W O R L D WAT C H R E P O R T
Beyond Disasters
Creating Opportunities
for Peace
michael renner and zoë chafe
W O R L D WAT C H R E P O R T
Beyond Disasters
Creating Opportunities
for Peace
michael renner and zoë chafe
l i s a m a s t n y, e d i t o r
w o r l d wat c h i n s t i t u t e , wa s h i n g t o n , d c
© Worldwatch Institute, 2007
ISBN 1-878071-80-7
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On the cover: Indonesian workers construct a house in a refugee camp
in Kaye Jato village, Aceh Besar, June 2005.
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Table of Contents
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
“Unnatural” Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The March Toward Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Understanding Factors of Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Storm Clouds and Silver Linings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Case Study—Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Case Study—Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Case Study—Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No Political Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Creating Future Opportunities for Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figures, Tables, and Sidebars
Figure 1. Number of Disasters Worldwide, 1987–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 2. People Affected and Killed by Natural Disasters, 1987–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 3. Fair Market Rent for a One-Bedroom Unit in New Orleans, 2000–2006 . . . . . . 17
Figure 4. Aceh and Its Location in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Figure 5. Incidents of Conflict Between GAM and Indonesian Government Forces
(GoI) and Local-Level Conflicts, January 2005–February 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 6. Sri Lanka: Tsunami-Displaced Persons by Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 7. Deaths in Sri Lanka’s Civil War, 2000–2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Figure 8. Kashmir: Political Division and Earthquake Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Figure 9. Deaths from Violence in Jammu and Kashmir, 1989–2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Table 1. The Impact of Selected Major Disasters, 2004–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 2. Attempts at Bilateral Post-Disaster Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 3. Impacts of Civil War and the 2004 Tsunami on Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 4. Selected Provisions of the Aceh Peace Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table 5. Aceh’s Peace Accord versus the Governing Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table 6. Impacts of Civil War and the 2004 Tsunami on Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table of Contents
Table 7. Assistance to Conflict- and Tsunami-Affected Sri Lankans, as of April 2006 . . . . 31
Table 8. Impacts of the Kashmir Conflict and the October 2005 Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . 34
Sidebar 1. After Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Sidebar 2. Drought and Conflict in Darfur, Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Sidebar 3. Disaster Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Sidebar 4. Principles of the “Do No Harm” Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Sidebar 5. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Acknowledgments
The authors are indebted to the Ford Foundation for its generous support of this project. This
paper was strengthened greatly by the detailed feedback provided by Philippe Hoyois (Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Brussels), analysts Nireka Weeratunge and Sunil
Bastian (Colombo, Sri Lanka), Ilan Kelman (DisasterDiplomacy.org, Boulder), Dayna Brown
(Listening Project), and Worldwatch Board member Larry Minear. Field trips to Aceh and Sri
Lanka in 2005 and 2006 provided us with valuable insights into this topic. We thank Jessica Rucell
and Elizabeth Wong for organizing and leading a small Global Exchange delegation to Aceh. We
are similarly grateful to Rixt Bode (Oxfam Novib), Amal Kumar Pramanik (Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee), Devanand Ramiah and Niel Kusumsiri (UNDP), and Natasha Udugama (Sarvodaya) for facilitating visits to post-tsunami micro-credit and reconstruction projects
in southern Sri Lanka.
In Aceh, the following individuals generously shared their views: Linda North and Kerry Ross
(Yayasan Lamjabat); Fuad Mardadital (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Commission, BRR);
Lilianne Fan (Oxfam); Peter Woetmann and Nicholas Alexandre Bonvin (Aceh Monitoring
Mission); and Bakhtiar Abdallah (GAM). In addition, staff members of the Aceh Civil Society
Task Force, Aceh Recovery Forum, Women Volunteers for Humanitarian Action, Yasindo
(Community Rural Development Foundation), and the International Organization for Migration
granted interviews.
In Sri Lanka, the authors benefited from conversations with: Madhavi Ariyabandu; Nikki
Burns and Priyanka Samarakoon (CARE); Iveta Ouvry (MercyCorps); Mahinda de Silva
(Sewalanka Foundation); Nanditha Hettitantra (Oxfam America); and Johannah Boestel (Asian
Development Bank).
Meeri-Maria Jaarva (Crisis Management Initiative, Helsinki) and Tore Hattrem, Sondre
Bjotveit, Erik Ivo Nürnberg, and Tom Knappskog (Norwegian Foreign Ministry) also took time
out of busy schedules to discuss the challenges of peacemaking efforts in Aceh and Sri Lanka.
Last, but certainly not least, several Worldwatch colleagues played crucial roles in shepherding
this report from manuscript to polished final product, and ensuring its visibility: Senior Editor
Lisa Mastny, Art Director Lyle Rosbotham, Communications Manager Darcey Rakestraw, and
Marketing Director Patricia Shyne.
4
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Summary
T
wo recent tragedies, the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami and the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, gave rise to
hopes that three longstanding Asian
conflicts could finally be brought to an end:
the separatist uprising in Indonesia’s Aceh
Province, the civil war in Sri Lanka, and the
territorial dispute between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir. Amid terrible loss of life, these
disasters presented residents and policymakers
alike with a host of new challenges, but also
with unique opportunities to address their
ongoing troubles.
Earthquakes, floods, droughts, and other
natural disasters exact a heavy human and economic toll. On average, 231 million people
were affected by natural disasters each year
over the past decade—equivalent to every person in Indonesia, the fourth most populous
country in the world.
As climate change and ecosystem destruction intensify, the stage is being set for more
frequent, more powerful, and more destructive
disaster events. Communities that are already
disempowered as a result of economic and
ecological marginalization are exceptionally
vulnerable to disasters, which exacerbate problems of poverty, indebtedness, and food insecurity. Many of the world’s poorest residents
are forced to live on unstable hillsides or in
areas prone to drought or flooding. Women,
children, and the elderly are among those most
affected by disasters.
Disasters can trigger conflicts by straining
the social and economic fabric of affected
communities. Recriminations may occur over
such post-disaster realities as unequal relief
efforts, inadequate compensation, contentious
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
aid distribution, unwelcome resettlement, or
lack of consultation with those who are most
affected. In extreme cases, the seeds of violent
conflict may be sown.
Areas of recent or current armed conflict
are particularly at risk. But when disasters
occur in conflict zones, they can produce an
unexpected silver lining: the opportunity for
peace. By jolting the political landscape, disasters hold the potential to quickly transform
conflict dynamics and generate opportunities
to bring long-running disputes to an end.
Hardship that cuts across existing divides can
prompt acts of goodwill and create common
relief needs. Joint emergency aid efforts and
rebuilding activities can be a catalyst for building mutual trust among adversaries. In some
cases, the destruction wrought by a disaster
may be so great that reconstruction in conflictafflicted regions is able to proceed only with a
ceasefire or peace agreement.
Aceh, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir have each
taken dramatically different paths in the aftermath of disaster. In Aceh, the tsunami served
as a catalyzing shock that decisively shifted the
political dynamics of the region and cemented
a collective interest in peace. Sri Lanka had a
ceasefire in place, but struggles over control
of reconstruction aid reinforced the island’s
divides and contributed to renewed warfare.
And in Kashmir, despite substantial post-disaster goodwill, India and Pakistan ultimately
missed a unique opportunity to reinvigorate
the stalled reconciliation process.
The differing experiences of these three
disaster- and conflict-affected regions offer
important lessons:
• Compassion alone is unlikely to carry warB E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
5
Summary
ring factions through the complexities of a
peace process. It must lead to political change
that addresses the root causes of the conflict.
• Solutions must be indigenous, supported by
the affected forces and communities rather
than engineered by outside actors.
• The international community has an important role to play in facilitating fledgling peace
processes, reinforcing shared interests, and
creating maneuvering space for civil society.
This includes donor governments, United
Nations agencies, private aid groups, and
others.
• Environmental protection and restoration
measures are important for reducing future
disaster vulnerability as well as the potential
for associated hardship and conflict. These
measures are especially critical as post-disaster reconstruction puts enormous pressure on
natural resources and the environment.
How can we identify and harness unique
opportunities for peacemaking in post-disaster
6
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
situations? Policymakers must exhibit courage
and use skilled leadership. The intersection of
disaster, conflict, and peacemaking requires
creative interdisciplinary responses from governments, international donors, and civil society. Relief groups, development agencies,
economists, environmentalists, human rights
advocates, and conflict mediators must work
together more proactively, building on one
another’s expertise.
Because aid is inevitably political, relief and
development groups need to integrate conflictsensitive strategies into their work. Aid is not
an easy lever for peace, and unless carefully
designed, aid policies can exacerbate conflicts.
Sincere consultations with communities and
civil society leaders, which ensure that local
needs and interests are taken into account,
are a critical prerequisite for successful aid
projects. Great care must be taken to avoid
inequities in assistance to disaster- and conflict-affected populations.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
“Unnatural” Disasters
I
n late December 2004, the earth shook violently. Deep beneath the Indian Ocean, an
enormous tectonic plate lurched sideways,
shifting more than 15 meters in a matter
of seconds.* Pushing the adjoining plate
upward, the movement set off a massive earthquake that measured 9.0 on the Richter scale,
triggering one of the deadliest tsunamis in
modern history. Although it took many weeks
to tally the gruesome toll, within hours more
than 200,000 people had lost their lives in over
a dozen countries along the Indian Ocean’s
rim.1†
For the two countries hit hardest by the
waves—Indonesia and Sri Lanka—widespread
death and suffering are unfortunately not new
experiences. Both nations were, at the time of
the tsunami, home to festering civil conflicts,
and their experiences in the disaster’s aftermath had an important bearing on how these
conflicts would unfold. Worldwide, as the
impacts of earthquakes and other disasters
worsen over time, and as civil or international
conflicts arise and persist, a better understanding of the connections between these two types
of tragedies will be critical.
Whether under the sea or on land, earthquakes—along with floods, droughts, hurricanes, and other weather extremes—are often
seen as the cause of natural disasters, the forces
of nature unleashed in unpredictable ways.
But these occurrences might be better characterized as “unnatural” at times. There is growing recognition that disaster is itself often
*Units of measure throughout this report are metric
unless common usage dictates otherwise.
†Endnotes are grouped by section and begin on page 43.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
the product of human impacts on the natural
environment, as well as shortsighted and inappropriate development patterns, settlements
in increasingly vulnerable areas, and socioeconomic divides and inequities.
Disasters present complex challenges, beyond
the obvious tasks of improving early warning
systems or mobilizing quick relief. They are
connected in important ways to a range of
social, environmental, and ultimately political
challenges faced by humanity, including:
• Environmental degradation:
Human-induced changes in ecological systems
and cycles make certain types of disasters more
likely and increase their destructive power.
Deforestation heightens the danger of flooding
and landslides; inappropriate land use contributes to droughts and desertification; and
the destruction of coral reefs, mangroves, and
wetlands increases coastal areas’ exposure
to storms.
• Climate change:
The release of massive amounts of carbon into
the atmosphere from fossil fuel burning and
deforestation further aggravates many of these
problems. River deltas and other low-lying
areas will be forced to contend with the specter
of sea-level rise. Populations already living in
areas prone to drought or extreme weather
patterns—many of them with limited capacity
to adapt and cope—will face even greater
challenges.
• Population and housing:
Population growth translates into larger numbers of people potentially living in harm’s way,
particularly in areas where houses are poorly
built (and thus less likely to withstand natural
forces). Many people settle, by choice or necesB E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
7
“Unnatural” Disasters
sity, in disaster-prone places. With more frequent natural hazards, certain areas are likely
to become less habitable or economically
viable. This is expected to contribute to more
involuntary population movements.
• Poverty and inequality:
Poorer residents often have little choice about
where to live and work. Marginalized by economic and political structures that cater to the
more powerful, they may settle in the most
vulnerable places—on steep hillsides or at low
elevations likely to be hit by landslides, floods,
or other disasters. After a disaster happens, the
poor are often unable to purchase clean food
or water. They will also suffer when money for
social programs is diverted for disaster relief
and recovery efforts. Disaster can derail progress on international targets for well-being,
such as the United Nations’ Millennium
Development Goals.
8
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
• Human security and peacemaking:
The heavy economic toll and sudden stress
imposed by disasters can easily reinforce existing inequalities and may even trigger disputes.
On the other hand, when disasters strike in
conflict zones, the shared suffering offers an
unprecedented opportunity for “humanitarian
peacemaking”: a chance to overcome the divisive issues at the heart of long-lasting conflicts.
In the days after the 2004 tsunami struck,
there was hope among residents of conflicttorn Sri Lanka and in Indonesia’s Aceh province that the fateful shift of tectonic plates
might translate into a political realignment
conducive to making peace. But this is just one
of many possible outcomes when disaster and
conflict overlap. Ultimately, the thoughts and
actions of the individuals and groups involved
in coordinating relief and recovery efforts have
a profound effect on the way forward.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
The March
Toward Disaster
I
*The following hazards are included under the umbrella
term “natural disaster”: drought, earthquake, extreme
temperature, flood, slides, volcano, wave/surge, wildfire,
and windstorm.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Figure 1. Number of Disasters Worldwide, 1987–2006
2000
Source: EM-DAT
Number
1500
1000
500
1987–1991
1992–1996
1997–2001
2002–2006
fatalities down over time, a single major event
like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami can
1500 this trend. It is notable that there were
obscure
Source:
EM-DAT
just as many
deaths
from other disasters during
the 2002–06 period as were suffered during
Deathsthe
1200
tsunami,
though this event attracted more
global
Affected
attention than any single other occurrence.
2004
Meanwhile, the number of people affected Tsunami
900
by disasters—injured, left homeless, or otherwise requiring immediate assistance—has
increased
600 more than 10 percent over the past
two decades, from an average of 209 million a
year between 1987 and 1996 to an average of
300
a year between 1997 and 2006.4
231 million
Widespread hazards account for a large share
of those affected: over the past decade, 82
2.3 billion people
affected1997–2001
or
percent0of the
1987–1991
1992–1996
2002–2006
injured by a natural hazard were survivors of a
flood (1.2 billion) or drought (736 million).5
Disasters are often portrayed as unavoidable
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
9
1500
1200
900
600
300
0
Millions Affected
0
Thousand Deaths
n recent years, the world’s attention has
been pulled rapidly from one disaster event
to the next. With an average of nearly one
natural disaster per day—348 recorded
each year over the past decade—it is no wonder
that governments, aid agencies, local organizations, businesses, and citizens are hard-pressed
to keep up with these calamities.1* (See Figure
1.) To qualify as a disaster, as defined by the
Center for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters, a natural hazard must kill 10 or
more people, affect 100 or more people, or
necessitate a declaration of emergency or call
for international assistance.2
Some disasters are never reported. In other
cases, they capture media attention only
momentarily, when the scope of suffering
and pain seems overwhelming. The recovery
period, which can appear slow and distant,
gets less support than is needed to help us
understand the long-term challenges facing
survivors. As quickly as they enter the spotlight, the epicenters of disaster can fade out,
leaving residents and responding agencies to
cope with the necessary rebuilding and recovery efforts. The rising frequency of disasters
and constant flow of competing news stories
reinforce this tendency to focus only briefly
on individual events.
Over the past 20 years, the human toll from
natural disasters has changed markedly.3 (See
Figure 2, page 10.) While advances in earlywarning systems have pushed the number of
2000
Source: EM-DAT
The March Toward Disaster
Number
1500
1000
500
0
1987–1991
events. But in reality, they are the product of
several factors: natural hazards (such as windstorms, earthquakes, or floods), vulnerabilities
(such as lack of access to information, poor
food security, deforestation, or inadequate
city planning), and failed risk-management
tactics (such as implementing building codes,
improving sanitation, and conducting emergency drills).6 While humans have little ability
to1992–1996
control natural1997–2001
hazards, much
more can be
2002–2006
Figure 2. People Affected and Killed by Natural Disasters,
1987–2006
1500
1500
Source: EM-DAT
Deaths
Affected
1200
2004
Tsunami
900
900
600
600
300
300
0
1987–1991
1992–1996
1997–2001
Millions Affected
Thousand Deaths
1200
0
2002–2006
done to understand vulnerability and use
risk-management tactics to prevent future
devastation.
Natural hazards often expose existing
vulnerabilities. But human-related factors ultimately influence the severity of the devastation. These include population growth and
urbanization, environmental destruction, and
climate change:
• Population growth and urbanization:
As the human population rises past 6.5 billion,
putting greater pressure on the availability and
cost of land, more people are being forced to
live in riskier places and in higher concentrations.7 By 2030, an additional 1.7 billion
people will live on our planet, bringing the
total population to an estimated 8.2 billion.8
Because disasters are defined in part by their
human toll, having more people in harm’s way
10
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
will likely bring an associated rise in disaster
impacts.
In 2008, for the first time ever, more people
will live in cities than rural areas; by 2030, this
urban share is projected to reach 60 percent, or
some 5 billion people.9 Cities have been home
to some of the most lethal and costly disasters
in recent years. A 1995 earthquake in Kobe,
Japan, killed an estimated 6,400 people and
caused damages totaling $128 billion (in 2005
dollars).10 * Ten years later, Hurricane Katrina
engulfed the U.S. city of New Orleans, killing
1,800 residents and having a similar economic
effect.11 In 2006, an earthquake in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, killed more than 5,700 people and
affected 2.3 million others.12
Many cities are located in risky areas—
along coasts, near known fault lines, or in
low-lying regions susceptible to flooding. In
some cases, this siting is a vestige of advantageous sea trading routes. In other cases,
sprawl has left residents no choice but to
move to less-desirable areas outside the city
center. Whatever the historical reason, as
urbanization intensifies, cities often lose their
natural defenses.
• Environmental destruction:
When the 2004 tsunami came ashore on the
southeastern coast of India, one village—
Naluvedapathy in Tamil Nadu state—was
largely spared. Two years earlier, villagers had
planted more than 80,000 trees, resulting in a
kilometer-wide forest barrier between the village and the ocean.13 Although the massive
waves still caused widespread flooding, the
trees broke the waves’ impact, resulting in few
deaths among residents.
Neighboring areas were not so lucky. Across
wide swaths of tsunami-affected coastline, the
deforestation of mangroves and the degradation of offshore coral reefs left villages vulnerable. One study in Sri Lanka revealed that
damage to the coast was far greater in places
where mangrove forests had been disturbed.
In areas with more-intact forests, the trees
remained in place even as they bore the brunt
*All dollar amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars unless
indicated otherwise.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
The March Toward Disaster
of the waves.14
This pattern of environmental degradation
leading to worse disasters has been observed
time and again. New Orleans, devastated by
the flooding and storm surge that followed
Hurricane Katrina, is losing coastal wetlands
to rising seas at a rate of 1.5 football fields
(8,026 square meters) an hour; the state of
Louisiana has lost a quarter of its wetlands
since the 1930s, mostly due to levees blocking
the natural flow of sediments down the Mississippi River.15 Mumbai, India, which was
inundated by massive flooding in 2005, has
lost much of its natural flood defense—mangrove forests—to development.16 And many
countries in Central and South America experience devastating landslides each hurricane
season due to deforestation.
• Climate change:
As scientists develop a better picture of our climatic situation, global awareness of climate
change has reached a tipping point. According
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), the Earth’s average surface
temperature has increased measurably over the
past 100 years.17 The U.S. National Aeronautics
and Space Administration reports that the five
warmest years since the late 1880s all fell
within the last decade.18 And in 2005, meteorologists announced they had observed an 80
percent increase over 35 years in the most
powerful types of tropical cyclones—storms
fueled by warm ocean water.19
As drought, flooding, erratic weather, and
extreme temperatures are on the rise, so are the
disasters that often follow these phenomena.
In 2006, long-term drought on the Greater
Horn of Africa, including the worst drought in
Somalia in a decade, led to food shortages that
affected at least 11 million people.20 That same
area experienced its most severe flooding in 50
years.21 The UK-based humanitarian organization Christian Aid reported that one third of
pastoralists in Kenya have had to abandon
their traditional lifestyle because of adverse
conditions related to drought.22 This is just one
example of the many ways extreme weather
can produce either rapid-onset, high-profile
disasters or slow-onset, relatively inconspicuw w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
ous disasters.
