PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE
EXECUTIVE IN IRELAND: NONPARTY, INTER-PARTY, CROSS-PARTY
AND INTRA-PARTY
Michael Gallagher
Department of Political Science
Trinity College, University of Dublin
Dublin 2, Ireland
Phone: +353-1-608 1891
Fax: +353-1-677 0546
Email: mgllgher @ tcd.ie
Paper presented in the workshop on “Parliamentary control of the
executive”, directed by Thomas D. Lancaster and Manuel Sanchez de
Dios, at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium of Political
Research, Copenhagen, 14–19 April 2000
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
2
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland: inter-party, cross-party and
intra-party
“Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland”, if not quite on the same level as
“socialism in the American Congress” or “mountaineering in Denmark”, might not
seem to be a topic offering a great deal of scope for exploration. By common consent,
the Irish parliament is not among the world’s strongest in its capacity to control or
even constrain the executive. Comparative textbooks, drawing upon such
information on Ireland as is available, rate it as among the least powerful of
legislatures. Writers on Irish politics, who to some extent provide the raw material
for the assessment of comparativists, have, at least in the past, delivered withering
assessments. In the 1970s it was described as “supine”, in the 1980s it was adjudged
“a woefully inadequate institution”, and in the 1990s it was seen as “a puny
parliament peopled by members who have a modest view of their functions and a
poor capacity to carry them out” (quotes from Ward, 1974, p. 241; Dinan 1986, p. 71;
Chubb, 1992, p. 189). The Irish parliament, for obvious historical reasons, was based
closely upon the Westminster model when it was established in 1922 at the time of
independence from Britain. The post-independence political elite “rather uncritically
accepted the British model of government Ireland had inherited, a model in which
party governments dominate the political process by controlling the executive and
the lower house” (Ward, 1996, p. 59). Until recently, the Irish parliament scarcely
overhauled its procedures even to the limited extent that the House of Commons
did in the twentieth century.
We shall begin by briefly setting the scene, giving a brief overview of the structure
of parliament and of the general pattern of behaviour of members of parliament and
their attitudes to the whole question of parliamentary control. Having established
the context, and in particular the very different perspectives of government deputies
and opposition deputies, we will examine in more detail the means through which
the opposition might hope to control government by means of parliamentary
weapons, and through which the government’s own parliamentary supporters may
be able to exert a degree of control.
In doing this, it would not be profitable to adopt the traditional “government versus
parliament” perspective, which, in asking how much power parliament has vis-à-vis
government, implicitly treats parliament as something close to a unitary actor. This
perspective was firmly challenged by King (1976), who identified five different
“modes” of executive–legislative interactions: inter-party, opposition, cross-party,
non-party and intra-party. His typology has been modified by Andeweg and
Nijzink, who suggest that only three modes are needed: a non-party mode,
conforming to the traditional government versus parliament model; an inter-party
mode, in which members of a government party interact with members of other
government parties or with opposition MPs (these form two distinct sub-modes);
and a cross-party mode, in which ministers and MPs combine across party lines to
defend sectoral interests against other cross-party combinations that promote
different sectoral interests (Andeweg and Nijzink, 1995, p. 153). The precise
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
3
distinction between non-party and cross-party cooperation across party lines is not
entirely clear; it seems to depend on the extent to which the cooperating MPs have
identifiable sectoral interests, yet one might assume that any group of MPs
cooperating across party lines must by definition have some such common cause or
interests, so examples of a pure non-party mode might be difficult to find. In
addition, given that ministers are in practice often held in check more by their own
MPs than by opposition MPs, it is not clear why their typology discards King’s intraparty mode.
Although a proliferation of such schemes is inherently undesirable, we shall slightly
amend the scheme of Andeweg and Nijzink. MPs might interact with the
government in one of the following modes:
1. Non-party mode. MPs’ orientation to government is determined primarily by
their membership of parliament per se; the question of which party they belong
to, and which parties are in government, is not important.
2. Inter-party mode. MPs’ orientation to government is determined primarily by
their party affiliation. There are three sub-modes:
2a. Opposition mode, applicable to MPs whose parties are in opposition;
2b. External support mode, applicable to MPs whose support is vital to the
government but whose parties are not part of the government;
2c. Intra-coalition mode, applicable to MPs whose party is in government,
when they are dealing with ministers of other government parties.
3. Cross-party mode. MPs ally across party lines with other MPs and ministers
on the basis of promotion of some issue or sectoral interest.
4. Intra-party mode. MPs of a government party interact with ministers of their
own party.
This scheme is fundamentally the same as that of Andeweg and Nijzink, except for
the addition of 2b and 4.
This gives 6 possible modes or sub-modes in which MPs might interact with
government, and through which parliament might exercise control over the
executive. Thus, MPs across party lines might have a strong sense of “parliament” as
opposed to government, and might exercise control in mode 1. Alternatively, the
rules or conventions of parliament might mean that in practice the cooperation of
the opposition is essential for the passage of legislation, in which case we might
speak of parliamentary control in mode 2a. A minority government will be
constrained by those MPs able to operate in mode 2b, while a coalition government
will be constrained by those MPs able to operate in mode 2c. If MPs identify
themselves with issues or sectoral interests that cut across party lines, then there is
potential for parliamentary control in mode 3. Finally, all governments will be
constrained by MPs of their own party, operating in mode 4.
The salience of any of these modes of interaction or control will vary among
parliaments. In this paper, as we examine parliamentary control in Ireland, we shall
largely disregard modes 2c and 3. Regarding mode 2c, although it is true that
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
4
coalition government has become the norm in Ireland, the intra-coalition mode does
not appear significant. The relationship between coalition parties is handled
primarily by the party leaders, and does not otherwise directly involve members of
parliament. As for mode 3, this is almost completely absent from the Irish
parliament; the few exceptions will be noted at the appropriate places, such as the
role of committees in policy-making.
PARLIAMENT IN THE IRISH POLITICAL SYSTEM
The system of government is prescribed by the constitution, which dates from 1937.
This establishes a bicameral parliament: there is a directly-elected lower house, Dáil
Éireann, and an indirectly elected upper house, Seanad Éireann. Membership of the
Dáil varies over time in line with population changes – it currently stands at 166 –
while the size of the Seanad is fixed at 60. The Seanad has very few powers, and
Lijphart’s categorisation of Ireland as a case of “weak bicameralism” could not be
disputed (Lijphart, 1999, p. 212). The Seanad has only minor delaying powers over
legislation (Gallagher, 1999b, pp. 198–200), and in this paper we shall concentrate on
the role of the Dáil.
The Dáil, like most other parliaments, is dominated by political parties, the main
reason why the “government versus parliament” paradigm makes little sense.
Indeed, the entire political system is dominated by parties – government in Ireland
is very much party government. The parliamentary party groups are strong and
very cohesive; it is extremely rare for a member of the Dáil (TD) to defy the party
line on any issue whatever. Moreover, such defiance, when it occurs, almost
invariably results in immediate expulsion from the parliamentary party. As in
Britain, each parliamentary party has officers called “whips” (the term comes from
fox-hunting, in which the hounds are kept in one group by a man with a whip), and
the chief whips of the various groups organise the day-to-day activity of the Dáil.
Increasingly, it seems, the chief whips decide which of their party’s TDs should
speak and in what order. Consequently, TDs see little need to sit around in the Dáil
chamber hoping to be called by the Ceann Comhairle (Speaker); instead, they do not
turn up in the chamber until shortly before they are due to speak.
There is a strong sense in the Dáil of a continuous battle between government and
opposition, which far outweighs any feeling of a contest between government and
parliament. This is reflected in, and perhaps reinforced by, the seating arrangements
in the Dáil chamber, which are based on those of the palace of Westminster. The
government and the opposition front bench spokespersons confront each other
across a strip of “neutral territory”, and behind each set of leaders are ranged their
respective rank-and-file supporters, who for obvious reasons are termed
“backbenchers”. An essentially adversarial relationship between government and
opposition is assumed by this physical structure, and this contrasts with the practice
in a number of other European countries of seating the government as a bloc facing
the entire parliament (see diagrams in Andeweg and Nijzink, 1995, p. 158). In
addition, the government and parliament buildings are adjacent, and in fact form
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
5
part of the same complex. The prime minister simply has to walk along a few
corridors from his office to reach the Dáil chamber. There is no equivalent of the
president or prime minister “setting out to visit” parliament from the White House,
10 Downing Street or the Matignon, with whatever extra sense of separation of
government and parliament this may engender. Moreover, parliament does not get
any block grant as of right, being instead in receipt of whatever funding the
Department of Finance deems appropriate – though some parliamentary insiders
feel that however demeaning this may be, in practical terms parliament actually
does better financially from this arrangement than it would from a block grant.
