Semi-presidentialism in Francophone Africa: Is it working?
Sophia Moestrup, Ph.D., National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)
Paper presented at the International Political Science Association’s 20th World Congress
Fukuoka, Japan, July 9-13, 2006
Introduction
This paper will address the issue of how well young semi-presidential democracies are
working in Francophone Africa, where semi-presidentialism has been the privileged
constitutional choice. 1 The 1958 constitution of the French Vth Republic with its 1962
amendment introducing direct elections of the president, has served as a natural blueprint for
many of the current constitutions in the region.
In theoretical debates, the jury is still out as to the likely effect of semipresidentialism on young democracies: is it a help or a hindrance for democratic survival? 2
Duverger (1997) and Sartori (1997) argue that semi-presidentialism has inherent qualities that
serve a young democracy well, as the existence of a dual executive in theory addresses some
of the rigidities found in presidential systems. It is argued that semi-presidential systems are
better equipped to weather situations of divided government, where the president is not
backed by a parliamentary majority, as executive power then shifts to the prime minister. On
the other hand, critics of semi-presidentialism like Linz (1997) and Stepan and Suleiman
(1995) argue that it is a regime type that is even more gridlock prone than presidential
systems, given the possibility of “cohabitation” between a president and a prime minister
from opposite political camps.
1
In the present paper I follow Robert Elgie who defines semi-presidentialism as “the situation where a popularly
elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament”
(Elgie 1999c, 13). For a brief overview of the debates surrounding the definition of semi-presidentialism, see
Moestrup (2005).
2
I will discuss democratic survival in lieu of democratic “consolidation.” As pointed out by O’Donnell (1996),
existing definitions of democratic consolidation in the democratization literature tend to be either teleological,
tautological or both. A consolidated democracy is generally simply one that has not been overturned yet.
Francophone Africa provides an excellent setting for taking a closer look at how
semi-presidentialism is actually working in a number of young democracies. Though very
diverse in ethnic composition, geography, resource endowments, literacy rates etc.,
Francophone African countries share a common colonial history that left significant political
imprints. I am here referring to the territories of the former administrative federations of
French West and Equatorial Africa. 3 Political elites were socialized to the French political
system and some became elected as representatives to the legislature of the IVth French
Republic and even served as cabinet members. After independence in 1960, Francophone
Africa maintained close political, economic, cultural and security ties to France, as evidenced
through the holding of periodic conferences of Francophone leaders; France’s continued
backing of the currency of the zone (the Franc CFA); 4 regular meetings of the cultural
organization La Francophonie; and France’s repeated military interventions in local conflicts,
most recently in support of President Déby in Chad. 5
The workings of semi-presidentialism in a number of young democracies in the region
will be analyzed through a process of structured focused comparison (George 1979):
structured because the same questions will be asked of each case, and focused because
limited to those questions perceived as relevant for the purposes of the present inquiry. The
aim is to uncover the political processes at work, to help determine whether semipresidentialism has indeed played a facilitating or a hindering role for the survival of young
democracies in the region.
3
Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) and Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF). AOF included: Mauritania,
Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta), Benin (former Dahomey), and Niger;
with Togo having status as UN trust territory. AEF included: Chad, Central African Republic (former UbanguiShari), Gabon, and Congo Brazzaville (former French Congo); with Cameroon having status as UN trust
territory. The former French colony of Madagascar was incorporated along with the AEF and AOF territories
into the French Union in 1946, and has since maintained close ties with France and its former colonial
territories; Madagascar will therefore be included in the present discussion of Francophone Africa.
4
Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine.
5
For more on the commonalities linking Francophone Africa together and “making valid comparative analysis
possible,” see Le Vine (2005, 2-5).
2
Semi-presidentialism in Francophone Africa has had a mixed record. Of the six young
democracies discussed in the following, three have survived while three have broken down at
one point or another. While the young Malian democracy is thriving, the difficulties
encountered in countries like Niger and Madagascar in managing intra-executive conflict
illustrate that semi-presidentialism does not by itself enhance political flexibility. In Niger,
political gridlock provided the opportunity for a military coup, in 1996. In Madagascar,
conflict between president and prime minister culminated in 1998 with a constitutional
amendment giving the president the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister.
One of the major finding of this paper is that semi-presidentialism tends to hinder the
chances of survival of young democracies having undergone a conflict-ridden transition to
democracy. Political flexibility is a precondition for semi-presidentialism to work rather than
an institutionally derived outcome. This is a somewhat paradoxical finding, given that semipresidentialism may often appear particularly attractive to key political actors in a country
undergoing a difficult democratic transition, as it allows for power-sharing at the top of the
executive.
In the following, I start by giving a brief overview of the process of democratic
transition in Francophone Africa in the 1990s, followed by an outline of salient provisions in
the semi-presidential constitutions that were adopted by young electoral democracies in the
region during this period. This is followed by a section presenting and discussing the actual
performance of semi-presidentialism in our sample of countries, comparing and contrasting
the experience of countries where democracy survived with that of countries where it did not.
Major findings are summarized in the conclusion.
The process of democratic transition
Of the 15 Francophone African countries listed above, only seven went through a process of
political transition during the late 1980s and early 1990s so extensive as to culminate with at
3
least one set of free and fair elections. 6 These are: Benin, Central African Republic, Congo
Brazzaville, Mali, Madagascar, Niger, and Senegal. These countries all at one point achieved
the status of “electoral democracy” following Freedom House’s definition, 7 even if
democracy did not subsequently survive in all seven.
Of these seven, Benin opted for a presidential system and will therefore not be
included in the present analysis. Congo Brazzaville changed its regime form from semipresidential to presidential in 2002, and its short-lived experiment as a young semipresidential democracy will be included in the discussion below. In the remaining eight
countries, though there have been attempts at political reform pushed from below (e.g. Gabon
and Togo) or constitutional reforms initiated by incumbent leaders (e.g. Cameroon and
Burkina Faso), political developments have so far fallen short of resulting in a democratic
transition.
Of the six semi-presidential young democracies established in Francophone Africa in
the early 1990s, three have survived so far (Madagascar, Mali and Senegal), while three have
broken down (Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville and Niger). Democracy has since
been restored in Niger (1999) and the Central African Republic (2005), bringing the current
number of electoral semi-presidential democracies in Francophone Africa to five.
