Insurgencies in Northern Mali:
A Tentative Assessment on the Current Conflict
Insurgencies in Northern Mali:
A Tentative Assessment on the Current Conflict
By
Priscyll Anctil Avoine
JEFCAS Working Paper nº 5
1
Insurgencies in Northern Mali:
A Tentative Assessment on the Current Conflict
By
Priscyll Anctil Avoine
JEFCAS Working Paper nº6
Published by: John & Elnora Ferguson Centre for African Studies (JEFCAS) –
University of Bradford, UK.
For more information visit our website at www.brad.ac.uk/africa or our blog at
http://jefcas.wordpress.com/
Email for correspondence for this paper: [email protected]
2
Table of Contents
Historical Background: The Socio-political Context of Northern Mali............................................... 5
Present Conflict: A Tentative Assessment ............................................................................................ 7
Geopolitical Puzzle .............................................................................................................................. 9
The Dilemma of Intervention ............................................................................................................. 11
Voices from Victims ........................................................................................................................... 14
Concluding Thoughts ......................................................................................................................... 16
Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................... 17
Bibliography....................................................................................................................................... 18
3
Introduction
“I know I’m going to die anyway, so at least I
want it to
be for the sake of God.”
-Ahmed Ag Mohamed Al Ansari, a Tuareg
Mujahideen (Welsh, 2012)
dilemma of intervention, regional countries
are unable to fix the situation that is getting
worse. The security vacuum has favoured the
religious fundamental rebel group to gain
power and capture more territories at the
expense of the Tuareg rebels. In the middle of
Recently, the Sahelian belt attracted the
those multiple insurgencies, the civilian
attention of international media due to the
population is the habitual and immediate
phenomenal
West
victims of the conflict. Besides drought which
regarding international terrorism and their
afflicts the Shael the region this summer and
links with rebel groups from the Sahel. At
other war related sufferings, it is estimated
present, it is estimated that about 20 European
that up to 200, 000 people have been
nationals are still held in captivity (Alvarado,
displaced (AJ, 2012) during the insurgency.
propaganda
of
the
2012, p. 7); this picture reinforces the
Is Mali the next “Afghanistan of the
concerns about the regionalization of the
Sahel” (Belmadi and Youcef, 2012) as most
activities of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
of the Western countries seem to think? In this
(AQIM). In 20012, the security situation in
paper, we attempt to nuance this widespread
the Shael region became even worse with the
emergence
of
irregular
insurgencies
belief that Mali is the new safe haven for
in
terrorism by analysing the root causes of the
Northern Mali. On 6 April 2012, the Tuareg
rebels
of
the
Mouvement
National
present conflict. We thus aim to foster
de
preliminary answers on the current situation
Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and some
in Northern Mali and to evaluate the broader
jihadists from both Ansar Dine and the
Mouvement pour l’unicité et le djihad en
implications of the conflict by looking at the
Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) declared the
regional and global trends. Obviously, we do
not
Northern Mali as an independent state. The
pretend
to
offer
an
exhaustive
investigation of the conflict since at the time
insurgents benefited from both the regional
of writing this article, the situation is still
context of the collapse of the Gadhafi regime
unpredictable and the regional countries are
and the military coup that ended what used to
literally facing a geopolitical impasse. Also,
be a stable regime of Amadou Toumani Touré
we are conscious of the methodological
(ATT) (Alvarado, 2012, p. 1). While the
obstacles because the literature on the subject
international community (IC) is facing the
4
is still embryonic and we had to carefully
particular
analyse the newspapers to come up with a
sovereignty throughout all of its territory. The
judgment on the current crisis while paying
northern part has been particularly marked by
attention to the ambiguous role played by the
troubles on the part of the minorities,
media. An example is the role of Agence
especially the Tuaregs. They constitute a
France Press (AFP) regarding the high
nomadic group of approximately 1.3 million
tendency to qualify MNLA as part of AQIM
people crossing “southern Algeria, southwest
(Alvarado, 2012, p. 7) which shows a
Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali” (Cline,
dangerous lack of fairness.
