing
transactions
of
its
oil
much
harder.
As
a
result,
by
early
May,
Iran
had
already
lost
almost
10
percent
of
all
of
its
crude
supply
contracts
globally.154
More
importantly,
China
had
cut
imports
by
6.2
percent
and
delayed
signing
a
new
series
of
contracts.
Iran’s
current
strategy
for
weathering
this
crisis
is
to
pump
the
20
151
"Iran
Moves
to
Preempt
EU
Embargo."
The
Times
of
Israel.
10
Apr.
2012.
Web.
11
May
2012.
Additionally,
the
United
States
initiated
an
even
stricter
round
of
sanctions
of
Iran’s
national
bank,
making
it
even
more
difficult
for
Iran
to
process
oil
transactions.
152
Blas,
Javier.
"Saudis
Risk
Iranian
Anger
over
Crude
Flow."
Financial
Times.
6
Feb.
2012.
Web.
03
Mar.
2012.
153
Ibid.
154
Narayanan,
Pratish.
"Iran
May
Lose
9.5%
of
Oil
Contracts
as
Asian
Buyers
Cut
Imports."Bloomberg.
3
May
2012.
Web.
11
May
2012.
Ramel
94
percent
of
its
oil
that
it
has
not
been
able
to
sell
into
tankers
to
be
held
at
sea.155
Over
the
course
of
the
month
of
April,
Iran’s
exports
fell
an
additional
600,000
bpd
to
1.6
million
bpd.
A
low‐end
estimate
for
the
lost
revenue
from
this
export
drop
is
$2
billion
in
revenue,
all
of
which
the
Iranian
government
now
no
longer
has
to
help
further
fund
its
nuclear
program
and
the
domestic
social
programs
that
help
maintain
the
peace
within
Iran.
If
this
keeps
up,
Iran
will
quickly
be
forced
to
either
cut
popular
domestic
programs
or
diminish
funding
for
its
nuclear
program.
Neither
is
palatable
to
Khamanei’s
regime,
but
one
or
both
may
become
necessary
if
the
embargo
and
sanctions
persist.
The
Future
of
‘the
Oil
Weapon”
and
Policy
Relevance:
All
in
all,
the
current
EU‐Iran
standoff
is
one
in
a
long
line
of
“oil
weapon”
usages
through
history.
Evaluating
various
frameworks
for
understanding
what
undergirds
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
and
its
rhetoric,
this
thesis
established
the
following:
1)
a
punctuated
equilibrium
model
best
explained
the
1945‐1973
re‐ordering
of
the
global
oil
industry;
2)
Kingdon’s
multiple
policy
streams
framework
both
best
explained
the
most
memorable
iterations
of
“the
oil
weapon”
in
1967
and
1973‐1974
and
those
that
occurred
during
the
period
from
1974‐2003
that
was
marked
by
generally
less
political
uses
of
oil;
and
3)
during
the
high
oil
price
period
running
from
2003‐2008,
a
combination
of
Kingdon’s
model
and
offensive
realist/regional
hegemonic
models
held
differential
explanatory
155
Herron,
James.
"Iran
Oil
Exports
Fall
as
Sanctions
Tighten."
The
Wall
Street
Journal.
The
Wall
Street
Journal,
11
May
2012.
Web.
11
May
2012.
Ramel
95
power
for
different
cases,
with:
A)
Kingdon
covering
Venezuela,
and
most
of
Iran;
and
B)
offensive
realism/regional
hegemony
explaining
the
remaining
aspects
of
Iran’s
decision‐making
process
and
all
of
Russia’s.
In
terms
of
the
hypothetical
framework
established
in
Chapter
II,
Hypothesis
1B,
on
Baumgartner
and
Jones’
punctuated
equilibrium
model,
holds
strong
explanatory
power
for
1945‐1973.
Hypothesis
2A,
on
the
inadequacy
of
that
model
in
explaining
iterations
of
“the
oil
weapon”,
also
holds
true.
Hypothesis
2B,
Kingdon’s
model,
holds
strong
explanatory
power
for
1967,
1973‐1974,
1974‐2003,
and
Venezuela
from
2003‐2008,
and
good
explanatory
power
for
Iran
from
2003‐2008.
