PRWORA’s Immigrant Provisions
Policy Analysis Paper: PRWORA’s Immigrant Provisions
Kathy Takahashi
University of Wisconsin Green Bay
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PRWORA’s Immigrant Provisions
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Policy Overview
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996 radically altered the U.S. public welfare system by replacing former federal entitlement
programs with Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), a block grant to the states to operate
their own programs. Federal TANF regulations emphasized strict new work requirements and
time limits on cash assistance. PRWORA also included provisions that addressed Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) eligibility, child support enforcement, child protection, childcare,
marriage promotion, and abstinence education. In addition, Title IV of this act significantly
impacted legal immigrant (noncitizen permanent resident) eligibility for public benefits
(Karger & Stoesz, 2006).
Although PRWORA’s general welfare reform provisions also affected immigrant
families, Title IV specifically targeted legal immigrants, restricting their access to public
benefits at every government level. Title IV departed from prior policy by making receipt
of benefits more dependent on citizenship. It also increased support requirements for
immigrant sponsors, expanded the state’s role in determining immigrant eligibility, and at
the same time, reduced the state’s power to extend benefits to illegal (undocumented)
immigrants. It clearly distinguished between legal immigrants who arrived before and
those who arrived after PRWORA’s enactment on August 22, 1996; post-enactment
immigrants faced more severe restrictions (Fix & Passel, 2002). The following analysis
will focus on PRWORA’s Title IV immigrant provisions.
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Historical Background
Although PRWORA was welfare reform policy, Title IV has been described as “back
door” immigration policy (Fix & Passel, 2002). Consequently, in order to understand its
historical antecedents, examination of past immigration policy is helpful.
The history of immigration policy in the U.S. reflects conflicting responses of
humanitarianism and protectionism/exclusion. Since the late 1800s, the latter view has
predominated. With the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Congress sought
protection from the “yellow peril” of immigrating Chinese laborers. This act was expanded in
1907 to also exclude Japanese and most Asians, preventing their naturalization and/or
reunification with family members. After 1924, a national origins quota system favoring Western
European immigrants went into effect for 40 years. During this time, immigration actions
continued to discriminate by race and ethnicity (NASW, 2006).
Then in 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments ended the national
origins quota system prioritizing family relationships and labor market skills for immigrant
admission instead. As a result, immigration increased, especially from Asia and Latin America.
Following the Vietnam War, a large number of refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia also
added to the Asian population in the U.S. (NASW, 2006).
In the 1980s and 1990s, immigration policies exhibited ambivalence. On the one hand,
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 sanctioned employers who hired
undocumented workers, while on the other hand this act legalized many undocumented
immigrants. The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the total number of immigrants admitted.
Refugees fleeing oppressive circumstances in their own countries faced differing treatment in the
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U.S, depending on foreign policy priorities; Cuban “political refugees” were welcomed, whereas
the “economic refugee” status of Haitians made them less desirable (NASW, 2006).
At the time PRWORA was enacted in 1996, anti-immigration sentiment was heightened.
Two laws passed at this time – the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) – increased restrictions on
immigrants (Fix & Passel, 2002). IIRAIRA made it easier to deport legal immigrants and report
undocumented immigrants. The implementation of this act disrupted families, and negatively
impacted national and international communities (Dinan, 2005a; NASW, 2006).
Attitudes toward immigration that have shifted between humanitarian acceptance,
protectionism and bigotry mirror the ambivalent attitudes toward public assistance that Karger &
Stoesz (2006) have characterized as “ a mixture of compassion and hostility” (p. 271).
Protectionist attitudes stem in part from the perception of immigrants’ economic dependency. In
this view, immigrants are an economic liability, depleting public benefits and supplanting native
workers. In contrast, others see immigrants as an asset, paying taxes, filling unwanted jobs, and
adding new blood to the nation (NASW, 2006). When negative sentiments reign – often when
increasing numbers of people of color immigrate to the U.S. – immigration policies become
restrictive.
