5
K n N T T A N I r v t p E R A T r v EASN D
G n E E KV n L U E S
Paul Schollmeier
Ew pHILosopHERS
HAVEDoNEASMUCHto enhanceour understand_
ing of ancient moral value as has Arthur lil7.H. Adkins. His strategy
of analyzingwhat form and role responsibilityassumedin ancient
Greek societyespeciallypresentsmodern scholarsand studentsalike with
many insightsinto ancientmorality and its beliefs.'vhat I would like ro
do in the presentessayis to build upon this understandingoftheseancient
values.My purposewill be nor so much to increaseour understandingof
the ancientsbut rather to increaseour understandingof ourselves.In particular, I want to examineand to evaluatethe modern Kantian view of our
moral selves.
Without a doubt, Immanuel Kant has cast a very long shadow over
modern philosophy.This shadow is particularly deepin the field of moral
'we
philosophy.
almost always couch our discussionsof the most basic
moral problems in Kant's very terms. And we do so with good reason.
Kant clearlyinventedethicalconceprsthat haveenabledus ro improveour
understandingof ourselves.Nevertheless,thesevery conceptsas Kant employed them do have their limits, and theselimits have preventedus from
understandingourselvesevenbetter.
The Kantian conceptsmost influential are those of imperatives,both
categoricaland hypothetical. Theseconceptsare frequently usedto determine the nature of moral injunctions.The questionusually askedis, Are
moral imperatives categorical or hypothetical? The answer, whatever it
might be, relies with only rare exceptions not solely on Kant's definitions
of these imperatives but on his particular applications of them as well.2
Though loyalty to his theory is commendable, I want to suggest that
145
1 4 6/ P a u rS c H o L L M E I E R
Kant's specificationof his imperativesin application obscuresa moral position worthy of our consideration.
We may, I think, shed new light on the Kantian imperativesby returning to ancientGreek moral theory.For my evaluationof theseimperatives,
I propose to examine and to compare the concept of intrinsic value prer*t.d in Kant's moral theory with that presentedin Plato's and Aristotle's
theory. I thus intend to reversethe strategy of Adkins. My strategy will be
not to bring a modern moral concept to ancient Greek philosophy in order
to view it from a new perspectivebut rather to take a concept from the
ancient Greeks in order to gain a new perspectiveon modern moral philosophy.The result,I hope, will be a moral outlook as admirableas Kant's
in its essentialsbut as adroit as Aristotle'sin its applications.
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I, too, shall ask the usual questionabout moral imperatives,whether they
are categoricalor hypothetical.My answerwill be that moral imperatives
t0Veshall
are categoricalbut that theseimperativesneed not be Kantian.
indeed discover that categorical imperatives can take a variety of forms.
How many kinds there are dependson how we conceiveof the subjectof
moral imperatives,that is, on how we conceiveof ourselves.
But I want first to review our definitions of categoricaland hypothetical imperativesand then to examine our usual applicationsof thesedefinitions. We tend to follow Kant very closely in defining imperatives,and I
think that we are right to do so. We distinguish categorical from hypothetical imperativesby their ends. Both categoricaland hypotheticalimperativesexpresscommands.But a categoricalimperativecommands an
action as good for its own sake; a hypothetical imperative commands an
action as good for the sake of something else. In other words, the one
imperative requires an action as an end; the other requires an action as a
m e a n s( G r . 2 . 4 1 4 ) . 3
Examplesare ready to hand. Let us assumethat we have a moral obligation not to commit suicide.Suppose,then, that someoneis in deep
despairand no longer desiresto live. He in fact wishes to die (compare
Gr. r. 397-98).aIf he yet preservesit without caring for it, this poor person clearly preserveshis life merely for the sake of fulfilling an obligation
to do so (Gr. r. lgg-4ool. He can hardly preserveit for the sakeof satisfying a desire, for he has no desire to live. He thus acts for the sake of
lawfulnessitself (4or). Or, more precisel5this individual acts in accordance with a categorical imperative, for he conforms his action to a universal law solely for the sake of conforming to it. That is, he acts in such a
way that he can will his maxim to be a universallaw (4oz)'
But imagine someone with a strong desire to live-someone with a
K n N t t , r N l , r a r ne , q t r v E S
AND Gnrrr Yxtuts / 147
joie de uiure.lf he preserveshis life, this happy fellow in all likelihood acs
merely for the sake of satisfying his desire to live. This person seeksthe
pleasure that this satisfaction gives him. He thus follows a hypothetical
imperative, for he engagesin an action solely for the sake of its effects.
And he does not act for the sake of conforming to moral obligation itself.
His action does conform to a universal law, but it conforms for the sake
of pleasure(compareGn r . 397- 98).
Behind the Kantian distinction between categorical and hypothetical
imperatives lie two models of human acion. Behind the categorical imperative is an assumption that we ourselvesand our actions are essentially
rational.sAs rational beings,we can act in accordancewith our idea of a
law. \7e can do so only becausewe have a will, for our will is nothing
other than practicalreason,which enablesus ro deriveactionsfrom laws
'We
(Gr. z. 4rz-r3).
consequentlyseekwhat is objectivelygood, for we
use reasonto recognizethe good, and reasonis the samefor us all (4r3).