Hypothesis
2D,
offensive
realism
and
regional
hegemony,
offers
strong
explanatory
power
for
Russia
from
2003‐2008
and
some
explanatory
power
for
Iran
from
2003‐2008.
Hypotheses
1A,
on
the
explanatory
power
of
Krasner’s
punctuated
equilibrium
model,
does
not
hold
explanatory
power
for
the
period
from
1945
to
1973,
Hypothesis
2C,
on
neo‐
realism,
does
not
hold
much
explanatory
power
throughout,
and
Hypothesis
2E
only
helps
to
support
the
explanatory
power
of
the
Kingdonian
model
in
1973‐1974.
Given
these
findings,
I
offer
the
following
predictions
regarding
the
patterns
of
use
of
“the
oil
weapon”
and
its
rhetoric
in
the
future:
1. The
current
EU‐Iranian
situation
will
remain
untenable
for
the
Iranian
regime,
forcing
it
to
deal
with
domestic
unrest
from
revenue
shortfalls.
Whether
it
can
maintain
funding
for
its
nuclear
programs
remains
dependent
on
how
willing
the
Iranian
political
elite
is
to
shift
funds
from
other
programs
into
the
nuclear
program.
Iran
will
Ramel
96
continue
to
use
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
and
threaten
to
close
the
Strait
of
Hormuz,
but
its
hand
is
played
out.
2. The
new
trend
of
“reverse
oil
weapons”,
meaning
the
importing
countries
cutting
off
imports
from
a
targeted
exporting
country,
will
likely
grow
in
popularity
following
the
conclusion
of
the
current
EU‐
Iranian
imbroglio.
The
United
States
and
Europe,
having
figured
out
how
to
execute
such
a
policy
strategy,
will
bring
it
out
to
pressure
trenchant
authoritarian
regimes.
3. States
with
direct,
overland
pipeline
oil
connections,
like
what
Russia
has
with
the
Baltic
States,
will
be
much
more
likely
to
engage
in
unilateral
“oil
weapon”
usage
against
individual
targeted
states.
These
uses
of
“the
oil
weapon”
will
be
very
effective
in
getting
what
the
coercer
desires.
4. Venezuela
under
Chavez
will
never
actually
embargo
its
oil.
Doing
so
would
be
political
suicide
for
Chavez,
who
depends
on
the
revenues
from
the
United
States’
importation
of
Venezuela’s
oil
to
fund
his
raft
of
domestic
social
programs.
5. Continued
existence
of
Saudi
Arabia’s
valuable
swing
capacity
will
blunt
all
forms
of
“oil
weapon”
use,
whether
by
pipeline
or
more
generally
across
the
international
oil
economy.
However,
should
this
swing
capacity
diminish
appreciably,
it
would
signal
an
extremely
important
structural
change
in
the
world’s
oil
economy
which
would
increase
the
frequency
and
severity
of
“oil
weapon”
use.
Ramel
97
6. Politically
far
left
and
far
right
oil
exporting
countries
will
be
the
most
likely
to
engage
in
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric.
7. Further
increases
in
oil
prices,
or
maintenance
of
the
current
high
levels,
will
encourage
many
authoritarian
oil
exporting
states
to
engage
in
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
should
that
rhetoric
play
well
with
domestic
audiences’
nationalist
or
anti‐imperialist
positions.
These
high
prices
will
create
one
half
of
a
permissive
political
stream,
and
as
long
as
there
are
domestic
audiences
served
by
such
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric,
the
stream
will
be
complete.
With
the
policy
and
the
political
stream
in
place,
it
will
only
take
a
policy
entrepreneur
to
find
a
problem
of
their
choosing
to
attach
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
to.
Due
to
its
increasingly
adversarial
relations
with
Western
powers,
Sudan
is
one
potential
likely
locus
for
this
future
rhetoric.
In
terms
of
policy
relevance
beyond
the
predictions
above,
the
conclusions
of
this
thesis
will
help
policy
makers
and
diplomats
decide
how
best
to
expend
political
capital
in
engagements
with
potentially
hostile
oil‐exporting
countries.