When PRWORA’s Title IV was being constructed, the perception predominated that
federal government spending on immigrant welfare was increasing and that the nation had
become a “welfare magnet” for the least desirable immigrants – those with less education, skills
and income. Although some challenged this perception, this concept of the “immigrant problem”
prevailed in the creation of the policy (Fix & Passel, 2002). Work requirements and marriage
promotion central to PRWORA’s welfare reform were non-issues because most immigrants were
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working hard and lived in two parent families. Instead, PRWORA’s immigrant provisions sought
to remove the welfare incentive for immigrants with economic need entering the U.S. (Fix &
Passel, 2002).
Since the enactment of PRWORA, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the US PATRIOT
ACT have muted humanitarian responses and promoted restrictive immigration policies.
Although Congress has made some efforts to mitigate the impact of the Title IV provisions on
legal immigrants, many of the restrictions remain.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 restored SSI and Medicaid benefits to certain preenactment elderly and disabled immigrants already receiving SSI, and to pre-enactment
immigrants if they became disabled in the future. The Agriculture, Research, Extension and
Education Reform Act of 1998 extended food stamps to pre-enactment immigrant children,
elderly and disabled. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 restored food stamps
to disabled immigrants and immigrant children regardless of their entry date, and adult
immigrants who had been in the U.S. for five years. However, most working age adults remained
ineligible for benefits until they became naturalized citizens, and post-enactment adult
immigrants continued to be barred from benefits unless the state chose to provide the option for
TANF and food stamps after five years. Post-enactment immigrants remained ineligible for SSI
and Medicaid (UCSIS, 2004).
In response to federal restrictions, a number of states extended benefits such as Medicaid,
TANF and State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to pre-enactment immigrants,
but their responses to post-enactment immigrants varied widely. This variation reflected the
fiscal reality that the federal government would contribute toward state expenditures for pre-
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enactment but not for post-enactment immigrants. Post-enactment immigrants continued to face
a patchwork of state programs (Dinan, 2005b).
PRWORA was supposed to be reauthorized in October 2002, but instead it went through
a series of short-term extensions until it was re-enacted in the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of
2005. Although, DRA made no significant change with respect to immigrant eligibility for
benefits, a new citizenship documentation requirement was proposed by Republicans to deter
undocumented immigrants from enrolling in Medicaid. Despite opposition from some Democrats
and from the HHS Office of the Inspector General – whose report found no evidence of
Medicaid abuse – as well as from states concerned about the administrative burden of this
change, the requirement was included in the final bill (Rosenbaum, 2007).
PRWORA’s contested passage took “20 months of debate, 19 Finance Committee
hearings, testimony from over 90 witnesses, and a presidential veto of two previous bills (Roth,
1996b)” (Agrawal, 2008, p. 636). The House of Representatives bill (H.R. 4) that initiated the
legislative process for PRWORA was introduced in January 1995 by Rep. Clay Shaw (R-FL)
and co-sponsored by 120 Republican representatives. H.R. 4 already included Title IV,
restricting legal and undocumented immigrants from 52 identified services (Agrawal, 2008).
Subsequently, an amendment to H.R. 4 substituted the text for H.R. 1214, a bill
introduced by three Republicans. In addition to the restrictions of federal benefits in H.R. 4, H.R.
1214 gave states the right to deny immigrant eligibility for all state benefits except emergency
medical aid, departing from the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause’s stipulation
that states shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”
(Agrawal, 2008, p. 643). H.R. 1214 also prohibited states from providing benefits to
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undocumented immigrants and added the requirement that a sponsor’s income and resources
must be considered in an immigrant’s qualification for benefits (Agrawal, 2008).
Dissenting opinions and amendments proposed by Democrats to restore benefits to
immigrants were “defeated largely along party lines” (Agrawal, 2008, p. 655). A compromise of
the amended H.R. 4 bill and a Senate bill was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act of 1995 that passed the House and Senate in December 1995. President Clinton vetoed this
bill in January 1996, declaring that the immigrant provisions violated “the Nation’s values” and
had “little connection to the central goal of work-based reform (Clinton 1996a, H342)”
(Agrawal, 2008, p. 658). The president had previously vetoed the Balanced Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1995, another welfare reform bill with immigrant provisions, in November
1995 (Agrawal, 2008).
