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What Factors Will Shape the Foreign Policy of the Next
Administration?
Dukakis Lecture
American College of Thessaloniki
Marten van Heuven*
November 24, 2004
* US Foreign Service officer (retired), former National Intelligence Officer for Europe,
Distinguished Lecturer State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (now named National
Foreign Affairs Training Center), senior consultant RAND Corporation. These are the
personal opinions of the author. The text was prepared before the U.S. presidential elections.
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I want to begin by expressing deep appreciation for the invitation to join you on this campus
to discuss the factors that will shape the foreign policy of the next administration. It is an
honor to do so under the auspices of a chair bearing the name of Governor Dukakis, a great
public servant in the best of the American tradition.
In 1956, the American author H.L. Mencken died, leaving the Baltimore Sun’s obituary
writer with a terse instruction in a sealed envelope: “Don’t overplay it.”
That was good advice. A degree of detachment is also desirable for an analyst of world
affairs. But I have to tell you that I find it hard not to feel deeply involved with the new
challenges facing the United States and the rest of the world. How could it be otherwise? As
a former US Foreign Service officer, I feel a personal stake in many of the policies,
international practices and institutions through which the United States helped shape the last
half century. Like other American citizens, I have a continuing stake in how the United
States plays its global role in the present century.
So let me lay out my agenda. First, I shall declare myself. Then I shall sketch my
impression of where the United States finds itself today. Next I’ll get at the heart of today’s
topic, namely the factors that will shape American policy. In conclusion, I shall try to frame
some issues for further discussion.
Where am I coming from?
In my college years at Yale, we took our teachers as they came. Over time we got to know
their methods and their views, warts and wisdom alike. Not so today. It is now customary –
certainly in the social sciences – for teaching staff to declare themselves at the outset,
ostensibly to remove any stigma of prejudice or partiality. Others will judge whether this
new method is better than the old one. But before you, I shall move with the times. So, up
front, I shall lay out some of my core beliefs, based on experience. For these beliefs inform
what I shall say to you.
Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk is said to have remarked once that at any time of the
night and day, two thirds of the people in the world are awake, and some of them are up to no
good. This bears out my own experience. During World War II and afterwards, I have seen
evil at work, and I have learned that the price of liberty is constant vigilance, hard work, a
willingness to sacrifice, and even the need to use force when necessary.
I am of the view that unrestrained power is dangerous. It has been my privilege, in my
official and personal capacities, to see many people who do good work on behalf of others.
But you will surely encounter, as I have, instances when reliance on the innate goodness of
people is not enough. What is needed is a system of checks and balances.1 The American
Constitution provides such a system. Americans set great store on the value of liberty.
However, they know that liberty must be exercised within the law and our institutions. In
international relations, unrestrained power carries its own dangers.
In my service at the United Nations, in Geneva and New York, I have come to appreciate the
value of international institutions.2 Since in essence they are political, they are mostly not
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efficient. Criticism to this effect from the former chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Jesse Helms, always struck me as ironic, coming from inside of one of the
least efficient deliberative bodies in the world. But the General Assembly of the United
Nations, and the governing bodies of the UN Specialized Agencies provide a unique,
valuable, and in today’s world essential sense of participation in the international system.
Though the UN has not been free of nepotism, or even fraud, the motivation and quality of
the international civil servants who administer economic and financial assistance, health care,
refugee and other programs has never failed to inspire me. I have deep respect for the many
UN officials who have worked tirelessly to preserve peace and security under UN Security
Council mandates. Often overlooked is the key role which the UN and the Specialized
Agencies play in the setting of global standards, such as in human rights. Moreover, there is
a practical consideration. Many of the tasks they perform are global in nature. They require
international cooperation in some institutionalized form. The mails have to move. Nuclear
materials must be monitored. Disease knows no boundaries. Neither does the weather.
Copyrights and trademarks need protection. Refugees require international care. These
functions are now carried out by organizations which, shortly after WW II, the United States
had a preponderant hand in creating. Broadly speaking, the UN system today reflects
American ideals, methods and procedures. Were we to replace this system with another, the
results would not be nearly as much to our liking.
I am also a firm believer in the value of NATO as the bedrock of transatlantic relations,
especially but not exclusively in the area of security policies. NATO has brought security to
Europe. It is now seeking to do the same in Afghanistan. It may yet have a significant role
in dealing with the security problems affecting Iraq, and possibly elsewhere.
