PDF - Local Government NSW

Land and Environment
Court Reporter
Issue 3, 2013
IN THIS ISSUE
Summary of cases
Page 1
1.Warringah
Council v Bonanno
[2012] NSWLEC 265
Page 1
2.Revelop Projects
Pty Ltd v Parramatta
City Council [2013]
NSWLEC 1029
Page 2
3.Cardno Pty Ltd v
Campbelltown City
Council [2013] NSWLEC
1056
Page 4
4.ABD Holdings Pty
Ltd v Council of the
City of Sydney [2013]
NSWLEC 45
Page 5
5.Dansar Pty Ltd v
Byron Shire Council
[2013] NSWSC 17
Page 6
Useful links
Page 8
Definitions
Page 8
Summary of cases
This issue looks at case studies taken from
April 2013, which includes:
1.A case concerning the appropriate sentence
to be imposed for an offence of carrying out
development without consent in circumstances
where consent was required.
2.A matter about the proposed consolidation and
re-subdivision of three adjoining allotments into
two allotments, the demolition of two existing
dwellings and construction of a two storey
boarding house on one of the allotments.
Issues for the Commissioner’s consideration
were the character of the local area as well as
proposed conditions of consent requiring the
imposition of a restrictive covenant and a limit
of the boarding tariff to be charged.
3.This case was an appeal against a deemed
refusal by the Campbelltown City Council
(Council) under s 97 of Environmental
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A
Act). The development application was for the
use of an existing commercial premises as a
retail liquor outlet.
4.This matter concerned an application by the
Council for the dismissal of the modification
application made to the court, on the grounds
that it was an abuse of process.
5.A case involving a claim in negligence brought
against a council by Dansar, a property
developer. The claim was for pure economic
loss, being the developer’s disappointed
profit expectations in respect of the proposed
construction of a residential complex with 18
dwellings at Byron Bay.
The material contained in the Land and Environment Court
Reporter is of the nature of general comment only. No reader
should rely on it without seeking legal advice.
1.Warringah Council v Bonanno
[2012] NSWLEC 265
This case concerned the appropriate sentence to be
imposed for an offence of carrying out development
without consent in circumstances where consent
was required.
Background
On 2 February 2012, Mr Bonanno cleared trees and
other vegetation from a Crown Reserve managed by
Warringah Council. The reserve was on the north
Narrabeen beachfront and adjoined a residential
property owned by Mr Bonanno which he was
seeking to sell. Mr Bonanno undertook this work
without consent.
The key species that Mr Bonanno cleared were
Sydney Golden Wattle and Coastal Banksia. The
vegetation on the ecologically intact sand dune was
cut down to a height of 100mm above ground level.
Mr Bonanno entered a plea of guilty to the charge
brought under section 125(1) of the Environmental
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) and
immediately offered to pay for the cost of repairing
the damage to the area caused by the clearing of
vegetation.
The Council gave evidence that the dune vegetation
provided a habitat and protection for small marsupials,
bandicoots, possums, flying foxes and small birds as
well as providing a corridor for small mammals and
birdlife. The removal of the vegetation reduced the
available habitat and corridor and could reduce the
number of fauna.
At the time of the offence, Mr Bonanno was under
financial stress and was anxious to maximise the
presentation of the Narrabeen property he was selling.
Mr Bonanno contended that he intended to tidy up
overgrowth on the neighbouring vacant lot and went
too far. Mr Bonanno contended that much of the
cleared vegetation was either dead or devoid of foliage
and that view improvement was not his objective.
1
land & environment
court reporter
Issue 3, 2013
Mr Bonanno immediately offered to pay for
restoration works and obtained a quote from a
contractor. He also offered to pay Council’s costs,
to make a donation to a local environmental charity
and fund an advertising campaign, on condition that
the Council withdrew the prosecution.
The Council declined to accept Mr Bonanno’s
cheque or to negotiate withdrawal of the
proceedings, consistent with its view as to the
seriousness of the offence.
Submissions as to the appropriate
sentence
The Council submitted that the offence was objectively
serious as there was substantial harm to the public,
including to a priceless public asset. The Council
contended that subjective factors in favour of Mr
Bonanno were weak.