2007, p. 891). In this paper, we analyse the
and
social
situation
maintain
its
Gyldenholm, 2012, p. 24) that compose
in Northern Mali, we will first comment on
political
to
minority of 10% of Tuaregs (Bondersholt and
In order to portray the current conflict
the
difficulties
Northern Mali (NM) but the readers must
that
keep in mind that other tribes, such as the
characterized the region before engaging in
Arabs and Peuls populate NM as well. These
the analysis of the present conflict. Then, we
tribes neither agree with Bamako nor with the
will try to contextualize this crisis in the
full idea of full secession (Ngachoko, 2012).
regional and global frameworks in order to
Thus, this article focuses on the complexity of
understand the dimensions that are currently
the Tuareg ethnic population in NM with a
worsening the conflict. In the fourth place, we
special focus of their struggles dating back to
will question the dilemma of intervention to
French
present the various obstacles confronted the
colonization
in
order
to
fully
comprehend the current crisis. This section is
peace process in Mali. Finally, we aim to
an attempt to trace these root causes in
study the consequences of this conflict on the
history.
civilian population so to render the reader
conscious of the real impacts of this
The
Tuaregs
mainly
practice
a
geopolitical power game over this Sub-
moderate but conservative Sufi Islam (Cline,
Saharan country and its neighbours.
2007, p. 892) and the allegations of Wahhabi
preaching are completely new and far from
being proven. Therefore, the suppositions
Historical Background: The Socio-political
Context of Northern Mali
regarding the evolving threats of terrorism in
the current crisis need to be nuanced as “past
Mali has long been considered a good
and
stable
“democracy”
in
the
and current insurgencies of the Tuaregs in
Sahel
Mali emanate from a number of historical and
(Ngachoko, 2012) even if it faced some
5
current circumstances, some of which date
2012; Cissoko, 2011, p. 15). This may suggest
back to the pre-colonial era” (Zounmenou,
that, while marginalized by the central
2012).
government, the Tuaregs were also part of
their own marginalization (Ngachoko, 2012)
In Mali, the French utilized a “divide-
as a vicious cycle of colonial consequences
and-rule” strategy as they organized the state
and misconceptions about cultural differences
to function in relations to the Tuaregs which
continue to be reinforced.
were the first to be under French rule
(Cissoko, 2011, p. 8). From the early years of
The first uprising which occurred
independence, both the Tuaregs and the
between 1962 and 1964 (IRIN, 2012)
central government entered into a conflictual
mirrored the systemic challenges that were
relationship since the former complained
responsible for polarising the Malian society.
about lack of infrastructure and the latter
The rebellion reached its climax in 1963
viewed
as
before the government troop completely
development
crushed it within a year. The Mali government
obstacles
nomadism
and
to
national
pastoralism
(Zounmenou, 2012). Consequently, since
counter-insurgency
Mali's independence, the Tuaregs opposed the
Tuaregs communities destroying their sources
central government of Bamako by demanding
of subsistence (IRIN, 2012; Alvarado, 2012,
better integration or autonomy. On the one
p. 3) left the poorly armed Tuaregs with abject
hand there were stark regional inequalities
poverty and with no social base and power
between the North and South Mali – wealth
among the population. Furthermore, the
was concentrated in the South while the north
1970s and 80s were economically difficult
remained in abject poverty (Cissoko, 2011, p.
period for the northern rural populations since
9). On the other hand, integration of the arid
extreme drought displaced many and affected
region of the north with the rest of the coun
all the pastoral communities like the Tuaregs
try has remained a major challenge for the
(IRIN, 2012).
country which lacks institutional capacity to
which
targeted
the
The second Tuareg uprising began in June
do so. In addition, it is argued that the cultural
1990 and was “triggered by an attack on a
differences in the country have always been
police post in Menaka ordered by Iyad Ag
an obstacle in the process of national
Ghali” (Alvarado, 2012, p. 3) who created the
integration since the Tuaregs are perceived by
Mouvement populaire de l’Azawad (MPA) in
the rest of Malians as violent, unpatriotic and
Libya two years earlier (IRIN, 2012). Unlike
as having a slave mentality (Zounmenou,
the first insurgency, the second one was
6
proved more difficult to handle as the rebels
Thus, the conflict in NM did not seemingly
were better armed. The conflict resulted in
emerge from nowhere as Laurent Bigot
significant losses to both sides of the
asserts in his video presentation that the
belligerents and so were the impact on the
Western countries just decided to close their
number of displaced civilians. On 11 April
eyes on the structural and recurrent corruption
1992, a National Pact that ended the conflict
behind a façade democracy (Bigot, 2012).
