No. 48, Fiscal Year 2005, Vol. 4
Structural reform after Prime Minister Koizumi
The direction of political and economic change
Ken Moroi, counselor of Taiheiyo Cement
Corp. and director of Tokyo Broadcasting
System, Inc., talks with SPF Chairman
Setsuya Tabuchi
The challenge of choosing
Koizumi’s successor
Setsuya Tabuchi: I’d like to begin
by asking you what you think will
happen in political circles after Prime
Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi steps
down when his term as president of
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
[LDP] expires in September this year.
Ken Moroi: I expect the LDP will
revert to its old pattern of factionbased politics. Koizumi became
prime minister pledging to change
Japan even at the cost of destroying
the LDP. He appointed the top party
executives without conferring with
On the inside
Special Reports:
Sino-Japanese Understanding
for a New Age — The Japan-China
Young History Researchers Conference
Dialogue to transcend war memories
and share viewpoints
5
What we can do to bridge the gap in
6
historical perceptions
Reports from the Field:
Exploring a comprehensive economic
partnership between BIMST-EC and
4
Japan
Foundation Updates
8
SPF Publications
From the Editor’s Desk
10
10
faction leaders and made cabinet
appointments on his own, too. He
left no room for factional intervention. That pleased the public, boosting his support. And young party
members, figuring that if the prime
minister enjoyed high support this
would help get them elected, also
backed him. All this prolonged
Koizumi’s rule.
Since there’s no one else right now
who could gain that kind of support,
picking the next leader will be hard.
There are quite a few within the LDP
who wish Koizumi would stay on to
strengthen the party’s chances in
the 2007 upper house election, but
Koizumi has said clearly that he
won’t extend his term as party president. If he went back on his word
and stayed on, support for him would
diminish, and if that happened the
party heavyweights would also lose
their clout with the public. So no
matter how much some within the
party may wish Koizumi to stay on,
he’ll refuse.
The LDP has to back someone
who can win support as the next
prime minister. But that person will
be saddled with raising the consumption tax, getting rid of current
tax cuts, and dealing with social
security problems, none of which is
likely to win hearts and minds. I
imagine each faction will put forward its own candidate, but there
aren’t that many people who can
attract public support. I think there
will be a certain amount of maneuvering by faction bosses and realignment of factional alliances and that
a particular trend will emerge from
this process. When Yoshiro Mori
became prime minister in 2000, it
was said that the LDP powerbrokers
of the day had conspired behind
closed doors to put him forward; the
same thing could happen again.
Tabuchi: But surely it’s no longer
possible to choose a prime minister
in secret.
Moroi: I wouldn’t say it’s beyond
the bounds of possibility.
Ken Moroi
Ken Moroi was born in Tokyo on April
23, 1928. Upon graduation from the University of Tokyo with a degree in economics in 1953 he joined the Industrial
Bank of Japan. He moved to Chichibu
Cement Co. (now Taiheiyo Cement
Corp.) in 1967, becoming president in
1976 and chairman in 1986. He
resigned as chairman in 1996 and
became a counselor. He has been a
vice-chairman of Keizai Doyukai (Japan
Association of Corporate Executives)
and a vice-chairman of Nikkeiren (Japan
Federation of Employers’ Associations).
He was appointed chairman of a Japan
Highway Public Corp. reform panel in
2003, chairman of a Seibu Group reform
panel later in 2004, and chairman of a
special committee on value assessment
at Tokyo Broadcasting System, Inc., in
2005. He has been an SPF trustee
since 1987. His honors include the Outstanding Merit Award of the Keizai Koho
Center (Japan Institute for Social and
Economic Affairs), the Zaikai Award,
and the Keizaikai Grand Award, all in
1986.
Structural reform will fail unless
the culture of dependence on
the bureaucracy is changed
Tabuchi: As businesses using computers and mobile phones proliferate, new crimes abusing information
technology [IT] also increase. Proclaiming the slogans “From the public sector to the private sector” and
“Small government,” Koizumi dismantled various established systems
and advanced privatization, including privatization of postal services
and the Japan Highway Public Corp.
But of course this doesn’t mean pri-
vatizing everything and anything is a
good thing. Indeed, I think there’s a
need for a new bureaucratic apparatus to deal with IT issues, such as
cracking down on IT-related crime.
What do you think?
Moroi: In the past, government
agencies divided up administration
of various fields. When it came to
issues involving more than one agency or field, the relevant agencies
would get together to decide how to
handle it—so-called interagency
coordination. The agency officially in
charge would draft a legislative or
budget bill, present it to the National
Diet, and explain it to the ruling party officials. Once they had given it the
nod, the bill would be passed. Only
when the law or budget was in place
would matters proceed.
Now this system is crumbling.
That’s because government agencies
began being driven by the desire to
augment their own interests. Bureaucrats’ wish to secure lots of jobs for
themselves once they’d retired from
their agencies led to turf wars.
Forums for interagency coordination
became turf-war battlefields. There’s
no one who can sort out the situation. This should be the job of the
officials working closely with the
prime minister at his official residence or of the Cabinet Office, but
since both the official residence and
the Cabinet Office include lots of staff
members seconded from various
government agencies, there’s little
they can do.