A different assumptionabout ourselvesand our actions lies behind
'We
the hypothetical imperative.
and our actions can also be irrational, for
we have a will which is fallible. Our will is not always in harmony with
moral law becauseit is exposedto subjectiveconditions.Theseconditions
are, in a word, our desires.6
And so we may act for the sakeof the pleasure
which fulfilling a desirecan give us (Gr. z.4rz-:'3). But pleasureinfluencesour will only through our senses.
Pleasureis thereforesubjective,for
the sensesare not the samefor everyone(4r3).
Considerour example again. The person who does nor care to live
acts out of sheer will power for the sake of acting in accordance with
moral law sincehe doesnot haveany desirefor life. His action essentially
conforms to moral law and henceis objective. The person with a desireto
live actsout of an inclination for the sakeof its pleasure.His action might
conform to moral law but only by accident.It is essentiallysubjective.
We may sum up by considering the Kantian concepr of a good will. A
categoricalimperativecommands an act of good will. An acrion of this
sort arisesfrom the will for the sake of its own activity (Gr. r . 397- 4oo).
A hypothetical imperative does not even command an act of will. Its
action arisesout of desirefor the sake of its satisfaction(seeGr. z. 413r4 n., where Kant distinguishesbetweena pracrical and a pathological
interest).
We thus follow Kant in defining categorical and hypothetical imperatives.\7e also tend to follow Kant in applying his definitions of imperatives, but I think that we are mistaken in doing so. Before I can show why
we are mistaken, I must first be clear about the Kantian application of
theseimperatives,especiallythe categorical.A good place for us ro begin is
in the middle of things with the secondformula of the categoricalimperative. The secondformula is probably the most popular with contemporary
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philosophers,though Kant himself commendsthe first (Gr. z. 435-37).
This formula will also be the eventual focus for my evaluation of the
imperative.
The second formula of the categorical imperative statesthat we must
act in such a way that we treat humanity in any personeveras an end and
never as a mere means(Gr. 2.429). Insufficientattention is paid, I think,
to the fact that this formulation rests on a supposition that something
existswhich is an end with absolutevalue in itself' This something,Kant
proclaims, is humanity itself: "Now I say: humanity and in generalany
rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means for the
arbitrary use of this or that will, but must in all its actions' both those
directedtoward itself and those directedtoward other rational beings,always be viewed at the sametime as an end" (Gr' 2.428).? As if to give it
special emphasis,Kant reiteratesthis assumption even more succinctly:
"The ground of this principle is: Rational nature existsas an end in itself
(Gr. z. 428-29).8 The principle referredto in this statementis of course
the categorical imperative. \7e would also note that rational nature is the
proper moral subject;human nature is only the proximate subiect(seeGr.
4 2 5 ,f o r e x a m p l e ) .
How doesthis assumptionyield a ground for the categoricalimperative? The assumption provides an obiective ground for the will in two
senses.An end valuablein itself 6rst of all providesan object for the will;
it is somethingthat the will can make its end. But the will also finds in this
end an objectiveprinciple. For an end of value in itself is the samefor all
humans and even all rational beings.Every rational being is by nature
absolutelyvaluablein itself (Gr. 2. 427 -28).e
A hypothetical imperative finds its ground in an end which is not absolutelyvaluablebut only relativelyvaluable.It has an end which is obiective in only one sense.Though not an oblect of the will, its end is an obiect
of impulse. Only in relation to a desirecan a hypothetical imperativecommand an action as a meansto another end. But this end is accordinglya
mere subjectiveprinciple, for its worth is relativeto the desireof a subiect
(Gr.2.427-28).
Considerour example again.A personwho doesnot commit suicide,
though sorely tempted, regards humanity in himself as an end of absolute
value.But someonewho commits suicideuseshis humanity as a meansto
another end of only relative value. Though he does not pursue pleasure,
he does seek to avoid pain by ending his life. The one person acts on the
second formulation of the categorical imperative; the other acts on a hypothetical imperative (Gr. z. 429).
So, humanity exists as an end in itself. \7e might now ask, Vhat is
this end in itself? Recall, now, that a categorical imperative commands an
K A N T I A INN a p t n n r l v A
EN
s DC R E r rV , r r u E /s 1 4 9
action as itself an end. But the second formula of the categorical imperative declaresthat we must treat our humanity as an end. Humanity would
thereforeappearto be an activity which is itselfan end. But what activity?
Presumably,a rational one. But, then, what rational activity is an end with
value in itself?
The first formula of the categoricalimperative tells us what this rarional activity is. This formula statesthat we must act only in such a way that
we can will our maxim to be a universallaw (Gr. z.4zr). Recall,again,
that a categoricalimperativecommandsan action as an end in itself. To
act so as to will a maxim to be a universal law would therefore be an
end in itself. Such an action is in fact an absoluteend, for universallaw
is unconditioned (4zo-zr). But the proximate absolute end is humanity, accordingto Kant. And so humanity is the activity of willing unrversal law.
A hypotheticalimperative,by contrast, aims only at an end conditioned by desire(Gr. z. 4zo- zr). And of courseits maxims are not moral
commandsbut merely rulesof skill or counselsof prudence(4r6-17).