was finally reached under the leadership of
Moreover, even if some of the Tuaregs were
Algeria (IRIN, 2012).
part of armed rebellions and certainly
committed crimes, they suffered a lot from
The 1992 peace agreements were
the brutality of the Malian army during their
never entirely implemented and both parties
engagement
never really respected their full engagement.
in
diverse
rebellions
since
independence. The Tuaregs suffered from
Although the National Pact provided some
“severe government security force operations,
level of autonomy to NM, Bamako never
including destruction of their villages and
became deeply involved in executing its main
reported massacres” (Cline, 2007, p. 891). In
clauses and the Tuareg movement was thus
addition, the integration of the Tuaregs
broken apart in multiples organizations based
remained largely weak since they always
on plenty of cleavages (Alvarado, 2012, p. 3).
lacked
The various initiatives to stabilize and
connections
with
Bamako,
infrastructure and economic development
develop NM became infructuous and tensions
opportunities (Cissoko, 2011, p. 50 & 57).
flared between communities once again. The
While this section attempted to present the
signing of the Accords d’Alger in 2006 was
historical root causes of the conflict, the
aimed at fostering security and economic
section which follows will try to draw the
growth in Kidal but violence never ceased. As
principal lines of the current crisis in NM by
tensions continued to grow from 2011 to
showing how it is much more complex than
2012, well-armed leaders and insurgent
just alleged terrorist threat.
returnees from Libya following the fall of
Muammar Gaddafi regime (IRIN, 2012;
Present Conflict: A Tentative Assessment
Alvarado, 2012) contributed to the complex
As
security dilemma of northern Mali.
mentioned
above,
the
contemporary insurgency is not the first
rebellion in NM based on Tuareg identity.
Al-Jazeera provides a detailed account
However, what differentiates the present
on how the people of NM endured hardships
conflict from the previous is the fact that, with
prior to the latest conflict (Welsh, 2012).
7
their association with armed religious groups,
quest for independence and ended up in
the Tuaregs succeeded in defeating the Malian
multiple insurgencies since the MNLA made
army and proclaimed independence. The
temporary alliances with the Islamists groups
dynamics of the present crisis are various and
as Movement for Unity and Jihad in West
complex and very much related to the
Africa (MUJAO) and AD. In February, it
geopolitical situation in the Sahel. This paper
began to be clear that ethnicities were being
is written in the middle of this crisis, so the
instrumentalized by the different armed
principal objective of this section is to have
groups and it became possible to establish
an overview on the latest events of this year
links between those groups and AQMI
(2012) as well as to understand the major
regarding logistical support (IRIN, 2012).
components of the conflict.
However, it was the coup d’État, on 21 March
The
present
conflict
has
2012, that facilitated the process through
been
which the insurgencies won against the
nourished by political dissatisfaction from the
Malian
northern peoples of Mali, but has also been
army
in
merely
two
months
(Alvarado, 2012, p. 4). This culminated in the
sustained by the geopolitical evolution in
independence of Azawad, in NM, on the 6th of
North Africa and particularly in Libya. The
April 2012.
fall of the Gadhafi regime provoked a
regional destabilization and some of the
In the meantime, the Malian army
Tuaregs who fought for this regime returned
suffered several defeats by the insurgencies,
from Libya around August 2011 (IRIN, 2012).
was humiliated (Keenan, 2012) and, as will be
They arrived in Mali with arms and logistical
argued later on, this is why they are so
support and the government of Bamako didn’t
reticent to an external intervention since it is
do anything to assimilate them into the
matter of national pride as well. On the one
regular army: president Amadou Toumani
hand, it first gave power to the MNLA to
Toure (ATT) completely failed to reintegrate
impose its domination on the three principal
them into Malian society (Keenan, 2012). The
areas in the north (Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao).