Although there were enough Republicans in the 104th Congress to pass legislation with a
majority vote, they could not overturn a presidential veto without Democratic support. In June of
1996, H. R. 3734 introduced by Rep Kasich (R-OH), reflecting the same immigrant provisions as
H.R. 4, passed in the House. A bill proposed by Senator Domenici (R- NM), the Personal
Responsibility, Work Opportunity and Medicaid Restructuring Act of 1996, passed in the Senate.
The compromise bill was PRWORA. Most Republicans favored the bill, whereas Democrats
were evenly split (Agrawal, 2008). When Clinton signed it, “PRWORA was the first welfare
reform bill in 20 months to garner enough votes in the House and the Senate to overturn a
presidential veto” (Agrawal, 2008, p. 660).
Proponents of the immigrant welfare provisions rationalized them by invoking the
“traditional” American principle of self-sufficiency, the “privileged” nature of citizenship and
the need for restrictive welfare policy to avoid the wrong incentive for immigration. Cost savings
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was another argument presented in support (Agrawal, 2008). In addition, “a tool repeatedly
utilized in the dominant discourse by proponents of immigrant exclusion from public benefits”
was language that reflected racial prejudice and bigotry (Agrawal, 2008, p. 664). In this
discourse, immigrants were represented as being “outside of familiar, law-abiding society
(Meechan, 1997)” (Agrawal, 2008, p. 664). Democrats opposed Title IV on the basis of equity;
legal immigrants contributed to society by paying taxes, working, and serving in the military just
like citizens, so they should be allowed equal access to public benefits. Unfortunately, this
argument excluded the disabled, sick, elderly and children who were most at risk of requiring
social services (Agrawal, 2008).
The opposing forces differed in their perception of the “immigrant bargain.” For
supporters of immigrant exclusion from benefits, the bargain was an immigrants’ obligation to
avoid becoming a public charge in return for entry into the U.S. The government was only
responsible for citizens’ welfare. Those who opposed Title IV argued that the bargain was that
the nation owed responsibility to any individual who contributed, citizen or not (Agrawal, 2008).
Social Problem
The social problem purportedly addressed by the PRWORA immigrant provisions was
the burden on the public benefits system from the increasing number of immigrants receiving
assistance. A USHR Committee on Ways and Means (1997) report on PRWORA cited increased
welfare use, particularly the number of immigrants receiving SSI, as the original impetus for
excluding noncitizens from benefits. Evidence for this problem was supplied by Borjas & Hilton
(1996) showing that if both cash and non-cash benefits were included, “nearly 21% of
immigrants received some type of assistance, as compared to only 14% of natives” (Borjas,
2002, p. 1094). These researchers cautioned that the availability of welfare benefits was an
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incentive for the wrong kind of immigrants – those attracted by the safety net. They warned that
the cost for taxpayers would be unsustainable if such immigrants were allowed unfettered access
to public benefits (Borjas, 2002).
This social problem was constructed as one that had been recognized in the past but had
not been effectively regulated. According to the same Committee on Ways and Means
PRWORA report, immigrants have been expected to be self-sufficient or be deported as a
“public charge” since the first immigration law of 1882. The report states that, “Public Law 104193 returns American policy on welfare for noncitizens to its roots by barring most noncitizens
who arrive in the future from receiving benefits” (USHR Committee on Ways and Means, 1996,
p. 6). Unlike TANF that based welfare eligibility on behavior, Title IV reflected the ideological
position that legal immigrants did not deserve support because of their status. Only citizenship
should be the basis for such support. Interestingly, the exceptions to these restrictions, military
service and sustained work for ten years, actually contradicted this position (Agrawal, 2008).