Finally, I am wholly committed to close cooperation between the United States and Europe.
To be sure, the two continents bring unequal qualities to the table. In some areas, such as the
capacity for military action, their potential is uneven, and this issue needs to be addressed.
But their relationship is not a zero sum game. The whole area of potential US-European
cooperation is greater than the sum of its parts
These, then are my views. But I am not here to give you a polemic. This is an academic
institution. So I shall encourage you to think with me about the issues I shall discuss. My
goal will be not to persuade you but to encourage you to come to your own conclusions.
Where is US foreign policy today?
Having stated my views, I want to describe where I think US foreign policy is today. I’ll
skip the details and merely note that World War II established without doubt the global
power and influence of the United States.3 During the years of the Cold War, this power was
brought to bear on the threat presented by Soviet communism. We are now beginning to
hear that today’s problems are more challenging than those during the Cold War.4 Perhaps
so. The threat then was vital and the stakes of controlling the danger of nuclear conflict were
enormous. With the exception of the Vietnam conflict, the United States exerted great
energy and ingenuity in shaping a worldwide consensus of free countries. The Soviet Union
collapsed of its own weight, dissolving a hostile nuclear empire. America and the world
heaved a sigh of relief.
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It now seems to me that, during the decade of the nineteen nineties, what passed for strategic
discussion about the nature of the post-communist world was sporadic, inconclusive, and did
not engage the American public.5 Neither was there closure on the issue of what global role
the United States should assume. The killing of American servicemen in Mogadishu
reinforced America’s reluctance to get involved militarily in places where US interests
seemed peripheral. Let me remind you that the early phase of the Yugoslav breakup
triggered criticism from some quarters of Europe about perceived US aloofness. Bosnia
changed that attitude, and the Clinton administration fathered the Dayton accords. However,
the conduct of that war left many in the US defense establishment with a bad memory of the
difficulties of fighting a war by committee. In any event, the issue of exit strategy remained
part of the American discussion.6 Also, the administration of President George W. Bush at
first consciously chose to take some distance from the Palestine conflict. Even now, it does
not show much inclination to push towards concrete results. Washington’s attention has
turned to Moscow, Peking, and New Delhi. In Europe, the US took the lead toward NATO
enlargement.
The attack of 9/11 galvanized America. The President declared war on terrorism, making
clear he expected international support, which he got. In quick order, US and allied forces
deposed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and, on what we now know to be faulty
intelligence, also produced regime change in Iraq. But the Iraq war badly divided the NATO
alliance and the aftermath of the conflict has proved to be difficult in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. US relations with some of its traditional allies were marked by sharp criticism
about lack of consultation, unilateralism, and perceived hegemonic American behavior.7
Indeed, during the recent electoral campaign, we heard the charge that US foreign policy has
heightened global risks. In sum, US leadership has now become a contentious issue.8
Iraq is only the most visible challenge on a list of current challenges, which includes nuclear
proliferation, failed states, instability in the greater Middle East, energy shortage, climate
change, poverty and disease. Far from withdrawing within itself, the United States has
broadened its global engagement. In doing so, the US administration has rediscovered that
effective action to cope with these threats requires international cooperation. Such
cooperation exists on many issues and in many forms, but to this observer, it is somewhat of
a hodgepodge. It lacks an agreed overall framework or concept.
What factors will shape US foreign policy?
Now I come to the heart of the question of what are factors will shape American the foreign
policy of the next administration.
Since foreign policy is ultimately the product of the interaction of individuals, personal
elements will enter into the equation: The lineup of the administration, the structures and
processes of decision making, and the choices – or non-choices - of the President and his
advisers will all affect the outcome. These elements are valid subjects of study, analysis, and
speculation. They are gist of the daily discourse of the media. Important as these elements
are, however, I want to leave them aside and instead address fundamental issues that any
administration, no matter who is President, must deal with. Let me name four: US interests,
American commitments, the domestic view of the US role in the world, and the impact of the
9/11 attacks on US domestic targets.9
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What are US vital interests?
US foreign policy will be largely determined by American vital interests. At first glance, this
proposition would seem to be a pretty uncontroversial. Vital interests are interests which in
their pursuit trigger an all-out national effort, including military force. Vital interests
determine what a country is. They constitute drivers of what the country will do. But US
vital interests are what the American people feel and say they are. Not surprisingly, people
will disagree. So an agreed definition of vital interests is elusive.