It is worth emphasising that all members of government in Ireland are also
members of the Dáil.1 In these circumstances, the “fusion” between government
members and the government parliamentary group(s) is especially strong, and the
degree of psychological separation between government and parliament is likely to
be especially weak. In most parliamentary systems, either there is a prohibition on
ministers being simultaneously MPs or, at least, there will be some ministers who
are not MPs; Ireland seems to be virtually unique in the degree of fusion between
government and parliament (see Figure 1). The government could be seen as a
committee of parliament, a committee to which parliament has delegated
considerable powers, or at least a committee of those deputies on the government
side of the house. From this perspective, it is more realistic to see parliament as
wielding power through the government that it has elected than to see it as seeking
to check a government that has come into being independently of it. The two-body
model might make sense when the executive comes into being independent of
parliament (for example, a president directly elected by the people or a prime
minister appointed by the monarch), but it makes much less sense when parliament
itself elects a subset of its own members to be the government.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
When examining parliamentary control under the headings outlined above, it is
important to bear in mind the orientation of deputies towards the executive,
something that is strongly affected by the fusion of government and parliament. It
means that there is scarcely any notion of a parliamentary career structure per se, as
opposed to a career structure that entails moving from the backbenches into
government. Ambitious backbenchers want to be in government, not to be
scrutinisers of government. It seems safe to say that no politician enters the Dáil
with the dream of becoming a committee chairperson, but many dream of becoming
a minister. This is not an unrealistic aspiration, given that in the average Dáil about a
quarter of all TDs either are or have been cabinet ministers, and another quarter are
or have been junior ministers outside the cabinet. Not all TDs think in these terms, it
is true; some are primarily locally oriented and have little interest in national
political issues per se, let alone in parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. These TDs
1.
According to the constitution (Article 28.7), all government members must belong to one of the
houses of parliament, with at most two ministers belonging to the Seanad. In practice, all
ministers belong to the Dáil; there have been only two short-lived exceptions since the
promulgation of the constitution in 1937.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
6
are not aspiring ministers, but neither are they likely to seek powers of policymaking and scrutiny for parliament. Thus those TDs who are not actually members
of the government have at best an ambivalent attitude to the idea of strengthening
the weapons of policy-making and scrutiny; those who hope to be ministers one
day, both government backbenchers and opposition TDs, do not necessarily favour
reforms that would weaken the control of ministers. In contrast, in countries where a
significant number of ministers are drawn from outside parliament and where many
MPs know they will never be a minister, it is inherently more likely that MPs will
seek to maximise the power of “parliament” as a non-party body.
In these respects, Ireland seems to be an archetypal example of a Fraktionenparlament,
in other words a parliament dominated by the parliamentary party groupings, and
this, combined with its conventional categorisation as a Westminster model country,
might seem to leave very little room for parliament to do anything worth studying.
However, for three reasons in particular, the idea of some degree of parliamentary
control over the executive is still a meaningful one.
First, minority government and coalition government are both common. Although
Ireland shares a number of features of the archetypal Westminster model, in certain
respects it differs from this model, most notably in its judicially interpreted written
constitution and its electoral system of proportional representation by means of the
single transferable vote (see Coakley and Gallagher, 1999, for a general overview of
Irish politics and government). The PR electoral system in particular makes politics
and government in Ireland quite different from the British pattern. Single-party
majority government, which was close to the norm in the early years of the state, has
become less common; governments with this status have been in office for only
about a third of the time from 1948 to the present (Gallagher, 1999b, p. 181). Indeed,
no single-party majority government has been elected since 1977. Coalition
government has become the norm, something that can be expected to have at least
some effect on dynamics within the government bloc in parliament, providing scope
for intra-coalition control (mode 2c). Moreover, minority government is not
uncommon (such governments were in office for 27 per cent of the time between
1948 and 1997), and, quite clearly, minority governments will not be able to wield
the same amount of control as majority governments. In addition, the PR-STV
electoral system has allowed, perhaps facilitated, the election of independent TDs,
and the Dáil is now virtually unique in Europe in containing a number of
independent deputies, whose presence provides an exception to the control
otherwise exerted by the Fraktionen. Hence there is scope for parliamentary control
in external support mode (mode 2b).
Second, even if the Dáil as a body lacks either the power or the will to exercise a
high degree of control over the government, this does not render the opposition
entirely ineffective. A variety of procedures and provisions, which we shall outline
in the paper, allow the government to be checked, or at least monitored, in various
ways, opening up the possibility of parliamentary control in opposition mode (mode
2a).
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
7
Third, although we have already observed that it is extremely rare for government
backbenchers not to support a government measure in votes in the Dáil, this does
not mean that these deputies are “dumb sheep” or mere “lobby fodder” who
automatically do the government’s bidding on every issue. Such a conclusion would
miss the point that these deputies have something close to a veto power over what
measures the government decides to bring to parliament in the first place. A
majority single-party government, in particular, can realistically be checked only by
its own backbenchers, who are able to exercise intra-party control (mode 4).
We now turn to a more detailed examination of the ways in which governments
may be controlled, or at least constrained, by parliament – in practice, by specific
actors within parliament. We shall examine this under the three conventional
headings of government formation, policy making, and scrutiny of the executive.
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENT SURVIVAL
The survival of a government in Ireland is entirely dependent on its retaining the
support of the Dáil – or, to be precise, on not being opposed by a majority within the
Dáil. The sequence of events for the coming into being of a government is
(i) the Dáil nominates the prime minister (termed the Taoiseach), and the
president duly appoints this person (Article 13.1.1 of the constitution)
(ii) the Taoiseach nominates the government and, once the Dáil has approved it,
the president appoints it (Article 13.1.2).
Similarly, the Dáil may at any time dismiss the Taoiseach (and hence the
government) by simple majority vote. Article 28.10 of the constitution states that
“The Taoiseach shall resign from office upon his ceasing to retain the support of a
majority in Dáil Éireann unless on his advice the President dissolves Dáil Éireann
and on the reassembly of Dáil Éireann after the dissolution the Taoiseach secures the
support of a majority in Dáil Éireann”. Thus, leaving aside the limited scope for
discretion that the president may exercise in these circumstances (Gallagher, 1999c,
pp. 107–8), which does not directly concern us here, parliament installs a
government in office and parliament may end its tenure at any time.
Government formation
How far, then, can it truly be said that it is parliament that determines which parties
shall form the government? The short answer is: not very far, yet markedly further
than is the case in an archetypal Westminster model country. Governments may
come into being by decisions made by any of three sets of actors: voters, political
parties, or parliament. We may say that the voters have chosen the government if an
election gives either a single party or a pre-declared coalition an overall majority of
seats; in this case parliament, though still nominally making the decision, is merely
ratifying the decision of the voters. The parties have made the decision if, after an
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
8
election, two or more parties agree on the formation of a majority coalition
government; here, too, the role of parliament is merely to rubber-stamp a decision
reached elsewhere. We may say that parliament has in any real sense chosen the
government only when the Dáil elects a government that does not control majority
support.
In these terms, eleven of the 27 governments (ie 41 per cent of them) to enter office
after elections, or as a result of an inter-election change in the partisan composition
of a government, between 1922 and 1999 can be said to have chosen by parliament
(see Table 1). On ten occasions (the most recent, though, being as far back as 1977)
one party or an identifiable coalition won an overall majority of seats; on a further
six, parties controlling a majority of seats put together a post-election majority
coalition.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The eleven cases where we can say that parliament was the real decision-maker, as
opposed to merely the arena where a decision reached elsewhere was formally
recorded, consist of nine that resulted in the election of a minority single-party
administration and two that produced minority coalitions (these are 1981 and 1997).
On some of these occasions, parliament has been universally viewed as the decisive
actor, in the sense that when it met to elect the government there was widespread
uncertainty about what would happen. On one occasion, in 1987, indeed, the Dáil
was tied (82–82) on the nomination of the Fianna Fáil leader as Taoiseach, and it
took the casting vote of the speaker to secure his election.
The figure of 41 per cent of governments whose appointment is decided by
parliament in a manner that is not pre-determined by the decisions of either the
voters or the political parties could be seen as either high or low, depending on
one’s prior expectations. Of course, the decisions even in these cases are made by
deputies acting as members of parties rather than by “parliament” as a unitary actor,
but if such cases cannot be seen as examples of parliament choosing the government,
then it is difficult to imagine what cases would qualify, just as we speak of the
electorate choosing a government or a president even though we know that many
people voted against that choice.
Government termination
The Dáil also has the power to dismiss a government, and this too has been
significant. Formally, parliament has ousted a government only twice, in November
1982 and 1992, by passing motions of no confidence in the Taoiseach. We could add
to this a further case, in January 1982, when a government’s budget was defeated;
this was interpreted as equivalent to a vote of no confidence and a general election
followed immediately.
Only three cases in the 78 years (1922–2000) of the independent Irish state does not
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
9
sound like a lot, and might suggest that, once installed, governments can take
parliament’s support pretty much for granted. However, appearances can be
deceptive. There have been ten other occasions when the Dáil has in effect
terminated the life of a government, in that the government has chosen to resign
rather than face what seemed to be inevitable defeat in a confidence motion. To give
the most recent example, in November 1994 the Fianna Fáil–Labour coalition broke
up; the Labour party left the government and declared that it would be voting with
the opposition in a motion of no confidence that the opposition had tabled. Had the
motion gone to a vote, it would undoubtedly have been passed given that Fianna
Fáil held only 67 of the 166 seats, but the government pre-empted its dismissal by
resigning in advance of the vote.
Given that a government needs the support of the Dáil to get into office in the first
place, under what circumstances might it subsequently be ejected from office by the
Dáil? There are at least five possible explanations:
(i) an initially secure position might be undermined as a result of by-election
defeats (in Ireland, as in Britain, casual vacancies are filled by by-elections,
and these usually result in government defeats), absences of government TDs,
or the defection from the government parties of TDs elected for one of these
parties, enabling TDs acting in opposition mode to bring down the
government.
