Aheadofhertime?ReflectionsonSusanStrange’s
contributionstocontemporarypoliticaleconomy
SusanK.Sell
GeorgeWashingtonUniversity
[email protected]
Commentswelcome!
PreparedforPrincetonWorkshoponSusanStrange’sLegacy,Princeton,January
10thand11th,2014
Abstract:
SusanStrange’sanalysisofpoliticaleconomywasdistinctiveinitstime.She
pioneeredthecontemporarypoliticalanalysisofglobalfinancialmarkets,and
warnedusmanyyearsagoofthedangersof“casinocapitalism”and“madmoney”.
NormativepoliticaltheoryinformedStrange’sanalysisofpoliticaleconomyasshe
repeatedlyraisedthequestion:cuibono?(whobenefits?).Furthermore,shebucked
state‐centricanalytictrendstorevealafarmorecomplicatedworldofnumerous
andoftenpowerfulnon‐stateagentsshapingglobalpolitics.Strangerejectedthe“‐
isms”approach(thenliberalism,realism,andMarxism)infavoroftryingtogetthe
analysisrightempirically.Likerealists,shetookpowerseriously.Unlikerealistsshe
examinedpowerbeyondthestate.LikeMarxists,sheexpressedconcernsabout
inequity.UnlikeMarxistsshedidnotfocusonclasses.Likeliberals,shetookmarkets
seriously.Yetsheemphasizedtheneedtounderstandtheinteractionbetween
statesandmarkets,andhowmarketsreflectedfundamentallypoliticaldynamics.
Anticipatingtherecent“pragmatic”and“practice”turnsininternationalrelations
theoryshestrivedtomakeherresearchrelevantfortheworld,ratherthanonlyfor
politicalscientists.Inthemidstofourcurrentglobalfinancialcrisis,itistimelyto
reflectontheapproachandtheinsightsthatSusanStrangeprovided.Itisworth
consideringtheseasapossiblewayforwardforanalysisandprescription.This
paperwillexaminetheseaspectsofSusanStrange’sintellectuallegacyanddiscuss
theirrelevancefortoday.
Introduction
SusanStrange’sanalysisofpoliticaleconomywasdistinctiveinitstime.She
pioneeredthecontemporarypoliticalanalysisofglobalfinancialmarkets,and
warnedusmanyyearsagoofthedangersof“casinocapitalism”and“madmoney”.1
InlightofboththeAsianfinancialcrisisof1994andthe2008OECDblowout,itis
clearthatshewasontosomethingconsequential.
Shesternlycriticizedunbridledmarketpowerandfavoredregulationandsocial
controlofmarkets.Ratherthanbeingsurprisedbypanics,crashes,andvolatilityin
financialmarkets,shefullyexpectedthese.Sheunderstoodthattheywerebakedin
thecake.Shearguedthatmarketswerenotself‐regulatingandthatpoliticalchoices
constructedthem.InthissensesheresuscitatedKarlPolanyi’sastuteanalysisofthe
socialembedded‐nessofmarkets,andthedangersofthedisarticulationofmarkets
andsociety.2Strangehighlightedthesymbiosisofthepoliticalsystemofstatesand
theeconomicsystemofmarkets.3ShebemoanedtheirresponsibleuseofAmerican
economicpowerandtheUnitedStates’government’sabdicationofresponsibility
formanagingandcontrollingfinancialmarkets.
NormativepoliticaltheoryinformedStrange’sanalysisofpoliticaleconomyasshe
repeatedlyraisedthequestion:cuibono?(Whobenefits?).Whilemainstreamtheory
wasimplicitlynormative(despiteassertionstothecontrary),Strangewas
refreshinglyopenabouthernormativeconcerns.Herprovocativeirreverence
rankledsome,butherworkinspiredmanyscholarswhosharedherconcernsabout
responsibilityandaccountability.4
Furthermore,shebuckedstate‐centricanalytictrendstorevealafarmore
complicatedworldofnumerousandoftenpowerfulnon‐stateagentsshapingglobal
2
politics.Strangerejectedthe“‐isms”approach(thenliberalism,realism,and
Marxism)infavoroftryingtogettheanalysisempiricallyright.Likerealists,she
tookpowerseriously.Unlikerealistssheexaminedpowerbeyondthestate.She
eschewedtherealistontologyofstatesinfavorofamorepluralistone,andanalyzed
aworldmadeupofstates,firms,sectors,internationalbusinesscivilizationand
have‐nots.LikeMarxists,sheexpressedconcernsaboutinequity.UnlikeMarxists
shedidnotfocusonclasses.RatherthantheMarxistemphasisoncapital
accumulation,Strangeinsistedthatthecreationandcontrolofcreditconstitutedthe
coreofthecapitalistsystem.Likeliberals,shetookmarketsseriously.Yetshe
emphasizedtheneedtounderstandtheinteractionbetweenstatesandmarkets,
andhowmarketsreflectedfundamentallypoliticaldynamics.Sherejectedthe
analyticseparationofstatesandmarkets.AsRogerToozepointsout,shecameto
seeherworkasoutsideofthemainstreamandcriticalinapproach.5Shewasaharsh
criticofmainstreamAmericaninternationalpoliticaleconomythatsheregardedas
narrowandpronetofads.