6
The spread of democracy in Africa during this period was a result of several confluent processes: the fall of
communism in Eastern Europe which helped discredit Marxist-Leninist regimes in the region; abysmal
economic performance during a prolonged period of time leading to increasing popular pressure for change; and
rising donor pressure for political liberalization and economic reform in a post-cold war context.
7
Freedom House classifies as ‘electoral democracies’ countries satisfying the following criteria: “1) A
competitive, multiparty political system; 2) Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for
restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offenses); 3) Regularly
contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of
massive voter fraud that yields results that are unrepresentative of the public will; 4) Significant public access of
major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning.
The electoral democracy designation reflects a judgment about the last major national election or elections. …
The presence of certain irregularities during the electoral process does not automatically disqualify a country
from being designated an electoral democracy” (Freedom House 2005).
4
Table 1. Democratization in the 1990s in Francophone Africa
Country
Electoral
democracy
Break-down
of democracy
Benin
1991
no
Burkina Faso
no
Cameroon
no
Central African Republic
1993
yes
Chad
no
Congo Brazzaville
1992
yes#
Côte d'Ivoire
no
Gabon
no
Guinea
no
Madagascar
1992
no
Mali
1992
no
Mauritania
no
Niger
1993
yes
Senegal
2000
no
Togo
no
# Congo’s 1992 democratic regime was semi-presidential
Source: Freedom House (2006)
Freedom House Current regime
score 2005 8
(P=presidential,
SP=semi-pres.)
2F
P
4 PF
SP
6 NF
SP
4.5 PF
SP
5.5 NF
SP
5 PF
P
6 NF
P
5 PF
SP
5.5 NF
P
3 PF
SP
2F
SP
5 PF
SP
3 PF
SP
2.5 F
SP
5.5 NF
SP
Of these six semi-presidential young democracies, three (Congo Brazzaville, Mali and
Niger) became democratic following the holding of a “National Conference” modeled on the
Beninese example. 9 In the case of Madagascar, a widely representative “National Forum”
served as a constituent assembly, drawing up a new constitution which was subsequently
adopted by referendum. In the Central African Republic and Senegal, democratic change
came through elections, without the prior holding of some sort of national consultation
resulting in the adoption of a new constitution.
8
Average of political and civic liberties scores. Freedom House ranks countries scoring 1-2.5 as ‘free’ (F), 3-5
as ‘partly free’ (PF), and 5.5-7 as ‘not free’ (NF). A country can still be classified as an ‘electoral democracy,’
though it is ranked as ‘partly free’ (e.g. Madagascar).
9
For a general discussion of the holding of National Conferences as a distinctive African process of political
transition, see Bratton and Van de Walle (1997). Benin held the first of these Conferences, in 1990, and the
Beninese model was subsequently followed in 10 other countries. Some have argued that France played a
capital role in the Beninese transition, talking of “Paristrojka” (Raynal 1991, 24). Without doubt, the opinion of
France was solicited and played a certain role in the choice and design of a National Conference modeled on the
experience of the “Convention d’états généraux” of the French revolution (Robinson 1994). However, the
Conferences resulted in very different outcomes, reflecting differences in local political context.
5
Both in Congo Brazzaville and Niger, the National Conference was a truly
revolutionary process, where the participants declared the Conference to be “sovereign” and
replaced the incumbent president (Sassou Nguesso in Congo and Ali Saibou in Niger) with a
new transitional government (Clark 1997; Moestrup 1999). The transitional government
subsequently oversaw the drafting and adoption by referendum of a new constitution and the
holding of presidential and legislative elections. In Mali, on the contrary, the Conference had
limited autonomy. It was stage-managed by the transitional government established following
a coup against former dictator Moussa Traore in March 1991, and presided over by the coupleader, lieutenant-colonel Amadou Toumani Touré. The transitional government, with both
civilian and military members, had overseen the drafting of a new constitutional text, which
was then submitted to the National Conference for adoption (Clark 1995). In Madagascar, the
National Forum was set up following a prior compromise between incumbent President
Ratsiraka and opposition forces, resulting in the establishment of a transitional government
(Africa Report 1992). In other words, while the transition and adoption of a new democratic
constitution was forced through from below in Congo Brazzaville and Niger, it was the result
of a prior compromise in Mali and Madagascar.
In the Central African Republic, President Kolingba tried to control political reform
by refusing the holding of a sovereign National Conference, while allowing for constitutional
changes introducing a semi-presidential regime and multipartism. A last ditch attempt on
Kolingba’s side to subvert the 1993 presidential elections was opposed by France, and AngeFelix Patassé was elected president in a second round of elections, under the watchful eye of
the French government with 1,400 troops stationed in the country (O’Toole 1997, 118-119).
In contrast, the elections that brought democracy to Senegal in 2000 were free and fair not
under external pressure, but as a product of a gradual process of political liberalization over
the 1980s and 1990s (Le Vine 2005, 259).
6
To conclude this brief overview of the transition process through which democracy
was introduced in these six semi-presidential Francophone countries, it is interesting to note
that in the three countries where democracy was the result of compromise or gradual
liberalization, democracy has so far survived (Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal). In the
remaining three countries, where democracy either came about through pressure from below
or from the outside resulting in the ousting of incumbents, democracy was at some point
overturned (the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, and Niger).
Constitutional provisions and electoral law
The constitutions that came to govern the six young semi-presidential democracies discussed
here, 10 share the fundamental common element of a dual executive, with a directly elected
president and a prime minister accountable to parliament (though Congo Brazzaville in 2002
switched to a presidential system). In all the constitutions there are provisions for
parliament’s ability to dismiss the government through a vote of no confidence; similarly, the
constitutional texts provide for the president’s power to dissolve parliament. Interestingly, the
length of the presidential mandate is now the same for all of the countries (five years) with a
maximum of two terms, except in Madagascar where three terms are allowed (the Central
African Republic 1994 constitution provided for three six year terms which changed to two
five year terms in 2004). 11
There are, however, important differences between these constitutions in terms of the
relative distribution of powers between the president, the prime minister, and the legislature.
And it is interesting to note some of the changes that have been made over time following
constitutional revisions in individual countries (Central African Republic, Madagascar, Niger,
and Senegal). The specific relations to be discussed in the following include: the president’s
10
The constitutions to be discussed in the following are: the Central African Republic (1994 and 2004), Congo
Brazzaville (1992), Madagascar (1992, amended in 1995 and 1998), Mali (1992), Niger (1992 and 1999), and
Senegal (1963 with 1998 amendments, and 2001). Appendix 1 provides references to where the full text of these
constitutions can be found.
