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Add Navy Destroyers, Not
Brigades to Deter Russia
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By Colin Reed
August 08, 2016
In 478 BC, formal delegations from all across the Greek world met on the small Aegean island of Delos. They had
just repelled an invasion by the greatest threat any of them could recall in their lifetimes – the Persian Empire – and
they were determined to cement the coalition that had enabled their victory into a formal, enduring, alliance. After
much negotiation about force contributions, yearly meetings, and all the other nuts and bolts of international
cooperation, the members gathered at the edge of the sea, and ceremonially cast iron ingots into the greenish­blue
surf. The ritual symbolized the intense commitment of the alliance, which would endure until the bars floated to the
surface.
To the many tiny island nations of the Aegean and coastal Asia Minor, it was more than a poetic gesture – it was a
very real commitment of mainland power Athens to their collective defense against a Persian threat which was, for
allies such as Lesbos and Chios, a next­door neighbor. The casting of the ingots committed Athens to projecting an
umbrella of power across an area unprecedented in size for the small city­state – and yet, that is exactly what
Athens accomplished over the next century, using strong naval forces capable of responding to diverse threats all
around the Aegean.
The US – and NATO – can learn valuable lessons from the
example of the Athenians. Much like Athens, the US faces the task of guaranteeing the security of an array of
smaller states, some of which are geographically positioned far from American shores but directly next to a powerful
and dominating adversary: Russia. Much like the Lesbos and Chios of 478 BC, the Baltic states themselves are all
too aware of their vulnerability, and look to NATO for their security. But while NATO remains ostensibly committed to
the defense of all of its members, troop numbers in the region indicate a different state of affairs. According to an
oft­cited recent RAND Study, Russia’s military capability in the Baltics and Eastern Europe is sufficient to all but
guarantee victory over NATO forces in a conventional warfare scenario.
In order to address this gap, commentators have called for force buildups in forward­postured positions throughout
the Baltics and Europe. The United States has largely heeded these calls – the President has increased
the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), the recently­concluded NATO meeting in Warsaw instituted a plan
to deploy 4 allied battalions in the Baltics and Poland, and Operation Atlantic Resolves continues to rotate air­strike
componentsthroughout the region.
The wisdom of this form of conventional balancing, however, has been called into question. Michael Kofman argues
atWar on the Rocks that Russia is unlikely to conventionally challenge NATO in the Baltics, given that such action
would be unlikely to address Russia’s current overarching national security goal – the removal of NATO from its
neighborhood. Even if Russia did invade the Baltic states conventionally, both Kofman and Major General Ralph S.
Clem argue that the geographic situation of the Baltics makes them almost indefensible. The overwhelming majority
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Clem argue that the geographic situation of the Baltics makes them almost indefensible. The overwhelming majority
of Baltic territory lies under Russian anti­access/area denial (A2/AD) bubbles extending from inside Kaliningrad, St.
Petersburg, and Belarus. These so­called bubbles incorporate detection, fire control, and both kinetic and non­
kinetic weapons in an attempt to prevent penetration of air, sea, or land­space by conventional military forces. No
reliable evidence presently exists indicating how American power projection would fare against these integrated
access denial systems. Russia and China have invested heavily in these systems nonetheless, indicating their
strong belief that such networks will be able to hold American power at arm’s length. Finally, the geography of the
Baltics is a harsh mistress for any conventional defense force. The furthest western point in Estonia is merely 220
miles from the Russian border, and only a tiny 60­mile gap separates the Russian military’s stronghold at
Kaliningrad from Russian client­state Belarus.
Taken together, these arguments paint a grim reality for forces attempting to defend the Baltic states from a
conventional Russian invasion. Because of its territorial advantages, Russia has the ability to overrun NATO
defenses while denying access to any reinforcements that might arrive in time. NATO planners seem to be
preparing to fight a delaying action in the Baltics, similar to their plans for a defense­in­depth of the famous Fulda
Gap. The Baltics are not, however, heartland Germany, and the nature of the geographic situation begins to make
them look far more like a different historical example – the Falaise Pocket. In the immediate aftermath of the Allied
breakout from Normandy, German forces became encircled by Allied forces. Hitler denied his field commander
permission to retreat, and as a result some 50,000 German soldiers became trapped and many were systematically
destroyed. NATO should fear this example – the more forces that NATO pours into the Baltic States, the more
forces it will find trapped within Russian A2/AD bubbles, in easy range of both land and air strike, with little in the
way of resupply or reinforcement. GivenAmerican overdependence on air superiority, fighting a high­end conflict
against superior Russian forces in an at­best contested aerial environment does not seem like a winning proposition
– especially given Russian superiority in conventional artillery systems.