radicalization of certain parts of the Tuareg
On the other hand, this lasted for a short
movement was then more than obvious in
amount of time since religion took on a
October 2011 (IRIN, 2012). In January 2012,
stronger central role in the crisis, notably due
the National Movement for the Liberation of
to the difficulty for northern Malians to accept
Azawa (MNLA) was ready to engage in the
the democratic model, which failed to provide
rebellion (D’Almeida, 2012) that began as a
answers to their needs (Bigot, 2012). The
8
ideological shock between all the groups
(Castillo, 2012). For the same reasons, the
involved regarding NM's independence and
crisis in Mali is a geopolitical problem as will
the imposition of Shari’a Law is very
be demonstrated in the next section.
important and uneasy to obscure. The MNLA
Geopolitical Puzzle
now lost almost all its territory gained in April
The analysis of the Malian conflict is a
to the hands of the Islamists groups
(Berthemet, 2012) and it has become a
heavy task since it implies “a clear source of
question of who is going to be the privileged
problem
interlocutor with Bamako (Diffalah, 2012).
for
the
neighboring
states”
(Alvarado, 2012, p. 6). Beginning from 2001,
Currently, it is very difficult to properly
predict the next trajectory of the conflict.
the geopolitical situation in the Sahel has been
Nevertheless, it became clear in the month of
facing increasing destabilization. Security is
August
that
the
population
does
not
extremely volatile and the UN estimated in
appreciate the radical interpretation of Islam
preached by the MUJAO or the AD. Many
2009 that 21 tons of cocaine worth US$ 900
demonstrations have since taken place which
million
show that the general population resent the
transited
through
West
Africa
(Abderrahmane, 2012). The end of the
violent means of punishments imposed by the
Shari’a Law (Idoumou, 2012a) that the
Gadhafi
insurgents have been implementing. Thus, the
geopolitical panorama of the Sahel, giving
conflict is quite difficult to evaluate since it is
oscillating
between
insurgencies,
civil
secession
war,
and
also
worsened
the
opportunity to criminal groups to obtain arms
guerrilla
more easily. Thus, the conflict in Mali can be
communal
disorders.
In
regime
dangerous at the regional level since it can
conclusion,
Bamako
did
not
extend itself to other neighboring countries
succeed in re-establishing their control over
(Abderrahmane, 2012) and “the shock wave
NM due to three important factors: the
[…] could even reach Nigeria” (Alvarado,
Tuaregs formed the MNLA which was much
more well-armed in comparison to previous
2012, p. 7).
insurgencies, the coup d’État permitted them
The Sahel has always been part of
to declare independence and, finally, because
of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel
migration
9
processes
and
trade
routes
(Roussellier, 2011, p. 8; Cline, 2007, p. 889).
the threat is considered real, the governments
It is a “confluence of a complex historical and
in the Sahel are also instrumentalizing and
human dynamics” with an increase of arms
amplifying the terrorist threat of AQMI in
and drugs trade during the last decade
order to respond to their interests and grab
(Roussellier, 2011, p. 8). The numerous
attention and funds from the West (Cline,
antiterrorist
stabilizing
2007, p. 891). This is why it is crucial to
interventions completely failed to recuperate
situate the Malian crisis in a wider context
the volatile situation in the Sahel (Roussellier,
since it also plays a part in the general
2011, p. 8) as the Malian crisis risks to
geopolitical imperative.
programs
and
worsen the current situation. In the meantime,
Otherwise, if the indications of the
these regional programs also served Bamako
links between AQMI and AD are still weak, it
because ATT used them as an excuse to get
appears that the US is increasingly present in
economic and military aid from foreign
the Sahel, taking a more extensive role in the
countries. In fact, at “no time did ATT
region (Cline, 2007, p. 893). Is Mali falling in
seriously take on the Tuareg demands, whose
the eternal vicious cycle of the dichotomy
threat he did not hesitate to exacerbate in
US-terrorism (Cline, 2007, p. 896)? It is
order to obtain aid and additional resources
difficult to know for the moment, but what is
for the struggle against terrorism” (Alvarado,
sure, is that the terrorism threat in Mali might
2012, p. 6).