A decade ago, the Council on Foreign Relations managed to agree on only one vital interest,
namely the protection of US territory and American citizens from external attack. A recent
attempt produced four. First, the protection of US territory and American citizens from an
external attack that could cause mass casualties or disrupt the essential functions of the
national government. Second, the security of North America, Mexico, Canada, the
surrounding waters and the nearby islands in the Caribbean, and the air space – and space
itself. Third, avoidance of the dominance of Europe and northeast Asia by a hostile power
given the importance of these places as centers of economic and military power and their
strategic positions on the opposite shores of the oceans that guard the United States. Fourth,
maintenance of key international systems on which the United States depends: Trade.
financial markets, energy, transport, and the environment.10
Comprehensive as it is, this definition seems to have been overtaken by events. Note that it
defines “strategic” mostly in geographical terms. Note also that it speaks of oceans guarding
the United States, though the fact is that the most recent attack came from within the United
States. Any redefinition should also make mention of health, as those who went through he
SARS scare in Toronto in 2003 will attest. There is another factor bedeviling this issue. It is
easier to define a vital interest as a response to a threat. That was the case during the Cold
War. The threat was present and acute. Meeting it became a vital interest of the United
States and other countries. In contrast, a physical threat was not present in the post Cold War
years. This made it harder to define precisely what were thought to be the vital interests of
the United States. This situation contributed in the nineteen nineties to what now looks like
the foreign policy vacuum after the first Iraq war. Moreover, then as now, the question is
whether vital interests require – and permit – the use of force in the pursuit of human rights
in countries and situations not presenting a clear and imminent threat to the United States.
Thus, while vital security interests will shape American foreign policy, it will take a
perceptive eye to discern how America defines its vital interests at any given moment. It will
also be a matter of judgment to what degree these perceived vital interests will translate into
specific US policies.
What is the effect of US commitments?
US foreign policy is also shaped by American commitments. America is not starting its
global role each day with a clean slate. It has played such a role for a century. It has created
institutions and arrangements. These have given rise to expectations – by the United States
of others and by others with respect to America. . Cumulatively, these American obligations
and commitments shape the view of the United States held by other, friends and foes alike.11
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They are the essence of the trust and respect in which the United States is held by the rest of
the world. They are key elements of American power.
The American commitment to stand by its allies has provided them with security. Thus, the
United States has provided stability in Europe, the Korean peninsula, East Asia, and the
Middle East. When former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to the United
States as the “indispensable nation”, this was, in my view, less an expression of hubris than a
reflection of the fact that for many countries in the world the key question is: What more can
the US do for us? Those who have labored in the Washington vineyards are familiar with the
incessant pressures for American attention from virtually every significant actor on the global
stage.
Other elements add powerfully to the picture of an America embedded in the world, in trade,
investment and finance. American technology also ties it closely to the rest of the world.
The attractions of American culture and education are demonstrated by the legions who
aspire to a slice of them. The nature of the deep America involvement with the rest of the
world today leads to expectations based on American values – freedom, democracy, market
economies and human rights – that are held by many and are the hope of many more.
This web of interrelationships is thickened daily by the trend toward globalization, leaving
isolation as a non-option for America. It is a powerful tool for the exercise of US influence.
Conversely, though, it creates both obligations as well as restraints on US foreign policy.
The manner in which these reciprocal relationships play out is a matter of diplomacy. In this
realm, skill and experience matter. In sum, American obligations and commitments leverage
its influence but also restrain US freedom of action.
What is the domestic view of the US global role?
The foreign policy of the next administration will also be shaped by how Americans view the
role of the United States in the world. In plain language, Americans will decide the foreign
policy of their country. This is how it should be in a democracy.
American foreign policy has long ago become an extraordinarily complex interplay of actors
and institutional arrangements. These are beyond the capacity of the ordinary citizen to
follow, let alone influence. In normal circumstances, therefore, most US citizens are content
to leave foreign policy in the hands of their elected representatives. Americans trust them to
do the right thing.
So American foreign policy is made by the executive branch of the US government – the
President and the White House staff, the National Security Council, the Department of State
and the growing number of departments and agencies that have a foreign policy role, such as
Defense, Treasury, Energy, Commerce, Agriculture, the US Trade Representative, and now
also the Department of Homeland Security. Alongside the executive branch, the Congress
has a constitutional role, exercised by the respective plethora of Senate and House
committees dealing with foreign policy, defense and appropriations. Their influence can be
decisive; witness the rejection by the Senate of President Wilson’s plans with respect to the
League of Nations.