The Council submitted that the dune vegetation may
not ever fully recover and the evidence did not support
Mr Bonanno’s contention that the cleared vegetation
was in poor condition. The Council submitted that
Mr Bonanno’s actions were intentional, or at least
reckless and certainly negligent. Mr Bonanno was
in control of the work undertaken and had a financial
motive. In addition, the offence was committed on
public land and involved protected species. The
Council submitted that there was a serious need for
general deterrence in respect of offences of this type.
In addition, the Council submitted that the fact that two
people and a chainsaw were used in the offence were
aggravating factors.
Mr Bonanno submitted that he had consistently
admitted his responsibility, he had not sought to blame
those he employed, he adhered to his admissions,
he volunteered further information about the species
that he cleared, he obtained an early quote for
remediation works and offered to make additional
environmental contributions.
Consideration of section 10 order
Mr Bonanno also submitted that an order under
section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
1999 (CSP Act) should be made. Under such an
order, the Court could find Mr Bonanno guilty of the
offence, without proceeding to a conviction.
In considering whether it was appropriate to make an
order under section 10 of the CSP Act, Justice Sheahan
noted that the Court must have regard to the ‘trivial
nature of the offence’. His Honour noted that as the
offence was far beyond trivial, the Court would have to
be satisfied of relevant personal characteristics of the
defendant, extenuating circumstances or some other
matter in order to make an order under section 10.
Justice Sheahan noted with that the discretion to make
an order under section 10 should be rarely invoked in
environmental matters, and not where aversion of the
harmful event was within the power of the offender.
Accordingly, his Honour rejected Mr Bonanno’s
submission to make an order under section 10 of the
CSP Act.
Conclusion
Justice Sheahan concluded that the offence was
objectively serious with some aggravating features. As
a result, a conviction, fine and costs order were called
for. The environmental harm was substantial and was
likely never to be fully remediated. The level of harm
was foreseeable by Mr Bonanno, even if it was not
intentional or premeditated, and he ignored practical
measures to avoid it. Mr Bonanno had control of
the operation constituting the offence and he was
motivated by his need to maximise the sale price on
his property, although there was no evidence of any
resulting financial gain. Mr Bonanno was a man of
good character with no previous convictions and his
very early plea of guilty entitled him to the full 25%
discount. The Court was satisfied that he would not
reoffend, however there was no justification for the
Court to make an order under either section 10 or 11 of
the CSP Act.
Mr Bonanno was found guilty and was convicted
of the offence of carrying out development without
consent in circumstances where consent was required
by section 76A(1)(a) of the EP&A Act. He was
fined $37,500 ($50,000 fine less 25% discount) and
ordered to pay the Council’s costs and appropriate
investigation expenses.
2.Revelop Projects Pty Ltd v
Parramatta City Council [2013]
NSWLEC 1029
This case concerned the proposed consolidation and
re-subdivision of three adjoining allotments into two
allotments, the demolition of two existing dwellings
and construction of a two storey boarding house on
one of the allotments. Issues for the Commissioner’s
consideration were the character of the local area as
well as proposed conditions of consent requiring the
imposition of a restrictive covenant and a limit of the
boarding tariff to be charged.
Background
The site comprised three adjoining allotments which
each contained a single storey dwelling house
and ancillary structures. The site was zoned R2
Low Density Residential under Parramatta Local
Environmental Plan 2011 (LEP). Subdivision of land
and boarding houses were permitted with consent in
the R2 zone. Parramatta Development Control Plan
2011 (DCP) also applied to the site.
2
land & environment
court reporter
Issue 3, 2013
Despite boarding houses being permitted with consent
under the LEP, the application was lodged under
State Environmental Planning Policy (Affordable
Rental Housing) 2009 (SEPPARH). Division 3 of
SEPPARH permitted development of a boarding
house on land within the R2 zone provided that land
was in an accessible area. It was common ground
that the site was within an accessible area for the
purposes of the policy.