have been too exaggerated. Those links still
On the one hand, it seems like Mali
must be proven since the rebellion is still
insurgency is now taking the route of a
limited to NM (Alvarado, 2012, p. 6). For the
nationalist conflict that is transforming itself
moment, the Tuaregs are forming tactical
into an ethno-religious crisis, similar to those
alliances with AQMI and enjoying their
in Somalia or Algeria. On the other hand, if
trafficking networks
10
(Zounmenou,
2012;
Roussellier, 2011, p. 8) but we cannot talk
thought that Algeria would be afraid of a
about “terrorism” yet.
more important terrorist threat in the region
since there are already seven Algerian
Finally, we need to ask ourselves
diplomats that are captives of the MUJAO
about the role of Algeria, France or the US in
(Belmadi and Youcef, 2012). Also, it was
this crisis. In the case of the latter, Mali is
believed that Algeria would have tried to
believed to be a future site of oil exploitation
affirm its leadership after the fall of Gadhafi
even if this is not confirmed (Cline, 2007, p.
regime in order to appear as the only regional
896). Equally, France has never been an
power (Alvarado, 2012, p. 6). Is this crisis in
impartial actor in Mali and the US is not well
Mali an answer to some long-term interests of
perceived since the increase of its military
Algeria (Keenan, 2008, p. 459)? This
presence in the region. Natural resources such
geopolitical puzzle is thus far from being
as uranium and oil that are found in Niger and
resolved.
Mali are mostly in the areas of Tuaregs. This
raises yet another question regarding whether
The Dilemma of Intervention
The now recurrent question regarding
the huge militarization of the Sahel is driven
the crisis in Mali is: does it warrant an
by natural resource motives. One must thus be
external intervention? If yes, who should be
very careful with the power balance in the
in-charge of the intervention: an African
regional force, such as an AU force or an
Sahel, which is way more complex than it is
international one? Who should decide? Is the
thought to be. Concerning Algeria, it is even
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which
more complicated to understand its position.
authorizes the supranational entity to send
blue helmets to re-establish constitutional
A new state in the region, the Azawad, is a
order, applicable in the Mali case (Gonin and
direct threat to the Algerians (Alvarado, 2012,
Pérousse de Montclos, 2012)? It seems as
p. 6). Its reluctance to engage in intervention
though the answer is not so obvious since the
Sahel is posing a number of logistical
is surprising because it would have been
problems that are difficult to manage.
11
Moreover, the IC faces a multitude of
Senegalese and Nigerian troops (MICEMA)
intervention problems. While the Somali and
(Gueye, 2012b). However, even if it would be
Afghan cases are still uneasy to manage, the
an African solution to an African problem, the
Congo is in complete ebullition and Syria is
mission raises a number of important issues.
facing a tragic and unprecedented bloodshed
while
Russia
is
vetoing
First of all, the NM region offers a
intervention.
hostile condition for intervention due to its
Moreover, the intervention in Libya has been
desert climate, arid terrain and vastness. An
criticized for its numerous civilian casualties
ECOWAS operation is largely destined to fail
while the “responsibility to protect” provoked
in this context without counting on any
even more victims under the auspice of
support from the Malian army. In addition,
NATO. The intervention dilemma is now
ECOWAS’
reaching a climax point in international
logistical
means
for
operationalizing the mission are largely
debates and Mali finds itself at the very heart
insufficient (Alvarado, 2012, p. 2). In the
of it.