Anticipatingtherecent“pragmatic”6and“practice”7turnsininternationalrelations
theory,sheendeavoredtomakeherresearchrelevantfortheworldratherthan
onlyforscholars.Inthemidstofourcurrentglobalfinancialcrisis,itistimelyto
reflectontheapproachandinsightsthatSusanStrangeprovidedandtoconsider
theseasapossiblewayforwardforanalysisandprescription.Thispaperwill
examinetheseaspectsofSusanStrange’sintellectuallegacyanddiscusstheir
relevancefortoday.
Thepaperproceedsinfoursections.First,itbrieflysituatesStrange’sscholarshipin
thestateofthefieldwhenshewaswriting.Second,itdiscussestheimportanceof
keeping“cuibono?”attheforefrontofinternationalpoliticaleconomyanalysis.
Third,itunderscorestheprescienceofherattentiontonon‐stateactorsandher
resistancetothe“‐isms”thatdominatedinternationalpoliticaleconomyanalysisin
the1980sandearly1990s.Finally,itsituatesherscholarshipincontemporary
trendsinthestudyofinternationalpoliticaleconomy.
3
SettingtheStage:MainstreamIPEinSusanStrange’sTime
DuringtheColdWarAmericanneo‐realistKennethWaltzarguedthattheworldwas
anarchicandthatthedistributionofcapabilitiesacrossstateswasthemost
analyticallyfruitfulwaytothinkabouttheinternationalsystem.8Anarchysimply
meanttheabsenceofworldgovernment.Thisperspectivehasremainedinfluential
andhasinformedmainstreamAmericanscholarshiponinternationalcooperation.
Studiesof“cooperationunderanarchy”haveinformedmuchofthecontemporary
scholarshiponinternationalinstitutions,internationalpoliticaleconomy,andglobal
governance.9
Inthe1980sinternationalrelationsscholarsfocusedoninternationalregimes.
Prominentscholarsdefinedtheseas:“institutionspossessingnorms,decisionrules,
andprocedureswhichfacilitateaconvergenceofexpectations.”10StephenKrasner’s
editedvolumeonregimes11featuredanalyticvariety.Realists,constructivists,and
functionalistsallweighedinonthesourcesandcontoursofinternational
cooperation.12Realistsfocusedonpower,constructivistsonideasandidentity,and
functionalistsoninstitutions.
However,RobertKeohane’srationalistfunctionalismcametodominatethe
literatureoncooperationandinternationalinstitutions.Imbuedwithamarket
perspective,Keohoanefocusedon“supply”and“demand.”Keohanearguedthat
despiteanarchy,statescooperatedbecauseinstitutionsprovidedbenefitstothem.
Internationalinstitutionsreducedtransactioncosts,providedinformation,and,if
welldesigned,discouragedcheatingandfreeriding.Thereafter,literatureon
institutions,internationalregimes,andinternationalorganizationsdominated
mainstreamAmericanscholarshiponinternationalcooperationandinternational
politicaleconomy.Interstatedynamics,treatymakingandinternationallaw
occupiedmuchoftheanalyticterraininstudiesofglobalgovernance.
4
ProducedduringaneraoftheperceivedhegemonicdeclineoftheUnitedStatesin
the1980s,Keohane’sanalysisforegroundedstabilityasthechiefnormativevalue.