A 2007 report from the IPCC reinforces the
fact that climate change will hit poor countries
the hardest.23 Climate change will intensify
coastal and weather-related hazards threatening these vulnerable communities.24 This rising
level of risk will require additional attention
from the international donor community.25
Aid organizations are already struggling to
keep up with the rising disaster toll. The 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami, which inspired an
outpouring of international support, was the
best-funded relief effort ever recorded, with a
Table 1. The Impact of Selected Major Disasters, 2004–2006
Year
Event
Deaths
Total
People
Affected
(Number)
2006
2005
2005
2004
Yogyakarta Earthquake
Kashmir Earthquake
Hurricane Katrina
Indian Ocean Tsunami
5,778
74,648
1,833
226,408
Total
People
Deaths Affected
(Percent of all
disasters during year)
2,340,745
3,026,265
500,000
2,431,807
27.1
84.4
2.1
93.3
Source: See Endnote 28 for this section.
staggering $1,241 donated per beneficiary
when only an estimated $261 was required.26
The total pledge amount came to $8.5 billion—second only to the $9 billion pledged
after Hurricane Mitch hit Central America in
1998—with individual giving comprising $5.5
billion of this.27 But disasters of the type and
magnitude of the tsunami or the October
2005 earthquake in Kashmir are relatively
rare. While they are typically characterized
by high numbers of deaths, they touch a far
smaller percentage of the total population
affected by disasters over the course of a
year.28 (See Table 1.)
Heightened attention to certain high-profile events obscures the fact that persistent,
localized disasters occur each and every day,
most of which generate little or no response.
When Hurricane Stan hit Guatemala roughly
a month after Hurricane Katrina, it resulted
in a similar number of fatalities but generated
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
11
1.7
2.1
0.3
1.4
The March Toward Disaster
UNHCR camp for
earthquake survivors
at Muzaffarabad,
Kashmir.
© Fründt/teamwork-press
only a fraction of the media coverage and
subsequent aid response.29 Worldwide, flooding in some low-lying areas makes people
homeless on an annual basis, heavy rains produce landslides that engulf entire communi-
12
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
ties, and windstorms destroy power lines or
other costly infrastructure. These smaller disasters are often deadly and demand ongoing
attention from aid agencies.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Understanding Factors
of Vulnerability
D
isasters provoked by storms, floods,
droughts, earthquakes, and other
hazards often compromise human
security, exacting a heavy economic toll and undermining livelihoods. These
effects can be temporary, but in many cases
disaster also impairs the long-term habitability
or economic viability of the affected area.
While the severity of disaster is an important
factor, the timeliness and adequacy of relief
and rebuilding programs, and the resilience of
affected communities and societies, will ultimately shape the future of the area.
In poorer countries, disasters easily exacerbate problems of poverty and indebtedness by
sucking away scarce financial resources from
social programs and contributing to food insecurity. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused economic damage equivalent to 60–65 percent of
the gross domestic product (GDP) of Honduras and Nicaragua.1 In contrast, the $128
billion in damage caused by the massive 1995
earthquake in Kobe equaled just 2 percent of
Japan’s GDP.2
In urban areas, poor residents are often
forced to live in the most undesirable neighborhoods, in environmentally precarious
places (such as on unstable hillsides or floodplains), or on contaminated land. Similarly, in
rural areas, inequitable land distribution or
economic marginalization may mean that
small farmers are forced onto steep grades or
areas prone to drought or flooding. Hurricane
Mitch revealed such vulnerabilities with brute
force, killing some 30,000 people and displacing 1.5 million in Honduras and Nicaragua.3
Economic and ecological marginalization
leaves poor and disempowered communities
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
exceptionally vulnerable to disasters. The
United Nations Development Programme
notes that countries with a low human development score—a measure of life expectancy,
education, and standard of living—account for
53 percent of recorded deaths from disasters,
even though these countries are home to only
11 percent of the people exposed to natural
hazards worldwide.4
When a natural hazard strikes, certain segments of the population are often at higher
risk for injury or death. Women in particular
are disproportionately affected by disasters,
given their economic situations and roles in
the home, as are children and the elderly. Taking the special vulnerabilities and capacities of
these groups into consideration when designing disaster response plans can minimize the
physical, social, and economic consequences.
After Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in
2005, race and economic class were often cited
as factors to explain the demographic divide
in impacts, as well as the poor U.S. federal
response. Few sources mentioned gender,
though women in the New Orleans area are
more likely than men to live in poverty and to
head single-parent families.5 In the aftermath
of the disaster, many women faced the daunting challenges of ensuring their own safety and
attending to their children’s health, finding
housing for themselves and their families,
and organizing schooling while searching for
jobs—all while wading through the attendant
bureaucracy to receive the financial benefits to
which they were entitled.6
Hurricane Katrina is not an isolated example of gender’s role in disaster vulnerability.
Surveys in the Ampara district of eastern Sri
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
13
Understanding Factors of Vulnerability
Lanka indicate that 66 percent of those killed
by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were women,
many of whom were preparing breakfast in
their homes or tending to their children when
the waves hit.7 Initial estimates from Aceh in
Indonesia found that more than 70 percent
of the fatalities were female, in part because
women waiting on the shore for fishing boats
to return were more severely affected than the
fishermen out at sea.8 And an earthquake that
leveled buildings in Maharashtra, India, in 1993
crushed more women than men (who were
likely to be working or sleeping outdoors).9
The insecurity and unusual circumstances
that arise post-disaster place women at higher
risk as well. In temporary camps, insufficient
lighting and a breakdown in social accountability can result in embarrassment, sexual
harassment, and abuse, as was observed anecdotally in Sri Lanka after the tsunami.10 Lack
of employment and general depression can
lead to domestic violence.11 And basic issues
such as inadequate sanitation facilities and
supplies can add significantly to women’s
burdens. Mothers and pregnant women face
particular health and safety challenges in environments where food supplies and medical
care are often scarce.
Economic vulnerability is another significant concern for women. When land titles are
lost or the titleholder dies, women may have
little sway in retaining family property. If a
husband was killed during the Kashmir earthquake in 2005, his land often went to the eldest
son, even if the surviving wife occupied and
used it.12 In Sri Lanka, women owned as much
as 75 percent of the affected land prior to the
tsunami, but afterwards, most donor-given
houses were deeded in a man’s name.13 And in
India, tsunami relief money was disbursed to
men, leaving female-headed families without
support.14
But women should not be seen as helpless
victims. In fact, they are crucial players in successful disaster management planning and
recovery efforts. In San Alfonso, El Salvador,
women who had been affected by Hurricane
Mitch in 1998, as well as two earthquakes in
2001, successfully evacuated before Hurricane
14
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
Stan hit their community in 2005, though
many houses were destroyed. Female survivors
have since constructed a risk map that integrates health and environmental information
and set up a monitoring system to watch the
nearby river.15
In situations where prior planning was not
effective, women can forge crucial links to
stave off worsening crises. Just before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, six women who
worked as telephone dispatchers in Lower
Plaquemines Parish were instructed to stay at
their desks while their superiors evacuated.16
They had not been alerted to any emergency
plans, so they used their knowledge of the local
area, as well as their personal connections with
the residents, to devise phone trees and evacuation plans before phone lines and electricity
were cut.17 Their efforts probably saved several
hundred lives.18
Children and the elderly are two other
demographic groups at potentially higher risk
during disasters. They may need assistance to
evacuate safely and effectively according to disaster plans (if these exist), as well as special
attention to ensure they receive warnings in
enough time to act on them. The 2005 Kashmir earthquake proved deadly for children,
killing more than 16,000 in schools that collapsed during the quake.19 The elderly, who
may depend on family members to help them
access food and health services, suffered as
well: of 11,540 elderly people in camps after
the earthquake, some 1,564 were without any
adult support.20 Anecdotal evidence suggests
that the tsunami killed a disproportionately
high number of both groups as well.21
In many cases, children may survive but
their parents do not, leaving them to fend for
themselves in a chaotic post-disaster situation.
In Sri Lanka alone, at least 1,500 children were
orphaned by the tsunami, and in Indonesia
another 2,000 were separated from their parents or orphaned.22 Some 2,430 children were
separated from their parents by Hurricane
Katrina.23
As with women, the risks for children do
not disappear once a disaster has hit. Their
ability to go back to life as they knew it may be
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Understanding Factors of Vulnerability
seriously compromised by factors
beyond their control. Schools
may be closed for prolonged periods of time if they were damaged
or if teachers are unable to return
to work. Alternatively, families
may be unable to afford school
fees if wage earners have lost their
jobs or must redirect their earnings toward rebuilding or medical
fees. In some areas of Sri Lanka,
25 percent of children were still
not back in school two years posttsunami, even where attendance
was very high before the disaster.24 And safety risks may dissuade families from allowing
children, especially girls, from
returning to school.25
Disasters can leave children at
risk of becoming child laborers
or being trafficked to other
regions or countries. If a child is
orphaned, he or she will often
have to find food, clothing, and
shelter or earn money to purchase
these things. In many cases, new
orphans—or those temporarily
separated from their parents—are
at increased risk for economic
exploitation.26
Some governments are taking
proactive measures to reduce this risk. After
the Kashmir earthquake, Pakistan restricted
child relocation to prevent trafficking, collaborated with nongovernmental organizations to
reunite families, and built temporary schools.27
In Indonesia, a post-tsunami project funded by
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Precariously placed
housing in Kandy,
Sri Lanka, clings to
a hillside after heavy
flooding.
© Zoë Chafe
the U.S. Department of Labor and implemented by Save the Children targeted 10,530
children at risk of working in hazardous or
exploitative positions by reactivating community learning centers and working with staff to
raise awareness of the problem.28
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
15
Storm Clouds and
Silver Linings
B
eyond livelihood and human security
impacts, sudden stresses caused by
disaster may strain the social and
economic structures of a community,
deepening existing inequalities and triggering
conflicts. Not only are disasters, as a 2005 Oxfam
International report put it, “profoundly discriminatory in their impact on people” (with factors
like gender, age, and income determining who
will be most affected), but human reactions
often reinforce their unequal impacts.1 How well
a government responds has important political
implications. Competent disaster management
can improve an agency’s image and efficacy,
while an inept or indifferent attitude toward
disaster will likely erode citizens’ trust.
Potential political and economic repercussions in the aftermath of disasters include:
• Aid as a political tool: Disagreements over
the allocation of disaster aid among affected
groups may erupt, especially if politicians
wield aid as a tool for dispensing favors to
their supporters, as happened in Peru in 1998
following an El Niño-triggered disaster.2
• Aid distorts the economy: High-profile disasters
(such as the 2004 tsunami or the Ethiopian
famines of the mid-1980s) can mobilize massive amounts of international aid, creating
“an economic branch of its own,” in the
words of a 2005 German study.3 But the
quick receipt of such money may deepen
inequality, benefiting residents who rent
houses or offer services to emergency aid
groups while hurting those who face rising
prices from aid-induced inflation. After Hurricane Katrina, for example, rents rose substantially in New Orleans, pricing out some
long-term residents.4 (See Sidebar 1.)
16
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
• Competition for jobs and services: Disasterdisplaced populations may not be welcome
elsewhere if they are seen as competitors for
scarce land, water, jobs, and social services.
This was the plight of flood-displaced
Bangladeshis in India’s Assam region, and of
drought-displaced Hawaweer pastoralists in
northern Sudan, in the early 1980s.5
• Unequal compensation: Disputes may erupt
over inadequate compensation for property
losses, particularly if land titles and other
forms of documentation are lost (or did not
exist to begin with). Or, as happened in the
2004 tsunami, the physical landscape may be
so fundamentally altered that it becomes nearly
impossible to adjudicate property disputes.
• Conflict over resettlement: If resettlement and
reconstruction proceed without properly
consulting affected communities and respecting their rights, conflict can ensue. When
survivors of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake
protested their eviction from a makeshift
refugee camp in Muzaffarabad, police broke
up the march, injuring and arresting several
demonstrators.6
• War weakens resilience: Areas of recent or
ongoing armed conflict are especially at
risk. Warfare depletes a country’s economic
resources, rends its social fabric, and damages
its natural environment—affecting the resilience needed to recover from a disaster. Somalia, for example, routinely contends with
severe flooding and drought, but war-damaged roads and bridges hinder aid delivery.7
In extreme cases, governments that fail to
adequately and fairly manage disasters could
sow the seeds of violent conflict. In November
1970, after a cyclone claimed an estimated
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Storm Clouds and Silver Linings
course. But not all types of disasters necessarily
lend themselves to conflict resolution: droughts
may lead to mounting rivalries over access to
scarce land and water among different comSidebar 1. After Hurricane Katrina
When Hurricane Katrina hit the southern coast of the United States in
2005, causing widespread damage in several states, it exposed the stark
divides between the distinct geographic communities living in the city.
Areas built earlier in the city’s history and on higher ground, such as the
French Quarter, were largely unaffected by the storm surge. Newer neighborhoods such as the Ninth Ward, built on less-desirable land in the
mid-1900s, suffered the worst impacts. Most of all, the storm and its aftermath served as a devastating testimonial to the lack of evacuation and
recovery options faced by America’s urban poor.
Before Katrina, New Orleans was a vibrant city, home to 454,863 residents. Of these, 67 percent were African-American. Just over a year after
the event, the city’s demographics had changed drastically: the city had
shrunk to less than half of its former population, with an estimated 187,525
residents in October 2006. Only 46 percent were African-American.
In the wake of the storm, rents rose significantly as damaged rental
units were razed, dramatically restricting the socioeconomic makeup of
people able to remain in, or move back to, the city. (See Figure 3.) Infrastructure regeneration also varied considerably. In wealthier Jefferson and
St. Tammany Parishes, 100 percent of public schools were re-opened as
of November 2005. In Orleans Parish, only 44 percent of schools had
reopened by January 2007, nearly a year and a half after the storm; the
record was even worse in hard-hit St. Bernard Parish, where only one in
five schools had opened.
Source: See Endnote 4 for this section.
Figure 3. Fair Market Rent for a One-Bedroom Unit in
New Orleans, 2000–2006
1000
Source: Brookings
Monthly Rent (2006 Dollars)
300,000–500,000 lives in the eastern province of
Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh), many residents accused the government in distant Islamabad of being indifferent to their suffering or
even intentionally delaying aid shipments.
The disaster fueled demands for political
autonomy, and Pakistan’s military government
responded with increased repression, provoking a war that cost some 3 million lives but led
to Bangladesh’s independence in December
1971.8 That same month, a devastating earthquake hit Nicaragua’s capital, Managua. After
the country’s dictator Anastasio Somoza
Debayle embezzled international reconstruction aid, support from the business community crumbled, weakening his regime. Amid
deteriorating economic conditions, the Sandinista National Liberation Front grew rapidly
and by 1979 overthrew the Somoza regime.9
The negative repercussions of disasters may
be seen as new storm clouds—a cascade of suffering and misery. But when disasters occur
in conflict zones, they can also bring an unexpected silver lining: the opportunity for peace.
By jolting the political landscape, disasters can
dramatically transform conflict dynamics and
generate opportunities to bring long-running
disputes to an end.
Disasters may inflict suffering that cuts
across existing divides, temporarily triggering
acts of goodwill or mutual solidarity and creating common relief needs. Joint emergency aid
efforts and rebuilding activities among adversaries can be a catalyst for building mutual
trust. The destruction wrought by a disaster may
be of such a scale that reconstruction can proceed only with a ceasefire or peace agreement.
But post-disaster opportunities are brief,
lasting for perhaps no more than a fleeting
moment along the timeline of the conflict.
Whether the chance for peacemaking is
seized—and whether it ultimately succeeds—
depends on a range of factors and circumstances: the scale of disaster, the type of conflict,
political leadership, and the role of the military, international donors, and civil society.10
After a disaster of great magnitude (relative
to the suffering inflicted by conflict), leaders
and the public may be receptive to a changed
800
600
400
200
2000
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
2001
2002
B E Y O N D
2003
D I S A S T E R S
120
Source: Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update
2004
2005
17
2006
Storm Clouds and Silver Linings
munities, creating rifts rather than common
interests, as has occurred in Darfur, Sudan.11
(See Sidebar 2.) And slow-onset or smallerscale disasters that elude the media or donor
spotlight often fail to prompt international
engagement and pressure for peace.
Disasters have the potential to unite people
from opposing sides around a common goal.
But the range of dynamics that may unfold is
Sidebar 2. Drought and Conflict in Darfur, Sudan
In Sudan’s Darfur region, years of creeping desertification and severe
droughts have led to sporadic famine. These environmental challenges
might have spurred cooperation between the area’s farming and nomadic
communities—two populations with a history of competing for scarce
water and fertile land, but also a record of economic interdependence and
a tradition of seeking negotiated solutions. Instead, increasing scarcity has
led to rising tribal antagonism over the past 20 years. Darfur has also
experienced increased banditry and lawlessness, and it has played involuntary host to insurgent groups from neighboring Chad.
In February 2003, war broke out in Darfur, the result of many decades of
economic and political marginalization by the central government in Khartoum. When Darfur rebels, primarily black Africans, formed armed groups
to attack government installations, the Sudanese government, which is
predominately Arab, responded by playing up ethnic distinctions and arming the so-called Janjaweed nomadic militias. Working in concert with government army attacks, the Janjaweed have killed at least 200,000 Darfuris,
burned 90 percent of farming villages, raped countless women and forced
2.5 million residents out of their homes. At least 2 million displaced Darfuris are now living in refugee camps, where the constant need for water
and firewood force women to make long and dangerous treks out of the
camps in search of these basic resources.
Source: See Endnote 11 for this section.
wide, depending on whether a disaster affects
people on both sides of a conflict or strikes primarily one side. Suffering on both sides is likely
to prompt a certain commonality of interests,
at least in the short run. Though a “one-sided”
calamity is likely to elicit acts of compassion, it
may ultimately fail to overcome distrust.
Even when an opportunity for peacemaking
arises, it may wither if one side feels strong
enough to prevail with military force or fears
that entering negotiations will be seen as an
act of weakness. Or, the conflict parties may
see a humanitarian ceasefire not as a prelude to
peace but as an opportunity to regroup and re18
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
arm.12 While post-disaster meetings about aid
and recovery efforts can be a “door-opener”
that allows parties to meet and build the trust
necessary to discuss grievances and political
issues, there is no guarantee that such contact
will lead to political engagement.13
A key factor to the success of such peacemaking efforts is the commitment of political
leaders to initiate meetings or respond constructively to such overtures by opponents.
This is particularly the case when intense internal rivalries divide ethnic groups or warlords,
and where the relationship between states is
marked by ideological rigidity or conflicting
interests.14 (See Table 2.) To succeed, peacemaking efforts need to take into account the
interests and motivations of political rivals,
public pressure, media and other opinion
shapers, or outside powers. If opposition parties or other important segments of society are
left out or intentionally sidelined, they may well
see a political benefit to opposing peace. Others
may be tempted to undermine any conflictresolution efforts because they derive enormous profit from maintaining a war economy
through arms deals, smuggling, extortion, and
other illicit activities.
Disaster relief efforts sometimes rely heavily
on armed forces, due to militaries’ substantial
personnel and logistical capacities. This can
be positive or negative, depending on the type
of existing conflict. With interstate conflict,
mutual trust could be built if the armed forces
of both sides engage in collaborative relief
work. In civil war situations, the military plays
a contradictory role: a force that may have
been seen as an oppressor by the affected population is suddenly meant to be received as a
first-aid provider.
After a disaster, there is often an influx of
civilian aid workers. Especially if accompanied
by intense (though typically short-lived) global
media interest, their presence turns the spotlight on war-torn areas that may previously
have been ignored or even off-limits to outsiders, as was the case in Aceh, Indonesia, after
the 2004 tsunami. Such circumstances present
an unprecedented opportunity to enhance
transparency and end human rights abuses.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Storm Clouds and Silver Linings
Table 2. Attempts at Bilateral Post-Disaster Diplomacy
Ethiopia–Eritrea
• 1999–2000
drought and famine
• 2002 drought
During a 1998–2000 border war, Eritrea agreed to deliver food aid to landlocked Ethiopia through a humanitarian corridor from its port of Assab.