(ii) a minority government may deliberately adopt an inflexible stance in dealing
with other parties and independents in the belief that it would fare well in an
election precipitated by defeat in the Dáil, allowing TDs acting in opposition
mode to defeat it on some issue;
(iii) a minority government might rely on the tacit support or benign neutrality
of small parties and/or independent TDs, but an issue may arise that causes
some of these to vote against the government, leading to the termination of
the government’s life by TDs acting in external support mode;
(iv) a government might be brought down by internal factors, such as the breakup of a coalition government, ie by TDs acting in intra-coalition mode;
(v) a government might suffer defections among its own backbench supporters,
operating in intra-party mode, in combination with the opposition, to defeat
it.
As Table 2 shows, most governments (18 out of 31) have come to an end voluntarily,
with the prime minister retiring or dissolving parliament either tactically or at the
end of a term. This leaves thirteen occasions when a government’s life has been
ended against its will, and Table 2 seeks to categorise these, though it must be
acknowledged that in some cases more than one factor was involved. Only in 1938,
1944 and 1951 was opposition strength sufficient to bring down the government
(and in 1951 the position was complicated by the break-up of some minor parties in
the coalition, with some of these parties’ TDs becoming independents), but of course
in all the other cases opposition strength was necessary.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
10
Summing up this discussion in terms of the various kinds of controls that might be
exercised, we can conclude as follows:
Non-party controls
Parliament could exercise control over government composition if its members were
unconcerned about the partisan composition of government. Given that, on the
contrary, MPs very definitely do think in party terms, there is in effect no “nonparty” control over government formation.
Inter-party controls
(a) Opposition mode. In the essentially adversarial Irish political system, the
opposition can be expected to oust the government by means of a no confidence
motion whenever it has the chance. However, it rarely has the chance to do so,
unless the balance of forces changes during the lifetime of a parliament. The
opposition’s determination to bring down a government is necessary to achieve this,
but is rarely sufficient.
(b) External support mode. Those MPs able to operate in this mode have a better
chance to terminate the life of a government, given that their support is crucial for
its survival. Several Irish governments have indeed had their terms ended by MPs
acting in this way.
(c) Intra-coalition mode. Coalition governments are vulnerable to break-up if the
component parties fall out, and three Irish governments have ended due to this.
Intra-party controls
Although a government could in theory be dismissed due to a rebellion by its own
deputies, an explicit internal rebellion against the government per se has never
happened and, given the very high levels of party discipline, cannot realistically be
envisaged. However, intra-party controls can certainly be used to bring about the
downfall of a prime minister. This occurred in January–February 1992, when Charles
Haughey resigned as Fianna Fáil leader and as Taoiseach due to a rebellion against
his leadership; he was replaced as party leader by his main rival within the party,
Albert Reynolds.2 Reynolds was duly elected by the Dáil as the new Taoiseach, at
the head of a government of exactly the same partisan composition as Haughey’s. In
1994 it was Reynolds who met this fate, though a break-up of the coalition was the
more fundamental cause in that it brought about the internal party moves against
Reynolds. The Fianna Fáil deputies realised that if he remained party leader, the
2.
The Fianna Fáil leader is chosen by the party’s Dáil representatives.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
11
Labour party would withdraw from the coalition government and precipitate either
a change of government or an election. Reynolds was replaced as party leader by
Bertie Ahern, and a fresh Fianna Fáil–Labour coalition was about to be formed when
Labour decided not to go into government with Fianna Fáil at all; instead, the party
joined with two of the opposition parties, Fine Gael and Democratic Left, to form a
new government (Garry, 1995).3 This remains the only occasion when there has been
a change in the partisan composition of a government without an election. In 1979,
during a period of single-party Fianna Fáil government, pressure from backbenchers
led the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, to retire earlier than he had intended, and he was
succeeded by Haughey, who formed a fresh Fianna Fáil single-party majority
government.
Summing up this section, it is clear that while “parliament” as a non-party actor is
unlikely to dismiss a government, a government continues in existence only for as
long as it can command a majority in parliament in any vote of confidence. Clearly,
this potentially gives “parliament” a degree of control over what the government
does – if the government doesn’t do what certain actors within parliament want it to
do, parliament can simply dismiss the government. How, then, is this potential
control manifested? In what areas can we see evidence of actors within parliament
being able to exert control over government? We shall now examine the area of
policy-making generally, before moving on to the scrutiny functions performed by
parliament.
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER DECISION-MAKING
When we come to examine the degree of control exerted by parliament in the field of
policy-making – which includes law-making, the supply of money to the
government, and so on – we can again use the four categories of non-party, interparty, cross-party and intra-party control. Non-party control refers to the ability of
MPs operating without regard to party to control decision-making. Inter-party
control can refer to the degree of control exerted by opposition parties, external
support parties, and coalition actors over government policy; cross-party control
refers to the extent to which decision-making is in practice made on a cross-party
basis by MPs across party lines with common sectoral interests; intra-party control
refers to the way in which backbench members of the government party or parties
may control the behaviour of their government ministers.
Before we discuss this in more detail, we should acknowledge that a range of factors
3.
Many Irish party labels, Labour apart, reveal little about the ideological complexion of the parties.
Fianna Fáil, the largest party, was allied in the European Parliament with the RPR (Gaullists) until
the RPR group fragmented in 1999. Fine Gael, the second largest party, is a member of the
christian democratic group. The Progressive Democrats belong to the Liberal group. Democratic
Left was slightly to the left of Labour, but the two parties merged in January 1999. For more on
the Irish parties see Laver and Marsh, 1999; Mair, 1999; Sinnott, 1995.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
12
have led to a good deal of decision-making moving outside the confines of
parliament altogether; sometimes, indeed, outside the scope of government. First,
judicial review is significant in Ireland (contrary to the view of a number of
comparative textbooks), and the courts, interpreting the constitution (which can be
changed only by referendum), have struck down a number of laws over the years
and, in broad terms, impose powerful constraints on what political actors can do
(Gallagher, 1999a). Second, the growing role of the EU means that an increasing
proportion of decisions are made at that level, by-passing not only the Dáil but also
national parliaments in other member states. Third, since the late 1980s Ireland has
moved firmly to the corporatist end of the pluralist–corporatist scale when it comes
to the making of economic policy; it has become the norm, every three years, for
government, trade unions and employers’ organisations to hammer out a package
involving not only wages but also taxation policy and government spending
patterns, and parliament – or, more precisely, those MPs who are not government
ministers – are left with little role except to chew over a fait accompli (Murphy,
1999).
Non-party control
As was noted in the introductory section of this paper, it is not entirely clear what
we would look for under this heading. Mere examples of MPs combining across
party lines to make policies would not suffice, for, according to the definition of
Andeweg and Nijzink, if the combining MPs are motivated by some common
interest then this is in fact an example of activity in cross-party rather than nonparty mode. Moreover, the interpretation of “common interest” is broad:
such interests need not be confined to policy areas such as agriculture,
defence, or education. Regional or linguistic interests may also provide
incentives for relations between ministers and MPs that cut across party lines
(Andeweg and Nijzink, 1995, p. 164).
Only if we can find some example of MPs combining across party lines where it is
impossible to discover any common interest among them can we properly speak of
MPs behaving in non-party rather than cross-party mode. What exactly, other than a
common interest, might motivate MPs to cooperate across party lines is something
of a mystery. Suffice it to say that there do not seem to be any examples of such
behaviour in the Dáil.
Inter-party control
(a) Opposition mode
By general consent, the weapons of inter-party control are weak in Ireland, and this
is what mainly accounts for the quotes in the first paragraph of this paper. In this
respect at least, Ireland corresponds closely to Arend Lijphart’s Westminster-type
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
13
“majoritarian” model (Lijphart, 1999, p. 248), in which the government can usually
rely on getting all of its legislation through virtually unscathed. In this model, the
majority party or coalition is prepared, if necessary, to railroad all of its legislation
through regardless of the feelings of the opposition. Moreover, the opposition sees
its role as criticising the government rather than trying to influence it.
In many ways the relations between government and opposition in Ireland conform
to this model. Virtually all decisions can be taken by simple majority, so the
government does not need the cooperation of the opposition to have its proposals
passed. The Dáil’s agenda is set largely by the government. Under Dáil standing
orders, the government controls virtually the whole order of business, with only
about three hours a week set aside for debates on measures introduced by the
opposition (Morgan, 1990, p. 138). This domination by government must be
assumed to enjoy general consensus since no government or indeed parliament,
whatever its composition, has sought to change it. Not surprisingly, Döring (1995, p.
225) ranks Ireland, along with the United Kingdom, as occupying one end of the
spectrum when it comes to government control of the agenda, with Italy and the
Netherlands at the other end.
Virtually all government bills are passed by parliament. Defeats of such bills are,
indeed, virtually unknown, given the complete loyalty of government backbench
TDs. Even minority governments do not suffer defeats on proposed legislation. Of
course, in both cases the law of anticipated reactions can be assumed to be
operating, as we discuss further below. There is no explicit equivalent of the French
“confidence vote procedure” that Huber discusses (Huber, 1996, pp. 3–7), but in
practice all government legislation comes with an implicit confidence motion
attaches; if a government were to suffer defeat on any of its bills, it would be likely
to resign and advise the president to dissolve parliament.
Similarly, virtually all bills that are passed by parliament are government bills. Any
deputy can introduce a “private member’s bill”, but these rarely become law; one
passed in 1989 was the first for over 40 years, and there have been only a handful
since then. Such bills are almost always introduced by an opposition TD, usually in
reality on behalf of his or her party rather than by a lone deputy. The rare private
member’s bills that succeed do so because the government has no objection to the
bill and does not block its passage. “Free votes”, that is, votes where party discipline
is relaxed, are virtually unknown in the Dáil, so there is no scope for a private
member’s bill to prevail by mobilising government backbench support against the
wishes of the government. Even so, unsuccessful private member’s bills may have
some impact. The government, in explaining why it will be voting the proposal
down, may criticise the timing or the detail of the bill while welcoming its broad
thrust, and the bill may be the spur for the rapid production of a government bill
along similar lines.