Whilenotself‐consciouslynormative,thenormativeunderpinningsofhisanalysis
werestark.ThequestionwashowtheUnitedStatescouldmaintainits“benign”
hegemonywhilelosingpowerrelativetootherstates.Manyrelatedanalyseswere
statistandfunctionalist.Theyfocusedonstructuresorformsofcooperationand
downplayedboththecontestationandthepoliticsanimatinginternational
relationships.Bothpowerandpoliticsseemedtodisappearintheseaccounts.They
exhibitedastaticconservativebiasintendedtopreserveaparticularUS‐led
internationalorder.SusanStrangeofferedatrenchantcritiqueofthisapproach,
pointingoutitsinherentnormativebias,itspreoccupationwithstasis,andthelimits
ofitsstate‐centricparadigm.13
Subsequentdevelopmentofthisstrandoftheorizingaddressedquestionsof
institutionaldesign,suchasmembershipanddecision‐rules.14Amplescholarshipon
globalgovernancehasfocusedonforms,orstructuresofgovernance.15This
literaturehasfocusedonintergovernmentalinteractionsandtechnocratic,
managerial,approachestoglobalgovernance.Thislineofworkimplicitlyassumed
thatinternationalcooperationandglobalgovernancewereinherentlygood.
Cooperationwasgood;morecooperationwasbetter.Governancewasgood;more
governancewasbetter.Evenanalystsofsub‐stateactorscoordinatingacross
bordersemphasizedabenign,managerialstyleofgovernance.16AsRonenPalan
argues:
Theresultsaretheoriesofformwithoutsubstance.Regimetheoriesare
theoriesaboutcoordinationproblemsthatstatesarefacingwithno
particularreasonsorcauseforcoordinationbesidessomevaguenotionthat
thosestatesthatjoinregimeshaveareasonfordoingso.Regimetheory
supposedlytellsusabouttheimpactofcoordination,buthaslittletosay
aboutthesubstanceoftheregimeassuch.17
Manyscholarsfocusoninternationalorganizations,treatiesandinternationallaw,
yetthesegovernancefoundationsarebasedupon“thinstateconsent.”18For
5
instance,internationaltreatiesonlyrequirethatstatesagreetothem;“international
lawisagnosticonhowthisagreementwasreached(process),whoparticipatedin
itsestablishment(actors),whatformittakes(instrument)andwhatisactually
agreedon(substance.)”19
Notonlydidthisrationalistfunctionalistapproachsaylittleaboutsubstance,it
providedlittleinsightintowhoseneedswerebeingmetbygovernance
arrangements.20
Cuibono?Whobenefits?
Internationalpoliticsislargelyaboutwhogetswhat,whobenefits,howcostsand
benefitsaredistributed,whopaysadjustmentcosts,andcontestationoverallof
these.21Bydownplayingthesecentralissuesthefunctionalistapproachfailedto
addresssomeofthemorecontestedelementsofinternationalpoliticaleconomy.
SusanStrangeemphasizedthesefundamentallypoliticalaspectsthatthe
mainstreamanalystsofformoversubstancetendedtoobscure.Byasking“cui
bono?”Strangeinvitedanalyststothinkaboutthedistributiveconsequencesof
policychoicesandintroducedanexplicitnormativeanalysis.
Inthiswaysheencouragedanalyststothinkaboutwhethercurrentarrangements
werethebest,andwho’sinteresttheybestserved.Thispavedthewayforanalysts
topayasmuchattentiontothesubstanceofdeliberationsastheyhavetothe
institutionalformsanddecisionrules.Thissuggeststhatthesubstanceofpolicies,
ratherthaninstitutionalforms,demandanalysis.Totheextentthatpoliciesare
contestedorresistedordefied,someone’sinterestsremainunaddressed.That
“someone”mightnotfindgovernancearrangementstobelegitimate.AsManuela
Moschellasuggests:
Legitimacyismorethanapropertythatglobaleconomicgovernancecan
acquirethroughinstitutionalreforms,suchasdecision‐makingand
governancereforms.Rather,legitimacyisaninter‐subjectivebeliefabout
6
howandwhytogoverntheworldeconomyanditistherebydependentona
collectiveaudiencetobesustainedovertime(2009).22
Legitimacyisasocialrelationship;tobelegitimateistobe“sociallyrecognizedas
rightful”23bythoseoverwhomglobalgovernorsclaimauthority.Thisimmediately
raisesthornynormativeissues.AsRegineKreideasks,“Whatnormativedemands
musttransnationalgovernancecomplywith?Andwhenistransnationalgovernance
legitimate?”24