11
The new presidential constitution in Congo Brazzaville provides, however, for two seven-year terms.
7
role in appointing and dismissing the prime minister; the president’s agenda setting and vetopowers; and the procedures surrounding votes of no-confidence and the dissolution of
parliament. Annex 2 provides a summary of these relationships.
Shugart and Carey (1992) first argued for the need to subdivide semi-presidential
regimes into two categories, premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes, given
the distinct differences in authority patterns between the two. Shugart (2005) has further
elaborated on this distinction and classifies a number of countries into premier-presidential
and president-parliamentary systems, depending on whether the president has discretion to
dismiss the prime minister: the president can unilaterally decide to dismiss the prime minister
in president-parliamentary systems, but not in premier-presidential systems. 12 The risk for
democratic break-down should be larger in president-parliamentary systems, given the more
presidential nature of the system (Elgie 2005). In our Francophone African sample, based on
a reading of the constitutional texts, we find that the president cannot dismiss the prime
minister at his own initiative in Mali, Niger and according to the 1992 constitutions in Congo
and Madagascar; but he can in Senegal, the Central African Republic and the revised 1998
Malagasy constitution.
While all the constitutions have the president formally appointing the prime minister,
there are some important qualifications to these powers in some of the constitutions. The
Malian, Nigerien 1992, and Senegalese constitutions simply state that the president appoints
the prime minister. Both the 1994 and 2004 Central African constitutions add that the prime
minister must subsequently submit his government’s program to parliamentary approval, at
which point parliament may topple the newly appointed government through a vote of no
12
An issue here is that it may require an interpretation of the constitutional text to determine whether indeed the
president does have discretion to dismiss the prime minister – there is thus room for ambiguity, as Shugart
(2005) admits. For example, while Shugart (2005) classifies Senegal as premier-presidential, I find that both the
1998 revised constitution and the 2001 constitution should be classified as president-presidential, as it is clearly
stated that “The President appoints and dismisses the prime minister” (art. 43 and 48, respectively), without
special provisions for the conditions under which the prime minister may be dismissed.
8
confidence. Congo’s 1992 constitution specifies that the president appoints a prime minister
who has been previously approved by a parliamentary majority, while the Malagasy 1992
constitution went as far as saying that the prime minister is elected by a parliamentary
majority. In Niger and Madagascar, where disagreements ensued between president and
parliament over the appointment of the prime minister, subsequent changes to the
constitutional text went in opposite directions: strengthening the role of the president in
Madagascar (where the constitution now after the 1998 amendment simply states that the
president appoints the prime minister), while weakening that of the president in Niger (who
now appoints the prime minister from a list of three names submitted by parliament). 13
With regards to agenda setting powers, the president presides over the Council of
Ministers according to all the constitutions discussed here. In addition, the Central African
Constitution of 1994, the Senegalese constitution in both its 1998 and 2001 versions, as well
as the Malagasy 1998 amended constitution, specify that the president determines national
policy which the prime minister then implements. In the 2004 Central African Constitution,
the provision was softened to giving the president the prerogative of deciding the “outline of
national policy.” In the 1999 Nigerien constitution, based on the experience of conflict
between president and prime minister over agenda-setting for Council of Minister meetings
where national policy is formulated, it is now stipulated that the president and prime minister
must agree on the agenda.
Concerning legislative initiative, the Malagasy, Central African and Senegalese
constitutions give the right to initiate laws to both president and government, as well as the
legislature (though the provision for presidential legislative initiative is eliminated from the
2001 Senegalese constitution); in the Malian, Nigerien and Congolese constitutions,
legislative initiative is given only to the government (prime minister and cabinet) and the
13
Interestingly, the 1995 amendment to the Malagasy constitution had introduced a similar provision.
9
legislature. Veto-powers also vary across constitutions. The Central African and the 1992
Nigerien constitution require a two thirds majority vote to overturn a veto, and the Senegalese
constitution a three fifths legislative majority. While the Congolese and Malagasy
constitutions give the president no veto powers, the Malian and 1999 Nigerien constitutions
require a simple majority of parliament to overturn a presidential veto.
Finally, with regards to the countervailing powers of the president to dissolve
parliament and of parliament to topple the government through a vote of no confidence, there
are also interesting variations. While the general pattern is for the president to be able to
dissolve parliament every 12 months, the 1992 Malagasy constitution restricted this right to
once every 18 months, and only after two previous instances of no-confidence vote in the
government (and then only at the request of the government). The Senegalese 1998 amended
constitution similarly required a previous vote of no-confidence to be passed in the
government. The 1999 Nigerien constitution now limits the president’s right to dissolve
parliament to once every 24 months, while the Senegalese 2001 constitution specifies that
parliament cannot be dissolved during the first two years of its term.
For votes of no confidence, the general pattern is that they must be supported by at
least one tenth of deputies to be brought forward, and then require a simple majority of
members of parliament to pass (Congo, Niger, and Senegal). In the Central African Republic,
the proposal for a censure vote must have the initial support of one third of deputies. The
required majority for a vote of no confidence to pass is increased to two thirds in Mali and in
the 1998 amended Malagasy constitutions (where the motion of no confidence must
moreover have the support of one half of the deputies to be tabled for a vote).
To sum up the variations in authority patterns and countervailing powers discussed
above, the constitutions that favor of the president the most are the Central African ones, the
Malagasy with 1998 amendments, and the Senegalese with 1998 amendments. All three can
10
be classified as president-parliamentary, following Shugart and Carey’s definition, and have
other provisions besides the ability of the president to dismiss the prime minister unilaterally
that reinforce the powers of the president vis-à-vis parliament and the government (though
the president has no veto-powers in Madagascar). It is also interesting to note that while the
Nigerien and Senegalese, and to a lesser extent the Central African constitution, over time
have been changed to decrease the president’s powers, in Madagascar, on the contrary, there
has been a consistent and considerable increase in presidential powers through the 1995 and
1998 revisions.
This discussion leaves no immediate clues as to the impact of authority structures on
the likelihood of survival of a young semi-presidential democracy. The risk of democratic
break-down does not seem to be greater in the more presidential constitutions: democracy has
survived thus far in Madagascar and Senegal, while it broke down in Congo Brazzaville, the
country with the semi-presidential constitution which arguably provided for the weakest
presidential powers.