A further impediment to the chances of the opposition securing the passage of its
own proposals comes from the provision, in Article 17.2 of the constitution, that no
resolution that would entail the expenditure of public money is valid unless the Dáil
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
14
has received a message from the Taoiseach, on behalf of the government, endorsing
the measure. The rationale of this, clearly, is to prevent the Dáil voting for the
spending of money but then voting against government efforts to raise the revenue
to pay for it. The Dáil shares this feature with parliaments in France, the UK,
Portugal and Spain (Döring, 1995, p. 232).
Ireland’s law-making procedure is based closely upon that of the House of
Commons, and ensures that government measures emerge largely unscathed. Bills
go through a number of stages and, importantly, the debate on the broad principle
of the bill precedes the detailed consideration by committee; the former is the second
stage of bills, the latter the third stage. Quite clearly, a debate by the whole house is
conducive to promotion of the inter-party mode while committees are much more
likely to operate in non-party or cross-party mode, and it is generally agreed that the
order in which these two stages occur has a great influence on the scope for
parliamentarians to achieve a genuine input into decision-making.
Debates by the full Dáil on bills – nearly all of these, as we have said, being
government bills – tend to be formal and ritualistic. Given the centrist nature of all
the main Irish parties, few items of legislation provoke intense antagonism from the
opposition, but the opposition usually criticises some aspect of the bill, or argues
that it is belated. Attendance in the Dáil chamber is almost invariably low for such
debates, and indeed the term “debate” is something of a misnomer, as matters
proceed mainly by TDs coming in to make a speech prepared in advance and then
leaving at once. One TD, one of the few who is noted as a “parliamentarian”, in
Andeweg’s terminology (Andeweg, 1997), deplores this:
It is the whips, rather than the chair, who decide which of their deputies
speak in debates and in which order. This, in particular, leads to the daily
scandal seen on TV of a virtually empty Dáil chamber, as deputies due to
speak go into the chamber just a few minutes before the time appointed by
the whips. Not long ago deputies had to sit in the chamber to listen to the
debate and hope to catch the eye of the chair (Mitchell, 1999).
In this regard the Dáil resembles the archetypal Fraktionenparlament, the Bundestag,
in which the leaders of the Fraktionen prestructure all debates, allocating speaking
time in such a way that there is hardly any scope for spontaneous action by
individual MPs (Schüttemeyer, 1994, pp. 35–9). With the outcome a foregone
conclusion, there is little point in TDs putting much effort into second stage
speeches. In terms of the likelihood of influencing anyone’s vote, a speech by an
opposition TD is “like heckling a steamroller”, in the words of the British Labour
MP Austin Mitchell (quoted in Norton, 1994, p. 19). It is not clear how valid the
picture of deputies in the past listening to the debates and participating freely really
is: as long ago as 1929 the Fianna Fáil party whip secured the agreement of the
parliamentary party that none of the party’s TDs would be allowed to speak in the
Dáil without the agreement of the whips (Horgan, 1997, pp. 49–50).
At the third stage of bills, the committee stage, the opposition might be able to make
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
15
some impact, as we discuss below, but it will not be able to achieve this in
opposition mode, ie by imposing amendments against the wishes of the
government. At this stage bills are considered in detail by a small committee, with
the minister responding to suggested amendments, but the prospects of a
government defeat are remote. The government usually has a majority on each
committee, and, in the unlikely event of a government defeat in a committee vote,
any committee decision can be overturned by the full Dáil.
What we have written so far in this section assumes that government and opposition
are inherently in conflict, and in this situation it is clear that opposition scope for
influence is very low. Opposition parties can be excluded from all power and
influence if the government wishes this. If the opposition is to have any impact, it
must be through the existence of more consensual patterns of behaviour; that is,
through a government willingness to take on board opposition suggestions and
objections, even though it does not have to. At the risk of sending the typology
spiralling out of control, we might distinguish between a government operating in
“conflictual mode” vis-à-vis the opposition and one operating in “consensus mode”.
We have seen that an Irish opposition confronted by a government operating in
conflictual mode has little or no scope to control the government.
However, it might still be able to achieve some degree of control if the government
is willing to behave in a more consensual fashion. Even if an opposition has no
formal power, and if, as in Ireland, the rules do not give it any veto role in the
legislative process, it might still be able to wield some influence in these
circumstances. There might, for example, be political cultural constraints on
governments making major decisions without securing the opposition’s agreement,
or an unspoken pact among the parties that strong objections from the opposition
will suffice to stop any government measure in its tracks. In the Irish case, such
willingness on the part of government to operate in consensus mode might manifest
itself at any of various stages: when legislation is being drawn up, at the second
stage when the main speeches on a bill are made, or at the third (committee) stage
when bills are considered in detail. It must be said that research in this area is very
limited; the extent to which government proposals are amended during their
passage through parliament, and how many such amendments result from
opposition suggestions, has never been quantified. However, it can at least be stated
that there is a widespread impression that cooperation between government and
opposition is very limited.
When it comes to framing legislation or other policies in the first place, governments
may well consult with relevant interest groups (Murphy, 1999), but as far as is
known they do not usually consult opposition parties. The enhanced role given to
parliamentary committees from 1993 onwards has allowed these committees to play
a part in framing legislation, if the relevant minister chooses to bring general
proposals to the committee and ask it to play a part in drawing up detailed
legislation. However, it appears that this option has hardly if at all been used, as
governments prefer to keep full control of policy formulation.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
16
As for the passage of a bill through parliament, again it does not seem that
governments are particularly disposed to cede ground to opposition parties. As far
as is known, there is little or no bipartisan formulation of policy, even in policy areas
where by tradition opposition parties do not “play politics”, such as Northern
Ireland. At committee stage, the impression of observers is that ministers may be
willing to take on board amendments from opposition deputies if these do not
fundamentally change the nature of the bill, but this is not quantified.
The impression, then, is that even informal controls are fairly weak, though this
should be seen in the context of a political system marked by a great deal of policy
consensus. Many years ago, Michael Marsh observed that all the main Irish parties
accepted the mixed economy, the welfare state, membership of and integrationist
measures within the EU, and the ultimate goal of Irish unity (Marsh, 1985, p. 175).
This remains true. While there are differences of nuance between the parties in most
policy areas, it could hardly be said that very much of what one government does is
anathema to the opposition of the day. The opposition may not be able to stop the
government pressing ahead with its policies, but in most cases it has no strong
objection to these policies. Policy debate is muted further by expectations about
coalition government: opposition parties may be reluctant to attack government
policies that their prospective coalition allies agree with. Indeed, in the 1990s the
Irish parties became “politically promiscuous”, with former opponents
unexpectedly becoming coalition allies (Mair, 1999). All Irish governments, whether
single-party or coalition, have their centre of gravity very near the centre of the
political spectrum. This could offer greater potential scope for informal opposition
control, since suggested amendments emanating from the main opposition parties
are unlikely to reflect a radically different perspective on the issue in question and
thus may be relatively easy for the government to accept, but governments have an
instinctive reluctance to change their plans at the instigation of the opposition.
In summary, inter-party control in opposition mode by parliament over policymaking is weak. The formal powers of the opposition to control a government that
adopts a confrontational attitude to the opposition are extremely limited, and there
are very few signs of any informal powers that might derive from a government
willingness to promote a consensual approach between itself and the opposition.
(b) External support mode
At times of minority government, some TDs are able to operate in this mode and
may be able extract policy concessions from the government that depends on them
for its survival. Minority government is not uncommon in Ireland, accounting for 27
per cent of the time from 1948 to 1997. A minority government depends for its
existence on some non-government members of the Dáil refraining, when it comes
to the crunch, from using their power to oust the government. Usually, those
members belong to a minor party or are independent TDs – as we have already
observed, Ireland usually has more independent members of parliament than the
rest of western Europe combined (6 out of 166 TDs in 1997).
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
17
Independents’ demands tend to be particularistic. A few examples will make the
point. In March 1982, the newly-elected independent TD Tony Gregory,
representing a relatively deprived area of inner-city Dublin, undertook to vote for
the Fianna Fáil nominee for Taoiseach in exchange for a written promise to spend
large amounts of public money on various projects in his constituency. In 1989 an
independent elected in a rural constituency on a platform of opposition to a plan to
close the local hospital gave his support to the government in return for a promise to
rescind this plan. After the 1997 election, the incoming coalition government
controlled only 81 of the 166 seats, and it did firm deals (whose details were not,
though, disclosed) with three independent TDs about funding for various projects in
their constituencies. These independents have a weekly meeting with the chief whip
to “iron out” any “problems” they might have with the government business due to
go through the Dáil in the coming week. Although these independents have ready
access to government ministers, it is not clear whether this has in fact resulted in any
benefit for their constituencies in resource terms (information on the relationship
between the government and the independent TDs from O’Regan, 1998; Brennock,
1998; Rafter, 2000). In this instance, some of the independent TDs have national
policy preferences – for example, at least two are strongly opposed to abortion and
wish to see a referendum on the complete outlawing of abortion – and have striven
to give the impression that their continued support depends on the government
taking appropriate steps on the issue.