Koizumi’s idea of structural
reform was to demolish the system
of division of administrative labor
and interagency coordination.
Demolishing this system is all very
well, but there are no private-sector
organizations and rules, no surveillance and punishment apparatus, to
take its place. So in the end the
bureaucracy has to do the job. This
means returning to the status quo
ante, though, and it’s not a good
idea to resurrect something once it’s
been destroyed.
When it comes to IT, a bureaucratic apparatus with a certain degree of
technical expertise may be necessary, but technical knowledge alone
isn’t enough. Cutting-edge IT is
advancing by leaps and bounds and
changing all the time. So while technical knowledge is important, so is
the ability to anticipate change. It’s
necessary to read trends accurately
and create appropriate laws and regulations. This means not only having
technical knowledge but also being
able to discern world trends. But
Japanese bureaucrats aren’t trained
to do that.
Tabuchi: America has a lot of experience here, doesn’t it?
Moroi: That’s right. Japanese bureaucrats are very knowledgeable
about existing laws, and they’re
good at crafting laws. But they’re
not trained either at school or on
the job in foreseeing how the market mechanism, for example, will
change. All they can do is study on
their own.
When bureaucrats believe that if
they just persist they can come up
with a solution they work hard, but if
they believe a problem is beyond
them no matter how hard they try
their thought processes freeze and
they stop doing anything. This leads
to the lack of appropriate rules for IT
issues you alluded to. But since we
can’t just leave things as they are, we
need to rebuild the bureaucratic system.
Tabuchi: Lately a number of
unforeseen problems have arisen. I
was startled by the recent scandal
over hotels and condominiums with
insufficient steel reinforcement in
their support pillars to meet Japan’s
earthquake-resistance standards
because data had been falsified to
cut costs. Many people are saying it
was a mistake to leave inspection
and certification of architectural
plans to private-sector firms and
that a robust public-sector system is
necessary in this field.
Moroi: I don’t think we can or
should return to the former centralized, bureaucracy-led system. But
politicians, business leaders, and
ordinary citizens alike have depended on the bureaucracy, saying,
“When there’s a problem the bureaucracy should step in. What’s the
bureaucracy doing?” Behind condemnation of bureaucratic leadership lies public dependence on the
bureaucracy.
We need to stop being dependent
and rebuild the system, beginning by
deciding who should do what
according to what rules. So the next
prime minister has his work cut out
for him. He needs to be able to interpret world developments as well as
create a new system. In addition, he
has to gain public support.
Tabuchi: Breaking free of dependence on the bureaucracy would
require radical social change, I
should think.
Moroi: Koizumi has been energetically trying to effect change by shifting functions from the public sector
to the private sector and from the
central government to local governments. Since it’s the prime minister’s
bidding, the bureaucrats have followed suit. As a result, middle- and
lower-level bureaucrats have no idea
what to do. They’re thoroughly
demoralized and totally bewildered.
China’s gap between rich and
poor will lead to antigovernment movements
Tabuchi: On a different subject, it
seems to me that China’s continued
rapid economic growth has caused
worldwide turmoil. The gap between
rich and poor has begun to widen
even in Japan, but in Japan’s case
when the disparity gets too great a
sense that a balance needs to be
restored emerges naturally. China,
on the other hand, doesn’t appear to
be fazed no matter how egregious
the disparity becomes. Eventually,
however, won’t the gap between rich
and poor lead to antigovernment
movements?
Moroi: The gap between rich and
poor is especially clear cut in the disparity between interior and coastal
regions. Moreover, China is developing economically without properly
thinking through its water, forestation, and pollution problems. During
Japan’s rapid-growth period corporate responsibility began to come
under scrutiny and there was an
increasing focus on problems of pollution. As a result antipollution technology advanced greatly. Today,
Japan’s automobile industry boasts
the world’s best antipollution technology. China hasn’t yet addressed
this area, so a lot of problems are
likely to occur.
Tabuchi: Years ago I went to Inner
Mongolia as part of a delegation.
They were strip-mining coal. The
coal was loaded onto a conveyor belt
and transported to a power plant,
and the electricity was sent on to
Beijing. The chimneys were belching
thick smoke.
Moroi: Not only smoke but also
nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and
soot would have been emitted. But
eventually China too will have to
tackle pollution. The victims of pollution are the poor. China has been
able to develop efficiently because of
its centralized one-party dictatorship, its state rule. Meanwhile,
though, problems of poverty and
regional disparities have emerged.
The Chinese government is going to
have to deal with these problems
while wrestling with the opposition
movements they trigger. This will be
very tough. Governing a country
with such a huge territory and population is an enormous task. There are
only two ways to do it: rigorous
democracy or rigorous centralized
state rule. I imagine there’d be a sort
of federal system. After all, China
used to be divided into a number of
kingdoms.
Why mergers of Internet and
media firms don’t work
T a b u c h i : You’re a director of
Tokyo Broadcasting System, Inc.