Considerthe poor soul contemplatingsuicideone final time. By declining to commit suicide,this person acts so as to treat his maxim as a
universallaw. He thus takes as his end the activity of conforming his
maxim to lawfulness.And he regardsthis activity as absolute,for he is
without desire. He thus acts on the categorical imperative in its first formula. But someonewho commits suicidedoesnot treat his maxim as universal law. By ending his life, he acts on a rule of skill. Nor is his end
absolute;it is relativeto his desire.His action rhus resrson a hypothetical
imperative(seeGr. z. 4zt-zz).
The third formula confirms our inferenceabout the first two. Indeed.
this formula of the categoricalimperative,Kanr explicitly argues,sumsup
the first and the secondformulas (Gr. z. 43o-3r). It statesthat we musr
act in such a way that we treat humanity as having a will which makes
universallaw (see$o-3 r ). This formulation thus suggests
that we as well
as others exist as an end in ourselveswhen we are self-legislative.
In a
word, the only end of absoluteworth is self-legislation.ro
To conclude,I would like to point out how limited Kant's application
of his categoricalimperativeis. Kant recognizesonly one end which is
valuable in itself: a rational being or more proximately a human being.
lWhat makes such a creaturean end in itself is its rationality. But rationality itselfhas only one practicalfunction: the activity of making law for
its own sake.
Kant himself believesthat thesetwo limitations are in the nature of
things.He assertsthat through its proper nature a rational being is determined as an end in itself and thereforeas a legislator(Gr. z. 415-36).He
150 /
P , q . uS
LcHoLLMEIER
also statesthat the natural end of the human will is universallegislation
That would appear to be why Kant prefersthe first formula'
tilr-l).
*hi.h tt"t.t this function most explicitly'11
III
cateSoriI would now like to addressthe question,Are moral imperatives
but
categorical'
are
imperatives
Moral
is,
cal or hypothetical?My answer
Kantian
the
accept
I
shall
Kantian.
not
be
.ur.gori."l imperativei need
appli.onJ.ption of ih. ."t.gorical imperativebut reiect Kant's narrow
need
we
but
imperatives,
categoncal
on
act
cation of it. That is, we may
lye can act instead for the
law.
moral
making
solely for the sake of
no,
widen
sake".,of othei activities that haue uJue in themselves'We may thus
imperative'.
our applicationof the categorical
To show that we -"y *id.n our application,I shall first make explicit
and in Kant's
a distinction implicit in our discussionof moral imperatives
to the anat
once
us
back
takes
own discussionas well. This distinction
(Rep. z.
value
instrumental
and
cient Greeks:it is that betweenintrinsic
v
a
l
u ei f i t i s
i
n
t
r
i
n
s
i
c
h
a
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
A
n
; th. r.7. ro97a25-34)J2
l S z b - S Z dE
value if
instrumental
has
action
an
for the sate of-itself;
.nol..*ority
is
dancing
example'
For
else'
choiceworthy fo, the sake of something
the
even
dances,
ballroom
dances,
choiceworthyfor its own sake.country
intrinsicvalue.But we put on our dance
iinerbug, we can perform for their
Putting
,lipp.rr"io, the sake of somethingelse-for the sake of dancing.
slipperson has instrumentalvalue.
has inA categoricalimperativeobviously commands an action that
sake.
its
own
for
action
an
perform
trinsic valu"e,for it demandsthat we
to
According
law-making'
is
Kun, u.gu.r, as we haveseen'that this action
maxlm
a
on
act
must
we
the first formula of his categoricalimperative,
imperative
that we could will to be a universallaw. But a hypothetical
an
requires
it
for
value,
commands an action that has only instrumental
usuperson
a
sort
of
this
action for the sakeof somethingelse.An action
accordingto Kant'rl
ally
' pursuesfor the sakeof pleasure,
intrinsic
i.lo*, I can only ask, is making law the only activity with_
that
I
think
value?
value?And doeslaw-making have the highestintrinsic
the
not
is
making
Law
our answer to both questio"nsmust be negative'
intrinwith
action
only
action with the highestintrinsicvalue,nor is it the
value in themsic value. $ve may perform many other actions which have
senseof the
Greek
the
selves.These actions constitute our happiness in
which
activity
is
an
i..-. gy definition, happinessfor Plato and Aristotle
for
example'
is itself .nd lEtb. r.'i- ro98a:'6- t7; Rep'4' 4r9a- 4zrc'
"r,
activity for
though Plato simply urru-., what Aristotle asserts).And this
humanscan only be action (seeesp. Eth' z' r-z)'
Kerurrnn
IMpERATTvESC
, cnNr oer V n L u l s , /1 5 1
'We
can glean an indication of what theseintrinsically valuable activities are by glancing at some Aristotelian and Platonic virtues, for happinesson their account is an activity in accordancewith virtue (Eth. r.7.
r o 9 8 a t 6 - r 7 a n d E t b . 2 . 6 . t r o 6 b 3 6 - r r o T a z i s e eR e p . 4 . 4 z 7 a - 4 3 4 c
and 44tc-44zdl.to Happiness in the Greek sensepresentsits clearestexample in the activity of theoretical knowledge. To know theoretically is to
know for the sake of knowing. Aristotle is probably the most ardent proponent of pure scienceand its intrinsic value(Eth. ro. 7. rry7br-41.\le
must strain every nerve, he declares,in the pursuit of theoretical knowActivity of this kind is the best; it is the most
ing jr77b1r-tr78azl.