meantime, the Sahelian region continues to
The question of intervening in Mali
experience serious security problems and so
poses numerous problems. It is argued that
are countries bordering Mali with “other
the military branch, Cédéao, of ECOWAS is
significant internal security issues” to deal
better placed to intervene in Mali's internal
with (Cline, 2007, p. 891). Therefore, the
security that continues to threaten the entire
ECOWAS security framework fails to offer a
Sahel region. The regional countries, mostly
safe and solid base for a strong consortium to
Nigeria, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal, have
intervene. The other problem with the
been contemplating sending a stabilizing
regional tactical force is that it still has not
force of approximately 3,000 to 3,300 men in
received the authorization and legitimation of
an attempt to consolidate the transitional
Bamako. No formal demand has been given
institutions in Bamako and re-establish the
from Mali for them to engage in a military
territorial integrity of Mali (Alvarado, 2012,
operation (Abderrahmane, 2012). This is
p. 2; Gueye, 2012a). However, some heads of
partly why all the regional actors are still
state,
prioritizing political dialogue (RFI, 2012)
such
as
Niger,
view
military
intervention as the only possible solution to
with the different insurgencies in NM.
the conflict (Gueye, 2012a; Idoumou and
However,
Oumar, 2012). It the military mission is to be
the
situation
is
more
complicated as it is difficult to understand
deployed, it would mostly comprise of
which group it is better to talk with. The West
12
African strategy presents a third logistical
whether negotiation is a viable option in
problem: Algeria (Belmadi and Youcef, 2012)
dealing with the insurgents (Le Pays, 2012)?
is totally opposed to the military option yet it
Although the MNLA may be open to
is the only regional power with the capacity to
dialogue, it is adamant to change its decision
respond to the crisis by force. Without
on independence of Azawad. The Islamist
Algeria, the mission is more likely to fail.
groups, too, openly oppose the partition of
Algeria was opposed to the intervention in
Mali yet are determined to unconditionally
Libya, is more than reticent to a military
apply the Shari’a Law to the region (Oumar,
operation in Syria, so it appears to be obvious
2012a).
that the intervention in Mali is not an option
Compaoré’s role as the mediator in the
for the Algerians. Even if the USA and France
conflict catapulted him into international fame
are hardly pushing Algeria to intervene by
and prestige, critics have argued that his
offering logistical support (Belmadi and
agency has instead worsened the conflict.
Youcef, 2012), Algeria is more likely to
seriousness
and
as
Blaise
of caution (Berthemet, 2012), the AU is trying
concludes that the possibility of a regional
lacks
much
While Washington is acting with a lot
pursue a political solution. This paper thus
intervention
Moreover,
to support a military intervention with the
has
help of the UN. The UN critically examined
resulted in severe divisions in strategic foci.
the AU military proposals and rejected it
In addition, critics argue that ECOMOG’s
twice on the basis that the text was not precise
previous interventions in Nigeria and Liberia
enough (Guèye, 2012c). It claimed that the
were marred with sexual violence perpetrated
demand made to the Security Council will
by the soldiers who were supposed to restore
need to be more specific regarding material
order (Gonin and Pérousse de Montclos,
and human needs and strategies (Journal du
2012).
Mali, 2012). This is a very questionable
The political negotiations to end the
option because of the current situation of the
deadlock have also failed to yield solution to
UN, which faces multiple fronts at the global
the security dilemma in NM as contested
level. The UN also received a lot of criticisms
issues remain complex and barely understood.
regarding the intervention in Libya and its
While the MNLA lost power, the possibility
delegation of the dossier to NATO. The
of holding further negotiations with the
“responsibility to protect” has been largely
religious groups seem predictable (MJAO &
criticized for being a semantic euphemism
AD). However, what is questionable is
(Galy, 2012) to legitimize invasion and killing
13
of civilians. It is also criticized for supporting
civilians suffer from multiple forms of
neo-colonial interests of the superpowers
violence as international organizations face
(Galy, 2012). The AU thus proposes a similar
difficulties in accessing the region. It is not
intervention to that in Somalia, which means
very clear as to which group perpetrates the
that it would receive the financial and
violence, or which group protects the civilians
logistical support of the UN but would
from the other. It seems that the situation
assume the development of the mission on the
more closely resembles a civil war rather than
ground by itself. However, the effectiveness
a political declaration of independence. The
of AMISOM is another debatable issue.
civil
Moreover, since the intervention in Somalia
organizations in the region make an explosive
in 1992, the UN adopted a regional approach
cocktail for the population that is already
by disengaging themselves from directly
confronted with a number of structural
intervening
The
problems. This section explores the different
perspective of an international intervention is
ways in which the population has become the
then also improbable.
victim of the events that have taken place
in
Africa
in
general.
very
reticent
to
an
and
multiple
radical
since the beginning of the year.