[TBS]. After the Internet firm
Rakuten, Inc., acquired a major
stake in TBS last year, you were
made the chairman of a TBS special
committee on value assessment of
the company. There’s a lot of talk
these days about mergers between
Internet firms and TV and other
established media companies. What
are the business merits of Rakuten’s
acquiring a TV network?
Moroi: Although the advent of
broadband has led to greater use of
the Internet, it has fewer customers
and less content than TV. I imagine
Rakuten wanted to bring a TV network under its umbrella because it
thought adding the weapon of TV
broadcasting to its arsenal would
expand its business. That’s not mistaken. But in America, America
Online Inc.’s acquisition of Time
Warner Inc. and creation of AOL
Time Warner Inc. was a spectacular
failure. You won’t find one case of a
successful Internet-media partnership anywhere in the world.
TV networks operate by making
programs, broadcasting them, and
receiving fees from sponsors. The
networks worry that if their programs are shown on the Internet the
programs’ value will fall and Internet companies will start interfering
with program content. If that happens, the corporate culture and
know-how the networks have built
up will be negated. That’s why the
employees of Fuji Television Network, Inc., opposed the takeover bid
by the Internet firm livedoor Co. last
year. The same thing happened at
TBS. That sort of emotional reaction
exacerbates the situation, so it doesn’t work.
Tabuchi: Rakuten and TBS have
agreed to discuss a business alliance
for half a year. Does that mean your
role has come to an end?
Moroi: Yes. Now it’s up to TBS top
management to determine network
policy and instruct employees
accordingly.
Tabuchi: You were also involved in
radical reform and reconstruction of
the ailing Seibu Group as head of a
management reform panel. I imagine you’ll continue to be called on in
this way. There are too few people
who can explain things clearly and
firmly to the press the way you can.
Perhaps it’s your destiny to undertake this kind of work.
Exploring a comprehensive economic partnership between BIMST-EC and Japan
By B. S. Malik
President
Centre for Studies in International Relations and Development
The genesis of BIMST-EC
The countries of the BIMST-EC
region (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar,
Sri Lanka, and Thailand) have traditionally been a laboratory of multicultural and multiethnic existence
because of their geographic location.
This is possibly the world’s only
region, whose countries are linked by
history, language, food, family ties,
customs, and culture, where peopleto-people relations have remained
unaffected by the roller coaster of official regional diplomacy. Over the
years unofficial cross-border trade
and commerce have continued
unabated, sometimes marginally
affected by the prevailing political
circumstances but never ceasing completely. Migration has been common,
mostly for economic reasons, despite
difficult lateral communications.
After the countries of the region
consolidated their freedom from
colonial rule (with the exception of
Thailand, which had never been colonized), their leaders realized the need
to exploit the latent synergies in the
capabilities and vast natural-resource
endowments of their countries for
mutual development. Proximity and
direct access to the Bay of Bengal and
common historical circumstances led
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand to think of cooperating in
the areas of trade and investment,
tourism, transport and communications, technology, energy, and fisheries. The idea of this regional grouping for economic cooperation was
first mooted in Bangkok through the
Bangkok Declaration of June 6, 1997,
which led to the creation of BIST-EC
(Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation).
Later, at the special ministerial
meeting convened in Bangkok on
December 22, 1997, Myanmar was
accepted as a member of BIST-EC,
making the grouping BIMST-EC.
Bhutan and Nepal were added in
2004. Since then, by shifting the
emphasis from countries to the region
under the name of the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation, this economic grouping has continued as
BIMST-EC. The signing of the Framework Agreement to establish a free
trade area in February 2004 and the
Summit Declaration on July 31, 2004,
gave BIMST-EC good momentum for
launching the process of deeper economic integration of the region.
The relationship between BIMSTEC and Japan
It is worth pondering why BIMSTEC, constituted way back in 1997, did
not make progress like other regional
economic groupings despite the
impetus of ongoing globalization.
Clearly, historically the region had an
economic paradigm whereby natural
resources were taken to faraway
shores to be turned into goods. These
resources now needed to be explored
locally or exchanged regionally, making use of the available capabilities.
That demanded cross-border road
and rail communications, to allow
goods to be traded freely for mutual
benefit. Production of goods and
improvement of communications
infrastructure required investments
by an economic power acceptable to
the region, a power with resources to
spare and an economic stake in the
region’s development and stability.
Japan, with its great economic stake
in the region, fit the bill admirably.
Apart from being one of the region’s
largest investors and trade partners,
its vital energy supply lanes passed
through the region. Japan also had a
high level of political acceptability in
the region, with no historical baggage,
and its surplus savings could easily
find attractive outlets in the BIMSTEC economies. Could Japan’s experience of technological cooperation in
ASEAN be replicated in the BIMSTEC countries? The obvious question
demanding deeper examination was
whether a comprehensive economic
partnership between BIMST-EC and
Japan was possible.