For those who argued against the immigrant provisions, the social problem was
constructed differently. They questioned “the power of the so-called “welfare magnet,” the
perceived decline in the quality of immigrants, and even the disproportionately high use of
benefits among noncitizen populations” (Fix & Passel, 2002, p. 3). Those opposed to immigrant
exclusion from benefits cited research that observed declines across all federal means-tested
benefit programs for legal permanent resident families between 1994 and 1997, showing
immigrant families to be less dependent on welfare than native families (Fix & Passel, 2002). In
their view, policy supporters’ invocation of the American tradition of denying entry to potential
public charges, “muddied the fact that no established law actually denied legal immigrants
welfare benefits” (Agrawal, 2008, p. 645).
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To understand the nature of the social problem surrounding the intersection of
immigration and welfare it is helpful to look at the demographics of the affected population. One
in nine people in the U.S. are immigrants. Most of these 36 million foreign-born reside in the
U.S. legally. This number includes naturalized citizens (32%), lawful permanent residents (29%),
and refugees/asylees (7%). About 10 million (29%) are undocumented immigrants. Each year
one million people are given legal residency status. Most of these people are already in the U.S.
under another statute. Many factors, including labor needs in the U.S. and in other countries, as
well as the economic and political circumstances in immigrants’ countries of origin, affect
immigration flow. Restrictive legal immigration policies tend to increase illegal immigration
rates (Dinan, 2005a).
The percentage of children with at least one foreign-born parent increased from 13% in
1990 and to over 23% in 2007. One of five children in the U.S. is the child of an immigrant.
Most of these children have parents from Latin American countries, although other areas of the
world are represented as well. Many immigrant families are of mixed legal status including both
citizens and non-citizens. In nearly one third of these families, the children are U.S. born citizens
(Fortuny, Capps, Simms & Chaudry, 2009). There are also about 1.6 million undocumented
children in the U.S (Dinan, 2005a).
One of four low-income children in the U.S. lives in an immigrant family. Among
children with foreign-born parents, 97% have a parent who works and 72% have a parent who
works full-time. These parents are more likely to receive low wages and less likely to receive
employer benefits such as health care. Before the current recession, even with the changes in
sponsorship rules, half of all immigrant families had incomes below 200% of poverty. Two
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thirds of post-enactment immigrant families live with incomes under 200% of poverty (Dinan,
2005a).
“Children of recent immigrants and children of undocumented immigrants are
particularly likely to be low income. And these are also the groups most likely to be affected by
federal restrictions on immigrant access to benefits” (Dinan, 2005a, p. 4). Low-income
immigrant families with high rates of food insecurity are less likely to receive TANF or food
stamps. Their children are twice as likely to be uninsured if parents are noncitizens, yet are less
likely to receive Medicaid. Low-income children living with undocumented parents are even less
likely to be insured (Dinan, 2005a). Most of these children will remain in the U.S. for their
lifetimes, but hardship puts them at risk. Soon, these children will make up one quarter of the
U.S. labor force (Fix & Passel, 2002).
The issue of whether the federal government should provide welfare benefits for
noncitizens was disputed among those who believed that legal immigrants should be treated like
other Americans and those who believed that noncitizens did not have the same rights to benefits
as citizens. Those who supported benefits for immigrants expressed concern that these families
were being left outside of the welfare safety net that provided protection for the elderly, disabled
and poor. In this view, because noncitizens worked, paid taxes and were eligible for a wartime
draft, they should qualify for this protection. The children of noncitizens born in the U.S. were
viewed as especially deserving of social welfare (Fix & Haskins, 2002).
Those who would deny benefits argued that citizen taxpayers should not be required to
support needy noncitizens. In this view, noncitizens who could not support themselves should
not be in the U.S. Removing the welfare incentive to immigration would deter those more likely
to need public assistance from entering or staying in the U.S. To relieve the immigrant burden on
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the public benefits system, the too lenient rules controlling public assistance eligibility and
sponsorship conditions needed to be changed. It was this view that predominated in the Title
IV’s definition of the “immigrant problem” (Fix & Haskins, 2002).
Policy Description
Prior to the enactment of PRWORA’s Title IV, legal immigrants in the U.S. were eligible
for public assistance on similar terms as citizens. Following enactment, with few exceptions,
only citizens became eligible for means-tested federal benefits such as TANF, SSI, food stamps,
and Medicaid. Immigrants exempted from the bar on benefits included victims of domestic
violence, veterans of the U.S. armed forces, and those who had worked in the U.S. for ten years.