Development consent was sought to consolidate three
lots and then re-subdivide the area into two larger lots;
to demolish two of the existing dwelling houses and to
erect a boarding house on one of the newly created
lots. The third existing dwelling would be retained on
the other enlarged lot. The proposed boarding house
would contain 12 rooms and accommodate 18 lodgers.
The Council had notified the original application and
received a significant number of objections, including
a petition containing 645 signatures. The Council
refused the application despite it being recommended
for approval by Council officers.
The evidence
The town planning experts agreed that the plans,
which were amended following a conciliation
conference and joint conference, provided adequate
solar access to the common room. The experts also
agreed that the development complied with all of the
relevant standards contained in clauses 29 and 30
of SEPPARH and that the development should not
exceed 18 lodgers.
Controls in the DCP regarding front and side setbacks,
deep soil zone, landscaped areas and minimum
allotment size were satisfited, however the control in
the DCP for rear setback was not.
The main area of disagreement between the parties
was whether the design of the development was
compatible with the character of the local area.
The Council’s town planning expert submitted that
the local area was limited to one side of the street,
which had a consistent pattern of subdivision and
building rhythm.
The applicant’s town planning expert submitted that
the local area was the visual catchment and therefore
included both sides of the street, as well as the area
beyond which was under redevelopment.
The parties had prepared draft conditions of consent
which were agreed except for two conditions requiring
the registration of a covenant on the land to ensure
that the use of the building was for the purposes of a
boarding house only, and another condition that sought
to limit the tariffs paid by lodgers.
Consideration and findings
Commissioner Morris noted that it was common
ground that the amended plans achieved compliance
with all of the controls contained in clauses 29 and 30
of SEPPARH.
The Commissioner also noted that clause 30A of
SEPPARH (the character consideration) was a
precondition to a consent authority exercising the
power to grant consent. In considering whether the
design of the development was compatible with the
character of the local area, the Commissioner held that
the local area included both sides of the street and
that the visual catchment was the minimum area to be
considered in determining compatibility.
Commissioner Morris noted with approval the
principles set out in Project Venture Developments v
Pittwater Council [2005] NSWLEC 191 with respect to
the assessment of compatibility, and that ‘compatible’
in an urban design context means ‘capable of existing
together in harmony’ and is different from ‘sameness’.
The Commissioner indicated that ‘the most important
contributor to urban character is the relationship of
built form to surrounding space, a relationship that is
created by building height, setbacks and landscaping.
In special areas, such as conservation areas,
architectural style and materials are also contributors
to character.’
The Commissioner considered that it was important
to assess the proposed development against both
the existing and desired future character of the local
area, and was satisfied that the proposed development
addressed the essential elements of the local area,
and that the side setbacks were consistent with the
rhythm of setbacks in the street.
The Commissioner found that the proposed
development, although not meeting the rear setback
area prescribed in the DCP, still achieved the
landscape open space objectives. The Commissioner
further held that the side walls of the proposed
development did not require additional articulation.
The Commissioner concluded that the design of the
development was compatible with the character of the
local area.
The Commissioner noted that the conditions sought to
be imposed by the Council requiring the registration
of a restrictive covenant had previously been the
subject of review by the Land and Environment Court
in MacDonald v Mosman Municipal Council [1999]
NSWLEC 215. Consistent with the judgment in that
case, the Commissioner held that any change of use
of the building would require consent and therefore the
imposition of a restrictive covenant was not necessary.
It was appropriate, however, for the conditions to
specify the use of the building and its purpose as a
boarding house.
3
land & environment
court reporter
Issue 3, 2013
The proposed condition to limit the tariff charged
to lodgers was similarly held to be unnecessary.
The Commissioner held that it was a matter for the
applicant whether it exercised its ability to obtain land
tax exemptions from the Office of State Revenue by
charging lower tariffs and it was not necessary to have
a condition linking tariffs to those set by the Office of
State Revenue.
The Commissioner upheld the appeal and approved
the development application.
3.Cardno Pty Ltd v Campbelltown
City Council [2013] NSWLEC
1056
This case was an appeal against a deemed refusal by
the Campbelltown City Council (Council) under s 97
of Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
(EP&A Act). The development application was for the
use of an existing commercial premises as a retail
liquor outlet.