Ethiopia dismissed this as a “gimmick.” In November 2002, Ethiopia again
rejected a similar offer.
Taiwan–China
• Sept. 1999
Chi-Chi Earthquake
At a time of high political tension, China offered post-disaster assistance to
Taiwan. The Taiwanese saw this as a patronizing move by China, which claims
sovereignty over the island.
India–Pakistan
• Jan. 2001
Gujarat Earthquake
India’s acceptance of Pakistani earthquake aid was impetus for a summit
in July 2001. The meeting failed to meet expectations, and relations later
dramatically worsened.
Greece–Turkey
• 1999 Earthquakes
in both countries
Post-disaster mutual assistance and goodwill led towards improving bilateral
relations, but did not bring a resolution to the long-standing Cyprus conflict.
Cuba–United States
• Nov. 2001
Hurricane Michelle
• July 2005
Hurricane Dennis
• Oct. 2005
Hurricane Wilma
Cuba declined aid offers after Hurricanes Michelle and Dennis (suggesting
instead that the United States normalize bilateral trade relations). After Wilma,
Cuba agreed to receive a U.S. disaster assessment team; but when it insisted
on discussing disaster response coordination, the United States withdrew
the offer.
Iran–United States
• Dec. 2003
Bam Earthquake
The United States sent medical personnel and supplies to Iran, but the gesture
of goodwill failed to thaw icy relations between the two countries.
United States–Others The United States did not accept aid offers from Cuba (1,500 doctors and
• Aug./Sept. 2005
medical supplies), Venezuela (food, oil, water, and aid workers), or Iran (20
Hurricane Katrina
million barrels of crude oil, predicated on end of U.S. sanctions).
Source: See Endnote 14 for this section.
International aid workers, donors, and
mediators who appear on the scene after a disaster may need to play an assertive role in
encouraging warring parties to resolve their
conflict or at least adopt a ceasefire. International donors will likely insist that the parties
undertake concrete steps toward that end, so
that emergency aid can be delivered and reconstruction efforts are not ultimately in vain.
But foreign workers may also be seen as unwelcome meddlers, or their impartiality may
be questioned.
Where conflicts are already ripe for resolution and no military solution is imminent,
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
post-disaster goodwill can provide a muchneeded spark for peacemaking. The 2004
tsunami and the 2005 Kashmir earthquake,
for example, gave rise to hopes that three longstanding Asian conflicts, with diverse histories
and different possibilities for peace, could
finally be brought to an end: civil wars in
Indonesia’s Aceh province and in Sri Lanka,
and a cross-border dispute between India and
Pakistan in Kashmir. Building on the tools for
understanding disaster and conflict discussed
in the preceding sections, the following case
studies detail the very different post-disaster
trajectories that each conflict has followed.
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
19
Case Study
Aceh: Peacemaking
After the Tsunami
O
n December 26, 2004, fighters
with the Free Aceh Movement
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM)
looked on helplessly from mountain redoubts as tsunami waves washed over
their coastal village below, killing nearly every
inhabitant. Although the tsunami that devastated much of Aceh—a province of Indonesia
embroiled in conflict for almost 30 years—did
not end fighting right away, it helped kick-start
successful peace negotiations.
Aceh, located at the northern tip of Sumatra
Island, became part of the newly established
0
KOTA
LHOKSEUMAWE
ACEH
BESAR
BIREUEN
PIDIE
ACEH
JAYA
ACEH
UTARA
BENER
MERIAH
Meulaboh
NAGAN
RAYA
INDIAN
OCEAN
ACEH
BARAT
DAYA
KOTA
LANGSA
ACEH
TIMUR
ACEH
TENGAH
ACEH
BARAT
Figure 4. Aceh
and Its Location
in Indonesia
50 miles
50 km
ACEH
TAMIANG
GAYO
LUES
ACEH
ACEH
TENGGARA
S
PACIFIC
OCEAN
u
ACEH
SELATAN
m
a
t
SIMEULUE
I
Jakarta N
D
O
N
E
S
I
A
ACEH
SINGKIL
20
B E Y O N D
Aceh
incorporated
into North
Sumatra
province.
D I S A S T E R S
1953–62
Aceh becomes
part of newly
sovereign
Indonesia.
19 5 0
Aceh
Timeline
19 4 9
INDIAN
OCEAN
Acehnese
support
Darul Islam
rebellion.
19 5 7
r
a
To pacify
Aceh, 1950
incorporation
is reversed.
Aceh granted
“special
territory”
status, an
empty promise.
19 6 6
0
19 5 9
ACEH
Regencies and
selected towns
KOTA SABANG
KOTA BANDA ACEH
Republic of Indonesia in 1949. But excessive
political centralization and broken promises of
autonomy provoked deep misgivings among
the Acehnese. Local resentment was further
fueled by the unjust exploitation of the area’s
vast natural resources. Revenues from oil, natural gas, and logging ventures primarily benefited multinational companies and cronies of
long-reigning dictator Suharto in Indonesia’s
capital city, Jakarta.1 Aceh today remains one
of Indonesia’s poorest provinces.2
GAM was founded in 1976 with the express
goal of seceding from Indonesia.3 (See Timeline, below.) The group’s initial uprising was
quickly suppressed by the Indonesian army, but
membership surged in reaction to severe human
rights violations by the government army.4
As the dominant institution in Indonesia
for decades, the military was increasingly
involved in a broad range of legal and illegal
business deals. Profits from ventures in Aceh
and other parts of the country supplemented
the official defense budget and enriched individual commanders.5 One of the military’s
most lucrative sources of income in Aceh has
been illegal logging. Some elements of the military have also been involved in marijuana production and trafficking, prostitution, and
extortion. For this reason, among others, the
military was resolutely opposed to a negotiated
solution to the Aceh conflict; some units
actively worked to undermine peace efforts
General
Suharto
establishes
dictatorship.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
GAM fighters
return to Aceh
and renew
uprising.
B E Y O N D
Aceh declared
a Military
Operations
Area; mass
killings ensue.
D I S A S T E R S
21
19 9 2
GAM fighters
receive
extensive
military training
in Libya.
19 9 0
GAM’s initial
uprising
crushed by
Indonesian
military.
19 8 9
GAM
(Free Aceh
Movement)
founded.
19 7 9
Natural gas
discovered in
Aceh; land
seized without
compensation.
19 7 6
19 7 1
*Legally, martial law gave way to a state of civil emergency
in May 2004, but this made little practical difference.
catalyzing shock; it produced a focus on common goals of relief, recovery and reconstruction; and it brought increased international
attention.” 14 Several donors, including the governments of Germany and Japan, made it clear
that they expected progress on settling the
conflict so that reconstruction could proceed
unimpeded, though they stopped short of
conditioning aid directly on resolving the conflict.15 With the eyes of the
world trained on Aceh, both
the government and the
Table 3. Impacts of Civil War and the
rebels were anxious to seize 2004 Tsunami on Aceh
the moral high ground.
Number of People
Impacts
or Housing Affected
Just four months before
the tsunami struck, PresiCivil War
dent Susilo Bambang YudKilled
13,000–50,000
hoyono had been elected
Displaced in 1992–2002
1.4 million
on a platform that included Displaced in 2003–04 120,000–150,000
settling the Aceh conflict.
Tsunami
After the disaster, his govKilled or missing
167,540
ernment saw an opportuDisplaced or homeless
500,000
nity to repair Indonesia’s
Damaged and destroyed houses 116,880
international credibility,
sullied by endemic corrup- Source: See Endnote 9 for this section.
tion and the military’s reputation for brutality, and to push ahead with the
difficult task of further democratizing Indonesia’s political culture.16
Meanwhile, GAM had endured significant
military setbacks during the period of martial
law. It suffered from combat fatigue, disruptions of supply lines and communications, and
reduced strength in urban areas.17 Aware of the
lack of international support for Aceh’s independence, its leaders had come to realize,
shortly before the tsunami, that negotiations
were their only way to maintain legitimacy.18
In January 2005, peace talks began in Helsinki,
mediated by former Finnish President Martti
Ahtisaari. By August, eight months after the
tsunami, a peace agreement had been signed.19
While it may be tempting to believe that
19 8 6
between 2000 and 2003.6
Since the fall of the Suharto dictatorship
in 1998, political reformers have worked to
loosen the military’s grip on Indonesian society.7 A 2004 law requires the military to end its
lucrative business ventures within five years,
and the practice of reserving a number of seats
in parliament for representatives of the armed
forces was abandoned. These reforms are
essential both for peace in Aceh and for
Indonesia’s overall evolution toward more
democratic governance.8
The humanitarian catastrophe triggered by
the tsunami provided a critical opportunity for
change in Aceh.9 (See Table 3.) When the disaster happened, the province had been suffering
under martial law since peace talks failed in
May 2003. The sudden attention generated by
Aceh’s post-disaster plight pried the area open
to international scrutiny—which in turn
helped end human rights violations, created
political space, and offered an avenue for halting the conflict with GAM.*
The need for massive international assistance was irrefutable, though government
hardliners attempted to bar foreign relief personnel from Aceh.10 Eleven countries deployed
some 4,500 soldiers to provide emergency
aid.11 As many as 180 international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) registered in the
provincial capital, Banda Aceh, and perhaps an
even larger number swept in for short periods
of time.12 Indonesians themselves collected
huge amounts of food and clothing for
tsunami survivors, and a flood of volunteers
from all over the country poured into Aceh.13
The enormous scope of the tsunami’s
destruction shifted the political dynamic quite
decisively, as Richard Baker of the East-West
Center explains: “It provided a powerful and
Second GAM
rebellion
largely
suppressed.
Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami
22
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
“Humanitarian
Pause for
Aceh” agreed
but sabotaged
by military.
Special
autonomy
legislation for
Aceh signed.
2002
November:
GAM resumes
activities.
Parliament
rejects demand
for Aceh
independence
referendum.
2000
August:
Martial law in
Aceh lifted.
19 9 9
Severe
financial
crisis; popular
uprising ends
Suharto reign.
19 9 8
1997–98
© Michael Renner
Affairs Yusuf Kalla asked his deputy Farid
Husain to explore options for ending the conflict.20 Following the presidential election in
2004, Kalla became vice president. Two months
prior to the tsunami, his intermediaries
secretly signed nine “Points of Agreement”
with representatives of GAM military commander Muzakkir Manaf—providing amnesty
and economic concessions in exchange for an
end to GAM’s armed struggle. When word of
the agreement leaked out, other GAM field
commanders and GAM’s exiled leaders in Sweden rejected it as economic bribery devoid of
needed political change.21
Meanwhile, Juha Christensen, a Finnish
philologist and businessman intimately familiar with Indonesia, embarked on determined
citizen diplomacy in 2002 to bring government
representatives and the exiled GAM leaders
19 9 8
One year after the
tsunami, the coastal
areas of Aceh’s
capital Banda Aceh
were still a scene of
devastation.
2 0 01
together. By late 2004 they had gained enough
trust to commence negotiations. Just when former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who
agreed to act as facilitator, was ready to invite
the two sides to Helsinki, the tsunami struck.22
It is by no means clear whether negotiations
would have succeeded in the absence of the
tsunami and the international spotlight that
followed it to Aceh. Given the history of failed
peace efforts, there were tremendous challenges to establishing sufficient trust, formulating an acceptable political formula, and
overcoming the opposition to a negotiated
peace agreement. Even after the tsunami,
several Indonesian ministers were initially
opposed to the resumption of peace talks.23
GAM military leaders in East Aceh were reluctant to abandon the goal of independence, and
those in West Aceh seemed satisfied with the
material benefits they gained from the war
economy. But they did not mount a challenge
to the negotiations.24
President Yudhoyono’s and Vice President
Kalla’s strong personal commitment to peace
proved essential. Yudhoyono’s military background enabled him to identify and neutralize
hard-line government army officers. Kalla,
who heads Golkar, Indonesia’s largest political
party, dealt with critics among politicians and
parliamentarians.25
Despite sincere commitment from GAM
and government representatives, international
pressure, and tremendous expectations in
Aceh, the Helsinki negotiations proved thorny.
The government did not reciprocate a unilateral ceasefire by GAM, and army violence
against civilians continued. “The breaking
point was often close,” writes Finnish journalist
Katri Merikallio in her insider account of that
period.26 In the end, a peace agreement—the
so-called Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU)—was struck in July and signed on
August 15, 2005.27 (See Table 4.)
Indonesia’s experience with the tsunami led
directly to successful peace negotiations,
there are several other factors to consider. For
instance, secret peace efforts had begun prior
to the tsunami. In 2003, Minister for Social
February:
New peace
talks start.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami
Table 4. Selected Provisions of the Aceh Peace Agreement
Issue
Provision
Disarmament and GAM to demobilize its 3,000 fighters and relinquish 840 weapons. Government
Demobilization
forces in Aceh reduced to 14,700 soldiers and 9,100 policemen.
Amnesty
GAM members to receive amnesty; political prisoners to be released.
Human Rights
A Human Rights Court and a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation to be
established.
Reintegration
Former combatants, pardoned prisoners, and affected civilians to receive
farmland, jobs, and other compensation.
Political
Participation
Free and fair elections: Aceh governor (2006), Aceh legislature (2009). Government to facilitate the establishment of local political parties (by amending the
national election law) by January 2007.
Economy
Aceh entitled to retain 70 percent of its natural resource revenues.
Source: See Endnote 27 for this section.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
B E Y O N D
January:
GovernmentGAM peace
negotiations
begin in Helsinki.
D I S A S T E R S
23
2005
December:
Tsunami
devastates
Aceh.
2005
October:
Yudhoyono
becomes president; pledges
peace in Aceh.
2004
May:
Tokyo peace
talks fail;
martial law.
and another quarter by the tsunami. Six
months after the peace agreement, almost 75
percent of GAM members were unemployed.31
The situation has not changed significantly
since.32
Political disputes, bureaucratic delays, and
corruption have slowed distribution of reintegration assistance.33 And the number of people
needing such aid far exceeds the 3,000 combatants mentioned in the peace agreement.34 In
February 2006, the Badan Reintegrasi Aceh
(BRA, Aceh Reintegration Agency) agreed to
expand the ranks of those eligible for reintegration assistance to more than 20,000 (including unarmed GAM members and supporters,
former political prisoners, anti-GAM militias,
and others).35
Violence between GAM and the Indonesian
army has come to an end. But as former combatants grow frustrated and disillusioned with
their compensation, there has been a rise in
armed robberies and extortion.36 And local
conflicts over aid and electoral politics have
2004
March/April:
Anti-GAM
militias attack
CoHA offices.
2003
December:
Cessation of
Hostilities
Agreement
(CoHA) signed.
2003
2002
The implementation of the peace agreement
was closely supervised by the European Unionled Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from
September 2005 to December 2006. During the
first three months, some 1,800 prisoners were
released, 3,000 GAM fighters disarmed and
demobilized, and close to 32,000 government
soldiers and policemen withdrawn.28 Compared with earlier failed peace efforts, AMM
had considerable political weight behind its
mission, and the EU supported the peace and
reconstruction effort with 300 million Euros
($400 million) in 2005 and 2006.29 As AMM
head Pieter Feith put it, once the EU decided
to get involved, failure was not an option.30
Successful reintegration of former GAM
fighters remains a crucial factor in determining
whether peace will be stable. Those fighters
who own land have fared reasonably well. But
many others still require land, capital, skills
training, and jobs. Half of the GAM ex-combatants surveyed by the World Bank had their
houses damaged or destroyed by the conflict,
May: Aceh and
Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board
established.
1000
Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami
800
600
400
200
2000
2006. Despite splits within GAM, one of the
group’s leaders, Yusuf Irwandi, emerged as the
winner and was inaugurated as governor in
early February 2007. In guiding Aceh forward,
he faces a range of tough challenges. A key
question is whether he will be able to shape the
implementation of the governing law to satisfy
Acehnese expectations. Reconstruction and
economic revival are also crucial for cementing
peace.41
The tsunami triggered one of the most generous humanitarian aid responses ever, with
pledges in the billions of dollars pouring in
from all over the world. However, despite a sixfold increase in provincial revenues and aid
flows since 1999, more people in Aceh live in
poverty now.42 The conflict drove the poverty
rate up from about 10 percent in 1996 to 20
percent in 1999 and 28.5 percent in 2004. After
the tsunami, more than 35 percent lived in
poverty.43 And a March 2006 poll revealed
that 76 percent of Acehnese felt inflation and
unemployment had actually made life harder
since the peace agreement.44
The reconstruction effort has run into a
number of problems, including unresolved
land and property disputes. Two years after the
tsunami, about 57,000 houses—roughly half
the number needed—had been built. Many
people remain in temporary barracks or tents,
with overcrowding, little privacy, and often a
lack of basic sanitation services such as toilets
and running water.45 In March 2006, some
10,000 of the new houses were judged to be
so poorly built that they require major repair.
Corruption has also plagued the rebuilding
effort.46
The plethora of aid groups present in Aceh
is impressive evidence of a worldwide desire
to assist the Acehnese in their hour of extreme
need. But their redundant efforts have translated into high overhead costs, duplication of
projects, and a greater risk of inappropriate
flared up since the peace agreement, and tensions between local communities and military
forces have increased.37 (See Figure 5.) Despite
a recent upswing in violence, the vast majority
of these local disputes are non-violent.
Although key provisions of the MOU were
to be incorporated into a new governing law
for Aceh, the law submitted by the government
to the Indonesian parliament and the version
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Figure 5. Incidents of Conflict Between GAM and
Indonesian Government Forces (GoI) and Local-Level
Conflicts, January 2005–February 2007
120
Source: Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update
100
GAM–Gol
Local-level conflicts
Incidents
80
60
40
20
0
1/05
6/05
11/05
4/06
9/06
2/07
24
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
July:
Indonesian
parliament
passes Aceh
governing law.
2006
February:
Peace and
Reintegration
body (BRA)
formed.
2006
August:
Peace
agreement
(MOU) signed.
2006
May:
State of
emergency
ends.
2005
2005
eventually approved are much weaker.38 GAM
and many Acehnese NGOs charge that it falls
short of the autonomy provisions in the peace
accord in several instances.39 (See Table 5.)
Aceh was paralyzed by protests and a one-day
general strike when the law finally passed
in July 2006. The government says it can be
amended in a year or two.40 But given Jakarta’s
long track record of broken promises, that is
not reassuring to the Acehnese.
The delay in passing the law meant that
Aceh elections had to be postponed repeatedly,
from an initial target of April, to December
December:
GAM leader
Irwandi Yusuf
wins gubernatorial elections.
2007
Monthly Rent (2006 Dollars)
Source: Brookings
February:
Irwandi
inaugurated as
Aceh governor.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Aceh: Peacemaking After the Tsunami
Table 5. Aceh’s Peace Accord versus the Governing Law
2005 Peace Accord
2006 Governing Law
Decisions with regard to Aceh require
Central
Government consultation with, and consent of,
Acehnese authorities. (Section 1.1.2.)
Refers only to a consultation process,
weakening Aceh’s autonomy. (Article 8)
Human
Rights
Establish a Human Rights Court.
(Sect. 2.2.)
Establish ad-hoc tribunal that will not hear
cases retroactively. (Art. 215)
Indonesian
Military
Responsible for external defense only.
(Sect. 4.1.1.)
Responsible for state security; could be read
as an internal function. (Art. 193)
Natural
Resources
Aceh is entitled to retain 70 percent of
revenues from its natural resources.
(Sect. 1.3.4.)
Law mentions 15–55 percent entitlement. (Art.