To find the answer to this question,
an interactive and collaborative
research project is being undertaken
by the Centre for Studies in International Relations and Development in
India with support from SPF. The
project is being carried out with the
participation of noted research organizations and think tanks in BIMSTEC countries, including the
Bangladesh Institute of International
and Strategic Studies, the Centre for
South Asia Studies at Chulalongkorn
University, Bangkok, and the Sri
Lanka Centre for Development Studies of the Marga Institute. The project is analyzing Japan’s economic
relations with BIMST-EC countries,
with the aim of coming up with a perspective for a comprehensive economic partnership between BIMSTEC and Japan. The first year of the
project concluded with a very successful international conference to
discuss the findings of the study so
far, held in Kolkata, India, December
16–17, 2005.
Lieutenant General B. S. Malik is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College
(India) and the Royal College of Defence
Studies (United Kingdom), and has an
MSc and a Ph.D. from Madras University.
He is currently president of the Centre for
Studies in International Relations and
Development. He is also a member of the
governing council of the Netaji Subhash
Institute of Management Sciences, the
Indian Pugwash Society, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (United
Kingdom), and is a life member of the United Service Institution. In addition, he was
recently elected to the executive council of
the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. He has published many articles on
international and national affairs, economic
security, technology, and communications,
and has presented papers at civil and military institutions both in India and abroad.
He is also active in the International Pugwash Society movement and track-two initiatives between India and Pakistan.
The problem of differing historical perceptions has cast a
dark shadow over all fields of Sino-Japanese interaction,
including politics, diplomacy, military affairs, and cultural
exchange. Many factors leading to the clash between SinoJapanese historical perceptions have been identified. Not the
least of these are inadequate scholarly exchange between
Japanese and Chinese historians, the fact that historical
sources have not been shared, and lack of interest in the other country’s view of history and historical research methods.
Aware of all this, in fiscal 2001 the Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship Fund inaugurated the Japan-China Young
History Researchers Conference. The average age of
members at that time was 37.7 years. The reason for the
insistence on youth was the wish to give maximum scope
to the fresh viewpoints of young researchers not constrained by past historical research.
So far the conference has held regular study meetings of
young history researchers from Japan and China, invited
Chinese researchers to Japan, sponsored international
symposiums, and undertaken other initiatives. Five years of
activities will culminate in the Conference of Young History
Researchers from Japan and China at Waseda University,
Tokyo, on March 28 this year.
In addition, to make the research findings widely available, a book titled Viewpoints on the History of SinoJapanese Relations: For a Historical Perception Surmounting National Borders (temporary title) will soon be
published in Chinese by the China Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House. It is to be published in
Japanese by the University of Tokyo Press in May. The
book presents historical sources from the two countries,
along with commentaries by young history researchers
from both countries, in regard to subjects closely bound up
with Japanese and Chinese historical perceptions.
(Yoshiyuki Kobayashi, Research Associate, The Sasakawa
Japan-China Friendship Fund)
Dialogue to transcend war memories and share
viewpoints
By Liu Jie
Professor
Waseda University
Dealing with the war memories
behind the Sino-Japanese rift
The friendship between Japan and
China maintained for more than 20
years following the restoration of
diplomatic relations in 1972 was cultivated with great care, based on reflection on history, in both countries. In
the 1990s it was hoped that a forward-looking relationship of trust
could be built, now that both countries’ courses were in the hands of a
postwar generation that had no experience of bilateral hostility.
In reality, however, while economic
and social interdependence deepened, a rift between the two countries’
postwar generations emerged. The
rift was created not by the history of
war bequeathed by the prewar generation itself but by the way in which
this history was remembered, told,
and passed on.
The major view of history that took
root in Japan’s postwar generation
was the “1945 viewpoint,” focused on
the radical changes that took place in
and after 1945. Most Japanese of the
postwar generation naturally make
use of the 1945 viewpoint when
thinking about the various phenomena occurring in present-day Japanese
society and do not feel the need for
dialogue with the prewar period.
The Chinese, by contrast, look at the
present in terms of the “1911 viewpoint.” Chinese society underwent
great changes during and after the
period from the Xinhai Revolution of
1911–12 to the Communist Revolution of 1949, but the objectives of
“construction” (modernization) and
“unification” (the formation of a unified state) are incomplete. Moreover,
the greatest obstacle to achieving
these objectives is perceived as
Japan’s aggression against China. The
defeat of 1945 has a decisive meaning
for Japan, whereas the Chinese viewpoint, focused on modernization and
unification, is always conscious of
1911, when the “Republican Revolution” began. This difference in viewpoints between the two countries’
postwar generations has made dialogue on history difficult.
The search for a way to share
the 1945 and 1911 viewpoints
The reform and open-door policies
initiated at the end of the 1970s not
only enabled China to achieve rapid
economic growth but also led to the
disclosure of historical sources and
greater freedom for scholarly
research in the field of history. The
ability to make use of diverse historical sources gave historians more
channels for dialogue with the past.
It was during this period that things
like the Nanjing (Nanking) Massacre
and Yasukuni Shrine became widely
known to the postwar generation.
Chinese historians revised their
image of Japan while investigating
Japan’s past and present. They
employed a viewpoint that led them
to see the Japanese people as having
also been victims of militarism. But
as the perception of a “rightward
shift” of Japanese society became
general, more weight was put on
Japan’s wartime military atrocities.