When a party rather than a number of independents is crucial to the survival of a
minority government, the price demanded is likely to be calibrated in terms of broad
policy outputs. The best known example occurred in 1987, after the election of a
minority Fianna Fáil government which, with the public finances running out of
control, immediately embarked on a programme of retrenchment in public
expenditure. The main opposition party, Fine Gael, supported this policy, and in
September 1987 its leader, Alan Dukes, announced that, in the national interest, his
party would not seek to bring the government down provided it pursued correct
policies (this was named “the Tallaght strategy” after the Dublin suburb where his
speech was made). This was a radical departure from usual Irish practice whereby
oppositions almost instinctively oppose governments at virtually every turn. It was
controversial within Dukes’s own party, with some members feeling that the party
had in effect neutered itself, especially since the government gave Fine Gael no
credit whatever and insisted that it was merely implementing the policies that it
thought right and was not in any way amending its course at Fine Gael’s behest.
Fine Gael itself claimed that its offer of conditional support was keeping the
government “on the straight and narrow”, even if the government would not admit
this.
Cross-party control
As we observed at the start of the paper, there is little sign of MPs in Ireland
operating in cross-party mode, that is, combining across party lines on the basis of
sectional interests. In some ways this is surprising given the nature of the two main
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
18
Irish parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Both are cross-class catch-all parties and
belong somewhere in the centre of the left–right spectrum. At the 1997 election, for
example, Fianna Fáil won 35 per cent of the middle-class vote, 41 per cent of the
working-class vote and 48 per cent of the farmers’ vote; Fine Gael’s figures in these
three groups were 28, 21 and 39; Labour’s were 12, 14 and 4 (calculated from Marsh
and Mitchell, 1999, p. 311). Thus there would seem to be great scope for cross-party
alliances, particularly between TDs of the two main parties, along sectoral lines,
between TDs representing agricultural interests, urban interests, or other sectors
prominent among TDs such as lawyers, teachers or publicans. Yet such alliances
seem to be virtually non-existent.
The explanation lies in the almost complete government control of parliament’s
decisions and the overwhelming primacy of party as the focus of representation for
TDs. The structure of decision-making allows few opportunities for TDs from
different parties to cooperate. Matters might be different if parliamentary
committees played a greater role in the decision-making process. If an Education
committee, an Agriculture committee, and so on were given responsibility for
decision-making in their respective spheres, we could expect such committees to
attract TDs wanting more resources for sectoral interests and being prepared to
cooperate across party lines to achieve this. The agriculture committee might well be
dominated by farmers and the education committee by teachers, for example, with
each committee seeking extra resources for the interest groups that “colonise” it, a
pattern that has been noted in a variety of countries, including Germany and
Belgium (Saalfeld, 1999, pp. 57–61; De Winter, 1999, pp. 95–7). Exactly this behaviour
was noted when the Irish committee system was expanded in the mid-1980s. The
Committee on Small Businesses of 1983–87 accepted uncritically the barrage of
material fed to it by an umbrella business organisation and produced reports that
were little more than small business wish lists (O’Halpin and Connolly, 1999, p. 133).
Given this experience, and the cross-class nature of the two main parties, the longstanding call of “more power for parliament” seems a little naive. Parliament could
be made stronger only by having a more effective committee system to which the
government was willing to devolve real power; yet, if this happened, the true
winners would not be “parliament” but those interest groups that were able to wield
the greatest influence in cross-party committees.
Intra-party control
Cross-party control is difficult enough to measure, and intra-party control poses
even more problems, because this is likely to be wielded behind closed doors rather
than in public. Intra-party control, ie the constraints imposed on governments by
their own parliamentary rank-and-file supporters, may be exercised in either of two
ways: (i) government deputies may not vote in parliament for government measures
of which they do not approve, or (ii) government deputies may exercise a veto over
the proposals that the government is able to put to parliament in the first place.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
19
The first of these happens very rarely indeed. This is another area that has not,
unfortunately, been quantified, but a reasonable estimate might be that there is on
average about one case per year of a government deputy failing to support a
government measure in a vote in the Dáil. The penalties for such indiscipline are
severe, usually entailing instant expulsion from the parliamentary party. In Fianna
Fáil the rules are especially strict: any Fianna Fáil deputy who does not support the
party line (that is, who either opposes it or even merely abstains) in a parliamentary
vote automatically loses membership of the parliamentary party. In practice, this
seems to have become a “sin bin” punishment rather than a banishment, as the
offending deputy is usually readmitted after six months or so. Instances of
government proposals actually being defeated due to lack of support from
government backbenchers are extremely few. Moral issues that arose in the 1970s
and 1980s on which the Catholic church took a strong line caused difficulties within
all parties. In 1974 a government bill to legalise the sale of contraceptives was
defeated when seven government TDs joined the opposition in the vote – bizarrely,
these TDs included the prime minister! In 1983, the wording of an anti-abortion
amendment to the constitution was also contentious, and the slightly less absolute
phraseology proposed by the government was rejected by the Dáil, in favour of a
version preferred by the opposition and by conservative anti-abortion groups, due
to the defection of a number of government deputies. With these exceptions,
governments have had every reason to feel confident that their proposals will not be
defeated due to lack of support from their own backbenchers.
The second, the possibility that government backbenchers exercise control over what
measures the government proposes to parliament in the first place, is more difficult
to judge but is almost certainly much more significant. Such control is manifested at
meetings of the respective parliamentary parties (attended by TDs, Senators and
MEPs of the party), which are held behind closed doors. As far as can be discerned,
the position is that
(a) in areas where the government has to act quickly, or where economic, foreign
policy or security concerns mean that there is an argument for confidentiality,
the government does not need to secure the prior approval of its
parliamentarians for its actions. It has to report subsequently on
developments, but the parliamentary party will not seek to have it rescind its
decisions;
(b) where routine legislation is concerned, the minister must present this to the
parliamentary party in advance of its introduction in parliament, and
government backbenchers have the power to insist on significant
amendments or even withdrawal of the proposals.
Policy areas in the first category would include the budget, traditionally kept secret
until the last moment from virtually everyone outside the government and the ranks
of those involved in drawing it up; the European Union, where governments do not
expect to have their negotiating style cramped by any other domestic political
actors; Northern Ireland, a policy area where sensitive negotiations are often in
place and where there are also security considerations. Attempts by government
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
20
backbenchers to lay down markers for the government in such fields are usually
given short shrift. This at least is the conventional wisdom; in the absence of
rigorous enquiry we cannot be certain that it is accurate. Archival research by
historians suggests that for earlier decades such a conclusion may underestimate the
veto power of backbenchers. A study of one of Fianna Fáil’s most powerful leaders,
Seán Lemass, found that on a number of occasions key decisions had to be amended
after his backbench TDs had insisted on changes, and at least once they forced him
into a climbdown over a deal that, as prime minister, he had made with other party
leaders (Horgan, 1997, pp. 164–5, 173, 199, 329).
In category (b), once again we have nothing like a precise measurement, but a few
cases have surfaced over the years. In the mid-1980s, backbenchers of one of the
coalition parties became convinced that a bill that their government was steering
through parliament was a bad piece of legislation, and following views expressed at
parliamentary party meetings, it was significantly amended. This case was unusual
in that it was Dáil speeches by an opposition TD that sowed the seeds of doubt in
the minds of the government backbenchers, so there was an “inter-party” element to
this government retreat (Gallagher, 1999b, p. 190). In early 1991 government
proposals to make contraceptives available to 16- and 17-year-olds ran into
resistance from government backbenchers and were not proceeded with. In July
1999, a government proposal to make changes in the licensing laws that publicans
felt would give hoteliers and club owners an unfair advantage precipitated heavy
pressure on government backbenchers. They were lobbied intensively by publicans,
a group whose wrath they fear, partly because many of them hold their constituency
“clinics” (where they receive constituents to listen to their grievances) in pubs, and
partly because, it is said, they fear the electoral consequences of publicans “badmouthing” them continuously to their customers (Coghlan, 1999). As a result, a
number of deputies spoke out against the measure at the parliamentary party
meeting, and the minister duly withdrew it. Interestingly, there was never any
doubt that if the minister had gone ahead and introduced the bill in parliament, all
the government backbenchers would have voted for it, notwithstanding their
reservations.
Such cases reach the media every now and again, but in the absence of detailed
study it is not clear how often such backbench veto power asserts itself. Of course,
this intra-party control can be exercised just as effectively without a showdown. It is
perfectly plausible to assume that governments, obeying the law of anticipated
reactions, always take care to judge the likely attitude of their backbenchers to any
proposal that they consider introducing. When backbench resistance compels a
proposal to be withdrawn, this is a sign that the government misjudged its deputies’
mood. In this sense, the cases where this happens merely affirm the extent of intraparty control, which is just as meaningful even if no conflict between ministers and
backbenchers occurs.
However, as far as we know this intra-party control over government is purely a
veto one; there is no evidence that backbench TDs ever set the agenda and compel
governments to initiate measures against their will. Backbench TDs, whether
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
21
government or opposition, are not policy initiators, either within the Dáil or as a
result of any extra-parliamentary role (such as that played by deputies in Iceland
and Sweden due to their positions on government commissions, which are
important in formulating policy (Arter, 1999, pp. 157, 227)).
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF GOVERNMENT
The third of the roles traditionally ascribed to “parliament”, after appointing the
government and playing a part in decision-making, is scrutinising the executive.
Emphasis on this, indeed, represents a tacit acceptance that parliament does not
have much scope in either of the first two areas; governments do not usually need to
fear being voted out of office by parliament, and neither do parliaments expect to
make decisions as opposed to merely debating and usually endorsing government
proposals. The only meaningful role left to parliaments, it seems, is to scrutinise the
government, to monitor its behaviour, expose its mistakes, and ensure its
accountability.