continuous, the most pleasant,and the most self-sufficient(rry7ar8t77br). Plato, of course, recognizesthe intrinsic value of pure knowledge,though he views it more as a dangerousdistraction.The guardians
of his ideal citn he argues,must study mathematicsand dialecticsespecially in order to develop and to understand models of their city lRep. 7.
he fearsthat
5zrc- 515a\.But so delightfulare thesestudiesin themselves,
his guardians will have to be coaxed and coerced, if necessary,to return
t o p o l i t i c a l i f e ( 5r 9 b - 5 z r b ) .
Though we do not always recognizethe fact, we, too, pursuescience
for its own sake.An astrophysicist,for example,does not seekto determine the nature of black holes for the sake of any application.There is
none, despite some fanciful claims to the contrary. He is determined to
account for the amount of matter in the universe. Nor does a particle
physicistsearchfor the missingquark for the sake of any possibleutility.
His purpose is to isolate the ultimate elementsof matter. On occasion, a
scientistmay arguethat his investigationswill ultimately issuein practical
applications. But theseapplications are of no real concern to him; they are
merely spinoffs,most often sought by others.
Practicalknowledgecan also be an end in itself. Plato takespleasure
in poking fun at those who pursue knowledge of this kind for it own sake.
He dubs them philodoxers becausethey confuse theoretical knowledge
with practical and pursue practical knowledge as if it had theoretical
value, These characters are the lovers of sights and sounds who seek
out every Dyonisiacfestival(ReP. S. 475d-48oal. Aristotle recognizesa
similar pursuit in a lessdisparagingmanner.He distinguishestheoretical
sharply from practical knowledge and identifies a virtue for this activity.
Understanding,he argues,is an ability to judge practical matterswithout
issuingcommands(Eth. 6. rc.).
'We
also enjoy practical knowledge in itself, but, again, we often fail
to realizethat we do. Journalists,for example,bring us live telemediareports about political and other matters from around the world, and yet
the information thus proffered has little, if any, practical bearing on our
lives. !7e have our own philodoxers too, though they are known by other
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names. For example, fans of movie stars, rock stars, and sports stars ardently seek practical knowledge as if it were the only kind. So does the
neighborhood gossip. Bird watchers and those who enjoy wild flowers
take a similar, if more reserved,attitude toward other creatures.
The Greeks argue that even practical activity has its value for its own
sake. Plato's very purpose in the Republlc is to show that justice has intrinsic value in addition to any instrumental value that it may have (Rep.
z. 357a-358d). Justice,he argues,consistsin all citizensperformingtheir
own functions, and each citizen finds his happinessin the performance of
his function (Rep. +. 4r9a-4zrc and 4z7c-434c). Aristotle argues in
generalthat one must choosemoral actions for their own sake as well as
perform them with knowledge and from habit lEth. z' 4, especially
rrosa1,o_ j3). More specifically,he explains that an action is not iust if
done only instrumentally-that is, for the sake of its effects.If we act out
of fear, say of punishment,we do only what a iust personwould do lEth.
5 . 8 .r r 3 5 b z - r r 5 5 b 8 ) .
Despitesomecontemporarypessimism,we still do find intrinsic value
just
in
actions. We surely approve of people who do what they ought even
though their actions may not yield any advantagesfor themselves.We admire not only the citizen who refusesa reward for coming forward but also
the criminal who decidesto come clean.And we take a dim view of people
who exhibit a legalistic attitude toward the law, such as those who search
out tax loopholes for themselvesor hire lobbyists to carve them out'
Other practical activities,such as courageousand temperateactions'
also have intrinsic value. Personswho act courageouslydo what must be
done for its own sake with little thought of risk to themselves.Consider
the proverbial reply of the police officer or fire fighter who, upon receiving
an award for heroism, proteststhat he was only doing his job. That we
may perform temperate actions for their own sake is most obvious on
social occasions-for example, a banquet we do not normally attendedfor
the sake of satisfyingappetite.Attending a banquet is a ceremonyundertaken for its own sake.And so is a cocktail party and a backyardbarbecue.
Nor do the Greeks overlook the intrinsic value of theseactivities.A
courageousperson, Aristotle observes,is one who stands his ground
against pains and may even delight in doing so; a temperateperson delights in abstainingfrom pleasures.What they can both enloy is their virtuous activity itself and a pleasurewhich supervenesupon it (Eth. z. 3.
r r o 4 b z - 8 ; s e ea l s o E t h . r c . 4 . r 1 7 4 b 7 r - 3 ) ) . C o u r a g e o u sa n d t e m p e r a t e
activities for Plato also have value primarily in themselvesrather than in
avoiding pain or in seekingpleasure.The guardiansand other citizens,he
argues,all find their happinessin fulfilling their functions and not in living
as if they were revellersat a festival(Rep. 4. 4r9a-42rc again).