Meanwhile, in Japan during the
same period there was a rethinking
of the negative view of Japan’s modern history as a history chiefly of
aggression. Criticism of the Western
powers’ aggression against Asia led
to relativization of Japan’s aggression
against China and its colonial rule of
Korea, and the view of history
regarding Japan as having harmed
Asian countries was repudiated as
masochistic. The revised Japanese
view of history shared an emphasis on
the continuity of the prewar and the
postwar periods with the Chinese 1911
viewpoint, but the diametrically
opposed values informing the two
viewpoints brought the clash between
the two countries’ perceptions of history to the surface. The expression of
Japan’s nationalistic perception of history in textbooks made China and
South Korea wary. This, along with
the Japanese prime minister’s visits to
Yasukuni Shrine, led to deterioration
of Sino-Japanese political relations
and a clash of national sentiments.
Meanwhile, the assimilation of the
1945 viewpoint shared by most of
Japan’s postwar generation into the
“continuity viewpoint” exacerbated
the clash of national sentiments.
In the face of this reality, there is a
tendency to despair of the possibility of
a shared historical perception. But perhaps it is too soon to abandon the effort
to resolve the clash. I believe that we
should be able to engage in dialogue
through the medium of our shared past
while acknowledging both the 1911
viewpoint and the 1945 viewpoint.
An initiative to deepen dialogue
For the last 20 years Japanese and
Chinese researchers, not just historians, have engaged in various forms of
exchange and dialogue. For the most
part, those involved have simply
argued their own cases. It seemed
that we should be able to engage in
deeper dialogue, taking advantage of
our ability to share sources pertaining
to the history of Sino-Japanese relations. With the support of the
Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship
Fund, we launched the Japan-China
Young History Researchers Conference in October 2001.
The conference is a study group
made up of relatively young Japanese
and Chinese researchers. Its discussion
extends to the social changes underlying
historical issues. As well as understanding where one another’s interpretations come from and what their
grounds are, the members became
aware that there was a considerable
range of views even among their own
compatriots. One valuable experience
we gained was the realization that calm
and rational dialogue was possible
despite various differences.
It occurred to us that we might be
able to use the experience and knowledge we had gained through the conference to bridge the gap between the
younger generations in Japan and
China. Keenly aware of the need to
provide a climate conducive to dialogue between both countries’ younger
generations which were becoming
increasingly alienated from each other, we decided to publish a book titled
Viewpoints on the History of SinoJapanese Relations: For a Historical
Perception Surmounting National
Borders in both Japan and China.
This volume sets forth both
Japanese and Chinese viewpoints
regarding representative issues of
contention in the history of SinoJapanese relations so far. The target
period extends from the years preceding the Sino-Japanese War of
1894–95, through the Pacific War,
down to the present. Since SinoJapanese relations during this roughly 150-year span have oscillated
repeatedly between confrontation
and cooperation, understanding of
the period’s historical phenomena
calls for plural viewpoints. The book
explains why various issues have
become bones of contention between
Japan and China and attempts to present guidelines for resolving conflict.
It is true that there is a gap between
the historical perceptions of the people of the two countries, and there is
clearly a difference in the standpoints
of perpetrators and victims. It is
impossible to force others to accept
one’s own historical perception.
Reflecting on history involves feelings.
Surely showing consideration for the
other’s feelings and listening respectfully to the other’s case is the first step
toward bringing about true reconciliation between Japan and China.
Liu Jie was born in Beijing in 1962. He
gained a Ph.D. from the University of
Tokyo’s Graduate School of Humanities and
Sociology in 1993. He was a full-time lecturer and then an associate professor in Waseda University’s School of Social Sciences,
and has been a professor there since 2003.
His publications include Sino-Japanese
Wartime Diplomacy and The Chinese View
of History, both in Japanese.
What we can do to bridge the gap in historical
perceptions
By Hiroshi Mitani
Professor
University of Tokyo
Needed: the will to break the
vicious circle
I have been taking part in the
Japan-China Young History Researchers Conference since its inception in the autumn of 2001. I joined
because I agreed with the thinking of
Liu Jie, who wanted to build a deeper
relationship between young Japanese
and Chinese researchers, a relationship that was equal in every sense and
would enable them to exchange views
frankly. I am neither young nor an
expert on the twentieth century, but I
agreed to participate because I felt
that I could not ignore the perception
gap between Japan and neighboring
countries and that it was irrational for
the younger generation to bear the
total burden of problems caused by
the older generation. As like-minded
researchers from both Japan and China assembled, we discussed and
debated the facts of history, and the
related perception gap, one by one in
the light of actual historical sources.
When we initiated the conference,
we had an optimistic outlook, reasoning that although there was a serious
historical perception gap between
Japan and China, a generational
change was steadily underway in both
countries and that in China in particular generational change was likely to
make a new approach to Japan possible. On the basis of this outlook, we
proceeded with preparations to pre-
sent the world with the basic historical facts that should form the foundation of future relations. But at the
time of writing, early in 2006, relations between Japan and neighboring
countries are the frostiest they have
been since the restoration of diplomatic relations after World War II.