Additionally, it seems that the Malians
are
disorder
international
In the introduction of the present
intervention and are looking for recuperating
work, we mentioned that it is estimated that
their national pride. In that sense, they seem
200,000 people needed to escape from their
not to be interested in waiting for an
homes due to the growing violence between
international or regional operation (Sanou,
the different groups. In Gao alone, 35,000
2012). It is believed that Bamako is trying to
people have fled since January 2012, which
mobilize a special force in order to confront
totals half of the population (Libération,
the crisis in NM (RFI, 2012a). However, this
2012). The people that are still in the region
might also be a failure as they risk their young
of NM continue to face harsh reality. Men,
recruits to confront something similar to
women and children are the victims of what
urban guerrilla.
can be perceived as a mixture of religious and
nationalist demands that are less clear each
Voices from Victims
day as the violence is, on the contrary, getting
“War loves to seek its victims in the young.”
-Sophocles
worse.
As the insurgencies in NM have
While the civilian men cannot do
become more complex and radicalized,
anything against the violence because the
14
groups are well armed, women and children
moment to determine the number of children
are the primary victims of the conflict.
that have been recruited in the various groups,
Human Rights Watch and UNICEF denounce
but UNICEF claimed that at least 175 of them
the various violations perpetrated by the
already part of the armed group ranks and are
different
Whereas
estimated to be aged between 8 and 12 years
organizations such as UNICEF cannot access
old (UNICEF, 2012). The fact that most of the
the region due to the volatile security situation
schools are closed also worsens child
of NM
recruitment since the children are more
factions
(UN,
conducting
in
NM.
2012),
in
vulnerable when they do not have a
partnership with local organizations in order
productive activity that retains their attention.
to document the abuse. On the one hand, it is
It is estimated that the basic education of over
reported that women are victims of sexual
300,000 students might be in danger and this
abuse. These sexual crimes are committed by
also increases the chance that they will fall
both the Islamists groups and the separatists
victims of armed resistance (UNICEF, 2012).
even if data are still missing to determine
Moreover, the situation in NM is increasingly
exactly how many cases are attributed to each
volatile and the children are also victims of
group (RNU, 2012). The instances of sexual
the collateral damage. Many of them have
abuses are not isolated and are increasing
been mutilated or killed by explosive devices.
throughout
In fact, half of the mutilated victims are
women
diverse
they have been
the
are
investigations
northern
also
region.
abducted
Young
and
raped
children (RNU, 2012).
repeatedly. In Gao alone, 17 cases of violent
To all of this, there is the problem
sexual aggression have been reported and
there
is
thought
to
be
many
associated with the intention of the Islamist
more
groups applying a strict Sharia interpretation
undocumented. The abuses seemed to have
to NM. Reported cases of flagellations and
been perpetrated more so by the MNLA in
forced ways of dressing (not usual for the
this region, however, this has not been
ethnic groups in NM since their traditional
officially proven (Marièke, 2012).
dresses do not conform to the rigid Sharia’s
On the other hand, UNICEF, Human
Rights
Watch
and
the
UN
cited
requirements) have been seriously taken into
the
account and a number of civilians are fearing
recruitment of children in the militias of the
this sudden change in their way of living
Islamists groups and the MNLA factions (UN,
(Oumar, 2012).
2012; RNU, 2012). It is still difficult at the
15
Finally, it is also difficult to identify
are affecting about 18 million people in the
who is perpetrating the violence. It is argued
Sahel (CARE, 2012). This paints a pretty dark
that both the Islamists of MUJAO and Ansar
and uncertain future for the Northern Malians.
Dine, and the nationalists of MNLA are
Concluding Thoughts
implicated in violence and acts of terrorism.
