Little, Green and Polite
The Creation of Russian
Special Operations Forces
By Alexey Nikolsky
O
An Invisible Parade
n May 9, 2014, at the annual Victory Day parade in Moscow, units
freshly returned from Crimea strutted through Red Square on the
wave of their recent accomplishments. Among these units were the
16th Special Purpose Brigade, the 76th Airborne Assault Division, and the
Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Marines Brigade. These units were chosen on accord of
their role in the Russian military operation in Crimea earlier in the year, in late
February and March. Their service personnel were the “polite people,” as they
were termed in Russia, and the “little green men,” their moniker in Ukraine,
who worked with Crimea’s pro-Russian self-defense militia and Crimean units
of Ukraine’s Berkut special police squads to blockade and seize Ukrainian
military bases, government buildings, and key infrastructure facilities on the
peninsula. But one unit intimately involved in Crimean operations was notably absent from the parade – a newly formed group in the Russian Armed
Forces, the Special Operations Forces (SOF).1 It was SOF soldiers who played
the key role in seizing the most important objectives, such as the Crimean parliament building, the command HQs of the Ukrainian Army, and hard-target
military compounds that were expected to put up the greatest resistance. SOF
units were instrumental in achieving key political objectives and paralyzing
the Ukrainian Army in Crimea, thereby enabling Russia to complete the annexation of the peninsula without bloodshed.
The SOF service, established in 2011, is closely related in terms of command structure, personnel, and traditions with the special purpose forces
(spetsnaz) of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). However, the primary
mission of GRU Spetsnaz is deep special reconnaissance, while the focus of
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The Creation of Russian Special Operations Forces
125
SOF is closer to direct action. This close association, as well as the heightened
secrecy around both groups, often leads to confusion. The push to create SOF
Command, which is subordinated to the chief of the General Staff, was initiated
by the then chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, beside the then defense
minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, who together spearheaded a radical reform of
the Russian Armed Forces in 2008-2012. The idea to set up Russian SOF Command was born following a study by Gen. Makarov of the experiences of US,
German, and other foreign special operations forces.2 Russian delegations also
conducted fact-finding missions to the HQs of such special services, with each
delegation including officers of the GRU spetsnaz. In general, top brass of the
Russian MoD were greatly impressed by the physical fitness, special training,
psychological resilience, and discipline of Western special operations soldiers,
with particular note of how well these soldiers were trained in advanced tactics
with small arms.3
SOF Command was placed in direct operational control of specific special operations forces, rather than, as some had suggested, overseeing special
operations as a whole, such as GRU spetsnaz brigades, Navy spetsnaz, or the
45th Spetsnaz Regiment of the Airborne Troops. (Incidentally, GRU spetsnaz
brigades were subordinated to the military district commands rather than
the GRU itself in 2010. The decision was reversed in 2013, after Makarov and
Serdyukov resigned.) Candidates for the new SOF unit were to be selected
from among the finest soldiers of regular army reconnaissance units, and serve
with spetsnaz units before being chosen for SOF. But SOF was not created
entirely from scratch: Military Unit 92154, originally created in 1999 at the
Senezh 99/1 military compound not far from Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Region, was selected to become the core of the newly created SOF service. In its
original form Unit 92154 had been subordinated to the GRU, and was essentially a small combat training and operations center. Its primary remit was to
run GRU agents in conflict zones and to conduct counterterrorism operations
in the North Caucasus.
Controlling SOF – Should There Be Wide or Narrow
Operational Control of Special Operation Forces?
Despite the actual formation of SOF Command back in 2011, the creation of
SOF was officially announced by the chief of the General Staff, Gen. Valery
Gerasimov, only on March 6, 2013, at a meeting with foreign military attachés:
“Having studied the practice of the formation, training, and application of
special operations forces by the leading foreign powers, the leadership of the
Ministry of Defense has also begun to create such forces.” He added that military conflicts in the 21st century had demonstrated the growing importance of
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126
Alexey Nikolsky
such forces and the vital need to add such capability to the Russian inventory.
But as previously stated, in actual fact, SOF Command was set up back in 2011.