The only way to break through this
situation is to think rigorously about
why it has come about. Looking
directly at the fact that for 100 years a
vicious circle regarding historical perceptions has persisted between Japan
and its neighbors, we must have the
will to sever that vicious circle and
establish a virtuous circle.
The bitter exchanges of words by
the three East Asian countries of
Japan, China, and South Korea in
2005 occurred precisely because the
leaders of those countries are convinced that war will not break out. In
periods when war could occur at any
time words were chosen carefully.
Confident that the exercise of force is
now unthinkable, national leaders are
indulging in harassment. This is the
worst possible situation in human
relations. Since the countries involved
cannot “move house” or sever relations, using their ingenuity to devise a
way to live together amicably is the
only way to create a happy world.
Why a generation that has not
inflicted injury must find a solution
To bring about reconciliation the
Japanese, as members of the nation
that once perpetrated wrong, must
take the initiative. It should be noted
that most Japanese living today were
born after 1945, when the Empire of
Japan collapsed. Most of the population of Japan, China, and South
Korea have no experience of inflicting
or suffering injury. The second postwar generation grew up hearing such
memories from their parents, but in
recent years the third and fourth generations, who lack even that experience, have reached adulthood. This
generational change, while advancing
forgetfulness and enhancing the possibility of adopting a more relaxed
attitude on both sides, also provides
the context for the spread of beliefs
that ignore the conditions of the period in question. Providing a generation with no experience of either
inflicting or suffering injury with a
sure key to perception of the past is
extremely important at this time.
The generational issue is one that
cannot be ignored when thinking
about the question of responsibility. It
is unreasonable to lay all the responsibility for their ancestors’ harmful
actions on those born after the war,
but they were reared by their parents.
Amid their humiliation and poverty,
those parents devoted unstinting love
to bringing up their children. The
affluence and peace of today’s Japan
rests on that. Members of Japan’s
postwar generation have received a
great legacy from their parents. To
the later generation, the failure of
their parents’ generation to resolve
the problem of its own wrongdoing is
a great burden, but since the postwar
generation has already received a
positive legacy, it cannot very well
repudiate all of the negative legacy. It
has to do what it can.
In this connection, we need to distinguish clearly between prewar and
postwar Japan. It is true that postwar
Japan has forgotten the harm done by
prewar Japan to its neighbors, but on
the basis of reflection on its own experience Japan has not once waged war
in over 60 years, and has cultivated
the habit of free and pluralistic public
discourse. Japan created a different
and better society than that of the prewar period. In view of all this, it is foolish to equate present-day Japan with
the Empire of Japan, especially in its
terminal stage of total war.
Looking for a gate in the wall of
differing historical perceptions
What is important in SinoJapanese relations is the fact that
Japan sent more than 3 million
troops to China, fought the Chinese
who lived there, and attempted to
rule them. This is called the JapanChina War in Japan, but Chinese
troops never went to Japan and
fought there. Unilateral aggression:
that is the big picture. Once this big
picture is understood, we should be
able to respond calmly, without
flinching, even when horrible facts
we did not know about are thrust
before us.
This kind of perception is hard for
the Japanese, and to the postwar
generation it is, in a sense, even irrational. One way to surmount this
psychological barrier is to look at the
harsh facts in conjunction with
Japan’s own experience of victimization. For example, to imagine the
dire position of the Chinese during
the Japan-China War, one could
recall the Battle of Okinawa. A huge
U.S. force landed on the island, and
the grim battle that ensued engulfed
even civilians; more than 200,000
people were killed. By placing oneself on 1945 Okinawa, one can imagine the lot of the Chinese in the preceding decade.
Imagining how one would feel and
what one would do if one were in the
other’s position is the basis for building good human relations. Asking
oneself, “What would I do if I were in
that position?” softens the hard shell
of ego and cultivates the ability to
imagine the varied conditions in
which people find themselves. If
those on the side of the erstwhile perpetrators do this first, those on the
side of former victims who learn of it
can open their hearts too. Clarifying
past facts and responsibility is also
important, but this on its own will
simply deepen both parties’ psychic
wounds and lead to a vicious circle. If
a virtuous circle based on the question “What if I had been in the other’s place?” can be established, it
seems to me that awareness of past
abominations will heal psychic
wounds, lead to reconciliation, and
open the way to human relations.
A wall of differing historical perceptions stands between present-day
Japan and neighboring countries.
But there is a gate in that wall. The
book Viewpoints on the History of
Sino-Japanese Relations: For a Historical Perception Surmounting
National Borders is an attempt to
show how to look for that gate. It is
my deepest hope that this book will
help the people of East Asia to find
the gate, go through it, and begin acting together for a bright future.
Hiroshi Mitani was born in Fukuyama,
Hiroshima Prefecture, in 1950. He has a
Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology. He
was an associate professor at Gakushuin
Women’s Junior College and is now a professor in the University of Tokyo’s Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences. He is the
author of The Meiji Restoration and Nationalism: Foreign Policy and Political Shifts during the Transition from Tokugawa to Meiji
Japan and the editor of The Formation of
Public Discourse in East Asia, both in
Japanese.