Manyscholarshavetriedtoderivechecklistsofcriteriaforlegitimacythatare
derivedfromdemocratictheory,andthenappliedtothegloballevel.Yetcritics
pointoutthatexantecheckliststendtobeahistoricalandinattentivetosocial
context.25Forinstancealegitimateparticipationnormdidnotalwaysinclude
women;oneshouldexpectlegitimacytovaryaccordingtoculturalandsocial
context.DanielMuggearguesthat,“assessmentsoflegitimacyhavetofocusonthe
actualworkingsofinstitutions,notonformalflowsofauthority,informationand
accountability.”26
Thisconcernwithsubstanceoverformunderscoresthefactthatlegitimacyisnot
static;itinvolvescontinualinteractionbetweengovernorsandthegoverned.As
StevenBernsteinpointsout,“whatconstituteslegitimacyresultsfromaninteraction
ofthecommunityofactorsaffectedbytheregulatoryinstitution,i.e.thepublicwho
grantlegitimacy,withbroaderinstitutionalizednorms–orsocialstructure‐that
prevailintherelevantissuearea.”27
IndevelopingamoredynamicwayofthinkingaboutlegitimacyCalliessand
Zumbasenarguethatitisimplausibletoseparate,“thespherewhereofficial
authoritiesdecideoverlawornon‐lawfromthesocietalsphereinwhichthe
relevantactorsrecognizelegalnorms,bytheauthoritythesenormsexerciseover
theirlivesoractions.”28Authority,procedureandsubstancemaponto“actors”,
“processes”and“outputs”aswellastothebenchmarkofthickstakeholder
7
consensus.29Pauwelynandhiscolleaguesendorseproceduralintegrityrootedin
checksandbalancesthatexaminethefollowingthreeelements:“(i)thesource,
respectabilityofthenorm‐creatingbody,(ii)transparency,opennessandneutrality
inthenorm’sproceduralelaborationand(iii)thesubstantivequality,consistency
andoverallacceptance(consensus)ofthenorm.”30CalliessandZumbasenpropose
a“roughconsensusandrunningcode”approachtogovernance.The“rough
consensus”appliestothefrontendofthepolicyprocessandwouldfeature,“exante
controls(suchassettingaclearmandateorbenchmarkagainstwhichactorscanbe
heldaccountable;guidelines;appointments;orrulesonconflictsofinterest)andex
postcontrols(suchasre‐adjustmentofguidelines;financialaccountabilityor
complaintmechanisms).”31
Thuslegitimacymightbetterbeconceptualizedasanongoingprocessof
legitimation.Asaprocess,oneimportantcriterionforlegitimacywouldbethe
extenttowhichpolicy,oroutput,isopentocontestation.32Thisisanimportant
criterionthatcouldaddresstheflexibilityandresponsivenessthatglobalgovernors
andthegovernedneedtohave.Manyissuesinglobalgovernance,suchas
intellectualproperty,finance,andtheenvironmentexhibitahugediscrepancy
betweenthenarrowrepresentationandtechnicalfocusofglobalgovernorsandthe
hugesocietalfootprintofthesepolicyareas.33
Oneprominentapproachtothinkingaboutlegitimacyandsupranational
governancecomesfromtheEuropeanUnionliterature;FritzScharpfhasfocusedon
“input”and“output”legitimacy.34Briefly,inputlegitimacyreferstoparticipation
andrepresentationintheprocessofdefiningpolicygoalsandoutputlegitimacy
referstothetranslationofthesegoalsintopolicy.35Whilecomplicationsof
participationandrepresentationwerediscussedabove,outputlegitimacyraisesa
differentsetofchallenges.Distributionaloutcomesmatterandareintimatelytiedto
thequestionoflegitimacy.36
8
Findingwaystorecognizeandinstitutionalizetheongoingprocessesoflegitimation
andinteractionofgovernancepolicieswithcommunities“ontheground”isa
worthwhilegoal.Thismighthelptoallowforadjustmentswhencommunities
whoseinterestswereneverconsideredwhendevisingthepolicyaresuddenly
deeplyaffected.Forinstance,theintellectualpropertyrulescametosharplyaffect
HIV/AIDSpatientsinthedevelopingworld.PerhapstheInternationalMonetary
Fundshouldlistentocitizenswhoexperienceausterityfirsthandaswellasthe
bankerswhomitseekstomakewhole.Globalgovernanceprocessesmusttryto
addresssuchunintendedconsequencesinasystematicway.
Highlightingrelationshipsbetweenthegovernorsandthegoverneddirectsour
attentiontocrucialconsiderationsofaccountability,representation,andlegitimacy.