Issues
The focus of this decision by Commissioner O’Neill
was the appropriateness of the location for a retail
liquor outlet and the social impact on the locality.
Drawing on submissions from NSW Police, Tharawal
Aboriginal Corporation and the public, it was Council’s
contention that it was an inappropriate development
because it:
• Was likely to increase the potential for alcoholrelated incidents in the vicinity of the nearby
Campbelltown Skate Park (the skate park), which
was an alcohol free zone (AFZ) and a popular
meeting point for children and youths and would be
likely to increase the potential for secondary supply
of alcohol to minors, due to the convenience of
purchase near the skate park;
• The proposal was located close to two reserves,
which provided convenience for the illicit
consumption of alcohol and increased the potential
for alcohol-related incidents to occur at the reserves;
• The proposal was in close proximity to a number of
fast food outlets, which attracted families and youth
and there was the potential for alcohol purchased at
the proposed retail liquor outlet to be consumed on
the premises of fast food restaurants;
1 ‘The social gradient
of alcohol availability in
Victoria, Australia’ (ANZ
Journal of Public Health
2012 vol 36 no 1
• The proposal was located in close proximity to the
Ibis Budget Hotel which was used for emergency
accommodation by NSW Family and Community
Services;
• The proposal was located adjacent to the
walking route between the socio-economically
disadvantaged suburb of Claymore and Leumeah
Railway Station and a retail liquor outlet located
adjacent to the walking route would exacerbate antisocial behaviour in Claymore.
• The proposal would be harmful to those members
of the Aboriginal community with alcohol, mental
health and drug issues. Further, there was already
issues with consumption of alcohol in public by some
members of the local Aboriginal community.
The applicant disputed a number of conditions
of consent including: the extent of windows for
surveillance of the carpark and external areas; a trial
period of consent for 24 months; operating hours; plan
of management; requirement for security personnel on
Thursday, Friday and Saturdays; Requirement for a
Licensed Security Officer patrolling in the vicinity of the
proposal on any trading night.
Planning framework
Section 79C(1)(b) of the EP&A Act outlines certain
matters for consideration by a consent authority in
determining a development application including
‘the likely impacts of that development, including
environmental impacts on both the natural and built
environments, and social and economic impacts in
the locality.’
The site was zoned 4(b) - Industry B Zone, pursuant to
the Campbelltown (Urban Area) Local Environment Plan
2002 and the proposal was permissible with consent.
Adverse social impact
The experts agreed that the proposal may have an
adverse social impact on the locality, but disagreed as
to whether there was enough evidence to suggest that
that impact was unreasonable.
The Campbelltown Local Government Area was
comprised of a high proportion of disadvantaged
areas, including a medium to high crime density
‘hotspot’ for domestic violence and non-domestic
violence assaults. Commissioner O’Neill found, relying
on an article by Michael Livingston,1 that increasing
the number of liquor outlets in a disadvantaged
communities was likely to have an adverse social
impact in terms of alcohol-related harm.
Further the fact that the proposal was close to
fast food outlets, a skate park and the Ibis Budget
Hotel used for emergency accommodation was an
attractor and a popular meeting place for a significant
population of minors, youth and families.
The fast food outlets made the proposal an
inappropriate location for a retail liquor outlet, as it was
family oriented area which provide an alternative and
affordable option for eating out to licensed restaurants.
The visibility and proximity of the proposal to the
skate park made it a temptation for adults to purchase
4
land & environment
court reporter
Issue 3, 2013
alcohol and consume it in the vicinity of the skate
park and this could have the effect of jeopardising
the success of the skate park as a safe, free and
constructive place of entertainment for young people.
the building was proposed to be the public seating
area for the restaurant, and the lower level was to
include toilets, support space for the restaurant, and
commercial office space.
Finally, the Commissioner stated that the location of
a liquor outlet directly in front of a budget hotel used
for emergency accommodation by NSW Family and
Community Services for vulnerable people, who were
experiencing highly stressful circumstances, was
inappropriate.
The Class 1 proceedings before Commissioner Dixon
were an appeal against a deemed refusal by Council
of the development application under s 97(1) of the
EP&A Act.