Finally, a discussion of authority patterns and countervailing powers would be
incomplete without mentioning the electoral system. As Duverger (1980, 182-187) shows,
semi-presidential regimes in the developed world function very differently depending on
whether the president politically belongs to the legislative majority. If the president is
concomitantly the head of the parliamentary majority, the regime in practice becomes
presidential, with the president ruling through the prime minister. If not, the role of the
president may be limited to that of a controller. While a majoritarian electoral system tends to
reduce the number of parties in parliament, the opposite is true of systems of proportional
representation. The latter tend to promote the representation of smaller parties and contribute
to party system fragmentation (Duverger 1976), making it more unlikely for the president to
11
be backed by a majority-party in parliament and thereby increasing the chances of
cohabitation.
As can be seen from the table below, proportional representation has only been
adopted in Niger and Madagascar, and in both countries it did indeed lead to fractured
parliamentary majorities, contributing to government instability. Proportional representation
was abandoned in 1998 in Madagascar in favor of a mixed system, combining majoritarian
and proportional elements; in Niger, revisions in the electoral law in 1999, contributed to
making the system less proportional.
Table 2: Electoral systems in our six countries
Country
Electoral system
Central African Rep.
majoritarian
Congo Brazzaville
majoritarian
Madagascar
1993 - proportional;
1998 - mixed
Mali
majoritarian
Niger
proportional
Senegal
mixed
Source: African Elections Database
The effects of semi-presidentialism
So how has semi-presidentialism actually worked in our sample of six countries in
Francophone Africa? Has it contributed to democratic survival in Madagascar, Mali and
Senegal? Did it, on the contrary, contribute to democratic break-down in the Central African
Republic, Congo Brazzaville and Niger? Did the existence of a dual executive facilitate the
management of divided majorities, when the parliamentary majority did not coincide with the
majority having brought the president to power? Did power change easily from president to
prime minister in the event of cohabitation? Or did cohabitation, on the contrary, contribute
to democratic break-down? How well did presidents and prime ministers from the same
political majorities collaborate? These are crucial questions that will be addressed in the
following, where the discussion is divided into three parts, looking first at the “successful”
12
cases where democracy has so far survived, and then at the “unsuccessful” cases where the
young democracy broke down, though it may subsequently have been restored. Finally, the
findings are compared and discussed, in an attempt at answering the questions outlined
above.
Table 3: Human Development Indicators in our six countries
Country
2006
BreakPopulation GDP/capita
electoral
down of
2003
2003 (PPP
democracy
dem.
(million)
USD)
Central Afr.Rep.
Congo Brazza.
Madagascar
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Source: UNDP (2005)
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
3.9
3.8
17.6
12.7
13.1
11.1
1,089
965
809
994
835
1,648
Literacy
rate 2003
(% above
age 15)
49
83
71
19
14
39
Life
expect.
2003
(years)
39
52
55
48
44
56
As preliminary background information, table 3 above provides a picture of
differences in human development (measured in terms of GDP/capita, literacy levels and life
expectancy) between our six cases. As can be seen, democracy has so far survived in the
richest as well as the poorest country in the sample (Senegal and Madagascar). Democracy
has also survived in Mali, with a literacy rate of only 19%, but broke down in Congo
Brazzaville, with a literacy rate of 83%. There is no clear trend in the relationship between
life expectancy and democratic survival. And finally, small size does not seem to be a boon
for democracy, as democracy broke down both in the Central African Republic and Congo
Brazzaville, the two countries with the smallest populations.
Successful cases
It is interesting to note that in the three “successful” cases to be discussed here (Madagascar,
Mali, and Senegal), there have not been instances of cohabitation as yet, between a prime
minister and a president from opposite political camps. However, as shown by the following
brief overviews of political developments in these countries since their recent transition to
democracy, the relationship between the two executives has nonetheless not always been
13
smooth. In particular, the president may resent a prime minister from a coalition partner
(Madagascar), or even from his own party if the prime minister is seen as a political rival
(Mali and Senegal).
Madagascar: President Didier Ratsiraka, who had come to power in a coup in 1975,
negotiated an agreement with the opposition called the “Panorama Convention” signed on
October 31, 1991. This agreement maintained Ratsiraka as head of state, though he had to
relinquish most of his powers to a transition government; Ratsiraka was also allowed to run
in the 1993 presidential elections which, however, he lost to opposition leader Albert Zafy.
That same year, the opposition coalition “Hery Velona” which had supported the candidacy
of Zafy won a majority in parliament (Marcus 2004, 2). This opposition was, however, a
fractious movement whose internal contradictions rapidly surfaced once it came to power.
Government instability and tensions between prime minister and president ensued,
culminating in 1995 with Zafy’s calling for a referendum on a constitutional revision that
would allow the president greater influence in the appointment and dismissal of the prime
minister. The referendum passed. However, the following year, resentment over the
president’s move to replace Prime Minister Ravony, combined with accusations of
corruption, eventually lead to the impeachment of Zafy by parliament, upheld by the
Constitutional Court (ibid. 3). The 1996-97 presidential elections saw the come-back of
Ratsiraka as president, this time democratically elected.
The institutional framework had still not stabilized following the 1995 amendment to
the constitution. In 1998 Ratsiraka initiated a new amendment which again was adopted
through referendum. This amendment served to reinforce the president’s authority over the
prime minister and cabinet even further; gave him the right to dissolve parliament on his own
initiative; and included provisions for presidential appointment of one third of the members
of a newly created Senate (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005, 504). The electoral law was
14
also amended to introduce a mixed system in replacement of the previous system of
proportional representation. Ratsiraka proceeded to consolidate his power by gaining
majority support in parliament in the 1998 parliamentary elections.
Following a highly controversial presidential election in 2001, Ratsiraka unexpectedly
lost power to Marc Ravalomanana, a self-made businessman (Cornwell 2003). Backed by an
absolute majority in parliament for his party TIM since the 2002 legislative elections,
Ravalomanana has benefited from the strong presidential powers enshrined in the revised
constitution to rapidly consolidate his authority. He has kept the same prime minister,
Jacques Sylla, since 2002. In his critics’ view, Ravalomanana has used his powers to fuse
economic and political interests and power, appointing business partners to leading political
positions (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005, 508). Not surprisingly, tensions are again
arising as the December 2006 presidential elections approach, given the increasingly zerosum nature of Malagasy politics (UN IRIN 2006).
Mali: Following the end of the transition period and the adoption of a new
constitution in January 1992, Alpha Oumar Konaré, the leader of the ADEMA party that had
played an important role in the opposition to the regime of Moussa Traoré, was elected
president. ADEMA went on to win a comfortable majority in parliament. Though ADEMA
could have formed a one-party majoritarian government, Konaré privileged the inclusion of
other, smaller parties in cabinet formation (Askia 1995, 121).