Scholarswhododgeexplicitlynormativeissuesaboutsubstanceruntheriskof
“uncriticallyadoptingdominantnotionsofthe‘publicgood’thatpolicyshould
provide.”37
Notionsoflegitimacyareboundtochangeasthegovernedexperiencethebig
societalfootprintinunexpectedorunintendedways.Thisevolvingprocessrequires
anexplicitlynormativestatementof“legitimatesocialpurpose”38Focusingon
institutionallegitimacyaloneisinsufficient;analystsmustsquarelyfacethe
questionofsubstantivelegitimacy–whyisitthatonepolicyismoredesirablethan
another?39ThisbringsusbacktoSusanStrange’semphasisonwinnersandlosersin
governancecontests–cuibono?Whatsubstantivebenefitsdowewanttoachieve
andforwhom?Andhowshallwedoit?Distributionalconsequenceslieattheheart
ofcontestationoverglobalgovernance40andcannotbeignored.
Non‐stateactorsandresistingthe“‐isms”
Fourimportantdevelopmentsinthe1980sand1990spromptednewthinking
aboutinternationalcooperationandledscholarstoquestionthemainstreamstate‐
centricapproachtointernationalpoliticaleconomy.First,therapidpaceof
economicglobalizationmoretightlyconnectedpeopleacrossspaceandtime.This
9
triggeredshiftsinthinkingfromthelocalandnationalscalestotheglobalscale.
Second,economicprivatizationandderegulationincreasedthesocialpowerof
privateactors,especiallygloballyengagedmultinationalenterprisesandtitansof
globalfinance.Third,thedevelopmentofnewinformationandcommunication
technologiesradicallycompressedspaceandtime,andprovidedbothnew
opportunitiesforandconstraintsonconflictandcooperation.Fourth,theendofthe
ColdWarusheredinaperiodofrenewedcommitmenttoandoptimismabout
internationalcooperation.InresponsetothesedevelopmentsSusanStrange
exploredanalyticterritorythatsoughttobettercapturethesemomentouschanges.
Strangehighlightedthewaysinwhichglobalizationstrainedstatecapacity.She
revealedthepoorfitbetweenasystemofterritoriallybasedsovereignstatesand
rapidprocessesofglobalizationthatbothoverwhelmedandunderminedthat
system.Newlyconnectednetworksofactorsbothdisaggregatedandtranscended
thestate.Sheemphasizedtheincreasinglyprominentrolethatprivateactorswere
playingandexpressedconcernthatstateswerelosingcontrolofmarkets.41As
Strangeargued:
Wehavetoescapeandresistthestate‐centrisminherentintheanalysisof
conventionalinternationalrelations.Thestudyofglobalizationhasto
embracethestudyofthebehavioroffirmsnolessthanotherformsof
politicalauthority.Internationalpoliticaleconomyhastoberecombined
withcomparativepoliticaleconomyatthesub‐stateaswellasthestate
level.42
Strange’sworkinspiredsubstantialscholarshipontheprominentroleofnon‐state
actorsandprivateauthorityinglobalgovernance.AsStrangeoncecommentedupon
theworkofRobertCox,“Booksthatmarkturningpointsinperceptionsof
internationalaffairs,thatsucceedinredirectingthoughtandargumentinquitenew
directions,arerareindeed.”43Her1996book,TheRetreatoftheStateofferedarich
researchagendathatinspiredamuchbroaderandmorethicklypopulated
conceptionofinternationalpoliticaleconomy.
10
Inthe1990sanalystssuchasA.ClaireCutler,VirginiaHaufler,TonyPorter,Thomas
Biersteker,RodneyHall,MargaretKeckandKathrynSikkinkestablishedthe
prominenceofavarietyofnon‐stateactorsinglobalgovernance.44Theyhighlighted
theproliferationofpotentialgovernors,rangingfrombusinessfirms,social
movements,andnon‐governmentalorganizations(NGOs).Scholarsbegantolook
moredeeplyintowhogovernstheglobeandbegantoanalyzetheagencyofglobal
governors.“Globalgovernorsareauthoritieswhoexercisepoweracrossbordersfor
purposesofaffectingpolicy.Governorsthuscreateissues,setagendas,establishand
implementrulesorprograms,andevaluateand/oradjudicateoutcomes.”45Global
governorscanbeNGOs,civilsocietycampaigns,experts,intergovernmental
organizations,states,regulators,judges,lobbyists,businessfirms,andhybrid
networksblendingmultipletypesofactors.