181) Joint resource management by provincial
and central government. (Art. 160)
Source: See Endnote 39 for this section.
aid.47 Intense turf wars among some aid
groups resulted in certain towns and villages
receiving superfluous services, while more
remote ones were overlooked. A desire to
demonstrate quick results to Western donors
(and thus burnish credentials seen as necessary
to secure future funding) sidelined longerterm needs.48 Acehnese resentment rose
because of the lack of consultation and the
severe mismatch between aid groups’ promises
and actual delivery of benefits.49 The Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition warns in its 2006 assessment that local capacities—of both government and civil society—are in danger of being
undermined rather than strengthened.50
Indonesia’s post-tsunami experience highlights the risk of disbursing aid benefits
unevenly and creating wider economic disparities between population groups. The 120,000
Acehnese who lost their homes due to the conflict, but who have received little support compared with tsunami-affected communities, are
increasingly dissatisfied.51 Tsunami survivors
typically receive $5,000–6,000 for house reconstruction, whereas conflict survivors receive
only about $3,500.52 Some efforts are now
under way to address this imbalance—via the
Kecamatan Development Program, for instance, for which BRA is providing $60 million
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
over two years. By March 2007, 30 percent of
conflict-affected villages had received funds.53
Aceh and Indonesia have, thus far, successfully grasped the peacemaking opportunity
afforded by the tsunami. The country’s desire
for peace appears to remain strong, but it could
be endangered by inequities in aid provisions
and distributions. It will take several years for
Aceh’s economic and political challenges to be
fully resolved, and reinvigorating Aceh’s economy beyond reconstruction will be important
to give people a strong stake in peace.
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
To prevent others
from taking their
land, tsunami
survivors encamp
near their gutted
house in Banda
Aceh’s Meuraxa
neighborhood.
© Michael Renner
25
Case Study
Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow”
to Development
O
n the morning after Christmas
Day, 2004, several families in the
Sri Lankan capital of Colombo
were on their way to a festive
brunch at a hotel overlooking the Indian
Ocean. On their way, they heard an emergency
broadcast over the car radio, reporting that
large waves had hit the eastern and southern
coasts. They watched as a strange haziness
100,000–290,000
50,000–100,000
25,000–50,000
1,000–25,000
1–1,000
Jaffna
SRI
LANKA
Colombo
26
IN D IA
50 miles
0
B E Y O N D
Sinhala Only
Language Act
marginalizes
Tamil speakers.
D I S A S T E R S
Sinhala youth
uprising in
south brutally
crushed
by army.
19 7 2
Sri Lanka gets
independence
from Britain.
50 km
0
19 7 1
Matara
19 5 6
Sri Lanka
Timeline
19 4 8
Figure 6. Sri Lanka:
Tsunami-Displaced
Persons by
Province
New university
admission rules
discriminate
against
northern Tamils.
Liberation
Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE)
founded.
19 7 7
Number of
Displaced Persons
19 7 6
Source: UNHCR
developed on the horizon and ocean undulations left boats damaged in the nearby harbor.1
Even though it took two hours for the tsunami
waves to travel from the quake’s epicenter to
Sri Lankan shores, disaster came to the country
quite unexpectedly.
Sri Lanka is no stranger to suffering and
death; its residents have lived with civil war and
related violence since 1983.2 (See Timeline,
below.) But the intersection of disaster and
violence has tested the limits of the national
government and citizens’ resilience since the
tsunami struck. Unlike Aceh, Sri Lanka’s story
does not give much cause for hope. Rather, it
is an ongoing calamity in which the poor and
politically isolated are inevitably the losers.
Sri Lanka’s civil violence has deep roots that
can be traced back to colonial days. Historically, the country has been home to people of
diverse ethnicities and religions who lived in
relative harmony. Significant groups include
the majority Sinhalese, most of whom are Buddhist and live in the central and southern parts
of the country, and the less-populous Tamil
(mostly Hindu) and Muslim communities,
who live primarily in the north and east. There
are also so-called “Up-Country Tamils” in the
south-central highlands, who were brought to
the island from India by British tea plantation
owners in the 19th and early 20th centuries.3
Under British rule, British and American
missionaries who had established schools in the
Rising
anti-Tamil
violence in
Sinhala south.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
B E Y O N D
Indian Peace
Keeping Force
deployed in
northeast. IPKFLTTE fighting.
D I S A S T E R S
27
1987–90
LTTE emerges
as dominant
force in
Tamil politics.
19 8 7
Rise in
extra-judicial
killings and
“disappearances”
of Tamils.
19 8 6
Start of
Sinhala-Tamil
civil war.
Wickremasinghe’s efforts
Table 6. Impacts of Civil War and the
to negotiate an “Interim
2004 Tsunami on Sri Lanka
Self-Governing Authority” for the northeast,
Number of People
Impacts
or Housing Affected
based on highly controversial LTTE proposals.11
Civil War
Another key problem was Killed or missing*
86,000
that the ceasefire focused
Displaced, at peak
800,000
narrowly on the two main Displaced, March 2007†
465,000
actors: the governing
Damaged and destroyed houses
326,000
party and the LTTE. It
Tsunami
ignored divisions within
Killed or missing
35,322
the different ethnic comDisplaced
516,150
munities, sidelined the
Still displaced, Fall 2006
325,000
Muslim population,
Damaged
and
destroyed
houses
105,000
downplayed human rights
issues, and therefore failed *About 60,000 killed and more than 21,000 missto gain strong support
ing prior to 2002 ceasefire; close to 5,000 killed
between 2005 and early 2007.
from a variety of con† Includes people originally displaced before the
stituencies. Significant
2002 ceasefire, plus 223,000 newly displaced by
portions of society saw
increasing ceasefire violations in 2006 and 2007.
Some 128,000 Sri Lankans have sought refuge in
the ceasefire as contrary
neighboring India.
to their interests.12 The
government’s free-market Source: See Endnote 14 for this section.
policies, which were urged
by international donors, became another
obstacle to peace as poorer sections of society
experienced economic hardship under the
ceasefire. All in all, “the peace process acted as
a ‘lightening rod’ for wider political and societal tensions,” as a report published by the Asia
Foundation has described.13
By the time the tsunami hit Sri Lanka in late
2004, several rounds of peace talks had ended
in shambles. The LTTE had pulled out over
a political snub, with fear that peace might
loosen its grip over Tamil society. Meanwhile,
Wickremasinghe’s government was defeated
at the polls by hard-line candidate Mahinda
Rajapakse, and the breakaway Karuna faction
challenged the LTTE in a shadow war in the
east. On the day of disaster, the tsunami hit all
ethnic communities badly, killing half as many
19 8 4
Sinhala
anti-Tamil
riots.
19 8 3
Prevention of
Terrorism Act
passed; state
of emergency
in north.
19 8 1
19 7 9
north provided education to the Tamil population, enabling many to join the English-speaking administrative ranks. This preferential
treatment set up inequities that would fuel tensions after Sri Lanka—then called Ceylon—
regained independence in 1948.4 Subsequent
majority governments, inevitably dominated by
Sinhalese, instituted language, educational, and
religious policies that discriminated against
Tamils and other minorities (by declaring Sinhala the national language, for example).5
Initially, Tamils demanded autonomy
within Sri Lanka. But as successive governments reneged on agreements with the minority’s leaders, Tamil society became increasingly
radicalized and there were calls for a separate
state. By the late 1980s, the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had risen to
prominence under its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran.6 The LTTE waged war against the
government, using bomb attacks to single out
military installations, religious shrines, and
government events in a campaign that killed
thousands and displaced many more.7 The
new millennium began with a particularly
brazen attack that disabled the country’s sole
international airport.
When Ranil Wickremasinghe was elected
prime minister in late 2001, the first glimmer
of peace in more than a decade appeared. Having secretly begun negotiations with the LTTE
prior to his election, Wickremasinghe quickly
orchestrated a ceasefire agreement in February
2002, with Norway playing a key role as mediator.8 But the ceasefire was driven more by the
pressures of a severe economic crisis than by
a readiness to produce a political settlement.9
And a range of politicians, paramilitary
groups, and businesses had vested interests in
continued conflict, profiting materially or
politically from it.10
President Chandrika Kumaratunge—who
was sidelined in the negotiations—blocked
Sinhala
insurrection
against “Indian
expansionism”
suppressed.
Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development
28
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
LTTE bomb
attack in
Colombo kills
hundreds.
LTTE bombs
important
Buddhist
Temple
in Kandy.
LTTE attacks
Colombo airport; tourism,
foreign
investment fall.
2002
Cessation of
Hostilities
Agreement,
but peace talks
collapse.
1998
IPKF withdraws;
LTTE takes
control of
northeast,
breaks ceasefire.
19 9 6
GovernmentLTTE
ceasefire.
19 9 0
19 8 9
© Michael Renner
pouring of generosity—factories in Colombo,
for instance, closed so their employees could
ferry emergency supplies down the worse-hit
south coast. Momentary solidarity among the
conflict’s adversaries triggered hope that postdisaster cooperation would lead to reconciliation. Some Sri Lankans reminisce about the
three-week period immediately after the tsunami as a time when there were no divisions.16
But the cards were stacked against continued cooperation. The spontaneous acts of
grassroots solidarity that had brought so much
hope were not reinforced by politicians, who
proved unresponsive to public opinion polls
indicating a strong preference for peaceful con-
19 9 5
In Devinuwara, a
microloan enabled
this family to purchase a coir-spinning
wheel. Coir rope is
made from the fiber
of a coconut’s outer
shell.
2 0 01
flict resolution.17 In the immediate aftermath
of the tsunami, President Kumaratunge prevented then-United Nations Secretary-General
Kofi Annan from visiting LTTE-held areas—a
highly symbolic rebuff that began to solidify
old divisions once again.18
Before long, rifts emerged over the vast sums
of international aid that had begun to pour
into Sri Lanka. The LTTE directed outside
funds and private donations through its Tamil
Rehabilitation Organization, a non-transparent but reportedly efficient aid mechanism.19
Control over aid distribution is an intensely
political issue, closely interwoven with the
question of how Sri Lanka should be governed.
Even before the tsunami, two efforts in 2002
and 2004 to set up joint mechanisms to distribute conflict reconstruction aid had failed.20
Prompted by international donors, the government and LTTE did negotiate an aid-sharing
agreement (the so-called Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, or P-TOMS),
signed in June 2005.21 For the LTTE, a formal
role in the distribution of international reconstruction funds promised much-desired legitimacy. Sinhala nationalists denounced the deal,
perceiving it as a tool for the LTTE to carve out
a separate state.22 After just one month, Sri
Lanka’s Supreme Court suspended the agreement, pending a constitutional review.23 After
Prime Minister Rajapakse won presidential
elections in November 2005 with hardliners’
support (many Tamils, who would have likely
voted for his opponent Wickremasinghe, abstained), P-TOMS was effectively abandoned.24
Rajapakse has taken a notoriously hard-line
approach to dealing with the LTTE. Encouraged that several countries, including the
United States, India, Canada, and the European
Union, blacklisted the LTTE as a terrorist
organization, the government has increasingly
gone on the offensive—doggedly capturing key
parts of formerly LTTE-controlled territory.25
people in one day as had been killed in 20 years
of civil war.14 (See Figure 6, page 26, and Table
6, page 27.)
When the tremors ended, Sri Lanka was
confronted with an unprecedented opportunity to use relief and recovery efforts as a
means to overcome its self-immolating civil
war.15 The tsunami elicited an incredible out-
Government
and LTTE sign
ceasefire,
brokered
by Norway.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development
The backlash against foreigners and civil
society groups serves as a cautionary tale about
what outsiders can hope to accomplish in the
area of conflict resolution. The limits have
been apparent for some time. At a Tokyo conference in June 2003, international donors
pledged $4.5 billion in reconstruction and
development aid to Sri Lanka.33 Although the
Figure 7. Deaths in Sri Lanka’s Civil War, 2000–2007
4500
4000
Source: SATP
* Data for 2007 are January through March.
3500
Tamil Tigers
Government troops
Civilians
Number
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2000
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007*
0
March:
“Karuna faction”
breaks away
from LTTE.
B E Y O N D
1998
2001
2004
April:
New hard-line
government
elected, rejects
ISGA proposal.
D I S A S T E R S
29
2004
1995
2004
October:
LTTE proposes
Interim SelfGoverning
Authority (ISGA).
1992
2004
2003
2003
2003
2002
April:
LTTE pulls out
of peace talks.
June:
Donors pledge
$4.5 billion for
post-conflict
reconstruction.
2002
money was ostensibly tied to progress in the
peace negotiations, this was little more than an
4000
afterthought,
and no compliance mechanisms
Source: Swami, SATP
were adopted.
Individual
have
not
* Data
for 2007 aredonors
January t0
March
25.fol3500
lowed a joint strategy, but appear to have had
an exaggerated
view of the leverage of their aid
3000
vis-à-vis the strategic calculus of the government2500
and the LTTE. The massive inflows of aid
in the aftermath of the tsunami ended any
misconceptions.34
such 2000
The
statistical story of tsunami reconstruc1500
tion in Sri Lanka is not a simple one. Some
51 percent
1000 of the required houses have been
rebuilt, but this obscures important geographic
500 35 In the north, escalating conflict
differences.
has prevented rebuilding, such that less than 15
1989
Sri Lanka
Monitoring
Mission
(SLMM)
deployed.
2001
Number
Although the 2002 ceasefire agreement
remains in place on paper, Sri Lanka has begun
a steady slide back into the pattern of violence
and human rights violations that the country
unfortunately knows so well. During 2006
alone, more than 4,000 people were killed on
the island.26 (See Figure 7.) This trend has continued unabated in 2007, with several highprofile bomb attacks targeting civilians, an
unprecedented air strike on an air force base
adjacent to Colombo’s international airport,
and an attempted attack on Colombo’s harbor.27
When asked how the conflict could be
ended, by early 2007 only 46 percent of the
Sinhala public favored peace talks, compared
with 95 percent of Up-Country Tamils and 88
percent of Muslims. Some 35 percent of Sinhalese preferred a military defeat of the LTTE,
and another 11 percent a mix of talks and
fighting.28 The escalating conflict has led to a
humanitarian crisis and curtailed the political
space within which civil society can operate.29
On a visit to Colombo in early 2007, a sense
of tension and heightened security pervaded
the city, which sits far from the main centers
of daily violence to the north and east of the
country.30 Police and military checkpoints,
some reinforced with sandbags and covered
by camouflage tents, dominated major and
minor roads.
By this time, relations with international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating within Sri Lanka had become tense as
well, due primarily to a breakdown in
trust between these organizations and the Sri
Lankan government. The government accused
the Dutch organization ZOA-Refugee Care of
aiding the LTTE and threatened to expel it—
or any other NGOs proven to be collaborating
with the Tigers.31 Colombo newspapers now
regularly carry inflammatory articles warning
against sinister motives of certain foreign governments, the United Nations, or NGOs.32
2007*
December:
Tsunami hits
Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development
30
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
May: EU
declares LTTE
a terrorist
organization.
August:
Fighting in
east and north
escalates
sharply.
2006
December:
Tensions with
LTTE rise and
violence
breaks out.
2006
November:
Prime Minister
Rajapakse wins
Presidential
elections.
2005
July:
Supreme Court
rules P-TOMS
partially
unconstitutional.
2005
2005
2005
June:
Government and
LTTE agree to
share tsunami
aid (P-TOMS).
2006
but the resumed conflict has meant that the
northeast, already saddled with weak public
services and poor infrastructure, is increasingly
difficult to access.42
While 150,000 Sri Lankan families lost their
livelihoods after the tsunami, about 75 percent
have regained their main source of income.43
However, renewed violence in the north and
east has hindered this regeneration of livelihoods there. One specific example cited by several organizations includes the fact that both
reconstruction materials and products made
by small entrepreneurs are double or triple
taxed when they are transported out of the
north or east, as they enter or exit governmentcontrolled areas, LTTE-controlled territory, or
land now claimed by the breakaway Karuna
faction. This inflates transportation prices to
such a degree that it seriously hinders the shipment of goods necessary for local producers to
earn livelihoods.44
In the south, several microfinance programs
have been successful in helping families regain
their financial foothold. The Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC), an aid
organization working closely with Oxfam, has
given thousands of small loans of around $100
to tsunami survivors and their neighbors. Projects in and near the southern coastal city of
Matara have had a nearly 100-percent repayment rate, with any missing payments attributed to resettlement or migration.45 These
small loans support a variety of businesses,
mostly related to coir (coconut fiber) processing, handicrafts, food items, and retail.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administers another effective
initiative. With the acronym “Strong Places,”
it focuses on supporting community-based
organizations at a time when most international aid tends to flow through a select group
of large national NGOs.46 With the conviction
that local grassroots organizations can play key
percent of the needed housing had been constructed as of December 2006.36 On the east
coast, this figure is also low, at 25 percent,
according to the Sri Lankan government.37
In tsunami-affected areas, perceptions of
reconstruction aid are often marked by allegations of bias. Even though the south has fared
comparatively well, residents nonetheless
charge that the international community has
unduly focused on the plight of Tamil civilians
isolated by ongoing warfare. Those living to
the north and east, where construction has
been haltingly slow due to logistical difficulties
and serious security concerns, reportedly feel
that the south has received more than its fair
share of aid, in part because many tourists
made private donations to southern communities they had previously visited.38
A lack of communication across geographic
divides often fuels this type of animosity. The
Sri Lankan NGO Sarvodaya, which works in
10,000 villages across the country, has implemented an exchange program called “Villageto-Village, Heart-to-Heart” that seeks to overcome ethnic and linguistic boundaries. In
paired villages, residents travel to help each
other with manual tasks while gaining an
understanding of the common interests and
needs that they share.39 The Sewalanka Foundation, another NGO, has a staff that is part
Sinhalese, part Tamil. By emphasizing transparency, it has managed to avoid a politicization of its aid work.40
Despite efforts to the contrary, significant
inequities did materialize in the amount and
quality of aid provided. Among tsunamiaffected communities, the Sinhala-majority
south and west fared better than the north
and east of the country. Also, tsunami-affected
areas generally fared better than conflictaffected communities.41 (See Table 7.) Not only
do the south and west have far stronger political representation and influence in Colombo,
October:
Geneva talks
end without
progress.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Sri Lanka: A “Double Blow” to Development
Table 7. Assistance to Conflict- and Tsunami-Affected Sri Lankans, as of April 2006*
Conflict-Affected
Tsunami-Affected
Food (Estimated
nutritional value)
1,000 kilocalories per person per day
1,881 kilocalories per person per day
Transitional Shelter
(Estimated value)
$50–200 per shelter; for 60 percent of
17,852 families remaining in shelters
$300–600 per shelter; for all 60,000
families in need
Permanent Housing
(Estimated cost)
$2,500 per house; for 47,000 families,
or 14 percent of all in need†
$3,000–11,000 per house; for all
105,000 families in need
Cash Grants/
Allowances
$250 resettlement grant per family; for
105,000 families, or one third of all
families in need
$100–200, plus $50 emergency
resettlement allowance per family;
for all 405,000 families in need
* Inadequate information precludes a comparison with regard to compensation payments, non-food related items, and
livelihood restoration support.
† Government pledged support to 105,000 families (those with access to land and incomes of less than $250 per month)
in 2003, but resources were committed for only 47,000. In government “High Security Zones,” people are not permitted
access to their land; no alternative land has been provided.
Source: See Endnote 41 for this section.
January:
Government
captures Vakarai,
LTTE stronghold
on east coast.
2007
2007
roles in recovery and future disaster prevention, UNDP provides seed funding to build
capacity at this level.
Around Matara, three such organizations
funded through the Strong Places project provide an inspiring glimpse of the opportunities
associated with local organizing.47 The organizations are composed solely of women from
clustered villages. They utilize UNDP funds to
buy raw materials needed to kick-start small
businesses—support that is critical in sustaining poor families. The women hope to eventually own coir-processing mills or build
community meeting spaces. The tenacity with
which they describe their decision-making
process makes it clear that a strong bond and
sense of accountability exists between the
members of each group.48
Initiatives such as these provide bright spots
in an otherwise bleak picture of Sri Lanka.
Rather than becoming an opportunity for a
breakthrough in favor of peace, the tsunami
amplified Sri Lanka’s conflict dynamics. With
little hope for peace talks to resume, and continued suspicion over rebuilding efforts, the
divided country must confront many serious
issues if it is to indeed succeed at the goal of
“building back better.” 49
January:
Donors give $4.5
billion in aid for
2007–09; call for
end to violence.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
31
Case Study
Kashmir: Physical Tremor,
but No Political Earthquake
W
Source: Center of Excellence DMHA
TAJIKISTAN
C
H
NORTHERN AREAS
Occupied by Pakistan,
claimed by India
I
Northwest
Frontier
Province
LINE O F CO
K
EPICENTER
Kabul
NT
Peshawar
Islamabad
a
L
s
h
m
i
r
J A M M U A N D KA SH MI R
Occupied by India,
claimed by Pakistan
A
Srinagar
RO
N
AFGHANISTAN
Jammu
P A K I S T A N
I N D I A
Lahore
IND IA
32
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
Ceasefire
leaves
Kashmir
divided.