As we have already seen, some of the generalisations about parliament and policymaking come to look questionable when the notion of parliamentary control is
disaggregated. We shall use the same categories to examine the scrutiny powers of
parliament. By non-party control we mean the extent to which the mechanisms of
scrutiny operate on a cross-party or non-party basis, seeking to throw light on the
behaviour of government rather than simply to score political points as part of the
fight between government and opposition. Here, inter-party control refers to the
ability of the opposition to extract information from government and to put
government members on the spot, whether out of a desire to promote accountability
or simply to gain political advantage. Intra-party control refers to the extent to
which government backbenchers seek to monitor the behaviour of their party’s
ministers.
The Dáil as an institution has three main weapons with which to scrutinise the
executive: debates, parliamentary questions, and committees.
Dáil debates
Debates, other than those on bills, normally concern some pressing political issue,
with a government statement or action the focus of the discussion. Major political
developments usually bring a call from the opposition that the Dáil “debate the
issue”, which gives the opposition the chance to express its views. Debates are not
particularly useful as devices to scrutinise government. They allow the opposition a
platform to offer its alternative plans, and as such offer a means of inter-party
control, but they almost invariably end with a governmental reiteration of its
position and a vote of approval for the government’s behaviour. Their role is more
to allow issues to be aired and discussed than to compel governments to give a
detailed defence of their actions. Sometimes, government and opposition interact in
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
22
consensual fashion rather than confrontationally. For example, on issues where by
tradition the parties do not attack each other, such as Northern Ireland, the
opposition uses debates to express its support for government actions, so as to
demonstrate a united front, rather than to attack the government.
Debates have no relevance as methods of intra-party control. If backbench TDs of
the government parties wish to express reservations about government behaviour,
they are very unlikely to do this in a parliamentary debate; instead, they will do it at
a meeting of the parliamentary party, or in a private discussion with the minister
responsible.
Parliamentary questions
Like most parliaments, the Dáil allows members to put down questions to be
answered by government ministers (parliamentary questions are discussed more
fully in Gallagher, 1999b, pp. 191–4). Unlike most parliaments, there is no provision
for the interpellation, though the short debates at the end of each day’s sitting,
arising out of two or three parliamentary questions selected by the speaker, are an
approximate equivalent. Some questions are put down for “oral answer”, meaning
that the minister must answer them verbally in the Dáil chamber; others are for
“written answer”, and the TD asking the question receives an answer through the
mail. Questions for written answer mainly concern local constituency matters, and
the number of such questions has risen hugely over the years. Questions for oral
answer usually concern matters of government policy. Each cabinet minister faces
about an hour of questioning in the Dáil once every five weeks or so. The minister
has three working days to prepare an answer. This task of preparation is of course
carried out by civil servants, and it appears to be taken very seriously, with answers
being cleared at high levels of the civil service before being passed on to the minister
for approval. Civil servants are clear that their duty is to the government and not to
the opposition; one writer refers to “the skill of civil servants in crafting replies
which offer the minimum of information or insight into the government’s activities”
(O’Halpin, 1998, p. 132).
Parliamentary questions are employed almost exclusively as a means of inter-party
control by TDs operating in opposition mode. Most questions, especially those about
broad policy issues, are asked by opposition deputies rather than by government
backbenchers. Parliamentary questions provide the opportunity for TDs to grill
ministers and compel them to reveal potentially damaging information. How far
this opportunity is realised in practice is unclear. On occasions, ministers are made
uncomfortable by close questioning, and sometimes disclose information that they
would rather have kept private. “Question time”, as it is termed, probably receives
rather more media attention than other aspects of parliamentary life in Ireland, due
to the “cut and thrust” and the political point-scoring that it generates, so a poor
performance by a minister who is unable to deal effectively with opposition
questions will reach the politically aware public. However, critics argue that
parliamentary questions are largely ineffective as a means of holding governments
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
23
to account. Ministers seem to find it relatively easy, in the absence of instructions
from the Ceann Comhairle (the speaker or chairperson of the Dáil), to avoid
answering questions directly, to the frustration of opposition TDs. Jim Mitchell, an
opposition TD whom we quoted earlier, complains:
Question Time, once the great tool of parliamentary accountability, has
descended into an ineffective, unproductive, virtually unattended daily
session. Fewer questions than ever before are reached despite the fact that
fewer deputies than ever before bother to attend (Mitchell, 1999).
Occasionally, it subsequently emerges that a reply given to a parliamentary question
was, at best, evasive and incomplete. An excuse offered by members of more than
one government is that information was not disclosed because the opposition “had
not asked the right question”, even though the opposition has been able to point out
that it could not possibly have asked the right question unless it had already known
the answer (Gallagher, 1999b, p. 193). This illustrates the way in which
parliamentary questions are used almost entirely as a tactic in the battle between
government and opposition rather than between government and parliament.
Oppositions use parliamentary questions not in an innocent quest for information
but in the hope of embarrassing the government; governments respond by
disclosing as little as possible.
Parliamentary questions have little role as part of either non-party or intra-party
control. The conceptual distinction between questioning in non-party and
opposition mode seems to depend on the motivation of the questioner; is an
opposition critic of the government concerned to defend the position of parliament
against government, or to make political capital from attacking the government?
Given the impossibility of answering this for each of the approximately 16,000
parliamentary questions asked each year, we cannot disallow the possibility that
some questions from opposition TDs are asked in non-party spirit, but it seems
likely that far more come from TDs operating in opposition mode. Parliamentary
questions could be employed as a means of intra-party control, but in practice
government backbenchers do not employ parliamentary questions to try to put their
own ministers on the spot; again, if they have any doubts about what the
government is doing, they express these in private meetings. Government
backbenchers, indeed, do not even ask many questions of a purely local nature,
presumably having other channels through which to obtain information.
Parliamentary committees
Effective scrutiny of the executive, where it occurs, is most likely to be carried out by
a well developed committee system. Traditionally, the Irish parliament’s system of
committees has been anything but well developed, being based primarily on what
obtained at Westminster at the time of independence in 1922. Following a series of
reforms, perhaps better described as experiments, in the 1980s and 1990s, there
seems to be a consensus among the political parties in favour of a meaningful
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
24
committee system, but there is some uncertainty about exactly what roles
committees should have and how the system should be organised. The result has
been something close to the establishment of a fresh committee system after every
election, with expansion followed by contraction (details can be found in Arkins,
1988; Gallagher, 1999b, pp. 194–8; O’Halpin, 1986; O’Halpin, 1998, pp. 134–8). In
1983 there was expansion, with a rather haphazard and excessively large set of
committees; this was followed by contraction after the elections of 1987 and 1989.
Following the 1992 election, there was another expansion, producing a well
designed set of committees whose precise roles were not always clear; as with the
1983–87 system, there were too many committees, and TDs simply did not have to
fulfil all their committee responsibilities.
After the 1997 election, a different approach was tried. Fourteen committees were
established, with most of these committees monitoring one government department
(or in some cases two departments). The committee deals with the committee stage
of legislation emanating from the department (we dealt with this earlier when
considering decision-making), discusses the department’s financial estimates, and
generally monitors the behaviour of the department. In this last capacity it has the
power to summon civil servants from the department to give an account of the
department’s activities, and to question the minister. The committees have the
power to set their own agenda.
Clearly, unless such a committee system works on a non- or cross-party basis it can
at most provide for better informed scrutiny of the government by the opposition,
operating in inter-party mode. The relative newness of the system, and the complete
absence of detailed academic study, means that it is hard to generalise about the
impact of the committees and about the extent to which they operate on a non- or
cross-party basis rather than an inter-party basis. Each committee chooses its own
chair, in theory, but in practice it is common for the government to decide to fill
most of the committee chairs with one of its own TDs, with the government TDs on
each committee using their majority to elect one of their number. Of the 14
committees operating in March 2000, nine were chaired by a government TD, one by
an independent TD who supports the government, and only four by an opposition
TD.
Moreover, it is clear that in practice the chairs are selected by the party leaders, with
the party’s members on the committee simply ratifying this choice. Some committee
chairs are chosen on patronage grounds; for example, in the case of committees
chaired by a government TD, the post of chair (which is paid) may be used as
consolation for those not appointed to a government position. The whips control
assignment of committee members, though it appears that the wishes of individual
TDs are taken into account when deciding which TDs to put on which committee.
As we pointed out in the “Parliament in the Irish political system” section,
competition for committee places is anything but intense. While some TDs might see
a place on a committee as providing an opportunity to build a reputation that could
lead to promotion within the party and hence appointment to government at some
stage in the future, other TDs regard a committee assignment as simply a chore that
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
25
does not in any way enhance their chances of re-election.
One committee that stands a little apart from the rest is the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC), which is a standing committee (ie it is mentioned in the Dáil’s
standing orders and thus is automatically appointed after each election). By
tradition, it is always chaired by an opposition TD. It has the role of checking that
public money has spent by the executive in the manner directed by the Dáil, and can
investigate apparent irregularities, waste or inefficiency in the handling of public
money (O’Halpin, 1985). It has a close relationship with the Comptroller and
Auditor General, who controls all issues of money from the exchequer and audits
government accounts, reporting to the Dáil and advising the Public Accounts
Committee in its investigation of the accounts (O’Halpin, 1985, p. 486). The PAC has
the potential to control the executive by earning a reputation for exposing cases
where ministers, or civil servants at the behest of ministers, have spent money
outside strict accordance with the rules, or where inadequate procedures exist
within departments to ensure compliance with the rules and value for money. Its
activities should, therefore, make future compliance more likely.