JoostPauwelynandhiscolleagueshavenotedtheincreasingstagnationof
internationallawandthesimultaneousemergenceofnewactors,newoutputsand
newprocessesthathaveledtoamuchbroaderrangeofgovernancepractices.46
Manyglobalgovernorsoperateinthespacebetweenthinstateconsentand“thick
stakeholder”consensus.47Sovereignstatesarejustoneconstituency.Stakeholders
includetherulemakers,thegovernors,andtheruletakers,thegoverned.More
informalprocesses,non‐stateactors,andnetworksthatstriveformorerobust,or
thick,stakeholderconsensusareedgingoutthetraditionalstate‐centricmodesof
globalgovernance.Globalizationhasstrainedmoretraditionalgovernance
mechanisms.AsJoostPauwelynandhiscolleaguespointout:
Thestateremainsapivotalentityofinterestaggregation,legitimationand
control.Yetitissupplemented,assisted,correctedandcontinuously
challengedbyavarietyofotheractorsbetheyregulators,nationaland
internationalagencies,citymayors,businessesorNGOswhocanmake
cooperationnotonlymorelegitimatebutalsomoreeffective.48
11
Hybridcoalitionsandnetworksofstateandnon‐stateactorshaveemergedas
prominentsourcesofglobalgovernanceandregulatorychange.
Strange’sconcernwithequityandthehave‐notsinspiredmorecriticalscholarswho
wereinterestedinthedevelopingworld.Apartfromdependencytheory,
internationalpoliticaleconomyhadonlyasmallhandfulofanalystsconcernedwith
development.RogerHansen,RobertRothstein,AlbertHirshman,PeterEvans,Craig
Murphy,StephenKrasnerandThomasBiersteker49stoodoutinthisregard.In1996
MaryDurfeeandJamesRosenausurveyedtenyearsoftheleadinginternational
relationsjournalsandfoundthattheword“poverty”wasmentionedonlytwice;
theyconcludedthat“mainstreamtheoristshavehadvirtuallynothingtoofferonthe
subjectofpoverty.”50Thisneglectwasastonishinggiventhefactthatwellover80%
oftheworld’spopulationlivesonlessthan$10aday.Mainstreaminternational
politicaleconomyremainedexclusivelypreoccupiedwiththeOECDcountriesand
offeredverylittletoscholarsinterestedindevelopment.
SusanStrangeandContemporaryIPE
Notsurprisingly,scholarsarestillgrapplingwiththecoreissuesthatSusan
Strange’sscholarshipaddressed.Thethreebigfailuresthatsheidentifiedin1998
haveonlygottenworse:
Failuretomanageandcontrolthefinancialsystem;failuretoactforthe
protectionoftheenvironment;failuretopreserveasocio‐economicbalance
betweentherichandthepoor,thepowerfulandtheweak.TheWestfailure
systemisthusfailingCapitalism,thePlanetandglobal(andnational)civil
society.51
Asmanyanalystshavepointedout,thegulfbetweentheAmericanmainstreamand
theso‐called“British”schoolremains.52SinceStrange’stimeamoreexplicit
toleranceoftheoreticalpluralismandpragmatismininternationalrelations
12
scholarshiphasemerged.Strange’sskepticismofgrandtheoryandhereclectic
approachthatdefiedthe“isms”categorizationwouldfitcomfortablywithinthis
nascenttrend.Avarietyofanalyticbridge‐buildingandinterdisciplinaryexercises
inmiddlerangetheoryareunderway.53
Ofcoursenoteveryoneembracesthiscallfortheoreticalpluralism,asisevident
withtheOpenEconomyPoliticsapproach.54Scholarsinterestedinpolicyrelevant
researcharelessenamoredofOEPthanothers,formanyofthesamereasonsthat
SusanStrangefoundthe1980smainstreamscholarshipwanting.55Attheendofthe
dayscholarsofinternationalpoliticaleconomymaynotneedtochoosewhetherthe
fieldshouldbedefinedbyitssubject,asSusanStrangesuggested,orbyits
methodologicalcommitments,asDavidLakehasurged.56Onepressingdangeris
dogmatism;theworldwillalwaysfindawaytohumbleus.Amorepromising
orientationcomesfromFrankeandWeber:
Viewingdifferenttheoriesasdifferenttoolsandinstrumentsfor
dealingwiththesocialworldwouldthusmakepossibledifferentresearch
agendasanddesigns,perhapsnotsomuchconcernedwithshowingthata
giventheoryiswrongperse,butwithargumentsthatitisnotofmuchuse
whenappliedforthepurposextoaproblematicsituationy,wherethisor
thattheorymightbeofmoreuse.57
Paradigm“wars”ininternationalrelationstheoryhavenotalwaysbeenthemost
productivewaystogetonwiththebusinessofunderstandingandexplaining
importantaspectsoftheworld.