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While in the ordinary course of events the population at large is largely passive with rrespect
to the conduct of US foreign policy, special interest groups can exercise influence
disproportionate to their size. The Cuban lobby is a current case in point.
However, when presented with a foreign policy issue that engages Americans across the
board, the electorate can slowly but powerfully affect the direction of the country.12
Remember Vietnam. Growing popular disenchantment with the war turned to active
opposition, ultimately forcing the administration to change course. The effect of popular
views can also be anticipatory. The death of American servicemen in Mogadishu led to
reluctance on the part of the administration to contemplate US military involvement in other
places. Thus, the Clinton administration initially sought to limit any US role in dealing with
the breakup of Yugoslavia. Only when internecine warfare and ethnic cleansing threatened
the prospects of a second Clinton term did the administration get engaged, leading to the
Dayton accords.
My own experience with my countrymen – in and out of government – with respect to
foreign policy leads me to the view that, on the whole, they are sure about American values.
They also feel it is right to carry them abroad. They support the UN, though they would not
let matters of vital interest become hostage to procedures such as the veto in the Security
Council. They support NATO, and the American role in unifying Europe. They prefer
working with allies to proceeding alone. And, perhaps because it is often in the American
power to make things happen, they want to get things done. Here I should add that, contrary
to a view I occasionally hear expressed in Europe, Americans know the world pretty well.
They enjoy the benefit of increasing global experience over the past century, over half of that
period in a leading role. Moreover, the knowledge gained from this experience is not
confined to a small elite. American businessmen, soldiers, artists, educators and students
have been an integral and significant part of life abroad, adding sophistication to the
domestic appreciation of America’s role in the world.
I do not want to ask you to simply accept my personal views. What Americans think about
foreign policy has been traced since 1974 by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
After 9/11, according to the Council’s 2002 report, Americans have become even more
attentive to what is going on beyond their borders. American internationalism has been
refocused on containing and defeating the international terrorist threat. Support for an active
foreign policy to deal with a wide range of international problems is up. Yet the public does
not focus exclusively on terrorism. Americans also put a priority on protection from threats
to their domestic economic health and well-being, even as they are concerned about certain
regional conflicts, the global environment, and world hunger. The 2002 Chicago Council
report also notes that, while Americans embrace the US status as the world’s sole superpower
and support action to protect American interests, they are not comfortable taking on
international problems alone. Most Americans favor limits. They seek multilateral support.
They also favor devoting substantial but not unlimited resources to military capabilities.
The 2002 Council report concludes that American leaders and the public both generally
support working with allies and through international institutions, although in many cases
public support is higher than that of leaders. Leaders, like the public, support using US
troops, but leaders show much stronger support for using troops. Both the public and leaders,
however, show strong support for multilateral uses of force. The public is far more
concerned than leaders about safeguarding American jobs and well-being at home. The 2004
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report, just out, corroborates that American people are more interested in protecting their
own jobs rather than promoting democracy abroad. And the 2004 Report concludes that,
while Americans feel strongly that their country should take an active role in international
affairs, 80% say that America is policing abroad more than it should, and that they prefer to
combat terrorism through the UN. Another poll indicates that an overwhelming majority of
Americans wants the United States to work closely with allies to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons.13
These attitudes, in sum, constitute the bedrock on which the next administration must build
its foreign policy.
The effect of 9/11
Finally, I want to turn to the effect of 9/11 on the foreign policy of the next US administration.
I have come to the conviction that 9/11 has been a watershed for America.14 The events of that day
and the period that followed will shape US policy for years to come.15
I did not come to this conclusion right away. My initial view, also held by other Americans
and many Europeans, was that, bad as it was, the action of a small band of suicidal Middle
Easterners was part of a long pattern of terrorism as we had known it – the Baader Meinhof
gang in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the ETA in the Basque country, and the IRA in
Northern Ireland and Britain. Though each of these countries was lethally affected, they all
coped – and eventually overcame – these threats through intelligence, police work and
political effort. I thought that the United States would also come to cope with terror. Indeed,
we were encouraged by our leaders to resume normal life after 9/11.