The mitigative measures proposed by the applicant
were insufficient to adequately cure the adverse
social impact.
On this basis the Commissioner concluded that appeal
be dismissed.
4.ABD Holdings Pty Ltd v Council
of the City of Sydney [2013]
NSWLEC 45
This case concerned an application by the Council for
the dismissal of the modification application made to the
court, on the grounds that it was an abuse of process.
Issues
The Council of the City of Sydney (Council) moved
the court to dismiss the ABD Holdings Pty Ltd’s
(Applicant) proceeding on the basis that it was an
abuse of process pursuant to Rule 13.4 of the Uniform
Civil Procedure Rules 2005. Rule 13.4 states that the
court may order that proceedings be dismissed where
the proceedings are an abuse of process.
The proceedings involved a Class 1 application
filed by the Applicant, on 28 September 2012, to
modify, pursuant to s 96(8) Environmental Planning
& Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act), a development
consent granted by consent orders agreed upon
at the hearing, and made, in a s 97(1) appeal, by
Commissioner Dixon, on 14 August 2012, only 6
weeks earlier.
Section 96(8) of the EP&A Act enables the Court to
modify a consent granted.
The Council submitted that the proceedings to modify
the consent were an abuse of process on the basis that:
1.they brought the Court into disrepute;
2.there was an Ashun estoppel;
3.the proceedings are unjustifiably oppressive.
The project
The Applicant sought to convert a building on Riley
Street, Woolloomooloo, for use as a restaurant
and commercial office space. The upper level of
After an unsuccessful s 34 process and continued
negotiations, the parties agreed on consent orders
which configured the lower ground floor of the
building to include three parking spaces and a
loading bay, and much less office space than had
originally been sought.
The s 96(8) modification application sought to delete
three of the parking spaces, and reconfigured the
lower ground floor to include more commercial space.
Abuse of process
In order for an abuse of process to be demonstrated,
there must be multiple applications which are “more or
less precisely the same” (Russo v Kogarah Municipal
Council [1999] NSWCA 303). Council conceded that
“abuse of process” was an overarching principle that
could be difficult to apply in relation to planning law.
However, Council argued that it was crucial that the
Court promote confidence in the administration of justice
by ensuring the finality of litigation and avoiding the reagitation of issues that have already been determined.
The Applicant argued that there was a significant
difference in the nature of the applications made under
s 96 as compared with s 97 despite both concerning
Council’s requirement for on-site parking. Quoting on
Nikolaidis v Pittwater Council [2009] NSWLEC 227, the
Applicant argue that
to use one process after having used the other
process is not to make repeated applications; they are
different applications and appeals. There is no express
statutory limitation on being able to use one process
after having used the other process.
Council’s submissions
Council argued that the Applicant had the opportunity
to present the evidence in the earlier proceedings
on the issue of parking and that the issues which
were the subject of this litigation were a re-agitation
of the same issued raised by Council in the previous
proceedings. Allowing this litigation to proceed would,
argued Council, be an abuse of the Court’s processes,
be unfairly oppressive and as such, bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.
Council also argued that the Applicant was required
to bring forward all material in one proceeding and not
raise new material in subsequent proceedings even if
the matter was not essentially determined.
5
land & environment
court reporter
Issue 3, 2013
Applicant’s submissions
Background
The Applicant conceded that it could be said to have
accepted the only development consent proffered
by Council rather than fighting the parking issue,
however, this was no bar to the Applicant later
seeking to modify that outcome by commencing a
different type of proceeding.
Dansar’s original development application was lodged
on 6 February 2001 and sought consent for the
construction of 18 two-bedroom, two-storey dwellings
with associated car parking spaces, landscaping and a
swimming pool.
The Applicant argued it had followed the process
anticipated under s 96(8).
Consideration
Justice Sheahan held that it was not fair to assert
that either the Council or the court imposed a parking
condition which would ruin the viability of the project.
On this basis, Sheahan J held that to revisit the
parking issue in a s 96(8) process did not offend the
principles of finality to litigation, and there was nothing
to indicate that the applicant’s resort to that process
was not “proper”.