Refugees and asylees qualified for time-limited public assistance for seven years after arrival
(Fix & Passel 2002; USCIS, 2004).
A further distinction was made between legal immigrants who entered the country before
and after 8/22/1996. Legal immigrants living in the U.S. as of 8/22/1996 were barred from food
stamps and SSI until they became citizens. However, states could provide TANF and Medicaid
at their option. Legal immigrants who entered the U.S. after 8/22/1996 were barred from all
public benefits for their first five years in the country. After five years, states could, at their
option, offer TANF and Medicaid. Later changes restored food stamp eligibility to preenactment immigrants who were at least 65, or with disabilities, and all children under 18.
Undocumented immigrants were only eligible for emergency Medicaid, immunizations,
diagnosis and treatment of communicable diseases, school lunch and breakfast programs (Dinan,
2005a; USCIS, 2004).
In addition, Title IV shifted financial support responsibility to immigrants’ sponsors. For
the first time, sponsors were required to have a certain income level – 125% of the federal
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poverty threshold – based on the combined members of both sponsor and sponsored immigrant
families. The immigrant provisions also devolved new power to the states. States, earlier denied
the right to discriminate against legal immigrants, were now allowed to do so. States could also
to use their own benefits to supplement lost federal benefits. Thus, state authority to determine
immigrant eligibility for public benefits expanded. At the same time, states were restricted from
extending benefits to undocumented immigrants, effectively limiting benefit access for this
group (Fix & Passel, 2002).
Short-term goals of Title IV included decreasing the number of legal immigrants
receiving welfare to realize cost savings. In 1997, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimated that 40% of PRWORA’s $54 billion expected savings would come from immigrant
restrictions, even though immigrants were only 15% of all welfare recipients in the U.S. (Fix &
Passel, 2002). Long-term goals included shifting responsibility for immigrant support from the
federal government to their sponsors thus controlling immigrant flow by discouraging the
poorest immigrants, those most likely to seek benefits, from entering the U.S. The intended
outcomes were to save money by ensuring that immigrants relied on private rather than public
resources (Library of Congress, 1996).
Title IV delegated the administration of the provisions to the states. To prove eligibility,
applicants for federal public benefits would be required to verify their citizenship or immigrant
status. The policy stipulated that the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, would issue regulations for verification. States were required to
implement verification systems that complied with these federal regulations. Nonprofit charitable
organizations were exempted from verification requirements (Library of Congress, 1996). After
enactment for the most part, states allowed applicants to orally, under oath, affirm their legal
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status. However, a new documentation amendment in 2005 required that states have Medicaid
beneficiaries present written documents – passports, naturalization and birth certificates – to
prove citizenship and legal status (Rosenbaum, 2007).
With the denial of federal benefits, public assistance funding for immigrants increasingly
became the responsibility of the states. Republican proponents of Title IV expected that the
states would not use their option to supplement lost federal benefits, whereas Democrats had the
opposite expectation (Agrawal, 2008). As it turned out, most states extended Medicaid and
TANF to pre-enactment immigrants; only one state, Wyoming, chose to restrict pre-enactment
immigrants from Medicaid. Thus, Title IV created a cost shift to the states (Brookings
Institution, 2002). However, treatment of post-enactment immigrants was less generous with a
widely divergent state response (Dinan, 2005b).
Title IV did not include formal criteria to assess the effectiveness of the policy. Reports
have found declines in immigrant benefit use and an increase in the naturalization rate (Borjas,
2002; Fix & Haskins, 2002). Overall immigration numbers have gone down (Fortuny et al.,
2009). However, depending on who reports and analyzes these changes, causal explanations
have differed. PRWORA was re-enacted in 2005 and there is no projected end date for the Title
IV provisions. When President Clinton signed the bill, he called for immediate corrections to
Title IV, but since that time there has been “no comprehensive federal initiative to correct
immigrant eligibility restrictions” (Agrawal, 2008, p. 668)
Title IV was purportedly based on empirical evidence and a causal theory. For policy
supporters, the new rules to restrict immigrant benefits in Title IV were a logical response to
stem the rise in immigrant use of public assistance (Borjas, 2002). However, from the outset
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CBO financial figures showed discrepancy between the data and what was being framed.