Finally, there remain what I think are perhapsthe most obvious in-
s N o C n eg r cV , q l u r s , 1z 5 3
K , q N r r , ql uNt e n a r r v E A
stancesfor us-the arts as well as sports and games.Dances,concerts,
plays,movies,and gamesof all sortswe all enloy for their own sakes,not
merelyas spectatorsbut also as performersor players.Rare is the person
who doesnot enjoy a gala ball or a squaredance.Amateur musiciansand
actors perform in our cities and towns purely out of their love for the arts.
Until recently the modern Olympics were quite rightly limited to amateurs,who participatedwithout a thought of compensation.
The Greeks. of course, advocate the intrinsic value of these activities
as well. Aristotle arguesat length that music is an important leisureactivity, pursued for its own sake (Politics,8. 3. 437b27-r338a1o),He
disagreesabout sports,unfortunately.Games,he argues,are mere relaxation-medicine for the soul (rr37b35*r338ar). Plato suggeststhat
when properly blended,music and gymnasticsboth are important leisure
activities,though he points out their instrumentalvalue (Rep. 3.4rob4zrcl. And he clearly encouragesthe guardiansto engagein imitationbut only of objectsconsistentwith their function (lg+d-39zb).
The Greekconceptionof happiness,then, showsthat we may perform
many activitiesof various sorts for their own sakes.But I must acknowledgethat philosopherstoday do engagein controversiesabout what kind
of valueour intellectualand moral activitieshave.Any questionabout the
value of scienceas such Plato and Aristotle would find philosophically
moot. Scienceitself can only be pure becauseit concernseternal truths
valuablefor contemplationalone (Rep. S. 475d-48o, for example;Eth.
6. 3. and 6. 6.). But contemporaryphilosophersarguethat scienceessentially has not intrinsic value but rather instrumentalvalue.John Dewey
does,for example.He arguesthat we must defineideas"in termsof operations to be performed" and that we must test their validity "by the consequenceof theseoperations."rs
!7e also concedethat practicalknowledgeis' of course,practical'The
Greeksthemselvesesteemedit for its applications.Aristotle is more explicit than Plato about practicalwisdom and its functions.Both theoretical and practicalwisdom grasptruth, he argues,but practicalwisdom can
a l s o c o n t r o l d e s i r e( E t h . 6 . z . r r J g a z r - 3 r ; E t h . r ' r 1 . r r o z b r 3 - 2 8 ) .
But even Plato recognizesthe practical value of opinion. The guardians,
after their philosophicaleducation,must return to politics and accustom
t h e m s e l v etso i t s i d o l s ( R e P .Z . i r 9 b - 5 z r b ) .
Clearly,we would like to know more about our contemporariesand
their cultures in order to be better able to live together with them. This
aspiration I take to be the motive behind current cries for political correctnessand cultural diversity. The environmental crisis, in fact, requires
other applicationsof us. We needto know better the naturesand functions
of plants and animals in order not to harm them but to preservetheir
speciesand ecosystems.
1 , 5 4/
Pxul ScHoLLMEIER
That practical activitieshave instrumentalvalue is most obvious, especiallyin our acquisitiveera. But Plato himself classifiesiusticeas a good
of th. b.tt sort preciselybecauseit is valuablenot only for itself but also
for its effects(Rep. z. 357c-158a). Aristotle arguesthat only theoretical
activiry has value for itself alone and that practical activity we value for
i t s e l fa n d i t s e f f e c t s( E t b . r c . 7 - 8 . ) .
Nevertheless,I would aver that, in addition to their instrumental
value,all human activities,theoreticalas well as practicaland productive,
still have intrinsic value. And we may surely engagein these activities for
the sake of such value. Even Dewey acknowledgeswhat he calls the play
of ideas.He thus acknowledgesthat theoreticalactivity has someintrinsic
Can we not equally
value,though he emphasizesits instrumentaleffects.r6
well and perform
as
activities
other
of
our
nature
playful
recognize the
f;
,r'11
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rr(
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ri,i
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rr.,
r $ ll
them for their own sake?
In theseexamples,then, we find activitieswhich are choiceworthyfor
the sake of themselves.Activities of knowing, doing, and making, to put
the matter in more generalterms, all haveintrinsic value.rtAnd evenlawmaking too still retainsits intrinsic value.Kant himself points out that to
dete.mi.rethe will in accordancewith universal law has value for itself
even if it issuesin unsuccessfulaction or in no action at all (Gr. r. 394).
we all recognizethis intrinsic value when we are able to uphold our principlesunder trying circumstances.
But we also seehow multifarious our identity as rational beingsactually is. Scientist,citizen, artist, sports fan, bird watcher' hero' host,
prima donna, or centerlinebacker,we are eachand everyone of us one or
more of these intrinsically valuable beings.And of course I have hardly
exhaustedthe list of intrinsicallyvaluableactivitiesand their corresponding identities.
'we
need not, then, view moral selvesmerely as law-makers who make
law for the sake of making law. Admirable though acting from the Kantian imperative is, to engagein theseother activities for the sake of engaging in them is equally noble. Their worth shinesout, as doesthat of Kantian duty. when we overcome a temptation to pursue these ac_tivities
merely for the sake of something else, such as personal gain or pleasure
(see,of course,Gr. r. 394).