Economic troubles and violent demonstrations contributed to government instability
during the first year and a half of the new democratic regime, with three cabinets in rapid
succession (Sborgi 1998, 450). The ability of Konaré to use his prime ministers as
“scapegoats” for the economic and political troubles the country was encountering may have
15
helped defuse tensions. 14 Eventually, the smaller coalition partners of ADEMA left the
cabinet in 1994, leaving the party alone at the helm of the government, and alone to assume
the responsibility of solving the intractable economic problems (Askia 1995, 123). Ibrahim
Keita was appointed prime minister in 1994, introducing a period of government stability;
Keita remained in place till February 2000 when he was dismissed due to his alleged
implication in a corruption scandal. Under Keita’s tenure, the prime minister’s office had at
times been seen “as a near rival in power of the presidency,” as Keita cumulated the double
offices as leader of ADEMA and as the head of government (Smith 2001, 76).
While a majoritarian electoral system may increase the chances of a one-party
majority, it cannot, of course, guarantee that internal conflict within the dominant party
and/or within the dual executive in a semi-presidential regime do not eventually undermine
the unity of the party. Despite the comfortable majority ADEMA enjoyed in parliament from
1992 to 2001, the party has suffered from internal divisions. The party practically imploded
in 2001 due to mutual accusations of corruption and deep disagreements over the selection of
the party’s candidate for the presidential elections, as Keita left the party and went on to
create his own, taking a number of ADEMA deputies with him (Boilley 2002, 174-75).
Former general Amadou Toumani Touré, one of the chief facilitators of the
democratic transition, won the presidential elections and took over power in June 2002 at the
end of Konaré’s second term. Touré does not have any formal party affiliation, and no single
party or coalition managed to win an absolute majority of seats in the July 2002
parliamentary elections. The current political situation has been characterized as one of
imperfect cohabitation (“cohabitation imparfaite”): a president faced with a parliament
without stable majority (Lissouck n.d., 9). In April 2004, Touré replaced one technocrat for
the other as prime minister.
14
Blondel (1992; 166, 169-70) argues that one of the advantages of semi-presidentialism in particular (and dual
leadership systems in general) is that it allows “the head of state to keep some distance apart from ‘ordinary’
politics.”
16
Senegal: Senegal had a long and protracted transition to democracy, culminating
with the election of Abdoulaye Wade as president in March 2000, replacing Abdou Diouf in
power since 1981 (Le Vine 2005, 205-206). Wade proceeded to nominate Moustapha Niasse
of the AFP party as prime minister, honoring inter-party agreements between members of the
coalition which had brought him to power. During the election campaign, Wade had
promised a new constitution, reducing presidential powers. Following his election, debates
over constitutional design ultimately resulted in the adoption of a new semi-presidential
constitution with only somewhat reduced presidential powers, compared to the 1962
constitution that had been amended in 1998 (Thomas and Sissokho 2005, 101).
Disagreements between Wade and Prime Minister Niasse over economic policies led
to Niasse stepping down in April 2001. The AFP became the major opposition party
following legislative elections later that month, where the remainder of the coalition backing
Wade won three quarters of the seats (Galvan 2001, 56). The large victory of Wade’s forces
was in part due to a revision of the electoral system which while maintaining a mixed system,
increased the number of seats allocated through plurality (Creevey et al. 2005, 488).
Wade proceeded to nominate Senegal’s first female prime minister, Madior Boye,
who was sacked in November 2002 as a result of a series of financial scandals and a deadly
ferry accident. She was replaced by Idrissa Seck, vice-president of the PDS, Wade’s party.
Seck went ahead and took on a more active governing role than had otherwise been the
practice in Senegal. Reports of rivalry between the prime minister and the president began to
emerge, and Seck came to be perceived as a possible presidential candidate and competitor to
Wade. Not surprisingly, Wade dismissed Seck in April 2004 and appointed a more malleable
technocrat, Macky Sall, to be Senegal’s fourth prime minister in as many years (afrol News
2004).
17
In July 2005 former Prime Minister Seck was arrested and imprisoned under
accusations of corruption and of threatening state security. He spent seven months in
detention till the security charges were dropped and he was released in February 2006. His
imprisonment led to fractions in the PDS, with a number of members breaking off to form a
party to support Seck (IRIN 2006). Seck has since gone on to declare his intention to run for
the presidency in 2007. In December 2005, the National Assembly voted to delay
parliamentary elections scheduled for 2006 till 2007, to coincide with presidential elections.
This will buy the PDS time to rally its troops. In the meantime, the arrests of other leading
opposition figures for shorter or longer periods of time have tarnished Wade’s democratic
credentials.
Unsuccessful cases
The “unsuccessful” cases to be discussed here are the Central African Republic, the Republic
of Congo, 15 and Niger. In all three cases, the military or armed militias (Congo Brazzaville)
have played a crucial role, arms trumping electoral outcomes and constitutional rules. In none
of the three cases did semi-presidentialism help instill a culture of negotiation and dialogue.
On the contrary, conflict between president and prime minister contributed to a coup in
Niger, while attempts at avoiding cohabitation led to armed confrontation in Congo
Brazzaville. In the Central African Republic, democracy survived as long as foreign
peacekeeping forces remained present.
Central African Republic: Presidential elections held in August-September 1993 under
the watchful eye of France led to the replacement of General Kolingba in power since 1981
by Ange-Félix Patassé, former prime minister and cabinet member under Bokassa and
subsequent opposition leader. A new constitution was adopted the following year that was
criticized by the opposition to Patassé for being too “presidential,” giving the president
15
Also called Congo Brazzaville, to distinguish it from its mighty neighbor the Democratic Republic of Congo
(former Zaire).
18
significant authority over the prime minister, and allowing for three six-year presidential
terms (O’Toole 1997, 118-121).
Patassé’s party, the MLPC, won only a relative majority of seats in the legislature and
had to form a coalition government. Threatened by a vote of no-confidence, Prime Minister
Jean-Luc Mandaba resigned in April 1995. Patassé was accused by the opposition of
privileging his own ethnic group, the Sara, ethnocentrism having characterized most of the
Central African Republic’s history both under colonial times and since independence. Patassé
appointed Gabriel Koyambounou of the Yakoma ethnic group (and member of the MLPC) as
new prime minister (ibid.).