Agrawal (2008) states;
Not only were the highest monetary savings from legal immigrant restrictions small
components of the specific bills proposed, but they were at least three orders of
magnitude lower than the deficit and the national debt – the given reasons for adopting
the immigrant restrictions (p. 648).
In addition, early CBO reports questioned the relevance of status differences between citizen and
immigrant; most legal immigrants were eligible to become citizens and simply did not have the
financial incentive to do so. If these legal immigrants became naturalized citizens, this would
undermine expected savings (Agrawal, 2008). Although some questioned the quality of the
knowledge on which Title IV was based, critical reports were mostly ignored and/or manipulated
in the “ideologically driven” debate over restricting benefits (Agrawal, 2008, p. 666).
Policy Analysis
Unlike PRWORA’s general welfare reform that promoted goals of marriage and work,
Title IV’s immigrant provisions had a different agenda. Explicit policy goals stated in Title IV
Section 400 included reducing immigrants’ dependence on public resources and discouraging
immigrants with the potential to become “public charges” from entering the United States. A
third goal that surfaced in the congressional debate over Title IV was the economic incentive
(Agrawal, 2008; Broder, 2005).
An implicit goal of the immigrant provisions was to keep “less desirable’ immigrants out
of the U.S. These immigrants, primarily people of color whose numbers had been increasing in
the years before the passage of Title IV, were viewed as an economic liability in the protectionist
climate of the 1990s. A value premise underlying this perspective was that poor, unskilled, and
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uneducated immigrants brought nothing worthwhile with them and instead, drained the nation’s
resources when they went on welfare. Dan Stein of the Federation for American Immigration
Reform (FAIR), a well-known anti-immigration lobbying group, shared his perception of this
population as “illiterate in any language, fifth grade education. Joining a community of a lot of
relatives who live in poverty as well as unlikely to ever rise above the poverty level” (Brookings
Institution, 2002, Stein dialogue).
The ideological assumption underlying Title IV’s elevation of citizenship status and the
extolment of the traditional American principle of self-sufficiency was that these were virtues of
current citizens not shared by recent immigrants. The implication was that earlier immigrant
groups, unlike recent ones, had arrived with the correct intentions, bringing valuable assets with
them. When immigrants’ naturalization rates increased after Title IV was enacted, former
proponents lost enthusiasm for the measure. They began to caution against linking citizenship
with welfare. “Many immigrants will choose to become citizens not because they want to fully
participate in the U.S. political system, but because naturalization is the price that they have to
pay to receive welfare benefits” (Borjas, 2002). Immigrants who had been vilified for their
noncitizen status continued to be disparaged when they became citizens.
The social vision contained in Title IV was shaped by the underlying value premise and
ideological assumptions as well as by the belief that unregulated immigration placed an
unsustainable burden on citizens. By allowing entry only to those who could provide for
themselves, citizen taxpayers could be protected from carrying this burden. In this vision, it was
not feasible to allow everyone desiring better opportunities to immigrate. FAIR’s Dan Stein
shared his view of who might be exempted from exclusion. “Somebody who’s got a PhD in
microprocessing, who has some English language ability and doesn’t have a lot of relatives here,
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who doesn’t bring his parents… is going to outpace natives’ taxpaying contributions and his
income or her income will exceed natives’ overnight” (Brookings Institution, 2002, Stein
dialogue).
In the context of Title IV, the target population of immigrants was viewed as in need of
stricter control. Immigrant use of public benefits was out of control. Immigrant flow was out of
control. Restrictive welfare regulations were an attempt to control/slow the immigrant flow. This
correlated with stricter immigration laws to secure the border and crack down on illegal
immigrants in the workplace. Rather than deny entry or deport immigrants, Title IV attempted to
control immigration in “a more circuitous way” (Borjas, 2002, p. 1119).