Making universallaw is thus not the sole activity valuableas an end
in itself. Bu1 neither is making law the activity with the highest intrinsic
value. The Greeks themselvesargue that theoretical knowledge is the activity which has the highest value in itself. They cite in support of their
coniention the properties of this activity' as already noted, as well as the
alsoEtb' 6'
propertiesof its object (again,Eth. :ro.7. try7ar8-n77br;
l
o
w
l y c i c a d aa s
t
h
e
P
l
a
t
o
u
s
e
s
ReP'z.5r9b-5r9c).
7. it4tutT-rr4rb8;
from birth
sings
cicada
As
the
an image of our devotion to this activity.
, u l en , q r t v t sn N o G n l t r V R l u es / i 5 5
K R N T T Rl N
until death without need of sustenance,so too those devoted to philosophy argue with one another and quite forget food and drink (Phaedrus
z59b-259d).
Most, if not all, contemporary philosophers would argue that even
activity of a practical sort has greater value than an activity of lawmaking.ls Making laws and following them, they argue, are of value not
for themselvesprimarily but for their effectsin action. Unfortunately, philosophers today often overlook the intrinsic value of practical activity in
favor if its instrumental value.leThe pragmatistsespeciallydo. Dewey, for
example, arguesthat practical activity, like practical knowledge, has value
But we clearly do admire individuals
primarily for its consequences.20
who act justly or courageouslywithout regard for what the consequences
might be for themselves.
Many people would find the highest intrinsic value in the arts and
their products. Theater goers and concert goers as well as musicians and
actors find greater intrinsic value in the performancesof high culture than
in either of the investigationsof scienceor the machinations of politics.
The same may be said of the plastic arts and more recent genres,such as
iazz. Lnd I need not mention again the devoted fans of popular culture
and the spectaclesof mass media. Aristotle himself argues that tragedy
is its own end; its plot is its soul, as it were (Poetics 6. r45oazz-23 and
t8- ls).
By importing the concept of an intrinsically valuable activity from ancient Greek philosophy, we can thus cast a new light on modern moral
'We
can now seehow restricted Kantian moral theory appears
philosophy.
to be. Kant considered only one activity to have intrinsic value, and he
focused on an activity that does not have the highest value of this kind.
We see,too, that we in fact perform many intrinsically valuable activities,
though we may fail to recognizein theory that we do.
So, I would now ask, Does an activity which is an end in itself but
which is not making universal laws entail a categoricalimperative?I think
that it does. An eudaemonic activity in the ancient Greek sensemakes a
an intrinsic value, and
categoricaldemand on us, for it is an activity with 'We
can thus be obliged
such an activity can be rational ground of choice.
to engagein many activities of this kind, for they alone constitute our
value as an ends.2r
This argument is essentiallyKantian in one respect. It agreeswith
what Kant statesin the secondformula of the categorical imperative, that
an intrinsic value is a ground for a moral demand. But the argument is
decidedlynot Kantian in other respects.It disagreeswith what Kant states
in the first formula, which requires universal legislation' I am arguing
rather that we can be required to engagein thought, action, or art. In other
words, I suggestthat we are essentiallyactivities of knowing, doing' and
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Ptul ScHoLLMEIER
making, for in these activities we realize ourselvesmost fully.'We are not
merely self-legislatingcreatures,as the third formula asserts.
The non-Kantian categoricalimperativesthat result from this analysis
are obiective in two senses.Though they are a posteriori, these imperatives do rest on objective knowledge of ourselves.I thus assumethat empirical knowledge is the same or very similar for us all. But this knowledge,sinceit is empirical,is subjectto the usual caveats.That is, we may
be mistaken about what our function in given circumstancesis or about
what our circumstancesare. But as categorical, these imperatives command an action as an end in itself. They thus provide an obiect for the
will. Ve act on them becausewe recognize that an activity has intrinsic
value, not becausewe wish to satisfy a desire.22
The analysisalso assumesthe Kantian model of a will which is rational and rejectsany conceptof an irrational will. As beingswith a rational
will, we act in accordancewith a concept of an intrinsicallyvaluableactivity. Do philosophers, for example, engagein inquiry for the sake of the
pleasurethat it might give?Even if impelled by a desireto know, we most
often find the pleasureof satisfying our curiosity outweighed by the pains
of doing so. Rather, we engagein theoretical activity for its own sake; we
wish to know for the sake of knowing. Any pleasureis adventitious.
'We
can act
But of course people can shirk non-Kantian obligations.
irrationally, for our will remains fallible. Ve most often do so when we
treat an intrinsicallyvaluableaction as an action with instrumentalvalue.
That is, someonemay perform an action with intrinsic value for the sake
of an ulterior end. He usually seeksprofit or pleasureand thus pursuesa
subjective good dependent on greed or another desire. He thus subiects
himself not to a categorical imperative but to a hypothetical one. And this
imperative is hypothetical in the Kantian sense'
I would assert,therefore, that humanity is by nature a knowing, doing, and making creature.Specificactivities of thesesorts entail categorical
obligations becausethey are ends in themselves.
IV
My argument does require some sacrificesof us, however' if we are to
maintain it. We must sacrifice some cherished prejudices inherited from
Kant. The first sacrifice required is our notion of a moral agent; we
must modify it. Kant argues that all rational beings as such are ends in
themselveswith absolute value becausethey are self-legislative(seeGr. z.