1962–63
Referendum
on Kashmir
agreed, never
carried out.
19 4 9
Newly
independent
India and Pakistan
go to war over
Kashmir.
19 4 8
19 4 7
Kashmir
Timeline
Quake-affected area
India-Pakistan
talks over
Kashmir; no
agreement
reached.
India-Pakistan
war over
Kashmir.
19 6 5
Figure 8. Kashmir:
Political Division
and Earthquake
Zone
19 6 5
Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the two nations have repeatedly
skirmished over Kashmir.2 (See Timeline,
below.) And since 1989, a separatist insurgency
in India’s state of Jammu and Kashmir—in
which some supporters favor independence
and others prefer to join Pakistan—has led to
tens of thousands of deaths.3 (See Figure 9.)
Initially nationalistic and secular in orientation, the movement was later dominated by
Islamic groups and aided by Pakistan’s powerful intelligence service. Although violence has
decreased substantially since 2002, the Kashmir
conflict remains at the heart of the political
antagonism between New Delhi and Islamabad.4
Both countries are armed with nuclear
weapons and have hundreds of thousands
of soldiers arrayed against each other. After
armed Kashmiri militants attacked the Indian
parliament in New Delhi in December 2001—
abetted by Pakistan, India suspected—the two
rivals nearly came to blows during a tense sixmonth standoff.5 Wary of another conflagration, the two governments began to step back
from the precipice of war in April 2003. They
restored full diplomatic relations, adopted a
ceasefire along the LoC in November 2003,
agreed to pre-notify each other of ballisticmissile tests, and in February 2004 initiated a
“composite dialogue” on a range of disputes,
including Kashmir.6
Two years later, when this process was in
hen a massive earthquake
struck Kashmir on October 8,
2005, families sprawled across
this mountainous territory naturally wanted to make sure that relatives living
in nearby towns and villages had survived. But
many of them could not reach their kin—and
impassable roads were only part of the problem.
The quake’s epicenter was near the “Line of
Control” (LoC), the ceasefire line that demarcates India and Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir
and separates many Kashmiri families.1 (See
Figure 8.)
Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K)
Liberation
Front seeks
secession.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
4000
* Data for 2007 are January through March.
3500
Tamil Tigers
Government troops
Civilians
3000
Number
Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No2500
Political Earthquake
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
2005
2006
2007*
Figure 9. Deaths from Violence in Jammu and Kashmir,
1989–2007
4000
3500
Source: Swami, SATP
* Data for 2007 are January t0 March 25.
3000
Number
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007*
Insurgency in
J&K’s Kashmir
Valley; India
deploys troops.
B E Y O N D
All Party Huriyat
Conference
(APHC) founded
by secessionists.
D I S A S T E R S
33
19 9 8
Violent
protests
against
electoral fraud
in J&K.
19 9 3
nightly cross-LoC “peace bus” between the
Kashmiri cities of Srinagar and Muzaffarabad
was inaugurated with considerable fanfare in
April 2005. But Kashmiris were not consulted
during its setup.15 Stifling bureaucracy and
stringent security measures on both sides
meant that only 3,600 Kashmiris out of 17,000
applicants were able to travel, in either direction, during the first two years of the link.16
Some passengers had to wait a year or longer
for a travel permit.17 Although a second bus
service connecting the cities of Rawalakot and
Poonch was launched in June 2006, it operates
under similarly tight restrictions.18
Tensions have been reduced and bilateral
trade has increased more than sixfold. But
19 8 9
First free
and fair
elections
in J&K.
2000
of extremists) limited the flow of visitors, and
by the1500
end of 2006 only about 1,700 people
had crossed
the LoC. 14 What could have been
1000
an historic breakthrough became, instead, a
500 tightly circumscribed exercise.
timid and
In general,
people-to-people contact has
0
2000promise
2001 than
2002
2003
2004
remained more
reality.
A fort-
19 8 7
Simla
agreement:
Line of
Control (LoC)
established.
19 7 7
India-Pakistan
war; some
fighting
in Kashmir.
19 7 2
19 7 1
danger of failing, energetic diplomacy inspired
by earthquake relief offered a fresh opportunity to defuse the Kashmir conflict. Immediately after the quake, many observers,
including Indian and Pakistani newspapers,
watched to see if pragmatic cooperation
around relief and rebuilding, and expanded
cross-border civil society contacts, would
cement a new peace.7 Subsequent developments, however, fell short of these high hopes.
More people perished in one day due to the
earthquake than in two decades of conflict.8
(See Table 8, p. 34.) Immediately after the
October 8 tremor, goodwill prevailed between
India and Pakistan. Within two weeks, India
had delivered close to 300 tons of food, medicine, and tents to its neighbor; consented to let
Pakistani helicopters operate in a no-fly zone
along the LoC; temporarily re-established
cross-border phone links severed 16 years earlier; and pledged an additional $25 million
worth of relief aid.9
Because landslides and damaged roads cut
off rescuers’ access to some of the affected
areas, helicopters became a critical asset.10
India offered to have its army helicopters join
search-and-rescue missions. But distrust
between the two nations sabotaged that proposal. Pakistan, referring to “military sensitivities,” refused to let Indian pilots fly the aircraft.
India, in turn, insisted on using its own crews,
and no agreement was ever reached.11
On the ground, the governments agreed to
open five crossing points along the LoC to
facilitate cross-border relief and allow separated families to meet. Despite a terrorist
attack in New Delhi, believed to have been perpetrated by Kashmiri extremists, an agreement
was signed.12 But mutual suspicions delayed its
implementation, so it was not until November
17 that the first civilians were finally allowed
passage.13 Rigid security measures on both
sides (due to fears of cross-border infiltration
India and
Pakistan
conduct
nuclear
weapons tests.
Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No Political Earthquake
Internally displaced
persons
In Kashmir Valley: 350,000–450,000†
Along Line of Control: 30,000 ‡
Impact of the Earthquake
Deaths
Injuries
Displaced/homeless people
Pakistan
India
73,000**
79,000
3.3 million
1,300
6,600
150,000
* Aggregate number from Figure 9; estimates vary.
† Estimated range as of February 2005.
‡ Down from 150,000–175,000 in 2002.
**Official estimate; unofficial figures are higher (88,000 in November 2005).
Source: See Endnote 8 for this section.
34
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
India and
Pakistan test
nuclear-capable
missiles.
2003
India and
Pakistan at brink
of war after
attack on Indian
parliament.
2002
July: India and
Pakistan leaders
meet, do
not resolve
Kashmir issue.
2001
India-Pakistan
clashes at
Kargil kill
more than
1,000 people.
2001
19 9 9
there is not enough willingness to resolve the
most contentious issues, specifically the status
of Kashmir.19 Indian columnist C. Raja Mohan
commented in late 2005: “In any creative
endeavour, it is when you decide to play safe
that you start raising the odds of failure.”20
The relationship between India and Pakistan remains vulnerable to the political effects
of terrorist acts, such as the commuter train
bombings in Mumbai that killed more than
180 people in July 2006.21 India charged that
the bombings were “instigated, inspired and
supported by elements across the border.”22
Bilateral talks did take place again in November 2006 but failed to make any gains, hobbled
by continued discord over responsibility for
the Mumbai attacks.23
Military spending in both countries remains
high. India almost doubled its expenditures,
even after factoring in inflation, from $11 billion in 1996 to $20.4 billion in 2005. Pakistan’s
military budget rose until 2003, but has since
declined somewhat to about $3.2 billion.24 The
huge cost of relief and rebuilding following the
May: India
and Pakistan
restore
diplomatic ties.
July: DelhiLahore bus
service
resumes after
18 months.
2003
Impact of the Conflict (since 1990)
Deaths
In Jammu & Kashmir: 42,000+*
2003
Kashmir quake—estimated at $5.2 billion—is
straining Pakistan’s financial resources. Under
growing pressure from civil society organizations, in early November 2005 President Pervez
Musharraf temporarily postponed the planned
$4.5 billion purchase of 75 to 80 F-16 fighter
jets from the United States.25 Although India
had severely criticized the planned deal
because the jets can carry nuclear weapons, by
April 2006 Musharraf decided to go forward
with the purchase of a smaller package of U.S.
jets.26
To realize peace in Kashmir, India and
Pakistan must go beyond normalizing their
bilateral relationship and change their heavyhanded policies toward the region. Unfortunately, if anything concrete can be said about
post-earthquake measures, it is that they alienated rather than endeared Kashmiris. The
Indian and Pakistani armies aggressively took
charge of relief efforts, yet proved ineffective
and, by some accounts, even discriminatory in
distributing supplies.27
Pakistan has long lacked an effective civilian
disaster management policy. After the quake,
the government put army generals in charge
of the newly established Federal Relief Commission (responsible for rescue and relief operations) and the Earthquake Rehabilitation
and Reconstruction Authority (tasked with
rebuilding). Widespread demands for transparency and accountability were largely ignored.28
Asserting control over relief operations and
reconstruction planning, the Pakistani military
sidelined Parliament and civilian agencies and
failed to consult with affected communities. A
quarter-million troops were in the region, but
the military’s relief effort was ill planned and
poorly executed.29 The International Crisis
Group commented that “troops…reacted as
if they were in a state of war, not faced with a
natural disaster.” Opposition parties in Kashmir complained that their supporters were
Table 8. Impact of the Kashmir Conflict and the October 2005
Earthquake
November:
Ceasefire
along LoC.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No Political Earthquake
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
September:
Second meeting
between Indian
government and
APHC.
B E Y O N D
The main road into
Muzaffarabad, half
its width collapsed
by the earthquake.
© Sheikh Danish Ejaz
October:
Earthquake
in Kashmir
and northern
Pakistan.
D I S A S T E R S
2005
April:
Cross-LoC
bus service
established.
2005
Kashmir was largely a missed opportunity for
a peacemaking breakthrough. The leaders of
both India and Pakistan showed that they were
not prepared to break decisively with deeply
ingrained patterns of mutual distrust. As one
analyst put it, “even genuine attempts to reach
across the divide are always analyzed in terms
of propaganda value and diplomatic oneupmanship.” 39 Had these leaders taken some
calculated risks—directing their armies to
cooperate in relief efforts, throwing open the
LoC, and welcoming greater civil society crossborder contacts—a dramatically different
dynamic may have unfolded.
It is an open question whether local and
international aid agencies could have played a
2005
February:
India and
Pakistan launch
“composite
dialogue.”
groups. 37 There has been little tangible change
to date. However, in the face of decreasing militant violence, India indicated in April 2007
that it might finally make good on promises
to reduce its troop presence in the Kashmir
valley—a key demand of Kashmiri activists
and an essential step to resolving the underlying conflict.38
In all, the post-earthquake situation in
2005
January:
First meeting
between India
and APHC
moderates.
2004
December:
India and
Pakistan
resume rail
and air links.
2004
2003
denied assistance.30
The Pakistani government allowed front
groups for banned anti-India extremist groups,
such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaishe Mohammed, to play a major role in providing humanitarian aid to earthquake survivors.31 Although
popular support for these groups appears limited, their presence nevertheless gave them
fresh legitimacy and the potential to recruit
new members. This presents new risks to confidence-building efforts with India.32
In the disaster’s aftermath, Pakistani civil
society initiated a massive mobilization in support of earthquake victims. Some observers,
like veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid, think
this may ultimately translate into growing pressure for democratization.33 It appears that true
peace on the subcontinent will come not solely
as a result of high politics, but only as stable
constituencies for peace and a growing crossborder dialogue involving civil society emerge.
In Indian-controlled Kashmir, too, it was
the military that carried out the bulk of relief
and rehabilitation efforts. As was the case on
the Pakistani side, there were protests against
the perceived slow and biased distribution of
relief supplies, with claims that victims with
government connections received priority.
Alienation among Kashmiris grew as the army
handled the rescue and relief operations in the
manner of an occupying force.34
Battling the insurgency, India expanded
its military presence in Kashmir from 36,000
troops in 1989 to some 600,000 as of early
2007.35 But human rights abuses committed
with impunity by these forces have fueled proindependence sentiments among many Kashmiris. Human rights protections and greater
accountability are key ingredients to resolving
the long-running conflict.36 In an encouraging
move, India has opened a dialogue with the
All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella
alliance of nearly two dozen political separatist
35
October:
Bombs in New
Delhi kill more
than 60 people.
Kashmir: Physical Tremor, but No Political Earthquake
A young boy sells
bananas from the
rubble of his school,
destroyed by the
2005 earthquake.
© Fründt/teamwork-press
36
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
December:
Pakistan tests
short-range
nuclear
missile.
2007
September:
India and
Pakistan
resolve to
resume talks.
international aid presence has been lopsided—
Pakistan requested outside help while India
tightly restricted any foreign presence—it is
not clear whether a more active role by aid
agencies would have had sufficient impact on
both sides.40
2006
July: Bombs
strike commuter
train in Mumbai;
Pakistan
fingered.
2006
June: Second
cross-LoC
bus service
launched.
2006
November: India
and Pakistan
open five LoC
crossings for
civilians.
2006
2005
more active role toward peacemaking. They
did not push such an agenda. At any rate, their
position—similar to that of local civil society
organizations—was circumscribed by the
armed forces’ assertive role in what remains
a highly militarized zone. And because the
February:
Bomb on DelhiLahore train.
Kashmir extremists suspected.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Creating Future
Opportunities for Peace
A
ceh, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir have all
experienced conflict and then disaster.
Their starkly different post-disaster
trajectories offer critical lessons for
conflict resolution, exemplifying the diversity
of roles that the government, military, disaster
relief, and conflict resolution communities can
play when opportunities for peace arise.
These examples also provide insight into the
complex post-disaster dynamics and unique
local contexts that can make or break fleeting
opportunities for peace. While local sensitivities can be overpowering, some larger lessons
hold true for most cases: for instance, compassion alone is unlikely to carry warring factions
through the complexities of a peace process.1
(See Sidebar 3.) Only when all sides have
decided they are ready to address the root
causes of the conflict—grievances, inequities,
and discordant goals—will a political formula
for peace be possible.
The following is a comparison of the three
case studies in several critical areas:
Committing to a Political Solution
• In Aceh, the Indonesian government and GAM
concluded they could not win militarily and
committed to resolving core conflict causes.
• In Sri Lanka, although a ceasefire was already
in place, the tense situation was marked by
confrontational posturing. Military success
became the sought-after outcome, with
efforts to find a political solution left behind.
• In Kashmir, despite efforts to build trust
between Indian and Pakistani officials, there
was no substantial change in military deployments to Kashmir.
Confronting Those Against Peace
• In Aceh, Indonesia’s top leaders worked hard
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Sidebar 3. Disaster Diplomacy
Ilan Kelman, a researcher at the National Center for Atmospheric Research
in Boulder, Colorado, is a leading proponent of the view that “disasterrelated activities can catalyze diplomacy but are unlikely to create diplomacy.” His Web site, www.disasterdiplomacy.org, provides a clearinghouse
of resources on the intersections between disaster and conflict. The site
directs readers to publications, current debates, and more than two dozen
relevant case studies.
Kelman challenges readers to investigate key examples and offer their
own opinions. He recommends the need for further research to identify the
influence—if any—that disasters may have on foreign affairs or diplomacy,
as well as how to confront political border issues in the wake of disaster.
Source: See Endnote 1 for this section.
to confront or neutralize opponents of a
negotiated peace among military officers and
parliamentarians.
• In Sri Lanka, hard-line Sinhala parties adeptly
manipulated public opinion and wielded considerable influence over government policy.
On the Tamil side, the LTTE feared that peace
would endanger its grip on Tamil society.
• In Kashmir, the Pakistani government permitted militant anti-India groups to play a
major role in assisting earthquake survivors,
despite the danger that extremists would gain
fresh legitimacy and support.
Controlling Disaster Aid
• In Aceh, tsunami relief flowed freely, both
because there were no fixed lines of territorial
control between the combatants and because
GAM did not object to government aid
distribution.
• In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers demanded control over relief aid in their own zone, a move
viewed by many Sinhalese as a stepping stone
toward secession. A protracted squabble over
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
37
Creating Future Opportunities for Peace
In Banda Aceh, GAM
members surrender
their weapons to
representatives of
the Aceh Monitoring
Mission.
© Michael Renner
aid distribution sharpened tensions.
• In Kashmir, coordinated Indian-Pakistani
relief efforts were curtailed by sovereignty
and security concerns.
Facilitating and Monitoring Peace
• In Aceh, the strong-willed facilitator kept
negotiations on track and the European
Union put its prestige and funding behind
the resulting accord.
• In Sri Lanka, facilitator Norway has been the
target of recriminations from both sides.
International ceasefire monitors have struggled under a weak mandate and little international backing. Outside powers like the
United States and the European Union forfeited their ability to act as neutral mediators
by declaring the LTTE a terrorist organization.
• In Kashmir, there has been no comparable
outside-mediated peace process.
Conflict solutions must be indigenous—
developed and supported by those involved in
or affected by the fighting. Still, donor governments, United Nations agencies, private aid
groups, and other foreigners play an important
political and financial role in facilitating fledg38
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D I S A S T E R S
ling peace processes. They can make these
more effective by: improving conflict mediation capacities; undertaking a more systematic
assessment of the connections between disaster, conflict, and peacemaking; and examining
lessons learned from such experiences. The
U.N. Development Programme’s Bureau of
Crisis Prevention and Recovery is currently
undertaking such an effort, an important step
toward sharing disparate knowledge and standardizing the way that peace processes are
approached in post-disaster scenarios.
In each of the three cases discussed, examples of post-disaster solidarity belied the
chasms cut by years of conflict: parts of the
population clearly desired an end to the longstanding conflicts. (These sentiments were
expressed most strongly in Aceh, where ubiquitous roadside signs and banners proclaimed
“Kami sangat rindu kedamaian”—“We really
desire peace.”)2 Whether these hopes translated
into changed policies depended in part on the
nature of the national political systems and
political cultures. This is not a simple question
of nominally democratic forms of governance.
Rather, at issue is whether minority needs and
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Creating Future Opportunities for Peace
human rights were addressed and whether
popular wishes were reflected adequately at
the political level. The broader struggle for
more inclusive and transparent governance,
civilian control over the military and (in multiethnic societies) decentralization is crucial to
the outcome.
Civil society has an important role to play
in bridging the gap between public interests
and political decisions. Strengthening local
civil society is also important with regard to
transparency and accountability in how postdisaster and post-conflict programs are carried
out. The central goals of the international
community in countries emerging from the
twin challenges of disaster and conflict must be
to create maneuvering space for civil society,
reinforce shared interests, and thus strengthen
support for peace.
Leveraging Aid Toward Peace
In both Aceh and Sri Lanka, donors urged that
conflicts be settled so relief and reconstruction
could proceed unimpeded, but stopped short
of making conflict termination a formal condition for aid.3 However, in the Sri Lankan case,
economic incentives have not trumped the
core political objectives of the parties involved
in the conflict.
This does not mean that aid cannot be a
tool for peacemaking—rather, that it should be
regarded as an intensely political tool. As long
as the political dispute at the heart of a conflict
remains unresolved, aid-related decision-making will be colored by political posturing. In
the absence of a deal to end Sri Lanka’s conflict, for example, the P-TOMS agreement
between the government and the Tamil Tigers
became a lightning rod because it was seen as
an avenue for the LTTE to cement its claim to
a separate state.
There is also a danger of mismatching the
promise and reality of aid. Disaster-affected
populations in conflict zones will expect relief
and reconstruction assistance to bring about a
noticeable improvement in their economic fortunes following the deprivations suffered due
to conflict. (Indeed, the post-tsunami slogan
was “building back better.”) But if the actual
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
experience is at variance with expectations, new
frictions may result and possibly undermine
peacemaking. Donor governments and aid
agencies must ensure that aid does not reopen
old grievances or create new divisions, such as
amplified social and economic inequalities.