It is increasingly clear to me, however, that America sees itself in a qualitatively and
radically different situation. First, the nature of terrorism has changed. Second, the threat
posed by Al Qaeda remains real and imminent. Third, the capacity of Al Qaeda to inflict
massive harm has grown. Fourth, the US homeland is at risk. And fifth, the United States is
by no means prepared to cope with – let alone defeat – terrorism. Any doubt on this score
was removed by the 9/11 Commission Report: “Countering terrorism has become, beyond
any doubt, the top national security priority for the United States. This shift has occurred
with the full support of the Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the
American people.”
The United States government has made major adjustments to deal with the new threat.16 It
has articulated a new national security strategy. It has established the Department of
Homeland Security. It is overhauling the structure of its intelligence apparatus. Congress
has passed the Patriot Act, strengthening intelligence and law enforcement, though at a cost
in civil liberties. A substantial portion of the armed forces of the United States is engaged in
Iraq, even as the country maintains military missions in Afghanistan and many other
countries. The budget surplus has turned into a deficit. The cost in human lives is mounting.
Pressures to see the Iraq engagement come to an end are bound to grow.
This new situation begs the question of what strategy the United States should pursue in
meeting these new threats. The National Security Strategy of the United States, issued by the
Bush administration, is explicit. The United Sates, as a matter of common sense and self
defense, will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed. Also, he United
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States will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who
harbor terrorists.
This new US strategy has been controversial. How does it tie into Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, which preserves the right to individual and collective self-defense “if an
armed attack occurs.”? And what are the consequences it any state felt free to act upon
suspicion of a threat? The new threats facing the world today – terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, failed states, regional instability – all contain a lethal mix of radicalism and
terrorism. Must we wait until these threats materialize? If we are to act to prevent this from
happening, on what evidence? And with what justification? World opinion will be a factor
influencing state behavior. But world opinion has not coalesced around an acceptable answer
to these questions. As is historically the case in the growth of international law, state
behavior, including that of the United States, will in due course shape a pattern which may
become accepted as law. But we are not there yet. The problem of how to respond to the
new threats is real. It needs more thought and discussion.
Framing the way ahead
So where do we go from here? The considerations I have advanced have brought out some
fundamental issues. How they will be seen and dealt with will be the key to what we face
ahead.
First, what is the nature of the future world? Must we see it in essentially Westphalian terms
– states sovereign within their own realm - though globalization continues to chip away at
state sovereignty? Or are we facing a more complex pattern in which non-state actors – from
multinational to private organizations, groups, and even handfuls of individuals also play a
decisive role in shaping the future? If the latter, how can we achieve the concerted action
necessary to maintain peace, security, prosperity, and human rights? Who will lead that
effort?
Second, what will be the nature of Europe and what role will it play?17 Will the EU provide
the structures and processes which, in a hugely differentiated continent, are nevertheless seen
as meeting the common needs and aspirations of its peoples?18 Or will, in a favorite phrase
of my colleague Michael Stuermer, the old demons reappear and the EU acquis not prove up
to the task of channeling European vision and action into commonly agreed ways?19
Finally, will the preoccupation with the consequences of 9/11 drive America to focus
defensively on the war against terrorism or will it confront terrorism as part of a larger view
of its world role.20 And how will America combine its historic instinct toward unilateralism
with the lessons it learned as the leading architect of international cooperation in the past
century?21 And how will America apply wisely its sense of being an agent of divine
providence?22
So this is the framework I shall leave you for thinking about theUS foreign policy of the next
US administration. I am sure there will be plenty to discuss.23
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1
Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter argue that “[B]ehind the debate about the conduct of the war in
Iraq, and the occupation, is a larger divide – between those Americans who believe that their unique virtues should
permit them to act above the law, and those who believe that people in authority, necessarily imperfect, must be
constrained by institutions and by law.” “Bush’s mistaken view of U.S. democracy,” International Herald Tribune,
June 23, 2004, p.6.
2
A classic view to the contrary is contained in John J. Mearsheimer’s ”The False Promise of International
Institutions,” International Security, Winter 1994-95 issue, Vol.19, No. 3, pp. 5-49. Mearsheimer acknowledges the
widely held belief that multilateral institutions are a key means of promoting world peace, citing President Clinton,
former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and academics Robert Keohane and John Ruggie. His central
conclusion, however, is that “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little promise for
promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.”( p.7). Mearsheimer’s argument focuses on Europe. If this view
were right with respect to Europe, it would be all the more so in the greater Middle East, which has not experienced
any significant discussion of multilateral institutional arrangements.