At the time of compiling this paper,
However, the military forces and the central
the political crisis in Mali was far from being
government in Bamako are so weak that they
resolved. On the 14th and 15th of August 2012,
cannot respond to this juridical problem,
leaving
the
perpetrators
the Malian government and its army met the
unpunished.
heads of state of the Cédéao in order to
Consequently, Bamako is seeking the help of
establish a concrete plan that would be
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in
addressing
the
problem
since
implimented under the auspice of the UN
severe
(Kamguia K., 2012). The outcome of the
violations of International Humanitarian Law
meeting was not successful since the Malian
have been perpetrated within the past months
government did not accept one of the three
in NM. The ICC has been asked to investigate
proposals of the plan. Mali did not accept the
the war crimes occurring in the Sahel on the
fact that external actors would take charge of
basis of a number of allegations of human
the transitional institutions of Bamako. To the
rights violations denounced by various NGOs
and
international
organizations
Malian army and government, this is a war
(Gueye,
that nobody can conduct except the Malians
2012a). In addition to the insecurity, an
themselves (Kamguia K., 2012). However,
outbreak of cholera has been reported in Mali:
they accepted the logistical support offered by
out of the 34 reported cases, at least 2 known
the Cédéao with the aim of reorganizing the
fatalities have been recorded (RNU, 2012). In
military forces and reconquering the northern
general, the population suffers from the
part
absence of the state to ensure their most basic
of
the
country
that
is
currently
monopolized by Tuareg Islamists.
rights. The hospitals lack medical supplies
and most of the furniture they receive from
The most recent data concerning the
the International Committee of the Red Cross
displaced people are even more alarming.
is given to the combatants and not the
More than 436,000 people fled from their
civilians (Idoumou, 2012). The appalling
homes due to the crisis and around 140 cases
sanitary situation coupled with food crisis
of cholera have been documented with 11
aggravated by the worst drought since the
deaths (AFP, 2012). A rapid solution is
beginning of the insurgencies in January 2012
necessary in order to avoid a degradation of
16
the situation as was the case with Somalia.
(Castillo, 2012) and this is why this paper
The good news is that, at least, the extremist
chose to discuss multiple insurgencies. Mali is
groups are not enjoying a lot of credibility
confronting a very fragile and volatile
among the Sufi culture that characterizes
situation that is geopolitically not easy to
Mali's population. In fact, the Islamists are
manage. The truth is that, even if a regional
having trouble in convincing the population
approach might be the best solution, the
that their ideology can be an alternative to
Malians still face a huge and unanswered
democracy and are thus trying to reach new
question regarding democracy.
sections of the Malian society in order to gain
ACRONYMS
support, but in vain (Idoumou, 2012a).
Moreover, the population in NM is now
AFP
Agence France Presse
AQIM
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb
ATT
Amadou Toumani
Touré
AU
African Union
CÉDÉAO
Communauté
économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
IC
International
Community
ICC
International Criminal
Court
MNLA
Mouvement national de
Libération de l’Azawad
MPA
Mouvement populaire
de l’Azawad
MUJAO
Mouvement pour
l’unicité et le djihad en Afrique de l’Ouest
NM
Northern Mali
UN
United Nations
organizing itself to protect people from the
exaction
perpetrated
by
the
insurgents
(Powelton, 2012). The unique preoccupation
would be that the links between AQMI, AlShabaab or Boko Haram become more
pronounced (Griswold, 2012) to the point that
they could be involved in huge criminal
activities such as drug trade to finance their
organisations or through kidnap.
What should be done in Mali? Is an
international
or
regional
intervention
necessary? Is the Malian army giving too
much of a chauvinist connotation to the crisis
by prioritizing the pride over the security of
the civilians? Why is Algeria so reticent
regarding intervention? Why is the Cédéao so
insistent? This paper was an attempt to
portray the actual situation in Mali and to
open up new avenues to understand the crisis.
It is important to specify that the Tuaregs
never formed a united political entity
17
Tuareg Livelihood’, Bachelor (thesis),
Rosekilde University, Denmark
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20