The PAC is seemingly the only committee whose activities have received academic
attention, and the researcher in question was unimpressed by its performance, while
noting that an effective chairperson could make a big difference to this (O’Halpin,
1985). The PAC’s position was strengthened in the 1990s by the enhancement of the
role and resources of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Connolly and O’Halpin,
1999, p. 267). In 1999 it conducted an enquiry on apparent non-compliance by a
number of banks with, and non-implementation by the Revenue Commissioners of,
taxation laws on interest on certain bank accounts, and the speed and efficiency with
which it carried out its task earned it widespread plaudits that some felt would
enhance the status of the Dáil as a whole. It is clear that in this case it worked
entirely on a non-party basis, and this was important to its effectiveness, though
since its prime targets were not politicians this was easier for it to achieve than it
would have been for a committee that is scrutinising the work of ministers.
Summing up, committees have a degree of significance as a means of inter-party
control. They have none as a means of intra-party control; again, if government
backbenchers have a reservation about the behaviour of a minister, they will air this
at a private meeting. For a government backbencher to grill or make life hard for a
minister in public would be seen as a sign of disloyalty. Backbench government TDs
want to back the government – indeed, ultimately to become members of it – and
not to harass it. Potentially, committees can be significant in imposing a degree of
non-party control on behalf of parliament as a whole vis-à-vis the executive, though
a non-party mode of operation will be jeopardised if a committee tackles a subject
with partisan overtones. The empirical evidence as to whether this potential is
realised is lacking, but the impression is that a degree of non-party control of the
executive is exercised by these committees of scrutiny.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
26
CONCLUSION
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland is, quite clearly, limited. In Figure 2
we attempt to summarise rather crudely the picture painted in the above account.
When it comes to government survival, the government is always vulnerable to
those on whom it depends, that is its own MPs and any MPs who are giving it
external support. In practice, about a third of governments can be said to have
brought down by actors within parliament. In terms of policy making, the
opposition has little or no influence, but, again, those on whom the government
depends can exercise a degree of control, albeit more often a veto power than an
agenda-setting one. When it comes to scrutiny of government, the procedures of
parliament allow the opposition a degree of control.
Rules are one thing; the inclination of MPs to seek to control the government is
another. Observers are often struck by the apparent acceptance in Ireland, right
across the political spectrum, of the principle that “the government must govern”. In
1996 a group established to review the Irish constitution reported, and recommended few if any changes to the balance between government and parliament,
stressing throughout that “concern to ensure ... checks on Government action should
not fetter the ability of Government to decide and act in the public interest and
should, if possible, enhance that capacity, subject to full democratic check”
(Constitution Review Group, 1996, p. 91). Reviewing this report, Ward expresses
surprise that the group did not seem even to consider the opposite point of view,
that the disadvantages of “strong government” outweigh its virtues (Ward, 1996).
Certainly, it is true that there are few calls for greater parliamentary control of the
executive. Focusing on the rules of parliament as a reason why parliamentary
control is low misses the point: those rules are made by parliament, and MPs could
change them in such a way as to reduce the dominance of the government if they
wished. Rules that give the government effective control of the parliamentary
agenda are not an externally imposed restraint against which MPs chafe but, rather,
a rule made by MPs, a symptom of apparently widespread support for the notion of
strong government. Most MPs seem to prefer the status quo, not only because all
parties expect to get their turn as part of a strong government but also, it may be
suggested, because of a political culture that does not see any reason to weaken the
effectiveness and control of the government. Although the political implications of
strengthening “parliament” may not have been fully thought through by political
actors, we have suggested above that to give “parliament” greater control over
decision-making is likely in practice to strengthen interest groups.
The concept of “parliamentary control of the executive” inherently reflects the “twobody” Montesquian perspective that, we have argued, is particularly ill-fitting in the
Irish case. There is little sense of government and parliament as two separate bodies.
Instead, with all members of government being simultaneously members of
parliament, the government is more akin to a committee of parliament than an actor
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
27
engaged in a power struggle with parliament. For government MPs in particular,
when the government acts it acts on behalf of parliament, and parliamentary control
is expressed through the government that parliament has elected, not in terms of
parliamentary control over government.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
28
Table 1: Origins of governments, 1922–97
Government composition
settled by
Election: single party or
pre-declared coalition
wins majority of seats
Parties: parties controlling
a majority of seats put
together post-election
majority coalition
Parliament: Dáil elects
government that controls
only a minority of seats
Number
of cases
10
Cases
1922, 1923, 1933, 1938, 1944, 1957, 1965,
1969, 1973, 1977
6
1948, 1954, Nov 1982, 1989, 1992, 1994
11
1927-1, 1927-2, 1932, 1937, 1943, 1951,
1961, 1981, Feb 1982, 1987, 1997
Source: based on Appendix 1.
Note: Of the 32 governments listed in Appendix 1, five (Cosgrave W V, Lemass I, Lynch I, Haughey I
and Reynolds I) are excluded from these calculations. In the last four cases the new government had
exactly the same partisan composition as its predecessor, and the change of government resulted
simply from the retirement of the prime minister and his replacement by another member of his
party. In the case of Cosgrave W V, not even the prime minister changed.
Table 2: Reasons for termination of Irish governments 1922–97
Reason for termination
N cases Cases
Voluntary termination
– prime minister retires
– prime minister of minority government not in apparent
danger of defeat dissolves parliament in hope of
securing post-election majority
– government approaching end of term
Government brought down by TDs acting in opposition mode
– initially secure position undermined by by-election
defeats
– minority government courts defeat on some issue
– prime minister of minority government dissolves
parliament to pre-empt likely confidence vote defeat
Government brought down by TDs acting in external
support mode
Government brought down by TDs acting in intra-coalition
mode
Government brought down by defections among own TDs
4
2
1959, 1966, 1979, 1992-1
1933, 1989
12
1927-1, 1932, 1937, 1943,
1948, 1961, 1965, 1969,
1973, 1977, 1981, 1997
1
1951?
2
3
1938, 1944
1927-2, 1954, 1957
3
1930, 1982-1, 1982-2
3
1987, 1992-1, 1994
0
[1951?]
Source: based on Appendix 2.
Note: the 1923 election is excluded as it took place before routine patterns of political competition had
been established. In 1957, withdrawal of external support was also a key factor.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
29
Figure 1: Fusion and separation of government and parliament
Category
Examples
Complete fusion
All members of government belong to lower house of
parliament
Moderate to high fusion
Many members of government belong to lower house
of parliament, but at least some do not
Moderate separation
No member of government belongs to parliament,
but many or most members of government have
belonged to parliament in past and may well do so
again in future
Ireland
Germany, Italy (pre-1995),
United Kingdom
France, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden
High separation
No member of government belongs to parliament, few if
any members of government have ever belonged to
parliament
USA
Source: various; partly based on de Winter (1991, pp. 47–9).
Note: in the case of the United Kingdom, not all ministers belong to the directly-elected house of
parliament, the House of Commons.