Title IV was not designed to foster real social change. It did not address the root causes of
immigrant poverty in the U.S., nor did it assist families struggling to make ends meet in low
wage jobs. It did not address issues of labor rights or of discrimination in employment practices.
It did not address the root causes of migration or the injustices of our own and other countries’
economies. Title IV was a shortsighted exclusionary policy that focused on keeping needy
people out of the U.S.
Republicans initially introduced PRWORA and its Title IV immigrant provisions.
Although President Clinton expressed dismay at the restrictions, he signed the bill and at least
half of the Congressional Democrats voted for the final bill. Public sentiment was supportive of
the restrictive provisions at the time and recent immigrant laws proposed in states such as
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia show that such sentiment still exists (Broder, 2007). The DRA
Medicaid documentation requirements and recent health reform debates in Congress reveal that
exclusionary attitudes toward illegal immigrants are especially entrenched.
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However, public opinion has changed with regard to legal immigrants. Title IV was
initially proposed to be in the best interest of the citizen taxpayer majority because cost savings
could be realized by paying less for welfare. Although, as Title IV framers hoped, immigrants’
overall use of public benefits declined after PRWORA’s enactment, both supporters and
opponents agree that the consequences have been detrimental not only to immigrants, but also
for the states and citizens (Borjas, 2002; Fix & Passel, 2002).
Proponents and opponents are unhappy with the consequences of Title IV for differing
reasons. For conservatives, expanded state funding and increased immigrant naturalizations are
problematic. In this view, state efforts to supplement federal benefit cuts have detracted from the
disincentive of the immigrant restrictions. Conservatives are also concerned that new immigrant
(now naturalized) voters will increase support for liberal politicians. Conservative groups, who
had earlier supported Title IV, focus more on controlling businesses that employ illegal
immigrants and lobbying for restrictive immigration admissions policy (Borjas, 2002; Brookings
Institution, 2002).
Opponents of Title IV cite the need to restore benefits to support immigrant families. Fix
& Passel (2002) suggest that Title IV’s “chilling effect” has led to steep declines in public
benefit use among all immigrants, even refugees and mixed legal status families who qualified
under the law. They explain the decline not as a function of increased naturalizations or rising
income or even change in eligibility, but primarily as lowered inclination to participate because
of confusion created by restrictive policy and fear of deportation. Immigrant benefit use fell
drastically in states that were the least generous in providing benefits, even though these were the
states where immigrant populations were growing rapidly. Increased migration to states with less
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generous safety nets places these families at greater disadvantage and also challenges the welfare
magnet theory (Fix & Passel, 2002).
After Title IV was enacted and federal benefits cut, states attempted to address the gap in
support. However, as immigrants dispersed from historical concentrations in the six states of
California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and Texas, uneven state responses became
even more significant. “Currently, none of the four states with the fastest growing foreign-born
populations – Arkansas, Georgia, Nevada, and North Carolina – have state-funded replacement
programs” for food stamps, TANF, SSI and Medicaid (Dinan, 2005b). In this scenario, the
disparity between generous and less generous states will negatively impact a greater number of
immigrant families (Broder, 2007).
Former Title IV supporters have recognized that there were “political, social and
economic costs” to “removing immigrants already in the U.S. from welfare rolls.” “It is naïve,
after all, to assume that there are no long-run consequences from denying needy immigrants
access to food stamps or medical services” (Borjas, 2002, p. 1122). According to a National
Immigration Law Center survey in 2002, the majority of Americans – Republicans, Democrats
and independents – agreed that legal immigrants and citizens should have access to public
benefits (Fang, 2007).
Agencies have struggled with documentation requirements. Some have disregarded them
and others have been more restrictive. Child welfare agencies recognize that immigrant children
in the U.S. are a rapidly growing demographic with socioeconomic indicators that put them at
risk. Yet bans on work supports and public assistance for this population have made it difficult to
provide resources or services. The heightened fear of accessing benefits and services after Title
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IV has created confusion and anxiety so that many families are not applying for what they are
entitled to (Lincroft, Resner & Leung, 2006).