3
This development fits trend projections. “The United States will continue to be a major force in the world
community. US global economic, technological,military, and diplomatic influence will be unparalleled among
nations as well as regional and international organizations in 2015. This power will not only ensure America’s
preeminence, but also will cast the United States as a key driver of the international system.” Global Trends 2015:
A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts, National Intelligence Council, NIC 2000-02,
December 2000, p.12. Events since 9/11 do not significantly alter these conclusions, but highlight the issue of how
US preeminence will be exercised by the United States and perceived by the rest of the world.
4
“The complexity of the challenge America now confronts dwarfs what it faced half a century ago in Western
Europe.”, Zbigniew Brzezinsky, “Hegemonic Quicksand,” The National Interests, Winter 2003-04, p.5. He
explains: “For at least a generation, the major task facing the United States in the effort to promote global security
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will be the pacification and then the cooperative organization of a region that contains the world’s greatest
concentration of political injustice, social deprivation, demographic congestion and potential for high-intensity
violence. But the region also contains most of the world’s oil and natural gas. --- The combination of oil and
volatility gives the United States no choice. America faces an awesome challenge in helping to sustain some degree
of stability among precarious states inhabited by increasingly politically restless, socially aroused and religiously
inflamed peoples. It must undertake an even more daunting enterprise than it did in Europe more than half a century
ago, given a terrain that is culturally alien, politically turbulent and ethnically complex.”p. 6
5
“In short, the scope and rapidity of change after 1989, and the loss of a galvanizing threat caused our ship of state
to slip its strategic moorings. We were adrift, searching for the lodestar that would help us find our bearings.”
Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997, p.
344. “In Washington, an age of moral and philosophical sterility is deeply entrenched ---. The decline dates from
the end of the cold war, which suddenly and shockingly left Washington without any purpose that could be called
visionary or even faintly noble.” Russell Baker, “In Bush’s Washington,” The New York Review, May 13, 2004, p.
25.
6
“Should America cut and run [from the current Iraq crisis]? No. But we should get realistic, and look in earnest
for an exit.” Paul Krugman, “Finding the least bad answer in Iraq.” International Herald Tribune, August 7-8,
2004, p. 5. The US military command anticipated a rapid drawdown of US forces shortly after the taking of
Baghdad. See Michael R.Gordon, “How postwar plan in Iraq went awry,” International Herald Tribune, October
19, 2004, p.1
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America is now widely seen as the only remaining superpower. This power has diplomatic, military, economic
and cultural dimensions. US influence derives not only from the physical means at America’s command. Much of
it constitutes what Harvard University Kennedy School of Government’s Joseph S. Nye has called “soft power.”
The Iraq war has corroded this reservoir of soft power. Prominent Europeans agree. “Some Americans believe that
September 11 changed the world. That is not quite correct. Instead, it deeply changed the way in which Americans
perceive the outside world; this is the real change. --- An imperialist element in American foreign policy has always
coexisted with other elements, including isolationism, internationalism, and idealism (nowadays called
multilateralism). Sometimes one of these elements prevailed, sometimes another. --- A sense of mission has been
part of American strategy for a long, long time. --- One might characterize America’s present strategy by two
principles: first, the belief that freedom of action should not be impeded by entangling alliances, to use a very old
phrase from American constitutional history; and second, the willingness to wage preventive wars. Many Europeans
take these principles to represent democratic imperialism. You do not hear this from them; people think that
speaking their mind is politically incorrect. However, it seems conceivable to me that these guiding principles will
persist longer than President George Bush Jr.’s term in office. Right now, only a minority of sovereign states is
happy with America’s strategic attitude or the extension of the American fear of interference. Most people,
particularly in Europe, would prefer America to act as a leader in internationalism or multilateralism, and they try to
influence America in that direction. My own guess is that the world will have to live with a considerable degree of
American unilateralism for a while. Such a situation will not necessarily entice other nations and governments to
voluntarily engage themselves. Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, “The Global Situation: A European
Point of View,” German Historical Institute, Bulletin, Issue 34, Spring 2004, pp. 9-24, at pp. 20-21.
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Earlier this year, 27 retired American diplomats and military commanders criticized the administration, stating that
it does not understand the world and remains unable to handle in either style or substance the responsibilities of
global leadership. See “Retired Envoys, Commanders Assail Bush Team,” The Washington Post, June, 17, 2004, p.
A22.
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This enumeration leaves aside one essential element of foreign policy, namely principles. America has long stood
for freedom, individual liberty, democracy and human rights. These principles are enshrined in the Constitution.