Understanding among
Asian journalists
By Eriko Tada
Associate Program Officer
The Sasakawa Pan Asia Fund
s part of the project Supporting Journalism
in Asia, the sixth Asian Journalists Forum
was held in Bangkok January 13–14, 2006.
The aims of the forum are to expand and strengthen the network of Asian journalists and deepen
understanding among journalists in the region.
Journalists from 20 countries took part in this
year’s forum. The target region, originally Southeast Asia, has now expanded to include the Middle
East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia, South
Asia, East Asia, and Northeast Asia as well.
The session themes—“Interpretation of History:
The Role of Media in Reconciliation,” “Media and
Journalism in Elections: Cases from Central Asia
and South Caucasus,” “Bird Flu and Its Containment: The Role of Media,” “Journalism Today in
Asia: Reporting the News in an Asian Way,” and
“Observations on the East Asian Summit”—
spanned a wide range of fields and elicited lively
A
A scene from the sixth Asian Journalists Forum, which was held January 13–14, in Bangkok.
exchanges of views. The sessions on an Asian way of
reporting and the East Asian Summit in particular
appeared to spur participants to reconsider the
meaning of “Asia” and of “Asian journalists.”
In continuing support for the Asian Journalists
Forum, the Sasakawa Pan Asia Fund hopes to provide a mechanism for further developing the network of Asian journalists.
Financial, tax, and activity
reporting for NPOs
By Fumiko Okamoto
Research Associate
The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
he project Action Research on NPO Financial
and Narrative Reporting (grant recipient,
Coalition for Legislation to Support Citizens’
Organizations) set up an accountability study group
made up of accounting specialists and NPO activists
in January 2005 to discuss financial and activity
reporting for incorporated NPOs. A symposium,
“What Is NPO Accountability?” was held on December 20 that year to present a document setting forth
the study group’s proposals, “Basic Thinking on
External Reporting by Incorporated NPOs.”
Improved accountability is being demanded of
incorporated NPOs, but in the absence of unified
principles and criteria for financial and activity
reporting on the part of Japanese incorporated NPOs,
they face the problem of how to conduct such reporting appropriately. The study group suggested
accounting criteria incorporating the idea of “donation transactions” as a solution. For example, when
NPOs receive donations from citizens for disaster victims, the donations are regarded not as income but as
T
Nearly 130 people participated in the “What is NPO Accountability?”
symposium.
liabilities, the NPOs holding the donations and the
donors’ feelings in trust, as it were. This approach
enhances transparency regarding the use of funds and
enables NPOs to seek tax exemption for such donations.
Symposium participants noted the need for a manual
on the proposed accounting criteria for incorporated
NPOs and for coordination with the relevant government agencies. It is hoped that further study will lead
to the introduction of accounting and reporting criteria
that are easy for incorporated NPOs to use and for citizens to understand.
Bioethics education and diverse social and cultural values
Developing Teaching Materials on Bioethics/Phase II
By Tetsuya Ishizuka
Associate Program Officer
The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
Rising expectations of bioethics education
While the development of life sciences has led to the
expectation of benefits, it has also raised new ethical
challenges. Bioethical issues are becoming more complex, too—for example, how to balance the advance of
medical technologies for prolonging life with the
demand for death with dignity, how to regulate organ
transplantation amid mounting demand for transplants, and how to deal with the ethical problems
posed by the use of genetic information. Moreover,
discussion of bioethics requires understanding based
on an international perspective that takes account of
social and cultural contexts, including countries’ economic conditions, differences in Eastern and Western
values, and religious doctrines.
To address the ethical issues accompanying the
rapid advance of life sciences, debate and education to
heighten interest in and deepen understanding of
bioethics are becoming more vigorous. In December
2005 the twelfth session of UNESCO’s International
Bioethics Committee was held in Tokyo. “UNESCO
and Universal Principles in Bioethics: What’s Next?”
and “Contemporary Problems of Bioethics: Asian Perspectives” were among the themes discussed. Meanwhile, rising interest in bioethics has prompted calls
from educators for teaching materials on bioethics for
lay people, especially youth.
SPF has identified understanding of bioethics as
one of the issues to be addressed in the core area “Initiatives in Comprehensive Understanding of Civilizational Issues.” In fiscal 2003 the Foundation began
awarding grants to the Eubios Ethics Institute established by Dr. Darryl Macer (then an associate professor at the University of Tsukuba and now an advisor
in UNESCO’s Bangkok office) for the project Developing Teaching Materials on Bioethics. Eubios means
“good life.” This institute has built an international
network of people involved in bioethics education,
chiefly high school and university teachers, which is
engaged in activities to promote bioethics education.
Diverse values revealed by a bioethics textbook
In phase I of the project (fiscal 2003–4), on the
basis of discussion by teachers and researchers
involved in bioethics education, a textbook on
bioethics for high school students and first-year university students was prepared and used on a trial
basis in Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Central
America. In phase II of the project (fiscal 2005), the
second edition of the textbook was prepared and is
being used on a trial basis and evaluated.