Thisalsoraisesimportantquestionsaboutone’sintendedordesiredaudienceand
motivationsforscholarship.Individualscholarshavevariedmotivations,leaving
asidethesubstantialsocializingeffectsofnavigatingthetenureandpromotion
process.Doesoneseektomakeanameforone’sselfinthefield,ortotrytomake
theworldabetterplace?Ifitistheformer,onemightbewritingforanaudienceof
fellowacademicsperiod.Ionceaskedacolleaguewhathismotivationforwriting
was,andhetoldmethathewantedthehandfuloftoppeopleinthefieldtoreadhis
13
work.Ifoneseekstohaveone’sscholarshipberelevantintheworldonewould
presumablywriteforabroaderaudience,asSusanStrangedid.Shemanagedto
achievebothgoalsasaprominentacademicwhoseworkwas(andisstill)widely
read.WhenthemostrecentfinancialcrisishitIimmediatelythoughtofhowshe
hadwarnedusaboutthisyearsago.
Strangewasacriticaltheorist,(butnotinapost‐modernsense),insofarasshetook
astrongnormativestandagainstprevailingtrendsininternationalpolitical
economybothinscholarshipandinfinancialmarkets.Inamemorableexchange
betweenWilliamWallaceandKenBooth,Wallacechargedthatcriticaltheorists
were“monks”withnothingtooffertodiplomats.58Boothcounteredthatcritical
theoristswerespeakingtoapracticalaudience,butadifferentoneofcivilsociety,
activists,socialmovements,includingsomeactorsingovernmentswhowere
workingforabetterworld.59Strange’sworkspeakstothisaudienceaswell.
SusanStrangehighlightedtherichnessofinternationalpoliticaleconomyandits
historicalspecificity.Shepavedthewayforfuturescholarstoconsiderabroadand
deepmenuofsubjectsforanalysisandtobeself‐consciousandexplicitabouttheir
normativecommitments.Hercompellingconceptualizationsofstructuralpower
(finance,security,productionandknowledgestructures)haveremindedusthat
makingtherulesthatothersmustfollowhaslastingeffects.Theseparticular
structureshavebecomeonlymoreimportantasglobalizationhasproceededapace,
albeitunevenly,intheyearssinceshewrote.Asymmetricalpowerrelationships,the
state‐marketcondominium,60questionsoflegitimacyandcontestationover
substantiveissuesanddistributionaloutcomesremainsalienttodayandlieatthe
heartofinternationalpoliticaleconomy.SusanStrangeremainsaninvaluabletour
guideforthoseofusseekingtounderstand,explain,andhopingtoimproveit.
1SusanStrange,1997.CasinoCapitalism(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress);SusanStrange,
1998.MadMoney:WhenMarketsOutgrowGovernments(AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress).
14
2KarlPolanyi,2001.TheGreatTransformation:Thepoliticsandeconomicoriginsofourtime.(Boston:
BeaconPress).
3SusanStrange,“TheWestfailureSystem”,ReviewofInternationalStudies1999,25:348.
4Forexample,TimothySinclair’sworkoncreditratingagenciesreflectedmanyofStrange’sconcerns
aboutprivatesectoractorsgainingunprecedentedpoweroverstatesandmarkets.TimothySinclair,
2008.TheNewMastersofCapital:AmericanBondRatingAgenciesandthePoliticsofCreditworthiness
(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress).
5RogerTooze,2000.“SusanStrange,AcademicInternationalRelationsandtheStudyofInternational
PoliticalEconomy,”NewPoliticalEconomyv.5,no.2:1.
6JorgFriedrichsandFriedrichKratochwil,2009.“OnActingandKnowing:HowPragmatismCan
AdvanceInternationalRelationsResearchandMethodology,”InternationalOrganization63:701‐
731;UlrichFrankeandRalphWeber,2011.“AtthePapiniHotel:OnPragmatisminthestudyof
InternationalRelations”,EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations18(4):669‐691.
7EmmanuelAdlerandVincentPouliot,2011.“InternationalPractices,”InternationalTheory3:1‐36.
8KennethWaltz,1979.TheoryofInternationalPolitics(FULLCITE)
9
Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
10
Stephen Krasner, ed. International regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
11Ibid.
12PeterKatzenstein,RobertKeohane,andStephenKrasner,“InternationalOrganizationandthe
StudyofWorldPolitics,”InternationalOrganization52:4(1998):660.
13
Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis,” International Organization 36, no. 2
(1982): 479-498.
14
Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, eds., The rational design of international
institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
15
Jonathan Koppell, World rule: accountability, legitimacy, and the design of global governance,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
16
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A new world order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
17
Ronen Palan, “Cave! Alius Draco: There was a sixth dragon!” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/21/cave-
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15
18
Joost Pauwelyn, Ramsel Wessel, and Jan Wouters, 2012. “The Stagnation of International Law”,
Working Paper No. 97 (October): 12.