425-26, for example).I agreewith Kant that rational beingsare ends in
themselves,but I do not agree that rational beings as such have intrinsic
value. I am arguing that other activities besidesself-legislation-activities
which are empirical-have intrinsic value. The subiects of morality are
K , t N t t , r rI.ur t t n a t t v r s n N o C n r r r V a r , u t s/ 1 5 7
thus not all rational beings but merely human beings as we know them.
That is, only rational animals of one speciesare moral agents.
r07hatis more, the rational animals in question do not have absolute
value as endsin themselves.Homo sapienshas an intrinsic value which is
merely relative. What has absolute value is the whole of which we are but
a puny part. \fe can of course experienceonly intermediate wholes with
relatively greater value than ourselves.These wholes make up our social
and natural environments.23But the ultimate whole with absolutevalue in
itself can only be the universeitself.2a
The second sacrifice required by this analysis is the universality of
moral imperatives.Kant arguesthat categoricalimperativesare both universaland necessary(for example, Gr. z. 4zo-zt). The necessityof moral
imperativesof courseremains.Categoricalimperativesare necessarybecausethey are requiredof us as beingswho engagein intrinsicallyvaluable
activities.Though without absolutevalue,theseactivitiesconstitutewhat
we are.'Weare, again,creaturesengagedin knowing, doing, and making
in all their variety and particularity.
But moral imperativescan be only generalitiesbecausethey rest on
empiricalknowledge.How do we know what is incumbentupon us?We
and we obourselvesexperienceactivitieswhich havevalue in themselves,
serveothersengagingin them. Our knowledgeof our moral obligationsts
thus limited by our experienceand its scope,though theselimits can be
probed with imagination.Our knowledgeof moral obligationsis also limited by its objects.Empirical obiectsare subjectto changeand dependon
their environment.What we find intrinsicallyvaluabletoday may indeed
havedisvaluetomorrow.
Finally,we can have a kingdom of endson this account' But I would
prefer to call such a society a community of ends. With this change in
\We
nomenclature I mean to draw attention to the members of society.
again are not rational beingslegislatinguniversallaws for ourselves;we
are rather human beingsparticipatingin human activitieswithin human
situations.Any moral laws that we make are not primarily ends in themAnd
selves;they are rather meansto actionsvaluedas endsin themselves.
what these actions are we determine only by experiencewithin a given
environment.
V
Today philosophersare not as sanguineabout rationality and its activity
as was Kant in his day. Kant advocatedone absoluterational standardfor
all moral conduct. Many contemporaryphilosophersare so disillusioned
with his project that they eschewany rational standardfor conduct.They
often advocatewhat amounts to little more than an intellectual fad. But
I
LcHoLLMEIER
1 5 8/ P a , u S
without taking the "high priori" road of Kant' I think that we can keep
our rationality and take a "low posteriori" road. We need not seekone
rational activity with absolute intrinsic value; we may pursue many activitieswhich haverelativeintrinsic value.Indeed,we must'
NOTES
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r. Arthur V. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility,t96o ed. (Chicago:Untversity of ChicagoPress,r975).
z. Two exceptions known to me are Villiams and Foot. Though they both
quarrel with Kant's conceprionof emorion, \Tilliams discoversa new application
for the categorical imperative, Foot finds one for the hypothetical imperative. See
Bernard !ililliams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (cambridge: Harvard universityPress,r985), chapter ro, r891 Philippa Foot, Virtuesand Vices(Berkeley:
Universityof California Press,r978), chapter r r, r58-59.
3. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Akademie
edition of Kants Werke (Berlin: $Talterde Gruyter, 1968), vol.4,385-64. All
referencesare to this editron.
do of
4. That we can never be completelysure of the motives for any action' I
. e eG r . 2 . 4 o 6 ' 4 o 7 .
c o u r s er e a l i z eS
5. Williams challengesthis assumption.He arguesthat a categoricalimperative
is not unconditionalin the sensethat it dependsonly on reasonand not on desire'
This imperativeis unconditional rather in that it dependson a desireessentialto
our very character. It thus does not depend on any desire we may merely happen
to have.Williams, chapter ro, r89.
6. This assumptionFoot challenges.Shearguesthat a hypotheticalimperative
can be conditioned by a desire for a long-term proiect as well as by a passing
inclination.And we may be said to want a long-term project eventhough it might
at a given moment leaveus cold. Foot, chapter r r, r58-59.
7 . T h e t r a n s l a t i o ni s m i n e .
8. Patton'stranslation.
g. I thus differ significantly with Korsgaard on rhe interprerarion of this formula. Borrowing terminology from Moore, she argues that our humanity as a
choicehas intrinsic,or unconditioned,value and that humanity as an end has only
extrinsic,or conditioned,value. Sheexplainsthat when we chooserationally,we
confer value on our humanity as an end. Kant thus avoids,accordingto her, the
"ontological task" of identifying rational ends. See,for example, Christine M'
Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness"' Tbe Philosophical Reuiew 9z
(t98j), .^69- gS,especiallyry7-84. But Kant not only declaresemphatically,as
we have seen,that our humanity existsas an end in itself, he also clearly argues
that humanity alone exists as an unconditioned end (see again Gr. z. 428). Far
from avoiding it, Kant tackles the ontological issuehead on.
ro. Kant also arguesthat the three formulas are the same in that they express
the form, the matter, and the complete determination of our maxims. See Gr. z.
warner A.