It was also found that the proceeding were not
“oppressive to the Council”, given Council’s very firm
stand on on-site parking in the original DA assessment
and the appeal proceedings.
Based on the above, there was no grounds for making
a finding of abuse of process. However, Sheahan J
noted that this decision in relation to the question of
abuse of process in no way considered the merits of
the matter when it came to a hearing
Council’s notice of motion was dismissed.
5.Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire
Council [2013] NSWSC 17
This case concerned a claim in negligence brought
against a local council by Dansar, a property
developer. The claim was for pure economic loss,
being the developer’s disappointed profit expectations
in respect of the proposed construction of a residential
complex with 18 dwellings at Byron Bay.
One of the planning issues raised by the
development application was a question as to the
extent of Byron Shire’s spare sewage treatment
capacity. Dansar Pty Ltd, asserted that the
Byron Bay Shire Council (Council) negligently
underestimated the degree of spare sewage
treatment capacity in Byron Shire and overestimated
the extent to which such capacity was already
allocated to existing properties or other approved
developments. This resulted in the Council denying
the existence of spare capacity sufficient to meet the
requirements of Dansar’s proposal.
Development consent could not be grated unless the
Council was satisfied that the application complied
with clause 45(1) of the Byron Local Environment Plan
1988 (LEP) which required Council to be satisfied that
prior adequate arrangements have been made for the
provision of sewerage, drainage and water services.
The Council had ongoing issues with sewerage flows
and in 1997 had breached the standards imposed
by the Environment Protection Agency. However,
in 2000, after having completed works to increase
the capacity of its plants, the Council passed a
resolution acknowledging spare capacity, opening the
opportunity for developers to lodge applications for
new development.
Dansar’s application came before Council on 14 August
2001, however, the Council’s development engineer had
a series of concerns about the application (unrelated
to sewerage) and recommended a determination be
deferred for two months. Following this determination to
defer, Dansar appealed to the Land and Environment
Court on the basis of a deemed refusal.
Despite lodging amended plans, on 18 December
2001 the Council refused the application for a variety
of reasons beyond simply the sewerage issue. In
October 2002, following the dismissal of Dansar’s
appeal against the Council’s deemed refusal, Dansar
lodged a new development application. The application
was ultimately approved.
Claim of duty of care
The circumstances surrounding the Council’s
assessment in 2000 that there was existing spare
capacity at its sewerage plant and the manner of
allocation of that capacity were relied upon by Dansar
to support the existence of a duty of care. Dansar
argued that the Council had a duty:
1.to give proper consideration to the development
application;
2.to give proper consideration, at the time it came
to determine the development application, as
to whether sufficient sewerage capacity existed
at the sewage treatment plant to accommodate
the development proposals constituted by the
application.
Dansar also argued that proximity vulnerability,
foreseeability and the Council’s constructive
knowledge of the alleged actual spare sewerage
treatment capacity, all pointed to the existence of
a duty of care. Dansar argued that it should be
6
land & environment
court reporter
Issue 3, 2013
able to claim for damages in respect of the losses
it sustained due to Council’s failure to allocate
sewerage treatment capacity.
Consideration and findings
Justice McCallum considered the discrepancy between
the duty of care asserted by Dansar and Council’s
statutory function which includes considerations of
public health and environmental impact,. It was held
that to assert the existence of a private right in these
circumstances would impede the exercise of the
Council’s function.
Further, using the ‘salient features’ test put forward by
Allsop P in Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar
[2009] NSWCA 258, produced the same result in
favour of the Council. This test required the Court to
analyse the relationship between the developer and
council by examining a number of features of the
relationship including foreseeability of harm and the
degree of vulnerability of the developer, in order to
determine whether a legal duty of care arose.
While the type of harm claimed by Dansar was
foreseeable, it was inherent in the nature of the
process due to the considerations that Council must
take into account when assessing new proposals.
The nature of the harm alleged by Dansar was
for delayed receipt of development profits and the
expenses and holding costs incurred during the delay,
however it was held by McCallum J that there was
no reliance, no assumption of responsibility and no
vulnerability in the relevant sense.