The new prime minister only survived little more than a year in office, before being
replaced in short succession by two prime ministers from outside the MLPC, as Patassé
formed governments of national unity in response to three military mutinies in 1996 and
1997. These mutinies were driven both by material (salary arrears) and political grievances
(unequal treatment of military officers based on ethnic affiliation) and were put down by
French troops. An African peacekeeping force was deployed to Bangui in early 1997 and
subsequently replaced by a UN peace-keeping mission (the MINURCA) in 1998, which
remained in place till 2000, following Patassé’s reelection as president in 1999 (State Dept.
2006).
In May 2001, former President Kolingba and forces loyal to him within the army
made a putsch attempt which was put down with the help of Libyan forces. The Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces, François Bozize, was suspected of being in connivance with the rebels
and fired. This led to skirmishes between forces loyal to the government and supporters of
Bozize within the army. Bozize fled the country but returned to launch a coup attempt in
October 2002, and eventually he succeeded in ousting Patassé in March 2003 (ibid.).
19
General Bozize proclaimed himself president and mandated a National Transitional
Council with the elaboration of a new constitution (Freedom House 2004) which was adopted
in 2004. This new constitution reduced the length and number of presidential terms to two
five-year terms; it also reduced somewhat the president’s prerogatives for determining
national policy, in favor of increased powers for the prime minister. In 2005, Bozize was
elected president in free and fair elections, and the Central African Republic resumed its
status as electoral democracy (Freedom House 2006). Bozize proceeded to appoint a
technocrat from the African Development Bank, Elie Doté, as new prime minister.
Clearly, in the Central African Republic the political scene since the first transition to
democracy in 1993 has been dominated by the military as principal arbiter of politics (Le
Vine 2005, 290). A politicized military has been the locus of interethnic grievances and
conflicts, and the appointment of a prime minister of the Yakoma ethnic group in 1996 was
plainly insufficient to address these.
Republic of Congo: The national conference which took place in Brazzaville in FebruaryMarch 1991 stripped President Sassou-Nguesso, in power since 1979, of most of his powers,
and criticized him severely, some conference members going as far as calling for his arrest.
The subsequent transition government organized legislative and presidential elections in
June-July 1992, which Pascal Lissouba (a former prime minister) and his electoral alliance
won (Clark 1997, 68-71).
The coalition supporting Lissouba’s choice of prime minister quickly fell apart as
Sassou Nguesso’s party, the PCT (which had been part of this coalition), was dissatisfied
with only receiving three cabinet posts. The new parliamentary majority voted no-confidence
in the prime minister and his cabinet in September 1992. Lissouba retorted by dissolving the
legislature, which led to a severe political crisis as this move was declared illegitimate by the
20
opposition. 16 Eventually the military acted as mediator, prompting Lissouba to form a
government of national unity under a neutral prime minister (ibid. 72).
Parliamentary elections in May 1993 confirmed the previously observed ethnoregional distribution of votes, between the north (Sassou), the south-west (Lissouba) and the
south-east (Bernard Kolélas, the leader of the MCDDI party and runner up against Lissouba
in the presidential elections). Lissouba’s party and coalition partners won a majority of seats,
against widespread accusations of fraud by the opposition, leading to armed clashes between
militia groups supporting Lissouba, and Kolélas, respectively. 17 Relative peace only returned
in January 1994, as a result of a compromise in parliament (Eaton 2006, 50-52).
Reconciliatory measures continued throughout the year and in January 1995, Lissouba
formed a new government including members from Kolélas’ party. Sassou Nguesso,
however, remained alienated from the reconciliation process (Clark 1997, 75).
As the presidential elections of 1997 approached, Sassou’s popularity appeared on the
rise. Following confrontations between Sassou and Lissouba supporters, Lissouba ordered the
arrest of several key members of Sassou’s entourage, thus initiating an armed confrontation
which Sassou eventually won, with support of Angolan troops and the tacit backing of France
(Clark 2005, 134-135). 18 Lissouba fled into exile. After renewed fighting in 1998-1999,
Sassou has since consolidated his power through the adoption of a new, presidential
constitution in 2002 and flawed presidential elections that same year, which led to his
“election” for a seven-year mandate (renewable once).
16
Article 80 of the 1992 constitution states that: “When the equilibrium of the public institutions is interrupted
notably in the case of sharp and persistent crisis between the executive power and the Parliament, or if the
National Assembly overturns the Government two times in the time of one year, the President of the Republic
can, after consultation of the Prime Minister and the President of the National Assembly, pronounce the
dissolution of the National Assembly.”
17
During the 1993 electoral conflict, Sassou’s militia group, the “Cobras” largely remained on the sidelines,
though Sassou reportedly supplied Kolélas with arms (Magnusson and Clark 2005; 563, 568).
18
Lissouba had backed UNITA and concluded an agreement with an American oil company, much to the
displeasure of Luanda (IRIN 1997) and Paris (Clark 2005, 136). Sassou’s militia included officers retired from
the Congolese military in 1995 in a military restructuring aimed at ensuring greater ethnic balance within the
armed forces which had tended to be dominated by northerners (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999, 42).
21
The unwillingness of key political actors in Congo to compromise and abide by
electoral outcomes while preferring military solutions, undermined democracy in Congo
Brazzaville. In lieu of facilitating power-sharing, semi-presidentialism contributed to conflict,
as Lissouba refused to appoint a prime minister from the opposition once he lost the
parliamentary majority in 1992.
Niger: Opposition participants dominated the preparation and the conduct of the National
Conference, seeing it as “a strategy of regime change” (Robinson 1994, 603). The military
was abundantly criticized for its role in politics. At the end of the transition period,
Mahamane Ousmane, leader of the CDS, won the presidency, and the six-party coalition
supporting him won a slim majority in parliament.
Economic difficulties and social discontent quickly put a severe stress on the
governing coalition. In accordance with pre-election agreements, Ousmane had appointed
Mahamadou Issoufou, leader of the PNDS, as prime minister. Disagreements between
Ousmane and Issoufou over policy issues and the distribution of prerogatives between the
two executives, culminated with the prime minister stepping down in September 1994,
withdrawing his party from the coalition. The PNDS entered a new majority coalition with
the MNSD (the party that had governed the former one-party regime), and proceeded to
toppling the new government through a vote of no confidence (Issa Abdourhamane 1996, 1517). Ousmane dissolved parliament and called fresh legislative elections in January 1995 that
his coalition however lost, forcing him to appoint the Secretary General of the MNSD, Hama
Amadou, as the new prime minister (Africa Report 1995, 6-7).