In September 2005, an international conference was held on the issues
of bioethics with about 40 educators involved.
In addition to an overview of bioethics, the textbook
includes chapters on such subjects as environmental
ethics, genetics, medical ethics, reproduction, neuroscience, and social ethics.* There are also questions for
discussion. The revised and expanded second edition
includes “movie guides” discussing such films as
Frankenstein, which deals with resuscitation of the
human body, to stimulate interest in bioethics. The
English-language version was also translated into Chinese and Spanish.
Evaluation of the textbook following trial use
revealed that the way bioethics is understood depends
on diverse value systems and their social and cultural
contexts. In China, for example, it is difficult even to
discuss organ transplantation because of the belief that
one’s entire body is bequeathed by one’s parents and
that filial piety dictates that the body not be mutilated
in any way. In Vietnam, people are uncomfortable discussing the dignity of the embryo as the source of
embryonic stem cells. And in Malaysia, which is predominantly Muslim, people have little sympathy for
arguments insisting on the dignity of the embryo as a
human being, since the Koran states that the soul does
not enter the body until 128 days after conception.
These differences demonstrate the difficulty of seeking
a unified bioethics.
Toward deeper comprehensive international
understanding
Given differing social and cultural contexts, many
bioethical issues resist one-size-fits-all answers, and
deepening comprehensive understanding is far from
easy. Meanwhile, as life sciences advance, it is becoming increasingly important to raise young people’s
awareness of bioethics. Phase II of the project is due to
finish at the end of March 2006, but SPF hopes to continue to contribute to deepening comprehensive international understanding based on diverse value systems, including understanding of bioethics.
* The textbook can be downloaded from UNESCO’s Bangkok office
website: http://www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=2508.
SPF Publications
• The Russian Far East in the Asia-Pacific Region — Proceeding of the International Workshop 25–26 January
2005, Khabarovsk — Published by the Economic Research
Institute, Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of
Sciences. Outcome of the fiscal 2004–2006 project Russian Far East in the Asia-Pacific Region.
• A Guideline for Networking Cooperation among Small
Entrepreneurs in Central Europe — by Akihiro Ishikawa,
Published by the Sasakawa Central Europe Fund (Internet
on-demand publishing BookPark [www.bookpark.ne.jp/
spf/english.asp]). Outcome of the fiscal 2002–2003 project
Promotion of Small Enterprises: Sharing Experiences
between Japan and Central Europe.
• Business Cases in Uzbekistan — edited by Kee Young
Kim and Osamu Nariai. Published by SPF. Outcome of the
fiscal 2003–2005 project Business Case Development:
Enhancement of Business School Education in Uzbekistan.
From the Editor’s Desk
This issue’s special reports consist of two articles on
Sino-Japanese historical perceptions, one by a Chinese
participant in the Japan-China Young History
Researchers Conference and one by a Japanese participant. As is only to be expected, the viewpoints and
arguments of the authors differ. Both, however, agree
on the importance of creating an environment enabling
calm debate based on objective historical sources and
of showing consideration for the other side’s viewpoint.
The fact that the conference participants have engaged
in reasoned dialogue while respecting one another’s
differences and have reached the point of publishing
their findings represents a modest first step toward
advancing Sino-Japanese understanding.
Elsewhere in this issue, reports on the projects
Developing Teaching Materials on Bioethics/Phase II
and Supporting Journalism in Asia discuss the existence of differing ways of looking at things and the consequent need for promoting mutual understanding. It
is unfortunate that the international community continues to be plagued by incidents that can be seen as
indicating a “clash of civilizations.”
In the previous issue’s column, I touched on riots by
the children and grand children of immigrants that had
begun in a Paris suburb and spread to other parts of
France and on the underlying problem of ethnic discrimination. Now we are seeing confrontation and controversy over satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.
While cartoons originally published in a Danish newspaper were the starting point, the clash between media in
various European countries and Muslims in the Middle
East, Asia, and elsewhere has escalated into sometimes
violent protest. Both sides have valid points, but surely
they need to refrain from inflaming hostile feelings by
failing to reflect on prejudice against and insufficient
understanding of each other. With the advance of globalization, opportunities for contact between people with
differing backgrounds have increased dramatically. At
the same time, though, it is necessary to wisely overcome
the present situation of countries that are far from deepening mutual understanding.
Yoshihiko Kono
THE SASAKAWA PEACE FOUNDATION
The Nippon Foundation Bldg., 4th Fl., 1-2-2 Akasaka, Minato-ku,Tokyo107-8523 Japan
SPF Newsletter No. 48, FY 2005 Vol.4
• Published: March 2006 by The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
• Publisher: Akinori Seki
• Editor: Yoshihiko Kono
Tel: +81-3-6229-5400
Fax: +81-3-6229-5470
E-mail: [email protected]
URL: http://www.spf.org
©2006, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
Please note: The views and opinions expressed in this newsletter are of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the
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