They have been invoked in every major conflict as the basic justification for US policies. Principles in the abstract,
however, are not by themselves a clear guide to specific policies, which derive from the need to advance national
interests.
12
10
See James Thomson,”US Interests and the Fate of the Alliance,” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003-04, pp.
207-219, p. 208.
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There may be a need to rethink which countries are America’s allies. Charles Wolf of the RAND Corporation
concludes that China, India, Pakistan and Russia are more closely aligned with key US security policies and interests
than the “traditional allies” France and Germany. These key policies are countering global terrorism, making a
commitment to security, reconstruction and democratization in both Afghanistan and Iraq, promoting a” road map”
solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, insisting on multilateral negotiations by the six powers (rather than unilateral
negotiation by the United States) for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear programs and capabilities, endorsing a
peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status, and demanding that Iran be inspected and monitored to insure that it forego
nuclear weapons development. Charles Wolf Jr., “Allies and interests,” International Herald Tribune, July 8, 2004,
p.6.
12
The President of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that the adjustments to American policy in Iraq reflect
political realities at home. Characterizing the Iraq intervention as a war of choice, he offers three guidelines to the
administration: Line up domestic support, line up international support, do not assume that any war will be quick
and easy. Richard. N. Haass, “Wars of Choice,” The Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2003, Op-Ed.
.13 PIPA/Knowledge Networks poll conducted in March 2004, as reported in The Washington Post, April 17, 2004,
p. A16.
14
9/11 has also led to a profound reappraisal by leading European Union politicians of the purpose of their union.
German Ministers Joschka Fischer and Otto Schily are now more favorably inclined to the admission of Turkey.
See “How terrorism trumped federalism,” The Economist, Oct. 2, 2004, p. 54.
15
These events have been chronicled and analyzed in detail in The 9/11 Commission Report (Norton, 2004). The
Commission characterizes the war on terrorism as one demanding the use of all elements of national power. Report,
p. 363. It concludes that the threat is not just “terrorism”, but Islamist terrorism, especially the Al Qaeda network,
its affiliates, and its ideology. Report, p. 362. The Report concludes with a series of practical recommendations
with respect to the global strategy the US should pursue, as well as how the US government should be organized to
accomplish these objectives. Report, Chapters 12 and 13.
16
The daily conduct of US diplomacy has also altered as a result of 9/11. Personal security is now a priority of US
diplomatic and consular posts. Recruitment and retention are adversely affected; more posts are now designated as
“unaccompanied,” causing extended family separations. While security measures are not thought to hinder
diplomatic outreach, the emphasis on terrorism-related issues has caused the downgrading of other priorities, such as
monitoring human rights as well as political and economic reporting. New visa procedures have adversely affected
political relationships and public diplomacy. These are the conclusions of “How Terrorism Affects American
Diplomacy,” published by the Council of American Ambassadors and the Institute for the Study of Public
Diplomacy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, March
2004.
17
For a seminal discussion of Europe, see Hugh Seton-Watson, “What is Europe, Where is Europe?”, Encounter,
July-August, 1985, p .9.
18
“Yet there are strong reasons for doubting that an attempt to turn the EU into a political superpower will provide it
with a fresh impetus. Indeed, it is just as likely to end up splitting the Union.” “Outgrowing the Union,” The
Economist, Sept. 25, 2004, p.7. The EU was divided on the issue of Iraq. It harbors a wide range of views with
respect to Russia. See Judy Dempsey, “EU divided in reaction to Putin’s power play,” International Herald Tribune
Sept. 15, 2004, p.1. The risk remains that the EU will define itself in opposition to the United States and “run the
danger of becoming a professional critic of America for overreaching itself, while husbanding its own power and
wealth and reaching for very little.” Jonathan Power, “Raising the sights,” International Herald Tribune,
September 2, 2004, p. 6.
13
19
A former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and former United States ambassador to Germany
notes that “the EU remains an interest-driven association of national states.” He continues: ”As in the past, the
European debate will be influenced by the tension between the perceived practical needs of the big countries and
the deep desire of the smaller member states to maintain the institutional lock on large country hegemony.” John C.
Kornblum, “The EU Balancing Act,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Dec.11, 2003,
wysiwyg://1/http://www.aicgs.org/c/kornblumc3.shtml.