Despite all of these challenges, NATO simply cannot do nothing in response to Russian posturing. Deterrence of
aggression against its members is the cornerstone upon which western military cooperation is built. Challenging
Russian parity – or even possibly superiority – in land and air forces in the Baltics is not, however, the best way to
accomplish this goal. Instead, sound strategy tells us to look to areas where we possess a comparative advantage
vis­à­vis our adversary – and when it comes to Russia, that advantage is the US Navy.
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The guided missile destroyer USS Milius (DDG 69) at sea. US Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Daniel
J. McLain.
During the Cold War, it was expected that allied forces in Europe would be pushed back by the weight of Soviet tank
divisions, fighting a delaying action until reinforcements from the continental US could arrive. The US Navy was
tasked with clearing and keeping open the Atlantic so that these troop convoys could successfully arrive. Relegated
as it was to this support role, the Navy never played a prominent part in contributing to AirLand battle war plans. As
Kofman points out, the RAND study seems to have rolled over many of the AirLand battle tenets into the
21st century, continuing the trend of forgetting about the US Navy in the contest with Russia.
Warfare in the Baltics, however, is not the same as warfare in the heartland of Germany, as it would take place in
close proximity to the sea – and in that domain the US has a significant advantage. Russian naval forces in the
Baltic are, like their naval forces elsewhere, heavily dependent on aging surface combatants complemented
by highly competent, quiet, small diesel submarines. NATO, meanwhile, can bring to bear a range of capabilities
and forces from the many nations surrounding the Baltics, as well as from US, UK, and French high­end forces.
In any conflict in the Baltic, American naval forces would offer a flexible, mobile tool for conducting long­range strike
missions into Russian A2/AD bubbles (with Tomahawk and similar missile systems) and with carrier aviation if the
environment permits. Granted, this capability would not come without danger to US systems­ Russian anti­ship
missile systems are quite good, on paper – but then no scenario of high –spectrum conflict between two of the
world’s strongest militaries will occur without significant casualties on both sides. Unlike forward based army­ or air­
forces, however, ships are not tied to bases within easy strike range of Russian missiles – they are mobile, and can
move in and out of zones of risk as situations change. This returns the initiative – presumably taken at the outset by
a surprise Russian invasion – to NATO commanders, who can choose the location and timing of their retaliatory
strikes, rather than committing to support particular forces on the ground. As matters currently stand, US Naval
Forces represent NATO’s primary comparative force advantage in the Baltics.
Aside from strictly military concerns, naval forces can also adequately address the issue of reassurance for our
allies in the region. Some might argue that having a mobile and non­regular force presence means sacrificing the
physical deterrent of forward based combat troops. But naval systems can be just as effective at demonstrating
resolve as land­based forces. Throughout history, ships have been used as symbols of state power, whether for
intimidation or reassurance. As large capital investments, the presence of a US Naval vessel in your harbor
indicates that the United States has a continuing interest in your affairs, for good or ill – $10 billion dollar vessels
don’t spend $7 million dollars a day to take pleasure cruises. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Russians
are any less deterred by naval forces than by land forces – indeed, given the particularly hostile response US naval
forces have received during their trips to the Baltics, it would seem that just the opposite is the case. Just about the
only role naval forces can’t play in the “conventional war in the Baltics” scenario is that of a tripwire, which many
cynically argue is the principle reason for NATO ground troops in the first place. But if this is the real reason for
forward­deployed troops, one company of special operation forces in Tallinn should prove an equally compelling
tripwire for war to a US army brigade, while reducing the daily cost to the taxpayer and reducing the overexposure
of US military systems.
Just as the Athenians dropped iron ingots into the sea to demonstrate their commitment to their allies, its time the
US turned back to the sea to deter Russia in Europe. The flashpoint in the new Cold War isn’t taking place in the
German heartland, anymore. Naval forces can’t fulfill every strategic mission, but at present they are being asked to
do NO strategic mission – future force planning for European deterrence should take into account the strengths that
the US Navy can bring to the table, while increasing the flexibility of NATO commanders to respond to diverse
Russian threats.
Colin Reed is a recent graduate of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He
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Colin Reed is a recent graduate of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He
received his undergraduate degrees in History and International Studies from North Carolina State University, where
he was a junior fellow in the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and presented thesis research on the
effectiveness of UCAV operations in Pakistan. He specializes in NATO­Russian relations, naval strategy, and
intelligence methods. He is currently employed as an operations analyst in the private sector.
This article originally appeared at Ramen IR.
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