$6-J7. For an elaborationof this argument,the readermay consult
'Wick,
"I.tttoduction: Kant's Moral Philosophy," Immanuel Kant, Ethical Phi-
K , c Nr rr , { N l , r a t r n e t t v e
s AND Gnrrr VnLuts / 159
losopby, translated by James \07. Ellington, (lndianapolis: Hackert Publishing
Company, r983 ), xvii-xxi.
r r. Williams is thus quite right to lament this impoverished conception of our
moral selves.SeeWilliams, chapter4,64-69, for example.
rz. Plato, Republic; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.
r 3. Korsgaard'sattempt to map Moore's terminology onto Kant's moral theory
appears to be what leads her astray, I have used the terms "instrumental" and
"intrinsic" merely to indicate values that are means and ends. Without using
"intrinsic," Korsgaard also opposes the instrumental values to those which are
ends. But she goes on to oppose the term "extrinsic" to "intrinsic" in order to
distinguish objects which have value from something else or in themselves.See
Korsgaard, 169-7o. For this distinction Kant prefers the terms "relative" and
"absolute" or "conditioned" and "unconditioned." Kant accordingly indicates
that our humanity has value as an unconditioned end (seen. 9 above). But Korsgaard deniesthat Kant takes a position of this sort, though she recognizesir as a
possibleone. Kant's position, according to her, is that our rationality is an extrinsic end. This is, a conditionedend. See17o-7r and 17z-7 j. Korsgaard'sutilization of Moore's terminology thus obscuresin Kant's theory the very distinction
that she meant to illuminate.
r4. This definition of happinessdiffers from that of Kant. Though he at times
ascribesit to Aristotle, Kant appears to define happinessas an activity that is at
bottom strong-willed or even weak-willed, for he identifies it with the pursuit of
p l e a s u r eC
. o m p a r e ,f o r e x a m p l e ,E t h . r . r 1 . r : . o z b r 1 - 2 8 w i t h G r . 2 . 4 4 2 - 4 3 ;
and Eth. 7 . r - ro. Also seeRoger J. Sullivan, "The Kantian Critique of Aristotle's
Moral Philosophy,"The Reuieu of Metaphysicsz8 (r9741,24- 53.Foot and \Williams too both remark how narrow Kant's discussionof nonmoral action is. \fill i a m s ,c h a p t e r4 , 6 4 - 6 j ; F o o t ,c h a p t e rr r , r 5 8 - 5 9 a n d 1 6 4 - 6 5 .
r5.John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
r 9 z 9 ) , c h a p t e r5 , r r 4 .
r6. Dewey,chapter6.
r7. This conception of action and its intrinsic value agreeswith what MacIntyre saysabout a practice and its internal goods. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, znd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,r984), chapter r4,
especially r87-9o. But Maclntyre parts company with us when he argues that a
value intrinsic to action is sociallyteleological.See196-97.1would argue that
intrinsic value is naturally teleological becauseit is something that we discover by
meansof empirical knowledge.
r 8. Williams arguesof coursethat a desireessentialto an agent is the sourceof
the highestpracticalvalue.Again seechapter ro, r98.
r9. SeeFoot, chapter rr, t64-66. If one caresabout others,she argues,then
one will seeknot the role of helping them but their good.
zo. For example, John DeweS Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon
Press,r948), especiallychapter7.
zr. McDowell is thus on the right track to argue that an action may be presented as practically necessaryby our view of a situation. John McDowell, "Are
Moral RequirementsHypothetical Imperatives?" Proceedingsof the Aristotelian
Society,sup.vol. 5z (19781,r3-;-9; for example,r4. But he explainsthat we view
i 6 0 / C n N o n c tV o e r l n
seeits
an action as morally requiredmerely becauseour upbringing teachesus to
int.nstc
the
situation in a special light. See Lo-zz. McDowell thus overlooks
value of an action and its moral significance.
for
zz. Ricoeur arguesmerely that Kant's moral theory providesa framework
of
ethics
Aristotle's
incorporates
right
of
ethics
Kant's
of
action.
Aristotle'stheory
good becausetheir judgmenrsinrersect.Both normativeand evaluativeiudgments
than exIpply to fundamentalhu-un goods,which, he claims, are nothing more
of
structures
Deontological
and
Teleological
t.rn^l goodt. SeePaul Ricoeur,"The
(CamGriffiths
A.
Phillips
by
edited
Phitosophy,
French
Action," Contemporary
r'
bridge: CambridgeUniversityPress'r984), 99- Lrr especiallyro8- r.r .
placegreat emphasison our socialand politiolcourse
and"Aristotle
lt"ro
i.
For ex.ul n"tur.; today we must also take into account our ecologicalnature.
University
(Oxford:
Oxford
Almanac
ample, seeAldoLeopold, The Sand County
P r e s s r, 9 4 9 ) .
24. On this topic one might consult Marcus Aurelius or Spinoza'
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