Title IV is not a desirable policy and comprehensive reform will be required to
adequately deal with the social problem of welfare and immigration. Even those who earlier
supported the immigrant provisions, now admit that its long-term exclusionary goals could be
better met through immigration policy. “In the end, it is probably easier and cheaper to address
the problem raised by immigration of public charges not by ‘ending welfare as we know it,’ but
by reforming immigration policy instead” (Borgas, 2002). Devolution of immigrant policy to the
states, welfare as an incentive for naturalization, and exclusion of immigrants from work
supports are all design defects of Title IV (Fix & Passel, 2002). Repeal of Title IV’s immigrant
provisions to restore the safety net for all legal immigrants is a necessary initial change.
Discussion
PRWORA’s Title IV does not adequately address the social problem of welfare and
immigration, in part because policy framers constructed a social problem and solution that did
not reflect reality. They ignored the CBO’s technical data, the demographics and the lived
experiences of the target population. They did not consider the underlying causes of immigrant
poverty such as economic forces on migration and labor policies. Framers also did not recognize
that punitive immigrant policy would adversely impact citizens with whom immigrants shared
families, neighborhoods and communities.
Title IV does not enhance social justice. It does not “enhance the human well-being or
meet the basic needs…of people who are vulnerable, oppressed and living in poverty” (NASW,
1999, p. 10). Title IV’s immigrant provisions distinguished between those who had and had not;
those who were citizens and noncitizens; those who immigrated for the right reasons and the
PRWORA’s Immigrant Provisions
21
wrong. In each instance, those who stood to lose the most from Title IV had the least of
everything – money, skills, education and status. Title IV’s goals negatively affected the
redistribution of resources, entitlements and opportunities for the immigrant population,
adversely affecting the quality of their lives particularly in a recessionary period.
Title IV also exacerbated racial/ethnic tensions and divisions between immigrants and the
rest of society. Not coincidentally, it was the nativist lobby such as FAIR and the Center for
Immigration Studies (CIS) that influenced Congress and the research on which the immigrant
provisions were based (Borgas, 2002; LCCREF, 2009). Numerous discriminatory local proposals
that denied or hindered access to services sprang up in the wake of PRWORA’s Title IV
reflecting this increased distrust and division. These laws hurt the immigrant population, but also
had the unintended consequence of harming eligible citizens and immigrants.
DRA’s documentation requirements that prohibited states from providing Medicaid
without verification of citizenship adversely impacted the elderly poor who had to pay for
expensive passports. It also affected the mentally ill who could not say where they were born and
victims of disasters such as Katrina who had lost documentation. African Americans, who were
not allowed in hospitals for their births, as well as poor whites and Native Americans from rural
areas, who were not born in hospitals, lacked the required birth certificates. The DRA
requirements increased state administrative costs and deprived many eligible citizens of
Medicaid coverage (Broder, 2007; Kulkarni, 2006).
Title IV has not improved the social problem of immigrant poverty. On the contrary, the
consequences for low-income immigrant families have been dire. The provisions limiting access
to benefits have not only been ineffective in controlling immigration, they have imposed
hardship on many community members, particularly those with lower incomes. Excluding
PRWORA’s Immigrant Provisions
immigrants from the reformed welfare system is not reasonable policy. To help immigrants
contribute to society, work supports such as health insurance and job training are necessary and
cost effective.
Placing responsibility for immigrant support on the states has created administrative and
financial burdens, and unfair disparities. Change is needed at the federal level. Benefits should
be restored to all legal immigrants in order to eliminate barriers for full participation in society.
Advocacy organizations support comprehensive immigration reform that includes providing
pathways for legal status and citizenship for all residents, ensuring fair and equal treatment for
those fleeing oppression, promoting family reunification and equitable labor policies (Center for
Community Change, 2007; NASW, 2006). Punitive, xenophobic policy such as PRWORA’s
Title IV exacerbates distrust and fear, doing little to protect the health and welfare of those who
are most vulnerable. Comprehensive, compassionate policy is needed to provide the resources
that will support and maximize the assets and strengths that all immigrant families bring.
22
PRWORA’s Immigrant Provisions
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