The influx of aid personnel is also a doubleedged sword. On the one hand, a substantial
international humanitarian presence can serve
to highlight and perhaps stop human rights
abuses; this is what happened in Aceh. However, aid agencies may introduce fresh problems
if they do not understand the local context or
fail to consult with affected communities.
Another problem is that large, well-funded
international agencies can easily overwhelm
local groups and outbid them for skilled staff.
They are de facto gatekeepers: by virtue of privileged contacts to major donor governments
and access to the media, they command access
to funds, decision-makers, and opinionshapers. Local NGOs typically work with them
in a subsidiary fashion.4 International agencies
need to exercise great care to avoid fueling
local divisions and resentment.5 Otherwise, the
net result may be the opposite of the capacity
building intended.6
Aid groups that have a long track record in
a given country, focusing not just on humanitarian assistance but also on longer-term development, are likely to be more sensitive to local
needs, norms, and dynamics than those that
come into a country purely on an emergency
basis—“parachuting in” with preconceived
notions of what is needed and what will work,
only to move on before gaining an adequate
understanding of the local situation.7
Political Acuity and Conflict Sensitivity
Many humanitarian groups, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, say their
expertise is strictly in providing aid to relieve
suffering, and that their mandate could be thus
categorized as well. Entering the tricky realm
of conflict resolution is, as David Petrasek of
the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in
Geneva explains, seen as straying into “fundamentally political questions, which will
inevitably compromise the ability to mitigate
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39
Creating Future Opportunities for Peace
In Kalutara, Sri
Lanka, a Sarvodaya
eco-village provides
resettled tsunami
survivors with
homes equipped
with rainwater
harvesting barrels
and solar panels.
© Zoë Chafe
suffering.” 8 There is a fear that a broader stance
will imperil impartiality and endanger staff on
the ground.
Although aid agencies have an oftenuncomfortable relationship with military
forces, these two groups are increasingly working in close proximity. Aid and military action
have become blurred in many disaster and
conflict situations. This blurring is thought to
have contributed to the 408 reported acts of
major violence against aid workers that killed
434 of them between 1997 and 2005.9
Being aware of political contexts is not
equal to taking sides. Some humanitarian
groups have come to “accept that their work
may have political impacts,” writes Petrasek,
and “endeavor to ‘do no harm’ through their
interventions.”10 (See Sidebar 4.) But disaster
aid and conflict resolution work are often seen
as separate realms. For instance, the Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition produced a highly
detailed assessment of the international
response to the 2004 tsunami, yet by its own
admission did not address “the question of
how the tsunami and the aid influenced the
conflicts in Sri Lanka and Aceh.”11
While hardly new, the “Do No Harm” prin40
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D I S A S T E R S
ciples are not uniformly applied. Aid is inevitably political, and relief organizations would
be wise to prioritize their conflict sensitivity by
better understanding the politics that inevitably
shape aid and recovery work; tracking the ways
in which aid groups’ actions either exacerbate
or decrease conflicts; and seeking out opportunities for post-disaster peacebuilding.12
Environmental Restoration
Environmentalists have an important role to
play in post-disaster rebuilding and peacemaking. In order to reduce future disaster vulnerability—and the potential for hardship and
conflict that is often associated with disasters—environmental protection and restoration is crucial. In coastal areas, mangroves,
coral reefs, and wetlands are important buffers;
in mountainous areas, forests anchor the soil
and help prevent devastating landslides.13
But, like aid groups, environmentalists need
to be conscious of socioeconomic and political
factors. The poor often have no choice but to
settle in vulnerable areas. Sri Lankan fishermen, for example, will seek to live close to the
ocean even though establishing a coastal buffer
zone may be an environmentally astute move.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Creating Future Opportunities for Peace
Post-disaster reconstruction puts enormous
pressure on natural resources and the environment. The need for speedy rebuilding to give
disaster-displaced people a firm roof over
their heads can be at odds with the goal of
environmental restoration, leaving disasterprone areas more vulnerable to subsequent
natural disasters.
Prior to the Kashmir earthquake, deforestation degraded the region’s steep slopes and
heightened the region’s vulnerability to landslides. Post-disaster, the earthquake intensified
the pressure on natural resources, as displaced
residents removed vegetation for use in construction, cooking, and heating.14 Sustainable
forest stewardship, watershed vulnerability
mapping, and slope stabilization—including
reforestation—are all critical recovery tasks.
In April 2005, the government of Indonesia
adopted Green Reconstruction Policy Guidelines
for Aceh, a framework document developed by
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).15
These guidelines address where to get reconstruction materials, what types of environmental restoration techniques are most effective,
and the importance of building legitimate local
institutions. But the peace deal also opened up
areas to loggers that were once too dangerous,
and Aceh’s massive reconstruction needs fueled
already-rampant illegal logging.16 In response,
the province’s new governor Irwandi Yusuf
said in March 2007 that he would impose a
moratorium on all logging.17
Environmental restoration is a core ingredient of disaster prevention and mitigation
strategies. It also presents an unparalleled
opportunity to promote cooperation among
adversaries. A 2004 U.N. Development Programme report mentions that, “in Colombia,
violently opposed local communities in the
Department of Meta have worked together to
mitigate the impact of floods as a means not
only of protecting livelihoods, but also of
building trust and reconciliation.” But there is
still much room for innovative policymaking.
UNDP concludes that on a global scale, “little
or no attention has been paid to the potential
of disaster management as a tool for conflict
prevention initiatives.”18
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
While cooperation around environmental
restoration may bring opportunities for peace,
it is far preferable to base cooperation on disaster prevention and environmental protection. A growing array of “environmental
peacemaking” initiatives—including peace
parks, shared river basin management plans,
regional seas agreements, and joint environmental monitoring programs—are built on the
Sidebar 4. Principles of the “Do No Harm” Approach
The “Do No Harm” approach was first championed in 1994 by Mary B.
Anderson, author of the 1999 book Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support
Peace—Or War. The approach includes seven basic findings:
1. Assistance is not neutral; rather, it becomes a part of the conflict context.
2. Any conflict situation contains two realities: dividers, those factors that
people are fighting about or cause tension, and connectors, those factors that bring people together and/or tend to reduce tension.
3. Assistance has an impact on both dividers and connectors and can
increase or reduce either.
4. Resource transfers—what aid agencies bring in and how they distribute
it—are one mechanism through which assistance produces impacts.
5. Implicit ethical messages—what is communicated by how agencies
work—are the other mechanism of impact.
6. The details of assistance programs—what, why, who, by whom, when,
where, and how—matter.
7. There are always options for changing assistance programs to eliminate
negative impacts (increased conflict) or to improve positive contributions to peace.
Source: See Endnote 10 for this section.
notion that shared concerns can facilitate
cooperative behavior among otherwise
opposed communities or countries.19 Similar
notions foster cooperation around the concept
of disaster prevention.
Complex Challenges, Disparate Agendas
After a disaster, aid and relief groups are
understandably focused on immediate relief
challenges, just as development assistance
groups concentrate on economic goals, environmentalists tackle sustainability challenges,
and conflict mediators tame political grievances. Among the suite of international assistance agencies responding on the ground,
creative and imaginative collaboration is critical to avoiding fresh disputes and grasping
peacemaking opportunities in the wake of a
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41
Creating Future Opportunities for Peace
Sidebar 5. Recommendations
For donor governments and disaster relief agencies:
• Integrate conflict-sensitive strategies into disaster relief plans, and implement the lessons of the Do No Harm Project.
• Promote ongoing collaboration among aid organizations to avoid “turf
wars” and duplication of effort.
• Minimize relief inequities between disaster- and conflict-affected communities, and ensure that both are adequately represented in all decision-making.
• Conduct assessments of the opportunities and problems associated with
using aid to encourage peacemaking.
For conflict resolution groups:
• Use post-disaster relief as an opportunity for conflict resolution; analyze
and learn from previous cases.
• Raise awareness among diplomats of unconventional factors that can
trigger or worsen conflicts, such as livelihood loss, environmental degradation, and climate change.
• Ensure strong international support for mediation and monitoring
efforts, and create multi-disciplinary training programs.
For environmental organizations:
• Conduct proactive assessments of natural disaster risk in conflict zones.
• Integrate environmental protection and restoration into disaster-mitigation efforts.
• Work with governments to plan sustainable reconstruction efforts
(including laws mandating careful use of natural resources during reconstruction).
For concerned citizens:
• Encourage elected officials to quickly and fully fund disaster and conflict
relief efforts.
• Get to know the types of projects supported by the organizations you
donate to.
• Press government leaders to make themselves available as international
mediators.
disaster. When the list of responders includes
those tackling reconstruction, disaster prevention, environmental protection, economic
development, conflict mediation, and postconflict disarmament efforts, better coordination is desperately needed.
Too often, agencies and organizations with
similar goals operate in parallel spheres, absent
communication or coordination. With disparate agendas, constituencies, operational cultures,
and time horizons—and given the typical
paucity of funding for peace-related ventures—
they often compete for influence and visibility.
The 2004 UNDP report laments that “the divisions between those working on natural disaster
risk reduction and complex political emergencies and development have hindered the search
for ways to address such situations.” 20
The multitude of actors responding to natural disasters should seek to integrate their
diverse perspectives and draw on their unique
strengths. (See Sidebar 5.) To reconcile the
short- and long-term needs of different constituencies and the agendas of various stakeholders, professionals from diverse fields need
to be brought together in dialogue. With such
interdisciplinary attention toward conflict resolution in a post-disaster context, future scenarios may hopefully follow the successful path
traced thus far by Aceh after the tsunami.
Opportunities for collaboration:
• Undertake a comprehensive study of lessons emerging from disasterconflict interfaces; generate recommendations for all actors concerned
(akin to the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition reports).
• Establish a forum where these recommendations and their implementation can be discussed, bringing together the perspectives and expertise
of various fields (including disaster mitigation, development, environment, and conflict resolution).
• Create plans for aid-sharing scenarios in advance of disaster.
42
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w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Endnotes
“Unnatural” Disasters
(Munich: 29 December 2005).
1. Worldwatch calculation based on Centre for Research
on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), “EM-DAT:
The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database,” at
www.em-dat.net, viewed 6 March 2006.
12. CRED, “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International
Disaster Database,” op. cit. note 1, viewed 4 March 2007.
The March Toward Disaster
14. Farid Dahdouh-Guebas et al., “How Effective Were
Mangroves as a Defence Against the Recent Tsunami?”
Current Biology, vol. 15, no. 12 (2005), pp. 443–47.
1. Figure 1 data are a Worldwatch calculation based on
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED), “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International
Disaster Database,” at www.em-dat.net, viewed 6 March
2006. Due to a change in disaster recording methods in
2003, recent figures on the number of disasters may
appear artificially inflated compared with historical figures; see CRED, “EM-DAT Data Entry Procedures,” at
www.em-dat.net/guidelin.htm.
2. CRED, “EM-DAT Criteria and Definition,” at
www.em-dat.net/criteria.htm, viewed 6 March 2006.
3. Figure 2 data are a Worldwatch calculation based on
CRED, “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International
Disaster Database,” op. cit. note 1.
4. Ibid.
5. Worldwatch calculation based on ibid.
6. Zoë Chafe, “Reducing Natural Disaster Risk in Cities,”
in Worldwatch Institute, State of the World 2007 (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), pp. 114–15.
7. United Nations Population Division, World
Urbanization Prospects 2005 (New York: 2006), also available online at esa.un.org/unup.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Munich Re, Megacities—Megarisks: Trends and
Challenges for Insurance and Risk Management (Munich:
2004), p. 21. Economic losses expressed in 2005 dollars
using deflator obtained from Robert Sahr, Oregon State
University, “Consumer Price Index Conversion Factors
1800 to Estimated 2016 to Convert to Dollars of 2005,” at
oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/faculty/sahr/sahr.htm, revised
11 April 2006.
11. Deaths from Gary Younge, “Gone with the Wind,”
The Guardian (London), 26 July 2006; economic losses
from Munich Re, “Two Natural Events Play a Prominent
Role in the 2005 Catastrophe Figures,” press release
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
13. Sunil Raman, “Tsunami Villagers Give Thanks to
Trees,” BBC News Online, 16 February 2005.
15. New Orleans from John Young, “Black Water Rising,”
World Watch, September/October 2006, p. 26. Louisiana
from Cornelia Dean, “Time to Move the Mississippi,
Experts Say,” New York Times, 19 September 2006.
16. Somini Sengupta, “Torrential Rain Reveals Booming
Mumbai’s Frailties,” New York Times, 3 August 2005.
17. United Nations Environment Programme and World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), “The Evidence for
Human-Caused Global Warming is Now ‘Unequivocal,’
Says IPCC,” press release (Paris: 2 February 2007). The
temperature increase spans the years 1906–2005.
18. U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
“2006 Was Earth’s Fifth Warmest Year,” press release
(Greenbelt, MD: 8 February 2007).
19. Richard Kerr, “Is Katrina a Harbinger of Still More
Powerful Hurricanes?” Science, 16 September 2005, p. 1807.
20. WMO, “WMO Statement on the Status of the Global
Climate in 2006,” press release (Geneva: 14 December
2006).
21. Ibid.
22. Christian Aid, Life on the Edge of Climate Change:
The Plight of Pastoralists in Northern Kenya (London:
2006), p. 2.
23. Andrew Revkin, “U.N. Draft Cites Humans in Effects
of Climate Shift,” New York Times, 5 April 2007.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), “World Disasters Report: Living
and Dying in the Shadows,” press release (Geneva: 14
December 2006).
27. Total donated from IFRC, World Disasters Report
2006 (Geneva: 2006), p. 168.
B E Y O N D
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43
Endnotes
28. Table 1 based on CRED, “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED
International Disaster Database,” op. cit. note 1, viewed 4
March 2007. “Total affected” refers to all those injured,
affected, or left homeless by a disaster. Estimates of the
number affected by the 2004 tsunami vary greatly, with
the United Nations tsunami appeal stating 5 million people, and the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and World
Bank estimating 2 million people, per IFRC, op. cit. note
27, p. 178.
29. IFRC, op. cit. note 27.
Understanding Factors of Vulnerability
1. Vicki Gass, Democratizing Development: Lessons from
Hurricane Mitch Reconstruction (Washington, DC:
Washington Office on Latin America, July 2002), p. 4.
2. Japan from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), German Committee for Disaster
Reduction, and University of Bayreuth, Linking Poverty
Reduction and Disaster Risk Management (Eschborn,
Germany: 2005), p. 24.
3. “The Politics of Hurricane Mitch,” CounterPunch,
1999, at www.counterpunch.org/mitch.html; Gass, op. cit.
note 1, p. 1.
4. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development (New
York: 2004), p. 1.
5. International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC), World Disasters Report 2006
(Geneva: 2006), p. 141.
6. Juliette Terzieff, “Michelle Castillo Evacuated; Now
Faces Unknown,” Women’s eNews, 2 October 2005, at
www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2474; Juliette
Terzieff, “Katrina Survivor Hangs On; Help Has Yet to
Arrive,” Women’s eNews, 27 August 2006, at www.wo
mensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2866/context/archive.
7. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, Joint
Report of the Government of Sri Lanka and Development
Partners (Colombo: December 2006), p. 5.
8. Oxfam International, “The Tsunami's Impact on
Women,” Briefing Note (Oxford: March 2005), p. 2.
9. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 144.
10. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit.
note 7, p. 5. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 155.
11. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit.
note 7, p. 5.
12. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 144.
13. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit.
note 7, p. 5.
14. Shannon Lacy, “What Can Women Do? Rebuilding
Lives Post-Tsunami,” undated, at www.disasterwatch.net/
resources%20links/rebuilding_lives_post_tsunami.pdf.
15. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 158.
16. Ibid., p. 142.
B E Y O N D
19. Office of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami
Recovery, “Helping Reduce Children’s Vulnerability to
Disaster: ISDR and UNESCO Launch ‘Disaster Risk
Reduction Begins at School’ Campaign,” press release
(New York: 16 June 2006).
20. Population Council, “Council Study Clarifies States of
Vulnerable Populations After Pakistan Earthquake,” Population Briefs, September 2006.
21. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit.
note 7, p. 6.
22. Sri Lanka from ibid.; Indonesia from U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor
Affairs, 2005 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor
(Washington, DC: 29 August 2006), p. xxi.
23. IFRC, op. cit. note 5, p. 144.
24. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit.
note 7, p. 5.
25. Ibid.
26. U.S. Department of Labor, op. cit. note 22.
27. Ibid., p. xxii.
28. Ibid.
Storm Clouds and Silver Linings
1. Oxfam International, “Targeting Poor People:
Rebuilding Lives after the Tsunami,” Briefing Note
(Oxford: 25 June 2005), p. 1.
2. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), German Committee for Disaster
Reduction, and University of Bayreuth, Linking Poverty
Reduction and Disaster Risk Management (Eschborn,
Germany: September 2005), p. 27.
3. Ibid.
4. Sidebar 1 from Adam Nossiter, “New Orleans
Population is Reduced Nearly 60 Percent,” New York
Times, 7 October 2006, and from The Brookings
Institution, “The Katrina Index: Tracking Recovery of
New Orleans and the Metro Area” (Washington, DC: 15
February 2007), pp. 20, 29. Figure 3 from idem, p. 24.
Fair Market Rent is a gross rent estimate that includes the
shelter rent plus the cost of all utilities, except telephones.
The margin of error for this survey is +/- 12 percent.
5 . GTZ, German Committee for Disaster Reduction,
and University of Bayreuth, op. cit. note 2, pp. 23–24.
6. Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia
Programme, South Asia Disaster Report 2005: Tackling the
Tides and Tremors (Islamabad: June 2006), p. 57.
7. “Drought, Floods and Conflict—Triple Emergency in
Somalia,” ReliefWeb, 20 December 2006, at www.reliefweb
.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EKOI-6WP5KM?OpenDoc
ument; Emily Wax, “Dying for Water in Somalia’s
Drought,” Washington Post, 14 April 2006.
8. Michael Renner and Zoë Chafe, “Turning Disasters
into Peacemaking Opportunities,” in Worldwatch
Institute, State of the World 2006 (New York: W.W. Norton
17. Ibid.
44
18. Ibid.
D I S A S T E R S
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Endnotes
& Company, 2006), pp. 115–16.
9. Ibid.
10. For a more detailed discussion, see Michael Renner,
“Post-Disaster Peacemaking: Conceptual Issues,” at
www.worldwatch.org/node/4829.
11. Sidebar 2 based on the following sources: Dan
Connell, “The Politics of Slaughter in Sudan,” Middle East
Report Online, 18 October 2004; Peter Verney, “Darfur’s
Manmade Disaster,” Middle East Report Online, 22 July
2004; Stephan Faris, “The Real Roots of Darfur,” The
Atlantic, April 2007, pp. 67–69; Helen Young and Abdal
Monim Osman, Challenges to Peace and Recovery in
Darfur, Feinstein International Center Briefing Paper
(Medford, MA: Tufts University, December 2006); Zoë
Chafe, “A Promise, Tested Again,” World Watch,
July/August 2006, p. 2; village destruction from Glenys
Kinnock, “The Rape of Darfur,” The Guardian (UK), 18
January 2006; deaths and displacement from “Q&A:
Sudan’s Darfur Conflict,” BBC News Online, 27 February
2007.
12. Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger, “Peace in
the Wake of Disasters? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004
Indian Ocean Tsunami,” Transactions of the Institute of
British Geographers, forthcoming, 2007.
13. David Petrasek “Vive la Différence? Humanitarian
and Political Approaches to Engaging Armed Groups,” in
Accord (Conciliation Resources), no. 16 (2005), available
at www.c-r.org.
14. Table 2 based on the following sources: cases discussed on the DisasterDiplomacy.org Web site; Kemal
Kirisci, “The ‘Enduring Rivalry’ Between Greece and
Turkey: Can ‘Democratic Peace’ Break It?” Alternatives:
Turkish Journal of International Relations, Spring 2002;
Anthony Boadle, “Cuban Doctors Say Politics Block
Katrina Offer,” Yahoo News, 9 September 2005; Frances
Harrison, “Iran Offers US Katrina Oil Relief,” BBC News
Online, 6 September 2005.