Figure 2: Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
Nonparty
mode
Government survival
Policy making
Scrutiny of government
Low
Low
Medium
Opposition
mode
Low
Low
Medium
External
support
mode
Intracoalition
mode
Intraparty
mode
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
30
Appendix 1
Origins of governments 1922–97
Taoiseach
1
Years
Party(-ies)
Cosgrave W I
2
1922–23 Pro-Treaty
SF
Cosgrave W II 1923–27 CG
3
Cosgrave W III 1927–27 CG
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Cosgrave W IV
Cosgrave W V
De Valera I
De Valera II
De Valera III
De Valera IV
De Valera V
De Valera VI
Costello I
1927–30
1930–32
1932–33
1933–37
1937–38
1938–43
1943–44
1944–48
1948–51
13 De Valera VII
14 Costello II
1951–54
1954–57
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
1957–59
1959–61
1961–65
1965–66
1966–69
1969–73
1973–77
1977–79
1979–81
1981–82
1982–82
1982–87
De Valera VIII
Lemass I
Lemass II
Lemass III
Lynch I
Lynch II
Cosgrave L I
Lynch III
Haughey I
FitzGerald I
Haughey II
FitzGerald II
CG
CG
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FG + Lab
+ others
FF
FG + Lab
+ others
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FG + Lab
FF
FF
FG + Lab
FF
FG + Lab
27 Haughey III
28 Haughey IV
1987–89 FF
1989–92 FF + PD
29 Reynolds I
1992–92 FF + PD
30 Reynolds II
1993–94 FF + Lab
31 Bruton I
1994–97 FG + Lab
+ DL
1997–
FF + PD
32 Ahern I
Origins
Voters? Pro-Treaty Sinn Féin had Dáil majority given
abstention from parliament of main opposition party
Voters? CG had Dáil majority given abstention from
parliament of main opposition party
Dáil: minority government (govt commanded only 31 per cent
of seats)
Dáil: minority government
Dáil: minority government
Dáil: minority government
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Dáil: minority government
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Dáil: minority government
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Parties: post-election deal among parties produces majority
coalition not identifiable to voters in advance of election
Dáil: minority government
Parties: post-election deal among parties produces majority
coalition not identifiable to voters in advance of election
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Dáil: minority government
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Voters: majority government identifiable to voters as an option
Dáil: minority government
Dáil: minority government
Parties: post-election deal among parties produces majority
coalition not identifiable to voters in advance of election
Dáil: minority government
Parties: post-election deal among parties produces majority
coalition not identifiable to voters in advance of election
Parties: post-election deal among parties produces majority
coalition not identifiable to voters in advance of election
Parties: post-election deal among parties produces majority
coalition not identifiable to voters in advance of election
Parties: inter-election deal among parties produces majority
coalition not identifiable to voters in advance of election
Dáil: minority government
Parties: Pro-Treaty SF – Pro-Treaty Sinn Féin (forerunner of CG); CG – Cumann na nGaedheal (forerunner of
Fine Gael); FF – Fianna Fáil; FG – Fine Gael; Lab – Labour; PD – Progressive Democrats; DL – Democratic
Left
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
31
Appendix 2: Reasons for termination of Irish governments 1923–97
Taoiseach
Years
Cosgrave W I
1922–23
Cosgrave W II 1923–27
Cosgrave W III 1927–27
Cosgrave W IV 1927–30
Cosgrave W V
De Valera I
1930–32
1932–33
De Valera II
De Valera III
1933–37
1937–38
De Valera IV
De Valera V
1938–43
1943–44
De Valera VI
Costello I
1944–48
1948–51
De Valera VII
1951–54
Costello II
1954–57
De Valera VIII
Lemass I
Lemass II
Lemass III
Lynch I
Lynch II
Cosgrave L I
Lynch III
Haughey I
FitzGerald I
Haughey II
1957–59
1959–61
1961–65
1965–66
1966–69
1969–73
1973–77
1977–79
1979–81
1981–82
1982–82
FitzGerald II
Haughey III
1982–87
1987–89
Haughey IV
Reynolds I
1989–92
1992–92
Reynolds II
1993–94
Bruton I
Ahern I
1994–97
1997–
Party(-ies)
Pro-T SF
CG
CG
Reason for termination
Dissolution to allow election in peacetime conditions
Dissolution near end of term
Tactical dissolution in face of anticipated defeat in
parliament
CG
Government overreacts to Dáil defeat on minor issue by
resigning; Dáil promptly reappoints the same government
CG
Dissolution near end of term
FF
Tactical dissolution by minority government in hope of
securing majority status
FF
Dissolution near end of term
FF
Tactical dissolution by minority government after Dáil defeat
on minor issue in hope of securing majority status
FF
Dissolution near end of term
FF
Tactical dissolution by minority government after Dáil defeat
on minor issue in hope of securing majority status
FF
Dissolution near end of term
FG + Lab
Tactical dissolution by minority government whose Dáil
+ others
position was weakened by disintegration within some
minor parties making up government
FF
Tactical dissolution by minority government whose position
had been weakened by by-election defeats
FG + Lab
Tactical dissolution in face of anticipated defeat in
+ others
parliament by government that had lost parliamentary
strength through by-election defeats and through
withdrawal of external support from minor party
FF
Retirement of prime minister
FF
Dissolution near end of term
FF
Dissolution near end of term
FF
Retirement of prime minister
FF
Dissolution near end of term
FF
Dissolution near end of term
FG + Lab
Dissolution near end of term
FF
Retirement of prime minister
FF
Dissolution near end of term
FG + Lab
Dáil defeat on budget due to defection of external support
FF
Dáil defeat in confidence motion due to defection of external
support
FG + Lab
Break-up of coalition
FF
Tactical dissolution by minority government in hope of
securing majority status
FF + PD
Retirement of prime minister
FF + PD
Dáil defeat in confidence motion following break-up of
coalition
FF + Lab
Break-up of coalition, minor government partner joining
opposition, government resigns hours ahead of certain
defeat in confidence motion
FG + Lab + DL Dissolution near end of term
FF
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
32
References
Andeweg, Rudy B. and Lia Nijzink, 1995. “Beyond the two-body image: relations
between ministers and MPs”, pp. 152–78 in Herbert Döring (ed.), Parliaments and
Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag and St
Martin’s Press.
Andeweg, Rudy B., 1997. “Role specialisation or role switching? Dutch MPs between
electorate and executive”, pp. 110–27 in Wolfgang C. Müller and Thomas
Saalfeld (eds), Members of Parliament in Western Europe: roles and behaviour.
London: Frank Cass.
Arkins, Audrey, 1988. “The committees of the 24th Oireachtas”, Irish Political Studies
3, pp. 91–7.
Arter, David, 1999. Scandinavian Politics Today. Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press.
Brennock, Mark, 1998. “Keeping the independent TDs happy”, Irish Times 12
December.
Chubb, Basil, 1992. The Government and Politics of Ireland, 3rd ed. Harlow: Longman.
Coakley, John and Michael Gallagher (eds), 1999. Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 3rd
ed. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
Coghlan, Denis, 1999. “In political wrestling, rural publicans a class apart”, Irish
Times 3 July.
Connolly, Eileen and Eunan O’Halpin, 1999. “The government and the
governmental system”, pp. 249–70 in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds),
Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 3rd ed. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
Constitution Review Group, 1996. Report. Dublin: Stationery Office.
De Winter, Lieven, 1991. “Parliamentary and party pathways to the government”,
pp. 44–69 in Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiébault (eds), The Profession of
Government Minister in Western Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
De Winter, Lieven, 1999. “Belgium: insider pressure groups in an outsider
parliament”, pp. 88–109 in Philip Norton (ed.), Parliaments and Pressure Groups in
Western Europe. London: Frank Cass.
Dinan, Des, 1986. “Constitution and parliament”, pp. 71–86 in Brian Girvin and
Roland Sturm (eds), Politics and Society in Contemporary Ireland. Aldershot:
Gower.
Döring, Herbert, 1995. “Time as a scarce resource: government control of the
agenda”, pp. 223–46 in Herbert Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in
Western Europe. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag and St Martin’s Press.
Gallagher, Michael, 1999a. “The changing constitution”, pp. 71–98 in John Coakley
and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 3rd ed. London:
Routledge and PSAI Press.
Gallagher, Michael, 1999b. “Parliament”, pp. 177–205 in John Coakley and Michael
Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 3rd ed. London: Routledge and
PSAI Press.
Gallagher, Michael, 1999c. “Republic of Ireland”, pp. 104–23 in Robert Elgie (ed.),
Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garry, John, 1995. “The demise of the Fianna Fáil/Labour ‘Partnership’ government
and the rise of the ‘Rainbow’ coalition”, Irish Political Studies 10, pp. 192–9.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
33
Horgan, John, 1997. Seán Lemass: the enigmatic patriot. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.
Huber, John D., 1996. Rationalizing Parliament: legislative institutions and party politics
in France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
King, Anthony, 1976. “Modes of executive–legislative relations: Great Britain,
France, and West Germany”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 1:1, pp. 11–34.
Laver, Michael and Michael Marsh, 1999. “Parties and voters”, pp. 152–76 in John
Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 3rd ed.
London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
Lijphart, Arend, 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Mair, Peter, 1999. “Party competition and the changing party system”, pp. 127–51 in
John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 3rd
ed. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
Marsh, M. A., 1985. “Ireland”, pp. 173–201 in Ivor Crewe and David Denver (eds),
Electoral Change in Western Democracies. London: Croom Helm.
Marsh, Michael and Paul Mitchell (eds), 1999. How Ireland Voted 1999. Boulder, CO:
Westview and PSAI Press.
Mitchell, Jim, 1999. “Scandals show reform of Dáil is badly needed”, Irish Times 17
December.
Morgan, David Gwynn, 1990. Constitutional Law of Ireland, 2nd ed. Blackrock: Round
Hall Press.
Murphy, Gary, 1999. “The role of interest groups in the policy making process”, pp.
271–93 in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of
Ireland, 3rd ed. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
O’Halpin, Eunan, 1985. “The Dáil Committee of Public Accounts, 1961–1980”,
Administration 32:4, pp. 483–511.
O’Halpin, Eunan, 1986. “Oireachtas committees: experience and prospects”, Seirbhís
Phoiblí 7:2, pp. 3–9.
O’Halpin, Eunan, 1998. “A changing relationship? Parliament and government in
Ireland”, pp. 123-41 in Philip Norton (ed.), Parliaments and Governments in
Western Europe. London: Frank Cass.
O’Halpin, Eunan and Eileen Connolly, 1999. “Parliaments and pressure groups: the
Irish experience of change”, pp. 124–44 in Philip Norton (ed.), Parliaments and
Pressure Groups in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass.
O’Regan, Michael, 1998. “Coalition labours hard to keep independents on side”, Irish
Times 13 April.
Rafter, Kevin, 2000. “Foley suspension would strengthen independents”, Irish Times
15 February.
Saalfeld, Thomas, 1999. “Germany: Bundestag and interest groups in a ‘party
democracy’ ”, pp. 43–66 in Philip Norton (ed.), Parliaments and Pressure Groups in
Western Europe. London: Frank Cass.
Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S., 1994. “Hierarchy and efficiency in the Bundestag: the
German answer for institutionalizing parliament”, pp. 29–58 in Gary W.
Copeland and Samuel C. Patterson (eds), Parliaments in the Modern World:
Changing Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Sinnott, Richard, 1995. Irish Voters Decide: voting behaviour in elections and referendums
since 1918. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
Parliamentary control of the executive in Ireland
34
Ward, Alan J., 1974. “Parliamentary procedures and the machinery of government in
Ireland”, Irish University Review 4:2, pp. 222–43.
Ward, Alan J., 1996. “The Constitution Review Group and the ‘executive state’ in
Ireland”, Administration 44:4, pp. 42–63.