20
“Nor, probably, does he [President Bush] think that the war on terror can be the sole organising principle of
American policy.” ‘Breathless to victory”, review of David Frum and Richard Perle’s An End to Evil: How to Win
the War on Terror, The Economist, Jan 10, 2004, p.72 at p. 73. The change in emphasis on the part of President
Bush, from looming threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, to possible intent by Sadam Husain to “game” the
international system as the justification for the invasion of Iraq, suggests a different interpretation of the security
strategy of the United States. The classical definition was imminent threat. The new strategy moved toward preemptive action against terrorism. Now, the trigger for US military action appears to be not so much capability as
intent. See David E. Sanger, “A Doctrine Under Pressure: Pre-emption is Redefined,” The New York Times, Oct.
11, 2004, p.A10.
21
A recent RAND study concludes that the United Sates is bound to be involved – even increasingly – in nationbuilding. “ --- [S]uccessive administrations have treated each new mission as if it were the first and, more
importantly, as if it were the last. This expectation is unlikely to be realized any time soon. Since the end of the
Cold War, the United States has become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. In the 1990s, the
Clinton administration conducted a major nation-building intervention, on the average, every two years. The current
administration, despite a strong disinclination to engage U.S. armed forces in such activities, has launched two
major nation-building enterprises within 18 months. It now seems clear that nation-building is the inescapable
responsibility of the world’s only superpower. Once that recognition is more widely accepted, there is much the
United States can do to better prepare itself to lead such missions. James Dobbins et al., “America’s Role in Nation
Building,” RAND, MR-1753-RC, 2003, p. 221. The likely prospect of robust U.S. engagement overseas is leavened
by caution. “What we ought to do at this point is to try to cut ourselves down to size in the dreams and aspirations
we direct to our possibilities for world leadership. We are not, really, all that great.” George F. Kennan, as quoted
in Geneva Overholser, “Kennan’s Counsel,” The Washington Post, August 3, 1999, p. A15.
2222
“As befits a nation founded on the conviction of its own uniqueness, the American empire is like no other in
history. Indeed, the peculiar American approach to empire offers a striking affirmation of American exceptionalism.
For starters, that approach eschews direct rule over subject peoples. Apart from a handful of possessions left over
from a brief, anomalous land grab in 1898, we have no colonies. We prefer access and influence to ownership.
Ours is an informal empire, composed not of satellites or fiefdoms but of nominally coequal states. In presiding
over this empire, we prefer to exercise our authority indirectly, as often as not through intermediary institutions in
which the United States enjoys the predominant role but does not wield outright control (e.g., the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.).
“Although we enjoy unassailable military supremacy and are by no means averse to using force, we prefer seduction
to coercion. Rather than impose our will by the sword, we count on the allure of the ‘American way of life’ to win
over doubters and subvert adversaries. In the imperium’s most valued precincts, deference to Washington tends to
be rendered voluntarily. Thus, postwar Europe, viewing the United States as both protector and agent of economic
revival, actively pursued American dominion, thereby laying the basis for an ‘empire by invitation’ that persists
even though European prosperity has long since been restored and threats to Europe’s security have all but
disappeared. An analogous situation prevails in the Pacific, where Japan and other states, more than able to defend
themselves, willingly conform to an American-ordered security regime.
“Imperial powers are all alike in their shared devotion to order. Imperial powers differ from one another in the
values they purport to inculcate across their realm. To the extent that the empires of Spain, France, and Great
Britain defined their purpose (at least in part) as spreading the benefits of Western civilization, the present-day Pax
Americana qualifies as their historical successor. But whereas those earlier imperial ventures specialized in
converting pagans or enlightening savages, the ultimate value and the ultimate aspiration of the American imperium
is freedom. Per Thomas Jefferson, ours is an ‘empire of liberty’.” Andrew J. Bacevich, “New Rome, New
Jerusalem,” The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, Number 3, Summer 2002, p. 50.
14
“The signal illusion from which America has to awake in Iraq and everywhere else is that it serves God’s providence
or (for those with more secular beliefs) that it is the engine of history. [B]elieving that it is Providence’s chosen
instrument makes the country overestimate its power; it encourages it to lie to itself about its mistakes; and it makes
it harder to live with the painful truth that history does not always – or even very often – obey the magnificent but
dangerous illusions of American will.” Michael Ignatieff, “America, the good and the ugly,” International Herald
Tribune, June 30, 2004, p. 6.
23. This discussion has already begun. See Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, “Iraq and U.S. Legitimacy,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, Number 6, November/December 2004, pp. 18-32.