If
the
country
is
only
likely
to
engage
in
“oil
weapon”
rhetoric
as
a
show
for
domestic
audiences,
then
clearly
such
a
country
requires
much
less
political
engagement
over
the
issue
than
a
country
that
has
direct
pipeline
control
over
the
oil
economy
of
another
country.
Additionally,
the
conclusions
that
Kingdon’s
framework
holds
solid
explanatory
power
in
many
“oil
weapon”
cases
demonstrates
the
importance
of
isolating
and/or
engaging
with
political
actors
within
potentially
hostile
oil‐
exporting
countries
to
try
to
dissuade
them
from
becoming
policy
entrepreneurs
for
Ramel
98
“oil
weapon”
usage
as
policy.
Next,
this
paper’s
conclusions
call
for
a
more
serious
engagement
with
Russia
on
energy
security
issues
during
Putin’s
new
term,
marked
by
the
establishment
of
a
working
series
of
norms
to
prevent
oil‐based
blackmail.
Such
measures
were
investigated
in
late
2007
and
2008,
but
require
further
development
to
the
point
where
Russia
sees
it
detrimental
to
its
self‐interest
to
use
“the
oil
weapon”
on
its
neighbors.
A
final
lesson
that
policymakers
should
draw
from
this
thesis
is
that
“the
oil
weapon”
is
a
blunt
tool
from
the
exporting
country’s
perspective
that
is
difficult
to
muster,
and
that
often
collapses
under
its
own
weight.
This
fact
should
help
temper
alarmist
takes
on
oil
supply
security
issues.
‘A
Double­Edge
Sword’:
To
close,
I
offer
a
quotation
from
a
New
York
Times
article
entitled
“OPEC’s
Chief
Shrugs
Off
Latest
Twists
in
Oil
Politics”:
“Gone
are
the
militant
years,
when
OPEC
ministers
barged
into
meetings
and
threatened
to
unsheathe
their
oil
weapon
only
to
discover,
much
too
late,
that
it
could
be
a
double‐edge
sword.”156
This
is
all
too
true.
“The
oil
weapon”
is
not
a
panacea
for
the
ills
of
oil
exporting
countries.
Despite
this,
it
has
been,
and
will
continue
to
be,
an
important
part
of
international
politics
for
years.
Only
by
understanding
what
factors
have
undergirded
its
patterns
of
use
in
past
years
will
we
be
able
to
develop
sound
plans
to
counter
it
in
the
future.
156
Mouawad,
Jad.
"OPEC's
Chief
Shrugs
Off
Latest
Twists
in
Oil
Politics."
The
New
York
Times.
The
New
York
Times,
04
Feb.
2006.
Web.
11
May
2012.
Ramel
99
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Appendix
A:
‘Oil
Weapon’
Use
and
Rhetoric:
2003­
2008
Date
Country
Oil Price NYMEX
OP - 6 Months
Previous
Percent
Change
January 21, 2003
Russia
33.90
26.97
25.70
February 26, 2003
Malaysia
37.96
28.39
33.71
March 1, 2004
Venezuela
36.85
28.31
30.17
August 17, 2005
Iran
63.25
48.05
31.63
August 17, 2005
Venezuela
63.25
48.05
31.63
January 26, 2006
Iran
65.80
59.00
11.53
April 17, 2006
Iran
70.30
62.26
12.91
October 28, 2006
Russia
60.75
69.44
-12.51
May 2, 2007
Russia
63.78
59.08
7.96
June 19, 2007
Iran
75.90
61.96
22.50
December 1, 2007
Iran
88.60
67.49
31.28
February 11, 2008
Venezuela
93.56
131.88
29.30
June 19, 2008
Venezuela
131.88
91.69
43.83
July 30, 2008
Russia
126.74
92.97
36.32
Ramel
111
Appendix
B:
Google
News
Hits
for
‘Oil
Weapon’:
1972‐
2011
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
‘Oil Weapon' Google News Search Results
79
1,260
1,020
224
130
198
190
921
577
575
167
107
149
139
208
193
196
179
790
934
224
224
174
204
178
159
252
260
280
341
1,440
1,870
1,150
1,420
3,300
2,500
2,180
1,540
1,430
1,840