A painful period of “cohabitation” ensued. Conflict centered around: control over the
political agenda; appointments in the local and central administration; and presidential vetoes
(Issa Abdourhamane 1996, 24-30). The central issue of contention was whether
“cohabitation” meant a shift in power from president to prime minister (as the majority
22
supporting the prime minister claimed); or whether it meant a co-management of power
between prime minister and president (as the president and his supporters claimed)
(Tankoano 1996, 93-96).
The stand-off between president and prime-minister seriously discredited the
democratic government and opened an opportunity for a military come-back. The military
took power in a coup on January 27, 1996, justifying its action with the supposed threat of a
civil war, though in the donor-community, few if any (including French diplomats) believed
that a civil war had been in the making. 19 The leader of the junta General Ibrahim Mainassara
Baré (former army chief of staff) proceeded to get himself elected in fraudulent presidential
elections in July 1996, after the adoption of a new presidential constitution. However, Baré’s
government was rapidly weakened by internal dissent in the army, fueled by competition over
access to public resources (Issa Abdourhamane 1999, 92). In April 1999, Baré was
assassinated by elements of the presidential guard, the leader of which, Major Dauda Mallam
Wanké, went ahead to organize a new democratic transition. This included the adoption of a
revised semi-presidential constitution that better clarifies the roles and responsibilities of
prime minister and president, notably in a situation of cohabitation.
Democracy returned to Niger with free and fair elections in October-November 1999.
Tandja Mamadou, the leader of the MNSD and a retired army Colonel, won the presidential
elections. The MNSD and the CDS (the two former arch-enemies during the fateful 1995
cohabitation) joined in a coalition and won an absolute majority of seats in the parliamentary
elections. Following pre-election agreements, former President Ousmane became chairman of
the National Assembly, while Hama Amadou became prime minister again (Di Lorenzo and
Sborgi 2001, 474-76). Since 1999, Niger has been characterized by a remarkable political
stability. Three attempted votes of no-confidence initiated by the PNDS and its allies in
19
Personal communications in Niamey with donor and diplomatic representatives, January and February 1996.
23
parliament have been unsuccessful. The 2004 presidential and legislative elections
reconfirmed the tandem Tandja-Hama Amadou as President and Prime Minister, respectively.
Discussion
What answers does the democratic experience of our six Francophone African cases provide
to the questions outlined at the beginning of this section?
Did semi-presidentialism help democracy survive in Madagascar, Mali and Senegal?
The ability of the president to dismiss prime ministers as “scapegoats” for the economic
hardships experienced immediately after the democratic transition may have helped the
young Malian democracy survive. This was possible because the president’s party ADEMA
controlled a majority in parliament - it would not have been possible in a situation of
cohabitation. So the argument could be made that semi-presidential young democracies that
avoid cohabitation stand a good chance of surviving. However, politics in Madagascar today
have become about as zero-sum as in any presidential regime, where the president controls a
majority in parliament, with the risks that that entails (a near civil war in Madagascar).
The successful cases illustrate that relations between president and prime minister
have not always been smooth, even though there was no cohabitation. We saw both in Mali
and Senegal that when the prime minister has a leading position within the same party as the
president, the two executives may easily become rivals, both in day-to-day business and
when elections approach. Such conflicts can moreover serve to split the ruling party, as has
happened both in Mali and Senegal. In Madagascar, the president resented a prime minister
from a coalition partner and proceeded to promote a referendum to increase the president’s
authority over the prime minister. Relations have tended to be smoother between presidents
and technocratic prime ministers without political ambitions (e.g. Senegal and Mali
currently).
24
What about the unsuccessful cases – can semi-presidentialism and cohabitation in
particular be blamed for the demise of democracy? It is of course difficult to argue that
institutions by themselves can “cause” democracy to collapse, in the presence of disloyal
armed forces (Niger), politicized militaries (Central African Republic), or resentful former
incumbents (Congo Brazzaville) – in other words, when democracy is opposed by those who
have the means of overturning the rules of the game, regardless of the specificities of those
rules, rules by themselves may matter very little. Nevertheless, it is also true that provisions
for a dual executive did not help in our three unsuccessful cases.
Power did not shift easily from president to prime minister, with shifting
parliamentary majorities. On the contrary, cohabitation or the fear thereof did contribute to
the break-down of democracy in Niger and Congo Brazzaville. Gridlock and the unsavory
spectacle of the president and prime minister competing for the perks of power in Niger,
provided the military with a golden opportunity to retake the reigns of power. In Congo
Brazzaville, Lissouba’s unwillingness to share executive power with a prime minister from
the opposition led him to dissolve parliament; the opposition questioned the legitimacy of this
move, leading to the first of a series of armed clashes between militias which eventually
culminated with Lissouba’s overthrow. The existence of a dual executive was not used by the
chief political actors as a venue for enhancing dialogue and negotiation.
In the Central African Republic, the real locus of political competition was in the
army, and the appointment of a prime minister from an ethnic group that felt disadvantaged
by military promotions was an insufficient palliative. This leads to a more general point,
namely that where the military has played an important role in politics (Central African
Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Mali, and Niger), particular consideration must be given to the
role played by the armed forces in the democratic transition (to gage whether the young
democracy can at least count on their tacit support) as well as the ability of civilian
25
authorities to manage civil-military relations. The new democratic authorities in Mali
carefully cultivated good relations with the military. Having been closely associated with the
highest echelons of power and the running of government for over 20 years, it was not
evident that the Malian army would easily return to its barracks (Champaud 1992, 3-4).
Conclusion
So how well has semi-presidentialism been working in Francophone Africa? Our analysis of
the democratic performance of six country cases from the region (Central African Republic,
Congo Brazzaville, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Senegal) provides an interesting composite
picture that allows us to provide some tentative answers.
Overall, it does not appear that a strong argument can be made for semipresidentialism having helped democracy survive in the three successful cases (Madagascar,
Mali and Senegal). Though these three countries avoided cohabitation, tensions within the
dual executive and political rivalry between president and prime minister contributed to the
dismissal of the latter. In Senegal and Mali, this ultimately resulted in the governing party
breaking apart. Semi-presidentialism does not appear to have survived this far in these three
countries because it was less “presidentialized:” both Senegal and Madagascar can today be
characterized as president-parliamentary systems, using Shugart and Carey’s (1992)
subdivision of semi-presidential systems. Unwillingness on the president’s part to share
power and authority over the appointment of the prime minister appears to have contributed
to making politics increasingly zero-sum in these two countries.