5. International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Natural
Resources and Law Enforcement, Asia Report No. 29
(Jakarta and Brussels: 2001), pp. 10–12.
6. McCulloch, op. cit. note 1, pp. 12–17; Down to Earth,
Aceh: Logging a Conflict Zone (London: 2004).
7. Bill Guerin, “Aceh Rises Above the Waves,” Asia Times
Online, 19 July 2005.
8. Abigail Abrash Walton and Bama Athreya, “US Ties
and Challenges to Peace in Aceh,” Asia Times Online, 21
January 2005; “Indonesia Bans Army Business Ties,” BBC
News Online, 12 April 2005; C.S. Kuppuswamy, Indonesia:
Armed Forces and their Diminishing Political Role, Paper
No. 528 (Noida, India: South Analysis Group, 2002).
9. Table 3 from the following sources: Global IDP
Project, “Indonesia: Post-Tsunami Assistance Risks
Neglecting Reintegration Needs of Conflict-Induced
IDPs” (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council, 26 May
2005), pp. 1, 3; Global IDP Project, “Prior to Tsunami, at
least 125,000 People Had Been Displaced Since May 2003
by the Conflict” (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council,
December 2004); UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
2004 Global Refugee Trends (Geneva: 2005); Indonesia
Relief, “Post-Tsunami Aceh Population Census to Start in
August,” press release (Jakarta: 6 July 2005). Range of
conflict deaths from Katri Merikallio, Making Peace.
Ahtisaari and Aceh (Porvoo, Finland: WS Bookwell Oy,
2006), p. 224.
10. Jane Perlez, “Indonesia Orders Foreign Troops
Providing Aid to Leave by March 26,” New York Times, 13
January 2005.
11. Kirsten E. Schulze, Between Conflict and Peace:
Tsunami Aid and Reconstruction in Aceh (London School
of Economics and Political Science, undated), p. 7.
12. John Telford, John Cosgrave, and Rachel Houghton,
Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian
Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report (London: Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition, July 2006), pp. 55–56.
Case Study—Aceh:
Peacemaking After the Tsunami
13. Schulze, op. cit. note 11, p. 9; Merikallio, op. cit. note
9, p. 14.
1. Lesley McCulloch, Aceh: Then and Now (London:
Minority Rights Group International, May 2005); Kirsten
E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of
a Separatist Organization, Policy Studies No. 2 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004).
14. Richard W. Baker, “Asian Insurgencies—Two Conflicts, Two Stories,” East–West Wire (East-West Center),
19 July 2005.
2. Rizal Sukma, Security Operations in Aceh: Goals,
Consequences and Lessons, Policy Studies No. 3
(Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004), p. 3.
3. Timeline based on the following sources: McCulloch,
op. cit. note 1; Sukma, op. cit. note 2; Schulze, op. cit. note
1; Sejarah Indonesia, “An Online Timeline of Indonesian
History,” at www.gimonca.com/sejarah/mapmain.shtml;
Peter Kreuzer, “Aceh: Nach der Flutwelle Neue Hoffnung
auf Frieden?” in Ulrich Ratsch et al., eds., Friedensgutachten 2005 (Münster, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2005), pp.
115–24; “Acheh in History,” Acheh Times, at www.acheh
times.com/timeline.
4. Schulze, op. cit. note 1, pp. 14–17.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
15. Rachel Harvey, “Aceh Looks for a New Political
Future,” BBC News Online, 21 March 2005; Merikallio, op.
cit. note 9, p. 37.
16. “Aceh Key to Indonesia’s Rehabilitation,” Asia International Political and Strategic Review, May 2005; Evelyn
Rusli, “After Big Step Toward Aceh, Still Many Hurdles to
Overcome,” International Herald Tribune, 19 July 2005.
17. International Crisis Group, Aceh: A New Chance for
Peace, Asia Briefing No. 40 (Jakarta and Brussels: 15
August 2005), pp. 4–5.
18. Ian Fisher, “Rebels Express Thanks for Aid to Indonesians,” New York Times, 17 January 2005; Merikallio, op.
cit. note 9, p. 99.
19. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, pp. 15–26, 128–31.
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
45
Endnotes
20. Ibid., p. 29.
21. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 17, pp. 1–3;
Schulze, op. cit. note 11, pp. 26–27.
22. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, pp. 29–37.
23. Schulze, op. cit. note 11, p. 29.
24. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, pp. 166, 184.
25. Michael Morfit, “A Happy, Peaceful Anniversary in
Aceh,” Asia Times Online, 15 August 2006.
26. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, p. 136.
27. Table 4 from “Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
and the Free Aceh Movement,” 15 August 2005, available
at Crisis Management Initiative, www.cmi.fi/?content
=aceh_project.
28. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, pp. 152–200; Pieter Feith,
“The Aceh Monitoring Mission Experience,” paper presented at “Beyond the Tsunami from Recovery to Peace”
seminar, Jakarta, Indonesia, 3 May 2006.
29. European Commission, External Relations, “European Commission Assistance to Aceh— Overview” (Brussels: December 2006), at ec.europa.eu/comm/external
_relations/indonesia/assistance_to_aceh/index.htm.
30. Merikallio, op. cit. note 9, p. 99.
31. World Bank/Decentralization Support Facility
(WB/DSF), GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment:
Enhancing Peace through Community-Level Development
Planning (Banda Aceh/Jakarta: March 2006).
32. World Bank, “Brief—The Aceh Peace Agreement:
How Far Have We Come?” (Washington, DC: December
2006), at web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESIAEXT
N/0,,contentMDK:21150070~pagePK:141137~piPK:1411
27~theSitePK:226309,00.html.
33. International Crisis Group, Aceh’s Local Elections: The
Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Asia Briefing No.
57 (Jakarta and Brussels: 29 November 2006); World
Bank, op. cit. note 32.
34. Michael Renner, interview with GAM spokesman
Bakhtiar Abdullah, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 21 December
2005.
35. Christine Beeck, “Nach den Gouverneurswahlen in
Aceh,” BICC Focus 3 (Germany: Bonn International
Center for Conversion, January 2007), p. 4.
36. WB/DSF, “Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update”
(Jakarta: November 2006 and January 2007 editions).
37. WB/DSF, “Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update”
(Jakarta: March 2007 edition). Figure 5 from “WB/DSF
Aceh Conflict Monitoring Dataset,” as transmitted in email communication with Blair Palmer, World Bank
Conflict and Development Team, Jakarta, 2 March 2007.
38. Michael Renner, interview at Aceh Recovery Forum,
Banda Aceh, Indonesia, 17 December 2005.
39. Jane Perlez, “Aceh Says Indonesia Law Falls Far Short
on Autonomy,” International Herald Tribune, 12 July 2006.
46
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
Table 5 based on “Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
and the Free Aceh Movement,” op. cit. note 27 and on
Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia, Pemerintahan
Aceh (Jakarta: July 2006), at www.parlemen.net.
40. Nani Afrida, “General Strike Mars Aceh Law’s
Enactment,” Jakarta Post, 12 July 2006; “GAM Wants Aceh
Governance Law Revised to Meet Peace Deal,” Jakarta
Post, 4 August 2006.
41. International Crisis Group, Indonesia: How GAM
Won in Aceh, Asia Briefing No. 61(Jakarta and Brussels:
22 March 2007); Lucy Williamson, “Aceh Votes for Major
Change,” BBC News Online, 12 December 2006; “Ex-Rebel
Becomes Aceh Governor,” BBC News Online, 8 February
2007.
42. World Bank, “Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis.
Spending for Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction”
(Washington, DC: September 2006), at siteresources
.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/
280016-1152870963030/APEA.pdf.
43. Ibid.; Sukma, op. cit. note 2, pp. 3, 30.
44. H. Diani, “Acehnese Unsure Peace Will Last: Poll.”
Jakarta Post, 31 March 2006.
45. Seth Mydans, “Tsunami-Tossed City’s Survivors
Struggle to Carry On,” New York Times, 26 December
2006.
46. “Aceh Aid Homes Unfit,” The Age (Australia), 30
March 2006.
47. Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton, op. cit. note 12.
48. Michael Renner, interviews with local NGOs in Aceh,
Indonesia, December 2005.
49. Eye on Aceh and Aid Watch, A People’s Agenda? PostTsunami Aid in Aceh (Erskineville, New South Wales:
February 2006), at www.aidwatch.org.au/index.php?cur
rent=1&display=aw00878&display_item=2.
50. Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton, op. cit. note 12, pp.
18–19.
51. Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, “The Right to Return: IDPs in
Aceh,” Forced Migration Review, May 2006, p. 70.
52. WB/DSF, “Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update”
(Jakarta: November 2006 and March 2007 editions).
53. World Bank, op. cit. note 32.
Case Study—Sri Lanka:
A “Double Blow” to Development
1. Authors’ interview with residents of Colombo, Sri
Lanka, January 2007.
2. Timeline based on the following sources: Jeremy
Armon and Liz Philipson, eds., Accord Issue 4: Demanding
Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka (London:
Conciliation Resources, August 1998); Alan Keenan, “No
Peace, No War,” Boston Review, Summer 2005; International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace
Process, Asia Report No. 124 (Colombo and Brussels: 28
November 2006); “Timeline: Sri Lanka,” BBC News Online,
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Endnotes
at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1166237.stm, viewed
20 March 2007; Jonathan Goodhand and Bart Klem, with
Dilrukshi Fonseka, S.I. Keethaponcalan, and Shonali
Sardesai, Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka,
2000–2005 (Colombo: Asia Foundation, August 2005);
Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Transition from Civil War to Peace:
Challenges of Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka,” Working Paper
(Colombo: Social Scientists’ Association, November 2005).
3. K.M. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind. Ethnic Conflict,
Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Penguin Books
India, 1998).
4. Ibid.
5. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 2, p. 3.
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Ibid.
8. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 2, p. 5.
9. Authors’ interview with Sunil Bastian, Colombo, Sri
Lanka, 15 January 2007.
10. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, “Dysfunctional
Democracy and the Dirty War in Sri Lanka,” Asia Pacific
Issues, No. 52 (Honolulu: East-West Center, May 2001),
pp. 1, 6.
11. Keenan, op. cit. note 2; Uyangoda, op. cit. note 2, pp.
9–10, 19. Text of the Interim Self-Governing Authority
proposal at “Full Text: Tamil Tiger Proposals,” BBC News
Online, 1 November 2003.
12. Goodhand and Klem with Fonseka, Keethaponcalan,
and Sardesai, op. cit. note 2.
13. Ibid., p. 8.
14. Figure 6 from UNHCR GIS Unit Sri Lanka, “Displacement Caused by Tsunamis by District, as at 02
January 2005, 15:45 hrs.” Table 6 based on the following
sources: Mandeep Kaur Grewal, Approaches to Equity in
Post-Tsunami Assistance. Sri Lanka: A Case Study, commissioned by the Office of the UN Special Envoy for
Tsunami Recovery (New York: November 2006), Table 1;
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Escalation of
Conflict Leaves Tens of Thousands of IDPs Without
Protection and Assistance” (Geneva: November 2006),
available at www.internal-displacement.org; South Asia
Terrorism Portal, “Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Sri
Lanka since March 2000,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/annual_casualties.htm, viewed 30
March 2007; “U.N. Envoy Visits Sri Lanka Amid
Deteriorating Humanitarian Situation,” International
Herald Tribune, 8 September 2006; “More Than 40,000
Civilians Flee Latest Fighting In Eastern Sri Lanka,”
UNHCR News, 13 March 2007.
16 September 2006, at www.colombopage.com/archive/
September16135927SL.html.
18. “UN Chief Restricted from Tiger Areas,” BBC News
Online, 8 January 2005.
19. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 2, p. 9.
20. In 2002, a “Sub-Committee on Immediate
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and
East” (SIHRN) was proposed, and in 2004, a North East
Reconstruction Fund. See Grewal, op. cit. note 14, p. 17.
21. Jo Johnson, “Sri Lanka’s Faltering Peace Process Gets
Boost,” Financial Times, 24 June 2005. “Memorandum
of Understanding for the Establishment of a PostTsunami Operational Management Structure,” available at
www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/
papers/P-TOMS.htm.
22. Dumeetha Luthra, “Sri Lanka’s Controversial
Tsunami Deal,” BBC News Online, 24 June 2005.
23. “Sri Lanka Suspends Tsunami Deal,” BBC News
Online, 15 July 2005.
24. Grewal, op. cit. note 14, p. 18.
25. “Sri Lanka Troops ‘Take Key Town,’” BBC News
Online, 19 January 2007.
26. Figure 7 from South Asia Terrorism Portal, op. cit.
note 14. Data are from March 2000 to March 2007.
27. “Bomb Hits Second Sri Lankan Bus,” BBC News
Online, 6 January 2007; “Rebel Boats Sunk, Says Sri
Lanka,” BBC News Online, 27 January 2007; “Sri Lanka
Blast ‘Kills Civilians,’” BBC News Online, 2 April 2007.
28. Centre for Policy Alternatives, Peace Confidence Index
(Colombo: February 2007). Tamils in the northeast were
not polled.
29. Centre for Policy Alternatives, War, Peace and
Governance in Sri Lanka: Overview and Trends 2006
(Colombo: 2007).
30. The authors visited Colombo and parts of Sri Lanka’s
south coast during a research trip in January 2007.
31. Simon Gardner, “Sri Lanka Investigates Aid Groups
Over Rebel Links,” Reuters, 11 January 2007. The group’s
full name in Dutch is Zuid-Oost Azië Vluchtelingenzorg
(South-East Asia Refugee Care).
15. David Rohde, “In Sri Lanka’s Time of Agony, a
Moment of Peace,” New York Times, 4 January 2005.
32. See, for example: Janaka Perera, “European Double
Game to ‘Tame’ Sri Lanka,” Sunday Observer, 14 January
2007; Walter Jayawardhana, “UN Diplomat Allegedly
Involved with Terrorism,” Sunday Observer, 21 January
2007; Lucien Rajakarunanayake, “INGO, NGO What Are
You?” Daily News, 20 January 2007. Save the Children felt
compelled to take out a newspaper ad to defend itself
against scurrilous charges, per “Save the Children in Sri
Lanka Clarifies,” Sunday Observer, 21 January 2007.
16. Authors’ interviews in Colombo, Sri Lanka, January
2007.
33. Goodhand and Klem with Fonseka, Keethaponcalan,
and Sardesai, op. cit. note 2, p. 11.
17. Ibid. A public opinion survey conducted in June and
July 2006 showed that 79 percent of respondents preferred a peaceful resolution of the country’s conflict, per
“Sri Lankans Need Peace, a Survey Says,” ColomboPage,
34. Ibid., p. 87; Uyangoda, op. cit. note 2, p. 17; authors’
interviews, op. cit. note 16.
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
35. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, Joint
Report of the Government of Sri Lanka and Development
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
47
Endnotes
Partners (Colombo: December 2006), p. 6.
36. Ibid., p. ix.
37. Ibid.
38. Authors’ interviews, op. cit. note 16.
39. Authors’ interview with staff at Sarvodaya headquarters, Moratuwa, Sri Lanka, 16 January 2007.
40. Authors’ interview with Mahinda de Silva, Sewalanka
Foundation, Boralesgamuwa, Sri Lanka, 17 January 2007.
41. Table 7 adapted from Grewal, op. cit. note 14, Table 2.
42. Ibid.
43. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit.
note 35, p. 6.
44. Authors’ interviews, op. cit. note 16.
45. Authors’ interview with Amal Kumar Pramanik,
BRAC officer, Matara, Sri Lanka, 20 January 2006. The
authors are grateful to Rixt Bode of Oxfam Novib for
assisting with the organization of this field visit, and to
Amal Kumar Pramanik for sharing his knowledge and
time.
46. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
“Sustaining Tsunami Recovery by Organisations
Networking at the Grassroots level through Promoting
Local Accountability and Capacity Enhancement Systems
(STRONG PLACES),” undated, at mdg-guide.undp.org/
files/Module%203.4/STRONG_PLACE_Project_Sri_Lan
ka.doc.
47. Observations based on authors’ field visit to projects,
Matara, Sri Lanka, 20 January 2007. The authors are
grateful to Devanand Ramiah, UNDP, for organizing the
visit and to Niel Kusumsiri for sharing precious time and
expertise.
48. Authors’ conversations with community groups,
Matara, Sri Lanka, 20 January 2007.
49. Post-Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction, op. cit.
note 35, p. 8.
Case Study—Kashmir:
Physical Tremor, but No Political Earthquake
1. “South Asia Quake: In Depth,” BBC News Online, 4
October 2006. Figure 8 based on map generated by
the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance (DMHA), Tripler AMC, Hawaii.
2. Timeline based on the following sources: “Timeline
of the Kashmir Conflict,” Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kashmir_conflict; Justin Podur,
“Kashmir Timeline,” 10 January 2002, at www.zmag.org/
southasia/kashtime.htm; “Timeline: Steps to Peace in
South Asia,” BBC News Online, 15 April 2005, at news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3825917.stm; South Asia
Terrorism Portal, “Jammu and Kashmir Timeline—Years:
1931–1999,” at www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/
states/jandk/timeline/year1931_1999.htm.
3. Figure 9 based on Praveen Swami, Quickstep or
Kadam Taal? The Elusive Search for Peace in Jammu and
Kashmir, Special Report 133 (Washington, DC: U.S.
48
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
Institute of Peace, March 2005), and on South Asia
Terrorism Portal, “Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence
1988–2007,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/
states/jank/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm.
4. For a brief summary of the origins of the Kashmir
conflict, see “Kashmir Flashpoint,” BBC News Online,
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/south_asia/2002/kashmir
_flashpoint, and Emma Batha, “Crisis Profile: What is the
Conflict in Kashmir About?” Reuters AlertNet, 19 October
2005, www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefsources/11297138
2078.htm.
5. International Crisis Group, India, Pakistan and
Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia Briefing No. 51
(Islamabad and Brussels: 15 June 2006).
6. Ibid.
7. See, for example: “Press Hopes Quake May Ease Ties,”
BBC News Online, 9 October 2005; Scott Baldauf and
Laura Winter, “Quake Relief Fights Tough Terrain,”
Christian Science Monitor, 11 October 2005; Tim Sullivan,
“Kashmiris Believe Quake Can Bring Peace,” Boston
Globe, 17 October 2005.
8. Table 8 based on the following sources: Duryog
Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia Programme,
South Asia Disaster Report 2005: Tackling the Tides and
Tremors (Islamabad: June 2006), p. 47; Center of
Excellence DMHA, “South Asia Earthquake Update,”
13 April 2006 and 8 November 2005 at www.coe-dmha
.org/Pakistan/SAEU110805.htm and www.coe-dmha.org/
Pakistan/SAEU041306.htm; International Crisis Group,
Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing
No. 46 (Islamabad and Brussels: 15 March 2006); Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre Web site, www.internaldisplacement.org.
9. “India Offers Pakistan $25m in Aid,” BBC News
Online, 27 October 2005.
10. Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia
Programme, op. cit. note 8, pp. 55–56.
11. Tariq Ali, “A Tale of Two Tragedies,” The Nation (New
York), 14 November 2005, p. 5.
12. Ravi Prasad, “Militancy and Natural Disaster in
Kashmir,” ISN Security Watch, 4 November 2005, at
www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=13386.
13. Amit Baruah, “LoC Crossing to Be Made Easier,”
The Hindu, 13 November 2005; “Kashmiris Reunite in
Grief Across LoC,” expressindia, 17 November 2005, at
www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=58471.
14. “1407 People from India and PoK Have Crossed
LOC,” The Hindu, 16 December 2006.
15. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 5.
16. “LoC Bus Completes Two Years Amid Less Enthusiasm,” Greater Kashmir, 11 April 2007, at www.greaterkash
mir.com/Home/Newsdetails.asp?newsid=6134&Issueid=2
10&Arch=.
17. Sheikh Mushtaq, “Peace Bus Carries Few Passengers,
Flickering Hope,” Reuters, 16 April 2006.
18. Scott Baldauf, “‘Confidence’ Measures Falter in Kash-
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Endnotes
mir,” Christian Science Monitor, 25 July 2006; “Kashmiri
Grief Crosses India-Pakistan Divide,” Reuters India, 4
October 2006.