Dansar claimed that Council had a high degree of
control (able to be exercised to avoid harm to Dansar)
in considering whether there was spare sewerage
treatment capacity in that Council had total and
exclusive control over the calculation of spare capacity.
Her Honour disagreed with this argument on two
grounds:
1.it focuses on the financial interests of developers as
if they were the only interest required to be served in
the exercise of the Council’s functions
2.it treats sewage capacity as if it were a fixed and
measureable resource which Council had an
obligation to allocate exhaustively without taking into
account the complexity of the sewage issue.
While the Council had a degree of control in respect of
the sewage allocation process, it could not control the
sewage.
On the question of vulnerability, McCallam J held
that Dansar had not specifically relied on any
positive representation made by Council and was
not vulnerable in the relevant sense. Further, the
recognition of a duty of care to protect an individual
against such vulnerability would skew the balance
of competing interest sought to be achieved by the
statutory regime of regulation and management.
Justice McCallam concluded that the Council did not
owe a duty of care to Dansar and failing this first limb,
did not consider the question of breach or causation.
7
land & environment
court reporter
Issue 3, 2013
Useful links
Definitions
Local government, planning, environment and
related law: http://localgovnet.maddocks.com.au
Subpoena - a document by which a court compels a
person to attend a court to give evidence or to produce
documents within that person’s possession.
Land and Environment Court website:
www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lec
Australasian Legal Information Institute:
www.austlii.edu.au
Commonwealth Development Assessment Forum:
www.daf.gov.au
NSW Attorney General’s Department - Land and
Environment Court: www.agd.nsw.gov.au/lec
Case Law NSW: www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au
Environment Australia, Environmental Protection
Biodiversity Conservation Act: www.ea.gov.au/epbc
Environment Protection Biodiversity Conservation
Act - subscription to EPBCA group:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/epbc-info/
Environment and Planning Law Association NSW:
www.epla.org.au
Development and Environmental Professionals
Association: www.depa.net.au
Urban Development Institute of Australia:
www.udia.com.au
Property Council: www.propertyoz.com.au
Housing Industry Association: www.hia.com.au
Planning NSW: www.planning.nsw.gov.au
Environment Australia: www.erin.gov.au
Environmental Protection Authority (NSW):
www.epa.nsw.gov.au
EDONet: www.edo.org.au
NSW Agriculture: www.agric.nsw.gov.au
NSW National Park and Wildlife Service:
www.nationalparks.nsw.gov.au
Planning Institute of Australia:
www.planning.org.au
State heritage significance - in relation to a place,
building, work, relic, moveable object or precinct
means significance to the State in relation to the
historical, scientific, cultural, social, archeological,
architectural, natural or aesthetic value of the item.
Local heritage significance - in relation to a place,
building, work, relic, moveable object or precinct
means significance to an area in relation to the
historical, scientific, cultural, social, archeological,
architectural, natural or aesthetic value of the item.
Existing use rights - rights under Planning Legislation
to continue previously lawful activities on land which
would no longer be permitted following the introduction
of changes to environmental planning instruments.
Procedural fairness - this term is interchangeable
with “natural justice” and is a common law principle
implied in relation to statutory and prerogative
powers to ensure the fairness of the decision making
procedure of courts and administrators.
Development means:
(a) the use of land, and
(b) the subdivision of land, and
(c) the erection of a building, and
(d) the carrying out of a work, and
(e) the demolition of a building or work, and
(f) a
ny other act, matter or thing referred to in section
26 that is controlled by an environmental planning
instrument, but does not include any development
of a class or description prescribed by the
regulations for the purposes of this definition.
Development Application means an application for
consent under Part 4 of the EP&A Act to carry out
development but does not include an application for a
complying development certificate.
Free email subscription:
Subscribe to receive the Land and Environment Court Reporter
directly by email on the Local Government NSW website:
lgnsw.org.au/subscribe
Maddocks
www.maddocks.com.au
LGNSW welcome any feedback or suggestions relating to future editions
of the Land & Environment Court Reporter by email to LGNSW’s Legal
Officer, Frank Loveridge at [email protected]
8