In the three unsuccessful cases where democracy broke down (Central African
Republic, Congo Brazzaville and Niger) former incumbents had remained on the sidelines
waiting for an opportunity to return to power. Semi-presidentialism contributed to providing
this opportunity both in Niger and Congo Brazzaville. In Niger, a conflict-ridden cohabitation
provided a semblance of legitimacy for a military coup, while unwillingness to accept
26
cohabitation led to armed clashes in Congo Brazzaville, culminating with the return to power
of the former dictator. In the Central African Republic, dissatisfaction within the army was
not appeased by prime ministerial appointments aimed at enhancing ethnic and political
balance.
Semi-presidentialism facilitates democratic transitions, but can be a difficult system to
handle subsequently, notably in the presence of divided majorities and if the transition
process was conflict-ridden. Taking this into consideration, it is interesting that young semipresidential democracies that have broken down tend to revert to semi-presidentialism upon
their return to democracy, as has been the case both in Niger and the Central African
Republic.
Fortunately, there is a process of democratic learning and adaptation taking place in
young democracies, including young semi-presidential ones, as the case of Niger illustrates.
Following the return to democracy in 1999, the semi-presidential constitution has been
adjusted to address some of the deficiencies that had contributed to gridlock. 20 The roles and
responsibilities of president and prime minister have been spelled out in greater detail,
particularly in the event of cohabitation. Though cohabitation has not happened again, the
institutional framework would now seem much better apt at coping with this eventuality,
particularly given a series of newly created institutions aimed at enhancing political dialogue
and mitigating conflict. This time around, there also seems to have been a greater consensus,
including within the army, for supporting the democratic transition. The longer-term
prospects for democratic survival are grimmer in the Central African Republic, where former
President Patassé remains excluded from the political process. Similarly, though democracy
has survived thus far in Senegal and Madagascar, there are worrying trends in both countries
towards power-concentration and exclusionary politics.
20
The return to semi-presidentialism in Niger is explained mainly by the fact that the interim authoritarian
regime of General Baré had opted for a presidential constitution, thereby largely discrediting presidentialism.
For more on Niger, see Moestrup (forthcoming).
27
The experience with semi-presidentialism in our six country sample thus far, indicates
that semi-presidentialism is a regime type that requires willingness to negotiate and openness
to power-sharing amongst key political actors in order to work, probably more so than other
regime forms. It is not a regime type that by itself enhances political flexibility. Similar
comparative studies of the performance of semi-presidentialism within other regions of the
world would provide an important complement to the above analysis, giving even more
nuanced insights on the actual workings of young semi-presidential democracies.
28
Appendix 1: Recent semi-presidential constitutions in young democracies in
Francophone Africa
Full text available in:
Central African Republic 1994: du Bois de Gaudusson et al. (1998), Vol. 2
Central African Republic 2004:
http://www.fodem.org/fodeminfo/CONSTITUTION%20FINAL.htm
Congo Brazzaville 1992: du Bois de Gaudusson et al. (1998), Vol. 1
Madagascar 1992 with 1995 amendment: du Bois de Gaudusson et al. (1998), Vol. 1
Madagascar with 1998 amendment: Malagasy Ministry of Justice,
http://www.justice.gov.mg/const1.htm
Mali 1992: du Bois de Gaudusson et al. (1998), Vol. 2
Niger 1992: Raynal (1993)
Niger 1999: Niger’s National Assembly, http://www.assemblee.ne/texteslegaux/cons99.htm
Senegal 1963 with 1998 amendments: du Bois de Gaudusson et al. (1998), Vol. 2
Senegal 2001: http://droit.francophonie.org/doc/html/sn/con/fr/2001/2001dfsncofr1.html
29
Appendix 2: Authority patterns and countervailing powers
Country
Appointment
of PM
President
may
dismiss
PM at his
discretion
yes
Central
African Rep.
appointed by
president,
legislature
must approve
of
government's
program
Congo
Brazzaville
president
appoints PM
approved by
parliamentary
majority
no
Madagascar
elected by
parliamentary
majority;
1995
amendment president can
appoint PM
from list of
three
candidates
submitted by
parliament;
1998
president
appoints PM
no/ 1998
yes
Agendasetting power
Veto-power
Dissolution
of
legislature
noconfiden
ce vote
legislative
initiative
President
presides over
Council of
Ministers and
sets the
agenda;
president
defines
national
policy which
is
implemented
by PM; 2004:
president
determines
outline of
national
policy
President
presides over
Council of
Ministers
2/3
legislative
majority
needed to
overturn
presidential
veto
once in 12
months
to be
proposed
by 1/3 of
deputies
president,
govt., and
parliament
no
once in 12
months
Govt. and
parliament
President
presides over
Council of
Ministers;
president
determines
national
policy
no
Once in 18
months at
the request
of the
government,
if two votes
of no
confidence
occur; 1998
- once in 12
months
to be
proposed
by 1/10
of
deputies,
not more
than
once
during
one
session
to be
proposed
by 1/5 of
deputies/
1998: 1/2
of
deputies,
approved
by 2/3
30
president,
govt., and
parliament
Mali
appointed by
president
no
President
presides over
Council of
Ministers
yes,
overturned
by simple
majority
once in 12
months
Niger
appointed by
president;
1999
constitution:
president
appoints PM
from list of
three
candidates
submitted by
parliament
appointed by
president
no
President
presides over
Council of
Ministers;
1999
constitution
stipulates
president and
PM must
agree on
agenda
President
presides over
Council of
Ministers;
determines
national
policy
2/3
legislative
majority
needed to
overturn
presidential
veto; 1999
constitution:
simple
majority
once in 12
months;
1999
constitutio
n: once in
24
months
overturned
by 3/5
legislative
majority
1998:
after vote
of noconfidenc
e, once in
12
months;
2001: not
during the
first two
years of
the
legislature
's
mandate
Senegal
yes
Source: see Appendix 1
31
to be
proposed
by 1/10 of
deputies
and
approved
by 2/3
majority,
not more
than once
during one
session
to be
proposed
by 1/10 of
deputies,
not more
than once
during one
session
to be
proposed
by 1/10 of
deputies,
not more
than once
during one
session
Govt. and
parliament
Govt. and
parliament
president,
(govt. in
2001) and
parliament
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