19Ibid:
20.
20DeborahAvant,
Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, “Who governs the globe?” in Avant, Finnemore
and Sell eds., Who governs the globe?(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 7.
21HaroldLaswell,1964;GETFULLCITE
22ManuelaMoschella,2009.“WhenIdeasFailtoInfluencePolicyOutcomes:OrderlyLiberalization
andtheInternationalMonetaryFund,”ReviewofInternationalPoliticalEconomy16(5):854‐882.
23Bartelson,2010:219,emphasisinoriginal.
24RegineKreide,“Theambivalenceofjuridification.Onlegitimategovernanceintheinternational
context.”GlobalJustice:Theory,PracticeandRhetoric2:2009:19.
25StevenBernstein,“Legitimacyinintergovernmentalandnon‐stateglobalgovernance,”Reviewof
InternationalPoliticalEconomy18:1(2011):42.
26DanielMugge,2011,“LimitsofLegitimacyandthePrimacyofPoliticsinFinancialGovernance,”
ReviewofInternationalPoliticalEconomy18(1):54.
27Bernstein,2011:19.
28Gralf‐PeterCalliessandPeerZumbansen,2012:RoughConsensusandRunningCode:aTheoryof
TransnationalPrivateLaw(Oxford:HartPublishing):129.
29Pauwelynet.al.,2012:34.
30Ibid.33.
31Ibid.25.
32JensBartelson,2010.“BeyondDemocraticLegitimacy:GlobalGovernanceandthePromotionof
Liberty,”inChristerJonssonandJonasTallbergeds.,TransnationalActorsinGlobalGovernance:
Patterns,Explanations,andImplications(N.Y.:PalgraveMacmillan,2010):220;IanClark,2007.
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33Mugge,2011:68.
16
34FritzScharpf,GoverninginEurope:effectiveanddemocratic?(Oxford,UK:OxfordUniversityPress,
1999).
35Mugge,2011:57.
36GeoffreyUnderhill,2003.“States,MarketsandGovernanceforEmergingMarketEconomies:
PrivateInterests,thePublicGoodandtheLegitimacyoftheDevelopmentProcess,”International
Affairs79(4):779.
37Mugge,2011:68.
38JohnRuggie,“Internationalregimes,transactions,andchange:Embeddedliberalisminthepostwar
economicorder,”InternationalOrganization36:2(1982):379‐415.
39Mugge,2011:68.
40CalliessandZumbasen,2010:111.
41SusanStrange,JohnStopfordandJohnHenly,1991.RivalStates,RivalFirms:CompetitionforWorld
MarketShares(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress);SusanStrange,1996.TheRetreatofthe
State:TheDiffusionofPowerintheWorldEconomy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).
42SusanStrange,1999.“TheWestfailureSystem,”ReviewofInternationalStudies,25:354.
43SusanStrange,quotedinAnthonyLeysens,2008.TheCriticalTheoryofRobertCox:Fugitiveor
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44A.ClaireCutler,VirginiaHaufler,TonyPortereds.,Privateauthorityandinternationalaffairs
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45
Avant,FinnemoreandSelleds.,(2010):2.
46Pauwelynet.al.,2012:13.
47Ibid.
48Pauwelynet.al.,2012:11.
49Citetheirworkshere
17
50MaryDurfeeandJamesRosenau,1996.“PlayingCatch‐up:InternationalRelationsTheoryand
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51SusanStrange,1999.“TheWestfailureSystem,”ReviewofInternationalStudies35:345.
52CitespecialissueofR.I.P.E.(2009)here:16(1).
53PeterandErnstHaas,2002.“PragmaticConstructivismandtheStudyofInternationalInstitutions,”
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54Checkel,2012,223;DavidLake,2009.“OpenEconomyPolitics:ACriticalReview”,Reviewof
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55ThomasOatley,2011.“TheReductionistGamble:OpenEconomyPoliticsinaGlobalEconomy”
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56RandallGermain,2009.“The‘American’SchoolofIPE?ADissentingView”ReviewofInternational
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57FrankeandWeber,2011:686.
58WilliamWallace,1996.“TruthandPower,MonksandTechnocrats:TheoryandPracticein
InternationalRelations”ReviewofInternationalStudies22(3):301‐321;KenBooth,1997.
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59NicholasRenggerandBenWhite,2007.“StillCriticalafteralltheseyears?Thepast,presentand
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60Underhill,2003:757.
18