Highlighting the belated nature of this announcement, Gen. Gerasimov went
on to say, “The SOF Command that has been set up is now working according
to plans and implementing the armed forces training program,” He continued,
“We have already drafted a set of guidelines that outline the objectives of these
forces, their training methods, and the modalities of their application.”4
Soon after these remarks by Gen. Gerasimov, there was much speculation
as to the command reach of the newly created command. The Nezavisimaya
Gazeta daily speculated that the forces subordinated to SOF Command would
include all seven of the GRU spetsnaz brigades, and that another three such
brigades would be formed. The daily wrote, “SOF Command will also have operational control over relevant battalions of the Navy’s marines, the Airborne
Troops, and units of the Air Force (attack, transport, and UAV squadrons).”5
This opinion, that SOF Command is essentially a Russian version of America’s
SOCOM, is still widely held in Russia, but it is in fact wrong. Such proposals
have been put forward on several occasions since the 1990s, but they have
always been rejected by the GRU and other military branches that operate special task forces. Various plans to merge all the Russian special operations forces
controlled by the MoD are still put forward from time to time. For example,
in 2013 the commander of the Airborne Troops, Gen. Vladimir Shamanov,
proposed that SOF, the Airborne Troops (VDV) and spetsnaz brigades should
be merged under a solitary “fifth” mobile forces command, on par with the
four military districts that become strategic commands in a time of war.6 That
proposal, however, would be extremely costly to implement and even more
importantly, it would be resisted by the GRU and other agencies. Nevertheless,
the status of SOF Command is quite likely to undergo certain changes in the
near future as its role and position within the MoD settles. For now though, it
is quite obvious that SOF Command is not a Russian equivalent of America’s
SOCOM. In terms of its structure and mission, it is more similar to the Pentagon’s 1st SFOD‑D (Delta Force) counterterrorism unit, Germany’s KSK, or
Russia’s own Alpha Group of the Special Purpose Center under the FSB.
Besides, Russian military leadership is not in any great hurry to merge
special reconnaissance forces (spetsnaz brigades and the Navy’s reconnaissance stations, the 45th VDV Spetsnaz Regiment, and other army spetsnaz
units) with the newly created SOF. And the reasons for that are not entirely
bureaucratic, as these outfits do in fact have different purposes. Also, spetsnaz
brigades cannot operate independently; they are combat support units, and
their mission is to conduct special reconnaissance behind enemy lines in support of operations conducted by the army (or frontline) command. SOF units,
on the other hand, are proper combat units themselves and can operate indeExcerpt from Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (Second Edition).
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The Creation of Russian Special Operations Forces
127
pendently. They are ready for rapid deployment across a spectrum of counterterrorism and combat missions, on Russian territory and abroad. Additionally,
these forces are reserved for missions of special political importance.
The Nuts and Bolts of SOF – Creation,
Structure and Command
As mentioned above, SOF Command was established approximately three
years after the creation of the Special Operations Force itself, built around
Military Units 92154 and 99450. Substantiating evidence of this setup was an
order given by the Minister of Defense: officers of both units were receiving
additional, special duty pay on top of their regular pay.7 Adding to the speculation that these units were of a “special” class, in 2010, then president Dmitry
Medvedev visited both Units 92154 and 99450.8
There has been additional speculation concerning another possible SOF
component – Unit 01355. On August 31, 2011, the MoD order on additional
payments was amended to include officers of Military Unit 01355.9 There are
reasons to believe that Unit 01355 is another SOF combat unit; the Interfax
news agency reported the creation of that unit at the Kubinka‑2 settlement
near Moscow on March 15, 2013.10 The agency reported that the unit would
have 500 service personnel, and that it would achieve operational readiness
by late 2013. Unfortunately, no other information about the structure of
Unit 01355 has appeared in open sources.
Some information is available, however, concerning the structure of the
previously created Units 92154 and 99450. This information comes from publicly released documents on contracts “for construction and installation works
under the first phase of the development of Military Unit 92154,” including
works to be completed at “Military Compound 52/3 Senezh.” These documents
were posted to the government’s procurement website in 2012.11, 12 The cost of
the first phase of the project is 1.045 billion rubles. According to other documents posted on the Internet, the cost of the second phase of construction
works under the same project at Military Unit 92154 is worth 1.642 billion
rubles. These figures translate roughly to $75 million that were to be spent on
building the training center.
Documents dealing with the first phase of the construction of Military
Unit 92154 suggest that the unit is the Special Operations Forces Center or
command element. This element includes a division designated as УСО (USO),
which most likely denotes Управление Специальных Операций – Special
Operations Directorate. According to procurement documentation for the
No. 92154 “combat” unit, this unit has an airborne landing hardware service,
a diving service, an engineering service, and NBC protection service, and an
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