“South Asia Earthquake Update” (Tripler AMC, HI: 8
November 2005), at www.coe-dmha.org/Pakistan/SAEU
110805.htm.
19. “Kashmiri Grief Crosses India-Pakistan Divide,” op.
cit. note 18.
Creating Future Opportunities for Peace
20. C. Raja Mohan, “Losing the Peace Plot,” Indian
Express, November 15, 2005.
1. Sidebar 3 from Ilan Kelman, “Disaster Diplomacy:
Current View,” at www.disasterdiplomacy.org/index.html
#currentview.
21. Somini Sengupta, “Peace Talks in Peril, India Warns
Pakistan,” International Herald Tribune, 15 July 2006.
22. Graham Usher, “Mumbai’s Casualties,” The Nation
(New York), 14 August 2006.
23. Somini Sengupta, “Talks by India and Pakistan Make
No Gains on Train Blasts,” New York Times, 16 November
2006.
24. Military expenditures, expressed in constant 2003
prices and exchange rates, from Petter Stålenheim et al.,
“Military Expenditure,” in Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), p. 340.
25. “Musharraf Sees Quake as a Chance for Kashmir
Solution,” Daily Times (Pakistan), 17 November 2005.
26. “Pakistan to Buy American F-16s, Chinese FC-10
Fighter Jets—Minister,” Forbes, 13 April 2006; “US Plans
to Supply Pakistan with Fighter Jets,” Mail & Guardian
Online (South Africa), 4 July 2006.
27. Prasad, op. cit. note 12.
28. Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia
Programme, op. cit. note 8, pp. 52–53.
29. Jan McGirk, “Kashmir: The Politics of an
Earthquake,” openDemocracy.net, 19 October 2005.
30. International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 8.
31. Ibid.; International Crisis Group, op. cit. note 5.
2. Aceh signs and banners observed by Michael Renner
during a visit to Aceh, Indonesia, 15–23 December 2005.
3. Rachel Harvey, “Aceh Looks for a New Political
Future,” BBC News Online, 21 March 2005; Zoë Chafe,
“Sri Lanka Donors Wary of Increasing Conflict,” at
www.worldwatch.org/node/4893.
4. Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, The Charity of Nations.
Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World (Bloomfield,
CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), pp. 183–202.
5. Authors’ interview with Nireka Weeratunge, independent consultant, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 14 March 2007.
6. John Telford, John Cosgrave, and Rachel Houghton,
Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian
Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report (London: Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition, July 2006), pp. 18–19, 43.
7. In Aceh, a member of a local NGO spoke disparagingly of those who hop from one crisis or disaster spot to
another, recounting how one expatriate greeted a colleague with the words “Hi Bob, haven’t seen you since we
did Somalia…” Michael Renner interview, Banda Aceh,
Indonesia, 16 December 2005. Similar problems were evident in Sri Lanka, per authors’ interviews in Colombo,
January 2007.
8. David Petrasek “Vive la Différence? Humanitarian
and Political Approaches to Engaging Armed Groups,” in
Accord (Conciliation Resources), no. 16 (2005), available
at www.c-r.org.
33. Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan Quake Revives Civic
Power,” BBC News Online, 15 November 2005.
9. Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Katherine Haver,
Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy
and Operations, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 23
(London: Overseas Development Institute, September
2006), p. 11.
34. Center of Excellence DMHA, “South Asia Earthquake
Update” (Tripler AMC, HI: 28 October 2005), at
www.coe-dmha.org/Pakistan/SAEU102805.htm; Prasad,
op. cit. note 12.
10. Petrasek, op. cit. note 8; Sidebar 4 from Collaborative
for Development Action, Inc., “The Seven Lessons,”
www.cdainc.com/dnh/the_seven_lessons.php, viewed 20
March 2007.
35. Anuj Chopra, “India Weighs Troop Reduction in
Quieter Kashmir,” Christian Science Monitor, 2 April 2007.
11. Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton, op. cit. note 6, p. 28.
32. Kamran Haider, “Quake-Hit Pakistani Kashmiris
Shun Islamist Parties,” Washington Post, 12 July 2006.
36. Human Rights Watch, Everyone Lives in Fear. Patterns
of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir (New York:
September 2006).
37. Palash Kumar, “Indian PM, Kashmir Group Agree
on Peace Talks System,” Reuters AlertNet, 3 May 2006,
www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DEL91854.htm.
38. Chopra, op. cit. note 35.
39. Muzamil Jaleel, “Kashmir’s Tragic Opportunity,”
openDemocracy.net, 4 November 2005.
40. Indian restriction from Center of Excellence DMHA,
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
12. Need to incorporate political analysis from Sunil
Bastian, Colombo, Sri Lanka, interview with authors, 14
March 2007.
13. Farid Dahdouh-Guebas et al., “How Effective Were
Mangroves as a Defence against the Recent Tsunami?”
Current Biology, vol. 15, no. 12 (2005), pp. 443–47.
14. Duryog Nivaran and Practical Action South Asia
Programme, South Asia Disaster Report 2005: Tackling the
Tides and Tremors (Islamabad: June 2006), pp. 61–62.
15. World Wide Fund for Nature–Indonesia, Green Reconstruction Policy Guidelines for Aceh (Jakarta: April 2005).
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
49
Endnotes
16. Fachruddin M. Mangunjaya, “Illegal Logging: Warning Light for Aceh Forests,” Tempo Magazine (Indonesia),
22 January 2007, available at www.acheh-eye.org; “Tsunami Reconstruction Drives Illegal Logging in Indonesia,”
mongabay.com, 6 August 2006, at news.mongabay.com/
2006/0806-ap.html.
17. “Aceh to Implement Logging Moratorium,” Jakarta
Post, 17 March 2007.
Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development (New
York: 2004), p. 73.
19. Ken Conca, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D.
Dabelko, “Building Peace Through Environmental
Cooperation,” in Worldwatch Institute, State of the World
2005 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), pp.
144–57.
20. UNDP, op. cit. note 18, p. 73.
18. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
50
B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
Index
A
Aceh (Indonesia)
gender of tsunami victims, 14
global attention on, 18
peacemaking, 5, 20–25, 37–39
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), 23
Ahtisaari, Martti, 21–22
aid, see also reconstruction
Aceh (Indonesia), 21, 24–25, 37
coordination, 42
Do No Harm approach, 41
Kashmir, 33, 35–36, 38
military delivery of, 18, 33, 35–36
pledges vs. media response, 11–12
political and economic effects, 6, 16, 37–40
recommendations, 42
Sri Lanka, 5, 27–31, 37–38
All Parties Hurriyat Conference, 35
Anderson, Mary B., 41
Annan, Kofi, 28
Asia Foundation, 27
B
Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA), 23
Baker, Richard, 21
Bam Earthquake (Iran), 19
Bangladesh, 17
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
(BRAC), 30
Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 38
C
Center for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters, 9
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 39
Chi-Chi Earthquake (Taiwan), 19
children, 13–15
China, 19
Christensen, Juha, 22
Christian Aid, 11
climate change, 7, 11–12
collaboration, 42
Colombia, 41
Colombo (Sri Lanka), 26, 28–29
w w w. w o r l d w a t c h . o r g
conflict, sparked by disaster management, 16–18
coral reef destruction, 10
Cuba, 19
D
Darfur (Sudan), 18
Debayle, Anastasio Somoza, 17
deforestation, 7, 10–11, 41
desertification, 7, 18
diplomacy, 37
disaster aid, see aid
disasters, see also specific disasters and disaster areas
defined, 9
human causes, 7–8, 10–12
statistics, 5, 9–11, 13, 27, 34
vulnerabilities to, 10, 13–15
displaced populations, 16
Do No Harm approach, 40–42
droughts, 7
conflict caused by, 17–18
Ethiopia, 19
Somalia, 11
Sudan, 18
survivors, 9
E
Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Authority (Pakistan), 34
earthquakes
El Salvador (2001), 14
Greece (1999), 19
India (1993), 14
India (2001), 19
Indian Ocean (2004), 7
Iran (2003), 19
Japan (1995), 10, 13
Kashmir (2005), 14, 32
Taiwan (1999), 19
Turkey (1999), 19
East-West Center, 21
El Salvador, 14
elderly, 13–14
environmental degradation, 7, 10–11, 42
environmental restoration, 6, 40–42
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Index
Eritrea, 19
Ethiopia, 19
European Union, 23, 38
International Committee of the Red Cross, 39
Iran, 19
Irwandi, Yusuf, 24
F
J
Federal Relief Commission (Pakistan), 34
Feith, Pieter, 23
flood survivors, 9
food shortages, 11
Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 20, 21–24, 37
Jaishe Mohammed, 35
Jammu (India), 32, 33
Japan, 21
jobs competition, 16
G
Kalla, Yusuf, 22
Karuna faction, 27, 30
Kashmir
deforestation, 41
earthquake (2005), 32–33
factors inhibiting peace, 37–38
India-Pakistan reconciliation opportunity, 5, 32–36
land title loss, 14
resettlement conflict, 16
Kecamatan Development Program, 25
Kelman, Ilan, 37
Kenya, 11
Kobe (Japan), 10, 13
Kumaratunge, Chandrika, 27, 28
GAM (Free Aceh Movement), 20, 21–24, 37
gender, 13–14
Germany, 21
Golkar, 22
Greece, 19
Green Reconstruction Policy Guidelines for Aceh, 41
Guatemala, 11
H
Honduras, 13
housing, 24, 29–30, 31
Hurricane Dennis, 19
Hurricane Katrina
aid offers rejected, 19
evacuation, 14
fatalities and costs, 10
gender of victims, 13
poverty, 17
Hurricane Michelle, 19
Hurricane Mitch, 11, 13, 14
Hurricane Stan, 11, 14
Hurricane Wilma, 19
hurricanes and climate change, 11
Husain, Farid, 22
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K
L
land title loss, 14
land use, 7
landslides, 41
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, 35
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 27–29,
37–39
Line of Control, 32, 33
Louisiana, 11, see also Hurricane Katrina
LTTE, see Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
I
M
India, see also Kashmir
flood defense loss, 11
gender inequities, 14
jobs and services competition, 16
Kashmir earthquake response, 32–36
Pakistani assistance to, 19
separatist insurgency, 32
tsunami barrier, 10
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004)
Aceh (Indonesia), 20–21
aid pledges, 11
children as victims, 15
gender of victims, 13–14
India, 10
Sri Lanka, 26–28, 30–31
statistics, 7, 21
Indonesia, 10, see also Aceh (Indonesia)
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), 11
Maharashtra (India), 14
Manaf, Muzakkir, 22
mangroves, 7, 10–11, 40
Matara (Sri Lanka), 30, 31
media attention, 9, 11–12
mediation/facilitation, 38, 42
Merikallio, Katri, 22
microfinance, 30
military
Aceh (Indonesia), 20–22, 25
aid delivery, 18, 33–35, 36, 40
Kashmir, 34–35, 37
Sri Lanka, 37
Millennium Development Goals, 8
Mohan, C. Raja, 34
Mumbai (India), 11
Musharraf, Pervez, 34
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Index
N
S
Naluvedapathy (India), 10
New Orleans, 11, see also Hurricane Katrina
NGOs, see nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
Nicaragua, 13, 17
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), see also aid
Aceh (Indonesia), 21
Kashmir, 35
local vs. international, 39
Sri Lanka, 29, 30
Norway, 27
Sandinista National Liberation Front, 17
Sarvodaya, 30, 40
Save the Children, 15
services competition, 16
Sewalanka Foundation, 30
Sinhalese, 26–27, 29, 30
Somalia, 11
Sri Lanka, 5
civil war, 26–31
factors inhibiting peace, 37–39
gender inequities among disaster survivors, 13–15
mangrove destruction, 10–11
tsunami, 7, 26–28
Strong Places project, 30, 31
Sudan, 16, 18
Suharto, 20, 21
O
Oxfam, 30
P
Pakistan, 19, 34, see also Kashmir
peacemaking, 8
Aceh (Indonesia), 20–25
environmental restoration, 40–41
Kashmir opportunity, 32–36
leveraging aid, 39
recommendations, 40
Sri Lanka, 27–29
success factors, 17–19, 37–38
Peru, 16
Petrasek, David, 39, 40
population growth, 7–8, 10
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure
(P-TOMS), 28, 39
poverty/poor, 8, 13, 24, 40
Prabhakaran, Vellupillai, 27
property loss compensation, 16
T
Taiwan, 19
Tamil, 26–30
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, 28
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 25, 40, 42
tsunamis, see Indian Ocean tsunami (2004)
Turkey, 19
U
U.S. Department of Labor, 15
United Nations, 8
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
13, 30, 38, 41, 42
United States, 19, 38
urbanization, 10
R
V
Rajapakse, Mahinda, 27, 28
Rashid, Ahmed, 35
reconstruction, see also aid
Aceh (Indonesia), 21, 23–24
environmental restoration, 6, 40–42
Kashmir, 34
need for ceasefire, 17, 21
need to consult affected communities, 16
Sri Lanka, 29–31
refugee camps, 14, 18
relief, see aid
resettlement, 16, 31
risk-management tactics, 10
Venezuela, 19
W
Wickremasinghe, Ranil, 27
women, 13–14
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 41
Y
Yokyakarta (Indonesia), 10
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 21, 22, 23
Yusuf, Irwandi, 41
Z
ZOA-Refugee Care, 29
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Disasters & Peacemaking Web Portal
Regular updates to the authors’ articles, links, and resources…
Check out the Disasters and Peacemaking portal on Worldwatch’s website at:
www.worldwatch.org/features/disasters
DISASTERS
A N D
Peacemaking
Other Worldwatch Reports
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On Climate Change, Energy, and Materials
169: Mainstreaming Renewable Energy in the 21st Century, 2004
160: Reading the Weathervane: Climate Policy From Rio to Johannesburg, 2002
157: Hydrogen Futures: Toward a Sustainable Energy System, 2001
151: Micropower: The Next Electrical Era, 2000
149: Paper Cuts: Recovering the Paper Landscape, 1999
144: Mind Over Matter: Recasting the Role of Materials in Our Lives, 1998
138: Rising Sun, Gathering Winds: Policies To Stabilize the Climate and Strengthen Economies, 1997
On Ecological and Human Health
165: Winged Messengers: The Decline of Birds, 2003
153: Why Poison Ourselves: A Precautionary Approach to Synthetic Chemicals, 2000
148: Nature’s Cornucopia: Our Stakes in Plant Diversity, 1999
145: Safeguarding the Health of Oceans, 1999
142: Rocking the Boat: Conserving Fisheries and Protecting Jobs, 1998
141: Losing Strands in the Web of Life: Vertebrate Declines and the Conservation of Biological Diversity, 1998
140: Taking a Stand: Cultivating a New Relationship With the World’s Forests, 1998
On Economics, Institutions, and Security
168: Venture Capitalism for a Tropical Forest: Cocoa in the Mata Atlântica, 2003
167: Sustainable Development for the Second World: Ukraine and the Nations in Transition, 2003
166: Purchasing Power: Harnessing Institutional Procurement for People and the Planet, 2003
164: Invoking the Spirit: Religion and Spirituality in the Quest for a Sustainable World, 2002
162: The Anatomy of Resource Wars, 2002
159: Traveling Light: New Paths for International Tourism, 2001
158: Unnatural Disasters, 2001
On Food, Water, Population, and Urbanization
171: Happer Meals: Rethinking the Global Meat Industry, 2005
170: Liquid Assets: The Critical Need to Safeguard Freshwater Ecosytems, 2005
163: Home Grown: The Case for Local Food in a Global Market, 2002
161: Correcting Gender Myopia: Gender Equity, Women’s Welfare, and the Environment, 2002
156: City Limits: Putting the Brakes on Sprawl, 2001
154: Deep Trouble: The Hidden Threat of Groundwater Pollution, 2000
150: Underfed and Overfed: The Global Epidemic of Malnutrition, 2000
147: Reinventing Cities for People and the Planet, 1999
To see our complete list of Reports, visit www.worldwatch.org/taxonomy/term/40
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About Worldwatch
The Worldwatch Institute is an independent research organization that works for an environmentally sustainable and socially just society, in which the needs of all people are met without threatening the health of the natural environment or the well-being of future generations. By providing
compelling, accessible, and fact-based analysis of critical global issues, Worldwatch informs people
around the world about the complex interactions among people, nature, and economies.
Worldwatch focuses on the underlying causes of and practical solutions to the world’s problems,
in order to inspire people to demand new policies, investment patterns, and lifestyle choices.
Financial support for the Institute is provided by the Blue Moon Fund, the Chicago
Community Trust, the Energy Future Coalition/Better World Fund, The Ford Foundation, the
German Government, the David B. Gold Foundation, The Goldman Environmental Prize/Richard
& Rhoda Goldman Fund, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Steven C. Leuthold Family
Foundation, the Marianists of the USA, the Noble Venture Fund/Community Foundation Serving
Boulder County, the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the V. Kann Rasmussen
Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, The Shared Earth Foundation, The Shenandoah
Foundation, the Taupo Community Fund of the Tides Foundation, the United Nations Population
Fund, the Wallace Genetic Foundation, Inc., the Johanette Wallerstein Institute, and the Winslow
Foundation. The Institute also receives financial support from many individual donors who share
our commitment to a more sustainable society.
About the Authors
Michael Renner joined the Worldwatch Institute in 1987 and is a senior researcher. His work
focuses on new concepts of security and the ways in which environmental degradation and competition over resources can generate conflict and human insecurity. Michael co-directed the
Institute’s State of the World 2005 report, focused on “Redefining Global Security,” and currently
directs the Global Security Project.
Michael has traveled and spoken extensively on environment and security issues and is involved
in efforts to translate his research findings into new policies. He has chaired discussions on an
environmental security strategy with policymakers and parliamentarians at both the European
Parliament and the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE). In 2006, he
wrote the foreword to the Inventory of Environment and Security Policies and Practices, published
by the Institute for Environmental Security. A native of Germany, Michael lives on Long Island,
New York, with his wife and two children.
Zoë Chafe is a Research Associate at the Worldwatch Institute. Since joining the Institute in 2003,
she has been a frequent contributor to Worldwatch publications, including State of the World,
Vital Signs, and World Watch magazine. Her writing has also been featured in such publications as
Worldchanging: A Users Guide to the 21st Century and the Pan-Arab environmental magazine AlBia Wal-Tanmia. Her recent work focuses on natural disaster trends, urbanization, and strategies
for confronting climate change.
Zoë coordinates Worldwatch University, the Institute’s youth outreach initiative, and has served
on the steering committee of SustainUS, the U.S. Youth Network for Sustainable Development.
She previously worked at the Center on Ecotourism and Sustainable Development in Washington,
D.C., the Centre for Science and Environment in New Delhi, the U.S. Forest Service, and the
Rocky Mountain Biological Laboratory. Originally from California, she currently lives in
Washington, D.C.
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B E Y O N D
D I S A S T E R S
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W O R L D WAT C H R E P O R T
Beyond Disasters
Creating Opportunities for Peace
The Indian Ocean tsunami, the Kashmir earthquake, Hurricane Katrina—
these disasters affected millions of people and captured the world’s attention,
eliciting some of the most generous humanitarian responses ever. Unfortunately, we now face a future in which disasters will become more common,
more powerful, and—in many cases—more deadly. With increasing populations, climate change, and environmental destruction, our communities may
be at greater risk than ever before.
When disasters occur in conflict zones, the devastation is compounded.
If aid is not distributed fairly among disaster and conflict survivors, new rifts
can emerge. Relief groups must be prepared to tread a fine line as they work
alongside armed militaries and rebel factions.
But there can be an unexpected silver lining: although disasters harm
people and communities in conflict areas, the cooperation and goodwill
following these events may jolt the political landscape, bringing renewed
opportunities for peace. Relief and reconstruction efforts can build trust
among combatants, ultimately even bringing conflicts to an end.
This report examines three unique situations in conflict-affected areas
following disasters, focusing on Indonesia’s Aceh province and Sri Lanka,
both affected by the 2004 tsunami, and on the long-contested region of
Kashmir, devastated by the 2005 earthquake. The experiences of these regions
yield important lessons that clarify the connections between disasters,
conflict, development, and peacemaking.
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